Neoliberalism K—UMich 2013
NEG
1NCs
1NC: Generic
American engagement in Latin America threatens progressive political action and reentrenches neoliberalism
Renique Associate Professor in the Department of History at the City College of the City University of New York 10-- ( Gerardo, “Latin
America today: The revolt against neoliberalism”, Socialism and Democracy, 19:3, 9/20/10,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08854300500284561#.UcnZQvnVCSo)//AS
In opposition to this agenda,
the new subaltern movements offer a politics of hope, which is the focus of this special issue
Latin America’s anti-systemic rebellions and social movements
becomes all the more imperative as the US hastily regroups forces to restore the neoliberal order,
which has been under attack since the early 1990s. The recent visit of Condoleezza Rice to Latin America, the White
House’s aggressive campaign to force the approval of CAFTA (Central American Free Trade Agreement), Bush’s threats
to interfere with the transmissions of Telesur (the news and TV network established between Venezuela, Cuba, Argentina, and Uruguay), and,
more ominous, the expansion of Washington’s geostrategic reach with the Paraguayan government’s recent
authorization of a military base in the Triple Border region with Brazil and Argentina, are telling expressions of the US effort to
reassert its imperial presence and to restore the confidence of its chastised local elites. The neoliberal offensive had its
of Socialism and Democracy. Analysis of
foundational moment in that other September 11, in 1973, when General Augusto Pinochet, with the support of the United States, led a
bloodycoupd’e´tat against the government of Salvador Allende – the first elected Marxist president in Latin America. For the most reactionary
sectors of global ruling elites, the establishment of the Pinochet regime offered an unsurpassed opportunity to voice openly and aggressively an
ultra-liberalism which had previously been constrained both by Keynesian strictures of the welfare state and by political compromise with
social-democratic forces and organized labor. The Chilean junta’s free market policies, uncompromising anti-communist discourse, and hostility
toward any state welfare functions, galvanized an ideological and political offensive, guided by economist Milton Friedman and his “Chicago
Boys,” against the regulatory and social policies that they viewed as fetters to the “invisible hand” of the market. Today their multinational
cadre of followers educated in mainly US universities hold key executive posts both in multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the
IMF, and in Latin American central banks and ministries of economy and finance. Not only did Pinochet enjoy the personal admiration of Henry
Kissinger, Margaret Thatcher, and their ilk, but any of his measures, such as the privatization of social security, were swiftly incorporated into
the emerging neoliberal orthodoxy. Operacio´nCo´ndor
– a secret multinational effort aimed at eliminating leftwing and popular opposition – marked the beginnings of a regional reactionary offensive that had managed,
by the 1980s, to defeat other leftwing and popular movements and to largely isolate the Cuban regime
Neoliberalism causes poverty, social exclusion, societal disintegration, violence and
environmental destruction—threatens humanity
De La Barra, Chilean political activist, international consultant and former UNICEF Latin America Public Policy Advisor 07-- (Ximena,
“THE DUAL DEBT OF NEOLIBERALISM”, Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Social Struggles in Latin America”, 9/1/09, edited by Dello Bueno and
Lara, Brill Online)//AS
The currently prevailing neoliberal development model has brought with it various technological advances and
economic and commercial growth. However, these results ultimately benefit fewer and fewer people
while augmenting social inequality, injustices, and promoting serious social and ethical setbacks . It is
definitely not eradicating poverty On the contrary, it creates conditions for a growing tendency towards
political,economic and social exclusion for the majority of the world’s population.The model
exacerbates poverty, social disparities, ecological degradation,violence and social disintegration. Loss
of governability flows from its systematic logic of emphasising an ever cheaper labour force, the
reduction ofsocial benefits, the disarticulation and destruction of labourorganisations,and the
elimination of labour and ecological regulation (de la Barra 1997). Inthis way, it consolidates a kind of
cannibalism known as social dumping thatseeks to lower costs below the value of social reproduction
rather than organising a process of progressive social accumulation. For most of Latin Americaand the Caribbean,
the present minimum wage levels only allow for a portionof the basic consumption package needed by working people (Bossio 2002).At
present, the global income gap between the 10% poorest portion of theworld’s population and the wealthiest 10% has grown to be 1 to 103
(UNDP2005). According to this same source, around 2.5 billion people, almost halfof humanity, lives on less than US$ 2. per day (considered the
poverty level),while 1.2 billion of these people live on less than US$ 1. per day (consideredthe level of extreme poverty).Given its neoliberal
character,
globalisation failed to produce the benefitsthat were touted. Indeed, the process has greatly
harmed the most vulnerable social sectors produced by the previous phase of capitalist
development.The lack of social and ethical objectives in the current globalisation processhas resulted in benefits only in those countries
where a robust physical andhuman infrastructure exists, where redistributive social policies are the norm,and where fair access to markets and
strong regulatory entities are in place.Where such conditions do not exist, globalisation
has led to stagnation
andmarginalisation, with declining health and educational levels of its children,especially among the
poor. Some regions, including Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Sub-Saharan Africa, and more recently, Latin America andthe
Caribbean, as well as some countries within regions and some personswithin countries (poor children and adolescents, rural inhabitants and
urbanslum dwellers, indigenous peoples, children of illiterate women, illegal immigrants, etc.) have remained mostly excluded (UNICEF 2001).
Neoliberalism is creating its own downfall—movements gathering political steam
against it—alt is to reject the neoliberal policies of the aff and allow it to fall
Lafer, political economist and is an Associate Professor at the University of Oregon's Labor Education and Research Center 04 (Gordon,
“Neoliberalism by other means: the “war on terror” at home and abroad”, New Political Science 26:3, 2004, Taylor and Francis)//AS
Finally, the
“global justice” movement that came together in the Seattle 1999 protests against the WTO
marked the potential birth of a massive and powerful new movement challenging corporate
prerogatives. It is easy to overestimate the importance of the Seattle protests.The few days of unity did not undo the many differences
between the various protest groups. And the months following Seattle were filled with “where do we go from here?” discussions that never
achieved a satisfactory answer. It is
not clear that the coalition that assembled in Seattle deserves to be called a
“movement.” However, even as a first step with an uncertain future, the import of these protests was
potentially earth-shaking. Essentially, the anti-WTO protests undid fissures that had fractured progressive
organizations for at least four decades. At least since the Vietnam war, the history of whatever might be called the American
“left” has been primarily characterized by fragmentation. In place of the Old Left’s unity around class, the New Left led to multiple and often
conflicting agendas organized around various forms of identity politics. While feminist, civil rights and labor organizations might come together
around specific political issues, the alliances were generally short-lived and superficial. Most important from an economic point of view, the
labor movement throughout the 1970s and 1980s was largely alienated from the most energetic social change movements. The incredible
accomplishment of Seattle was to forge a coalition that overcame these differences in opposition to a
common enemy. For union members, Seattle was possible because 20 years of jobs going overseas and management invoking the threat
to relocate as a strategy for slashing wages had made “globalization” a gut-level rank and file issue. Thus the process of
neoliberalism finally created its own antithesis in a labor movement that was ready to join with
youth, environmentalists and immigrant organizations in fighting the power. From a corporate viewpoint, the
divisions that for 30 years had so effectively kept the various parts of the “left” from coming together were threatening to dissolve.
1NC: Venezuela
US Intervention in Venezuela is marked by self-interest and neoliberal imposition
Clement, Visiting Assistant Professor of Politics at Pomona, 05 (Christopher, “Confronting Hugo Chávez: United States "Democracy
Promotion" in Latin America”, Latin American Perspectives 32:3, 5/05, JSTOR)//AS
I offer a markedly different critique of U.S.
democracy promotion. Indeed, the policy is premised on the ideological
assumption that democratic governance optimizes global capitalism and international stability , but
the above argument pays little attention to the narrow and orthodox intellectual forces that underpin
the practice of democracy promotion. The preoccupation with party building and the "semi-authoritarian"• tag used in
Venezuela and elsewhere demonstrates a growing awareness that political liberalization does not
necessarily result in populations or regimes that readily fall in line with free-market principles or U.S.-defined
global security priorities. Experimentation and departures from the authorized model of political liberalization are frequently identified as
threats to democratic consolidation. Hugo Chavez's trenchant critique of party politics in Venezuela and his sweeping political reforms run
counter to the conventional written narratives of democratization. Moreover,
idealism has not been the sole (or even the
principal) impulse behind the practice of democracy promotion. Contrary to the assertions of Zakaria and other critics,
U.S. foreign policy has not promoted democracy simply because it is moral. The practice is deployed
primarily when U.S. interests can be secured by using a targeted country's electoral system (or other constitutional
mechanisms) to accomplish regime change. Further- more, while these interventions may not be driven by morality, they are
associated with moral rhetoric that casts the intransigent leaders (even elected ones) as dubious political
actors with undemocratic intentions. The statements of several members of the Bush administration make clear that
Washington considers tensions with Venezuela the result of a government in Cara- cas that lacks an "understanding of what a democratic
system is all about."• Other official statements and the NED's grant descriptions also suggest that a victory by Chavez's U.S.-backed opponents
will not only "return"• the coun~ try to democracy but also repair Venezuela's "close friendship"• with the United States.
Neoliberalism causes poverty, social exclusion, societal disintegration, violence and
environmental destruction—threatens humanity
De La Barra, Chilean political activist, international consultant and former UNICEF Latin America Public Policy Advisor 07-- (Ximena,
“THE DUAL DEBT OF NEOLIBERALISM”, Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Social Struggles in Latin America”, 9/1/09, edited by Dello Bueno and
Lara, Brill Online)//AS
The currently prevailing neoliberal development model has brought with it various technological advances and
economic and commercial growth. However, these results ultimately benefit fewer and fewer people
while augmenting social inequality, injustices, and promoting serious social and ethical setbacks . It is
definitely not eradicating poverty On the contrary, it creates conditions for a growing tendency towards
political,economic and social exclusion for the majority of the world’s population.The model
exacerbates poverty, social disparities, ecological degradation,violence and social disintegration. Loss
of governability flows from its systematic logic of emphasising an ever cheaper labour force, the
reduction ofsocial benefits, the disarticulation and destruction of labourorganisations,and the
elimination of labour and ecological regulation (de la Barra 1997). Inthis way, it consolidates a kind of
cannibalism known as social dumping thatseeks to lower costs below the value of social reproduction
rather than organising a process of progressive social accumulation. For most of Latin Americaand the Caribbean,
the present minimum wage levels only allow for a portionof the basic consumption package needed by working people (Bossio 2002).At
present, the global income gap between the 10% poorest portion of theworld’s population and the wealthiest 10% has grown to be 1 to 103
(UNDP2005). According to this same source, around 2.5 billion people, almost halfof humanity, lives on less than US$ 2. per day (considered the
poverty level),while 1.2 billion of these people live on less than US$ 1. per day (consideredthe level of extreme poverty).Given its neoliberal
character,
globalisation failed to produce the benefitsthat were touted. Indeed, the process has greatly
harmed the most vulnerable social sectors produced by the previous phase of capitalist
development.The lack of social and ethical objectives in the current globalisation processhas resulted in benefits only in those countries
where a robust physical andhuman infrastructure exists, where redistributive social policies are the norm,and where fair access to markets and
strong regulatory entities are in place.Where such conditions do not exist, globalisation
has led to stagnation
andmarginalisation, with declining health and educational levels of its children,especially among the
poor. Some regions, including Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Sub-Saharan Africa, and more recently, Latin America andthe
Caribbean, as well as some countries within regions and some personswithin countries (poor children and adolescents, rural inhabitants and
urbanslum dwellers, indigenous peoples, children of illiterate women, illegal immigrants, etc.) have remained mostly excluded (UNICEF 2001).
Neoliberalism is creating its own downfall—movements gathering political steam
against it—alt is to reject the neoliberal policies of the aff and allow it to fall
Lafer, political economist and is an Associate Professor at the University of Oregon's Labor Education and Research Center 04 (Gordon,
“Neoliberalism by other means: the “war on terror” at home and abroad”, New Political Science 26:3, 2004, Taylor and Francis)//AS
Finally, the
“global justice” movement that came together in the Seattle 1999 protests against the WTO
marked the potential birth of a massive and powerful new movement challenging corporate
prerogatives. It is easy to overestimate the importance of the Seattle protests.The few days of unity did not undo the many differences
between the various protest groups. And the months following Seattle were filled with “where do we go from here?” discussions that never
achieved a satisfactory answer. It is
not clear that the coalition that assembled in Seattle deserves to be called a
“movement.” However, even as a first step with an uncertain future, the import of these protests was
potentially earth-shaking. Essentially, the anti-WTO protests undid fissures that had fractured progressive
organizations for at least four decades. At least since the Vietnam war, the history of whatever might be called the American
“left” has been primarily characterized by fragmentation. In place of the Old Left’s unity around class, the New Left led to multiple and often
conflicting agendas organized around various forms of identity politics. While feminist, civil rights and labor organizations might come together
around specific political issues, the alliances were generally short-lived and superficial. Most important from an economic point of view, the
labor movement throughout the 1970s and 1980s was largely alienated from the most energetic social change movements. The incredible
accomplishment of Seattle was to forge a coalition that overcame these differences in opposition to a
common enemy. For union members, Seattle was possible because 20 years of jobs going overseas and management invoking the threat
to relocate as a strategy for slashing wages had made “globalization” a gut-level rank and file issue. Thus the process of
neoliberalism finally created its own antithesis in a labor movement that was ready to join with
youth, environmentalists and immigrant organizations in fighting the power. From a corporate viewpoint, the
divisions that for 30 years had so effectively kept the various parts of the “left” from coming together were threatening to dissolve.
1NC: Mexico
US economic involvement in Mexico is profit-driven and hurts the Mexican people and
economy
Cooney, environmental and economic research at the Center for the Biology of Natural Systems, Queens College, City University of New
York, 01 (Paul, “The Mexican Crisis and the Maquiladora Boom A Paradox of Development or the Logic of Neoliberalism?”, Latin American
Perspectives 28:55, 2001, Sage Publications)//AS
Supporters of the maquiladora industry argue that transnational corpora- tion expansion is beneficial
and will continue to be so, providing more employment for Mexican workers and increasing Mexico's
competitiveness in the global economy. However, the fundamental problem is that, despite improvement in its
export position, Mexico is not in control of the wealth generated within the country. The question remains,
therefore, whether maquiladora development can be counted on to provide growth in the long run. If, for
example, maquiladora workers were to demand higher wages (perhaps something closer to a quarter of their U.S.
counterparts) or insist that health and safety standards be enforced or request that working overtime be optional, it is probable that
the capital accumulated by many of these trans- national corporations would continue its circuit
elsewhere. In other words, although surplus-value is generated in Mexico, it can relocate at the time of reinvestment if the conditions for
capital do not remain sufficiently propi- tious. This is not mere conjecture about a worst-case scenario; we need only consider what took place
when maquiladora workers started to demand higher wages and become more organized in the mid- 19705: there was a sig- nificant cutback of
investment by the transnational corporations operating in the northern border region (see Pena, 1997)
Neoliberalism causes poverty, social exclusion, societal disintegration, violence and
environmental destruction—threatens humanity
De La Barra, Chilean political activist, international consultant and former UNICEF Latin America Public Policy Advisor 07-- (Ximena,
“THE DUAL DEBT OF NEOLIBERALISM”, Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Social Struggles in Latin America”, 9/1/09, edited by Dello Bueno and
Lara, Brill Online)//AS
The currently prevailing neoliberal development model has brought with it various technological advances and
economic and commercial growth. However, these results ultimately benefit fewer and fewer people
while augmenting social inequality, injustices, and promoting serious social and ethical setbacks . It is
definitely not eradicating poverty On the contrary, it creates conditions for a growing tendency towards
political,economic and social exclusion for the majority of the world’s population.The model
exacerbates poverty, social disparities, ecological degradation,violence and social disintegration. Loss
of governability flows from its systematic logic of emphasising an ever cheaper labour force, the
reduction ofsocial benefits, the disarticulation and destruction of labourorganisations,and the
elimination of labour and ecological regulation (de la Barra 1997). Inthis way, it consolidates a kind of
cannibalism known as social dumping thatseeks to lower costs below the value of social reproduction
rather than organising a process of progressive social accumulation. For most of Latin Americaand the Caribbean,
the present minimum wage levels only allow for a portionof the basic consumption package needed by working people (Bossio 2002).At
present, the global income gap between the 10% poorest portion of theworld’s population and the wealthiest 10% has grown to be 1 to 103
(UNDP2005). According to this same source, around 2.5 billion people, almost halfof humanity, lives on less than US$ 2. per day (considered the
poverty level),while 1.2 billion of these people live on less than US$ 1. per day (consideredthe level of extreme poverty).Given its neoliberal
character,
globalisation failed to produce the benefitsthat were touted. Indeed, the process has greatly
harmed the most vulnerable social sectors produced by the previous phase of capitalist
development.The lack of social and ethical objectives in the current globalisation processhas resulted in benefits only in those countries
where a robust physical andhuman infrastructure exists, where redistributive social policies are the norm,and where fair access to markets and
strong regulatory entities are in place.Where such conditions do not exist, globalisation
has led to stagnation
andmarginalisation, with declining health and educational levels of its children,especially among the
poor. Some regions, including Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Sub-Saharan Africa, and more recently, Latin America andthe
Caribbean, as well as some countries within regions and some personswithin countries (poor children and adolescents, rural inhabitants and
urbanslum dwellers, indigenous peoples, children of illiterate women, illegal immigrants, etc.) have remained mostly excluded (UNICEF 2001).
Neoliberalism is creating its own downfall—movements gathering political steam
against it—alt is to reject the neoliberal policies of the aff and allow it to fall
Lafer, political economist and is an Associate Professor at the University of Oregon's Labor Education and Research Center 04 (Gordon,
“Neoliberalism by other means: the “war on terror” at home and abroad”, New Political Science 26:3, 2004, Taylor and Francis)//AS
Finally, the
“global justice” movement that came together in the Seattle 1999 protests against the WTO
marked the potential birth of a massive and powerful new movement challenging corporate
prerogatives. It is easy to overestimate the importance of the Seattle protests.The few days of unity did not undo the many differences
between the various protest groups. And the months following Seattle were filled with “where do we go from here?” discussions that never
achieved a satisfactory answer. It is
not clear that the coalition that assembled in Seattle deserves to be called a
“movement.” However, even as a first step with an uncertain future, the import of these protests was
potentially earth-shaking. Essentially, the anti-WTO protests undid fissures that had fractured progressive
organizations for at least four decades. At least since the Vietnam war, the history of whatever might be called the American
“left” has been primarily characterized by fragmentation. In place of the Old Left’s unity around class, the New Left led to multiple and often
conflicting agendas organized around various forms of identity politics. While feminist, civil rights and labor organizations might come together
around specific political issues, the alliances were generally short-lived and superficial. Most important from an economic point of view, the
labor movement throughout the 1970s and 1980s was largely alienated from the most energetic social change movements. The incredible
accomplishment of Seattle was to forge a coalition that overcame these differences in opposition to a
common enemy. For union members, Seattle was possible because 20 years of jobs going overseas and management invoking the threat
to relocate as a strategy for slashing wages had made “globalization” a gut-level rank and file issue. Thus the process of
neoliberalism finally created its own antithesis in a labor movement that was ready to join with
youth, environmentalists and immigrant organizations in fighting the power. From a corporate viewpoint, the
divisions that for 30 years had so effectively kept the various parts of the “left” from coming together were threatening to dissolve.
1NC: Cuba
US fails to understand oppressive impacts of capitalism on Cuban society
LaFeber, Marie Underhill Noll Professor Emeritus of History and a Stephen H. Weiss Presidential Fellow in the Department of
History at Cornell University, one of the United States' most distinguished historians 93 -- (Walter, “Inevitable Revolutions: The United
States in Central America”, 1/17/93, http://books.google.com/books/about/Inevitable_Revolutions.html?id=RqMp5TsWCqkC)//AS
The need of Cubans and Central Americans to find different means for achieving their version of a just
society arose in large part from their long experience with North American capitalism. This capitalism has had a
Jekyll and Hyde personality. U.S. citizens see it as having given them the highest standard of living and most open society in the world. Many
Central Americans have increasingly associated capitalism with a brutal oligarchy-military complex that
has been supported by U.S. poli- cies-and armies. Capitalism, as they see it, has too often threatened the
survival of many for the sake of freedom for a few. For example, Latin Americans bitterly observed that when the
state moved its people for the sake of national policy (as in Cuba or Nicaragua),the United States condemned
it as smacking of Communist tyranny. lf, however, an oli- garchy forced hundreds of peasants off their
land for the sake of his own profit, the United States accepted it as simply the way of the real world?
Neoliberalism causes poverty, social exclusion, societal disintegration, violence and
environmental destruction—threatens humanity
De La Barra, Chilean political activist, international consultant and former UNICEF Latin America Public Policy Advisor 07-- (Ximena,
“THE DUAL DEBT OF NEOLIBERALISM”, Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Social Struggles in Latin America”, 9/1/09, edited by Dello Bueno and
Lara, Brill Online)//AS
The currently prevailing neoliberal development model has brought with it various technological advances and
economic and commercial growth. However, these results ultimately benefit fewer and fewer people
while augmenting social inequality, injustices, and promoting serious social and ethical setbacks . It is
definitely not eradicating poverty On the contrary, it creates conditions for a growing tendency towards
political,economic and social exclusion for the majority of the world’s population.The model
exacerbates poverty, social disparities, ecological degradation,violence and social disintegration. Loss
of governability flows from its systematic logic of emphasising an ever cheaper labour force, the
reduction ofsocial benefits, the disarticulation and destruction of labourorganisations,and the
elimination of labour and ecological regulation (de la Barra 1997). Inthis way, it consolidates a kind of
cannibalism known as social dumping thatseeks to lower costs below the value of social reproduction
rather than organising a process of progressive social accumulation. For most of Latin Americaand the Caribbean,
the present minimum wage levels only allow for a portionof the basic consumption package needed by working people (Bossio 2002).At
present, the global income gap between the 10% poorest portion of theworld’s population and the wealthiest 10% has grown to be 1 to 103
(UNDP2005). According to this same source, around 2.5 billion people, almost halfof humanity, lives on less than US$ 2. per day (considered the
poverty level),while 1.2 billion of these people live on less than US$ 1. per day (consideredthe level of extreme poverty).Given its neoliberal
character,
globalisation failed to produce the benefitsthat were touted. Indeed, the process has greatly
harmed the most vulnerable social sectors produced by the previous phase of capitalist
development.The lack of social and ethical objectives in the current globalisation processhas resulted in benefits only in those countries
where a robust physical andhuman infrastructure exists, where redistributive social policies are the norm,and where fair access to markets and
strong regulatory entities are in place.Where such conditions do not exist, globalisation
has led to stagnation
andmarginalisation, with declining health and educational levels of its children,especially among the
poor. Some regions, including Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Sub-Saharan Africa, and more recently, Latin America andthe
Caribbean, as well as some countries within regions and some personswithin countries (poor children and adolescents, rural inhabitants and
urbanslum dwellers, indigenous peoples, children of illiterate women, illegal immigrants, etc.) have remained mostly excluded (UNICEF 2001).
Neoliberalism is creating its own downfall—movements gathering political steam
against it—alt is to reject the neoliberal policies of the aff and allow it to fall
Lafer, political economist and is an Associate Professor at the University of Oregon's Labor Education and Research Center 04 (Gordon,
“Neoliberalism by other means: the “war on terror” at home and abroad”, New Political Science 26:3, 2004, Taylor and Francis)//AS
Finally, the
“global justice” movement that came together in the Seattle 1999 protests against the WTO
marked the potential birth of a massive and powerful new movement challenging corporate
prerogatives. It is easy to overestimate the importance of the Seattle protests.The few days of unity did not undo the many differences
between the various protest groups. And the months following Seattle were filled with “where do we go from here?” discussions that never
achieved a satisfactory answer. It is
not clear that the coalition that assembled in Seattle deserves to be called a
“movement.” However, even as a first step with an uncertain future, the import of these protests was
potentially earth-shaking. Essentially, the anti-WTO protests undid fissures that had fractured progressive
organizations for at least four decades. At least since the Vietnam war, the history of whatever might be called the American
“left” has been primarily characterized by fragmentation. In place of the Old Left’s unity around class, the New Left led to multiple and often
conflicting agendas organized around various forms of identity politics. While feminist, civil rights and labor organizations might come together
around specific political issues, the alliances were generally short-lived and superficial. Most important from an economic point of view, the
labor movement throughout the 1970s and 1980s was largely alienated from the most energetic social change movements. The incredible
accomplishment of Seattle was to forge a coalition that overcame these differences in opposition to a
common enemy. For union members, Seattle was possible because 20 years of jobs going overseas and management invoking the threat
to relocate as a strategy for slashing wages had made “globalization” a gut-level rank and file issue. Thus the process of
neoliberalism finally created its own antithesis in a labor movement that was ready to join with
youth, environmentalists and immigrant organizations in fighting the power. From a corporate viewpoint, the
divisions that for 30 years had so effectively kept the various parts of the “left” from coming together were threatening to dissolve.
1NC: Policy Version
American economic engagement strategies are distinctly neoliberal and subscribe to
exceptionalist theories
Gill, Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science at York University, 95 (Stephen, “Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and
Disciplinary Neoliberalism”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 24:3, 1995, Sage Publications)//AS
North American arrangements are more hierarchical and asymmetrical,understood both in inter-state terms and in
terms of the class structures of eachnation. NAFTA is premised upon a low level of political institutionalisation
anda hub-and-spoke configuration of power, with the United States at the centre ofa continentalised
political economy. This is even more the case with theCaribbean Basin Initiative, which can be terminated unilaterally by the
UnitedStates." The United States has negotiated the implicit right to monitor andcontrol large areas of Canadian political life in the US-Canada
Free TradeAgreement. The US-Canada Agreement specifies that each side has to notify the other "˜party' by advanced warning, of intended
federal or provincial government policy that might affect the other side's interests, as defined by the agreements Because of Canada's extensive
economic integration with the United States, this situation necessarily affects the vast majority of Canadian economic activity, but not vice
versa. Thus, Canadian governments no longer can contemplate an independent or interventionist economic strategy. In
both NAFTA
and the US-Canada Agreement there are no transnational citizenship rights other than those accorded
to capital, and these are defined to favour US-registered companies. Finally, NAFTA can only be amended by
agreement of all signatories. Whilst these arrangements place binding constraints on the policies of Canada and Mexico, to a certain degree,
the United States retains constitutional autonomy and important prerogatives: its trade law is
allowed to override treaty provisions, notwithstanding the rights of redress that are available to participants through the
dispute settlement mechanisms." In other words, the US government is using access to its vast market as a lever of
power, linked to a reshaping of the international business climate, by subjecting other nations to the
disciplines of the new constitutionalism, whilst largely refusing to submit to them itself, partly for strategic
reasons. Indeed, one of the arguments expressed by former European Union President Jacques Delors in favour of comprehensive West
European economic and monetary union was strategic: to offset economic unilateralism from the United States, in matters of money and trade.
Thus, an
American-centred global neoliberalism _mandates a separation of politics and economics in
ways that may narrow political representation and constrain democratic social choice in many parts of the
world. New constitutionalism, which rarities this separation, may have become the de facto discourse of governance for most of the global
political economy. This discourse involves a hierarchy of pressures and constraints on government autonomy that vary according to the size,
economic strength, form of state and civil society, and prevailing national and regional institutional capabilities, as well as the degree of
integration into global capital and money markets.
Neoliberalism causes poverty, social exclusion, societal disintegration, violence and
environmental destruction—threatens humanity
De La Barra, Chilean political activist, international consultant and former UNICEF Latin America Public Policy Advisor 07-- (Ximena,
“THE DUAL DEBT OF NEOLIBERALISM”, Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Social Struggles in Latin America”, 9/1/09, edited by Dello Bueno and
Lara, Brill Online)//AS
The currently prevailing neoliberal development model has brought with it various technological advances and
economic and commercial growth. However, these results ultimately benefit fewer and fewer people
while augmenting social inequality, injustices, and promoting serious social and ethical setbacks . It is
definitely not eradicating poverty On the contrary, it creates conditions for a growing tendency towards
political,economic and social exclusion for the majority of the world’s population.The model
exacerbates poverty, social disparities, ecological degradation,violence and social disintegration. Loss
of governability flows from its systematic logic of emphasising an ever cheaper labour force, the
reduction ofsocial benefits, the disarticulation and destruction of labourorganisations,and the
elimination of labour and ecological regulation (de la Barra 1997). Inthis way, it consolidates a kind of
cannibalism known as social dumping thatseeks to lower costs below the value of social reproduction
rather than organising a process of progressive social accumulation. For most of Latin Americaand the Caribbean,
the present minimum wage levels only allow for a portionof the basic consumption package needed by working people (Bossio 2002).At
present, the global income gap between the 10% poorest portion of theworld’s population and the wealthiest 10% has grown to be 1 to 103
(UNDP2005). According to this same source, around 2.5 billion people, almost halfof humanity, lives on less than US$ 2. per day (considered the
poverty level),while 1.2 billion of these people live on less than US$ 1. per day (consideredthe level of extreme poverty).Given its neoliberal
character,
globalisation failed to produce the benefitsthat were touted. Indeed, the process has greatly
harmed the most vulnerable social sectors produced by the previous phase of capitalist
development.The lack of social and ethical objectives in the current globalisation processhas resulted in benefits only in those countries
where a robust physical andhuman infrastructure exists, where redistributive social policies are the norm,and where fair access to markets and
strong regulatory entities are in place.Where such conditions do not exist, globalisation
has led to stagnation
andmarginalisation, with declining health and educational levels of its children,especially among the
poor. Some regions, including Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Sub-Saharan Africa, and more recently, Latin America andthe
Caribbean, as well as some countries within regions and some personswithin countries (poor children and adolescents, rural inhabitants and
urbanslum dwellers, indigenous peoples, children of illiterate women, illegal immigrants, etc.) have remained mostly excluded (UNICEF 2001).
Unique moment for rejection of capitalism—only a total rejection will suffice
Resnick and Wolff, professors of economics at Amherst and Visiting Professor in the Graduate Program in International Affairs of
the New School University (Wolff) 03 (Stephen and Richard, “Exploitation, Consumption, and the Uniqueness of US Capitalism”, Historical
Materialism 11:4, Brill)//AS
The toll taken on workers' lives has been profound, and never more than at present. Stressed and collapsed
household class structures, severe psychological and physical strains, civic isolation and personal
loneliness, violence and despair are US capitalism's weaknesses and failures just as surely as rising rates of exploitation
and real wages are its successes. 'I`heopportunities for a socialist critique to be embraced are therefore
abundant in the US. Responding to those opportunities will require a shift away from defining class in terms of
wealth and property and away from programmes focused too narrowly on raising real wages. That plays to US capitalism's strength
and not its weaknesses. Of course, low wages, poor working conditions, and job insecurities will remain targets of socialist critique, but
eradicating them will be only part of a renewed socialism. Much the
greater part will connect the dominant organisation
of the surplus - capitalist exploitation - to the host of profound problems and sufferings now
experienced by the mass of US citizens. Such a socialism would make the end of exploitation an
indispensable component of its programme and vision. To paraphrase the old man once more: not higher wages
but the abolition of the wage system is the point. To demand less for the victims of capitalist exploitation would be
the equivalent of demanding better rations for the slaves rather than the abolition of slavery.
1NC: Critical Version
American economic engagement strategies are distinctly neoliberal and subscribe to
exceptionalist theories
Gill, Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science at York University, 95 (Stephen, “Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and
Disciplinary Neoliberalism”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 24:3, 1995, Sage Publications)//AS
North American arrangements are more hierarchical and asymmetrical,understood both in inter-state terms and in
terms of the class structures of eachnation. NAFTA is premised upon a low level of political institutionalisation
anda hub-and-spoke configuration of power, with the United States at the centre ofa continentalised
political economy. This is even more the case with theCaribbean Basin Initiative, which can be terminated unilaterally by the
UnitedStates." The United States has negotiated the implicit right to monitor andcontrol large areas of Canadian political life in the US-Canada
Free TradeAgreement. The US-Canada Agreement specifies that each side has to notify the other "˜party' by advanced warning, of intended
federal or provincial government policy that might affect the other side's interests, as defined by the agreements Because of Canada's extensive
economic integration with the United States, this situation necessarily affects the vast majority of Canadian economic activity, but not vice
versa. Thus, Canadian governments no longer can contemplate an independent or interventionist economic strategy. In
both NAFTA
and the US-Canada Agreement there are no transnational citizenship rights other than those accorded
to capital, and these are defined to favour US-registered companies. Finally, NAFTA can only be amended by
agreement of all signatories. Whilst these arrangements place binding constraints on the policies of Canada and Mexico, to a certain degree,
the United States retains constitutional autonomy and important prerogatives: its trade law is
allowed to override treaty provisions, notwithstanding the rights of redress that are available to participants through the
dispute settlement mechanisms." In other words, the US government is using access to its vast market as a lever of
power, linked to a reshaping of the international business climate, by subjecting other nations to the
disciplines of the new constitutionalism, whilst largely refusing to submit to them itself, partly for strategic
reasons. Indeed, one of the arguments expressed by former European Union President Jacques Delors in favour of comprehensive West
European economic and monetary union was strategic: to offset economic unilateralism from the United States, in matters of money and trade.
Thus, an
American-centred global neoliberalism _mandates a separation of politics and economics in
ways that may narrow political representation and constrain democratic social choice in many parts of the
world. New constitutionalism, which rarities this separation, may have become the de facto discourse of governance for most of the global
political economy. This discourse involves a hierarchy of pressures and constraints on government autonomy that vary according to the size,
economic strength, form of state and civil society, and prevailing national and regional institutional capabilities, as well as the degree of
integration into global capital and money markets.
Neoliberalism and violence are inextricably intertwined—violence is a reflection and
expression of capitalism
Springer,assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Victoria12 (Simon, “Neoliberalising violence: of the
exceptional and the exemplary in coalescing moments”, Area 44:2, Royal Geographical Society, 2012, Wiley Online)//AS
The existing relationship between neoliberalism and violence is directly related to the system of rule
that neoliberalism constructs, justifies and defends in advancing its hegemonies of ideology, of policy and
programme, of state form, of governmentality and ultimately of discourse. Neoliberalism is a context
in which the establishment, maintenance and extension of hierarchical orderings of social relations are recreated, sustained and intensified. Accordingly, neoliberalisation must be considered as an integral part of the
moment of violence in its capacity to create social divisions within the constellations of experiences that delineate
place and across the stories-so-far of space (Massey 2005). Violence has a distinctive ‘reciprocity of reinforcement’ (Iadicola and Shupe 2003,
375), where not only may inequality lead to violence, but so too may violence result in inequality . In this
light, we can regard a concern for understanding the causality of violence as being a consideration that posits where neoliberalism might make
its entry into this bolstering systematic exchange between inequality and violence. The empirical
record demonstrates a
marked increase in inequality under neoliberalism (Wade 2003), encouraging Harvey (2005) to regard this as
neoliberalism's primary substantive achievement. Yet to ask the particular question ‘does neoliberalism cause violence?’ is, upon further
reflection, somewhat irrelevant. Inequality alone is about the metrics and measuring of disparity, however qualified, while the link between
inequality and violence is typically treated as an assessment of the ‘validity’ of a causal relationship, where the link may or may not be
understood to take on multiple dimensions (including temporally, spatiality, economics, politics, culture, etc.). However,
the point is that
inequality and violence are mutually constitutive, which is precisely what Galtung (1969) had in mind
when he coined the term ‘structural violence’. Inequality begets violence, and violence produces further inequalities.
Therefore, if we want to disempower the abhorrent and alienating effects of either and rescind the
domination they both encourage, we need to drop the calculative approaches and consider violence
and inequality together as an enclosed and resonating system, that is, as a particular moment. As Hartsock
argues [t]hinking in terms of moments can allow the theorist to take account of discontinuities and incommensurabilities without losing sight of
the presence of a social system within which these features are embedded. (2006, 176) Although the enduring phenomenon of violence is riven
by tensions, vagaries and vicissitudes as part of its fundamental nature, within
the current moment of neoliberalism,
violence is all too frequently a reflection of the turbulent landscapes of globalised capitalism . Capitalism
at different moments creates particular kinds of agents who become capable of certain kinds of violence dependent upon both their distinctive
geohistorical milieu and their situation within its hierarchy. It is in this distinction that future critical inquiries could productively locate their
concerns for understanding the associations between violence and neoliberalism. By examining the contingent histories and unique
geographies that define individual neoliberalisations, geographers can begin to interpret and dissect the kaleidoscope of violence that is
intercalated within neoliberalism's broader rationality of power. It
is critically important to recognise and start working
through how the moment of violence and the moment of neoliberalism coalesce, to which I now turn my
attention.
We must recognize that we have a choice in order to dismantle neoliberalism—public
debate is a critical arena
Hay, Professor of Political Analysis at the University of Sheffield04 (Colin, “The normalizing role of rationalist assumptions in the
institutional embedding of neoliberalism”, Economy and Society 33:4, 2004, Taylor and Francis)//AS
Accordingly, however
depoliticized and normalized neoliberalism has become, it remains a political and
economic choice, not a simple necessity. This brings us naturally to the question of alternatives. A number of points might here
be made which follow fairly directly from the above analysis. First, our ability to offer alternatives to neoliberalism rests
now on our ability to identify that there is a choice in such matters and, in so doing, to demystify and
deconstruct the rationalist premises upon which its public legitimation has been predicated. This, it
would seem, is a condition of the return of a more normative and engaging form of politics in which more is at
stake than the personnel to administer a largely agreed and ostensibly technical neoliberal reform agenda. Second, the present custodians of
neoliberalism are, in many cases, reluctant converts, whose accommodation to neoliberalism is essentially borne of perceived pragmatism and
necessity rather than out of any deep 522 Economy and Society Downloaded by [Emory University] at 12:12 28 June 2013 normative
commitment to the sanctity of the market. Thus, rather than defend neoliberalism publicly and in its own terms, they have sought instead to
appeal to the absence of a choice which might be defended in such terms. Consequently, political
discourse is technocratic
rather than political. Furthermore, as Peter Burnham has recently noted, neoliberalism is itself a deeply depoliticizing
paradigm (2001), whose effect is to subordinate social and political priorities, such as might arise from a more
dialogic, responsive and democratic politics, to perceived economic imperatives and to the ruthless efficiency of
the market. As I have sought to demonstrate, this antipathy to ‘politics’ is a direct correlate of public choice theory’s projection of its most
cherished assumption of instrumental rationality onto public officials. This is an important point, for it suggests the crucial role
played by stylized rationalist assumptions, particularly (as in the overload thesis, public choice theory more generally and even
the time-inconsistency thesis) those which relate to the rational conduct of public officials, in contributing to the depoliticizing dynamics now
reflected in political disaffection and disengagement. As this perhaps serves to indicate, seemingly
innocent assumptions may
have alarmingly cumulative consequences. Indeed, the internalization of a neoliberalism predicated on
rationalist assumptions may well serve to render the so-called ‘rational voter paradox’ something of a
self-fulfilling prophecy.12 The rational voter paradox _/ that in a democratic polity in which parties behave in a ‘rational’ manner it is
irrational for citizens to vote (since the chances of the vote they cast proving decisive are negligible) _/ has always been seen as the central
weakness of rational choice theory as a set of analytical techniques for exploring electoral competition. Yet, as the above analysis suggests, in a
world constructed in the image of rationalist assumptions, it may become depressingly accurate. Political parties behaving in a narrowly
‘rational’ manner, assuming others (electors and market participants) to behave in a similarly ‘rational’ fashion will contribute to a dynamic
which sees real electors (rational or otherwise) disengage in increasing numbers from the facade of electoral competition. That this is so is only
reinforced by a final factor. The
institutionalization and normalization of neoliberalism in many advanced
liberal democracies in recent years have been defended in largely technical and rationalist terms and
in a manner almost entirely inaccessible to public political scrutiny, contestation and debate. The
electorate, in recent years, has not been invited to choose between competing programmatic
mandates to be delivered in office, but to pass a judgement on the credibility and competence of the respective candidates for high office
to behave in the appropriate (technical) manner in response to contingent external stimuli. Is it any wonder that they have chosen, in increa
increasing numbers, not to exercise any such judgement at all at the ballot box?
2NC Blocks
AT Blocks
AT: Cap Solves War
1. Empirics disprove—Iraq war was about oil-driven profit motive
2. False—cap doesn’t facilitate interdependence—pure capitalism means selfinterest and profit drive—profit drive causes endless drive for accumulation
that causes war
3. Finite resources mean war is inevitable under capitalism—nations compete for
limited resources to satisfy populations
4. Capitalism and war are inextricably linked—the neoliberal ideology demands
constant and predatory accumulation
Reyna, Associate researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology 99 (Stephen P., Deadly Developments: Capitalism, States
and War, Psychology Press, 1999, University of Michigan Libraries)//AS
Thomas Hobbes published Leviathan in l65l, beginning modem English discourse concerning the state. Hobbes' state consisted of the
"Soveraigne" and the "Subject" in a dominion (l968:228). I accept this Hobbesian notion of a state as a sovereign government and a subject civil
society, and my
concern in the present article is to introduce an approach that helps to explain the emergence
of the modem version of this Leviathan. So, in a sense, I tell a whale of a story, but do so using the logical approach introduced
below. The "logics" of what I call the new social anthropology. as opposed to those of mathematics, concern directions taken as a result of
complex actions, with it understood that "complexes" are groups of institutions in which force is concentrated' There
have been logics
of "capital accumulation" that move in the direction of increasing and concentrating capital force in
capitalist complexes. There have also been logics of "predatory accumulation" that move in the
direction of increasing and concentrating violent force within government complexes. Scholars have
recognized that changes internal to Atlantic European states"˜ capitalist complexes increased their capital accumulation and were influential in
the emergence of the modem state. Few scholars have contemplated any such role for predatory accumulation. and systematic analysis of the
relationships between the two logics in the making of the Leviathan has been virtually ignored. I argue in this article thata
militarycapitalist complex, based upon two mutually reinforcing logics of predatory and capital accumulation.
contributed to the formation of the modern state because the complex allowed the reciprocating
logics to produce more violent and capital force than was possible when they operated alone. 'Die military
capitalist complex. then. might be imagined as a sort of structural steroid that bulked up stately whales into Hobbes' "great Leviathan." a
creature with the forces of a "mortal God" ( l968:227) that-luckily for England-turned out by |763 to be England.
5. Neoliberal expansion is used to justify a new kind of modern war
Roberts and Sparke, Professors of geography at the Universities of, respectively, Kentucky and Washington 03 (Susan and
Matthew, “Neoliberal Geopolitics”, Antipode 35:5, 2003, Wiley Online)//AS
Armed with their simple master narrative about the inexorable force of economic globalization,
neoliberals famously hold that the global extension of free-market reforms will ultimately bring
worldwide peace and prosperity. Like Modernity and Development before it, Globalization is thus narrated as the force that will
lift the whole world out of poverty as more and more communities are integrated into the capitalist global economy. In the most idealist
accounts, such as those of New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman (1999:xviii), the process of marketized liberalization is represented as
an almost natural phenomenon which, “like the dawn,” we can appreciate or ignore, but not presume to stop.
Observers and critics of
neoliberalism as an emergent system of global hegemony, however, insist on noting the many ways in
which states actively foster the conditions for global integration, directly or through international organizations such
as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization (Gill 1995). Under what we are identifying as neoliberal
geopolitics, there
appears to have been a new development in these patterns of state-managed
liberalization. The economic axioms of structural adjustment, fiscal austerity, and free trade have
now, it seems, been augmented by the direct use of military force. At one level, this conjunction of capitalism
and war-making is neither new nor surprising (cf Harvey 1985). Obviously, many wars—including most 19thand 20th-century
imperial wars—have been fought over fundamentally economic concerns. Likewise, one only has to read the reflections of one of America’s
“great” generals, Major General Smedley Butler, to get a powerful and resonant sense of the long history of economically inspired American
militarism. “I served in all commissioned ranks from Second Lieutenant to Major General,” Butler wrote in his retirement, [a]nd during that
period, I spent most of that time being a high-class muscle-man for Big Business, for Wall Street and for the Bankers. Neoliberal Geopolitics
887In short I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism. I suspected I was part of a racket at the time. Now I am sure of it. I helped make
Honduras “right” for American fruit companies in 1903. I helped make Mexico, especially Tampico, safe for American oil interests in 1914. I
helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central
American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. The record of racketeering is long. I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking
house of Brown Brothers in 1909–1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. In China I helped to see
to it that Standard Oil went its way unmolested. (quoted in Ali 2002:260) If it was engaged in a kind of gangster capitalist interventionism at the
previous fin-de-siècle, today’s
American war-making has been undertaken in a much more open, systematic,
globally ambitious, and quasicorporate economic style. Al Capone’s approach, has, as it were, given way to the new world
order of Jack Welch.
AT: Cap Solves Environment
1. Empirics disprove—environmental degradation massively worse since the
industrial revolution
2. Tech solves arguments are logically flawed—capitalism created those problems
in the first place—creates an endless cycle
3. Profit motive disproves—under capitalism profit outweighs all so people will
exploit the environment at any cost
4. Even if it works now, it’s unsustainable—resources are finite
5. Expanding neoliberalism assures total environmental destruction and increases
disease susceptibility
Gill, Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science at York University, 95 (Stephen, “Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and
Disciplinary Neoliberalism”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 24:3, 1995, Sage Publications)//AS
Neoliberal forms of rationality are largely instrumental and are concerned with finding the best means
to achieve calculated ends. For neoliberals, primary motivations are understood in a possessively
individualistic framework. Motivation is provided by fear and greed, and is reflected in the drive to acquire more
security and more goods. Yet, any significant attempt to widen this pattern of motivation would entail an
intensification of existing accumulation and consumption patterns, tending to deplete or to destroy the ecostructures of the planet, making everyone less secure and perhaps more vulnerable to disease (even the
powerful). Thus, if North American patterns of accumulation and consumption were to be significantly
extended, for example to China, the despoliation of the global eco-structure would be virtually assured. Even
so, the central ideological message and social myth of neoliberalism is that such a possibility is both
desirable and attainable for all: insofar as limitations are recognised, this is at best through a redefinition of the concept of
"˜sustainable development' so as to make it consistent with the continuation of existing patterns of accumulation and consumption."•
6. Neoliberalism destroys the environment—resources are being irreversibly
depleted—tech can’t fix
De La Barra, Chilean political activist, international consultant and former UNICEF Latin America Public Policy Advisor 07-- (Ximena,
“THE DUAL DEBT OF NEOLIBERALISM”, Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Social Struggles in Latin America”, 9/1/09, edited by Dello Bueno and
Lara, Brill Online)//AS
Meanwhile, environmental
management remains on a permanent collision course with the neoliberal,
of production. The incessant search for expansion, consuming ever more nonrenewable resources in the process, fails to assume the accompanying environmental costs and
results in an irreversible deterioration. Technological innovation concentrated in the hands of just a few private
transnational corporations is unable to act as an engine for social transformation and reduction of
environmental risk, instead serving as a vehicle for intensifying exploitation of labour, social
exclusion, and environmental destruction.Globalisation and the growth of industrial production and commercial
advertising have created new patterns of consumption catering only to select sectors while increasing the
production of wastes and pollution. At the same time, there has been no corresponding rhythm of increasing the capacity for
waste reduction or even recycling the valuable resources being lost in waste, including water. This loss of balance has degraded
ecosystems to an alarming extent. In the last 50 years, the overall level of deterioration has sharply
accelerated. Climatic change is increasingly providing us with a painful reminder of this. The availability of water per capita
agro-export model
is now less than half of what once existed and these supplies are being contaminated by pesticides,
fertilisers, and untreated human wastes. Air quality is likewise worsening , resulting in at least a 50% increase in
registered respiratory infections. Five times more combustible fuels are being burned and four times as much emissions of carbon monoxide
are The Dual Debt of Neoliberalism • 43being produced. The proportion of urban inhabitants relative to the total has grown from 17% to 50%,
while the investments being made in urban infrastructure are being reduced. The use of cement has multiplied four-fold and the expansion of
built areas has limited the natural drainage capacity, especially in urban areas, causing more frequent and more severe flooding.
Over the
last 25 years, the planet has lost a third of its natural resources in terms of forests, fresh water, and
marine species. Meanwhile, a high proportion of vegetation that fulfils a hydro-regulating role has been lost, and global warming has
come to threaten our future as a species (UNDP 1998).4 Growing environmental risks therefore constitute an
additional negative consequence of the dominant development model. Coupled with increased social
vulnerability, the result is a breeding ground for the so-called “natural” disasters that continue to
increase in frequency and intensity
AT: Cap K2 Freedom
Note: DO NOT READ WITH DEMOCRACY LINK
1. False—capitalism subjugates all people to the endless profit drive—prevents
happiness and freedom by valuing human life economically
2. More freedom in the world of the alt—economic equality enables equal
opportunity
3. Neoliberalism is control—“free market” is a convenient term for “heavily
regulated in favor of the elite”—it’s control without the masses knowing
4. Neoliberalism imposes control on unwilling societies and represses political
dissidents
Peck and Tickell, Canada Research Chair in Urban & Regional Political Economy ,Professor of Geography, University of British
Columbia and Professor at Canada Research Chair in Urban & Regional Political Economy and Professor of Geography, University of British
Columbia respectively,
02 (Jamie and Adam, “Neoliberalizing Space”, Antipode 34:3, July 2002
The new religion of neoliberalism combines a commitment to the extension of markets and logics of
competitiveness with a profound antipathy to all kinds of Keynesian and/or collectivist strategies . The
constitution and extension of competitive forces is married with aggressive forms of state downsizing, austerity financing, and public- service
"reform."• Andwhile rhetorically
antistatist, neoliberals have proved adept at the (mis)use of state power
in the pursuit of these goals.For its longstanding advocates in the Anglo-American world,
neoliberalism represents a kind of self-imposed disciplinary code, calling for no less than monastic restraint. For its
converts in the global south, neoliberalism assumes the status of the Latinate church in medieval Europe,
externally imposing unbending rule regimes enforced by global institutions and policed by local functionaries.
Meanwhile, if not subject to violent repression, nonbelievers are typically dismissed as apostate
defenders of outmoded institutions and suspiciously collectivist social rights.
5. Democracy in the neoliberal state simply utilizes a politics of disposability to
decide who get to vote and and who gets to exist – effectively considering all
others a “disposed” population
Giroux, Ph.D. @ Carnegie-Mellon University, Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster
University in the English and Cultural Studies Department, 2008
(Henry A., “Beyond the biopolitics of disposability: rethinking neoliberalism in the New Gilded Age,”
Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture, Vol. 14.5, pp 606-607)//SG
At the dawn of the new millennium, it is commonplace for references to the common good, public trust, and
public service to be either stigmatized or sneered at by people who sing the praises of neoliberalism and
its dream of turning ‘the global economy . . . into a planetary casino’(Castoriadis, 2007, p. 47). Against this dystopian
condition, the American political philosopher, Sheldon Wolin, has argued thatbecause of the increasing power of
corporationsand the emergence of a lawless state (given immense power during the administration of George W. Bush),American
democracy is not only in crisis, it is also characterized by a sense of powerlessness and experiences of
loss. Wolin (2000) claims that this sense of loss is related ‘to power and powerlessness and hence has a claim upon theory’ (p. 3). In making a
claim upon theory,loss aligns itself with the urgency of a crisis, a crisis that demands a new theoretical
discourse while at the same time requiring a politics that involves contemplation, that is, a politics in which
modes of critical inquiry brush up against the more urgent crisis that threatens to shut down even the possibility of critique.For Wolin, the
dialectic of crisis and politics points to three fundamental concerns that need to be addressed as part of
a broader democratic struggle. First, politics is now marked by pathological conditions in which issues of
death are overtaking concerns with life. Second, it is no longer possible to assume that democracy is
tenable within a political system that daily inflicts massive suffering and injustices on weak minorities
and those individuals and groups who exist outside of the privileges of neoliberal values, that is, those
individuals or groupswho exist inwhat Achille Mbembe (2003) calls ‘death-worlds,new and unique forms of social existence in which
vast populations are subjected to conditions of lifeconferring upon them the status of the living dead’(pp. 39�40).Third,
theory in some academic quarters now seems to care more about matters of contemplation and
judgment in search of distance rather than a politics of crisisdriven by an acute sense of justice, urgency, and
intervention. Theory in this instance distances itself from politics, neutered by a form of self-sabotage in which ideas are removed from the
messy realm of politics, power, and intervention. According to Wolin (2000),
Even though [theory] makes references to real-world controversies,its
engagement is with the conditions, or the politics,
of the theoretical that it seeks to settle rather than with the political that is being contested over who
gets what and who gets included. It is postpolitical. (p. 15)
AT: Cap Solves Poverty
1. Empirically false—rampant poverty today particularly in countries exploited by
rich nations
2. Their evidence is biased and Eurocentric—poverty only decreases in the select
few nations that benefit from neoliberalism
3. No reason to redistribute resources in the status quo under capitalism—won’t
happen
4. Neoliberalism’s rapid requirement for urbanization exacerbates the rich-poor
divide resulting in ruined livelihoods, increased inequality, increased poverty,
detrimental environmental impacts, and horrific living conditions
Greenberg, Ph.D in Anthropology at University of Michigan, 2012
(James B., Thomas Weaver (Ph.D. in Anthropology at University of California at Berkeley), Anne Browning-Aiken (Ph.D. in Anthropology at
University of Arizona), William L. Alexander (Professor of Anthropology at University of Arizona), “The Neoliberal Transformation of Mexico,”
Neoliberalism and Commodity Production in Mexico, University Press of Colorado, pp 328-329)//SG
Neoliberal development has led tothe accoutrementsof modernization and prog- ress, such as arguably better
infrastructure and certainly greater opportunities for a narrow set of Mexican and foreign elites. For the
masses,however, neoliberalism has created toll roads they can’t afford to use. While free trade has
harmonized prices between the UnitedStatesand Mexicofor most commodities, forworking people incomes
remain flat and putting food on the table, let alone buying the foreign goods that flood the market, remains a
struggle.Neoliberal development has made the rich richer and the poor desperate. Beyond its costs for Mexico’s
masses, the economy and the environment have paid the price of neoliberal devel- opment. Although
conditions were far from good before,employment, working conditions, distribution of income, and living
conditions have become markedly worse for the masses under neoliberalism. As these conditions have
worsened, so have violence, oppression, and environmental degradation.The implementation of neoliberal policy
was brutal, particularly for Mexico’s rural poor. Rather than helping the poor, these policies have deepened poverty and
ruined livelihoods. Even by the World Bank’s own accounts, 5 to 10 percent of Mexico’s rural population still lives on under a dollar per
day, and another 20 percent lives on less than two dollars a day (World Bank 2004:xx).National fig- ures, however, hide rural
poverty. By 1996, following neoliberal restructuring and NAFTA, 80 percent of the rural population fell
below this line. Rural poverty numbers improved slowly between 1998 and 2006, according to the World Bank, because of public and
private transfers (the latter from migrant remissions) and increases in tourism and services; the poverty rate fell to 55 percent. But as the US
economy soured, rural poverty again began to rise and stood at 61 percent in 2008 (World Bank 2012). Under neoliberalism, inequality has also
Beyond the growing inequalities in
wealth, widespread and growing poverty comes with other social costs. As displaced rural migrants pour
into Mexico’s cit- ies, they face both large-scale unemployment and horrific living conditions;the only
been increas- ing in the United States since the 1980s (Glasmeier 2007; Uchitelle 2007).
housing they may be able to afford is improvised out of cardboard and other temporary materials and they seldom have heat, electricity, or
water. Without sewers and sanitation, these slums are breeding grounds for diseases of poverty and deteriorating health (Davis 2006).These
problems are only the down-payment on the social costs of neoliber- alism. For peasants and
smallholders fleeing ruined rural economies, migration entails a process of class transformation: unable
to make a living working their own lands, they must now work for someone else. Working for wages changes the
basic logic of livelihoods. Whether the migrants find work in Mexico or in the United States, working for wages rewards households that send
more workers into labor markets, and the people left behind must find ways to earn cash. This situation irrevocably changes the gender division
of household labor.
5. Neoliberalism exacerbates wealth gaps and leads to tremendous poverty
Albo, Department of Political Science, York University, 06 (Gregory, “The Unexpected Revolution: Venezuela Confronts Neoliberalism”,
Presentation at the University of Alberta, International Development Week, 1/06, http://socialistproject.ca/theory/venezuela_praksis.pdf)//AS
The social
impacts of neoliberalism have been dismal. The processes of social exclusion and polarisation that
sharpened in the 1980s across Latin America have continued with faltering per capita incomes and massive
informal sector growth, in the order of an astonishing 70-80 percent of new employment, to the present. With ECLA long having
declared the 1990s Latin A1nerica's second lost decade, it will soon have to do so for a third.'0 Here Venezuela records the same
numbing neoliberal patternsof reproduction of social inequality as elsewhere: some 80 percent of the population lives
in poverty, while 20 percent enjoy the oligarchic wealth produced by rentier oil revenues; the worst performance in per
capita GDP in Latin American from the late 1970s to the present, with peak income levels cut almost in halt, a collapse of rural incomes leading
to massive migration into the cities, with close to 90 per cent of the population now in urban areas, particularly Caracas, one of the world's
growing catalogue of slum cities; 3/4 of new job growth estimated to be in the informal sector, where half of the working population is now
said to "˜work'; and recorded unemployment levels (which have quite unclear meaning given the extent of reserve armies of underemployed in the informal economy) hovering
between 15 to 20 per cent for a decade. The tally of social ills
produced by neoliberal models of economic development makes for sober reading. These all impinge on any
attempt an alternate direction for the Venezuelan state, although the booming oil sector allows for far more room for redistributional policies
and potential to convert oil revenues into "˜endogenous development' than elsewhere. However, to date, there has been only some modest
increase in incomes for waged workers and poorer sections, which can largely be attributed to the economic recovery.
There has been
no radical redistribution of income and only modest shiiis in high-income tax burdens.
AT: Transition Causes War
1. Their evidence assumes people still want capitalism—post-alt people will
accept a better system
2. No incentive to go to war—no more profit motive for nations in the world of
the alt
3. Assumes flawed realist theory of states—they won’t lash out because it’s no
longer in their benefit to accumulate resources
4. Studies about transition war are methodologically flawed—no incentive to go
to war during transition
Bennett and Nordstrom, professors in the Department of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University 00 (D. Scott, Timothy,
“Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44, No. 1, Feb.,
pp. 33-61, JSTOR)//AS
Most scholarly works that examine the effects of domestic economic woes on international behavior have focused on the
theoretical possibility that leaders undertake adventurous foreign policies under conditions of
worsening economic, social, and political problems (Levy 1989). Commonly known as either externalization or diversion, the main
thrust of the argument is that political elites can solidify their relationship with their domestic constituents by transferring the public's attention
from economic issues to the foreign enemy. Underlying the process is the assumption that the military action will cause the citizens to "rally
'round the flag" (Mueller 1973) and thereby the patriotic mass will see political elites in a more positive light. Early studies attributed to his
rallying effect to a suspected in-group/out-group relationship. Simmel (1955) argued that an altercation with an out-group (the target of the
externalization efforts) helps promote cohesion within the in-group (the troubled leader's citizenry) because it is natural for individuals to pull
together with those they know when confronted by outsiders. Transferring the argument to action, it may be that if political elites realize that
this in-group/out-group dynamic exists, then they will make advantageous use of externalization tactics. Auxiliary arguments might suggest that
leaders will prefer short, manageable conflicts to boost their support without risking the long term costs of war. An additional implication of the
theory when applied strategically to pairs of conflictual states is that while states with problems are likely to be conflict initiators, states
without such problems are more likely to be the targets of diversion. If diversionary logic holds and states want to initiate a cheap and
manageable incident to divert attention without imposing major costs, then leaders would prefer to initiate against states in a good economic
or domestic situation. If the target is in bad shape domestically, then leaders in that target may have their own incentives to escalate the
conflict to divert public attention. Initiators thinking strategically may try to avoid conflict against such an opponent. While diversionary conflict
theory has been the subject of much scholarly attention, the evidence supporting the argument has been mixed. On one
hand, studies that take the historical case study approach tend to support the notion that leaders do externalize when faced with domestic
problems (Levy 1988, 667); in a related body of work, some case studies of deterrence failures have shown that these cases are often
characterized by an attacker who is motivated by internal problems (e.g., Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985). On the other hand, quantitative
studies of externalization have not provided consistent support. Across studies of externalization in general (e.g., Leeds and Davis 1997) or in
the context of specific states' foreign policies (Fordham 1998; Gowa 1998; Meernik 1994; Meernik and Waterman 1996; Ostrom and Job 1986;
Morgan and Bickers 1992; Mintz and Russett 1992), findings about whether quantitative data support the theory have been mixed. The
nature of the results has led some to question the validity of the theories. For example, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita
(1985) posits that the logical flaw in externalization theory lies in the psychological nature of the original scapegoat hypothesis on which
externalization theory is based. While the international relations version of this theory is indeed written in psychological terms (in-group/outgroup), it may be that "the
logical foundation for the leap from individual psychology to national action
remains non-existent" (1985, 130). Similarly, Levy (1989, 266) puts forth four problems with the original causal
process as described by Simmel (1955), Coser (1956), and other early writers on externalization(:1 ) little attention is paid to the
direction of the relationship between internal problems and external conflict, (2) attempts to develop
or test alternative theoretical relationships are rare,( 3) precise specifications of when externalization
should occur theoretically are rare, and (4) the conditions under which externalization conditions should
hold are unexplored. The conclusion that Levy draws from these theoretical issues is that many of the empirical studies suffer from
problems of misspecified models (1989, 267). An additional possible source of discrepancies in findings about diversionary conflict may be
attributable to differences in research design and variable measurement. Studies have used a variety of research designs, different dependent
variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation techniques, and different data sets covering different
time periods and different states. Even the central concept of externalization, namely, domestic trouble, is unclear. Most studies to date have
used presidential popularity, overall presidential success, the election calendar, or a misery index composed of inflation and unemployment as
indicators of presidential problems. Cross-national studies have most frequently examined what James (1988, 103) categorizes as manifest
conflict, a category which includes protest demon strations, political strikes, armed attacks, and deaths from domestic violence. This category
can be opposed to latent conflict, which exists when sources of trouble are present but have not yet led to the physical manifestations of
dissatisfaction. Diversionary
conflict theory as presented is typically so general in its discussion of internal
problems that it opens a Pandora's box of possible indicators of domestic conflict, and all of the types of
measures discussed above fit with the theory. The vague nature of the theory may be contributing to this possible problem of model
misspecification, but there are few arguments that suggest one indicator is superior to the others. Alternative relationships between domestic
economic performance and international conflict also have been proposed, perhaps most importantly by Blainey (1973, 74). Blainey offers the
alternative hypothesis about economics and war that economically challenged countries are more likely to be the target of aggressive military
acts than their initiator (1973, 86). Faced with a poor target in a bad economic situation, who is faced with an unhappy populace and possibly
limited resources, potential conflict initiators are likely to see opportunity. The argument also parallels the historical notion that leaders would
only go to war when their coffers were full-in bad times, leaders may simply not be able to afford to go to conflict.
Blainey's argument appears to pose a challenge to diversionary conflict theory in its emphasis on what is the most likely direction of conflict.
Note, however, that its prediction (weak states become targets) differs from a strategic application of diversionary conflict theory. By coming at
externalization from the substitutability perspective, we hope to deal with some of the theoretical problems raised by critics of diversionary
conflict theory. Substitutability can be seen as a particular problem of model specification where the dependent variable has not been fully
developed. We believe that one of the theoretical problems with studies of externalization has been a lack of attention to alternative choices;
Bueno de Mesquita actually hints toward this (and the importance of foreign policy substitution) when he argues that it
is shortsighted
to conclude that a leader will uniformly externalize in response to domestic problems at the expense
of other possible policy choices (1985, 130). We hope to improve on the study of externalization and behavior within rivalries by
considering multiple outcomes in response to domestic conditions.5 In particular, we will focus on the alternative option that instead of
externalizing, leaders may internalize when faced with domestic economic troubles. Rather than diverting the
attention of the public or relevant elites through military action, leaders may actually work to solve their internal problems internally. Tying
internal solutions to the external environment, we focus on the possibility that leaders may work to disengage their country from hostile
relationships in the international arena to deal with domestic issues. Domestic problems often emerge from the challenges of spreading finite
resources across many different issue areas in a manner that satisfies the public and solves real problems. Turning inward for some time may
free up resources required to jump-start the domestic economy or may simply provide leaders the time to solve internal distributional issues. In
our study, we will focus on the condition of the domestic economy (gross domestic product [GDP] per capita growth) as a source of pressure on
leaders to externalize. We do this for a number of reasons. First, when studying rivalries, we need an indicator of potential domestic trouble
that is applicable beyond just the United States or just advanced industrialized democracies. In many non-Western states, variables such as
election cycles and presidential popularity are irrelevant. Economics are important to all countries at all times. At a purely practical level, GDP
data is also more widely available (cross-nationally and historically) than is data on inflation or unemployment. 6 Second, we believe that
fundamental economic conditions are a source of potential political problems to which leaders must pay attention. Slowing growth or
worsening economic conditions may lead to mass dissatisfaction and protests down the road; economic problems may best be dealt with at an
early stage before they turn into outward, potentially violent, conflict. This leads us to a third argument, which is that we in fact believe that it
may be more appropriate in general to use indicators of latent conflict rather than manifest conflict as indicators of the potential to divert.
Once the citizens of a country are so distressed that they resort to manifest conflict (rioting or engaging in
open protest), it may be too late for a leader to satisfy them by engaging in distracting foreign policy
actions. If indeed leaders do attempt to distract people's attention, then if protest reaches a high level, that attempt has actually failed and
we are looking for correlations between failed externalization attempts and further diversion.¶
AT: No Alt Solvency
Extend Lafer – he cites empirical evidence of successful anti-neoliberal movements to prove that the
alt will be successful in this instance. Prefer empirics – they’re the best way to accurately predict
events.
Latin American anticapitalist revolutionary ideas are unconventional and successful
Albo, Department of Political Science, York University, 06 (Gregory, “The Unexpected Revolution: Venezuela Confronts Neoliberalism”,
Presentation at the University of Alberta, International Development Week, 1/06, http://socialistproject.ca/theory/venezuela_praksis.pdf)//AS
ln spite of so many determined efforts of the past to impose a uniform architecture, there is no blueprint
for making a revolution against capitalism. And there is just as clearly no single design for the Lett today to
break out of the straitjacket of neoliberalism, and re-open possibilities for more democratic and egalitarian social orders. The
thing about social revolutions is that they keep coming around in unexpected ways in unexpected places.
Who would have dared predict the emption that was Seattle in November l999, when the powers behind neoliberal globalization seemed
completely unassailable? And who would have predicted then - certainly none of the sages of the global social justice movement who quite
consciously moved to the margins the issue of winning state power as another failed blueprint- that Venezuela under Hugo Rafael Chavez Frias
would emerge as the key zone insisting that alternatives to neoliberalism must not only be asserted but tried? This is
exactly the
importance of Chavez and the Bolivarian revolutionary process, as the Chavistas refer to their struggle,
for the Left at this juncture in the struggle against neoliberal globalization."˜
AT: Can’t Solve Root Cause
Alt solves the root cause of the aff’s impacts – De La Barra uses economic data to substantiate her
claim that neoliberalist policies are the underlying cause of all violence and systemic impacts. Prefer
our evidence – all of their authors are biased in favor of the existing system
Neoliberal policies are the root cause of violence, oppression, warming, and instability– the price to
pay is too high
Greenberg, Ph.D in Anthropology at University of Michigan, 2012
(James B., Thomas Weaver (Ph.D. in Anthropology at University of California at Berkeley), Anne Browning-Aiken (Ph.D. in Anthropology at
University of Arizona), William L. Alexander (Professor of Anthropology at University of Arizona), “The Neoliberal Transformation of Mexico,”
Neoliberalism and Commodity Production in Mexico, University Press of Colorado, pp 334-335)//SG
Neoliberalism also underlies the growing problems of crime and violence affecting Mexico more broadly.
The policies that ruined smallholder agriculture also made the country receptive to growing marijuana and poppies, thereby open- ing spaces
into which drug cartels moved (see the chapter by Emanuel and chapter 9 by Weaver, this volume). The money from the drug trade has had a
pernicious effect on Mexican society, creating extensive problems of corruption and increas- ing levels of violence (Campbell
2009).Neoliberal
policies have driven millions of Mexicans into economic exile and helped turn Mexico
into a major source of drugs. Both drugs and victims of structural violence spill across the border, as does the violence that too often
accompanies them, reminding us that we live in a global society and thatneoliberalism in Mexico also has direct
consequences for the United States.As we have seen with the near collapse of global financial mar- kets, problems are
contagious in an increasingly integrated global economy. Just as the consequences of neoliberal policies
in Mexico spill over into the United States, the impacts of US applications of neoliberalism reverberate in
Mexico. As the popular saying goes, “When the United States catches a cold, Mexico catches pneumonia.” Tight credit affects commodity
chains, so the consequences of the neoliberal debacle in US financial markets are felt strongly in Mexico. In sum, our major area of unease
regarding neoliberalism is that, as an eco- nomic framework, the lopsided version of development it delivers comes at too high a price.While
neoliberalism may further global capitalism’s frantic drive for expansion and increased profit, it has not
resolved intra- and inter-nation prob- lems of inequality, environmental degradation, unequal
distribution of resources and gains, global warming, lack of healthcare, instability of pension funds, corruption, and clientelism. Instead, it has increased violence and oppression and generally worsened
working and living conditions.
AT: Cede the Political
Turn – only the alt truly engages in politics. The alt chooses to reject neoliberalism, but it does not
drop out of political action – instead, it uses political means to achieve an apolitical end. On the
contrary, the aff’s form of debate and discussion is fundamentally bankrupt – every author on
framework proves that the aff fails to produce effective discussions or solutions.
AT: Utopianism Bad
The alt is not utopian – Lafer chooses to discuss the real-world impact of a demonstration instead of
theoretical effects – the alt can happen in the real world
AT: Neolib Inevitable
Neoliberalism not inevitable – in fact, it’s contributing to its own downfall – that’s Lafer. The 1999
Seattle demonstrations against the WTO prove that liberal forces in society (youth, immigrants, and
environmentalists) had an impact on policymakers – means that the alt’s engagement in debate over
neoliberal policies has empirically been successful in spilling over into legislature
And, rejecting the notion of inevitable neoliberalism is critical to resistance – surrender is a selffulfilling prophecy
Hursh and Henderson, associate professor of education at the University of Rochester and PhD at the Warner Graduate School of
Education and Human Development 11 (David and Joseph, “ Contesting global neoliberalism and creating alternative futures”, Discourse:
Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 32:2, May 2011, Routledge)//AS
Contesting neoliberalism necessitates that we situate neoliberal policies within the larger neoliberal
discourse promoting markets, competition, individualism, and privatization. Analysing education policies in the
USA, whether the push for mayoral control in Rochester, New York (see Duffy, 2010; Hedeen, 2010; Ramos, 2010), school reform policies under
Renaissance 2010 in Chicago, or Race to the Top under the Obama administration, requires that we understand how reforms such as using
standardized testing are presented as efficient, neutral responses to the problem of raising student achievement, rather than examining the
root causes of student failure, including lack of decent paying jobs and health care, and under-funded schools. Current
policies
reinforce neoliberalism and leave the status quo intact. Similarly, if we look at education in Sub-Saharan Africa, we must
situate schools within the hollowing out of the state, and the lack of adequate funding for education and other social services such as health
care. For example, in Uganda, as in several other Sub-Saharan countries, the global recession has contributed to drug shortages, making it
impossible to treat the growing number of AIDS patients (McNeil, 2010). Yet, under more social democratic policies the state would play a
larger role in providing health care. Furthermore, education is increasingly contested, as the plutocracy promotes education as a means of
producing productive, rather than critical, employees. Schools are more often places where teachers and students learn what will be on the test
rather than seeking answers to questions that cry out for answers, such as how to develop a healthy, sustainable environment or communities
where people are actually valued for who they are rather than what they contribute to the economy. Instead,
we must ask what
kinds of relations do we want to nurture, what kinds of social relations, what kind of work do we want
to do, and what kinds of culture and technologies do we want to create. These questions require that we rethink
schools so that teachers and students can engage in real questions for which the answer will make a difference in the quality of our lives.
These questions also require that we rethink our relationship to a specific kind of ‘free’ marketplace
that is not, in fact, inevitable. By problematizing the idea of neoliberal marketization, we can begin to
construct new markets that actually value commonly held resources and local communities.
FW Blocks
Generic 2NC FW
A. Prefer the negative framework – extend that a discursive focus is the only way
to merge the political economy and poststructuralism. The aff doesn’t solve – it
excludes one or the other. That’s Springer in 12.
B. Don’t engage in state action - We have a responsibility to challenge neoliberal
dominance of the policymaking sphere—it damages equality, education, and
the environment
Hursh and Henderson, associate professor of education at theUniversity of Rochester and PhD at the Warner Graduate School of
Education and Human Development11 (David and Joseph, “ Contesting global neoliberalism and creating alternative futures”, Discourse:
Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 32:2, May 2011, Routledge)//AS
Neoliberal policies, in spite of their considerable damage to economic equality, the environment, and
education, remain dominant. In this paper, we suggest that neoliberalism has remained dominant in part because the
power elite who benefit from the policies have gained control over both public debate and policy-making.
By dominating the discourse and logic regarding economic, environmental, and education decision-making,
neoliberal proponents have largely succeeded in marginalizing alternative conceptions. We then use critical
theory and critical geography, or ‘historical geographic materialism’, to situate communities, cities, and countries within different scales and
networks and analyse current neoliberal policies. Environmentally,
neoliberalism elevates the market and profit
above considerations of climate change and environmental sustainability. Educationally, learning is valued
primarily in terms of its contribution to economic growth. Finally, we engage in the more complicated question of what
kind of world we want to live in, remembering that rather than a self-perpetuating neoliberalism in which individuals
are responsible only for themselves and all decisions are supposedly made by the market, we have responsibility for
our relationships with one another and our built and natural environment.
C. Empirically, policymaking focus kills political agency and fails to understand the
root of neoliberalism—discursive analysis must come first
Hay and Rosamond, Reader in Political Analysis in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of
Birmingham and Senior Research Fellow in International Politics in the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the
02
University of Warwick respectively,
, (Colin and Ben, “Globalisation, European Integration and the Discursive Construction of Economic
Imperatives”, Journal of European Public Policy 9:2, 4/02, http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ssfc0041/globalisation.pdf)//AS
It is certainly not our intention to question the extent to which our knowledge of the empirical phenomena associated with claims of
globalisation has been enhanced in this way. Nonetheless, we will argue that something
quite significant is lost in this overly
restrictive emphasis upon material indices of globalisation and on arguments which such indices might adjudicate.2
The implicit supposition which seems to underlie much of the sceptical or second-wave literature seeking to expose the ‘myth’ or
‘delusion’ of globalisation, is that a rigorous empirical exercise in demystification will be sufficient to reverse
the tide of ill-informed public policy made in the name of globalisation. Sadly, this has not proved to be the case.
For however convinced we might be by the empirical armoury mustered against the hyperglobalisation thesis by the sceptics, their rigorous
empiricism leads them to fail adequately to consider the way in which globalisation comes to inform
public policy-making. It is here, we suggest, that the discourse of globalisation — and the discursive
construction of the imperatives it is seen to conjure along with attendant fatalism about the possibilities for
meaningful political agency — must enter the analysis. For, as the most cursory reflection on the issue of structure and agency
reveals, it is the ideas actors hold about the context in which they find themselves rather than the
context itself which informs the way in which they behave (Hay 1999a, forthcoming a). This is no less true
ofpolicy makers and governments. Whether the globalisation thesis is ‘true’ or not may matter far less than whether it is deemed to be
true (or, quite possibly, just useful) by those employing it. Consequently, if the aim of the sceptics is to discredit the
political appeal to dubious economic imperatives associated with globalisation, then they might well benefit
from asking themselves why and under what conditions politicians and public officials invoke external
economic constraints in the first place. It is to this task that we direct our attentions in this paper.
D. Consequential thinking is bad decisionmaking – if we constantly think of the
consequences to every action, making decisions will take forever.
1. Proves consequential thinking is not inevitable – we don’t take 3 hours to decide
which color of pen to use
2. Decreases value to life
E. The role of the ballot is to allow for indiscriminatory discourse – that’s a neg
ballot. That’s Springer 12.
AT: Policy Relevance/Plan Focus
A. Don’t engage in state action - We have a responsibility to challenge neoliberal
dominance of the policymaking sphere—it damages equality, education, and
the environment
Hursh and Henderson, associate professor of education at theUniversity of Rochester and PhD at the Warner Graduate School of
Education and Human Development11 (David and Joseph, “ Contesting global neoliberalism and creating alternative futures”, Discourse:
Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 32:2, May 2011, Routledge)//AS
Neoliberal policies, in spite of their considerable damage to economic equality, the environment, and
education, remain dominant. In this paper, we suggest that neoliberalism has remained dominant in part because the
power elite who benefit from the policies have gained control over both public debate and policy-making.
By dominating the discourse and logic regarding economic, environmental, and education decision-making,
neoliberal proponents have largely succeeded in marginalizing alternative conceptions. We then use critical
theory and critical geography, or ‘historical geographic materialism’, to situate communities, cities, and countries within different scales and
networks and analyse current neoliberal policies. Environmentally,
neoliberalism elevates the market and profit
above considerations of climate change and environmental sustainability. Educationally, learning is valued
primarily in terms of its contribution to economic growth. Finally, we engage in the more complicated question of what
kind of world we want to live in, remembering that rather than a self-perpetuating neoliberalism in which individuals
are responsible only for themselves and all decisions are supposedly made by the market, we have responsibility for
our relationships with one another and our built and natural environment.
B. Empirically, policymaking focus kills political agency and fails to understand the
root of neoliberalism—discursive analysis must come first
Hay and Rosamond, Reader in Political Analysis in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of
Birmingham and Senior Research Fellow in International Politics in the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the
02
University of Warwick respectively,
, (Colin and Ben, “Globalisation, European Integration and the Discursive Construction of Economic
Imperatives”, Journal of European Public Policy 9:2, 4/02, http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ssfc0041/globalisation.pdf)//AS
It is certainly not our intention to question the extent to which our knowledge of the empirical phenomena associated with claims of
globalisation has been enhanced in this way. Nonetheless, we will argue that something
quite significant is lost in this overly
restrictive emphasis upon material indices of globalisation and on arguments which such indices might adjudicate.2
The implicit supposition which seems to underlie much of the sceptical or second-wave literature seeking to expose the ‘myth’ or
‘delusion’ of globalisation, is that a rigorous empirical exercise in demystification will be sufficient to reverse
the tide of ill-informed public policy made in the name of globalisation. Sadly, this has not proved to be the case.
For however convinced we might be by the empirical armoury mustered against the hyperglobalisation thesis by the sceptics, their rigorous
empiricism leads them to fail adequately to consider the way in which globalisation comes to inform
public policy-making. It is here, we suggest, that the discourse of globalisation — and the discursive
construction of the imperatives it is seen to conjure along with attendant fatalism about the possibilities for
meaningful political agency — must enter the analysis. For, as the most cursory reflection on the issue of structure and agency
reveals, it is the ideas actors hold about the context in which they find themselves rather than the
context itself which informs the way in which they behave (Hay 1999a, forthcoming a). This is no less true
ofpolicy makers and governments. Whether the globalisation thesis is ‘true’ or not may matter far less than whether it is deemed to be
true (or, quite possibly, just useful) by those employing it. Consequently, if the aim of the sceptics is to discredit the
political appeal to dubious economic imperatives associated with globalisation, then they might well benefit
from asking themselves why and under what conditions politicians and public officials invoke external
economic constraints in the first place. It is to this task that we direct our attentions in this paper.
C. Policy approaches externalize globalization and fail to understand how it
motivates their environment and decisions—examination of neoliberal motive
must be prior
Rosamond, Professor of Political Science, University of Copenhagen 99 (Ben, “Discourses of globalization and the social construction of
European identities”, Journal of European Public Policy 6:4, 1999, Taylor and Francis)//AS
As discussions like this proceed, so the
limits of rationalistic approaches become apparent. The externalization
of globalization in mainstream accounts is related to the treatment of interests and identities as exogenous
or prior to the processes of institutionalized interaction. The implication of much of the literature on globalization
and European integration is that actors’ interests are affected by globalization and/or that it is in some actors’
interests to promote globalization. The role of globalization in actually constituting those interests
and identities is largely ignored. This need not be so. Increasing attention is being paid to the complex effects of
institutionalization in the EU, and particularly to the capacity of institutions to co-ordinate actor expectations, generate shared systems of belief
and shape norms, values and conventions within policy communities (Cram 1997; Radaelli 1995; also Armstrong and Bulmer 1998; Garrett and
Weingast 1993). It is here that constructivist
approaches can add value by forcing an explanation of the social
construction of the external environment as a means to understanding how particular identity claims
and interests arise within a policy-making context. This is discussed further in the following section which elaborates briefly
a case for the analysis of the discursive aspects of globalization and goes on to discuss how constructivism might be used to
think about the usage of ‘globalization’ in the EU context. The third section of the article lays out some empirical material, with
reference to the role of globalization discourses within the EU polity. The argument is that our understanding of the global–European interface
can be greatly enhanced by the application of a form of constructivism. More concretely, the
argument builds the hypotheses
that (a) the deployment of ideas about globalization has been central to the development of a
particular notion of European identity among élite policy actors but that (b) ‘globalization’ remains contested within EU
policy circles.
D. Their Schmidt card concedes that we must use an analytical approach – means
you prefer the negative framework.
E. Considering state action is only half of the battle – state action only considers
the political economy not poststructuralism. We need both to successfully take
a discursive approach. That’s Springer in 12.
AT: Theory reasons K’s are bad
Kritiks enrich the activity and expand education and learning.
Shanahan 04 (William, “Twilight of the Topical Idols: Kritik-ing In the Age of Imperialism”, Contemporary Argumentation
and Debate, Vol. 25, pg. 66-77)
Make no mistake about it. Debate
is in the midst of a yet-to-be-determined
revolutionary transformation, some of the outlines of which are visible and whose edifices have begun to be erected.
Nonetheless, the powerful accommodational forces at work in debate, well-honed from years of brilliant, lived
circumvention, are engaged in an extensive project of rehabilitation and reconstruction, designed to rearticulate the besieged, discursive hegemony of that once-great, tradition of policymaking.
Contestatory, agonistic theoretical engagement exemplifies what is grand and worthy in our debate
community. Provisional, local theory, imbedded in a specific resolutional context and emerging
from the particularities of individual debate rounds, expands knowledge and forms better praxis.1
The long-dominant forms of traditional policymaking survived due to an extraordinary ability to absorb arguments and practices
that threaten it, while maintaining an almost fetishized insularity. In the words of critical debate’s new demigod, the debate
revolution needed to “strike twice,” at both the content and style of traditional debate, or risk the fate of the first Russian
revolution, the sixties counter-revolution, and the worlds too numerous to mention assimilated by the Borg.2
Debate is key to examine the affirmative’s relationship to the topic.
Shanahan 04 (William, “Twilight of the Topical Idols: Kritik-ing In the Age of Imperialism”, Contemporary Argumentation
and Debate, Vol. 25, pg. 66-77)
Most importantly perhaps, debate’s invigorated reflexivity1 finally acknowledged
that the process of interpretation was neither neutral nor innocent. For far too long however,
debate had proceeded as if affirmatives’ relationship to the topic was unproblematic and did not
require examination. This is not to say that our very erudite community failed to recognize how interpretation
was “subjective,” but rather they failed to accept the very notion that subjectivity itself was tied to politics,
ideology, and philosophical bent. Not surprisingly, debate’s insularity fairly effectively prevented
five decades of sustained criticism against the canons of Western philosophy and politics from
entering into debate rounds and debate thinking, as if most of, for example, Continental philosophy had nothing to
offer us. Even the most casual glance across a variety of disciplines demonstrated the irrefutable
relevance of so-called post-structuralism and postmodernism to debate practice. For an activity
that prides itself on its erudition, these theoretical oversights were conspicuous and disabling. How
could such a sophisticated argumentative community fail to
consider and evaluate the relevance of such far-reaching and important changes in academic
scholarship?
Kritiks are no longer on the fringes of the debate community. They are read in over
50% of debate rounds and are not unpredictable.
Bruschke 04 (Jon, Associate Professor of Communications at Cal State Fullerton, “Debate Factions and
Affirmative Actions”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 25, pg. 78-88)
By 1997 I was coaching at Cal. State Fullerton and the only argument my team would run on either side of the topic was critical,
and that more or less brings us up-to-date on my prognostication skills and the state of contemporary debate. Bill Shanahan ended
up at Fort Hayes, and they ramped the weirdness up a notch. In 2001 West Georgia won an octo-final debate on the World
Government counterplan (again, the entire topic in 1947), the morning after a near-miss on the first non-decision in the history of
the NDT: Dartmouth
and North Texas had found themselves in a spot where a discussion of debate, activism and critical theory broke out prior to the
2AR and lasted over an hour. A concession was offered and withdrawn, a subsequent flurry of discussion considered whether a
2AR was fair after the elapsed time, at least two judges left the room declaring they couldn’t decide the debate, and when the dust
had settled and the tears were dried Dartmouth advanced. From what Ican tell, in the year 2004 more than half of all
debates involve some sort of critical argument, it is issued as often by the affirmative as the
negative, and those who would resist constantly refer to a promised land of substantive debate that
will get to the core of the real issues, but when taken up on the offer seem only able to present
phantasmatic claims about political capital (“winners lose?”). Critical arguments have thoroughly
saturated the debate world, as witnessed by the acumen demonstrated in those arguments by the
old guard of our activity: Northwestern, Harvard, Dartmouth, Berkeley and Kansas (when they
want to), and more.
Kritiks provide negative teams fair ground in a world where affirmatives are running
increasingly narrowed plans.
Bruschke 04 (Jon, Associate Professor of Communications at Cal State Fullerton, “Debate Factions and
Affirmative Actions”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 25, pg. 78-88)
Since affirmatives have stopped defending the entire
resolution, negatives have had a damnable time finding links. A Dartmouth team once literally ran
a chicken dung case on the hazardous waste topic, Augustana granted one guy bar membership on
the free speech topic (George Anastopolo) and got a first round, I myself advocated issuing Halley’s Comet pencils
to Native Americans on the space exploration resolution. At first, negatives tried topicality, which worked as far
as it went but the collective judging pool seemed to have a distaste for it that was roughly akin to
broccoli: You had to admit there was probably a place for it, but you didn’t want it to dominate the
menu. Then hypothesis testing tried to get the affirmative to defend against all possible better alternatives, which was at least
I see pattern in all this.
one way for the negative to try to focus back to the resolution. When policy making killed that nonsense the meatball counterplan
emerged, and if affirmatives wouldn’t defend the core of the bloody topic negatives tried to make them defend all of capitalism or
something equally unsavory. When permutations sent that strategy to the back burner the critique emerged, with
negatives using their critiques to make affirmatives defend even broader things like Cartesianism
or rationality or statism. The tool is different but the instinct is the same: Affirmatives don’t have
to defend the topic so they defend as little as possible, and negatives employ strategies to make them
defend the broadest ground imaginable.
Kritiks are necessary to save debate from irrelevancy.
Bruschke 04 (Jon, Associate Professor of Communications at Cal State Fullerton, “Debate Factions and
Affirmative Actions”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 25, pg. 78-88)
The take-home point is this:
The divisions and factions now lurking in our hallways
and elim brackets are not new, nor even in my view as feisty as the divisions between the plan and
the counterplan, the hypo-tester and the policy-maker, or the meatball and the permutation. They reflect real
divisions in the intellectual traditions of our universities, and we would do well to welcome those
points of contention into our activity. If all goes well, it might mean that through our debates our
community can generate ideas that stimulate intellectual progress in those disputes, reconnecting us
to the central mission of the university and making us seem less like a bizarre group of caffeinesustained, poorly dressed frequent fliers who talk too fast and are otherwise irrelevant.
AT: Topic education
The kritik increases topic education – it forces the aff to question former assumptions
which allows for a deeper understanding of the topic.
Policy approaches externalize globalization and fail to understand how it motivates
their environment and decisions—examination of neoliberal motive must be prior
Rosamond, Professor of Political Science, University of Copenhagen 99 (Ben, “Discourses of globalization and the social construction of
European identities”, Journal of European Public Policy 6:4, 1999, Taylor and Francis)//AS
As discussions like this proceed, so the
limits of rationalistic approaches become apparent. The externalization
of globalization in mainstream accounts is related to the treatment of interests and identities as exogenous
or prior to the processes of institutionalized interaction. The implication of much of the literature on globalization
and European integration is that actors’ interests are affected by globalization and/or that it is in some actors’
interests to promote globalization. The role of globalization in actually constituting those interests
and identities is largely ignored. This need not be so. Increasing attention is being paid to the complex effects of
institutionalization in the EU, and particularly to the capacity of institutions to co-ordinate actor expectations, generate shared systems of belief
and shape norms, values and conventions within policy communities (Cram 1997; Radaelli 1995; also Armstrong and Bulmer 1998; Garrett and
Weingast 1993). It is here that constructivist
approaches can add value by forcing an explanation of the social
construction of the external environment as a means to understanding how particular identity claims
and interests arise within a policy-making context. This is discussed further in the following section which elaborates briefly
a case for the analysis of the discursive aspects of globalization and goes on to discuss how constructivism might be used to
think about the usage of ‘globalization’ in the EU context. The third section of the article lays out some empirical material, with
reference to the role of globalization discourses within the EU polity. The argument is that our understanding of the global–European interface
can be greatly enhanced by the application of a form of constructivism. More concretely, the
argument builds the hypotheses
that (a) the deployment of ideas about globalization has been central to the development of a
particular notion of European identity among élite policy actors but that (b) ‘globalization’ remains contested within EU
policy circles.
AT: no text
1. Ground –
a. Kills neg flex – our entire kritik cannot be limited to single sentence, kills
negative block’s strategic options.
b. Breadth – the less specific we are the more ground they get for turns and
they can still perm.
c. No moving target – our alternative is still grounded in the alt card.
2. Education -a. Cross-x check abuse – they could have gotten us to clarify a specific part
of the kritik if they didn’t understand it in our speech. We would have
defended it.
b. Critical thinking-- Condensing the critique into a one sentence alternative
allows the affirmative to not critically think about what we are critiquing
3. Err neg on theory -- aff gets first and last speech and unlimited prep.
4. Not a voter - Reject the argument not the team.
Link Blocks
Generic Link
1.
American engagement in Latin America is simply a result of the anti-neoliberalism
movements in Latin America. The US government is another act to suppress these movements to
prevent the overthrow of the neoliberal regimes.
2.
The US government wants to reinforce the US neoliberal policies in Latin America to
ensure future cooperation with Latin America that’s 1NC Renique, 10
3.
The affirmative sense of the need to globalize Latin America is an instance of
and therefore reinforces neoliberalism
Torres &Schugurensky, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, and Latin American Center, UCLA, and
Paulo Freire Institute, São Paulo, Brazil; OISE-University of Toronto, Canada, 2002 (Carlos A. and Daniel, “The political
economy of higher education in the era of neoliberal globalization: Latin America in comparative perspective”
http://www.del.ufrj.br/~ricardo/DocsArcuSur/Carlos.pdf)//JS
Economic globalization is shaped by a business offensive to restore rates of profits. Hence, it is
accompanied by a process of deregulation which calls for drastic cutbacks in social spending,
environmental destruction, regressive revisions of tax systems, loosened constraints on corporate
power, downward leveling of salaries and working conditions, widespread attacks on organized labor,
and increased spending on weapons (Dale 1989). Indeed, a major criticisms to the neoliberal policies is
that while high costs are already being paid in terms of drastic deterioration of wages, cutbacks in
spending on education, health and infrastructure, and massive unemployment, the majorityof the
populationhave not yet felt the benefitsof these policies. It is alsoclaimed that economic
restructuringleadsto a model of social exclusion thatleaves out large sectors of the world population
from accessing economic andsocial civic minimums. Another criticism is that with the implementation
ofneoliberal policies, the state withdraws from its responsibility to administerpublic resources and from
the liberal premise of pursuing egalitarianism,replacing them with a blind faith in the market and the
hope that economicgrowth will eventually generate enough of a spillover to help the poor
anddisenfranchised.Globalizationisnotonly expressed in the economic arena, butalsocultural and
political realms. Inculture, there is democratic dimension ofglobalization via expandedaccess to the
internet and electronic mail, but atthe same time there is a homogeneizing dimension product of the
unidirectional character of cable TV, by which a few media conglomerates promote the
Americanization of taste and values. In politics,thereisanascendanceof the power of supranational
institutions in prescribing policies and policingits enforcement. A critical perspective has termed the new
forms of capitalistdevelopment loosely associated with the historical experience of globalization as
institutional capitalism, and this, in turn, has serious implications for the transformation of higher
education.
4.
The Affirmative’s attempts to exert US influence over Latin America would
further reinforce the neoliberal policies that Latin America is trying to escape
Kellogg 2007, A master of arts in integrated studies at Athabasca University he has a PhD in political studies from
Queen’s, a M.A. in political studies from York, and a B.A. in political studies also from York. (Paul, “Regional Integration In Latin
America: Dawn of an Alternative to Neo-liberalism?.” New Political Science Vol. 29.2 June 2007
http://www.reginanockerts.com/Readings/Kellogg%202007%20_%20Regional%20Integration%20in%20Lat%20Am%20Dawn%2
0of%20an%20Alternative%20to%20Neoliberalism.pdf)//JS
What this article will do is—after sketching the surprising new economic conjuncture facing Latin
America—outline two of the new institutions emergingin the wake of the impasse of the FTAA, two
institutions based on regionalintegration outside the terms of the FTAA. One is the Union of South
American Nations (UNASUR), a continuation of the South American Community ofNations (CSN), whose
summit, December 8–9, 2006, brought together representatives from 12 Latin American nations,
including eight heads of state.8An initiative centered on the Brazilian state, the UNASUR/CSN, if
successful,could represent a very real challenge to US hegemony in Latin America. Thesecond is the
BolivarianAlternative for the Americas (ALBA), an initiative centered on the Venezuelan state. ALBA
means “dawn” in Spanish, and there is areal feeling that what we are witnessing is what Hugo Cha´vez
Frı´ as, president of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, has called “the dawn of a new era” in Latin
America9 —an alternative at last to the long night of neoliberalism. This articlewill argue that, while
both initiatives are frequently treated as one—theemergence of a new regionalism in opposition to the
US-led FTAA—they in factneed to be treated separately. The UNASUR, while a challenge to US
hegemony in the region, is completely embedded in a very familiar logic of capital accumulation and
corporate rule. ALBA, by contrast, is closely associated with the mass movements, which are at the
core of the leftward move of many of the region’s politics. If there is to be an alternative to US
hegemony in the region that can challenge capitalism as well as neoliberalism, it will be in relation to
the ALBA initiative, not that of the UNASUR.
5.
The 1AC’s attempts at positive globalization are backed by the drive to make
a profit back home
MacEwan, He has a PhD from Harvard University and is Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of
Massachusetts Boston 1999 (Arthur, Neo-liberalism or Democracy? Economic Strategy, Markets and Alternatives for the 21st
CenturyPub. Zed Books in 1999 Page 6)//JS
In large part, this claim that there is no alternative is based on the argument that the ‘globalization’ of
economic affairs forces virtually all countries of the world to embrace the world market if they wish to
achieve economic development. Globalization in the current era has involved, first of all, a progressive
deregulation of the international movement of goods and capital. Also, globalization today is taking
place in a world which is more and more uniformly capitalist. In this homogenized world economy,
businesses can do the same things in the same ways at a great variety of locations, and, with the
declining regulation of international commerce, they will accordingly continually relocate to the
lowest cost production sites. Thus, the neo-liberals contend,, if the government of a particular country
attempts to regulate private activity in order to achieve some desired social goal – great income equality
or environmental preservation, for example – businesses will simply leave the country for higher profits
elsewhere in the world. On the other hand, the argument continues, if a country eliminates both
external and internal barriers to commerce, globalization will allow it to reap the benefits: low-cost
goods from abroad, access to foreign markets for its own exports, and higher levels of investment by
both foreign and domestic businesses.
Econ/Heg Link
1. US economic policies always place the US at the central of control and place the others under its
reigns.
2. The US economic engagements are purely neoliberal and it constrains the governments of other
nations to the US’s trade policies and makes them abandon their sets of laws.
3. The US uses neoliberal policy to decrease the power of other country in order to increase the
economic assets of the US. That’s 1NC Gill 95
4. That aff’s promotion of market changes further neoliberal experimentation in Latin America
Lander, Professor of Social Sciences at the Universidad Central de Venezuela in Caracas, Summer 1996
(Edgardo, “The Impact of Neoliberal Adjustment in Venezuela, 1989-1993,” Translated by Luis A. Fierro, Latin American Perspective, Vol. 23.3,
50-73. JSTOR)//SG
Beyond the goals of reestablishing macroeconomic equilibria and structural reform of the Venezuelan economy,the economic
policy
we have been examining was part of the neoliberal/neoconservative political project. Neoliberal
thought constitutes not only an economic theory but a normative political one-a concept of what the
relationships between state and society as well as between the economy and the market should be (see
Waligorski, 1990).Starting from a critique of the threats to the free operation of the market represented by Keynesianism, the social-democratic
tradition and, the welfare state,
the neoliberal/neoconservative economists assert a need to rescue democracy
from itself through a radical limitation of the sphere of politics and of democratic decisions. They demand a
fundamental transformation of contemporary political systems with the purpose of recovering the economy's autonomy and its separation
from politics and limiting state action to guaranteeing the basic conditions for the operation of the market forces. "Thus they coincide with the
conservative critics of the "excesses" of contemporary democracy in their advocacy of reducing its scope in order to guarantee the
"governability" of modern societies (Crozier,Huntington, andWatanuki, 1975). In the core countries,no
such "revolutionary"
transformation of political systems has been possible despite the strength of neoliberal ideology and the
efforts of conservative governments such as those of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, which placed these goals at the
center of their political agendas.'2The situation in Latin America is quite different. The debt burden, the
deterioration of the state, the political parties, and the political system in general, and the association of
businessmen, technocrats, and right-wing politicians with international financial capital and the policies of the World Bank and the
have so altered the correlation of social and political power in these societies that
the continent has become an experimental laboratory for the neoliberal transformation. The declining
International Monetary Fund
legitimacy and organizational weakness of the traditional parties, labor unions, and organizations have left the popular sectors in many of the
countries of the continent without an effective voice,allowing
the advance of neoliberal neoconservative political
proposals with only limited resistance. In Venezuela this political project has had its expression in the aforementioned
agreements signed by the national government – behind the backs of Congress, the political parties, and public opinion – with the International
Monetary Fund. Beyond its short-term macroeconomic goals,
there was an attempt to redefine, in accordance with the
neoliberal agenda, the basic relationships between the state and society and between politics,
clienteles, populism, and inefficiency and corruption in state management, neoliberals seek solutions in
the reduction of the role of politics. Thus, the role of the state is reduced and there is an attempt to depoliticize economic
policymaking, isolating it from political debate and thus from populist and/or democratic temptations. From a radically reductionist concept of
the social order according to which only the quantifiable macroeconomic variables are held to be true, a new economic policy is advocated as if
it were exclusively a technical matter, without any attempt to create coalitions or consensus with regard to the proposed changes. Both the
government bureaucrats and the advisers of international organizations present it as an objective requirement of national conditions and those
of the international economy – a requirement that is beyond any possible debate about what type of country we desire. There seems to be
confidence that the weakness and limited legitimacy of parties and labor unions and the precariousness of the popular grass-roots
organizations will allow these transformations to take place without any resistance. In fact,the
important labor conflicts during
the development of the adjustment program have not proved capable of significantly influencing the
general orientation of economic policy. The political parties, both in government and in the opposition, have confronted a
systematic antipolitical and antiparty campaign charging them with corruption and narrow self-interest that has rendered them incapable of
presenting a credible alternative to the government’s policies. In contrast to the situation in other countries of Latin America, where recent
experience of military dictatorship, hyperinflation, or both has allowed the implementation of adjustment policies with relatively little
resistance and without a loss of legitimacy,in
Venezuela the adjustment has led to a deepening of the political crisis.
With the institutional mechanisms for changing these policies constrained, the reactions and resistance
have taken place at the margins of the formal political system. The social explosion of February 1989, the so-called
Caracazo, was the first such extrainstitutional response. The broad (though passive) popular support for the attempted coup of February 1992
was also a clear expression of the increasing disintegration of a political system that once seemed exceptional for its stability.
5. The 1AC uses neoliberalist policies to force their desired market on Latin America
MacEwan, He has a PhD from Harvard University and is Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of
Massachusetts Boston 1999 (Arthur, Neo-liberalism or Democracy? Economic Strategy, Markets and Alternatives for the 21st
CenturyPub. Zed Books in 1999 Page 4-5)//JS
While the basic tenets of neo-liberalism operate in the rich countries, the policy plays its most
powerful role in many of the low-income countries of Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Central and
Eastern Europe. Within these countries, influential groups see their fortunes tied to neo-liberalism, but
the conflict over economic policy is seldom confined within a nation’s borders. Officials from the
international lending agencies, particularly the IMR and the World Bank, from the government of the
economically advanced countries, particularly the United States, andfrom private internationally
operating firms use their economy and political power to foist ‘market oriented’ policy on the peoples
of the low-income countries. The use of the term ‘Washington Consensus’ to sum up the neo-liberal
prescription underscores the role of the US government, the IMF and the World Bank in its
premeditation, as well as the complementary role of the various US research and policy institutes in
providing intellectual support.
6. The 1AC’s attempts at positive globalization are backed by the drive to make a profit back home
MacEwan, He has a PhD from Harvard University and is Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of
Massachusetts Boston 1999 (Arthur, Neo-liberalism or Democracy? Economic Strategy, Markets and Alternatives for the 21st
CenturyPub. Zed Books in 1999 Page 6)//JS
In large part, this claim that there is no alternative is based on the argument that the ‘globalization’ of
economic affairs forces virtually all countries of the world to embrace the world market if they wish to
achieve economic development. Globalization in the current era has involved, first of all, a progressive
deregulation of the international movement of goods and capital. Also, globalization today is taking
place in a world which is more and more uniformly capitalist. In this homogenized world economy,
businesses can do the same things in the same ways at a great variety of locations, and, with the
declining regulation of international commerce, they will accordingly continually relocate to the
lowest cost production sites. Thus, the neo-liberals contend,, if the government of a particular country
attempts to regulate private activity in order to achieve some desired social goal – great income equality
or environmental preservation, for example – businesses will simply leave the country for higher profits
elsewhere in the world. On the other hand, the argument continues, if a country eliminates both
external and internal barriers to commerce, globalization will allow it to reap the benefits: low-cost
goods from abroad, access to foreign markets for its own exports, and higher levels of investment by
both foreign and domestic businesses.
Mexico Link
1. US investment is driven by profit that doesn’t result in the welfare of the Mexican people being
advanced and instead they are suffering because of the low wages.
2. The money that made in Mexico is instead of being put into Mexico’s economy is placed elsewhere.
This incomplete circuit in the Mexican economic causes economic problems.
3. Neoliberalism is a tool of the state viewing human capital as a commodity to sell and trade. The
perceived benefits of such policies simply serve as a mask for the stripping away of fundamental
rights
Kim, Politics & History student and the University of Alberta in Alberta, 2012
(Dongwoo, “Modernization or Betrayal: Neoliberalism in Mexico,” Constellations, Volume 4.1 2012, pg 223-25)//SG
Thus,
Carlos Salinas came to power in times of crisis in 1988. Understanding that PRI’s success was built on and
made economic recovery his priority.6 Furthermore,
Salinas had the ambition of modernizing Mexico through the implementation of neoliberal policies.
perpetuated by economic prosperity during the Mexican Miracle,Salinas
Salinas was educated at Harvard University, where he obtained two master’s degrees and a doctorate in political economy. He was stunned by
“progressive thinking about global economics and the lagging development of the Third World” whenhe
first came across neoliberal
economic theory and immediately drawn to it.7 Hence, Salinas believed that he would both stabilize and
modernize the country through the neoliberal transformation of Mexico. The emphasis on the association between
economic prosperity, modernity, and neoliberalism is apparent in Salinas’ inaugural speech. From the onset, Salinas emphasized that “nuestros
problemas no vienen por eI fracaso de nuestros esfuerzos, sirio por el tamaño de la adversidad,”8 suggesting the existence of a difficulty
beyond national level. Salinas then stated that “[l]a modernización de México es indispensable,” and also “inevitable,” as it is the only way of
affirming “nuestra soberanía en un mundo en profunda transformación.”9 Salinas then employed the word “modernización” various times
throughout his eight-thousand-word speech.Salinas
thus demonstrated his belief that the adoption of neoliberalism
was not only beneficial for Mexico, but also imperative for survival in a fast-changing world. Carlos
Salinas’ series of neoliberal economic policies culminated with the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada.Salinas was at first disinterested in forming a bilateral agreement
with the United States.10 After all, the PRI had staunchly closed up the Mexican economy to the world for the last sixty years and gained
popularity from its nationalist and defensive economic policies (especially against the United States), most notably the nationalization of the
petroleum industry in late 1930s by president Lázaro Cárdenas. However, due to the “lukewarm” response from the world leaders during his
European tour, which included a stop at the World Economic Forum in February of 1989,
Salinas realized that the only way of
drawing investors to Mexico was to “provide [them] with both cheap labor and privileged access to the
U.S. market.”11 Salinas immediately approached the American government officials with the intention
of negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement,shortly thereafter the administration shifted policies for the preparation and
successful negotiation of NAFTA. CarlosSalinas thus marketed NAFTA with fervor in and outside of Mexico and
hastened the pace of the neoliberal reforms. Salinas wrote that he made efforts to “disseminate more information and
confirm the active presence of key economic, labor, and business leaders in working groups” during the period of NAFTA negotiation.12 His
administration privatized public corporations and implemented land reforms. Furthermore, Carlos
Salinas marketed his neoliberal policies as means of modernizing the Mexican politics as well, thus
associating neoliberalism with democracy. In November 1990, Salinas said both political and economic
problems, which he described as “clouds,” were “dissipating.”13 Some even referred to Salinas’ reforms as
“Salinastroika,” paralleling these to the radical introduction of socio-political transparency and freedom in the former Soviet Union.14 The
Salinas administration thus provided hope that these neoliberal economic policies would continue as political reforms as well. Seemingly, Carlos
Salinas’ reforms were successful; his policies did draw foreign investments, Mexico relieved itself of a significant amount of debt and its
economy grew by 4.4% in 1993.15 Salinas administration earned the reputation as a “political juggernaut” for its political competency.16 The
elections for federal senators and state governors held in 1991 reflected the surging popularity of the Salinas administration; the PRI candidates
won 61 percent of the congressional votes, giving Salinas “the power to make laws without having to seek any support from the opposition.”17
Most importantly, Carlos Salinas’ leadership earned the respect and confidence of foreign investors. According to Dillon and Preston, President
Clinton praised Salinas for giving Mexico “better leadership than ever in [Clinton’s] lifetime” and The Wall Street Journal “looked favorably on
[his] reforms.”18Salinas was
thus deemed a progressive and modern leader by the “first world,” and many
believed that Mexico was truly modernizing.Many ordinary Mexicans shared this feeling
ofbuoyancyandprogress brought by NAFTA—the primary form of neoliberalism that they came across. Mexicans had long
identified the United States with “modernity,”19 and although historically described as an “imperialist bully,” it was a country
to be admired.20 According to Dillon and Preston, the successful negotiation ofNAFTA
gave Mexicans the impression that
they were entering an equal relationship with the “First World countries” like the United States or
Canada,and thus rendered an elevated sense of patriotism.21 Martín Calderón, an entrepreneur, echoed the ebullient sentiment of many
Mexicans when he said that NAFTA would render “fantastic opportunities to Mexico.”22The economic prosperity benefited
many Mexicans in the upper and middle classes.Those in the middle class then started to use credit cards to purchase “first
world” luxury items, which added to the sense of modernization. Hence, neoliberalism, mainly manifested in form of NAFTA to ordinary
Mexicans, was in a way perceived as the very signal of Mexico’s modernization and advancement into the “first world.” Many Mexicans, who
believed in PRI government’s promises about modernization, were hopeful for political changes as well.Nonetheless,
not everyone
shared this sense of advancement or modernization; in fact, neoliberalism symbolized the effective
betrayal of the Mexican pueblo by PRI for those in the marginalized sectors of the society. Although some
Mexicans, like Martín Calderón, received the neoliberal reforms of the Salinas administration positively, many others, especially
those in the marginalized sectors of the Mexican society, saw these as the betrayal of the pueblo by PRI.
Contrary to their name and self-constructed image of a “Revolutionary Party,” PRI had been betraying the populist promises embodied by the
Mexican Revolution and the Constitution of 1917.PRI
regime had become a brutal oppressor, which had led Mario
Vargas Llosa to refer to Mexico as “the perfect dictatorship.”23 The brutal acts of oppression by PRI, the
crackdown of the student protesters in the Tlatelolco Massacre of 1968being just one of the many examples, had
been shadowed by decades of brilliant economic performance between 1940s and 1970s. The neoliberal policies of the Salinas
administration had various aspects that conflicted with the core elements of the Mexican
nationalism,which had been greatly influenced by the memories and symbols of the Mexican Revolution. First, as Frederick C. Turner
notes, xenophobia, especially against the United States, formed a fundamental base of the Mexican
nationalism.24 The war of 1847 and loss of territories are deeply ingrained in the Mexican public discourse. However, the main element of
the modern Mexican nationalism is the memories of the Mexican Revolution of 1910. As Lynn Stephen claims, the images of Emiliano Zapata,
the leader of the original Zapatista movement, were “[served] as a symbol for the institutionalization and nationalization of the Mexican
Revolution,primarilyunderthetutelageof[...]PRI.”25 HenryC.SchmidtnotesthattheRevolution came to be perceived as the “protean mythos of
nationhood.”26 The Constitution of 1917, which was born out of the Revolution, fulfilled—at least in words—the pueblo’s demand for land
reform (ejidos) and empowered the labor sector through the articles 27 and 123, respectively.27 All of these historical memories were
embedded in the discourse of national identity, more so as PRI had appropriated and perpetuated these to legitimize its rule. All in all, the
Mexican Revolution played a fundamental role in shaping the modern national identity of Mexico. Therefore,
the neoliberal policies of
the Salinas administration that challenged the achievements of the Mexican Revolution and opened up
to the United States, the ancient enemy and “imperialist bully,” symbolized PRI’s turning away from the
promises of the Mexican Revolutionand even the Mexican pueblo itself. Alejandra, one of the interviewees of Judith Hellman,
echoes the sentiment of betrayal incurred by neoliberalism when she says that the “real history of Mexico has become an embarrassment to
the regime.”28 The following cases of unions, maquila workers, and land reforms, which demonstrate the contradiction of the promises of the
Constitution of 1917, support my claim thatthe
neoliberal policies undertaken by the PRI regime symbolize the clear
betrayal on the Mexican pueblo.Carlos Salinas trampled the workers’ rights, one of the key victories of the Mexican Revolution
enshrined in the Constitution of 1917, as part of his neoliberal economic agenda. The article 123 of the Constitution of 1917, among many other
things, guarantees the right of the workers, whether employed by public or private enterprises, to organize and strike; it states that “[t]oda
persona tiene derecho al trabajo digno y socialmente útil; al efecto, se promoverán la creación de empleos y la organización social de trabajo,
conforme a la ley.”29 Salinas’ brutal crackdown on union workers, which completely contradicted the article 123, symbolized the continuation
of the PRI government’s betrayal and oppression. For Salinas, thecrackdown of
the unions was a necessary step before the
implementation of his neoliberal policies. In the context of free trade with Canada and the United States, the “competitive
advantage” of Mexico consisted of “cheap labor” and “a minimum of state intervention in the economy,” and thus the labor had to be subdued
before anything else.30 According to Mark Eric Williams, most of the scholars agree that the “weak labor opposition,” diluted in the CTM, was
one of the key characteristics of the Mexican industry that allowed Salinas to implement his privatization policies.31 However, the labor leaders
who wielded significant influence in Mexican society, such as Joaquín Hernández or Agapito Gónzalez definitely posed a threat to Salinas’
agenda and hence it was necessary for him to overcome this opposition beforehand.Instead
of negotiation, which would have
been preferred in modernized countries and more in line with the Constitution of 1917, Salinas chose a
rather caudillo and PRI method of resolving conflicts: brutal crackdown.
4. US engagement with Mexico resulted in the spread of neoliberalism and an economic crash
Greenberg, et al, Ph.D in Anthropology at University of Michigan, 2012
(James B., Thomas Weaver (Ph.D. in Anthropology at University of California at Berkeley), Anne Browning-Aiken (Ph.D. in Anthropology at
University of Arizona), William L. Alexander (Professor of Anthropology at University of Arizona), “The Neoliberal Transformation of Mexico,”
Neoliberalism and Commodity Production in Mexico, University Press of Colorado, pp 3-4)//SG
President Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988) began his administration facing a depression greater than any in the post-revolutionary period. The
external debt had risen from a manageable 30 percent of the GDP in 1981 to 63 percent in 1983, with interest on the national debt absorbing
half of the country’s export income (Bosworth, Lawrence, and Lustig 1992:7). Eighty cents of every dollar earned from the oil industry was
owed to foreign banks. The debt had climbed to over $100 million when Mexico declared a debt moratorium in 1982.Bailing Mexico
out
of this crisis required a worldwide effort by banks supported by the US Federal Reserve, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB),and the US Department of the Treasury(Adams 1997:6).Their support,
however, was conditional on Mexico taking steps toput its economic house in order, which entailedadopting
neoliberal policies. From 1982 to 1985 the IMF backed a program to stabilize Mexico’s economy through fiscal and monetary
constraints.The program failedas a result of slow structural reform,and a new monetary crisis ensued, with the currency
rate set at 150 pesos per dollar.These loans came with a set of conditionalities that obliged the borrowing
governments to both adopt strict monetarist measures and institute free mar- ket and free trade
policies (Easterly 2005:3; Koeberle 2003:251). Although the intent of thestructural adjustmentprogram(SAP) was to
stimulate economic growthand help governments clean up their finances, the specific measures applied depended on local
circumstances. Commonly,these programsincluded a variety of neoliberal measures to
reducegovernmentspending, open markets, and encourage exports.As these neoliberal policies were implemented,
specific parts of the economy experienced immediate impacts. Neoliberalmeasuresto reduce government
expendituresultimatelytranslated into cutting programsand subsidiesand downsizing spending on health,
education, and welfare (Kolko 1999). The immediate effects includedincreased unemploymentas government and other civil
servants were laid off,loss of services, and rising pricesas subsidized commodities were forced into line with the market.
Frequently,monetary reforms included devaluation of the local currency against international currencies such as the US
dollar. Such devaluations have a double impact:they make national goods more competitivein the world market,but they
also drive up the price of imports.To curb inflation,neoliberal reforms typically included measures to restrict
creditby eliminating ceilings on interest rates,causing rates to soar and credit to dry up.Under the banner of market
liberalization and free trade, actions were taken to lift restrictions on foreign investments in local industry, banks, and other sectors of the
economy that enjoyed special protection and to abolish or cut tariffs, quotas, and other restrictions on imports. To encourage the
competitiveness of exports, SAP reforms often sought to deregulate export-oriented sectors of the economy and to free these sectors from
government controls that protected labor, the environ- ment, and natural resources (Babb 2005; Bello 1996:286). Because ultimately so much
rests on “getting prices right,” these packages often include policies to hold the line on wages or even to force them down (at least in terms of
their true foreign exchange equivalents) in an effort to make exports more competitive (Greenberg 1997).
5. Neoliberal reforms such as the aff have and will devastate the Mexican population
Watt, Masters from the University of Iowa; PhD from the University of Aberdeen; Professor of Latin American politics at The
University of Sheffield, 2010, (Peter, “NAFTA 15 Years on: The Strange Fruits of Neoliberalism”
http://www.stateofnature.org/?p=6369)//JS
Neoliberalism, then, has reduced the ability of Mexicans to participate in any meaningful democratic
process. While the 2000 elections in which the 70 year-long rule of theInstitutional Revolutionary
Party(PRI) came to an end represented a change on some level, it is difficult to see how this translated
into outcomes that have beneficial consequences for peoples’ lives.Regardless of the party in power, a
key provision of the NAFTA treaty allows investors to sue governments if legislation negatively affects
profits. With this, the Mexican state effectively passed control of environmental, labour and health
and safety legislation to multinational corporations. As a result, laws which protect the natural
environment are rarely enforced against corporations as the threat of legal action acts as a successful
deterrent.As part of neoliberal restructuring, Mexico would have to re-orientate its economy to the
export rather than the domestic market. Mexico was already heavily dependent on trade with the US,
but post-1982, Mexico’s dependency has become almost akin to that of a colony. US agricultural
products – most notably corn – subsidised by American taxpayers now flooded the Mexican market,
undercutting small domestic producers. For Mexican farmers the consequences have been ruinous
and have devastated domestic production, a process which continues under the recent government of
theNational Action Party(PAN).Concurrent with a reduction in real wages for the majority and cuts in
public spending, Mexicans were dealt a second blow with the onset of neoliberalism. Prices for daily
necessities, many of which previously were subsidised by the state, rose dramatically. Milk, tortillas,
petrol, electricity and public transport all became more expensive just as personal incomes began to
decline. In keeping with neoliberal logic, the government closed the CONASUPO shops which provided
subsidised necessities cheaply to poor communities. [11] This had a knock-on effect on those producing
subsidised corn and milk, who now found themselves not only undercut by imported food products, but
also without CONASUPO stores to buy their produce. Soon after the implementation of NAFTA,
Mexican corn farmers saw the price of their produce decline by 50 percent. Within the first decade of
neoliberal reform, the number of people living in poverty in Mexico rose by a third and around half the
population had no access to basic necessities. [12]
Venezuela Link
1. Contrary to popular belief the US doesn’t promote the neoliberal policies to help the other country,
but rather in Venezuela because the US has interest in their resources.
2. The US uses and imposes its neoliberal policies to secure interest not to maintain relations. That’s
1NC Clement 05
3. Venezuela is working towards an anti-neoliberal structure—US intervention prevents
Albo, Department of Political Science, York University, 06 (Gregory, “The Unexpected Revolution: Venezuela Confronts Neoliberalism”,
Presentation at the University of Alberta, International Development Week, 1/06, http://socialistproject.ca/theory/venezuela_praksis.pdf)//AS
A basic goal of neoliberalism is to reduce the role of the state in domestic policymaking and increase
the control of foreign capital over local economies. Venezuela has argued that the state must maintain
a role in promoting domestic economic development through strategic use of tariffs and government subsidies to protect
nascent industries and promote local development of jobs, as in the VuelvanCaras program. These are tools that governments around the
world -including the U.S. - have used for decades to help promote national economic growth and create local jobs.'"' Yet the
U.S. and EU
proposals in the WTO"" would drastically reduce the ability of developing countries from employing the
same strategies we used, effectively "kicking away the ladder of development."•'" Venezuela has opposed
these measures in global arenas, signing on with a group of 11 countries calling for the right to protect developing country's industrial policy
space in the WTO, for example. Another key aspect of Venezuela's opposition to corporate globalization is in its
approach to services. The "liberalization" of services involves privatizing services that are owned by the public to meet basic human needs
including health care, education, and distribution of water and electricity. But these basic
services are guaranteed to
Venezuelans in the Constitution. Programs like Barrio Adentro and the education missions, detailed above, ensure access of
Venezuelans to basic services. At the same time, promoting regional integration programs focusing on eradicating
illiteracy have been a focus on the Chavez administration: on April l8th, 2005 Venezuela presented a proposal for a massive regional
literacy program to a visiting UNESCO committee."" These programs exemplify the commitment to the right to basic services, and are
incompatible with privatized education or health care. And the
case of SAIC's interference in the Venezuelan oil
company's PdVSA's computer operations is a dire warning about the danger of allowing foreign
ownership of domestic services in strategic industries.
4. The affirmative attempts to better the lives of Venezuelans has empirically failed due to the
neoliberal policies that are reinforced by the 1AC
Hellinger Professor of Political Science at Webster University in St. Louis and directs the International Relations Program
1991 (Daniel, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy Pub. Westview Press pp. 197-98)//JS
As might be expected, the sudden rise in oil prices was welcomenews to the politically and economically
troubled nation, but President Perez soon made it clear that his embrace of an austere program of
economic readjustment, designed to satisfy the conditions laid down by the International Monetary
Fund, remained firm. In fact, despite expectations that the Gulf crisis would generate an additional
US$2 billion in export earnings, the government admitted it would fall $800 million short on debt
obligations due in November 1990.16 Some additional fund~ would be spent to ease the plight of the
poorest sectors, but within a month of the outbreak of the Persian Gulf crisis, it had become clear that
any improvement in economic conditions for the majority of families would have to wait several more
years of what Venezuelansbitterly call the "Perez truca" ("Perez trick").February 27 will probably stand
out in Venezuelan history as anevent similar to the massacre of students in the Plaza of Tlalteleco
inMexico City in 1968, that is, as a turning point in which the hegemony of the governing elite can no
longer be taken for granted, as the beginningof a longer term historical process of change. Even if AD
were to returnto its popular roots and offer a more humane and just approach toeconomic reform, the
level of repression may very well grow and threatenthe democratic gains made between 1935 and 1958.
With the enormous resources of the media and the power of the international banks and corporations
behind them, proponents of the neoliberal project have enormous advantages over proponents of the
alternative, democratizing project of the new social movements
5. Their representations of disaster as something the US has to fix is a cover for the expansion of
neoliberalism
Dubhashi, Ph.D. at Pune University, former Vice-Chanceller, Goa University, and an erstwhile Secretary,
Government of India, December 20, 2008
(Padmakar, “Myth and Reality of Capitalism: Neo-Liberalism and Globalisation,” MAINSTREAM, VOL
XLVII, NO 1, http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1111.html)//SG
EVER since Ronald Reagan of the Republican Party was elected the President of the US, an extremely conservative economic
ideology advocating unbridled capitalism and free market, as preached by Milton Friedman and his Chicago
School, has become the ruling economic ideology of the USA, going by the name of “Washington Consensus”. Under the
Presidency of George Bush (Junior), it has reached its acme. This was manifested in the privatisation of even “core”
functions of government, maximum deregulation, cut in expenditure on people’s welfare programmes and
promotion of neo-liberal policies all over the world. The prolonged Iraq war from 2003 till date is an example of
the extreme ideology. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfield brought the corporates into the heart of the US military. Logistic functions
relating to the war were handed over to private companies like Halliburton with which Vice-President Cheney has been intimately connected.
Health care and housing for soldiers were privatised. All the security functions were discharged by Blackwater including the security the US
military base and its seat of governance (Paul Bremmer’s Green Zone area). Of course, production and supply of weapons and material were all
handled by private companies. The contracts for Iraq oil exploitation were prepared by private firms. The selected contractors, whether for oil
exploitation or constru-ction in infrastructure projects, sub-contracted, since they themselves had no operational base.
The local Iraqi
public sector enterprises were left-outs, so were the local professionals. The Defence Minister, Donald Rumsfeld,
was a strong advocate of this approach of slim military, supported by a huge network of corporations. Billions of dollars spent on
the Iraq War want to the coffers of these private corporations. The Department of Homeland Security, set up after 9/11,
handed over $ 130 billion to private contractors to develop and install detection equipment and cameras against unproven threats. The war
on terror, an un-winnable proposition, has become a permanent fixture of the global economic
architecture. In the name of security. The Bush Administration fulfilled the corporate mission of merging political and corporate
interests. The same approach was adopted in dealing with the calamity of Hurricane Katrina which hit New
Orleans in September 2005. The poor people were left homeless as their public housing was washed away. So were the public schools where
Friedman saw in this the opportunity for privatisation of housing and schooling
system. Here again the private contractors failed in housing the poor. The poor were provided with vouchers to be paid
to the owners of the private schools which had a good business opportunity to make money. The
money-making got the better of the provision of public services like education and health to the poor. No
wonder the New Orleans rehabilitation programmes did no good to the poor. The Iraq war and Hurricane Katrina, both
“disasters”, have been good opportunities to corporate business for making money. Israel, the mini-USA in
the Middle East, has discovered that “perpetual” war with Arabs, whether in Palestine or in Lebanon, is conducive to
its dynamic economy. The rise of insecurity the world over has been an opportunity for Israel to develop the “security industry” in a big
their children studied. Milton
way. This is what Klein calls the “Disaster Capitalism” of today
Cuba Link
1. Cubans don’t like the US policies because they have been associated with oppression.
2. The Central Americans do not accept the expansion of neoliberal policies because they want to
develop their own economy separate from the US. That’s 1NC LaFeber 93
3. Neoliberal policies won’t work in Cuba - Cubans reject it – the aff fails
Carmona - Professor of Economics at the Universidad San Pablo. Spring 2000
(Antonio, “Cuba: Reforms and Adjustments Versus Transition,” International Journal of Political Economy. Vol 30.1, pp. 85. JSTOR)//SG
The difference among highly industrialized countries lies in the manner in which these elements are
implemented and in their political capacity. Each country has developed its own variant mode ofproduction throughout its
history. What makesWestern Europe different from the rest ofthe world's capitalist economies is their welfare
state, where the interests ofworkers are safeguardedin the legal and con- stitutional framework. The welfare state in
Europe was consolidated after World War II.The benefits ofthe welfare state and its reforms were won after nearly a
century of worker-based struggles and the efforts of unions, labor parties, and other emancipation groups. One cannot account for
the high level ofproductivity experienced in Western Europe without taking into consideration the framework in which the state operates. In
Cuba, most
ofthe welfare-state attributes were brought into existence with- out the installation ofan
industrialization process, and in a relatively short period of time. In this manner, the overthrow ofthe
FulgencioBatista regime andthe implementation ofthe so-called socialist project can be seen as revolutionary.
The institutional and infrastructure capacity forproductivity exists only through na- tional state power,the very same power
that guards the welfare reforms.Another reason for CUbans to reject neoliberalism is that Cuban workers are
already accus- tomed to the benefits ofthe welfare state and the political space for expressing economic
interests. Ultimately, what allows the Cuban government to enjoy sta- bility and support frommostworkers
isthe fact that Cubanworkers are much more involved in production planningthan their counterparts in free-market
econo- mies.Cubansare most likely tosupport Fidel Castro rather than allowmultina- tionalcompaniesto rule the
countryand wipe away benefits that were implemented a generation ago. The logical step for Cuba to take is to maintain a high level of
socialization ofproductivity and an increase in hard-currency profits
4. American economic engagement strategies are distinctly neoliberal and subscribe to exceptionalist
theories
Gill, Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science at York University, 95 (Stephen, “Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and
Disciplinary Neoliberalism”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 24:3, 1995, Sage Publications)//AS
North American arrangements are more hierarchical and asymmetrical,understood both in inter-state terms and in
terms of the class structures of eachnation. NAFTA is premised upon a low level of political institutionalisation
anda hub-and-spoke configuration of power, with the United States at the centre ofa continentalised
political economy. This is even more the case with theCaribbean Basin Initiative, which can be terminated unilaterally by the
UnitedStates." The United States has negotiated the implicit right to monitor andcontrol large areas of Canadian political life in the US-Canada
Free TradeAgreement. The US-Canada Agreement specifies that each side has to notify the other "˜party' by advanced warning, of intended
federal or provincial government policy that might affect the other side's interests, as defined by the agreements Because of Canada's extensive
economic integration with the United States, this situation necessarily affects the vast majority of Canadian economic activity, but not vice
versa. Thus, Canadian governments no longer can contemplate an independent or interventionist economic strategy. In
both NAFTA
and the US-Canada Agreement there are no transnational citizenship rights other than those accorded
to capital, and these are defined to favour US-registered companies. Finally, NAFTA can only be amended by
agreement of all signatories. Whilst these arrangements place binding constraints on the policies of Canada and Mexico, to a certain degree,
the United States retains constitutional autonomy and important prerogatives: its trade law is
allowed to override treaty provisions, notwithstanding the rights of redress that are available to participants through the
dispute settlement mechanisms." In other words, the US government is using access to its vast market as a lever of
power, linked to a reshaping of the international business climate, by subjecting other nations to the
disciplines of the new constitutionalism, whilst largely refusing to submit to them itself, partly for strategic
reasons. Indeed, one of the arguments expressed by former European Union President Jacques Delors in favour of comprehensive West
European economic and monetary union was strategic: to offset economic unilateralism from the United States, in matters of money and trade.
Thus, an
American-centred global neoliberalism _mandates a separation of politics and economics in
ways that may narrow political representation and constrain democratic social choice in many parts of the
world. New constitutionalism, which rarities this separation, may have become the de facto discourse of governance for most of the global
political economy. This discourse involves a hierarchy of pressures and constraints on government autonomy that vary according to the size,
economic strength, form of state and civil society, and prevailing national and regional institutional capabilities, as well as the degree of
integration into global capital and money markets.
5. That aff’s promotion of market changes further neoliberal experimentation in Latin America
Lander, Professor of Social Sciences at the Universidad Central de Venezuela in Caracas, Summer 1996
(Edgardo, “The Impact of Neoliberal Adjustment in Venezuela, 1989-1993,” Translated by Luis A. Fierro, Latin American Perspective, Vol. 23.3,
50-73. JSTOR)//SG
Beyond the goals of reestablishing macroeconomic equilibria and structural reform of the Venezuelan economy,the economic
policy
we have been examining was part of the neoliberal/neoconservative political project. Neoliberal
thought constitutes not only an economic theory but a normative political one-a concept of what the
relationships between state and society as well as between the economy and the market should be (see
Waligorski, 1990).Starting from a critique of the threats to the free operation of the market represented by Keynesianism, the social-democratic
tradition and, the welfare state,
the neoliberal/neoconservative economists assert a need to rescue democracy
from itself through a radical limitation of the sphere of politics and of democratic decisions. They demand a
fundamental transformation of contemporary political systems with the purpose of recovering the economy's autonomy and its separation
from politics and limiting state action to guaranteeing the basic conditions for the operation of the market forces. "Thus they coincide with the
conservative critics of the "excesses" of contemporary democracy in their advocacy of reducing its scope in order to guarantee the
"governability" of modern societies (Crozier,Huntington, andWatanuki, 1975). In the core countries,no
such "revolutionary"
transformation of political systems has been possible despite the strength of neoliberal ideology and the
efforts of conservative governments such as those of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, which placed these goals at the
center of their political agendas.'2The situation in Latin America is quite different. The debt burden, the
deterioration of the state, the political parties, and the political system in general, and the association of
businessmen, technocrats, and right-wing politicians with international financial capital and the policies of the World Bank and the
have so altered the correlation of social and political power in these societies that
the continent has become an experimental laboratory for the neoliberal transformation. The declining
International Monetary Fund
legitimacy and organizational weakness of the traditional parties, labor unions, and organizations have left the popular sectors in many of the
countries of the continent without an effective voice,allowing
the advance of neoliberal neoconservative political
proposals with only limited resistance. In Venezuela this political project has had its expression in the aforementioned
agreements signed by the national government – behind the backs of Congress, the political parties, and public opinion – with the International
Monetary Fund. Beyond its short-term macroeconomic goals,
there was an attempt to redefine, in accordance with the
neoliberal agenda, the basic relationships between the state and society and between politics,
clienteles, populism, and inefficiency and corruption in state management, neoliberals seek solutions in
the reduction of the role of politics. Thus, the role of the state is reduced and there is an attempt to depoliticize economic
policymaking, isolating it from political debate and thus from populist and/or democratic temptations. From a radically reductionist concept of
the social order according to which only the quantifiable macroeconomic variables are held to be true, a new economic policy is advocated as if
it were exclusively a technical matter, without any attempt to create coalitions or consensus with regard to the proposed changes. Both the
government bureaucrats and the advisers of international organizations present it as an objective requirement of national conditions and those
of the international economy – a requirement that is beyond any possible debate about what type of country we desire. There seems to be
confidence that the weakness and limited legitimacy of parties and labor unions and the precariousness of the popular grass-roots
organizations will allow these transformations to take place without any resistance. In fact,the
important labor conflicts during
the development of the adjustment program have not proved capable of significantly influencing the
general orientation of economic policy. The political parties, both in government and in the opposition, have confronted a
systematic antipolitical and antiparty campaign charging them with corruption and narrow self-interest that has rendered them incapable of
presenting a credible alternative to the government’s policies. In contrast to the situation in other countries of Latin America, where recent
experience of military dictatorship, hyperinflation, or both has allowed the implementation of adjustment policies with relatively little
resistance and without a loss of legitimacy,in
Venezuela the adjustment has led to a deepening of the political crisis.
With the institutional mechanisms for changing these policies constrained, the reactions and resistance
have taken place at the margins of the formal political system. The social explosion of February 1989, the so-called
Caracazo, was the first such extrainstitutional response. The broad (though passive) popular support for the attempted coup of February 1992
was also a clear expression of the increasing disintegration of a political system that once seemed exceptional for its stability.
Perm Blocks
Perm – Do Both
Group the permutations
1. There’s not articulated net benefit to the perm – don’t let them concoct one
later
2. If we win any other links the k is competitive and we win the perm – here’s
some link args
[Link Analysis]
3. Perm fails--The revolution is coopted by institutional politics and any capitalist
involvement
Katz, economist, researcher at the National Council of Science and Technology (CNCT), professor of
economics at the University of Buenos Aires 07-- (Claudio, “Socialist Strategies in Latin America”,
Monthly Review 59:4, 9/07, ProQuest)//AS
The Latin American left is once again discussing the paths to socialism. The correlation of forces has
changed through popular action, the crisis of neoliberalism, and U.S. imperialism's loss of offensive
capability. lt is no longer relevant to juxtapose a revolutionary political period of the past with a
conservative present. The social weakness of the industrial working class does not impede anticapitalist progress, which depends on the exploited and the oppressed uniting in common struggle.
What is crucial is the level of popular consciousness. The latter has forged new anti-liberal and antiimperialist convictions, but an anti- capitalist link, which an open debate about twenty-first century
socialism could foster, is still missing. The constitutional framework that replaced the dictatorships does
not impede the left's development. But the left must avoid institutional co-optation without turning its
back on the electoral process. Electoral participation can be made compatible with the promotion of
people's power. Movements and parties fulfill a complementary function since social struggle is not selfsufficient and partisan organization is neces- sary. Yet it is essential to avoid sectarian posturing and to
include im mediate improvements as part of the revolutionary agenda. This principle governs all
socialist strategy.
4. Capitalism is doomed to fail—rejection is key to avoid rampant exceptional violence
Springer,assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Victoria12 (Simon,
“Neoliberalising violence: of the exceptional and the exemplary in coalescing moments”, Area 44:2,
Royal Geographical Society, 2012, Wiley Online)//AS
The point of our critiques should not be to temper neoliberalism with concessions and niceties, as
capitalism of any sort is doomed to fail. The logics of creative destruction, uneven development and
unlimited expansion – which stoke the fires of conflict and contradict the finite limitations of the earth
– are capitalism’s undoing regardless of the form it takes (Harvey 2007). Hence, what instead needs to
be occurring in our scholarship on neoliberalism is a more thorough radicalisation of our agenda,
where the purpose becomes to consign neoliberalism and all other forms of capitalism to the waste
bin of history, so that the ‘exceptional’ and ‘exemplary’ violence of this maligned chapter of human
existence become disturbing abominations from our past, not enduring realities of our present, or
conceded inevitabilities of our future. What I mean by exceptional violence is that violence which
appears to fall outside of the rule, usually by being so profound in its manifestation. Exceptional
violence forces those who bear witness to its implications to recognise its malevolence precisely
because of the sheer shock and horror that is unleashed. Consequently, exceptional violence is jarring
and elicits a deep emotional response. Yet, exceptional violence is only exceptional in the reaction it
provokes and, as the proverb ‘the exception proves the rule’ hints, exceptional violence is not beyond
the bounds of the normative, but instead actually always exists in a co-constitutive relationship with
exemplary violence, or that violence which forms the rule.
5. The alt draws a line in the sand – your use of the state puts you on the same level as
the elite exploiting the poor – that’s another link
Perm – Pragmatism
1. Perm fails – Neoliberalism coopts and appropriates resistance movements—
coexistence is impossible
Clarke, Professor of Social Policy at the Open University 08 (John, “Living with/in and without neoliberalism”, Focaal 51, 2008, http://oro.open.ac.uk/18127/1/10_Clarke.pdf)//AS
By cohabitation I mean to identify the problem of how neo-liberalism lives with “others” in the world.
As a political–cultural project it must find ways of engaging with other projects, seeking to displace,
subordinate, or appropriate them. Most attention has been focused on the work of displacement—the
exclusion, marginalization, or residualization of other projects, discourses, and ways of imagining the
world and life within it. There are also the processes of subordination and appropriation. Each of these
terms accounts for the continued place of alternative political– cultural projects in a neo-liberal
dominated or directed assemblage. Subordination points to the allocation of secondary or subsidiary
roles for other institutions, practices, and discourses: allowed to function but in more confined spaces,
with narrowed scope (residual versions of the “social” or “welfarism,” perhaps; Clarke, 2007).
Appropriation points to a more active process that some have described as cooption or incorporation.
For example, Kothari (2005), writing about the politics of development, argues that the neo-liberal
agenda “co-opted the ‘alternative’ critical discourses” of development. As a consequence: Forms of
alternative development become institutionalized and less distinct from conventional, mainstream
development discourse and practice. … This strategy of appropriation reduced spaces of critique and
dissent, since the inclusion and appropriation of ostensibly radical discourses limited the potential for
challenge from outside the mainstream to orthodox development planning and practice… .As these
approaches were adopted they were embedded within a neoliberal discourse … and became
increasingly technicalised, subject to regimes of professionalisation which institutionalized forms of
knowledge, analytical skills, tools, techniques and frameworks. (Kothari 2005: 438–9) This view of cooptation hints at the discursive and political work of articulation—taking existing discourses, projects,
practices, and imaginaries and reworking them within a framing neoliberal conception of development
and its place in the world. Just as Kothari points to the incorporation of alternative/critical approaches
to development, and work on “difference” points to the reworking of radical politics of difference into a
normalized model of the individual consumer citizen (Richardson 2005), so other wouldbe
transformative political projects have been appropriated and reworked through a neo-liberal frame.
Dagnino (2006), writing about struggles over citizenship in Brazil, points to the “perverse confluence”
between key organizing ideas and principles of social movements and neoliberal politics, especially
those of “participation” and citizenship, which were centrally articulated by radical movements: Living
with/in and without neo-liberalism | 139 s10_fcl510110 4/9/08 9:27 PM Page 139There is thus a
perverse confluence between, on the one hand, participation as part of a project constructed around
the extension of citizenship and the deepening of democracy, and on the other hand, participation
associated with the project of a minimal state that requires the shrinking of its social responsibilities and
its progressive exemption from the role of guarantor of rights. The perversity of this confluence reflects
the fact that, although pointing to opposite and even antagonistic directions, both projects require an
active, proactive civil society… A particularly important aspect of the perverse confluence is precisely
the notion of citizenship, which is now being redefined through a series of discursive shifts to make it
suitable for use by neo-liberal forces. This new redefinition, part of the struggle between different
political projects, attests to the symbolic power of citizenship and the mobilizing capacity it has
demonstrated in organizing subaltern sectors around democratizing projects. The need to neutralize
these features of citizenship, while trying to retain its symbolical power, has made its appropriation by
neo-liberal forces necessary (Dagnino 2006: 158f.; emphasis in original). Dagnino talks about the
political frustration and confusion resulting from the “apparently shared discourse” (2006: 162) in ways
that are echoed by Bondi and Laurie’s observations about the “sense of uncertainty, ambivalence and
perplexity about the politics of the processes we were observing and analyzing” (2005: 394). This
“confusion” emerges precisely at the point of appropriation, articulation, and transformation exercised
by the neo-liberal re-framing of existing radical and alternative discourses. Neo-liberalism is marked by
a capacity to bend these words (and the political and cultural imaginaries they carry) to new purposes.
2. There’s no articulated net benefit to the perm – don’t let them concoct one later
3. Perm fails--The revolution is coopted by institutional politics and any capitalist
involvement
Katz, economist, researcher at the National Council of Science and Technology (CNCT), professor of
economics at the University of Buenos Aires 07-- (Claudio, “Socialist Strategies in Latin America”,
Monthly Review 59:4, 9/07, ProQuest)//AS
The Latin American left is once again discussing the paths to socialism. The correlation of forces has
changed through popular action, the crisis of neoliberalism, and U.S. imperialism's loss of offensive
capability. lt is no longer relevant to juxtapose a revolutionary political period of the past with a
conservative present. The social weakness of the industrial working class does not impede anticapitalist progress, which depends on the exploited and the oppressed uniting in common struggle.
What is crucial is the level of popular consciousness. The latter has forged new anti-liberal and antiimperialist convictions, but an anti- capitalist link, which an open debate about twenty-first century
socialism could foster, is still missing. The constitutional framework that replaced the dictatorships does
not impede the left's development. But the left must avoid institutional co-optation without turning its
back on the electoral process. Electoral participation can be made compatible with the promotion of
people's power. Movements and parties fulfill a complementary function since social struggle is not selfsufficient and partisan organization is neces- sary. Yet it is essential to avoid sectarian posturing and to
include im mediate improvements as part of the revolutionary agenda. This principle governs all
socialist strategy.
4. Capitalism is doomed to fail—rejection is key to avoid rampant exceptional violence
Springer,assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Victoria12 (Simon,
“Neoliberalising violence: of the exceptional and the exemplary in coalescing moments”, Area 44:2,
Royal Geographical Society, 2012, Wiley Online)//AS
The point of our critiques should not be to temper neoliberalism with concessions and niceties, as
capitalism of any sort is doomed to fail. The logics of creative destruction, uneven development and
unlimited expansion – which stoke the fires of conflict and contradict the finite limitations of the earth
– are capitalism’s undoing regardless of the form it takes (Harvey 2007). Hence, what instead needs to
be occurring in our scholarship on neoliberalism is a more thorough radicalisation of our agenda,
where the purpose becomes to consign neoliberalism and all other forms of capitalism to the waste
bin of history, so that the ‘exceptional’ and ‘exemplary’ violence of this maligned chapter of human
existence become disturbing abominations from our past, not enduring realities of our present, or
conceded inevitabilities of our future. What I mean by exceptional violence is that violence which
appears to fall outside of the rule, usually by being so profound in its manifestation. Exceptional
violence forces those who bear witness to its implications to recognise its malevolence precisely
because of the sheer shock and horror that is unleashed. Consequently, exceptional violence is jarring
and elicits a deep emotional response. Yet, exceptional violence is only exceptional in the reaction it
provokes and, as the proverb ‘the exception proves the rule’ hints, exceptional violence is not beyond
the bounds of the normative, but instead actually always exists in a co-constitutive relationship with
exemplary violence, or that violence which forms the rule.
Perm – All Other Instances
1. This is intrinsic – our alternative isn’t about other instances except in this round and
that’s a voter.
A. Decreases clash - the aff can get out of every disad or counterplan with intrinsicness
discouraging participation in debate.
B. Makes the aff a moving target- perm advocates the plan and action not endorsed by the
1AC. Key to predictable ground and strategy.
C. Infinitely regressive- their perm could do the plan, the counterplan, and create world
peace or bake a pie, the neg won’t be able to predict which way they could add something
to the perm.
D. It’s a voter for fairness and education.
2. There’s not articulated net benefit to the perm – don’t let them concoct one later
3. Can’t solve -The “other instances” they reject aren’t present in this round. It’s not in
the judge’s jurisdiction to reject something that doesn’t exist. Our argument deals
with the in-round interactions in which we debate through certain modes of
knowledge-production.
4. Rejection now is key to avoid rampant exceptional violence
Springer,assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Victoria12 (Simon,
“Neoliberalising violence: of the exceptional and the exemplary in coalescing moments”, Area 44:2,
Royal Geographical Society, 2012, Wiley Online)//AS
The point of our critiques should not be to temper neoliberalism with concessions and niceties, as
capitalism of any sort is doomed to fail. The logics of creative destruction, uneven development and
unlimited expansion – which stoke the fires of conflict and contradict the finite limitations of the earth
– are capitalism’s undoing regardless of the form it takes (Harvey 2007). Hence, what instead needs to
be occurring in our scholarship on neoliberalism is a more thorough radicalisation of our agenda,
where the purpose becomes to consign neoliberalism and all other forms of capitalism to the waste
bin of history, so that the ‘exceptional’ and ‘exemplary’ violence of this maligned chapter of human
existence become disturbing abominations from our past, not enduring realities of our present, or
conceded inevitabilities of our future. What I mean by exceptional violence is that violence which
appears to fall outside of the rule, usually by being so profound in its manifestation. Exceptional
violence forces those who bear witness to its implications to recognise its malevolence precisely
because of the sheer shock and horror that is unleashed. Consequently, exceptional violence is jarring
and elicits a deep emotional response. Yet, exceptional violence is only exceptional in the reaction it
provokes and, as the proverb ‘the exception proves the rule’ hints, exceptional violence is not beyond
the bounds of the normative, but instead actually always exists in a co-constitutive relationship with
exemplary violence, or that violence which forms the rule.
5. Resistance requires removing engagement—they cannot coexist and perm fails
Albo, Department of Political Science, York University, 06 (Gregory, “The Unexpected Revolution:
Venezuela Confronts Neoliberalism”, Presentation at the University of Alberta, International
Development Week, 1/06, http://socialistproject.ca/theory/venezuela_praksis.pdf)//AS
There has been a traditional view on the Left on the steps for undertaking an anti-capitalist
transformation: seize the commanding heights of the economy; close-off financial speculation and bring
the banks into the public fold; seal-off international private capital flows; impose central production
mandates on industry and point the state bureaucracy toward new public goals; develop forms of
workers' governance and rights in workplaces; and form any number of commissions to address
pressing social needs. These are, indeed, tasks that in some senses cannot be avoided: the challenge
has been partly in the timing, specifying the new means of administration and co- ordination, and
fostering the extension of popular and democratic capacities. The presumption has been of a disciplined
party acting at the centre of the state could work with cadres and workers across a decentralized base
to allow the unleashing of an inherent anti-capitalist logic. In historical social revolutions, this vision has
proven fraught in both theory and practice. These tasks are all aligned, moreover, quite differently when
there has not been a singular political rupture breaking the old regime. In the case of Venezuela the
initial agenda involved consolidating the political base for the Chavez regime and fostering the
organizational formation of new social forces. This has meant - to the extent a temporal ordering can be
discerned at all- developing an anti-neoliberal programme as the foundation from which to deepen
the processes of socialization and nationalization. In other words, the project has been to develop a
new co- operative, participatory and solidaristic logic that could consolidate against the logic of
private property and capital accumulation to break the material and visionary constraints of
neoliberalism. With such an overarching objective of opening new political spaces, it is not easy to
catalogue all the new initiatives of the Bolivarian programme. Some of the key policy fronts for
deepening the class struggle can, however, be highlighted.
6. Perm fails--The revolution is coopted by institutional politics and any capitalist
involvement
Katz, economist, researcher at the National Council of Science and Technology (CNCT), professor of
economics at the University of Buenos Aires 07-- (Claudio, “Socialist Strategies in Latin America”,
Monthly Review 59:4, 9/07, ProQuest)//AS
The Latin American left is once again discussing the paths to socialism. The correlation of forces has
changed through popular action, the crisis of neoliberalism, and U.S. imperialism's loss of offensive
capability. lt is no longer relevant to juxtapose a revolutionary political period of the past with a
conservative present. The social weakness of the industrial working class does not impede anticapitalist progress, which depends on the exploited and the oppressed uniting in common struggle.
What is crucial is the level of popular consciousness. The latter has forged new anti-liberal and antiimperialist convictions, but an anti- capitalist link, which an open debate about twenty-first century
socialism could foster, is still missing. The constitutional framework that replaced the dictatorships does
not impede the left's development. But the left must avoid institutional co-optation without turning its
back on the electoral process. Electoral participation can be made compatible with the promotion of
people's power. Movements and parties fulfill a complementary function since social struggle is not selfsufficient and partisan organization is neces- sary. Yet it is essential to avoid sectarian posturing and to
include im mediate improvements as part of the revolutionary agenda. This principle governs all
socialist strategy.
Perm – Double Bind
1. Severance – the perm severs out of plan text to solve back links and impacts which
guts neg ground – voter for education and fairness
2. Perm crushes the space needed for the alt to function – they are a rejection of
____(Insert alt)____
3. Double bind is wrong
a. The permutation cannot overcome the links outlined above and later on the flow- true
communism is only possible without the state. The plan removes the possibility of
affirming the communist hypothesis. They will never win ‘compromise good’.
b. Doesn’t prove critique wrong - just like if we cp out by saying the same thing as plan
wouldn’t mean you vote neg, the aff saying this doesn’t mean they get our advocacy. We
are an unconditional criticism of the system.
4. Rejection now is key to avoid rampant exceptional violence
Springer,assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Victoria12 (Simon,
“Neoliberalising violence: of the exceptional and the exemplary in coalescing moments”, Area 44:2,
Royal Geographical Society, 2012, Wiley Online)//AS
The point of our critiques should not be to temper neoliberalism with concessions and niceties, as
capitalism of any sort is doomed to fail. The logics of creative destruction, uneven development and
unlimited expansion – which stoke the fires of conflict and contradict the finite limitations of the earth
– are capitalism’s undoing regardless of the form it takes (Harvey 2007). Hence, what instead needs to
be occurring in our scholarship on neoliberalism is a more thorough radicalisation of our agenda,
where the purpose becomes to consign neoliberalism and all other forms of capitalism to the waste
bin of history, so that the ‘exceptional’ and ‘exemplary’ violence of this maligned chapter of human
existence become disturbing abominations from our past, not enduring realities of our present, or
conceded inevitabilities of our future. What I mean by exceptional violence is that violence which
appears to fall outside of the rule, usually by being so profound in its manifestation. Exceptional
violence forces those who bear witness to its implications to recognise its malevolence precisely
because of the sheer shock and horror that is unleashed. Consequently, exceptional violence is jarring
and elicits a deep emotional response. Yet, exceptional violence is only exceptional in the reaction it
provokes and, as the proverb ‘the exception proves the rule’ hints, exceptional violence is not beyond
the bounds of the normative, but instead actually always exists in a co-constitutive relationship with
exemplary violence, or that violence which forms the rule.
5. Resistance requires removing engagement—they cannot coexist and perm fails
Albo, Department of Political Science, York University, 06 (Gregory, “The Unexpected Revolution:
Venezuela Confronts Neoliberalism”, Presentation at the University of Alberta, International
Development Week, 1/06, http://socialistproject.ca/theory/venezuela_praksis.pdf)//AS
There has been a traditional view on the Left on the steps for undertaking an anti-capitalist
transformation: seize the commanding heights of the economy; close-off financial speculation and bring
the banks into the public fold; seal-off international private capital flows; impose central production
mandates on industry and point the state bureaucracy toward new public goals; develop forms of
workers' governance and rights in workplaces; and form any number of commissions to address
pressing social needs. These are, indeed, tasks that in some senses cannot be avoided: the challenge
has been partly in the timing, specifying the new means of administration and co- ordination, and
fostering the extension of popular and democratic capacities. The presumption has been of a disciplined
party acting at the centre of the state could work with cadres and workers across a decentralized base
to allow the unleashing of an inherent anti-capitalist logic. In historical social revolutions, this vision has
proven fraught in both theory and practice. These tasks are all aligned, moreover, quite differently when
there has not been a singular political rupture breaking the old regime. In the case of Venezuela the
initial agenda involved consolidating the political base for the Chavez regime and fostering the
organizational formation of new social forces. This has meant - to the extent a temporal ordering can be
discerned at all- developing an anti-neoliberal programme as the foundation from which to deepen
the processes of socialization and nationalization. In other words, the project has been to develop a
new co- operative, participatory and solidaristic logic that could consolidate against the logic of
private property and capital accumulation to break the material and visionary constraints of
neoliberalism. With such an overarching objective of opening new political spaces, it is not easy to
catalogue all the new initiatives of the Bolivarian programme. Some of the key policy fronts for
deepening the class struggle can, however, be highlighted.
6. Perm fails--The revolution is coopted by institutional politics and any capitalist
involvement
Katz, economist, researcher at the National Council of Science and Technology (CNCT), professor of
economics at the University of Buenos Aires 07-- (Claudio, “Socialist Strategies in Latin America”,
Monthly Review 59:4, 9/07, ProQuest)//AS
The Latin American left is once again discussing the paths to socialism. The correlation of forces has
changed through popular action, the crisis of neoliberalism, and U.S. imperialism's loss of offensive
capability. lt is no longer relevant to juxtapose a revolutionary political period of the past with a
conservative present. The social weakness of the industrial working class does not impede anticapitalist progress, which depends on the exploited and the oppressed uniting in common struggle.
What is crucial is the level of popular consciousness. The latter has forged new anti-liberal and antiimperialist convictions, but an anti- capitalist link, which an open debate about twenty-first century
socialism could foster, is still missing. The constitutional framework that replaced the dictatorships does
not impede the left's development. But the left must avoid institutional co-optation without turning its
back on the electoral process. Electoral participation can be made compatible with the promotion of
people's power. Movements and parties fulfill a complementary function since social struggle is not selfsufficient and partisan organization is neces- sary. Yet it is essential to avoid sectarian posturing and to
include im mediate improvements as part of the revolutionary agenda. This principle governs all
socialist strategy.
Perm – Plan Focus/Sever reps
1. This is severance –alt is a rejection of the 1AC and it’s reps. The perm severs
portions of their speech act because it rejects their reps. It’s kinda impossible to do
the 1AC and reject it simultaneously
2. Strat Skew - Our strat is based on their speech acts. Allowing them to reject
portions of their prior speech acts moots our prep and means no neg can ever win.
This a voting issue if they skew our time by extending this later in the debate.
3. Not net beneficial—They don’t articulate a net benefit to the perm – It’s more
important to forge a movement capable of ending ___(Insert Impact Analysis)___
4. Resistance requires removing engagement—they cannot coexist and perm fails
Albo, Department of Political Science, York University, 06 (Gregory, “The Unexpected Revolution:
Venezuela Confronts Neoliberalism”, Presentation at the University of Alberta, International
Development Week, 1/06, http://socialistproject.ca/theory/venezuela_praksis.pdf)//AS
There has been a traditional view on the Left on the steps for undertaking an anti-capitalist
transformation: seize the commanding heights of the economy; close-off financial speculation and bring
the banks into the public fold; seal-off international private capital flows; impose central production
mandates on industry and point the state bureaucracy toward new public goals; develop forms of
workers' governance and rights in workplaces; and form any number of commissions to address
pressing social needs. These are, indeed, tasks that in some senses cannot be avoided: the challenge
has been partly in the timing, specifying the new means of administration and co- ordination, and
fostering the extension of popular and democratic capacities. The presumption has been of a disciplined
party acting at the centre of the state could work with cadres and workers across a decentralized base
to allow the unleashing of an inherent anti-capitalist logic. In historical social revolutions, this vision has
proven fraught in both theory and practice. These tasks are all aligned, moreover, quite differently when
there has not been a singular political rupture breaking the old regime. In the case of Venezuela the
initial agenda involved consolidating the political base for the Chavez regime and fostering the
organizational formation of new social forces. This has meant - to the extent a temporal ordering can be
discerned at all- developing an anti-neoliberal programme as the foundation from which to deepen
the processes of socialization and nationalization. In other words, the project has been to develop a
new co- operative, participatory and solidaristic logic that could consolidate against the logic of
private property and capital accumulation to break the material and visionary constraints of
neoliberalism. With such an overarching objective of opening new political spaces, it is not easy to
catalogue all the new initiatives of the Bolivarian programme. Some of the key policy fronts for
deepening the class struggle can, however, be highlighted.
5. Perm fails--The revolution is coopted by institutional politics and any capitalist
involvement
Katz, economist, researcher at the National Council of Science and Technology (CNCT), professor of
economics at the University of Buenos Aires 07-- (Claudio, “Socialist Strategies in Latin America”,
Monthly Review 59:4, 9/07, ProQuest)//AS
The Latin American left is once again discussing the paths to socialism. The correlation of forces has
changed through popular action, the crisis of neoliberalism, and U.S. imperialism's loss of offensive
capability. lt is no longer relevant to juxtapose a revolutionary political period of the past with a
conservative present. The social weakness of the industrial working class does not impede anticapitalist progress, which depends on the exploited and the oppressed uniting in common struggle.
What is crucial is the level of popular consciousness. The latter has forged new anti-liberal and antiimperialist convictions, but an anti- capitalist link, which an open debate about twenty-first century
socialism could foster, is still missing. The constitutional framework that replaced the dictatorships does
not impede the left's development. But the left must avoid institutional co-optation without turning its
back on the electoral process. Electoral participation can be made compatible with the promotion of
people's power. Movements and parties fulfill a complementary function since social struggle is not selfsufficient and partisan organization is neces- sary. Yet it is essential to avoid sectarian posturing and to
include im mediate improvements as part of the revolutionary agenda. This principle governs all
socialist strategy.
M
FW
Discourse First
Ideas and discourse of neoliberalism profoundly influence policymaking—must be
accounted for in order to make effective decisions
Hay and Rosamond, Reader in Political Analysis in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of
Birmingham and Senior Research Fellow in International Politics in the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the
02
University of Warwick respectively,
, (Colin and Ben, “Globalisation, European Integration and the Discursive Construction of Economic
Imperatives”, Journal of European Public Policy 9:2, 4/02, http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ssfc0041/globalisation.pdf)//AS
It is important, then, at the outset that we consider the potential causal role of ideas about
globalisation in the structuration of political andeconomic outcomes.3 Our central argument is, we think, likely to
prove controversial. It is simply stated, though its implications are more complex. Essentially, we suggest, policy makers acting on
the basis of assumptions consistent with the hyperglobalisation thesis may well serve, in so doing, to
bring about outcomes consistent with that thesis, irrespective of its veracity and, indeed, irrespective of its
perceived veracity. This provocativesuggestion with, if warranted, important implications, clearly requires some justification (see also
Hay 1999b; Rosamond 1999, 2000b, 2000c). Globalisation has become a key referent of contemporary political
discourse and, increasingly, a lens through which policy-makers view the context in which they find
themselves. If we can assume that political actors have no more privileged vantage point from which to understand their environment
than anyone else and — as most commentators would surely concede — that one of the principal discourses through which
that environment now comes to be understood is that of globalisation, then the content of such ideas is
likely to affect significantly political dynamics.
Discourse deeply affects policy implementation of globalization policies—must be
considered first
Rosamond, Professor of Political Science, University of Copenhagen 99 (Ben, “Discourses of globalization and the social construction of
European identities”, Journal of European Public Policy 6:4, 1999, Taylor and Francis)//AS
With that in mind this
article represents an attempt to combine a social constructivist approach to the study of
the EU with a contribution to the growing concern in the social sciences about ‘globalization’ . As such it
offers (a) a particular view about how European integration can be investigated in the context of globalization and (b)
some propositions about how constructivist insights can be used to study certain aspects of the EU in particular and forms of regionalism in the
global political economy more generally. It
draws on, and, it is hoped, develops, an understanding of globalization as
discourse by contemplating the nature of the (inter)subjectivities generated within EU policy communities by
the globalization debate. This stands in contrast to treating globalization as simply a matter of
objective, exogenous or structural change. Rather the social construction of globalization and control
over knowledge about globalization become matters of import- ance. Moreover, globalization comes to
be construed as a zone of contestation rather than as a conditioning structure (Amin and Thrift 1994). The
article explores the proposition that the social construction of external or structural context is an important
element in the European integration process because it has helped to define the ‘politically possible’within the EU
polity. This has not been simply about the identification of constraints, but also about how globalization
discourse might open strategic opportunities for certain types of policy actor and/or help to embed
the case for rethinking the level at which the authoritative processes of governance can and should
occur. More broadly, the EU may be seen as a venue for the develop- ment of a discourse of the superiority of one form of ‘regionalism’ over
others.2 A further proposition is that the EU may be seen as an important empirical venue for the investigation of the
discursive strategies of so-called ‘globalizing élites’ (Gill 1996).
Discourse is a critical agent of institutional change and must be considered first
Schmidt, Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration Department of International Relations, Boston University 07 (Vivien, “Bringing
the State Back Into the Varieties of Capitalism And Discourse Back Into the Explanation of Change”, Center for European Studies Working Paper
Series 152, 2007, University of Michigan Libraries)//AS
Thus, although
historical institutionalists in VoChave gone very far in reintroducing dynamics into the
institutional stasis of VoC, they still have difficulty explaining change. The implicit micro-foundational recourse to
rational choice institutionalism, to which most turn, is insufficient to explaining the dynamics of change. Only with a further
discursive institutionalist (DI) approach, focused on ideas and discursive action, can we gain a full
explanation of institutional change. But before considering how ideas and discourse lend greater insight into the explanation of
the three varieties of capitalism, we need first to consider how rationalist/historical institutionalist accounts of strategic action within macrostructures fit against accounts of ideas and discourse. Importantly, many VoC scholars have already recognized the importance of ideas and
discourse. To begin with, even one of the very founders of the VoC school has taken the role of ideas seriously, albeit in earlier work. Peter
Hall, in an earlier incarnation, prior to his rationalist/historical institutionalist turn in VoC, was something of a discursive institutionalist in his
account of the role of ideas in promoting the neo-liberal paradigm instituted by Thatcher in Britain (Hall 1993). But some VoC scholars have also
more recently given a nod to discursive institutionalist accounts. Richard
Deeg (2005) acknowledges the role of discourse
when, in addition 18to defining a whole range of new ways of thinking about path dependency in
order to make VoC less path dependent, he takes note of theorists who see ideas as having
independent causal force of their own, rather than just as tools in the hands of powerful actors (e.g.,
Lieberman 2002, Lehmbruch 2001). Pepper Culpepper (2005), by contrast, takes us one step further when, in his discussion of the politics of
institutional change in vocational education in Switzerland and Austria, he adds to his rationalist/historical institutionalist explanation of
employers’ interests with regard to legal change a discursive institutionalist account of the role of political discourse in the legitimization of
One function of discourse is certainly legitimization. But discourse goes beyond afterthe-fact
justification and legitimization. It can also bring about change, which was Peter Hall’s (1993) argument. Interestingly,
such change.
even Christel Lane, in arguing that the unraveling of coordination in Germany is likely to lead to convergence to the LME model, nevertheless
suggests that this might be stopped were there an emerging “coalition of industrial managers, employees, and politicians working for a new as
yet inchoate compromise solution;” but she notes that the ideas are lacking (Lane 2005, p. 105). These four examples suggest that
rationalist/historical institutionalistVoC scholars naturally turn to ideas and discourse, whether as the
catalyst for change or as an accompaniment to change. But other than in the early Hall, none of this is developed
theoretically in these works.
Neoliberalism must be examined as a powerful rhetoric and pedagogy that occurs in
all political, economic, social, and cultural levels.
Riedner and Mahoney, 2008 - Associate Professor of University Writing and Women's Studies at
George Washington University (Rachel and Kevin, “Democracies to Come: Rhetorical Action,
Neoliberalism, and Communities of Resistance,” pp 19-20, 2008, www.ii4u.com/Rachel-Riedner-KevinMahoney-PDF1142054.PDF)//CS
Neoliberalism is a social relationship and is also a rhetoric: as Jarratt argues, rhetorics are modes of
personal, public, or private address that configure a relationship to power, that have their own
internal logic, are connected to fixed forms and ideologies, and a dynamic history (“Beside Ourselves,”
59). Rhetorics, we add to Jarratt, vis-à-vis GayatriSpivak configure relationships to value. In A Criticque of
Postcolonial Reason, Spivak extends a reading of Derrida’s notion of differance in which “all institutions
of origin concealed the splitting off from something other than the origin, in order for the origin to be
instituted” to a reading of capital (462). In her discussion of value, she shows how exchange value
conceals the splitting off of use-value from exchange-value in order for value to be articulated into the
logic of capital. Spivak reads that which “must be deferred” by value in order for capitalism to establish
itself (425). Therefore, when we use modes of address, we are connected to social relationships that
produce relations to capital. When we choose representations, following Jarratt, we make symbolic
decisions that simultaneously figure relations of power and configure social relations, thus
establishing a relationship to value. Representation, in the context of neoliberalism or any
manifestation of capitalism, is not a neutral act. It is an act that activates social, political, cultural, and
historical relationships of which we may not be aware, that consolidates identities, and that
interpellates bodies into systems of identity. It is also an act that creates everyday affective responses
and habits, and that creates relationships across public and private spheres. Insofar as representation is
an act, it is rhetoric-that is, it is an interested discursive act that intervenes in a particular conjuncture
and affects that conjuncture. Neoliberal rhetoric is intended to preserve, stabilize, and extend
capitalist social/labor-relations, with the particular purpose of producing labor subjects. As a rhetoric,
as a world vision, as a system of value, as relationship between labor and capital, as a politics, and as a
cultural consensus, neoliberalism is also a pedagogy: a mode of education that exists in a variety of
cultural sites that incorporates subjects into dominant neoliberal ideology. To rewrite Bourdieu’s
notion of neoliberalism as a “strong rhetoric” (Acts, 96), neoliberalism is a “strong” and persuasive
pedagogy that is embedded in the particular relations between State and capitalist power.
Neoliberalism, in other words, becomes an educational force of culture that shapes how we are
literate, how literacy is defined, and who is literate because of its constitutive relationship to labor. As
it prepares students to enter the workforce, either as skilled or unskilled laborers, neoliberal pedagogy
interpellates subjects into relationships between labor and capital. And more it interpellates subjects
into social relations that support the circulation and realization of capital in our daily lives. That is,
neoliberal pedagogy is not solely interested in producing specific laboring subjects for the workplace;
it seeks to produce subjects whose lives are fully subsumed within the logic of the global market.
Neoliberalism is therefore a pedagogy produced in a variety of public spaces, social sites, in civil society,
as well as traditional educational locations.
Debate Space Key
Their model of debate fuels neoliberal domination of education causing exclusion of
those deemed unfit – debate is critical for engaging the pedagogy of neoliberalism
Wilkins, Ph.D. in Social Policy, Research Fellow at University of Roehampton, April 23, 2012
(Andrew, “The spectre of neoliberalism: pedagogy, gender and the construction of learner identities,”
Critical Studies in Education, Vol. 53.2, pg 207-8)//SG
As a final thought,I
want to consider what a ‘critical’ or ‘transformative’ pedagogy might offer as an
alternative to managerialist culture of ‘testing, targets and tables’(DfES, 2004)endemic to British school
culture and education policy discourse more generally. From a Marxist perspective (Giroux, 2004; Hill, 2009; McLaren,
2005), Britishteach- ers, pupils and parents can beunderstood to be increasinglyalienated from the learning process
by virtue of the mechanisms and procedures thatnow shape anddefine it:the hyperbole aroundtest scores and
league tables peddled by both the public and media; the role of ‘philanthrocapitalism’ (Edwards, 2008) in British policymaking and political thought, which insists on the use of outside sponsors (usually charities, businesses, faith groups, universities or
philanthropic entrepreneurs) to run public sector schools; and the managerial focus on standardisation, market and professional accountability
(West, Mattei, & Roberts, 2011) and measured outputs. In this paper I have demonstratedthe
cultural dynamics inscribed
through classroom interaction, where pupils can be observed compet- ing for symbolic rewards of
teacher approbation and deliberately, sometimes maliciously, downplaying the efforts of others wishing
to engage with educational tasksalso. However, sincepupilsare not encouraged to work collaboratively as a team – and therefore
acquire skills in group learning, joint problem solving, consensus building, interpersonal social responsibility and so forth – but, rather,are
rewarded as individualistic competitors, the individual cannot be blamed for such insensitive and brazen
behaviour. This is because such behaviour is written into the education system itself. It is inscribed in the attitudes and
norms schools aim to inculcate into individuals as something which is acceptable, legitimate and even
desirable.For social theorists Beck (1992) and Bauman (1992),the movement from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ or
‘postmodern’ society is symptomatic of this shift in emphasis from the col- lective to the individual:
subjects are compelled to engage as reflexive, self-determining authors of their own lives and negotiate the ever-changing risks
andobligations brought
on by the necessities of the global market economy and the de-stabilising effects
of con- sumer capitalism on aspects of ‘tradition’ and local culture. Citizens whomilitate against
complacency,revere competitiveness, tolerate precarityand evince flexibilityarepreciselythose individuals who fit
into the coordinates of neoliberal performativity. At the same time,these dynamicsgenerate a heavy burden on
individuals andfacilitate new forms of inequal- ity and cultural injustice, pointing to the deleterious impact of
neoliberal discourses and practices.Pupils who lack the cognitive, cultural and social skills to engage as
competitive learners, for example, are systematically disadvantagedin two ways. First,they are disci- plined
by teachers for not engaging the ‘correct’ or ‘right’ wayand, subsequently, become marginalised as passive
and undeserving learners.Second, whenor ifthey do engage, they run the risk of being lampooned by the
churlish behaviour of more confident, often less intimated and high achieving learners. This means that somepupils find
themselves in a double-bind of being damned if you do and damned if you don’t. What is lacking, then,
is a form of ‘democratic’ education practice in which pedagogy and the curriculum is promoted and
practised as responses to the positive contribution of learners, rather than the imposition of businessoriented character and behaviour. In other words, there must be barriers to pro- tect the spontaneity, creativity and agency of
learners from the incursions of market forces, business ontology and bureaucratic administration.
Debate is key to challenging the logic of neoliberalism – neoliberal pedagogy results in
the formation of a capitalist enterprise-style education with the sole purpose of
produce workers to function in capital’s machine
Wilkins, Ph.D. in Social Policy, Research Fellow at University of Roehampton, April 23, 2012
(Andrew, “The spectre of neoliberalism: pedagogy, gender and the construction of learner identities,”
Critical Studies in Education, Vol. 53.2, pg 199-200)//SG
Since the 1980s,
education services in UK have increasingly come to be defined through the lens of new
public management and consumerist discourses (Gewirtz, 2002)with their attendant concepts of
deregulation and marketisation. A consequence of this has been a reorganisation of the relationship
between citizen and the state in which citizens are hailed (interpellated) through a narrow rational,
utilitarian logic that presupposes the willingness and capacity of individuals to behave as consumers of
education services(Clarke, Newman, Smith, Vidler, & Westmarland, 2007; Wilkins, 2010). Despite attempts to distance them- selves from
the anti-state,pro-market rhetoric of 1980sConservative governmentpolicyand politics, Blair’s New Labour government (1997–
2007)can be read as ‘distinct reflec- tions of, or developments from, the period of Thatcherism orneo-liberalism’(Ball, 2008,
p. 84),with its emphasis on the efficacious role of private sector involvement in public sec- tor
organisation. According to New Labour rhetoric (Department for Education and Skills [DfES], 2004), the ‘old’ system of
educationinherited from the post-war settlement sus- tained itself through delivering ‘a basic and standard product for all’ (Foreword),
making it incompatible with the expectations, desires and aspirations of a burgeoning ‘consumer
culture’. In contrast, the ‘new’ system of education imagined by New Labour was rep- resented in terms of a more equitable and fair model
of service delivery because of its sustained commitment to meanings and practices of consumer voice, choice and ‘the need to differentiate
provision to individual aptitudes and abilities within schools’ (Department for Education and Employment, 2001, Introduction). Central
to
this imagery of education was the lionisation of an ethics of self-care and self-responsibility in which
parents and students were solicited into fulfilling their assigned obligation and duty as consumers and
co-producers of education services.Following their electoral success on 6 May, 2010, the Conservative-led coalition gov- ernment
re-articulated the demand for such a model of education reform through shoring up visions of a ‘Big Society’ (Stratton, 2010), a society in which
citizens are ‘empowered’ to engage in the governance and delivery of public services as active and self-maximising wel- fare recipients.
Echoing earlier attempts by Labour governments to discredit and dismantle traditional notions of central
authority, regulation and state power, the coalition govern- ment extended the commercial use of
private companies and sponsorships for the delivery of education services with the introduction of the
free schools programme (Murray, 2011), together with an expansion of the Academies programme launched by New Labour in 2000.
But what has been the impact of these political and economic trends on the culture and ethos of British
schooling, in particular the character of pedagogical developments and the cur- riculum? Are their certain
types of learners and orientations to learning that are celebrated, rewarded and made more visible, to the detriment of others? The scope
and reach of private sector involvement in public sector education is evi- dent through the managerial
and disciplinary focus of education institutions, ranging from primary and secondary schools through to Further Education
(FE) colleges and Higher Education Institutions (HEIs). This battery of managerial and bureaucratic procedures, to which all
education institutions are forced to submit, represent themselves through the imposition of business-oriented
discourses and practices: measured outputs, accountabil- itymeasures, program specification, annualprogram
reports, progressionrates, withdrawal and retention rates, standardised test scores, school inspection, league table positioning, benchmark statements, curricula design, competition and so on. For Mccafferty (2010), these procedures for
effective education management are suggestive of a neoliberal pedagogy, ‘the inculcation of enterprise values as a
crucial element of contractual and ped- agogic obligation’ (p. 542). Monitoring systems and performance indicators that work to provide tighter
regulation and control of the measurement of effort and work levels (for both teachers and children), for example,echo
and redeem
the character of neoliberal gov- ernance (Ball, 2003). Elements of a neoliberal pedagogy can be further
traced to the ways in which schools, FE colleges and HEIs are encouraged to incorporate ‘capitalist
enterprises’ into their procedures and rationale (in other words, submit to the requirements of Capital) as a matter of
social responsibility and care (Fisher, 2009). This is because, as we are con- tinually reminded by pro-business
governments in advanced capitalist countries, children need to be equipped with the necessary skills for
ensuring future employability (presented in the language of fairness and equity); in other words, preserving economic
sustainability, the wealth of the nation and the needs of labour markets.As Hill (2007) observes, forcing
schools to produce ‘compliant, ideologically indoc- trinated, pro-capitalist, effective workers’ (p. 120) is a
testament to the pervasive role of neoliberalism on education reform. At the same time, we must remain
circumspect about the novelty of these policy trends. They signal nothing particularly ‘new’ about the tra- jectory of British education – the
need for state intervention in education to further the interests of capitalism has been understood since the nineteenth century (Jones &
Novak, 2000). Rather, these trends in education governing can be understood to register the con- tinuing embedding and subsuming of British
school culture within a competitive ethos and business ontology. And while competition in British schooling has existed since the 1970s (see
Lacey, 1970), neoliberalism
as a framing for guiding and shaping competition can be considered unique in
that it attaches importance to entrepreneurially relevant skill devel- opment and entrepreneurial
literacies that seek to close the gap between requisite learning skills and the demands of the labour
market. This demonstrates the role of state educa- tion as a disciplinary apparatus for facilitating and sustaining social control and political
stability on the one hand (Jones & Novak, 2000) and the development of ongoing govern- ment attempts to reform state education around
emerging labour market needs on the other (initially sketched out by Allen and Massey [1989]).
Policy Bad
Empirically, policymaking focus kills political agency and fails to understand the root
of neoliberalism—discursive analysis must come first
Hay and Rosamond, Reader in Political Analysis in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of
Birmingham and Senior Research Fellow in International Politics in the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the
02
University of Warwick respectively,
, (Colin and Ben, “Globalisation, European Integration and the Discursive Construction of Economic
Imperatives”, Journal of European Public Policy 9:2, 4/02, http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ssfc0041/globalisation.pdf)//AS
It is certainly not our intention to question the extent to which our knowledge of the empirical phenomena associated with claims of
globalisation has been enhanced in this way. Nonetheless, we will argue that something
quite significant is lost in this overly
restrictive emphasis upon material indices of globalisation and on arguments which such indices might adjudicate.2
The implicit supposition which seems to underlie much of the sceptical or second-wave literature seeking to expose the ‘myth’ or
‘delusion’ of globalisation, is that a rigorous empirical exercise in demystification will be sufficient to reverse
the tide of ill-informed public policy made in the name of globalisation. Sadly, this has not proved to be the case.
For however convinced we might be by the empirical armoury mustered against the hyperglobalisation thesis by the sceptics, their rigorous
empiricism leads them to fail adequately to consider the way in which globalisation comes to inform
public policy-making. It is here, we suggest, that the discourse of globalisation — and the discursive
construction of the imperatives it is seen to conjure along with attendant fatalism about the possibilities for
meaningful political agency — must enter the analysis. For, as the most cursory reflection on the issue of structure and agency
reveals, it is the ideas actors hold about the context in which they find themselves rather than the
context itself which informs the way in which they behave (Hay 1999a, forthcoming a). This is no less true
ofpolicy makers and governments. Whether the globalisation thesis is ‘true’ or not may matter far less than whether it is deemed to be
true (or, quite possibly, just useful) by those employing it. Consequently, if the aim of the sceptics is to discredit the
political appeal to dubious economic imperatives associated with globalisation, then they might well benefit
from asking themselves why and under what conditions politicians and public officials invoke external
economic constraints in the first place. It is to this task that we direct our attentions in this paper.
Policy approaches externalize globalization and fail to understand how it motivates
their environment and decisions—examination of neoliberal motive must be prior
Rosamond, Professor of Political Science, University of Copenhagen 99 (Ben, “Discourses of globalization and the social construction of
European identities”, Journal of European Public Policy 6:4, 1999, Taylor and Francis)//AS
As discussions like this proceed, so the
limits of rationalistic approaches become apparent. The externalization
of globalization in mainstream accounts is related to the treatment of interests and identities as exogenous
or prior to the processes of institutionalized interaction. The implication of much of the literature on globalization
and European integration is that actors’ interests are affected by globalization and/or that it is in some actors’
interests to promote globalization. The role of globalization in actually constituting those interests
and identities is largely ignored. This need not be so. Increasing attention is being paid to the complex effects of
institutionalization in the EU, and particularly to the capacity of institutions to co-ordinate actor expectations, generate shared systems of belief
and shape norms, values and conventions within policy communities (Cram 1997; Radaelli 1995; also Armstrong and Bulmer 1998; Garrett and
Weingast 1993). It is here that constructivist
approaches can add value by forcing an explanation of the social
construction of the external environment as a means to understanding how particular identity claims
and interests arise within a policy-making context. This is discussed further in the following section which elaborates briefly
a case for the analysis of the discursive aspects of globalization and goes on to discuss how constructivism might be used to
think about the usage of ‘globalization’ in the EU context. The third section of the article lays out some empirical material, with
reference to the role of globalization discourses within the EU polity. The argument is that our understanding of the global–European interface
can be greatly enhanced by the application of a form of constructivism. More concretely, the
argument builds the hypotheses
that (a) the deployment of ideas about globalization has been central to the development of a
particular notion of European identity among élite policy actors but that (b) ‘globalization’ remains contested within EU
policy circles.
We have a responsibility to challenge neoliberal dominance of the policymaking
sphere—it damages equality, education, and the environment
Hursh and Henderson, associate professor of education at theUniversity of Rochester and PhD at the Warner Graduate School of
Education and Human Development11 (David and Joseph, “ Contesting global neoliberalism and creating alternative futures”, Discourse:
Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 32:2, May 2011, Routledge)//AS
Neoliberal policies, in spite of their considerable damage to economic equality, the environment, and
education, remain dominant. In this paper, we suggest that neoliberalism has remained dominant in part because the
power elite who benefit from the policies have gained control over both public debate and policy-making.
By dominating the discourse and logic regarding economic, environmental, and education decision-making,
neoliberal proponents have largely succeeded in marginalizing alternative conceptions. We then use critical
theory and critical geography, or ‘historical geographic materialism’, to situate communities, cities, and countries within different scales and
networks and analyse current neoliberal policies. Environmentally,
neoliberalism elevates the market and profit
above considerations of climate change and environmental sustainability. Educationally, learning is valued
primarily in terms of its contribution to economic growth. Finally, we engage in the more complicated question of what
kind of world we want to live in, remembering that rather than a self-perpetuating neoliberalism in which individuals
are responsible only for themselves and all decisions are supposedly made by the market, we have responsibility for
our relationships with one another and our built and natural environment.
Process
Neoliberalism must be examined as a process – no interpretation of neoliberalism
exists independently.
Springer, Assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Victoria, Canada,
2012 (Simon, “Neoliberalism as discourse: between Foucauldian political economy and
Marxian poststructuralism,” Critical Discourse Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2, May 2012, 133–147, 2012,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17405904.2012.656375)//CS
Nonetheless, following Ward and England (2007) within the existing literature, we can identify four different
understandings of neoliberalism: (1) Neoliberalism as an ideological hegemonic project. This
understanding maintains thatelite actors and dominant groups organized around transnational class-based
allianceshave the capacity to project and circulate a coherent program of interpretations andimages of the world
onto others. This is not merely subordination to particular coerciveimpositions, but also involves a degree of
willing consent. Attention is focused on thepeople and ideas behind the conceptual origin of neoliberalism, as well
as those whoare at the forefront of its adoption in a range of geographical settings (see Cox, 2002;Dume´nil&Le´vy,
2004; Harvey, 2005; Peet, 2002; Plehwe et al., 2006).(2) Neoliberalism as policy and program. This frame of
reference focuses on the transfer ofownership from the state or public holdings to the private sector or corporate
interests,which necessarily involves a conceptual reworking of the meaning these categories hold.The
understanding itself is premised on the idea that opening collectively held resourcesto market mediation
engenders greater efficiency. The usual motifs under which suchpolicy and program are advanced include
privatization, deregulation, liberalization,depoliticization, and monetarism (see Brenner & Theodore, 2002;
Klepeis& Vance,2003; Martinez & Garcia, 2000).3) Neoliberalism as state form.In this understanding,
neoliberalism is considered as aprocess of transformation that states purposefully engage in to remain
economicallycompetitive within a transnational playing field of similarly minded states. This isthought to involve
both a quantitative axis of destruction and discreditation wherebystate capacities and potentialities are ‘rolled
back’, and a qualitative axis of constructionand consolidation, wherein reconfigured institutional mediations,
economic managementsystems, and invasive social agendas centered on urban order, surveillance,
immigrationissues, and policing are ‘rolled out’ (see Peck, 2001; Peck &Tickell, 2002).(4) Neoliberalism as
governmentality. This interpretation of neoliberalism centers onacknowledging a processual character where
neoliberalism’s articulation with existingcircumstances comes through endlessly unfolding failures and successes in
the relationsbetween peoples and their socially constructed realities as they are (re)imagined, (re)interpreted,and
(re)assembled to influence forms of knowledge through ‘the conduct ofconduct’ (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996;
Brown, 2003; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002;Larner, 2003; Lemke, 2002). This understanding implies power as a
complex, yetvery specific form centering on knowledge production through the ensemble of
rationalities,strategies, technologies, and techniques concerning the mentality of rule thatallow for the decentering of government through the active role of auto-regulated orauto-correcting selves who facilitate
‘governance at a distance’ (Foucault, 1991a).Thus, the internal dynamics of neoliberalism in this understanding are
underpinned byan unquestioned ‘commonsense’, meaning quite literally, a sense held in common.Given that
scholars of neoliberalism typically amalgamate two or more of these views on neoliberalism,my alignment of the
studies cited in each understanding of neoliberalism remainsopen to reader interpretation. Potential misgivings
over the associations I have made withregard to particular scholar’s views on neoliberalism actually reinforces my
argument thateach interpretation of neoliberalism does not exist in isolation, but is actually connected
to and recursive of the alternative views. Recent contributions demonstrate a growing readinessto sift
through the methodological, epistemological, and ontological differences between thesefour definitions (see
Larner, 2003; Peck, 2004; Peet, 2007), even if particular views on neoliberalismneoliberalismstill come through.
Nonetheless, important ‘middle ground’ inquires are emerging, whereGilbert (2005), Raco (2005), and McCarthy
(2006) all develop more amalgamated interpretations.Yet truly hybridized approaches that attempt to synthesize
or at least reconcile thesedivergent conceptions in any sustained sense are much less common. A series of
progressreports by Sparke (2004, 2006, 2008) offers a notably rare exception . Concatenating such divergent
theorizations is clearly no small task, as it is one that necessarily involves reconciling the Marxian
political economy perspective of hegemonic ideology with poststructuralist conceptualizations of
governmentality, where policy and program along with state form approaches fall somewhere in
between. For Barnett (2005) the potential of such an exercise is entirely unconvincingas the two intellectual
projects imply different models of the nature of explanatory concepts,of causality and determination, of social
relations and agency, and different normative understandingsof political power. Thus, he argues, ‘We should not
finesse these differences away by presuming that the two approaches converge around a common
real-world referent’(Barnett, 2005, p. 8). Similarly, Castree (2006, p. 3) disavows what he calls the
‘both/andagenda’ for its ‘intractable inability to “fix” [neoliberalism’s] meanings with real-world
referents’stemming from the use of multiple definitions where ‘“the real world” can only partly functionas a “court
of appeal” to resolve competing claims as to what is (or is not) neoliberal indegree or kind’. Castree (2006, p. 3)
uses the peculiar analogy of water to illustrate his point,taking its meaning from positivist scientism as having
liquid, gas, and solid forms, yet alwaysremaining water ‘wherever and whenever it is’. This comparison, however,
belies a faux realismas it fails to consider how different languages, cultures, and individuals may have very
differentmeanings for and understandings of ‘water in general’. The idea that Inuit peoples have hundredsof words
for the English language equivalent of ‘snow’ is an anthropological myth (Martin,1986), but it is nonetheless
instructive of how ‘the real world’ can be viewed as little morethan a semiotic construction, where even something
as seemingly universal as water may bereduced to competing claims as to what it is (or is not) in degree or kind. In
other words,Castree (2006) engages a very narrowly and privately defined understanding of the ‘real’,which is
mobilized as a cipher for his own idealism.
Neoliberalism must be understood as a process and a hybrid. – it should be
understood as the means not the ends.
Springer, Assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Victoria, Canada,
2012 (Simon, “Neoliberalism as discourse: between Foucauldian political economy and
Marxian poststructuralism,” Critical Discourse Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2, May 2012, 133–147, 2012,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17405904.2012.656375)//CS
On the other hand, some have called for a moment of pause, suggesting that we should be wary of
overly concrete or introspective analyses of the local, as such accounts inadequately attend to the
principal attributes and meaningful bonds of neoliberalism as a global project(Brenner & Theodore,
2002; Peck &Tickell, 2002). The ‘larger conversation’ that neoliberalism provokes is regarded as
imperative in connecting similar patterns of experiences across space, which may serve as a potential
basis for building solidarities (see Brand &Wissen, 2005;Escobar, 2001; Featherstone, 2005; Kohl, 2006;
Routledge, 2003; Springer, 2008, 2011b;Willis, Smith, &Stenning, 2008). Thus neoliberalism as a concept
allows poverty and inequalityexperienced across multiple sites to find a point of similitude, whereas
disarticulation underminesefforts to build and sustain shared aims of resistance beyond the micropolitics of thelocal. Accordingly, conceptualizing neoliberalism requires an appreciation of the
elaborate and fluctuating interchange between the local and extralocal forces at work within the
global political economy (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Peck, 2001). Ong
(2007,p. 3) corroborates this notion by conceptualizing ‘big N Neoliberalism’ as ‘a fixed set of
attributeswith predetermined outcomes’, while ‘small n neoliberalism’ operates in practice ‘as alogic of
governing that mitigates and is selectively taken up in diverse political contexts’. Inthis light, Peck and
Tickell (2002, p. 383) propose ‘a processual conception of neoliberalizationas both an “out there” and
“in here” phenomenon whose effects are necessarily variegated anduneven, but the incidence and
diffusion of which may present clues to a pervasive “metalogic”.Like globalization, neoliberalization
should be understood as a process, not an end-state’. Thus, neoliberalism-cum-neoliberalization can
be viewed as a plural set of ideas emanating from both everywhere and nowhere within diffused loci
of power (Plehwe&Walpen, 2006). The inability to straightforwardly align neoliberalism to particular
individuals, organizations, or states, and the further recognition that there is no ‘pure’ or
‘paradigmatic’ version of neoliberalism, but rather a series of geopolitically distinct and institutionally
effected hybrids (Peck, 2004),plays a significant role in the difficulty of realizing consensus on a
conceptual definition of ‘neoliberalism in general’. Neoliberalism, it would seem is simply too nebulous
to isolate or determine(McCarthy &Prudham, 2004).
Identity
The economic discussion of neoliberal democracy is intertwined with political and
social elements of one’s individual identity – we must examine the economic
freedoms of neoliberalism as if we were examining our political freedoms and rights.
Hughes, a PhD candidate in the School of Political Science and¶ International Studies at The University
of Queensland, 2005 (Bryan, “The ‘Fundamental’ Threat of (Neo)Liberal Democracy: An¶ Unlikely Source
of Legitimation for Political Violence,” UQ PolsiseJournal, pages 47-49,
http://www.polsis.uq.edu.au/dialogue/3-2-4.pdf)//CS
The conceptions of liberalism, neo-liberalism, democracy and liberal democracy derive from similar historic-cultural origins and
therefore, not surprisingly, they answer questions about how to live the ‘good life’ in much the same ways. The raison d’etre of
these theoretical viewpoints is to provide a framework for living together. With that noted it then becomes possible to
emphasize the point that the ideals and practices advocated by these discourses spill into all facets of life.How we
approach work and play, how we conceive justice, security and self-realization are examples that
begin to illustrate the ubiquitous influence of these frameworks touch our daily lives. A
comprehensive social structure is ultimately constructed through these discourses. The structure’s
particular ‘foundational logics’, in other words its underlying commitments about how to live the ‘good life’, inform the details
of everyday interaction. I elaborate further on these connections below. The principal point I want to make at this juncture is
that the explicit political and economic prescriptions of neo-liberal democracy have a direct impact on group identity. Identity
underpins these theories according to the assertion that identity is mutually-constituted with
economic and political practices. This allows group identity to take a central role in discussions about
conflict and neo-liberal democracy.The discussion below explores a number of the debates pertaining to the
commitments of liberalism, neo-liberalism, democracy and liberal democracy. I do so in order to delineate neo-liberal
democracy in such a way as to make it clear that its commitments constitute a particular group identity. A discussion on these
topics is complicated by the fact that the concepts of ‘liberal’ and ‘democratic’ remain contested and are often used vaguely,
even interchangeably. However, it is all too clear that the overlap of these theoretical discussions comprises
both explicit political and economic commitments rather than just political machinations. Neo-liberal
economic elements combine with the philosophical inclinations of liberalism and the political
traditions of liberal democracy. And this is appropriate since the political and economic commitments in the neo-liberal
democratic structure do work in tandem. I would add, along with others, that genuinely democratic practices could never exist
in a political institutions vacuum in the first place, immune to and uninfluenced by the economic realities of the citizenry. This
mutual reinforcement yields a total social structure which guides how we should live together. What then are the
characteristics of this social structure?The liberalism discourse highlights an essential principle of the neo-liberal¶ democratic
tradition: the freedom of the individual. As Michael Doyle (1983: 4-5) observes, this core principle generates civic rights and
institutions like freedom of religion. More precisely, equal freedom for individuals underwritten basic liberal institutions such as
freedom of speech, equal opportunity, and civic equality (Barry 2001: 122). Democracy, when grafted onto liberalism, provides
the procedural and institutional advice by which individuals are to determine their social affairs, based of course on the ideal of
equal freedom for the individual. Freedom rights are located at the individual level of analysis rather than the collective.18 But
democratic institutions alone are not sufficient to guarantee the freedom of the individual when it is recognized that
democracies can behave illiberally if the majority of individuals so choose (Lynn-Jones 1996: xxxii; Owen 1994: 153). Thus the
checks and balances envisaged by liberalism must work together with democratic institutions to achieve a ‘liberal democratic’
system which protects the rights of each individual against a backdrop of the popular will. Yet, as maintained above, these
philosophical groundings and political procedures are not devoid of economic commitments. 19The sanctity of
equalindividual freedom extends, necessarily, to the economic sphere, according to the social
perspective put forward by neo-liberal democracy. This is the point at which the discourses of neoliberalism and capitalism influence the direction of the social structure. The logic added from the neo-liberal
dimension presses that the lack of interference needed to ensure the political freedoms of the individual, like those applying to
speech, must also extend to economic free choice. After all, so the logic goes, an employer should have¶ the right to set wages
for their employees, for example. To this way of thinking, the notion of freedom applies to economic markets no
differently than to political rights.20 The intersection of the discourses of liberalism, democracy, and
neo-liberalism is a unique political economic structure which therefore impacts (whether directly or
indirectly)all facets of social existence.From the practices of an individual’s religious beliefs to the terms of one’s job, all
social interactions fall somehow under the rubric of the neo-liberal democratic framework’s commitments.
Analytic
The analytic perspective, not a political perspective, must be used to evaluate
neoliberalism.
Brand and Sekler,professor of International Politics at Vienna University and junior researcher in the area of
international politics in the Department of Political Science at Vienna University , 2009 (Ulrich and Nicola, “Postneoliberalism
– A beginning debate,” Development Dialogue, no. 51, page 6, January 2009,http://rosaluxeuropa.info/userfiles/file/DD51.pdf#page=173 )//CS
Dealing with ‘neoliberalism’ requires differentiating between at least two dimensions – an analytical
and a political one. Despite all the differences, analytically we can distinguish between, firstly, considering
neoliberalism as a theory and an intellectual movement (Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, the Mont Pelèrin
Society, the dominance of neoclassical thinking in universities and beyond) and, secondly, focusing on neoliberalism
as a broad strategy on the part of economic, political and cultural (and sometimes military) elites to
destroy the (peripheral) Fordist compromises and to restructure power relations, institutions, overall
orientations and truths, in particular societies and at the international level, even more towards capitalist interests. A
third analytical perspective is to view neoliberalism as a social practice, implying the assumption that
theoretical considerations and strategies to implement theory are not always and everywhere
comprehensively successful and functional as such. Accordingly, the contradictory and conflictive aspects of
(neoliberal) social practices in a global perspective – global North and South, East and West – and within societies are
examined. It is precisely this third analytical perspective that leads us to the political dimension of
‘neoliberalism’ – that is, concrete neoliberal policies, practices and political discourses representing
the compromises arising from the struggles of different social forces. In times of crises,neoliberal politics and
these compromises come under pressure. Delegitimation of neoliberalism takes place not only via visible crisis – like the
ecological and the financial one – or by means of the enormous social polarisation in many countries but in addition through
the continuing conceptual and practical criticism undertaken by intellectuals, scientists and critical media, social movements
and NGOs
Link
Link: Latin America
Latin American trade promotion brutalizes the region—it’s the new imperialism
Grandin, American historian and professor of history at New York University, 07 -- (Greg, “Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the
United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism”,
5/1/07,http://books.google.com/books/about/Empire_s_Workshop.html?id=t5itdZ7oycUC)//AS
Of course, the promotion of capitalism has long been a concern of American foreign policy, yet the
kind of capitalism advanced by the Bush Doctrine is innovative, at least in its arrogant disregard for
the lessons of history. It is a militarized and moralized version that under the banner of free trade,
free markets, and free enterpriseoften makes its money through naked dispossession. It was in Latin
America where this brutal new global economy was initially installed, beginning in the 19705, resulting
in what could be called the region's "third conquest"•-the first being led by Spanish con quistadores,
the second by American corporations starting in th<nineteenth century, and the last by multinational
banks, the U.S Treasury Department, and the International Monetary Fund.
American engagement in Latin America threatens progressive political action and reentrenches neoliberalism
Renique Associate Professor in the Department of History at the City College of the City University of New York 10-- ( Gerardo, “Latin
America today: The revolt against neoliberalism”, Socialism and Democracy, 19:3, 9/20/10,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08854300500284561#.UcnZQvnVCSo)//AS
In opposition to this agenda,
the new subaltern movements offer a politics of hope, which is the focus of this special issue
Latin America’s anti-systemic rebellions and social movements
becomes all the more imperative as the US hastily regroups forces to restore the neoliberal order,
which has been under attack since the early 1990s. The recent visit of Condoleezza Rice to Latin America, the White
House’s aggressive campaign to force the approval of CAFTA (Central American Free Trade Agreement), Bush’s threats
to interfere with the transmissions of Telesur (the news and TV network established between Venezuela, Cuba, Argentina, and Uruguay), and,
more ominous, the expansion of Washington’s geostrategic reach with the Paraguayan government’s recent
authorization of a military base in the Triple Border region with Brazil and Argentina, are telling expressions of the US effort to
reassert its imperial presence and to restore the confidence of its chastised local elites. The neoliberal offensive had its
of Socialism and Democracy. Analysis of
foundational moment in that other September 11, in 1973, when General Augusto Pinochet, with the support of the United States, led a
bloodycoupd’e´tat against the government of Salvador Allende – the first elected Marxist president in Latin America. For the most reactionary
sectors of global ruling elites, the establishment of the Pinochet regime offered an unsurpassed opportunity to voice openly and aggressively an
ultra-liberalism which had previously been constrained both by Keynesian strictures of the welfare state and by political compromise with
social-democratic forces and organized labor. The Chilean junta’s free market policies, uncompromising anti-communist discourse, and hostility
toward any state welfare functions, galvanized an ideological and political offensive, guided by economist Milton Friedman and his “Chicago
Boys,” against the regulatory and social policies that they viewed as fetters to the “invisible hand” of the market. Today their multinational
cadre of followers educated in mainly US universities hold key executive posts both in multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the
IMF, and in Latin American central banks and ministries of economy and finance. Not only did Pinochet enjoy the personal admiration of Henry
Kissinger, Margaret Thatcher, and their ilk, but any of his measures, such as the privatization of social security, were swiftly incorporated into
the emerging neoliberal orthodoxy. Operacio´nCo´ndor
– a secret multinational effort aimed at eliminating leftwing and popular opposition – marked the beginnings of a regional reactionary offensive that had managed,
by the 1980s, to defeat other leftwing and popular movements and to largely isolate the Cuban regime
The affirmative sense of the need to globalize Latin America is an instance of and
therefore reinforces neoliberalism
Torres &Schugurensky, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, and Latin American Center, UCLA, and
Paulo Freire Institute, São Paulo, Brazil; OISE-University of Toronto, Canada, 2002 (Carlos A. and Daniel, “The political
economy of higher education in the era of neoliberal globalization: Latin America in comparative perspective”
http://www.del.ufrj.br/~ricardo/DocsArcuSur/Carlos.pdf)//JS
Economic globalization is shaped by a business offensive to restore rates of profits. Hence, it is
accompanied by a process of deregulation which calls for drastic cutbacks in social spending,
environmental destruction, regressive revisions of tax systems, loosened constraints on corporate
power, downward leveling of salaries and working conditions, widespread attacks on organized labor,
and increased spending on weapons (Dale 1989). Indeed, a major criticisms to the neoliberal policies is
that while high costs are already being paid in terms of drastic deterioration of wages, cutbacks in
spending on education, health and infrastructure, and massive unemployment, the majorityof the
populationhave not yet felt the benefitsof these policies. It is alsoclaimed that economic
restructuringleadsto a model of social exclusion thatleaves out large sectors of the world population
from accessing economic andsocial civic minimums. Another criticism is that with the implementation
ofneoliberal policies, the state withdraws from its responsibility to administerpublic resources and from
the liberal premise of pursuing egalitarianism,replacing them with a blind faith in the market and the
hope that economicgrowth will eventually generate enough of a spillover to help the poor
anddisenfranchised.Globalizationisnotonly expressed in the economic arena, butalsocultural and
political realms. Inculture, there is democratic dimension ofglobalization via expandedaccess to the
internet and electronic mail, but atthe same time there is a homogeneizing dimension product of the
unidirectional character of cable TV, by which a few media conglomerates promote the
Americanization of taste and values. In politics,thereisanascendanceof the power of supranational
institutions in prescribing policies and policingits enforcement. A critical perspective has termed the new
forms of capitalistdevelopment loosely associated with the historical experience of globalization as
institutional capitalism, and this, in turn, has serious implications for the transformation of higher
education.
The Affirmative’s attempts to exert US influence over Latin America would further
reinforce the neoliberal policies that Latin America is trying to escape
Kellogg 2007, A master of arts in integrated studies at Athabasca University he has a PhD in political studies from
Queen’s, a M.A. in political studies from York, and a B.A. in political studies also from York. (Paul, “Regional Integration In Latin
America: Dawn of an Alternative to Neo-liberalism?.” New Political Science Vol. 29.2 June 2007
http://www.reginanockerts.com/Readings/Kellogg%202007%20_%20Regional%20Integration%20in%20Lat%20Am%20Dawn%2
0of%20an%20Alternative%20to%20Neoliberalism.pdf)//JS
What this article will do is—after sketching the surprising new economic conjuncture facing Latin
America—outline two of the new institutions emergingin the wake of the impasse of the FTAA, two
institutions based on regionalintegration outside the terms of the FTAA. One is the Union of South
American Nations (UNASUR), a continuation of the South American Community ofNations (CSN), whose
summit, December 8–9, 2006, brought together representatives from 12 Latin American nations,
including eight heads of state.8An initiative centered on the Brazilian state, the UNASUR/CSN, if
successful,could represent a very real challenge to US hegemony in Latin America. Thesecond is the
BolivarianAlternative for the Americas (ALBA), an initiative centered on the Venezuelan state. ALBA
means “dawn” in Spanish, and there is areal feeling that what we are witnessing is what Hugo Cha´vez
Frı´ as, president of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, has called “the dawn of a new era” in Latin
America9 —an alternative at last to the long night of neoliberalism. This articlewill argue that, while
both initiatives are frequently treated as one—theemergence of a new regionalism in opposition to the
US-led FTAA—they in factneed to be treated separately. The UNASUR, while a challenge to US
hegemony in the region, is completely embedded in a very familiar logic of capital accumulation and
corporate rule. ALBA, by contrast, is closely associated with the mass movements, which are at the
core of the leftward move of many of the region’s politics. If there is to be an alternative to US
hegemony in the region that can challenge capitalism as well as neoliberalism, it will be in relation to
the ALBA initiative, not that of the UNASUR.
Link: Cuba
US fails to understand oppressive impacts of capitalism on Cuban society
LaFeber, Marie Underhill Noll Professor Emeritus of History and a Stephen H. Weiss Presidential Fellow in the Department of
History at Cornell University, one of the United States' most distinguished historians 93 -- (Walter, “Inevitable Revolutions: The United
States in Central America”, 1/17/93, http://books.google.com/books/about/Inevitable_Revolutions.html?id=RqMp5TsWCqkC)//AS
The need of Cubans and Central Americans to find different means for achieving their version of a just
society arose in large part from their long experience with North American capitalism. This capitalism has had a
Jekyll and Hyde personality. U.S. citizens see it as having given them the highest standard of living and most open society in the world. Many
Central Americans have increasingly associated capitalism with a brutal oligarchy-military complex that
has been supported by U.S. poli- cies-and armies. Capitalism, as they see it, has too often threatened the
survival of many for the sake of freedom for a few. For example, Latin Americans bitterly observed that when the
state moved its people for the sake of national policy (as in Cuba or Nicaragua),the United States condemned
it as smacking of Communist tyranny. lf, however, an oli- garchy forced hundreds of peasants off their
land for the sake of his own profit, the United States accepted it as simply the way of the real world?
Neoliberal policies won’t work in Cuba - Cubans reject it – the aff fails
Carmona - Professor of Economics at the Universidad San Pablo. Spring 2000
(Antonio, “Cuba: Reforms and Adjustments Versus Transition,” International Journal of Political Economy. Vol 30.1, pp. 85. JSTOR)//SG
The difference among highly industrialized countries lies in the manner in which these elements are
implemented and in their political capacity. Each country has developed its own variant mode ofproduction throughout its
history. What makesWestern Europe different from the rest ofthe world's capitalist economies is their welfare
state, where the interests ofworkers are safeguardedin the legal and con- stitutional framework. The welfare state in
Europe was consolidated after World War II.The benefits ofthe welfare state and its reforms were won after nearly a
century of worker-based struggles and the efforts of unions, labor parties, and other emancipation groups. One cannot account for
the high level ofproductivity experienced in Western Europe without taking into consideration the framework in which the state operates. In
Cuba, most
ofthe welfare-state attributes were brought into existence with- out the installation ofan
industrialization process, and in a relatively short period of time. In this manner, the overthrow ofthe
FulgencioBatista regime andthe implementation ofthe so-called socialist project can be seen as revolutionary.
The institutional and infrastructure capacity forproductivity exists only through na- tional state power,the very same power
that guards the welfare reforms.Another reason for CUbans to reject neoliberalism is that Cuban workers are
already accus- tomed to the benefits ofthe welfare state and the political space for expressing economic
interests. Ultimately, what allows the Cuban government to enjoy sta- bility and support frommostworkers
isthe fact that Cubanworkers are much more involved in production planningthan their counterparts in free-market
econo- mies.Cubansare most likely tosupport Fidel Castro rather than allowmultina- tionalcompaniesto rule the
countryand wipe away benefits that were implemented a generation ago. The logical step for Cuba to take is to maintain a high level of
socialization ofproductivity and an increase in hard-currency profits.
Link: Venezuela
Intervention in Venezuela is marked by self-interest and neoliberal imposition
Clement, Visiting Assistant Professor of Politics at Pomona, 05 (Christopher, “Confronting Hugo Chávez: United States "Democracy
Promotion" in Latin America”, Latin American Perspectives 32:3, 5/05, JSTOR)//AS
I offer a markedly different critique of U.S.
democracy promotion. Indeed, the policy is premised on the ideological
assumption that democratic governance optimizes global capitalism and international stability, but
the above argument pays little attention to the narrow and orthodox intellectual forces that underpin
the practice of democracy promotion. The preoccupation with party building and the "semi-authoritarian"• tag used in
Venezuela and elsewhere demonstrates a growing awareness that political liberalization does not
necessarily result in populations or regimes that readily fall in line with free-market principles or U.S.-defined
global security priorities. Experimentation and departures from the authorized model of political liberalization are frequently identified as
threats to democratic consolidation. Hugo Chavez's trenchant critique of party politics in Venezuela and his sweeping political reforms run
counter to the conventional written narratives of democratization. Moreover,
idealism has not been the sole (or even the
principal) impulse behind the practice of democracy promotion. Contrary to the assertions of Zakaria and other critics,
U.S. foreign policy has not promoted democracy simply because it is moral. The practice is deployed
primarily when U.S. interests can be secured by using a targeted country's electoral system (or other constitutional
mechanisms) to accomplish regime change. Further- more, while these interventions may not be driven by morality, they are
associated with moral rhetoric that casts the intransigent leaders (even elected ones) as dubious political
actors with undemocratic intentions. The statements of several members of the Bush administration make clear that
Washington considers tensions with Venezuela the result of a government in Cara- cas that lacks an "understanding of what a democratic
system is all about."• Other official statements and the NED's grant descriptions also suggest that a victory by Chavez's U.S.-backed opponents
will not only "return"• the coun~ try to democracy but also repair Venezuela's "close friendship"• with the United States.
Venezuela is working towards an anti-neoliberal structure—US intervention prevents
Albo, Department of Political Science, York University, 06 (Gregory, “The Unexpected Revolution: Venezuela Confronts Neoliberalism”,
Presentation at the University of Alberta, International Development Week, 1/06, http://socialistproject.ca/theory/venezuela_praksis.pdf)//AS
A basic goal of neoliberalism is to reduce the role of the state in domestic policymaking and increase
the control of foreign capital over local economies. Venezuela has argued that the state must maintain
a role in promoting domestic economic development through strategic use of tariffs and government subsidies to protect
nascent industries and promote local development of jobs, as in the VuelvanCaras program. These are tools that governments around the
world -including the U.S. - have used for decades to help promote national economic growth and create local jobs.'"' Yet the
U.S. and EU
proposals in the WTO"" would drastically reduce the ability of developing countries from employing the
same strategies we used, effectively "kicking away the ladder of development."•'" Venezuela has opposed
these measures in global arenas, signing on with a group of 11 countries calling for the right to protect developing country's industrial policy
space in the WTO, for example. Another key aspect of Venezuela's opposition to corporate globalization is in its
approach to services. The "liberalization" of services involves privatizing services that are owned by the public to meet basic human needs
including health care, education, and distribution of water and electricity. But these basic
services are guaranteed to
Venezuelans in the Constitution. Programs like Barrio Adentro and the education missions, detailed above, ensure access of
Venezuelans to basic services. At the same time, promoting regional integration programs focusing on eradicating
illiteracy have been a focus on the Chavez administration: on April l8th, 2005 Venezuela presented a proposal for a massive regional
literacy program to a visiting UNESCO committee."" These programs exemplify the commitment to the right to basic services, and are
incompatible with privatized education or health care. And the
case of SAIC's interference in the Venezuelan oil
company's PdVSA's computer operations is a dire warning about the danger of allowing foreign
ownership of domestic services in strategic industries.
The affirmative attempts to better the lives of Venezuelans has empirically failed due
to the neoliberal policies that are reinforced by the 1AC
Hellinger Professor of Political Science at Webster University in St. Louis and directs the International Relations Program
1991 (Daniel, Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy Pub. Westview Press pp. 197-98)//JS
As might be expected, the sudden rise in oil prices was welcomenews to the politically and economically
troubled nation, but President Perez soon made it clear that his embrace of an austere program of
economic readjustment, designed to satisfy the conditions laid down by the International Monetary
Fund, remained firm. In fact, despite expectations that the Gulf crisis would generate an additional
US$2 billion in export earnings, the government admitted it would fall $800 million short on debt
obligations due in November 1990.16 Some additional fund~ would be spent to ease the plight of the
poorest sectors, but within a month of the outbreak of the Persian Gulf crisis, it had become clear that
any improvement in economic conditions for the majority of families would have to wait several more
years of what Venezuelansbitterly call the "Perez truca" ("Perez trick").February 27 will probably stand
out in Venezuelan history as anevent similar to the massacre of students in the Plaza of Tlalteleco
inMexico City in 1968, that is, as a turning point in which the hegemony of the governing elite can no
longer be taken for granted, as the beginningof a longer term historical process of change. Even if AD
were to returnto its popular roots and offer a more humane and just approach toeconomic reform, the
level of repression may very well grow and threatenthe democratic gains made between 1935 and 1958.
With the enormous resources of the media and the power of the international banks and corporations
behind them, proponents of the neoliberal project have enormous advantages over proponents of the
alternative, democratizing project of the new social movements.
Link: Mexico
Neoliberalism is a tool of the state viewing human capital as a commodity to sell and
trade. The perceived benefits of such policies simply serve as a mask for the stripping
away of fundamental rights
Kim, Politics & History student and the University of Alberta in Alberta, 2012
(Dongwoo, “Modernization or Betrayal: Neoliberalism in Mexico,” Constellations, Volume 4.1 2012, pg 223-25)//SG
Thus,
Carlos Salinas came to power in times of crisis in 1988. Understanding that PRI’s success was built on and
made economic recovery his priority.6 Furthermore,
Salinas had the ambition of modernizing Mexico through the implementation of neoliberal policies.
perpetuated by economic prosperity during the Mexican Miracle,Salinas
Salinas was educated at Harvard University, where he obtained two master’s degrees and a doctorate in political economy. He was stunned by
“progressive thinking about global economics and the lagging development of the Third World” whenhe
first came across neoliberal
economic theory and immediately drawn to it.7 Hence, Salinas believed that he would both stabilize and
modernize the country through the neoliberal transformation of Mexico. The emphasis on the association between
economic prosperity, modernity, and neoliberalism is apparent in Salinas’ inaugural speech. From the onset, Salinas emphasized that “nuestros
problemas no vienen por eI fracaso de nuestros esfuerzos, sirio por el tamaño de la adversidad,”8 suggesting the existence of a difficulty
beyond national level. Salinas then stated that “[l]a modernización de México es indispensable,” and also “inevitable,” as it is the only way of
affirming “nuestra soberanía en un mundo en profunda transformación.”9 Salinas then employed the word “modernización” various times
throughout his eight-thousand-word speech.Salinas
thus demonstrated his belief that the adoption of neoliberalism
was not only beneficial for Mexico, but also imperative for survival in a fast-changing world. Carlos
Salinas’ series of neoliberal economic policies culminated with the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada.Salinas was at first disinterested in forming a bilateral agreement
with the United States.10 After all, the PRI had staunchly closed up the Mexican economy to the world for the last sixty years and gained
popularity from its nationalist and defensive economic policies (especially against the United States), most notably the nationalization of the
petroleum industry in late 1930s by president Lázaro Cárdenas. However, due to the “lukewarm” response from the world leaders during his
European tour, which included a stop at the World Economic Forum in February of 1989,
Salinas realized that the only way of
drawing investors to Mexico was to “provide [them] with both cheap labor and privileged access to the
U.S. market.”11 Salinas immediately approached the American government officials with the intention
of negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement,shortly thereafter the administration shifted policies for the preparation and
successful negotiation of NAFTA. CarlosSalinas thus marketed NAFTA with fervor in and outside of Mexico and
hastened the pace of the neoliberal reforms. Salinas wrote that he made efforts to “disseminate more information and
confirm the active presence of key economic, labor, and business leaders in working groups” during the period of NAFTA negotiation.12 His
administration privatized public corporations and implemented land reforms. Furthermore, Carlos
Salinas marketed his neoliberal policies as means of modernizing the Mexican politics as well, thus
associating neoliberalism with democracy. In November 1990, Salinas said both political and economic
problems, which he described as “clouds,” were “dissipating.”13 Some even referred to Salinas’ reforms as
“Salinastroika,” paralleling these to the radical introduction of socio-political transparency and freedom in the former Soviet Union.14 The
Salinas administration thus provided hope that these neoliberal economic policies would continue as political reforms as well. Seemingly, Carlos
Salinas’ reforms were successful; his policies did draw foreign investments, Mexico relieved itself of a significant amount of debt and its
economy grew by 4.4% in 1993.15 Salinas administration earned the reputation as a “political juggernaut” for its political competency.16 The
elections for federal senators and state governors held in 1991 reflected the surging popularity of the Salinas administration; the PRI candidates
won 61 percent of the congressional votes, giving Salinas “the power to make laws without having to seek any support from the opposition.”17
Most importantly, Carlos Salinas’ leadership earned the respect and confidence of foreign investors. According to Dillon and Preston, President
Clinton praised Salinas for giving Mexico “better leadership than ever in [Clinton’s] lifetime” and The Wall Street Journal “looked favorably on
[his] reforms.”18Salinas was
thus deemed a progressive and modern leader by the “first world,” and many
believed that Mexico was truly modernizing.Many ordinary Mexicans shared this feeling
ofbuoyancyandprogress brought by NAFTA—the primary form of neoliberalism that they came across. Mexicans had long
identified the United States with “modernity,”19 and although historically described as an “imperialist bully,” it was a country
to be admired.20 According to Dillon and Preston, the successful negotiation ofNAFTA gave Mexicans the impression that
they were entering an equal relationship with the “First World countries” like the United States or
Canada,and thus rendered an elevated sense of patriotism.21 Martín Calderón, an entrepreneur, echoed the ebullient sentiment of many
Mexicans when he said that NAFTA would render “fantastic opportunities to Mexico.”22The
economic prosperity benefited
many Mexicans in the upper and middle classes.Those in the middle class then started to use credit cards to purchase “first
world” luxury items, which added to the sense of modernization. Hence, neoliberalism, mainly manifested in form of NAFTA to ordinary
Mexicans, was in a way perceived as the very signal of Mexico’s modernization and advancement into the “first world.” Many Mexicans, who
believed in PRI government’s promises about modernization, were hopeful for political changes as well.Nonetheless,
not everyone
shared this sense of advancement or modernization; in fact, neoliberalism symbolized the effective
betrayal of the Mexican pueblo by PRI for those in the marginalized sectors of the society. Although some
Mexicans, like Martín Calderón, received the neoliberal reforms of the Salinas administration positively, many others, especially
those in the marginalized sectors of the Mexican society, saw these as the betrayal of the pueblo by PRI.
Contrary to their name and self-constructed image of a “Revolutionary Party,” PRI had been betraying the populist promises embodied by the
Mexican Revolution and the Constitution of 1917.PRI
regime had become a brutal oppressor, which had led Mario
Vargas Llosa to refer to Mexico as “the perfect dictatorship.”23 The brutal acts of oppression by PRI, the
crackdown of the student protesters in the Tlatelolco Massacre of 1968being just one of the many examples, had
been shadowed by decades of brilliant economic performance between 1940s and 1970s. The neoliberal policies of the Salinas
administration had various aspects that conflicted with the core elements of the Mexican
nationalism,which had been greatly influenced by the memories and symbols of the Mexican Revolution. First, as Frederick C. Turner
notes, xenophobia, especially against the United States, formed a fundamental base of the Mexican
nationalism.24 The war of 1847 and loss of territories are deeply ingrained in the Mexican public discourse. However, the main element of
the modern Mexican nationalism is the memories of the Mexican Revolution of 1910. As Lynn Stephen claims, the images of Emiliano Zapata,
the leader of the original Zapatista movement, were “[served] as a symbol for the institutionalization and nationalization of the Mexican
Revolution,primarilyunderthetutelageof[...]PRI.”25 HenryC.SchmidtnotesthattheRevolution came to be perceived as the “protean mythos of
nationhood.”26 The Constitution of 1917, which was born out of the Revolution, fulfilled—at least in words—the pueblo’s demand for land
reform (ejidos) and empowered the labor sector through the articles 27 and 123, respectively.27 All of these historical memories were
embedded in the discourse of national identity, more so as PRI had appropriated and perpetuated these to legitimize its rule. All in all, the
Mexican Revolution played a fundamental role in shaping the modern national identity of Mexico. Therefore,
the neoliberal policies of
the Salinas administration that challenged the achievements of the Mexican Revolution and opened up
to the United States, the ancient enemy and “imperialist bully,” symbolized PRI’s turning away from the
promises of the Mexican Revolutionand even the Mexican pueblo itself. Alejandra, one of the interviewees of Judith Hellman,
echoes the sentiment of betrayal incurred by neoliberalism when she says that the “real history of Mexico has become an embarrassment to
the regime.”28 The following cases of unions, maquila workers, and land reforms, which demonstrate the contradiction of the promises of the
Constitution of 1917, support my claim thatthe
neoliberal policies undertaken by the PRI regime symbolize the clear
betrayal on the Mexican pueblo.Carlos Salinas trampled the workers’ rights, one of the key victories of the Mexican Revolution
enshrined in the Constitution of 1917, as part of his neoliberal economic agenda. The article 123 of the Constitution of 1917, among many other
things, guarantees the right of the workers, whether employed by public or private enterprises, to organize and strike; it states that “[t]oda
persona tiene derecho al trabajo digno y socialmente útil; al efecto, se promoverán la creación de empleos y la organización social de trabajo,
conforme a la ley.”29 Salinas’ brutal crackdown on union workers, which completely contradicted the article 123, symbolized the continuation
of the PRI government’s betrayal and oppression. For Salinas, thecrackdown of
the unions was a necessary step before the
implementation of his neoliberal policies. In the context of free trade with Canada and the United States, the “competitive
advantage” of Mexico consisted of “cheap labor” and “a minimum of state intervention in the economy,” and thus the labor had to be subdued
before anything else.30 According to Mark Eric Williams, most of the scholars agree that the “weak labor opposition,” diluted in the CTM, was
one of the key characteristics of the Mexican industry that allowed Salinas to implement his privatization policies.31 However, the labor leaders
who wielded significant influence in Mexican society, such as Joaquín Hernández or Agapito Gónzalez definitely posed a threat to Salinas’
agenda and hence it was necessary for him to overcome this opposition beforehand.Instead
of negotiation, which would have
been preferred in modernized countries and more in line with the Constitution of 1917, Salinas chose a
rather caudillo and PRI method of resolving conflicts: brutal crackdown.
US economic involvement in Mexico is profit-driven and hurts the Mexican people and
economy
Cooney, environmental and economic research at the Center for the Biology of Natural Systems, Queens College, City University of New
York, 01 (Paul, “The Mexican Crisis and the Maquiladora Boom A Paradox of Development or the Logic of Neoliberalism?”, Latin American
Perspectives 28:55, 2001, Sage Publications)//AS
Supporters of the maquiladora industry argue that transnational corpora- tion expansion is beneficial
and will continue to be so, providing more employment for Mexican workers and increasing Mexico's
competitiveness in the global economy. However, the fundamental problem is that, despite improvement in its
export position, Mexico is not in control of the wealth generated within the country. The question remains,
therefore, whether maquiladora development can be counted on to provide growth in the long run. If, for
example, maquiladora workers were to demand higher wages (perhaps something closer to a quarter of their U.S.
counterparts) or insist that health and safety standards be enforced or request that working overtime be optional, it is probable that
the capital accumulated by many of these trans- national corporations would continue its circuit
elsewhere. In other words, although surplus-value is generated in Mexico, it can relocate at the time of reinvestment if the conditions for
capital do not remain sufficiently propi- tious. This is not mere conjecture about a worst-case scenario; we need only consider what took place
when maquiladora workers started to demand higher wages and become more organized in the mid- 19705: there was a sig- nificant cutback of
investment by the transnational corporations operating in the northern border region (see Pena, 1997)
US engagement with Mexico resulted in the spread of neoliberalism and an economic
crash
Greenberg, et al, Ph.D in Anthropology at University of Michigan, 2012
(James B., Thomas Weaver (Ph.D. in Anthropology at University of California at Berkeley), Anne Browning-Aiken (Ph.D. in Anthropology at
University of Arizona), William L. Alexander (Professor of Anthropology at University of Arizona), “The Neoliberal Transformation of Mexico,”
Neoliberalism and Commodity Production in Mexico, University Press of Colorado, pp 3-4)//SG
President Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988) began his administration facing a depression greater than any in the post-revolutionary period. The
external debt had risen from a manageable 30 percent of the GDP in 1981 to 63 percent in 1983, with interest on the national debt absorbing
half of the country’s export income (Bosworth, Lawrence, and Lustig 1992:7). Eighty cents of every dollar earned from the oil industry was
owed to foreign banks. The debt had climbed to over $100 million when Mexico declared a debt moratorium in 1982.Bailing Mexico
out
of this crisis required a worldwide effort by banks supported by the US Federal Reserve, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB),and the US Department of the Treasury(Adams 1997:6).Their support,
however, was conditional on Mexico taking steps toput its economic house in order, which entailedadopting
neoliberal policies. From 1982 to 1985 the IMF backed a program to stabilize Mexico’s economy through fiscal and monetary
constraints.The program failedas a result of slow structural reform,and a new monetary crisis ensued, with the currency
rate set at 150 pesos per dollar.These loans came with a set of conditionalities that obliged the borrowing
governments to both adopt strict monetarist measures and institute free mar- ket and free trade
policies (Easterly 2005:3; Koeberle 2003:251). Although the intent of thestructural adjustmentprogram(SAP) was to
stimulate economic growthand help governments clean up their finances, the specific measures applied depended on local
circumstances. Commonly,these programsincluded a variety of neoliberal measures to
reducegovernmentspending, open markets, and encourage exports.As these neoliberal policies were implemented,
specific parts of the economy experienced immediate impacts. Neoliberalmeasuresto reduce government
expendituresultimatelytranslated into cutting programsand subsidiesand downsizing spending on health,
education, and welfare (Kolko 1999). The immediate effects includedincreased unemploymentas government and other civil
servants were laid off,loss of services, and rising pricesas subsidized commodities were forced into line with the market.
Frequently,monetary reforms included devaluation of the local currency against international currencies such as the US
dollar. Such devaluations have a double impact:they make national goods more competitivein the world market,but they
also drive up the price of imports.To curb inflation,neoliberal reforms typically included measures to restrict
creditby eliminating ceilings on interest rates,causing rates to soar and credit to dry up.Under the banner of market
liberalization and free trade, actions were taken to lift restrictions on foreign investments in local industry, banks, and other sectors of the
economy that enjoyed special protection and to abolish or cut tariffs, quotas, and other restrictions on imports. To encourage the
competitiveness of exports, SAP reforms often sought to deregulate export-oriented sectors of the economy and to free these sectors from
government controls that protected labor, the environ- ment, and natural resources (Babb 2005; Bello 1996:286). Because ultimately so much
rests on “getting prices right,” these packages often include policies to hold the line on wages or even to force them down (at least in terms of
their true foreign exchange equivalents) in an effort to make exports more competitive (Greenberg 1997).
Link: General
American economic engagement strategies are distinctly neoliberal and subscribe to
exceptionalist theories
Gill, Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science at York University, 95 (Stephen, “Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and
Disciplinary Neoliberalism”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 24:3, 1995, Sage Publications)//AS
North American arrangements are more hierarchical and asymmetrical,understood both in inter-state terms and in
terms of the class structures of eachnation. NAFTA is premised upon a low level of political institutionalisation
anda hub-and-spoke configuration of power, with the United States at the centre ofa continentalised
political economy. This is even more the case with theCaribbean Basin Initiative, which can be terminated unilaterally by the
UnitedStates." The United States has negotiated the implicit right to monitor andcontrol large areas of Canadian political life in the US-Canada
Free TradeAgreement. The US-Canada Agreement specifies that each side has to notify the other "˜party' by advanced warning, of intended
federal or provincial government policy that might affect the other side's interests, as defined by the agreements Because of Canada's extensive
economic integration with the United States, this situation necessarily affects the vast majority of Canadian economic activity, but not vice
versa. Thus, Canadian governments no longer can contemplate an independent or interventionist economic strategy. In
both NAFTA
and the US-Canada Agreement there are no transnational citizenship rights other than those accorded
to capital, and these are defined to favour US-registered companies. Finally, NAFTA can only be amended by
agreement of all signatories. Whilst these arrangements place binding constraints on the policies of Canada and Mexico, to a certain degree,
the United States retains constitutional autonomy and important prerogatives: its trade law is
allowed to override treaty provisions, notwithstanding the rights of redress that are available to participants through the
dispute settlement mechanisms." In other words, the US government is using access to its vast market as a lever of
power, linked to a reshaping of the international business climate, by subjecting other nations to the
disciplines of the new constitutionalism, whilst largely refusing to submit to them itself, partly for strategic
reasons. Indeed, one of the arguments expressed by former European Union President Jacques Delors in favour of comprehensive West
European economic and monetary union was strategic: to offset economic unilateralism from the United States, in matters of money and trade.
Thus, an
American-centred global neoliberalism _mandates a separation of politics and economics in
ways that may narrow political representation and constrain democratic social choice in many parts of the
world. New constitutionalism, which rarities this separation, may have become the de facto discourse of governance for most of the global
political economy. This discourse involves a hierarchy of pressures and constraints on government autonomy that vary according to the size,
economic strength, form of state and civil society, and prevailing national and regional institutional capabilities, as well as the degree of
integration into global capital and money markets.
That aff’s promotion of market changes further neoliberal experimentation in Latin
America
Lander, Professor of Social Sciences at the Universidad Central de Venezuela in Caracas, Summer 1996
(Edgardo, “The Impact of Neoliberal Adjustment in Venezuela, 1989-1993,” Translated by Luis A. Fierro, Latin American Perspective, Vol. 23.3,
50-73. JSTOR)//SG
Beyond the goals of reestablishing macroeconomic equilibria and structural reform of the Venezuelan economy,the economic
policy
we have been examining was part of the neoliberal/neoconservative political project. Neoliberal
thought constitutes not only an economic theory but a normative political one-a concept of what the
relationships between state and society as well as between the economy and the market should be (see
Waligorski, 1990).Starting from a critique of the threats to the free operation of the market represented by Keynesianism, the social-democratic
tradition and, the welfare state,
the neoliberal/neoconservative economists assert a need to rescue democracy
from itself through a radical limitation of the sphere of politics and of democratic decisions. They demand a
fundamental transformation of contemporary political systems with the purpose of recovering the economy's autonomy and its separation
from politics and limiting state action to guaranteeing the basic conditions for the operation of the market forces. "Thus they coincide with the
conservative critics of the "excesses" of contemporary democracy in their advocacy of reducing its scope in order to guarantee the
"governability" of modern societies (Crozier,Huntington, andWatanuki, 1975). In the core countries,no
such "revolutionary"
transformation of political systems has been possible despite the strength of neoliberal ideology and the
efforts of conservative governments such as those of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, which placed these goals at the
center of their political agendas.'2The situation in Latin America is quite different. The debt burden, the
deterioration of the state, the political parties, and the political system in general, and the association of
businessmen, technocrats, and right-wing politicians with international financial capital and the policies of the World Bank and the
have so altered the correlation of social and political power in these societies that
the continent has become an experimental laboratory for the neoliberal transformation. The declining
International Monetary Fund
legitimacy and organizational weakness of the traditional parties, labor unions, and organizations have left the popular sectors in many of the
countries of the continent without an effective voice,allowing
the advance of neoliberal neoconservative political
proposals with only limited resistance. In Venezuela this political project has had its expression in the aforementioned
agreements signed by the national government – behind the backs of Congress, the political parties, and public opinion – with the International
Monetary Fund. Beyond its short-term macroeconomic goals,
there was an attempt to redefine, in accordance with the
neoliberal agenda, the basic relationships between the state and society and between politics,
clienteles, populism, and inefficiency and corruption in state management, neoliberals seek solutions in
the reduction of the role of politics. Thus, the role of the state is reduced and there is an attempt to depoliticize economic
policymaking, isolating it from political debate and thus from populist and/or democratic temptations. From a radically reductionist concept of
the social order according to which only the quantifiable macroeconomic variables are held to be true, a new economic policy is advocated as if
it were exclusively a technical matter, without any attempt to create coalitions or consensus with regard to the proposed changes. Both the
government bureaucrats and the advisers of international organizations present it as an objective requirement of national conditions and those
of the international economy – a requirement that is beyond any possible debate about what type of country we desire. There seems to be
confidence that the weakness and limited legitimacy of parties and labor unions and the precariousness of the popular grass-roots
organizations will allow these transformations to take place without any resistance. In fact,the
important labor conflicts during
the development of the adjustment program have not proved capable of significantly influencing the
general orientation of economic policy. The political parties, both in government and in the opposition, have confronted a
systematic antipolitical and antiparty campaign charging them with corruption and narrow self-interest that has rendered them incapable of
presenting a credible alternative to the government’s policies. In contrast to the situation in other countries of Latin America, where recent
experience of military dictatorship, hyperinflation, or both has allowed the implementation of adjustment policies with relatively little
resistance and without a loss of legitimacy,in
Venezuela the adjustment has led to a deepening of the political crisis.
With the institutional mechanisms for changing these policies constrained, the reactions and resistance
have taken place at the margins of the formal political system. The social explosion of February 1989, the so-called
Caracazo, was the first such extrainstitutional response. The broad (though passive) popular support for the attempted coup of February 1992
was also a clear expression of the increasing disintegration of a political system that once seemed exceptional for its stability.
The 1AC uses neoliberalist policies to force their desired market on Latin America
MacEwan, He has a PhD from Harvard University and is Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of
Massachusetts Boston 1999 (Arthur, Neo-liberalism or Democracy? Economic Strategy, Markets and Alternatives for the 21st
CenturyPub. Zed Books in 1999 Page 4-5)//JS
While the basic tenets of neo-liberalism operate in the rich countries, the policy plays its most
powerful role in many of the low-income countries of Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Central and
Eastern Europe. Within these countries, influential groups see their fortunes tied to neo-liberalism, but
the conflict over economic policy is seldom confined within a nation’s borders. Officials from the
international lending agencies, particularly the IMR and the World Bank, from the government of the
economically advanced countries, particularly the United States, andfrom private internationally
operating firms use their economy and political power to foist ‘market oriented’ policy on the peoples
of the low-income countries. The use of the term ‘Washington Consensus’ to sum up the neo-liberal
prescription underscores the role of the US government, the IMF and the World Bank in its
premeditation, as well as the complementary role of the various US research and policy institutes in
providing intellectual support.
The 1AC’s attempts at positive globalization are backed by the drive to make a profit
back home
MacEwan, He has a PhD from Harvard University and is Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of
Massachusetts Boston 1999 (Arthur, Neo-liberalism or Democracy? Economic Strategy, Markets and Alternatives for the 21st
CenturyPub. Zed Books in 1999 Page 6)//JS
In large part, this claim that there is no alternative is based on the argument that the ‘globalization’ of
economic affairs forces virtually all countries of the world to embrace the world market if they wish to
achieve economic development. Globalization in the current era has involved, first of all, a progressive
deregulation of the international movement of goods and capital. Also, globalization today is taking
place in a world which is more and more uniformly capitalist. In this homogenized world economy,
businesses can do the same things in the same ways at a great variety of locations, and, with the
declining regulation of international commerce, they will accordingly continually relocate to the
lowest cost production sites. Thus, the neo-liberals contend,, if the government of a particular country
attempts to regulate private activity in order to achieve some desired social goal – great income equality
or environmental preservation, for example – businesses will simply leave the country for higher profits
elsewhere in the world. On the other hand, the argument continues, if a country eliminates both
external and internal barriers to commerce, globalization will allow it to reap the benefits: low-cost
goods from abroad, access to foreign markets for its own exports, and higher levels of investment by
both foreign and domestic businesses.
Link: BioD
Campaigns for biodiversity are veiled capitalism and exploitation of the
environment—commercialize biodiversity and essentialize native inhabitants
Bamford, associate professor of anthropology at the University of Virginia 02 (Sandra, “ON BEING ‘NATURAL’ IN THE RAINFOREST
MARKETPLACE”, Social Analysis 46:1, Spring 2002, Ingenta)//AS
C.I. promotes a radically different vision of the world. Employing
the rhetoric of a liberal, democratic ideology, they
argue for an extension of “rights” to all citizens of the world. Basing their stand on the view that rainforest
countries are entitled to benefit from the development and sale of their endemic species, C.I. has been
active in the development of international policy as it pertains to the ownership of genetic resources
(ibid.). One of its most aggressive campaigns to date has centered on the field of “bioprospecting”— the development of genetic material
derived from plant and animal species (ibid.). In a pamphlet that describes their “Shaman’s Apprentice Program”— elsewhere dubbed “the
hunt for genetic resources”—C.I. states that they
“encourage local tribes to record their knowledge, be proud of
their culture, and profit from it economically (C.I. 1997c).”8 Saving the planet, it would seem, can (and should)
be a rewarding experience for everyone. While couched in its own particular brand of rhetoric, the discourse of
Conservation International is fairly representative of contemporary biodiversity campaigns . Construed at
one level as a redemptive act—an attempt to protect ‘uncontaminated’ zones of the non-human world as ‘pristine’ and
‘undisturbed’9 —the narratives produced by biodiversity advocates often read more like a manual on
saving late twentieth century capitalist society. As Charles Zerner puts it: “Nature is analogized to a
warehouse, a library, or a safe-deposit box containing fixed, valuable, and threatened commercial assets (1996:
72).” Previously ‘uncapitalized’ parts of nature—including the very genes of living species—become
imminent sources of commercial value, awaiting only the power of science and technology to release their profit-making
potential (cf. Escobar 1996, Lewin 1995). Critics of contem- 40 Sandra Bamford 05-Bamford 7/8/02 6:03 PM Page 40porary environmentalism
have been quick to point out the contradictions inherent in this movement.10 Arturo Escobar has argued, for example, that far
from
challenging the basic premises of modern industrial society, campaigns to conserve biological diversity
represent a deepening of capitalist interests into the Third World. In a 1996 article, Escobar notes, for example: [in
contemporary discussions] … the key to the survival of the rainforest is seen as lying in the genes of the species, the usefulness of which [can]
be released for [monetary gain] through genetic engineering and bio-technology in the production of commercially valuable products, such as
pharmaceuticals. Capital
thus develops a conservationist tendency, significantly different from its usual
reckless, destructive form (1996: 47). Yet, if the rhetoric on biodiversity is fairly uniform in treating ‘nature’
as one big shopping mall, it evinces a certain amount of confusion in knowing exactly how to situate
indigenous people in the dialogue. On the one hand, indigenous people appear at first glance to be assigned
a favored position in the emerging rhetoric. They are given the role of ‘stewards’ in charge of preserving the last
remaining vestiges of biodiversity on the planet. Yet, if this appears to place them in a position of empowerment, it is
a position that is nonetheless riddled with contradictions. For as we shall see, contemporary discourse not
only constructs the ‘native’ as ‘superhero’: it also has the effect of ‘essentializing,’ ‘homogenizing,’
and ultimately ‘naturalizing’ those very people upon which the survival of the planet supposedly depends.
Link: Oil
Attempts to engage in foreign oil industries are neoliberally motivated and culminate
in war
Lafer, political economist and is an Associate Professor at the University of Oregon's Labor Education and Research Center 04 (Gordon,
“Neoliberalism by other means: the “war on terror” at home and abroad”, New Political Science 26:3, 2004, Taylor and Francis)//AS
I believe that, in its broadest logic, the
war must be understood as a means of advancing the neoliberal agenda
of global economic transformation. Both abroad and at home, the pattern of administration behavior reflects an ambitious and
aggressive drive to restructure the economy in line with neoliberal dictates. The choice of Iraq as the target of invasion and occupation was no
doubt driven both by Iraq’s vast oil reserves and its potential to substitute for Saudi Arabia as the market maker in the global oil exchange.
Apart from the Saudis, Iraq is the only country whose reserves are large enough that it could regulate world prices by choosing to expand or
contract production at strategic points in the price cycle. This
strategic value of Iraqi oil—above and beyond its straight
economic value—explains why, within one month of capturing Baghdad, US overseers raised the
prospect of pulling Iraq out of the OPEC consortium.3 Control of Iraqi oil offers the potential to exercise critical leverage
over the economies of the Middle East, Russia, China and other oil-dependent nations. But the allure of Iraq is about more than oil. Unique
among regional economies, the oil-producing nations of the Middle East constitute the one region of the world whose economies are both
significantly wealthy and largely state-run. As most of Europe, the Americas, Asia and increasingly Africa have been drawn into the neoliberal
regime of the IMF and WTO, the oil wealth of the Mideast has allowed these nations to evade the discipline of austerity budgets and structural
adjustment plans. In
the eyes of neoliberal reformers, oil wealth is not a blessing that lets governments
protect citizens against the dangers of unemployment or public service cutbacks, but a curse that
prevents nations from adopting more aggressive free-market policies. Thus Thomas Friedman notes that “there is
simply no way to stimulate a process of economic and political reform in the Arab-Muslim world without radically reducing their revenues from
oil, thereby forcing these governments to reform their economies.”4 As it is, oil
revenue has insulated these governments
from the strictures enforced virtually everywhere else. On the eve of the invasion, only two of the 13 oil-producing
nations of the Mideast had any IMF debt whatsoever.5 Thus, public employment, state-run industries, subsidized
public services, and restrictions on foreign capital—all of which have elsewhere been increasingly dismantled over the past
20 years—remain flourishing hallmarks of Mideast economies. An IMF review of the region concludes that these economies are
characterized by “lagging political and institutional reforms; large and costly public sectors … [and] high trade restrictiveness,” and grades the
region’s regulatory burden as significantly worse than that of Latin America, East Asia or the OECD countries.6 It is this form of economic
governance that the administration aims to undo in Iraq. This
is neoliberalism by other means: what could not be
achieved by trade or treaty will be imposed by military force.
Link: Terror
Anti-terror efforts are only a symptom of a neoliberal domestic agenda
Lafer, political economist and is an Associate Professor at the University of Oregon's Labor Education and Research Center 04 (Gordon,
“Neoliberalism by other means: the “war on terror” at home and abroad”, New Political Science 26:3, 2004, Taylor and Francis)//AS
If the war in Iraq is really about something other than weapons, what is the domestic “war on terror” about? At first glance,
the war at home appears to be more straightforward: a genuine if heavy-handed effort to prevent a repeat of anything like the attacks of
September 11, 2001. But here too, the administration’s actions point to motives that are mixed at best . On the one
hand, genuine security measures are often treated with a surprising degree of laxity. Whistleblowers within the federal intelligence community
complain that problems identified two years ago have remained unresolved. The multicolored national security alerts have produced great
public drama but, as far as the public has been told, have never had any relationship to major terrorist attacks either committed or deterred.
Critical needs such as preparing the public health system to cope with potential bioterrorist attacks, or supporting the anti-terrorism work of
state and local police, have gone unfunded as the monies were diverted to tax cuts.34 At the same time, a
wide range of initiatives
apparently unrelated to anything to do with terrorism—including the tax cuts, “fast track” authority,
and deunionization of federal jobs, have all been advanced as critical components of the war on
terror.35 I assume that the government is genuinely interested in preventing terrorism. Nevertheless, these facts suggest that the
administration’s agenda is more complex, and much more ambitious than simply that of protecting the population from future attacks. And
while any one of these items may be viewed as an individual case of cronyism or opportunism, the
broader pattern points to the
need for a deeper theory of what is driving the regime’s domestic agenda. I believe that the domestic
agenda, too, can only be understood in the context of neoliberal globalization. One of the axioms of
globalization is that capital accumulation has become disconnected from the nation-state. Before “global
city” became the mantra of Chamber of Commerce boosters everywhere, it was geographer SaskiaSassen’s term for the locales that are home
to the administrative headquarters of far-flung corporate empires.36 As corporate production, distribution and services have grown into
complex, worldwide networks, those at the top need ever greater capacity at central headquarters in order to coordinate these global empires.
A handful of cities have come to serve as the central hubs of financial, legal, accounting, marketing and telecommunicationsfunctions for global
capital. These cities are “global” because their dominant industries participate in an economy that is increasingly disconnected from the
fortunes of any particular nation. The functional colleagues of New York lawyers and stockbrokers are London lawyers and brokers. By contrast,
both have increasingly little economic connection to normal manufacturing and service workers. The latter are stuck in a parallel economy that,
while sharing the same physical and political space, has no means of participating in the growing fortunes of corporate empires. It may never
have been true that what was good for GM was good for America, but over the past 20 years the connection between the success of
“American” companies and the prosperity of Americans has grown threadbare.
Link: Shocks/Terror
Efforts at resiliency are inextricably linked to neoliberal policies of governmentality
Joseph, Professor of Politics at the University of Sheffield 13 (Jonathan, “Resilience as embedded neoliberalism: a governmentality
approach”, Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses 1:1, 2013, Taylor and Francis Online)//AS
In this contribution, I wish to argue that the recent
enthusiasm for the concept of resilience across a range of policy
literature is the consequence of its fit with neoliberal discourse. This is not to say that the idea of resilience is
reducible to neoliberal policy and governance, but it does fit neatly with what it is trying to say and do. A brief glance at the concept’s
origins shows it to have certain ontological commitments that make it ideally suited to neoliberal forms
of governance. Having briefly examined these philosophical aspects, I move on to define this relationship to governance through the
concept of governmentality. This also requires a particular understanding of the dominant forms of governmentality as specifically neoliberal in
nature. I then defend this interpretation of both resilience and governmentality against the claim that resilience is part of an emerging postliberalism. Instead, I argue that we are witnessing two connected but distinguishable processes – the rolling-back of classical liberalism and the
rolling-out or embedding of neoliberalism. To give a slightly optimistic tone to the argument, I suggest that this is a contested process and that
the perceived end of classical liberalism is as much an effect of the neoliberal discourse as it is an actuality. The
concept of resilience
has entered the political vocabulary from literature on the adaptability of ecological systems. Unlike
engineering resilience which emphasises how things return to a stable steady state, ecological resilience is far from stable. Instabilities may
change the system leading to significant restructuring.1 There may even be multiple stable states. These ideas come from applied mathematics
and resource ecology and are used to examine the interaction of ecological resilience and human adaptability in complex large systems.2 This
approach emphasises such things as complexity, self organisation, functional diversity and nonlinear ways of
behaving.3 Ecological and social components are linked by complex resource systems such as economic systems, institutions and organisations.
Resilience provides these complex systems with the ability to withstand and survive shocks and
disturbances. It also emphasises the capacity for renewal.4 Resilience, therefore, can be related to the way that
societies adapt to externally imposed change. The ecology literature is concerned with the impact of global environmental
change, but this could also include economic crisis and terrorist threats. The adaptive capacity of social systems
depends on the nature of their institutions and the ability to absorb shocks.5 Crises can actually play a constructive role in resource
management, forcing us to consider issues of learning, adapting and renewal.6
This idea is picked up in the political
literature. A pamphlet from the British think-tank Demos suggests that we think of the concept of resilience, not just as the ability of a
society or community to ‘bounce back’, but as a process of learning and adaptation.7 Similarly, the World Resources Institute defines resilience
as ‘the capacity of a system to tolerate shocks or disturbances and recover’ and argues that this depends on the ability of people to ‘adapt to
changing conditions through learning, planning, or reorganization’.8 The document even goes so far as to define resilience as the capacity to
thrive in the face of challenge.Elsewhere,10 I have argued that most contemporary social theories contribute to an ontology that renders the
world governable in certain ways. These ontological commitments are certainly not reducible to the political practices and indeed can be found
across a range of disciplines including ecology, geography and various intersections of social and natural science. Whether
these
philosophies go under the descriptions of ‘new materialism’, ‘complexity theory’, ‘network analysis’
or ‘reflexive approaches’, they share a set of ontological commitments. The idea of resilience fits
neatly with these ‘new’ ontological commitments. It assumes a world that is increasingly complex but also contingent.
Stable and enduring social relations are believed to have given way to complex networks of actors,
each with their own individual pursuits. Our social engagements have no necessity to them; they are what we make of them
and blend with our own particular narratives. And in order to survive the uncertainties of complex systems, people
have to show their own initiative as active and reflexive agents capable of adaptive behaviour.
Link:Healthcare
US intervention in healthcare causes the people of Latin America to suffer at the feet
of the beneficiaries of these neoliberal policies
Homedes and Ugalde ,School of Public Health, University of Texas–Houston; Department of Sociology, University of
Texas–Austin, 2005 (Núria and Antonio, “Why neoliberal health reforms have failed in Latin America,” El
Sevierhttp://www.proexcel.fiocruz.br/inalteraveis/Sistemas%20de%20Saude/PORQUE%20A%20POLITICA%20NEOLIBERAL%20F
ALHOR%20NA%20A%20LAT..pdf )//JS
The question that needs to be asked is why, in viewof the mounting evidence that neoliberal reforms
do not accomplish the intended goals, the WB continues to promote its health reform model.
Identifyingthebeneficiaries of the neoliberalreformsclarifiesthereasonfor the WB’s persistencein
promoting unsuccessful policies. The principal beneficiaries includetransnational corporations,
consultant firms, and theWB’s own staff.The prime beneficiaries have been the HMOs and private
health insurance firms, and—in some countries—the more affluent classes through decreases in outof-pocket expenses and access to care that offers more luxury hostelry services. The interests of the
US insurance firms in LA have been well documented [74]. The inclusion of privatization as acore policy
responds to those interests and cannot beexplained by any technical rationale. The increasing failures
of HMOs and private hospitals in the US—in spite of all the resources and regulating capabilities
available in this country—should by themselves have alerted WB staff that the US model was
inappropriate for LA, but the interests of the firms prevailed.The IMF and the WB are the overt actors
thatpromote the reforms. According to Stiglitz [75], aNobel prize laureate and economist who
occupiedkey posts within the WB and was an economic adviser to President Clinton, the two multilateral
agencies represent interests of groups articulated throughthe US Treasury. Stiglitz observed decisionmakingfrom an advantageous participant–observer positionand describes in great detail how the US
Treasury has imposed its ideology and interests, which are those of Corporate America, on the IMF
and WB. In a globalized economy, the well-being of European and Japanese transnational corporations
depends to some extent on the well-being of US transnational corporations, and for this reason the
governments from the EU and Japan do not object to the US Treasury’s dominant role in the IMF and
WB. Thus, we can understand the neoliberal ideologythat permeates the two multilateral agencies and
theirhealth policy choices and exclusions. For the US Treasury the main concern is profits for
transnational corporations. Excluded health policies are those that have a negative impact on
corporate profits such assafety programs in factories and agriculture, accidentreduction in vehicle
transportation, tobacco reduction,the promotion of generic drugs, and the promotion ofessential drug
lists; all of which at a very low costwould have improved significantly the health of thepopulations[76].
Programs to reduce violence, health education programs, and the promotion of some well-established
public health interventions have also been excluded from the neoliberal reforms. We can suggest that
they have been left out because they: (1) do not require the types of large loans that the WB is
accustomed to provide and (2) do not generate profits for corporations.
Link: Education
The affirmative’s want to change the current educational policies in Latin America will
only support neoliberalism
Edwards, M.A. in Latin American Studies from UT, PhD in Sociology from American University, (Beatrice, “Neoliberalism
and Educational Reform in Latin America, 1998 ” Nature, Society, and Thought Vol. 11 No. 4
http://homepages.spa.umn.edu/~marquit/nst114a.pdf#page=89)//JS
Debating the shortcomings and possibilities of education provides a reasonable response to this
confluence of issues without violating any of the new political constraints. Education has long been
presented as an instrument of upward social mobility.Vocal political debate about educational reform
revives publicbelief in the possibilities of higher standards of living throughaccess to expanded and
improved schooling. Discussion of public and private partnerships in providing broader educational
opportunity displays continued allegiance to the efficiency of free markets and competition, and a
romanticized view of educational potential closely conforms to an idealized presentation of
technological possibilities.In 1998, then, education became the major political theme atthe Second
Summit of the Americas held in Santiago, just astrade liberalization had been at the 1994 summit in
Miami.During this intersummit period, governments announced their commitment to extending a
better and more comprehensive education to all. Nonetheless, educational reforms, as they
arecurrently envisioned and previously implemented, reflect the inequalities of the neoliberal policies
that led to them. The educational reforms proposed by governments are largely reproductivist: they
provide educational services in such a wayas to replicate rather than mitigate social inequalities
throughsucceeding generations. Neoliberal educational reform, in fact,has changed school systems in
such a way as to serve the same purpose as before in a more inegalitarian and advanced technological
context.
Link: Poverty
The aff fails to answer the right question – poverty can only be fixed after reducing the
inequalities stemming from capitalism – this holds true in every society
Navarro,M.D., Ph.D., Professor of Public Policy, Sociology, and Policy Studies at Johns Hopkins
University, 2007
(Vicente, “NEOLIBERALISM AS A CLASS IDEOLOGY; OR, THE POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE GROWTH OF
INEQUALITIES,” International Journal of Health Services, Vol. 37.1, pp 60)//SG
This enormously important scientific finding, which builds upon previous scholarly work,has many implications; one
of them is that the major problem we face is not simply eliminating poverty but rather reducing
inequality. The first is impossible to resolve without resolving the second.Another implication is thatpoverty is
not just a matter of resources, as is wrongly assumed in World Bank reportsthat measure worldwide poverty by
quantifying the number of people who live on a standardized U.S. dollar a day.The real problem, again, isnot absolute resources
butsocial distance and the different degrees of control over one’s own resources. And this holds true in every
society.Let me elaborate. An unskilled, unemployed, young black person living in the ghetto area of Baltimore
has more resources (he or she is likely to have a car, a mobile phone, a TV, and more square feet per household and more kitchen
equipment)than a middle-class professional in Ghana, Africa. If the whole world were just a single society, the Baltimore
youth would be middle class and the Ghana professional would be poor. And yet, the first has a much shorter life expectancy (45 years) than
the second (62 years). How can that be, when the first has more resources than the second? The answer is clear.It
is far more difficult
to be poor in the United States (the sense of distance, frustration, powerlessness, and failure is much greater) than to be
middle class in Ghana. The first is far below the median; the second is above the median.
Link: NAFTA
NAFTA and other neoliberal reform such as the aff have and will devastate the
Mexican population
Watt, Masters from the University of Iowa; PhD from the University of Aberdeen; Professor of Latin American politics at The
University of Sheffield, 2010, (Peter, “NAFTA 15 Years on: The Strange Fruits of Neoliberalism”
http://www.stateofnature.org/?p=6369)//JS
Neoliberalism, then, has reduced the ability of Mexicans to participate in any meaningful democratic
process. While the 2000 elections in which the 70 year-long rule of theInstitutional Revolutionary
Party(PRI) came to an end represented a change on some level, it is difficult to see how this translated
into outcomes that have beneficial consequences for peoples’ lives.Regardless of the party in power, a
key provision of the NAFTA treaty allows investors to sue governments if legislation negatively affects
profits. With this, the Mexican state effectively passed control of environmental, labour and health
and safety legislation to multinational corporations. As a result, laws which protect the natural
environment are rarely enforced against corporations as the threat of legal action acts as a successful
deterrent.As part of neoliberal restructuring, Mexico would have to re-orientate its economy to the
export rather than the domestic market. Mexico was already heavily dependent on trade with the US,
but post-1982, Mexico’s dependency has become almost akin to that of a colony. US agricultural
products – most notably corn – subsidised by American taxpayers now flooded the Mexican market,
undercutting small domestic producers. For Mexican farmers the consequences have been ruinous
and have devastated domestic production, a process which continues under the recent government of
theNational Action Party(PAN).Concurrent with a reduction in real wages for the majority and cuts in
public spending, Mexicans were dealt a second blow with the onset of neoliberalism. Prices for daily
necessities, many of which previously were subsidised by the state, rose dramatically. Milk, tortillas,
petrol, electricity and public transport all became more expensive just as personal incomes began to
decline. In keeping with neoliberal logic, the government closed the CONASUPO shops which provided
subsidised necessities cheaply to poor communities. [11] This had a knock-on effect on those producing
subsidised corn and milk, who now found themselves not only undercut by imported food products, but
also without CONASUPO stores to buy their produce. Soon after the implementation of NAFTA,
Mexican corn farmers saw the price of their produce decline by 50 percent. Within the first decade of
neoliberal reform, the number of people living in poverty in Mexico rose by a third and around half the
population had no access to basic necessities. [12]
NAFTA is a tool of the capitalist state to retain US hegemony
Castillo Vera, Coordinator of the Political Economy Working Group, Colegio de la Frontera Norte in
Mexico, 1996
(Gustavo del, “NAFTA and the Struggle for Neoliberalism: Mexico's Elusive Quest for First World Status,” NEOLIBERALISM REVISITED –
Economic Restructuring and Mexico's Political Future, edited by Gerardo Otero, Westview Press, pg 33)//SG
It has; been suggested elsewhere thatthe
North American Free Trade Agree
mentand the Enterprise of the Americas
a strategic re- sponse on the part of the United States as the challengesposed by Japan and
the European Community (EC)threaten to diminish the economic hegemony that the United States gained
following World War II(del Castillo V., 1995a; Milner, 1993). This might sound like a simple proposition (or an extension of dependency
theory), but in factit involves new approaches to the management of advanced capitalist production, now
generalized throughout the world after the collapse of the state-socialist alternative (Thurow, 1992).The conflict over new
approaches to capitalist evolution arises because of the gradual but determined forging of a new
ideology in the United States by the Republican Party, beginning with the election of Richard Nixon to the presi- dency in
Initiativerepresent
1968 and continuing through the end of the Bush administration in 1992.These
years of Republican control of the White
House resulted in the dis- crediting of the state as a relevant social actor and involvedthe rediscovery of Adam Smith's faith
in market forces as the determinant factor in economic ex- change and in the allocation and distribution
of wealth in society.In contrast, the process of European integration depended on the active in- tervention of the state of each EC
country in defining social and economic we!- fare, both nationally and on a transnational and community basis. Clearly, in the European
tradition the state continues to be an important social actor (Fitzgerald, 1980). The same is true of Japan. Japan's experience in developing an
industrial policy after World War II emphasized the critical role of the state, and this same activist tradition emerges in the push toward
economic develop- ment in new regional econOmic actors such as Korea, Taiwan, and China.These experiences
-have all involved
active state participation in managing and defin- ing capitalist practices and strategic economic goals.
Link: Trade
The expansion of the market is simply a mask for organizations such as the World
Bank, IMF, and the WTO to exploit the weaknesses of developing countries in disguise
of economic reforms
Dubhashi, Ph.D. at Pune University, former Vice-Chanceller, Goa University, and an erstwhile Secretary,
Government of India, December 20, 2008
(Padmakar, “Myth and Reality of Capitalism: Neo-Liberalism and Globalisation,” MAINSTREAM, VOL
XLVII, NO 1, http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1111.html)//SG
IN these days of uncritical acclaim of globalisation by economists and the rest, the Bad Samaritans, a book by the Cambridge University
The “Unholy Trinity” of the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO, and
the financial institutions under their control or influence of those whom the author rightly describes as “Bad
Samaritans” have taken advantage of the weaknesses of the developing countries, imposed on them the
so-called package of economic reforms of liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation otherwise known as the
structural adjustment programme, that is, fiscal discipline, strict money policies, deregulation, dismantling public
projects and programmes, reduced role of the state, low tariffs and removal of barriers to private
investment—all aimed at making them a part of the free market world economy. In fact it is a self-serving strategy of the rich
countries led by the USA intended to impose their dominance on the world economy through
unfettered operation of their multinational corpo-rations even though it is detrimental to the economic interests of the
common people of the developing countries. The rich countries have systematically tried to hide their real purpose
by justifying their strategy of globalisation in a self-righteous manner as based on sound principles of free market
economic historian, comes like an eye-opener.2
economies which they advocate for the developing countries though they themselves had found it necessary to give a go-by to these principles
and resort to economic protection in their own early stages of development.
In tende-ring their advice to the developing
countries they do not find it necessary to pay any attention to the well-being of the common people of
the develo-ping countries nor the sovereign right of the governments of these countries to chalk out
their own policies. They have sedulously fostered myths of rationality and sanctity of the principle of the free market economy though
they are inconsistent with the economic reality. This has been facilitated by the recent upsurge of new-classical
economics under the leadership of the Chicago School of Economics—Milton Friedman and his followers—which
has virtually banished Keynesian Economics and the countervailing fiscal policies advocated by it as also the
newly born Developmental Economics formulated by economists like Ragner Nauske and Roscustein Roden to evolve a positive strategy of
development for the developing countries.
Trade promotes globalization and liberal economic policies causing more harm than
benefits
Szentes, Professor Emeritus of the Corvinus University of Budapest and member of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, 2008
(Tamas, “Globalisation and prospects of the world society,” CENTRAL EUROPEAN POLITICAL SCIENCE,
Vol. 9, pp 8-9, http://cepsr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ATT81762.pdf#page=9)//SG
(c)The wave of liberalisation, involving both the progress in liberalisation of international trade and capital flows, and the
worldwide spread of liberal economic policy of government, undoubtedly promotes globalisation and
the growth of world trade and capital flows, on the one hand, but benefits more the stronger, the more developed partners, on
the other. Trade liberalisation always works in favour of those with higher competitiveness, i.e. the more
developed partners. "Capital account"liberalisation promotes rapid and fluctuating flows of "hot money", i.e.
speculation-motivated transactions,rather than long-term investments, thereby contributes to the instability of
the international monetary system, and the spread ("contagion") of disturbances in money markets. A too rapid, full and
unprepared liberalisation, particularly in the field of finance,often causes more harm than benefit, as it was
experienced by several developing and “transition” (former “socialist”) countries, where it led to a fall of economic growthand,
in fact, to bigger disturbances in the economy than the preceding policy of state regulation.Liberalisationtends to sharpen competition,
but may discourage cooperation, and by its disequalising effects
contributes to the growth of international development gap under the conditions of the lack of
institutionalised correcting- compensating mechanism. Such a mechanism would also require global governance.The
international literature pays particular attention to various other effects of globalisation. Such as concerning
which stimulates technological progress,
“national sovereignty”, social welfare policies, national cultures, political conditions and convergence or divergence tendencies.
Link: Private Sector
The private sector co-opts politics resulting in increased neoliberalism through the
dismantling of state control
Ugalde, Ph.D in Political Science at National Autonomous University of Mexico, 1996
(Francisco Valdés, “The Private Sector and Political Regime Change in Mexico,” NEOLIBERALISM REVISITED – Economic Restructuring and
Mexico's Political Future, edited by Gerardo Otero, Westview Press, pg 135-36)//SG
The CCE was not just one more organization buta hierarchical instrument articulating a forced convergence
between the CMHN's program and that of the rest of the private sector. An initial objective was to
redistribute functions among organizations. Those dedicated to sectoral interests would no longer ex- pend their limited
energies in efforts to promote classwide interests.The latter were reserved for class organizations, thus strengthening
their capacity to act po- litically in a greater number of social and political processes. 6The CCE was created to accomplish wider objectives in this arena, to coordinate the activities of business associations with regard to all kinds of policies and
issues. Its aim was to present an aggressive, united front, intent upon shifting political life in Mex- icoaway from
populism in a moreliberal, business-oriented direction and Ca- pable of intervening systematicallyacross the
entire spectrum ofpublic affairs. The new association was thusdedicated to promoting the expansion of private influence in the public sphere of society. Its project, as was soon evident,was to parlay the private
sector's economic supremacy into supremacy within the state, purging thelatter of populist or nonconservative
officials indecisionmaking circles and reinforcing the linkages with the conservative (mostly
financial)bureaucracy. At the same time,the CCE emphasized the need to start a neoliberal downsizing of the
state's intervention in the economy and a concomitant loosening of its political control, summed up in the code words "privatization"
and "modernization."The former translates into a massive reallocation of economic resourcesin favor of the largest
firms and consor- tiums; the latter connotes a weakening or dismantling of the ties between gov- ernment and labor as wellas the eclipse
of the traditional(i.e., nonmodern)sectors of the bureaucracy. By the 1990s, capital's new forms of political participation had
become a permanent feature of Mexican politics, even though reforms seen as contrary to business interests were definitively abandoned after
1976, when the Lopez Portillo administration made the recovery of private-sector confidence the major aim of its economic policies.These
policies, however, met with indifferent success and eventuated in the most serious bone of contention
between business and government in recent times—the nationalization of banks in 1982.
The private sector insertion into politics removes the state from the economy
resulting in the loss of “Social Justice”
Ugalde, Ph.D in Political Science at National Autonomous University of Mexico, 1996
(Francisco Valdés, “The Private Sector and Political Regime Change in Mexico,” NEOLIBERALISM REVISITED – Economic Restructuring and
Mexico's Political Future, edited by Gerardo Otero, Westview Press, pg 136-7)//SG
Conceived along with the CCE in 1975,
the private sector's political program has been amended and augmented in
the light of subsequent events. A review of the major proclamations issued bybusinessorganizations during
the last twenty years7reveals the following list of demands: (1) a market-oriented economy; (2) increased
attention to the private sector's position, as opposed to that of other sectors, in government decisionmaking; (3)
reduced bargaining power for trade unions; (4) an invigoration of civil society; (5) official recognition of
the legiti- macy of business participation in politics, education, public opinion, and so forth.The first demand
involves the privatization of government-owned enter- prises and the restriction of state intervention to
regulatory functions. There are two aspects to the second demand: the reduction and specification of the president's power over economic decisionmakingand the establishment of rational institutional forms of bilateral decisionmaking.
Thethird demand has been manifested in the attacks on collective contracts and negotiations(particularly in
state enterprises, where labor has obtained the highest levels of income and social benefits) and on the
formulation of proposals to modify Article 123 of the Constitution regulating labor, in accordance to the new status quo. A more robust
civilsociety, the fourth demand,is conceived as one in which the indi- vidual, private initiative, entrepreneurship,
modernity, citizenship, and the like are the regnant ideals, replacing statism, corporatism, and revolutionary
na- tionalism in the public sphere. The final demand, which is self-explanatory, envisions a new and imposing
profile for the private sector and its supporters in society. The triumph of such a program representsa
major reformation of the state in today's Mexico—a rupture with the "social justice" tradition of the Mexican
Revolution. That tradition may be characterized as a reformist practice related to the aforementioned political ambiguity of the Mexican
state. Its legal foun- dations are the so-called social rights protected by the Constitution—more specifically, by Article 3, which provides that
education is to be state-supported and nonreligious; by Article 27, which defines land and natural resources as the property of the "nation" and
specifies that private property can be limited ac- cording to the "public interest"; by Article 123, which permits the state to in- tervene in
industrial relations on behalf of labor; and by Article 130, which legislates the separation of church and state. The historical origins of these
constitutional precepts are varied. The provi- sions concerning education date from the revolutionary period of 1910-1917; those dealing with
land and natural resources harken back to the Bourbon re- forms of the late colonial era; the prohibition of clerical involvement in politics is
rooted in the nineteenth-century liberal reform, which expropriated the agrarian properties of the Catholic Church. In order to restore stability
in the aftermath of the revolution, the president was granted "permanent exceptional powers" to enforce the Constitution, thus attaining a
dominant position vis-à- vis the legislature and the judiciary in Mexico's authoritarian political system.Because
constitutional law
has thus been enforced in a discretionary manner, the private-sector program has concentrated on
changing it. The development of the private-sector agenda can best be observed in the forms of political
activism adopted by business organizations. These may be grouped into two principal factions according to their attitudes
toward politics in general: one moderate or technocratic, the other radical or populist (see Table 7.1) (Luna et al., 1987:13-43; Jacobo et al.,
1989:6._9).8
Link: Democracy
The logic of capitalism and democracy are fully intertwined – there is no third way.
Their plan uses democracy as a subversive tool to support authoritarian regimes and
military dictators
Dubhashi, Ph.D. at Pune University, former Vice-Chanceller, Goa University, and an erstwhile Secretary,
Government of India, December 20, 2008
(Padmakar, “Myth and Reality of Capitalism: Neo-Liberalism and Globalisation,” MAINSTREAM, VOL
XLVII, NO 1, http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1111.html)//SG
NEO-LIBERALS postulate that democracy and free market are natural partners in promoting economic
development. Francis Fukuyama, a senior policy-maker in the US State Department, in his speech at University of Chicago in 1989 titled—
“Are we approaching the end of history?”, claimed that free markets and free people are a part of an inseparable
project of modernity and progress and represented the end-point of mankind’s ideological evolution and final form of human
organisation. There is no question of a “third way”. Fukuyama’s claim turned but to be a myth because it was fundamen-tally
illogical. There is a basic contradiction between democracy and free market. Democracy gives equal rights to each person
while markets give weightage to the rich people. Hence democratic decisions usually subvert the logic of the market. No
wonder “Bad Samaritans” here recom-mended policies that actively seek to undermine democracy. They
have promoted the concept of “minimal state”—reduction in the scope of government activity and
depoliticisation of the economy by establishing politically independent policy agencies like an independent Central Bank,
independent regulatory agencies and even independent tax office. These policies in fact amount to undermining
democracy by dimini-shing the scope of democratic control. In her powerful indictment of neo-liberal policy,
comprehensively documented, Naomi Klein, the best selling author of No Logo, has shown how the radical advocates of capitalism
sought to impose neo-liberal policies on the developing countries of the world by subverting democratic
institutions and supporting authoritarian rulers and military dictators.3 The intellectual epicentre of
radical capitalism and neo-liberal policies of marketisation, privatisation, deregulation, globalisation,
based on free trade and free movement of capital and minimal state, was the Chicago School of Economics led by Milton Friedman. He
“crisis is the mother of change”, that is, crisis in any form—economic, political or
military. Advocates of free market should not hesitate to create a crisis situation since it provides them with the opportunities to push
through their neoliberal policies. The goal should be to see that “neo-liberalism” rules the world. When a crisis situation arises
anywhere in the world, the neo-liberaliser should push through a whole gamut of new-liberal policies at
one go irrespective of the consequences on the well-being of the people. This came to be known as the “shock
formulated the theory that
therapy” administered by the “Chicago Boys” in Chile and other Latin American countries as also in China, the “Berkley Boys” in Indonesia and
the wonder boy of Harvard, Jeffrey Sachs, who administered it in Bolivia, Poland and Russia. The ruthlessness of the “shock therapy” is
analogous to the electric shock treatment administered by the CIA to the detainees in the Guantnamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prisons to extract
The idea is that the individual or
the country at the receiving end should be completely benumbed, disoriented and lose the will and the
capacity to resist. Klein’s extensive documentation of the “economic shock therapy” should open the eyes of the “economic reformers”
who indiscriminately support the neo-liberal policies. Like the Tsunami waves, the “neo-liberal policies” hit the fragile
economies of Latin American and African countries as well as the economies of Russia and Poland
shattered by the breakdown of communism leaving a trail of human distress and misery. In the somewhat
confessions and the “shock-and-awe strategy” the American Army used in their attack on Iraq.
different circumstances of China and South Africa the application of the neo-liberal policies had the same consequences, namely, gross
In all these countries people were cowed down by authoritarian governments
using ruthless power to crush resistance.
inequality and human misery.
Democracy promotion provides an opportunity for the expansion of neoliberalism –
this is unstable
Kurki, PhD @ University of Wales, Professor in International Relations Theory @ University of Wales,
Aberystwyth, 13 Feb 2013
(Milja, “Politico-Economic Models of Democracy in Democracy Promotion,” International Studies
Perspectives, pg 12-13)//SG
The fortunes of democracy promotion, a key post–Cold War policy agenda of the United States and the European Union,have
been mixed. The policy practice arose with great confidence in the post–Cold War era, which also saw a great
confidencebuilding up on the idea of liberal capitalist democracy.This is because the end ofthe Cold War saw a
sharp turn in the fortunes of both capi- talism and democracy: It resulted in their confirmation as the
foremost models of governance in modern societies. As Marc F. Plattner (1993:30) stated, in the post–Cold War
worldliberal democracy and capitalist economic systems provide the ultimate ideal to aim for all
societies.For Plattner (1997), the American model of democracy, in which both these characteristics have come together should serve as the
effective end-state to which all states, at least those that wish to be modern and internationally accepted, should aim (see also Fukuyama
1992).This view,
which of course did not arise in a power vacuum, but reflected both the power and the
interests of key capitalist liberal democracy promoting states(see Robinson 1996), has directed the trends in
democratization during the last few decades: Socialist and communist states have selected a path
toward capital- ism and democracy, as have many Asian and Latin American states.Up until the mid-1990s, there
was still a strong opposition to the “orthodox” Western model of capitalist democracy, notably in Asia. However, the Asian crisis confirmed, it
seems,
that national capitalist models would not be sustainable and would have to necessitate a turn
toward more pure forms of the capitalist system (Krugman 2008) as well as liberal democracy (McFaul 2004:149–50). Liberal
capitalism and liberal democracy triumphed: They also came to provide the mainstay of think- ing in all major international organizations, such
as the World Bank and IMF. Crucially,belief
in liberal democracy in the context of at least relatively liberal capitalist
economy also came to inform all the core democracy promotion agen- cies and their policies, from the
National Endowment for Democracy to the European Union(Przeworski, 1991; Burnell 2000; Patomaki and Teivainen
2004; Pridham, 2005; Simmons et al. 2008). Support for “capitalist democracy” has been especially strongly
maintained by the United States. While liberal ideas have always been central to American democracy promotion (Smith 1994),
George W. Bush’s administration’s “Free- dom Agenda” went perhaps further than most: Bush explicitly argued for eco- nomic liberty as a
crucial condition for political democratization. Even in the middle of the financial crisis, it argued that “the surest path to that growth is free
markets and free people” (Bush, 2008).This
view did not arise from nowhere, however; it reflected the previous
Clinton administration’s commit- ment to advancement of “market democracies” (Hippler 1995) and a wider
long- term commitment to conjoining of markets and democracy (Foley 2007). Other democracy promotion actors too have
seen democracy and markets as conjoined agendas. The European Union, for example, has attached its democ- racy
promotion agenda, both through membership conditionality and the new neighborhood policy, to the advancement of “market systems”
(European Com- mission 2004; Ferrero-Waldner 2006; Europa 2009). Liberal market capitalism and democracy are the core “shared values” of
the European Union (European Commission 2004; Interviews with European Commission Officials, January 18 and 19, 2011). These views have,
Thus, politi- cal
foundations, once the defenders of ideological diversity in democracy promo- tion, have for example
also come to the defense of a core liberal democratic model(Interviews with Brussels-based NGO actors, January 17 and
moreover, been adopted, surprisingly widely, also by some of the key civil society actors in democracy promotion.
28, 2011).
Democracy promotion is unrealistic – Obama’s agenda switch was only due to
embarrassment but still serves as a mask for the expansion of capitalism albeit with
less of a hard liberalist policy. Also, their knowledge gathering is flawed – democracy
promoters draw from a rag bag of evidence. Democracy and capitalism are
discursively linked
Kurki, PhD @ University of Wales, Professor in International Relations Theory @ University of Wales,
Aberystwyth, 13 Feb 2013
(Milja, “Politico-Economic Models of Democracy in Democracy Promotion,” International Studies
Perspectives, pg 14)//SG
It would mean in the first instance that the confident assertions of some democracy promoters and policy-makers
are overstated and unrealistic. Since the evidence seems to point in the direction that the link between democracy and
capitalism is more contingent than is often thought, it seems that confident self-assured efforts to expand
capitalist democracy to other parts of the world should perhaps be avoided. Indeed, a key consequence of the
analysis here is that it forces democracy promoters to think more carefully about the justifications that they
have for the models of democracy that they promote. As difficult, and in some senses unreason- able, as it is to call for
political and policy actors to remain attuned to nuances of academic argumentation, making some note of the academic controversy over capitalist democracy seems important at this juncture. This is important, both in terms of democracy promoters avoiding getting caught up in their
commitment to undefined liberalization when this clashes with support for social rights
or social justice—and in terms of democracy promoters being able to develop more nuanced and coherent positions on this linkaging—
more consistent “reform liberal” or “social model” alternatives, as well as liberal ones. Interestingly, as we have
seen, Barack Obama’s administration has arguably already revisited this relationship—if not selfconsciously. The shift in the Obama administration is not surprising in that a sense of embarrassment surrounds the talk
of capitalist democracy in the wake of the financial crisis. Yet, it could also be justified in clearer and theoretically as well
own rhetoric traps—
as evidentially more explicit and open terms. There are, as we have seen, more cautious complementarian lines that the administration could
refer to, as well as important reform liberal varia- tions, which see democratic controls over markets as a key aspect of democratiza- tion. Such
lines of thought would arguably fit with Obama’s wider policy agenda and, thus, consistent and systematic rethinking away from Hayekian lines
of thought would arguably benefit, rather than harm, the Obama administration’s movement away from the hard liberalism of the Bush years.
The European
Union’s rhetoric of democracy promotion remains vague: It is generally built on the core princi- ples of
free markets and liberal democracy, and the two are seen to go together. However, this “fuzzy liberal” actor also
seeks to nuance its democracy promotion with some references to issues of social justice and workers rights (Manners 2006). Yet, the
content of the European model then remains remarkably unde- fined, and as a result unconvincing and
poorly legitimated in the eyes of at least those who expect strategic or political convictions of specific
kind from this actor (International IDEA 2009). It is unclear whether it stands for social democracy, or in fact for hard core or moderate
forms of economic and political liberalism. Reflection on the relationship of markets and democracy—even if it was to rec- ognize
the plurality of such models—should help the European Union in its search for coherence and
consistency in its democracy promotion. A key point that emerges from the survey of academic scholarship and which is worth
Similar reflection would assist the European Union in developing long sought after “coherence” in its democracy promotion.
emphasizing is that, in the scholarly literature, even when there is general agreement between authors, say on complementarity of capitalism
and democracy, the exact logics of argument may differ widely. This is especially impor- tant to note in relation to the “complementarity”
account and is crucial for thinking about redirections of democracy promotion practice. The subtleties of argument on why and how capitalism
and democracy complement each other are important for not just academics but also policy practitioners to recognize, for they can come to
have a crucial role in thinking about justifications of democracy promotion policies, and indeed the shape of these policies them- selves.
Many democracy promotion scholars, as well as policy actors, tend to draw from a rag bag of
evidence and conceptual orientation in justifying their support for capitalist democracy . Paying attention
to these justifications and evi- dences is important to maintain a semblance of consistency and ideological or political coherence to democracy
promotion however it is to be conceived. At the same time, it means that democracy promoters need not necessarily give up on a
Noting explanatory pluralism also
reveals that the politico-economic argu- ments and models advanced now should be recognized as far
from “natural” and self-evident, but rather as political projects of a particular kind. This is important for it
complementarian position, even though the Hayekian line can be recog- nized as problematic.
challenges the underlying dynamics of much of recent democracy promo- tion. Democracy promotion has often been perceived as an apolitical
technical bureaucratic affair: An exercise in “box ticking” by expert groups far removed from the political and social contexts of the target
states’ democratizers (Kurki 2011). Contrary to a technical approach to democracy promotion, the approach here reveals the inherently
contingent and political nature of this policy practice and the ideologically biased nature of the idea of democracy advances, as well as the
conception of socioeconomic conditions of democracy.
There is nothing “natural” about liberal capitalist democracy
promotion. It follows that we must consider the different political and ideological conse- quences of the different positions on this and
their consequences for democracy promotion. First, we must think about the political predilections of the different
explanatory models. A Hayekian would seek to institute unconditionally the conditions of economic liberty in a state, this being seen as
a fundamental and necessary condition for democratization. A Przeworskian (Przeworski 2000) would instead focus on ensuring economic
development in a state to meet the level of economic income, which can be scientifically proven to be consistent with the rise of democracy.
The emphasis here is more technical, but also less concerned with the insisting on laissez-faire
capitalism as the necessary chosen model of economic development. A Moorian line of argument, on the other hand,
would prioritize the need to understand the specific conditions of eco- nomic development and class formation within a given state and would
be adverse to universalistic solutions, such as unconditional opening up of markets. This is not even to mention what the critics of the
complementarian approach would say. A reform liberal, social democratic, or national capitalist approach might go further and argue that
democratic values should be prioritized in the way in which market relations are encouraged within states. Thus, the guiding value in
the economic and trade policies of
democracy promoters should be subjected to measures of democratic control by target publics. Explor- ing
democratizing a state would be democratic control, not market values of efficiency. Thus,
which of these avenues democracy promoters, from the post–Bush United States to the European Union, exactly wish to follow would, it
seems, be impor- tant in terms of deciding on the precise strategic directions of their democracy support. Justifications for interventions, but
also the shape of the policies advo- cated—civil society support, institution building, rule of law reform, and trade policy—are affected in crucial
it is important to emphasize the fact that the explana- tory pluralism and
complexity identified here is also important in making us realize the normative and political pluralism
that may be involved in discussing the future of democracy promotion. It has been noted that the different positions
ways. Finally, and relatedly,
on capitalism and democracy can lead to very different definitions and visions of democracy. While many of those who work with the idea that
many of
those who see capitalism and democracy as contradictory reject a liberal democratic notion of
democracy as their chosen normative ideal. They advance alternative definitions and visions of democracy, participatory
capitalism and democracy are complementary advocate a liberal democratic notion of democ- racy as the guiding light of analysis,
models, social democratic models, or socialist models. Each of such models has very different democratic value hierarchies guiding it— some
emphasizing liberty, others solidarity, participation, or socioeconomic equality—and attached to each is also a very different vision of the
The recognition of explanatory pluralism then
directs us to make note of the existence of multiple different normative (as well as explanatory)
“politico-eco- nomic models of democracy” that might serve as basis for discussion over democ- racy
promotion. While discussion of alternative politico-economic models of democracy may seem outdated to some and is rejected by some
conservatives (Huntington 1990), this analysis reveals that such models still thrive and are evident and reflected in the
explanatory accounts that can be given of the capi- talism–democracy relationship. These alternative visions not
politico-eco- nomic systems that are appropriate for advancing those values.
only envisage alter- native realities and power relations for social life but also undo the firm discursive linkage that has developed between
capitalism and democracy during the post–Cold War years. Indeed, these visions are suggestive of the possibility that democracy and capitalism
Challenging this
discursive linkage provides one way forward. It provides an avenue for finding new ways of linking
economic discourses and democracy, and indeed, new inter- pretations of the meaning, functions, and
spheres of democracy (see e.g. Teivai- nen 2002).
may not be either necessarily or coincidentally joined, but importantly “discursively conjoined” (Dryzek 2006).
Link: Disasters/War
The Aff’s impacts and disasters are used as a mask for the unfettered expansion of
unrestrained capitalist policies
Klein, Milibrand Fellow at the London School of Economics, 2007
(Naomi, “The Shock Doctrine: the Rise of Disaster Capitalism,” p. 3-10)//SG
I met Jamar Perry in September 2005, at the big Red Cross shelter in BatonRouge, Louisiana. Dinner was being doled out by grinning young
Scientol-ogists, and he was standing in line. I had just been busted for talking to evac-uees without a media escort and was now doing my best
to blend in, a whiteCanadian in a sea of African-American Southerners. I dodged into the foodline behind Perry and asked him to talk to me as if
we were old friends,which he kindly did. Born and raised in New Orleans, he'd been out of the flooded city for aweek. He looked about
seventeen but told me he was twenty-three. He andhis family had waited forever for the evacuation buses; when they didn't ar-rive, they had
walked out in the baking sun. Finally they ended up here, asprawling convention center, normally home to pharmaceutical trade showsand
"Capital City Carnage: The Ultimate in Steel Cage Fighting," nowjammed with two thousand cots and a mess of angry, exhausted people be-ing
patrolled by edgy National Guard soldiers just back from Iraq.The news racing around the shelter that day was that Richard Baker, aprominent
Republican congressman from this city, had told a group of lob-byists, "We finally cleaned up public housing in New Orleans. We couldn'tdo it,
but God did."2Joseph Canizaro, one of New Orleans' wealthiest devel-opers, had just expressed a similar sentiment: "I think we have a clean
sheetto start again. And with that clean sheet we have some very big opportunities."3All
that week the Louisiana State
Legislature in Baton Rouge hadbeen crawling with corporate lobbyists helping to lock in those big
opportu-nities: lower taxes, fewer regulations, cheaper workers and a "smaller, safercity"—which in practice
meant plans to level the public housing projectsand replace them with condos. Hearing all the talk of "fresh starts" and"clean sheets," you
could almost forget the toxic stew of rubble, chemicaloutflows and human remains just a few miles down the highway.Over at the shelter,
Jamar could think of nothing else. "I really don't see itas cleaning up the city. What I see is that a lot of people got killed uptown.People who
shouldn't have died."He was speaking quietly, but an older man in line in front of us overheardand whipped around."What
is wrong
with these people in Baton Rouge?This isn't an opportunity. It's a goddamned tragedy. Are they blind?"A
mother with two kids chimed in. "No, they're not blind, they're evil.They see just fine."One of those who
saw opportunity in the floodwaters of New Orleans wasMilton Friedman, grand guru of the movement
for unfettered capitalismand the man credited with writing the rulebook for the contemporary,
hypermobile global economy. Ninety-three years old and in failing health,"Uncle Miltie," as he was known to his followers,
nonetheless found thestrength to write an op-ed for The Wall Street Journal three months after thelevees broke. "Most New Orleans
schools are in ruins," Friedman observed,"as are the homes of the children who have attended them. The children are now
scattered all over the country. This is a tragedy. It is also an opportunityto radically reform the educational
system."4Friedman's radical idea was that instead of spending a portion of the bil-lions of dollars in
reconstruction money on rebuildingand improving NewOrleans' existing public school system,the government should
provide fam-ilies with vouchers, which they could spend at private institutions, many runat a profit, that
would be subsidized by the state. It was crucial, Friedmanwrote, that this fundamental change not be a stopgap but rather "a
perma-nent reform."5A network of right-wing think tanksseized on Friedman's proposalanddescended on the city after
the storm. The administration of George W.Bush backed up their plans with tens of millions of dollars to
convert NewOrleans schools into "charter schools,"publicly funded institutionsrun byprivate entities according
to their own rules. Charter schools are deeply po-larizing in the United States, and nowhere more than in New Orleans,where they are
seen by many African-American parents as a way of reversingthe gains of the civil rights movement, which guaranteed all children thesame
standard of education. For Milton Friedman, however, the entire con-cept of a state-run school system reeked of socialism. In his view, the
state'ssole functions were "to protect our freedom both from the enemies outsideour gates and from our fellow-citizens: to preserve law and
order, to enforceprivate contracts, to foster competitive markets."6In other words, to supplythe police and the soldiers —anything else,
including providing free educa-tion, was an unfair interference in the market.In sharp contrast to the glacial pace with which the levees were
repairedand the electricity grid was brought back online,the
auctioning off of NewOrleans' school system took place
with military speed and precision. Withinnineteen months, with most of the city's poor residents still in
exile, New Or-leans' public school system had been almost completely replaced by pri-vately run charter
schools. Before Hurricane Katrina, the school board hadrun 123 public schools; now it ran just 4.Before that
storm, there had been7 charter schools in the city; now there were 31. 7New Orleans teachers usedto be represented by a strong union; now
the union's contract had beenshredded, and its forty-seven hundred members had all been fired.8Some ofthe younger teachers were rehired
by the charters, at reduced salaries; mostwere not.New Orleans was now, according to The New York Times, "the nation'spreeminent
laboratory for the widespread use of charter schools," while the American Enterprise Institute, a Friedmanite think tank, enthused that "Katrina
accomplished in a day . . . what Louisiana school reformers couldn't doafter years of trying."9Public
school teachers, meanwhile,
watching moneyallocated for the victims of the flood being diverted to erase a public systemand replace
it with a private one, were calling Friedman's plan "an educa-tional land grab."10I call these
orchestrated raids on the public sphere in the wake of cata-strophic events, combined with the
treatment of disasters as exciting marketopportunities, "disaster capitalism."Friedman's New Orleans op-ed ended
up being his last public policy recom-mendation; he died less than a year later, on November 16, 2006, at ageninety-four. Privatizing the school
system of a midsize American city mayseem like a modest preoccupation for the man hailed as the most influentialeconomist of the past half
century, one who counted among his disciplesseveral U.S. presidents, British prime ministers, Russian oligarchs, Polish fi-nance ministers, Third
World dictators, Chinese Communist Party secre-taries, International Monetary Fund directors and the past three chiefs of theU.S. Federal
Reserve. Yet his determination to exploit the crisis in New Or-leans to advance a fundamentalist version of capitalism was also an oddly fit-ting
farewell from the boundlessly energetic five-foot-two-inch professorwho, in his prime, described himself as "an old-fashioned preacher
deliver-ing a Sunday sermon."11For more than three decades, Friedman and his powerful followers hadbeen perfecting this very strategy:
waiting for a major crisis, then selling offpieces of the state to private players while citizens were still reeling from theshock, then quickly
making the "reforms" permanent.In one of his most influential essays,Friedman
articulated contemporarycapitalism's core
tactical nostrum, what I have come to understand as theshock doctrine. He observed that "only a
crisis—actual or perceived—producesreal change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken
depend on theideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop al-ternatives to existing policies, to
keep them alive and available until the politi-cally impossible becomes politically inevitable."12Some people stockpilecanned goods and water
in preparation for major disasters; Friedmanites stock-pile free-market ideas. And once a crisis has struck, the University of Chicagoprofessor
was convinced that it was crucial to act swiftly, to impose rapid andirreversible change before the crisis-racked society slipped back into the
"tyranny of the status quo." He estimated that "a new administration hassome six to nine months in which to achieve major changes; if it does
notseize the opportunity to act decisively during that period, it will not have an-other such opportunity."13A variation on Machiavelli's advice
that injuriesshould be inflicted "all at once," this proved to be one of Friedman's mostlasting strategic legacies.Friedman first learned how to
exploit a large-scale shock or crisis in the midseventies, when he acted as adviser to the Chilean dictator, General AugustoPinochet.Not
only
were Chileans in a state of shock following Pinochet's vi-olent coup, but the country was also
traumatized by severe hyperinflation.Friedman advised Pinochet to impose a rapid-fire transformation
of theeconomy—tax cuts, free trade, privatized services, cuts to social spending andderegulation.
Eventually, Chileans even saw their public schools replacedwith voucher-funded private ones. It was the
most extreme capitalist make-over ever attempted anywhere, and it became known as a "Chicago School"revolution,
since so many of Pinochet's economists had studied under Fried-man at the University of Chicago. Friedman predicted that the speed,
sud-denness and scope of the economic shifts would provoke psychologicalreactions in the public that "facilitate the adjustment."14He coined
a phrasefor this painful tactic: economic "shock treatment." In the decades since,whenever governments have imposed sweeping free-market
programs, the allat-once shock treatment, or "shock therapy," has been the method of choice.Pinochet also facilitated the adjustment with his
own shock treatments;these were performed in the regime's many torture cells, inflicted on thewrithing bodies of those deemed most likely to
stand in the way of the capi-talist transformation. Many in Latin America saw a direct connection be-tween the economic shocks that
impoverished millions and the epidemic oftorture that punished hundreds of thousands of people who believed in a dif-ferent kind of society.
As the Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano asked,"How can this inequality be maintained if not through jolts of electricshock?"15Exactly thirty
years after these three distinct forms of shock descended onChile, the formula reemerged, with far greater violence, in Iraq. First camethe war,
designed, according to the authors of the Shock and Awe militarydoctrine, to "control the adversary's will, perceptions, and understandingand
literally make an adversary impotent to act or react."16Next came theradical economic shock therapy, imposed, while the country was still in
flames, by the U.S. chief envoy L. Paul Bremer—mass privatization, com-plete free trade, a 15 percent flat tax, a dramatically downsized
government.Iraq's interim trade minister, Ali Abdul-Amir Allawi, said at the time that hiscountrymen were "sick and tired of being the subjects
of experiments. Therehave been enough shocks to the system, so we don't need this shock therapyin the economy."1' When Iraqis resisted,
they were rounded up and taken tojails where bodies and minds were met with more shocks, these ones dis-tinctly less metaphorical.I started
researching the free market's dependence on the power of shockfour years ago, during the early days of the occupation of Iraq. After report-ing
I traveled to Sri Lanka, several
months after the devas-tating 2004 tsunami, and witnessed another version of the same
maneuver:foreign investors and international lenders had teamed up to use the atmos-phere of panic to
hand the entire beautiful coastline over to entrepreneurswho quickly built large resorts, blocking
hundreds of thousands of fishingpeople from rebuilding their villages near the water. "In a cruel twist of
fate,nature has presented Sri Lanka with a unique opportunity, and out of thisgreat tragedy will come a
world class tourism destination," the Sri Lankangovernment announced. 1 8By the time Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans,and the
from Baghdad on Washington's failed attempts to follow Shock and Awewith shock therapy,
nexus of Republican politicians, think tanks and land developersstarted talking about "clean sheets" and exciting opportunities, it was clearthat
this was now the preferred method of advancing corporate goals: usingmoments of collective trauma to engage in radical social and economic
en-gineering.Most people who survive a devastating disaster want the opposite of aclean slate: they want to salvage whatever they can and
begin repairing whatwas not destroyed; they want to reaffirm their relatedness to the places thatformed them. "When I rebuild the city I feel
like I'm rebuilding myself," saidCassandra Andrews, a resident of New Orleans' heavily damaged LowerNinth Ward, as she cleared away debris
after the storm.19But
disaster capital-ists have no interest in repairing what was. In Iraq, Sri Lanka and New
Or-leans, the process deceptively called "reconstruction" began with finishingthe job of the original
disaster by erasing what was left of the public sphereand rooted communities, then quickly moving to
replace them with a kindof corporate New Jerusalem —all before the victims of war or natural
disasterwere able to regroup and stake their claims to what was theirs.Mike Battles puts it best: "For us, the fear and
disorder offered real prom- ise."20 The thirty-four-year-old ex-CIA operative was talking about how the chaos in postinvasion Iraq had helped
his unknown and inexperienced pri- vate security firm, Custer Battles, to shake roughly $100 million in contracts out of the federal
government.21 His words could serve just as well as the slo- gan for contemporary capitalism—fear and disorder are the catalysts for each new
leap forward. When I began this research into the intersection between superprofits and megadisasters, I thought I was witnessing a
fundamental change in the way the drive to "liberate" markets was advancing around the world. Having been part of the movement against
ballooning corporate power that made its global debut in Seattle in 1999,1 was accustomed to seeing similar businessfriendly policies imposed
through arm-twisting at World Trade Organization summits, or as the conditions attached to loans from the International Mon- etary Fund. The
three trademark demands—privatization, government deregulation and deep cuts to social spending—tended to be extremely unpopular with
citizens, but when the agreements were signed there was still at least the pretext of mutual consent between the governments doing the
negotiating, as well as a consensus among the supposed experts. Now the same ideological program was being imposed via the most baldly
coercive means possible: under foreign military occupation after an invasion, or im- mediately following a cataclysmic natural disaster.
September 11 appeared to have provided Washington with the green light to stop asking countries if they wanted the U.S. version of "free
trade and democracy" and to start im- posing it with Shock and Awe military force. As I dug deeper into the history of how this market model
had swept the globe, however,I
discovered that the idea of exploiting crisis and disaster has been the modus
operandi of Milton Friedman's movement from the very beginning—this fundamentalist form of
capitalism has always needed disas- ters to advance. It was certainly the case that the facilitating
disasters were getting bigger and more shocking, but what was happening in Iraq and New Orleans was
not a new, post-September 11 invention. Rather, these bold ex- periments in crisis exploitation were the culmination of three
decades of strict adherence to the shock doctrine. Seen through the lens of this doctrine, the past thirty-five years look very different. Some of
the most infamous human rights violations of this era, which have tended to be viewed as sadistic acts carried out by antidemo- cratic regimes,
were in fact either committed with the deliberate intent of terrorizing the public or actively harnessed to prepare the ground for the
introduction of radical free-market "reforms." In Argentina in the seventies, the junta's "disappearance" of thirty thousand people, most of
them leftist activists, was integral to the imposition of the country's Chicago School poli- cies, just as terror had been a partner for the same
kind of economic meta- morphosis in Chile.In
China in 1989, it was the shock of the Tiananmen Square massacre
and the subsequent arrests of tens of thousands that freed the hand of the Communist Party to convert
much of the country into a sprawling export zone, staffed with workers too terrified to demand their
rights. In Russia in 1993, it was Boris Yeltsin's decision to send in tanks to set fire to the parliament
building and lock up the opposition leaders that cleared the way for the fire-sale privatization that
created the country's noto- rious oligarchs.
The affirmative’s depiction of crisis is used to expand neoliberal policies
Greenberg, et al, Ph.D in Anthropology at University of Michigan, 2012
(James B., Thomas Weaver (Ph.D. in Anthropology at University of California at Berkeley), Anne Browning-Aiken (Ph.D. in Anthropology at
University of Arizona), William L. Alexander (Professor of Anthropology at University of Arizona), “The Neoliberal Transformation of Mexico,”
Neoliberalism and Commodity Production in Mexico, University Press of Colorado, pg 13)//SG
While such crises are routinely considered part and parcel of capitalism,the
problematic aspect of framing them this way is
that such a view may overly naturalize them and so remove them from consideration of how crises can
be manipulated to achieve political ends(Toussaint 2005). In a world of highly integrated markets, where large systemic
perturbations have become the norm, because crises spread they require ever more massive interventions to deal with them.
Importantly,each
crisis becomes a new opportunity to push new reforms and demand new concessions.
During crises, measures that would be politi- cally impossible to enact in normal times are more readily
accepted.Structural adjustment measures are a prime example. Other kinds ofcrises—in the form of natural disasters,
wars, and the “war on terror”—provide opportunities for the advancement of corporate globalization
into new areas and the forced restruc- turing of societies still reeling from the “shock” of such traumas
(Klein 2007).The study of “disaster capitalism” is a burgeoning field,as applied anthropologists inspired by Naomi Klein’s
“shock doctrine” thesis (ibid.) are documenting the wayspeople devastated and displaced by catastrophes are revictimized and made more vulnerable by recovery and rebuilding programs that are instrumental in
advancing neoliberalism(see Gunewardena and Schuller 2008). The chapters by Greenberg, González Ríos, and Sesia provide ample
evidence of neoliberal poli- cies that also used engineering crises within specific sectors. As they note in their respective chapters, after a
campaign in which ejiditarios and communal land- holders were offered titles to the land they worked, the government withdrew credit and
other subsidies to smallholders, effectively forcing them to sell or lease their lands. Vásquez-León’s chapter documents a similar move to
privatize fishing efforts. Again, the government withdrew credit this sector depended upon and forced fishing cooperatives into bankruptcy. An
adequate theory of Neoliberalism, however, must go beyond the capital N. We need a theory that also encompasses lowercase neoliberalism.
The authors in this book have used two frameworks to understand small n neoliberalism—an anthropology of place rooted in Political Ecology,
as defining and defined by sets of biophysical stocks and flows (see Greenberg and Heyman, this volume), and the anthropology of commodities
and commodity chains. One of the common themes that emerges in the chapters by Emanuel, Carter and Alexander, González Ríos, VásquezLeón, Nahmad, Sesia, Browning-Aiken, and Greenberg is thatneoliberalism
entails a profound transformation of
governance and jurisdiction, effectively redefining economic, political, and social spaces and activities.
The move away from corporate state-led capitalism toward neoliberal capitalism both altered Mexico’s economic and political institutions and
profoundly reoriented the economy toward exports to generate earnings necessary to pay the interest on Mexico’s massive external debt. The
emerging neoliberal state thus reframed and reoriented the stocks, flows, and activities that physically define particular places.
Their representations of disaster as something the US has to fix is a cover for the
expansion of neoliberalism
Dubhashi, Ph.D. at Pune University, former Vice-Chanceller, Goa University, and an erstwhile Secretary,
Government of India, December 20, 2008
(Padmakar, “Myth and Reality of Capitalism: Neo-Liberalism and Globalisation,” MAINSTREAM, VOL
XLVII, NO 1, http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1111.html)//SG
EVER since Ronald Reagan of the Republican Party was elected the President of the US, an extremely conservative economic
ideology advocating unbridled capitalism and free market, as preached by Milton Friedman and his Chicago
School, has become the ruling economic ideology of the USA, going by the name of “Washington Consensus”. Under the
Presidency of George Bush (Junior), it has reached its acme. This was manifested in the privatisation of even “core”
functions of government, maximum deregulation, cut in expenditure on people’s welfare programmes and
promotion of neo-liberal policies all over the world. The prolonged Iraq war from 2003 till date is an example of
the extreme ideology. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfield brought the corporates into the heart of the US military. Logistic functions
relating to the war were handed over to private companies like Halliburton with which Vice-President Cheney has been intimately connected.
Health care and housing for soldiers were privatised. All the security functions were discharged by Blackwater including the security the US
military base and its seat of governance (Paul Bremmer’s Green Zone area). Of course, production and supply of weapons and material were all
handled by private companies. The contracts for Iraq oil exploitation were prepared by private firms. The selected contractors, whether for oil
exploitation or constru-ction in infrastructure projects, sub-contracted, since they themselves had no operational base.
The local Iraqi
public sector enterprises were left-outs, so were the local professionals. The Defence Minister, Donald Rumsfeld,
was a strong advocate of this approach of slim military, supported by a huge network of corporations. Billions of dollars spent on
the Iraq War want to the coffers of these private corporations. The Department of Homeland Security, set up after 9/11,
handed over $ 130 billion to private contractors to develop and install detection equipment and cameras against unproven threats. The war
on terror, an un-winnable proposition, has become a permanent fixture of the global economic
architecture. In the name of security. The Bush Administration fulfilled the corporate mission of merging political and corporate
interests. The same approach was adopted in dealing with the calamity of Hurricane Katrina which hit New
Orleans in September 2005. The poor people were left homeless as their public housing was washed away. So were the public schools where
Friedman saw in this the opportunity for privatisation of housing and schooling
system. Here again the private contractors failed in housing the poor. The poor were provided with vouchers to be paid
to the owners of the private schools which had a good business opportunity to make money. The
money-making got the better of the provision of public services like education and health to the poor. No
wonder the New Orleans rehabilitation programmes did no good to the poor. The Iraq war and Hurricane Katrina, both
“disasters”, have been good opportunities to corporate business for making money. Israel, the mini-USA in
the Middle East, has discovered that “perpetual” war with Arabs, whether in Palestine or in Lebanon, is conducive to
its dynamic economy. The rise of insecurity the world over has been an opportunity for Israel to develop the “security industry” in a big
their children studied. Milton
way. This is what Klein calls the “Disaster Capitalism” of today.
Impact
I: Laundry List
Neoliberalism causes poverty, social exclusion, societal disintegration, violence and
environmental destruction—threatens humanity
De La Barra, Chilean political activist, international consultant and former UNICEF Latin America Public Policy Advisor 07-- (Ximena,
“THE DUAL DEBT OF NEOLIBERALISM”, Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Social Struggles in Latin America”, 9/1/09, edited by Dello Bueno and
Lara, Brill Online)//AS
The currently prevailing neoliberal development model has brought with it various technological advances and
economic and commercial growth. However, these results ultimately benefit fewer and fewer people
while augmenting social inequality, injustices, and promoting serious social and ethical setbacks. It is
definitely not eradicating poverty On the contrary, it creates conditions for a growing tendency towards
political,economic and social exclusion for the majority of the world’s population.The model
exacerbates poverty, social disparities, ecological degradation,violence and social disintegration. Loss
of governability flows from its systematic logic of emphasising an ever cheaper labour force, the
reduction ofsocial benefits, the disarticulation and destruction of labourorganisations,and the
elimination of labour and ecological regulation (de la Barra 1997). Inthis way, it consolidates a kind of
cannibalism known as social dumping thatseeks to lower costs below the value of social reproduction
rather than organising a process of progressive social accumulation. For most of Latin Americaand the Caribbean,
the present minimum wage levels only allow for a portionof the basic consumption package needed by working people (Bossio 2002).At
present, the global income gap between the 10% poorest portion of theworld’s population and the wealthiest 10% has grown to be 1 to 103
(UNDP2005). According to this same source, around 2.5 billion people, almost halfof humanity, lives on less than US$ 2. per day (considered the
poverty level),while 1.2 billion of these people live on less than US$ 1. per day (consideredthe level of extreme poverty).Given its neoliberal
character,
globalisation failed to produce the benefitsthat were touted. Indeed, the process has greatly
harmed the most vulnerable social sectors produced by the previous phase of capitalist
development.The lack of social and ethical objectives in the current globalisation processhas resulted in benefits only in those countries
where a robust physical andhuman infrastructure exists, where redistributive social policies are the norm,and where fair access to markets and
strong regulatory entities are in place.Where such conditions do not exist, globalisation
has led to stagnation
andmarginalisation, with declining health and educational levels of its children,especially among the
poor. Some regions, including Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Sub-Saharan Africa, and more recently, Latin America andthe
Caribbean, as well as some countries within regions and some personswithin countries (poor children and adolescents, rural inhabitants and
urbanslum dwellers, indigenous peoples, children of illiterate women, illegal immigrants, etc.) have remained mostly excluded (UNICEF 2001).
Neoliberal influence causes disease, starvation, and environmental destruction—
leaves the majority without protection
Gill, Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science at York University, 95 (Stephen, “Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and
Disciplinary Neoliberalism”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 24:3, 1995, Sage Publications)//AS
Nonetheless, as
Galbraith has shown, the privileges of the politically powerful and economically strong
have been reinforced in the OECD nations since the late 1960s, often to the detriment of the vast majority of the
population." The neoliberal shift in govemment policies has tended to subject the majority of the population
to the power of market forces whilst preserving social protection for the strong. In the Third World, the
counterpart to Galbraith's "˜culture of contentment' are urban elites and ruling and emerging middle classes which benefit from the
consumption pattems and incorporation into financial and production circuits of transnational capital."• Recent growth in enclave residential
development, private provision of security, and private insurance and health care suggests that access
to what were often
considered to be public goods under socialised provision is now increasingly privatised, individualised, and
hierarchical in nature. More broadly, there has been a transformation of the socialisation of risk towards a privatisation and
individualisation of risk assessment and insurance provision. Nevertheless, this process is hierarchical: for example, burdens of risk are
redistributed, marketised, and individualised (e_g., associated with illness, old age, or pensions) as opposed to being fully socialised through
collective and public provision."• Despite
enormous increases in global output and population since World War II, a
significant polarisation of income and of life chances has been central to the restructuring process of the
last twenty years. For the 800 million or so affluent consumers in the OECD, there is a counterpart number
starving in the Third World, with one billion more that have no clean drinking water or sufficient food to
provide basic nutrition."• More than half of Afrirfs population lives in absolute poverty. In the 1980s, the income of two-thirds of African
workers fell below the poverty line.
A disproportionate burden of adjustment to harsher circumstances has
fallen on women and children and weaker members of society, such as the old and the disabled."• Many of these
people also live in war-torn societies, where huge quantities of cheap mass-produced conventional weapons have accumulated,
including over 100 million landmines: "˜weapons that never miss'. One million landmines exploded under Third World victims in the last 15
years."• A
re-emergence of serious global public health problems may be indicated by the growth in contagious diseases
once thought to have been conquered in the march of medical progress (ag, cholera or anthrax), as well as in diseases associated with
environmental degradation and pollution (e.g., asthma and allergies), and new viruses such as AIDS). During the
decades since World War II, life expectancy increased steadily throughout the world. This process has now apparently gone into reverse in a
number of countries (notably in the former communist-ruled nations of Eastem Europe): [t]he resurgence of epidemics is a crucial indicator of
the state of our world, not only in terms of human suffering, but also in terms of development more generally. It
implies the
breakdown of the social controls that usually prevent such diseases-hygiene, nutrition, resistance to infection,
immunization programmes, housing."• The prices of many medical products marketed by transnational pharmaceutical firms have risen and
the relaxation of trade barriers, and other market forms of restriction and regulation, has made it simpler to dump expired or unsafe medicines
in parts of the Third World." Globally, public
health and educational provisions have been reduced, partly
because of neoliberal structural adjustment pressures on most governments to exercise monetary restraint, cut budgets,
repay debts, balance their international trade, devalue their currencies, remove subsidies and trade and investmentebarriers and, in so doing,
restore international credit- worthiness and thereby extend the market civilisation globally. Such pressures emanate from agents in the global
financial markets and from _intemationalorganisations like the World Bank and IMF, as well as from within these societies. Nevertheless, in
many pans of the Third World and in the former Soviet Union, economic liberalisation has been welcomed as a means of reforming the old,
unaccountable political order.
Neoliberal globalization is the root of cause of poverty, exploitation, environmental
degradation, and violence; the only solution is to eradicate neoliberal globalization
Szentes, Professor Emeritus of the Corvinus University of Budapest and member of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, 2008
(Tamas, “Globalisation and prospects of the world society,” CENTRAL EUROPEAN POLITICAL
SCIENCE, Vol. 9, pp 1-3, http://cepsr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ATT81762.pdf#page=9)//SG
It’ s a common place thathuman society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries
cannot develop. Althoughsince 1945 there has been no world war, but • numerous local wars took place, •
terrorism has spreadall over the world,undermining securityeven in the most developed and powerful countries, • arms
race and militarisation have not endedwith the collapse of the Soviet bloc,but escalated and continued, extending
also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, •many “invisible
wars”1 are suffered by the poor and oppressed people,manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment,
homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics andpoor health conditions, exploitation and
oppression,racial and otherdiscrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms ofviolence, the denial
or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., andlast
but not least, in the degradation of human environment,which means that • the “war against Nature”, i.e. the
disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution
of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and “invisible
wars”we find striking international and intra- society inequities and distorted development patterns2,
which tend to generate social as well as international tensions,thus paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars. It is a
commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war.The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within
societies involvenot only - though, of course, necessarily -demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradualelimination of
the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of thestructural and institutional bases of large-scale
internationaland intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social
and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing
about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous
co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional
representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and
Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating
globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and
space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one
part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars.Thus, peace requires, indeed, a
new,demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable
development. “Sustainabilityof development” (both on national and world level)is often interpretedasan issue of
environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generationsnot a
destroyed Nature with over- exhausted resources and polluted environment.However, no ecological
balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities
are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at
thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system.
the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly
or indirectly, losses. Therefore,
the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about
the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When
Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies.
We agreed thatdevelopment
studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries,
as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural
and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural
environment.While
all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of)
“development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”.While the monetary, financial, and debt
crises are cyclical,we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in
nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political
aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the
political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe.Under the circumstances provided by
rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such
profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single
spacecraft,the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the
other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible
wars in the world society.Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The
real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games:i.e. between, on the one hand,
continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by
demilitarisation and democratization.No
ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma
any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming
years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also
due to irreversible changes in natural environment. It is, of course, far easier to outline the normative principles of a
peaceful democratic social and world order than to state the ways and means of how to achieve it. The causes of inequalities on local, national,
regional and world levels are often interlinked.Dominance
and exploitation relations go across country boundaries;
oppressors are supporting each other and oppressing other oppressors. Societies that exploit others can
hardly stay free of exploitation, themselves. Nations that hinder others in democratic transformation can hardly live in
democracy. Monopolies induce also others to monopolise. Narrow, selfish interests generate narrow, selfish interest. Discrimination gives birth
to discrimination. And so on... The “national societies” of the contemporary world show a great many differences, stemming partly from their
own past, partly from their recent transformation.Differences appear
not only in the level of economic and
technological development and the related world-economic position (as between the “North” and the ”South”)or in
respect of the socio- economic system and the related political regime(as in the past between the “East” and the
“West”), but also within these groups of countries in terms of natural endowment, geographical and demographic dimensions, historical
traditions, cultures, mechanism of management and governance, policy of leadership, etc.At
the same time, all societies are
subject to the increasing effect of each other and to the impact of globalisation.
Neoliberalism is exclusionary, materialistic, and ecologically destructive—affects
world perspective
Gill, Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science at York University, 95 (Stephen, “Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and
Disciplinary Neoliberalism”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 24:3, 1995, Sage Publications)//AS
By market civilisation, I mean a contradictory movement or set of transformative practices. The
concept entails, on the one hand,
cultural, ideological, and mythic forms understood broadly as an ideology or myth of capitalist
progress. These representations are associated with the cumulative aspects of market integration and the
increasingly expansive structures of accumulation, legitimation, consumption, and work. They are largely configured by
the power of transnational capital. On the other hand, market civilisation involves pattems of social disintegration
and exclusionary and hierarchical patterns of social relations. Indeed, whilst the concept of the longue durêe Suggests
the lineage and depth of market practices, it can be argued that a disturbing feature of market civilisation is that it tends
to generate a perspective on the world that is ahistorical, economistic, materialistic, "˜me-oriented', shorttermist, and ecologically myopic. Although the governance of this market civilisation is framed by the
discourse of globalising neoliberalism and expressed through the interaction of free enterprise and the state, its coordination is
achieved through a combination of market discipline and the direct application of political power. In this sense, there has been a "˜globalisation
of liberalism”, involving 'the emergence of market civilisation: neoliberal
globalisation is the latest phase in a process
that originated before the dawning of the Enlightenment in Europe, and accelerated in the nineteenth
century with the onset of industrial capitalism and the consolidation of the integral nation-state."•
I: Class Hierarchies
Neoliberalism precludes social mobility and maintains class hierarchies
Lipschutz, Professor of Politics at the University of California at Santa Cruz 07 (Ronnie, “CAPITALISM, CONFLICT AND CHURN: HOW THE
AMERICAN CULTURE WAR WENT GLOBAL”, Conflicts and Tensions, 2007, Sage Publications,
http://www.ic.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/pol160A/Anheier.pdf)//AS
But almost certainly, this belief is incorrect (Jacoby and Glauberman 1995). Even
the United States, a society with arguably the highest
nevertheless characterized by relatively stratified social
and racial relations as well as class structures (Scott and Leonhardt 2005; Brown and Wellman 2005).6 Moreover, as is
widely recognized but rarely admitted, the capacity to ‘seize’ an opportunity, to accumulate wealth, and to move
upward in the social hierarchy, is not merely a matter of either individual merit or Fortuna (e.g., Isbister 2001:
ch. 5; Sen 1999). Success breeds success. Those who already have wealth are well-poised to acquire more,
degree of upward (and downward) mobility in the world, is
and rarely operate in isolation from others similarly well-off (Herbert 2005). They are well embedded in webs of social relations with people
who are wealthy and well placed economically and politically, whose families and background are of a particular sort, and who know the ropes
(which is why going to Harvard is so often a stepping stone to riches and public office; see Douthat 2005). Those
lacking such
advantages are rarely offered entry into that upper-class world (Wilkerson 2005). Social hierarchies are
closely linked to societal divisions of labor which, in turn, are historically related to group, rather than
individual, status, attributes and practices (e.g., Tilly and Tilly 1994; Brown and Wellman 2005). At the very least, those
lower in the economic hierarchy must work all the harder to build the necessary networks. Efforts to remedy disadvantage have
been half-hearted, at best (Katznelson 2005). As practiced in the United States, affirmative action, widely criticized as providing
unfair advantages to excluded groups, in fact seeks to promote individuals, and not groups, on the basis of some indicator of merit and
behavior (see, e.g., Fullinwider 2005; Brown and Wellman 2005). As a racial group, for example, most AfricanAmericans remain at the
bottom of the American social hierarchy and division of labor (Daniels 2005), while those who have risen to political and economic prominence
constitute a relatively small middle class. Still, the very essence of social stability requires that the possession of power and wealth by some be
recognized as legitimate by those who lack these attributes (and who can hope that they may, someday, be as well-off). Moreover, that
established hierarchy must constantly be naturalized through invocation of belief in the possibility of
‘self-improvement’.7
Social distancing is becoming more apparent between not only classes but between
countries as well – this increases with time. A critical evaluation of modes of
knowledge productionis necessary to halt neoliberal expansion.
Navarro,M.D., Ph.D., Professor of Public Policy, Sociology, and Policy Studies at Johns Hopkins
University, 2007
(Vicente, “NEOLIBERALISM AS A CLASS IDEOLOGY; OR, THE POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE GROWTH OF
INEQUALITIES,” International Journal of Health Services, Vol. 37.1, pp 59-61)//SG
That inequalities contribute to a lack of social solidarity and increase social pathology is well
documented. Many people, including myself, have documented this reality (16). The scientific evidence supporting this position is
overwhelming. In any given society, the greatest number of deaths would be prevented by reducing social
inequalities. Michael Marmot studied the gradient of heart disease mortality among professionals at different authority levels, and he
foundthat the higher the level of authority, the lower the heart disease mortality (17). He further showed
that this mortality gradient could not be explained by diet, physical exercise, or cholesterolalone; these risk
factors explained only a small part of the gradient.The most important factor was the position that people held within
the social structure(in which class, gender, and race play key roles),the social distance between groups, and the
differential control that people had over their own lives. This enormously important scientific finding, which builds upon
previous scholarly work, has many implications; one of them is thatthe major problem we face is not simply eliminating
poverty but rather reducing inequality. The first is impossible to resolve without resolving the second.
Another implication is that poverty is not just a matter of resources, as is wrongly assumed in World Bank reports that measure worldwide
poverty by quantifying the number of people who live on a standardized U.S. dollar a day.The
real problem, again, is not
absolute resources but social distance and the different degrees of control over one’s own resources.And
this holds true in every society. Let me elaborate.An unskilled, unemployed, young black person living in the ghetto
area of Baltimore has more resources(he or she is likely to have a car, a mobile phone, a TV, and more square feet per household
and more kitchen equipment)than a middle-class professional in Ghana,Africa. If the whole world were just a single society, the
Baltimore youth would be middle class and the Ghana professional would be poor. And yet,the first has a much shorter life
expectancy(45 years)than the second(62 years). How can that be, when the first has more resources than the second? The answer is
clear. It is far more difficult to be poor in the United States (the sense of distance, frustration, powerlessness, and failure is much greater) than
to be middle class in Ghana. The first is far below the median; the second is above the median.
Does the same mechanism
operate in inequalities among countries? The answer is increasingly, yes. And the reason for adding “increasingly” is
communication— with ever more globalized information systems and networks, more information is reaching the most remote areas of the
world. Andthe
social distance created by inequalities is becoming increasingly apparent, not only within but
also among countries. Because this distance is more and more perceived as an outcome of exploitation,we are facing an
enormous tension, comparable with that of the 19th and early 20th centuries, when class exploitation
became the driving force for social mobilization. The key element for defining the future is through what
channels that mobilization takes place. What we have seen is a huge mobilization, instigated and guided by an alliance of the
dominant classes of the North and South, aimed at—as mentioned earlier—stimulating multi-class religious or nationalistic mobilizations that
leave key class relations unchanged. We saw this phenomenon at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. Christian Democracy
in Europe, for example, appears as the dominant classes’ response to the threat of socialism and communism. The birth of Islamic
fundamentalism was also stimulated for the same purposes.The
progressive alternative must be centered in alliances
among the dominated classes and other dominated groups, with a political movement that must be
built upon the process of struggle that takes place in each country.The struggle for better health in any country has to
be part of that broader struggle to build a better world, emphasizing that another world—based on solidarity—is possible. But,to intervene
in and change current reality, we have to understand it, with a critical evaluation of the conventional
wisdom that reproduces neoliberalism worldwide— an evaluation that should be uncompromising in
the sense that it should fear neither its own results nor conflict with the powers that be. In that respect, this
evaluation should include the political analysis rarely seen in scholarly work. And here, I am concerned that the newly
establishedWHOCommission on Social Determinants of Health (18)
is not looking at the basis of the problems that
determine poor health, problems that are rooted in class as well as in race and gender power relations
and in the political instruments through which such power is exercised and reproduced. The political
determinants of health need to be understood and acted upon, however uncomfortable or risky this may be. Such is the intention of this
article.
The push for neolib has failed in the past and will fail again – the aff simply creates a
system where the elite benefits
Dubhashi, Ph.D. at Pune University, former Vice-Chanceller, Goa University, and an erstwhile Secretary,
Government of India, December 20, 2008
(Padmakar, “Myth and Reality of Capitalism: Neo-Liberalism and Globalisation,” MAINSTREAM, VOL
XLVII, NO 1, http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1111.html)//SG
Despite this, the World Bank and IMF imposed, as a part of the “conditionality” of their aid, neo-liberal policies on the countries of Latin
America and Africa. From the 1980s when
Latin America embraced neo-liberalisation, it had been growing at less
than one-third the rate of the earlier days of protectionist policy; Chile’s experiment with neoliberalisation led by the so-called Chigago Boys (a group of Chilean economists trained at the University of Chicago—the leading centre of
neo-liberalisation) was a disaster; while African countries saw a fall in living standards, a damning indictment of
neo-liberal orthodoxy of the World Bank and IMF which have been practically running these economies.
Following the launching of the WTO in 1995, the rich countries made concerted efforts to push the developing
countries into free trade through its regime as well as through bilateral and regional free trade agreements
forgetting that industries in several developing countries would not survive if exposed to international competition before they had the time to
improve their capabilities by mastering advanced technologies and building effective organisation. No wonder massive
trade
liberalisation proved harmful to several develo-ping countries. For example, whole swathes of Mexican
industry, built during the period of import substitution, were wiped out. In Ivory Coast the chemical, textile, shoe and
automobile industries collapsed. The agricultural sector in Mexico was also hit hard by subsidised US
products, especially maize. Trade liberalisation has reduced growth rates. The Theory of Comparative Cost, on which
the free trade policy is based, may be conducive to efficiency in the use of resources in the short run but not for economic development in the
long run. There is a great deal of hypocrisy in the advocacy of free trade by the rich countries. In the Doha
negotiations (2001) the USA and EU introduced the proposal dubbed NAMA (Non-agricultural market access) which wanted the developing
countries to open up markets for their agricultural products. The
rich countries give out subsidies of $ 100 billion every
year. In return for cutting tariffs by developing countries, they were not ready to reduce their subsidies
substantially. Also while the USA has an overall tax rate of 1.6 per cent, the tax rates raised for the products of a large number of
developing countries—four per cent for India and Peru and 14-15 per cent for poor countries like Bangladesh, Nepal and Cambodia. The socalled level playing field gives one sided benefit to the rich countries, through non-trade policies like TRIPS which
strengthened protection to Patents and other intellectual property rights. Subsidies are allowed for R & D, extensively used
by rich countries. The rich countries give huge subsidies in the name of “reducing regional unbalances”.
Thus in the name of the myth of free trade, the rich countries have in reality erected a new international
trading system rigged in their favour.
Neoliberal policies put schools at a disadvantage to socially exclude people
Grimaldi, PhD in sociology and social research, 2012(Emiliano, “Neoliberalism and the marginalisation of socialjustice:
the making of an education policy to combat social exclusion, International Journal ofInclusive Education, 16:11, 1131-1154)//JS
Interestingly enough, the issues related to social justice, equity and inclusioncontinue to appear in the
education policy documents, still having an apparent centralityin the national educational agendas in
many countries. Then, we face an attempt tobring together and reconcile discourses constantly in
tension such as economic rationalismand social justice (Mosen-Lowe, Vidovich, and Chapman 2009,
473).However, critical analysis has shown how what we are witnessing is neither a coexistencenor a
combination but the marginalising and subjugation of the commitmentwith social justice and inclusive
education by the hegemonic neoliberal discourse(Gewirtz, Ball, and Bowe 1995; Barton and Slee 1999;
Armstrong 2003; Vlachou2004; Lingard and Mills 2007).Alexiadou (2002, 2005), in her analysis of New
Labour and European Union policies,has extensively described how this subjugation takes place through
a sequenceof discursive moves. Education is ‘given an enormous burden to carry in
balancingincreasingly liberalised market-driven economies, with the requirements of a sociallyjust
society’ (Alexiadou 2005, 102). Social justice is defined in the light of a minimalunderstanding of the
concept of equality (Raffo and Gunter 2008) that refers to itsformal meaning (Brine 1997, 231) and
stands in a sharp contrast with any distributional,cultural or associational idea of social justice (Cribb
and Gewirtz 2003, 18).Problems of social exclusion are understood in terms of ‘individual’s right to
competeon a (legally) equal basis for social opportunities’ and in the light of ‘the concept ofindividual
meritocracy’(Alexiadou 2005, 115). Adopting naïve perspectives (Lingardand Mills 2007), discourses of school effectiveness,
standardisation, meritocracy andperformativity do not address any of the wider structural inequalities causing thedifferent
forms of exclusion. On the contrary they redirect the attention on schoolingand its failure, identifying in the reform of
management and in the provision oftargeted support to weak and failing schools the key strategy to cope with phenomenasuch
as exclusion, students’ under-achievement and dropout (Alexiadou 2005, 115).Social exclusion, in its various forms, is
conceptualised as a ‘condition’ derivingfrom ‘unsuccessful participation in education and training’
(Alexiadou 2002, 73). Asa consequence a strictly causal relation is established between inclusion and
educationalsuccess. They seem to become synonyms. Discourses of standardisation andperformativity
(Gillborn and Youdell 2000; Ball 2003) frame the understanding ofeducational success in terms of
achievement and under-achievement. Excluded youngpeople become those who are ‘not in the
mainstream of social activity’, being it schoolor employment (Alexiadou 2002, 75). Such a condition is
often causally related to theexhibition of negative behaviours and attitudes. The causal influence of
wider socialstructures and social stratification (based on class, race, gender or religious divides)
issimply ignored. This conceptualisation entails a delegation of the responsibility forexclusion on the
individual, who has the ‘moral’ duty to take the opportunities offeredby the state, the school or the
labour market. Within this discursive framework,schooling is given a primary role in combating social
exclusion and disaffection ofyoung people. While disaffected, excluded or at-risk young people have
to assume theresponsibility of their own lives (TeRiele 2006a, 139), schools have to give the
opportunitiesand make them see the significance of education. Exclusion becomes thecombined
outcome of individual faults and failing schools, where incompetentteachers ‘have low expectations,
do not make learning exciting’, or assume ‘wrongroles’ (Alexiadou 2002, 76).
I: Commodifies Humanity
Neoliberalism transforms everything and anything into a commodity, leading to
dehumanization and globalized violence.
Brand and Sekler,professor of International Politics at Vienna University and junior researcher in the area of
international politics in the Department of Political Science at Vienna University , 2009 (Ulrich and Nicola, “Postneoliberalism
– A beginning debate,” Development Dialogue, no. 51, page 6, January 2009,http://rosaluxeuropa.info/userfiles/file/DD51.pdf#page=173 )//CS
Fifth, the four already noted crises create such great economic, social, cultural and political tensions in and between states and
groups of states that violence necessarily increases. The answer to this at the moment has been a new
armaments spiral and the growth of a preventative security state(Braml 2004).Armament expenditures
have grown by around 50 per cent in the last decade, above all in the USA. They have not only created
a latent civil war domestically(with the highest share of prisoners worldwide – 2.3 million in 2005, every tenth black
man between 21 and 29 incarcerated at some point in his life) ,but have also transformed the Cold War against
the Soviet Union into a global civil war ‘against terror’, using military bases in 130 countries. They have
built a network of illegal prisons and concentration camps, similar to what occurred in the heyday of the old imperialism.
Worldwide, there are estimated to be many thousands of people who are held and tortured in such prisons. At the same time,
an asymmetrical terrorist war against the dominance of the USA and the West has begun.Water, raw materials, access
to the sea, migration, knowledge, capital, cultural identity – in neoliberalism, everything and anything
becomes not only a commodity, but also cause of violent confrontations. With the globalisation of
capital, violence has also been globalised.There is a security crisis.
The neoliberal policies enslave the Latin Americans that have been forced out of their
native country
Green, PhD and MA in Anthropology and is the Director of the Center for Latin American studies at The University of
Arizona, 2011, (Linda, “The Nobodies: Neoliberalism, Violence, and Migration” Medical Anthropology: Cross-Cultural Studies
in Health and Illness, 30:4, 366-385)//JS
In what follows I examine some of the social consequences of structuralvulnerability that were so
eloquently outlined in the introduction to thisissue. I do so through an explication of how seemingly
contradictoryGuatemalan migrant subjectivities are produced. By placing the conceptof structural
vulnerability within a complex and historical web of capitalistrelations and state-sponsored violence
in the fullest sense of the term, Iexplore some of the forces and processes that now produce, at an
unprecedentedrate, what Zygmunt Bauman called ‘‘human waste,’’ that is ‘‘therising quantities of
human beings bereaved of their heretofore adequateways and means of survival in both the
biological and social= cultural senseof that notion’’ (2004:7). Today in this market-driven global
economy, largenumbers of people need wages to survive but have no viable means toprocure cash.
They are quite literally redundant. At the same time, these‘‘nobodies’’ are reworked into ‘‘illegals’’
after crossing the Mexico-Arizonaborder, in this instance. As a cheap yet expendable source of labor
andprofit, whether as workers or detainees, they become crucial to shore upthe floundering American
economy (Fernandes 2007).An examination of migration across the Americas and its relationship
toneoliberalism, as both an economic model and a mode of domination (Gilly2005), reveals the multiple
and brutal ways ‘‘disposable people’’ fit into asystem in which violence, fear, and impunity are crucial
components. Immigrationin this instance can be thought of as (1) a consequence of a complexset of
global economic doctrines and geopolitical practices that produceboth nobodies in the global south
and low wage, dangerous, and non-unionjobs in the United States; (2) a strategy of survival for
millions of CentralAmericans and Mexicans who have few alternatives for procuring a livelihoodin
their own country; and (3) a set of punitive laws and practices thathave reconfigured the US-Mexico
border and beyond into a militarizedzone—a space of death that punishes those people who are
dispossessedand dislocated by US state-sponsored neoliberal policies and ongoingrepressive practices
(Green 2008).State-mandated exclusionary policies and practices against migrants havea long and sordid
history in the United States (Chacon and Davis 2006). Intheir most recent iteration, federal and state
immigration regulations accentuatein practice a long-existing discursive hierarchy of social worth
basedon skin color that puts minorities of class, gender, sexuality, and color intheir place, in social,
spatial, cultural, and political-economic terms. Andbecause of its historical particularities, to borrow
Gavin Smith’s (1998)term, Arizona turns out to be the ‘‘perfect’’ place for teaching brownskinnedpeople to know their place. A crucial dimension to this dynamic is thebombardment by the
mainstream media of innumerable examples ofmigrants’ violation of the ‘‘rule of law’’ (Chavez 2001).
This notion isreinforced by the now hackneyed but useful framing of human beings asillegals. Thus,
the logical response to migrants’ seemingly blatanttransgressions of American law and order
necessitates their increasinglybrutal punishment and containment. This is perhaps most fully executedin
the state of Arizona.
The neoliberal policies give way to the structural violence on the Latin Americans
Green, PhD and MA in Anthropology and is the Director of the Center for Latin American studies at The University of
Arizona, 2011, (Linda, “The Nobodies: Neoliberalism, Violence, and Migration” Medical Anthropology: Cross-Cultural Studies
in Health and Illness, 30:4, 366-385)//JS
These are not the reserve army of the poor in Marx’s terms, but a disposablepeople no longer necessary
or needed in their home countries. The fearof no future and the hope of creating a life for themselves
and their kin propelmigrants to ‘‘voluntarily’’ take on unimaginable debt and expose themselvesto
known and unexpected levels of violence, exploitation, virulentracism, and, increasingly,
incarceration. Yet they are simultaneously vital,as migrants, in propping up the failed economies of
Central America andMexico through their remittances and in the United States where they arean
exploitable, expendable workforcewithout anyprotection as workersand= or as human beings.As
containment and punishment increasinglybecome the backbone of US policies; the transfer of
taxpayer monies bythe carceral state to the private sector goes on unabated and unacknowledged.In
these contradictory spaces, Harvey’s ‘‘logics of power’’ becomeall the more evident. Migrants are a
disempowered workforce in Guatemalaand the United States, continually foiled in their attempts to
organize,unionize, or make demands for health and safety in the workplace. Currentviolent and vicious
border policies and practices are in part necessaryaccompaniments to the international structural
adjustment policies and itsattendant repressive apparatus (Klein 2007). Its domestic counterpart—USstyle neo-liberalism—orchestrated partially through deindustrializationand de-unionization, has led to
a massive decline in jobs and wages, as‘‘mass termination [of employees became] a reasonable profitmaximizingstrategy’’ (Wypijewski 2006:141). Together these processes (United Statesand Guatemalan)
work synergistically to produce a surplus of ‘‘disposablepeople’’ in Guatemala and a plethora of low
wage jobs in the United States.This reworked economy has also made ‘‘the historical demand for
blacklabor superfluous’’ (Marable 1983:18) while creating the conditions forthe largest prison system
in the world (Chomsky 2003; Pager 2007; Sider2004; Wacquant 2010)—what Christian Parenti (1999)
referred to as ‘‘LockdownAmerica.’’ Racial social control, a crucial component of structuralviolence, is
carried out in part through the mass incarceration of AfricanAmericans, the vast majority for nonviolent crimes, and increasingly ofillegal aliens through Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE,
theinterior enforcement arm of Customs and Border Patrol, and replacementof the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, commonly known as lamigrain Spanish) raids, detentions, and deportations.
I: Oppressive/Political Agency
Exposure to international markets adversely affects workers in less developed
countries—can’t effectively mobilize
Rudra, Associate Professor of International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh 02 (Nita, “Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare
State in Less-Developed Countries”, International Organization 56:2, Spring 2002, JSTOR)//AS
Globalization is likely to adversely affect government commitments to social welfare in nations highly
endowed with low-skilled labor. This theory challenges the view that labor in LDCs will experience both
economic and political gains with globalization; following such logic, if exposure to international markets is
increas- ing, abundant labor should be in a better political position to demand greatergovernment socialwelfare spending. I suggest, however, that labor in LDCs is in a weak bargaining position because the
sizeable population of low-skilled workers faces collective-action problems that are exacerbated by large pools of surplus
labor_ Labor in LDCs, unlike in developed countries, does not generally have national labor-market
institutions that can help mitigate these problems and strengthen workers' bargaining power. Thus globalization in LDCs will
lead to less, not more, social-welfare spending.
Neoliberalism imposes control on unwilling societies and represses political dissidents
Peck and Tickell, Canada Research Chair in Urban & Regional Political Economy ,Professor of Geography, University of British
Columbia and Professor at Canada Research Chair in Urban & Regional Political Economy and Professor of Geography, University of British
Columbia respectively,
02 (Jamie and Adam, “Neoliberalizing Space”, Antipode 34:3, July 2002
The new religion of neoliberalism combines a commitment to the extension of markets and logics of
competitiveness with a profound antipathy to all kinds of Keynesian and/or collectivist strategies . The
constitution and extension of competitive forces is married with aggressive forms of state downsizing, austerity financing, and public- service
"reform."• Andwhile rhetorically
antistatist, neoliberals have proved adept at the (mis)use of state power
in the pursuit of these goals.For its longstanding advocates in the Anglo-American world,
neoliberalism represents a kind of self-imposed disciplinary code, calling for no less than monastic restraint. For its
converts in the global south, neoliberalism assumes the status of the Latinate church in medieval Europe,
externally imposing unbending rule regimes enforced by global institutions and policed by local functionaries.
Meanwhile, if not subject to violent repression, nonbelievers are typically dismissed as apostate
defenders of outmoded institutions and suspiciously collectivist social rights.
American capitalism destroys workers’ lives—causes violence, exhaustion, and
massive wealth gaps
Resnick and Wolff, professors of economics at Amherst and Visiting Professor in the Graduate Program in International Affairs of
the New School University (Wolff) 03 (Stephen and Richard, “Exploitation, Consumption, and the Uniqueness of US Capitalism”, Historical
Materialism 11:4, Brill)//AS
We propose to argue a simple basic thesis about US capitalism relating to a certain uniqueness of its contradictions.1 On the one hand,
capitalism has delivered a stunning standard of living to US workers across the last 150 years, perhaps the best such showing by any capitalist
country. The result is that workers
in the US today enjoy exceptional levels of personal consumption and
wealth as well as formal political freedoms. These aspects represent the success of US capitalism. On the other hand, this
capitalism has subjected productive labourers to probably the highest rate of class exploitation (ratio of
surplus to necessary labour) in the capitalist world. Such exploitation contributes to the exceptional levels of
exhaustion, stress, drug-dependency, loneliness, mass disaffection from civic life, dysfunctional
families and endemic violence pervading US workers’ lives. Extraordinary exploitation yields a robust US
capitalism yet also one dependent on, and ultimately vulnerable to, a working class in deep distress. It
yields a huge and growing gap between the rich and powerful few and the mass. The sweep of US history since
the Civil War generated a capitalism that was both very strong and very weak.
I: Inequality
Neoliberal policies are profoundly hypocritical—impose the very inequality and
destruction they seek to prevent
Brenner and Theodore, Professor of Urban Theory at the Harvard Graduate School of Design and Associate Professor in the
Urban Planning and Policy Program at the University of Chicago respectively 02 (Neil and Nik, “Associate Professor in the Urban Planning and
Policy Program”, Antipode, 2002, http://metropolitanstudies.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/222/Brenner.Theodore.NL.pdf)//AS
Among activists and radical academics alike, there
is considerable agreement regarding the basic elements of
neoliberalism as an ideo- logical project. For instance, Moody (1997:119-120) has described neoliberalism concisely as "... a mixture of
neoclassical economic fundamentalism, market regulation ir1 place of state guidance, economic redistribution in favor of capital (known as
supply-side economics), moral authoritarianism with an idealized family at its center, inter- national free trade principles (sometimes
inconsistently applied), and a thorough intolerance of trade unionism."• However, as Moody and others have emphasized, there
is also a
rather blatant disjuncture between the ideology of neoliberalism and its everyday political operations
and societal effects. On the one hand, while neoliberalism aspires to create a "utopia"• of free markets liberated
from all forms of state interference, it has in practice entailed a dramatic intensification of coercive,
disciplinary forms of state intervention in order to impose market rule upon all aspects of social life
(see Keil this volume; MacLeod this volume). On the other hand, whereas neoliberal ideology implies that self-regulating
markets will generate an optimal allo- cation of investments and resources, neoliberal political practice
has generated pervasive market failures, new forms of social polarization, and a dramatic intensification
of uneven development at all spatial scales. In short, as Gill (1995:407) explains, "the neoliberal shift in government policies has
tended to subject the majority of the popu- lation to the power of market forces whilst preserving social protection for the strong."• During the
last two decades, the dysfunc-
tional effects of neoliberal approaches to capitalist restructuring have been
manifested in diverse institutional arenas and at a range of spatial scales (see Amin 1997; Bourdieu 1998; Gill 1995; Isin 1998;
Jessop and Stones 1992; Peck and Tickell 1994). As such studies have indicated, the disjuncture between the ideology of selfregulating markets and the everyday reality of persistent economic stagnation- intensifying inequality,
destructive interplace competition, and generalized social insecurity-has been particularly blatant in precisely those political-economic contexts in which neoliberal doctrines have been imposed most extensively.
Neoliberalism’s ever-expanding poverty, volatility, and insecurity encourages a
predatory mindset shift within the working class
Giroux, Ph.D. @ Carnegie-Mellon University, Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster
University in the English and Cultural Studies Department, 2008
(Henry A., “Beyond the biopolitics of disposability: rethinking neoliberalism in the New Gilded Age,”
Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture, Vol. 14.5, pp 593-594)//SG
One example of the predatory mindset entailed by neoliberal policies appeared in the New York Times
at the beginning of 2008and told the story oftwo elderly men who were arrested while ‘pushing a corpse,
seated in an office chair, along the sidewalk to a check- cashing store to cash the dead man’s Social
Security check’. In a desperate attempt to cash the late Mr. Cintron’s $335 check, thetwo men ‘parked the chair with the
corpse in front of Pay-O-Maticat 763 Ninth Avenue’, a business that Mr. Cintron had frequented.The attempt failed, as the
newspaper reported, because ‘Their sidewalk procession had already attracted the stares of passers-by who
were startled by the sight of the body flopping from side to side as the two men tried to prop it up, the
police said’(Lambert & Hauser, 2008). Police and an ambulance arrived asthe two men attempted to maneuver the
corpse and chair into the office. The story offered no reasons for such behavior and treated the narrative as a kind of odd spectacle
more akin to the workings of the Jerry Springer Show than a serious commentary aboutthe sheer desperation that follows the
collapse of the social state, accompanied by an ever-expanding poverty, volatility, and insecurity that
encroach on whole populations in the United States. Another even more brutal account in the mainstream press told of
howa New York City police detective and his girlfriend kidnapped and forced a 13-year-old girl to provide
sexual favors for the couple’s friends and other interested buyers. According to the story,the detective and his
girlfriend would parade the girl at parties and other places where adult men had gathered and force her
to have sex with them for money � $40 for oral sex, $80 for intercourse. The child was an investment. The
couple allegedly told her thatshe had been purchased for $500 � purchased, like the slaves of old, only this time for use as a
prostitute. (Herbert, 2008, p. A27)While the story connected the fate of this young child to the growing sex trade
in the United States, it said nothing about the ongoing reification of young girls in a market society that
largely reduces them to commodities, sexual objects, and infantilized accessories for boys and men.While
the sex trade clearly needs to be condemned and eliminated, it is an easy target politically and morally when compared
withthe music, advertising, television, and filmindustries that treat young people as merchandise, turn them into
fodder for profit, and appear indifferent to the relentless public debasement of young girls and women.
A third story provides yet another glimpse of the treatment accorded to those others rendered dispensable and deemed unworthy of humanity
or dignity. In this narrative, Benn Zipperer (2007)contemplates on the
emergence of prison rodeos that are used to entertain
large crowds by organizing gameswhere Americans buy tickets to watch inmates wrestle bulls and participate in
crowd favorites like ‘Convict Poker’.Also called ‘Mexican Sweat’, the poker game consists of four prisoners who sit expectantly
around a red card table. A 1,500-pound bull is unleashed, and the last convict to remain sitting wins. Especially
thrilling for the audience is the chaotic finale ‘Money the Hard Way’ in whichmore than a dozen inmates scramble to snatch a
poker chip dangling from the horns of another raging bull. In spite of their differences,all of these stories are
bound together by a politics in which the logic of the marketplace is recalibrated to exploit society’s
most vulnerable � even to the point of transgressing the sanctity of the dead � and to inflict real horrors,
enslavement, and injuries upon the lives of those who are poor, elderly, young, and disenfranchised,
because they are without an economic role in the neoliberal order. And as the third story illustrates, a savage and
fanatical capitalism offers a revealing snapshot of howviolence against the incarcerated � largely black, often poor, and
deemed utterly disposable � now enters the realm of popular cultureby producing a type of racialized terrorism
posing as extreme entertainment, while simultaneously recapitulating the legacy of barbarism associated with slavery.Most of these
stories place the blame for these crimes on individualized acts of cruelty and lawlessness. None offer a
critical translation of the big picture, one that signals the weakening of social bonds and calls the very
project of US democracy into question. And yet these narratives demand something more, a different kind of optic capable of
raising serious questions regarding the political culture and moral economy in which such representations are produced, the pedagogies of
reification, vengeance, and sadistic pleasure that enable people to ignore their warning, andthe
inherent instability of a
democracy that is willing to treat human beings as redundant and disposable, denied the rights and
dignities accorded both to citizens and even to humanity.And while such images conjure up startling representations of
human poverty, misery, deepening inequality, and humiliation,they bear witness to a broader politics of exploitation and
exclusion in which, as Naomi Klein (2002) points out, ‘Mass privatization and deregulation have bred
armies of locked-out people, whose services are no longer needed, whose lifestyles are written off as
‘‘backward’’, whose basic needs go unmet’ (p. 21). These stories are decidedly selective, yet, they point to something deeper
still in the current mode of neoliberal regulation, the rise of a punishing state and its commitment to the criminalization of social problems, the
unburdening of ‘human rights from a social economy’ (Martin, 2007, p. 139), and the wide circulation of and pleasure in violent spectacles of
As the social state is displaced by the market, a new kind of politics is emerging in
which some lives, if not whole groups, are seen as disposable and redundant. Within this new form of biopolitics �
apolitical system actively involved in the management of the politics of life and death � new modes of
individual and collective suffering emerge around the modalities and intersection of race and class. But
insecurity and abject cruelty.
what is important to recognize is that the configuration of politics that is emerging is about more than the processes of social exclusion or being
left out of the benefits of the market,it
is increasingly about a normalized and widely accepted reliance upon the
alleged ‘invisible hand’ of a market fundamentalism to mediate the most important decisions about life
and death. In this case, the politics managing the crucialquestions of life and death is governed by neoliberalism’s
power to define who matters and who doesn’t, who lives and who dies. Questions about getting ahead no longer occupy a
key role in everyday politics. For most peopleunder
the regime of neoliberalism, everyday life has taken an ominous
turn and is largely organized around questions of who is going to survive and who is going to die. Under
such circumstances, important decisions about life and death have given way to a range of anti- democratic forces that threaten the meaning
and substance of democracy, politics, human condition, and any viable and just vision of the future. In its updated version,neoliberal
rationality also rules ‘our politics, our electoral systems, our universities, increasingly dominat[ing]
almost everything, even moving into areas that were once prohibited by custom in our country, like
commercializing childhood’ (Nader, 2007).
Neoliberalism’s rapid requirement for urbanization exacerbates the rich-poor divide
resulting in ruined livelihoods, increased inequality, increased poverty, detrimental
environmental impacts, and horrific living conditions
Greenberg, Ph.D in Anthropology at University of Michigan, 2012
(James B., Thomas Weaver (Ph.D. in Anthropology at University of California at Berkeley), Anne Browning-Aiken (Ph.D. in Anthropology at
University of Arizona), William L. Alexander (Professor of Anthropology at University of Arizona), “The Neoliberal Transformation of Mexico,”
Neoliberalism and Commodity Production in Mexico, University Press of Colorado, pp 328-329)//SG
Neoliberal development has led tothe accoutrementsof modernization and prog- ress, such as arguably better
infrastructure and certainly greater opportunities for a narrow set of Mexican and foreign elites. For the
masses,however, neoliberalism has created toll roads they can’t afford to use. While free trade has
harmonized prices between the UnitedStatesand Mexicofor most commodities, forworking people incomes
remain flat and putting food on the table, let alone buying the foreign goods that flood the market, remains a
struggle.Neoliberal development has made the rich richer and the poor desperate. Beyond its costs for Mexico’s
masses, the economy and the environment have paid the price of neoliberal devel- opment. Although
conditions were far from good before,employment, working conditions, distribution of income, and living
conditions have become markedly worse for the masses under neoliberalism. As these conditions have
worsened, so have violence, oppression, and environmental degradation.The implementation of neoliberal policy
was brutal, particularly for Mexico’s rural poor. Rather than helping the poor, these policies have deepened poverty and
ruined livelihoods. Even by the World Bank’s own accounts, 5 to 10 percent of Mexico’s rural population still lives on under a dollar per
day, and another 20 percent lives on less than two dollars a day (World Bank 2004:xx).National fig- ures, however, hide rural
poverty. By 1996, following neoliberal restructuring and NAFTA, 80 percent of the rural population fell
below this line. Rural poverty numbers improved slowly between 1998 and 2006, according to the World Bank, because of public and
private transfers (the latter from migrant remissions) and increases in tourism and services; the poverty rate fell to 55 percent. But as the US
economy soured, rural poverty again began to rise and stood at 61 percent in 2008 (World Bank 2012). Under neoliberalism, inequality has also
Beyond the growing inequalities in
wealth, widespread and growing poverty comes with other social costs. As displaced rural migrants pour
into Mexico’s cit- ies, they face both large-scale unemployment and horrific living conditions;the only
been increas- ing in the United States since the 1980s (Glasmeier 2007; Uchitelle 2007).
housing they may be able to afford is improvised out of cardboard and other temporary materials and they seldom have heat, electricity, or
water. Without sewers and sanitation, these slums are breeding grounds for diseases of poverty and deteriorating health (Davis 2006).These
problems are only the down-payment on the social costs of neoliber- alism. For peasants and
smallholders fleeing ruined rural economies, migration entails a process of class transformation: unable
to make a living working their own lands, they must now work for someone else. Working for wages changes the
basic logic of livelihoods. Whether the migrants find work in Mexico or in the United States, working for wages rewards households that send
more workers into labor markets, and the people left behind must find ways to earn cash. This situation irrevocably changes the gender division
of household labor.
Terminal Impact: Society/Inequality
Societal inequality causes humanitarian emergencies that kill multitudes and inflict
massive violence
Nafziger and Auvinen, university distinguished professor of economics at Kansas State University and Docent of International
Politics at the University of Helsinki respectively 02 (E Wayne and Juha, “Economic Development, Inequality, War, and State Violence”, World
Development 30:2, Science Direct)//AS
Economic stagnation, political
decay, and deadly political violence interact in several ways: economic and political factors
contribute to war, while war has an adverse effect on economic growth and political development. This paper focuses on how the political
economy affects humanitarian emergencies, comprising a human-made crisis in which large numbers of
people die and suffer from war, state violence, and refugee displacement (Väyrynen, 2000a). Auvinen and
Nafziger (1999) analyze econometrically the relationship between humanitarian emergencies1 and their hypothesized sources in lessdeveloped countries (LDCs). Their analysis indicates that stagnation and decline in real GDP, high
income inequality, a high ratio of
military expenditures to national income, and a tradition of violent conflict are sources of emergencies. The study also finds that
countries that failed to adjust to chronic external deficits were more vulnerable to humanitarian emergencies. The findings are by and large
consistent for three measures of the dependent variable and for many different regression models.2 In addition, political
variables,
such as predatory rule, authoritarianism, and state decay and collapse,3 interact with economic
variables to affect vulnerability to humanitarian emergencies.
Income inequality causes massive death and violence due to instability
Nafziger and Auvinen, university distinguished professor of economics at Kansas State University and Docent of International
Politics at the University of Helsinki respectively 02 (E Wayne and Juha, “Economic Development, Inequality, War, and State Violence”, World
Development 30:2, Science Direct)//AS
Large income inequality
exacerbates the vulnerability of populations to humanitarian emergencies.
fueling social
discontent, increases socio-political instability, as measured by deaths in domestic disturbances and
assassinations (per million population) and coups (both successful and unsuccessful). Moreover, the policies of predatory and
Alesina and Perotti's (1996) cross-section study of 71 developing countries, 1960-85, finds that income inequality, by
authoritarian rulers increase income inequality. To measure income inequality, we used Gini coefficients calculated from an expanded and
qualitatively improved dataset from Deininger and Squire (1996, pp. 56-91), although we still decided not to use data from studies they relied
on which used incomparable research methodologies. We were able to find relationships between Gini and war, which
World Bank researchers Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and others, without this dataset, could not find. Collier and Hoeffler (1998, p. 563) indicate
“there is insufficient data to introduce distributional considerations into the empirical analysis.” Our regressions indicate that high
Gini or
income concentration contributes to humanitarian emergencies.
1
War deaths are from the Correlates of War database (Singer and Small, 1994). Refugees (across international
boundaries) are from U.S. Committee for Refugees (1980-1996). For discussion of these data, see Auvinen and
Nafziger (1999, pp. 267-90).
2
Regression models include ordinary least squares (OLS), generalized least squares (GLS or Prais-Winsten), twostage least squares, fixed and random effects, tobit, and probit models. See Auvinen and Nafziger (2001, on-line) for
the results of a few of these regressions.
3
A weakening or decaying state is one experiencing a decline in the basic functions of the state, such as
possessing authority and legitimacy, making laws, preserving order, and providing basic social services. A
complete breakdown in these functions indicates a failing or collapsing state (Holsti 2000, pp. 246-50;
Zartman 1995, pp. 1-7).
Poverty and ecological destruction place humanity on a path to extinction
Perrings, Professor of Environmental Economics at Arizona State University 87 (Charles, “AN OPTIMAL PATH TO EXTINCTION? Poverty
and Resource Degradation in the Open Agrarian Economy “, Journal of Development Economics 30, 1987,
http://www.public.asu.edu/~cperring/Perrings,%20JDE%20(1989).pdf)//AS
Famine is evidence of extreme poverty. Since the work of Sen (1981) we may be reasonably confident that it is not necessarily evidence of the
collapse of agricultural or pastoral output - food availability decline. This paper suggests, however, an even more disturbing causal relationship
between extreme poverty and the state of agricultural or pastoral resources in open agrarian economies that is worth further study. It now
seems clear that the dynamics of open agrarian economies are rather more complex than the early (quasi) stable equilibrium models of such
as Leibenstein would suggest, and that causality between poverty and resource degradation can run both ways .
We have seen, for example, that a collapse in the trade entitlements of agrarian producers may prompt them to increase the level of intensity
with which the land is exploited even if this imposes costs in terms of reduced productivity in the future. In the extreme case where
the
system is both locally and globally unstable, these costs can be fatal . Indeed, if we apply the logic of exhaustible
resource theory to the problem, given the distorting effects of poverty, we cannot avoid the conclusion that in
the Sahelian and similar cases people have set themselves on to what Pearce has called an ‘optimal path to
extinction’. The collective response has been to avert disaster so far as possible by emergency relief, but this will do
nothing to avert a recurrence of the problem in the future. Yet, if the source of the problem is the opening of agrarian
economies dependent on fragile ecological systems, the solution ought to lie in the arena of trade and transfers. The compensation principle
is, for example, a powerful ally in arguments for aid in cases where the gains from trade are uniformly negative for one county. By this principle
trade will always be superior to autarky since there exist a system of transfers that would ensure that everyone could be made better off. But
the compensation, has to be made if trade is not to impoverish rather than enrich. The appropriation of the gains from trade in the advanced
industrial economies, with occasional disbursements of aid or emergency relief to the traditional agrarian economies in times of famine, is no
guarantee against the collapse of 7Given the objective described in the text, such a time path would not contradict Bellman’s principle of
optimality. The latter requires that whatever the initial state and decision are, the remaining decisions at any point in the path must constitute
an optimal policy with regard to the state resulting from the first decision. Each segment of the time path must itself be optimal, no matter
what <as gone on before. fn this case the optimal policy requires quite simply that the individual maintain consumption at the minimum
subsistence level by dissaving for as long as possible. C. Perrings, Poverty and agrarian resource degradation 23 the latter. The problem, as Sen
points out, lines in the entitlements of agrarian producers in these economies. It is of crucial importance to secure a set of entitlements whether by appeal to the compensation principle or not _ that will provide those producers with the incentives to operate at sustainable
levels, and to search out forms of insurance against environmental fluctuations that do not themselves undermine the potential gains from
trade.
I: Environment
General
Neoliberal expansion is unsustainable and causes pollution, diminishing resources,
and environmental destruction
Faber and McCarthy, Professor of Sociology at Northeastern University and Director of the Northeastern Environmental Justice
Research Collaborative and Assistant Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at the college of Charleston 03 (Daniel and Deborah, “Neoliberalism, Globalization and the Struggle for Ecological Democracy: Linking Sustainability and Environmental Justice”, Just Sustainabilities:
Development in an Unequal World, 2/28/03,
http://books.google.com/books/about/Just_Sustainabilities_Development_in_an.html?id=I7QBbofQGu4C)//AS
To sustain economic growth and higher profits in the new global economy, American companies are increasingly
adopting ecologically unsustainable systems of production. Motivated by the growing costs of doing business and threat
of increased international competition in the era of globalization, corporate America initiated a political movement
beginning in the early 19805 for "regulatory reform', ie the rollback of environmental laws, worker
health and safety, consumer protection, and other state regulatory protectionsseen as impinging
upon the "˜free' market and the profits of capital. Termed "˜neo- liberalism'the recent effect has been a
general increase in the rate of exploitation of both working people (human nature) and the
environment (mother nature), as witnessed by the assaults upon labour, the ecology movement and
thewelfare state. Coupled with increased trade advantages brought about by corporate-led globalization and significant innovations in
high technology and service related industries in the "˜new economy', the US experienced a record-breaking economic boom under the Clinton
administration during the l990s, However, this economic
"˜prosperity' was to a large degree predicated upon the
increased privatized-maximization of profits via the increased socialized-minimization of the costs of
production, iethe increased displacement of potential business expenses onto the American public in
the form of pollution, intensified natural resource exploitation and other environmental problems.
Though progress was made on a number of critical issues, thc ecological crisis continued to deepen during the 1990s.
Expanding neoliberalism assures total environmental destruction and increases
disease susceptibility
Gill, Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science at York University, 95 (Stephen, “Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and
Disciplinary Neoliberalism”, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 24:3, 1995, Sage Publications)//AS
Neoliberal forms of rationality are largely instrumental and are concerned with finding the best means
to achieve calculated ends. For neoliberals, primary motivations are understood in a possessively
individualistic framework. Motivation is provided by fear and greed, and is reflected in the drive to acquire more
security and more goods. Yet, any significant attempt to widen this pattern of motivation would entail an
intensification of existing accumulation and consumption patterns, tending to deplete or to destroy the ecostructures of the planet, making everyone less secure and perhaps more vulnerable to disease (even the
powerful). Thus, if North American patterns of accumulation and consumption were to be significantly
extended, for example to China, the despoliation of the global eco-structure would be virtually assured. Even
so, the central ideological message and social myth of neoliberalism is that such a possibility is both
desirable and attainable for all: insofar as limitations are recognised, this is at best through a redefinition of the concept of
"˜sustainable development' so as to make it consistent with the continuation of existing patterns of accumulation and consumption."•
Neoliberalism destroys the environment—resources are being irreversibly depleted—
tech can’t fix
De La Barra, Chilean political activist, international consultant and former UNICEF Latin America Public Policy Advisor 07-- (Ximena,
“THE DUAL DEBT OF NEOLIBERALISM”, Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Social Struggles in Latin America”, 9/1/09, edited by Dello Bueno and
Lara, Brill Online)//AS
Meanwhile, environmental
management remains on a permanent collision course with the neoliberal,
of production. The incessant search for expansion, consuming ever more nonrenewable resources in the process, fails to assume the accompanying environmental costs and
results in an irreversible deterioration. Technological innovation concentrated in the hands of just a few private
transnational corporations is unable to act as an engine for social transformation and reduction of
environmental risk, instead serving as a vehicle for intensifying exploitation of labour, social
exclusion, and environmental destruction.Globalisation and the growth of industrial production and commercial
advertising have created new patterns of consumption catering only to select sectors while increasing the
production of wastes and pollution. At the same time, there has been no corresponding rhythm of increasing the capacity for
waste reduction or even recycling the valuable resources being lost in waste, including water. This loss of balance has degraded
ecosystems to an alarming extent. In the last 50 years, the overall level of deterioration has sharply
accelerated. Climatic change is increasingly providing us with a painful reminder of this. The availability of water per capita
is now less than half of what once existed and these supplies are being contaminated by pesticides,
fertilisers, and untreated human wastes. Air quality is likewise worsening , resulting in at least a 50% increase in
agro-export model
registered respiratory infections. Five times more combustible fuels are being burned and four times as much emissions of carbon monoxide
are The Dual Debt of Neoliberalism • 43being produced. The proportion of urban inhabitants relative to the total has grown from 17% to 50%,
while the investments being made in urban infrastructure are being reduced. The use of cement has multiplied four-fold and the expansion of
built areas has limited the natural drainage capacity, especially in urban areas, causing more frequent and more severe flooding.
Over the
last 25 years, the planet has lost a third of its natural resources in terms of forests, fresh water, and
marine species. Meanwhile, a high proportion of vegetation that fulfils a hydro-regulating role has been lost, and global warming has
come to threaten our future as a species (UNDP 1998).4 Growing environmental risks therefore constitute an
additional negative consequence of the dominant development model. Coupled with increased social
vulnerability, the result is a breeding ground for the so-called “natural” disasters that continue to
increase in frequency and intensity
Latin America
Increased trade and neoliberalism causes rampant environmental destruction in
Mexico
Liverman and Vilas,Regents ProfessorofGeographyandDevelopment, and co-Director of the Institute of the Environmentat
theUniversity of Arizona and Environmental Change Institute, Oxford University Center for the Environment respectively 06 (Diana and Silvina,
“NEOLIBERALISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN LATIN AMERICA”, Annual Review of Environmental Resources, 6/23/06, University of Michigan
Libraries)//AS
Whatever the environmental impact of individual manufacturing plants, there is general agreement
that the scale effects of NAFTA have had serious environmental effects in terms of the overall growth of
industrial activity and the environmental footprint of rapidly increasing employment in the sector (26, 35,
36). An increase in the number of border maquiladora plants, from 2000 to 3500, between the years 1995 and 2000
was concentrated mostly in five cities (Tijuana, Mexicali, Ciudad Ju´arez, Matamoros, and Reynosa) where
environmental degradation became increasingly evident. Several authors highlight the role of
employment and associated rapid and unplanned urban growth in environmental degradation at the
border. Employment in Mexican border states between 1995 and 2000 doubled to approximately 1.2 million workers, most of whom emigrated
from southern Mexico. The
growing population has increased water, energy, and transport demands, and
according to Pope (37), “All along the border, more people are competing for limited supplies of drinking water and electricity, generating
more solid refuse and sewage, and being exposed to ever higher levels of toxic wastes.” Liverman et al.
(38) document a range of environmental problems in border cities including air pollution from dirt
roads and expanding auto ownership in border cities such as Ciudad Ju´arez, untreated sewage and unclean
drinking water, as well as an accumulation of household and industrial waste in cities where infrastructure has
not kept up with urban sprawl. Border industrialization and population growth have increased vulnerability to flooding in some cities, for
example, Tijuana and Nogales where unplanned settlements encroach on floodplains or are located on steep devegetated slopes (39).
Neoliberal policies in Latin America have adverse environmental effects and spark
political instability
Liverman and Vilas, Regents Professor of Geography and Development, and co-Director of the Institute of the Environment at the
University of Arizona and Environmental Change Institute, Oxford University Center for the Environment respectively 06 (Diana and Silvina,
“NEOLIBERALISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN LATIN AMERICA”, Annual Review of Environmental Resources, 6/23/06, University of Michigan
Libraries)//AS
The emerging
literature on neoliberalism and the environment in Latin America shows a complex and
geographically varying pattern of the impacts of neoliberal processes, with researchers coming to different conclusions
about the costs and benefits of neoliberal policies, even when considering the same cases or data. Many studies contradict the
proneoliberal wisdoms that free trade will protect the environment, that private is better than common or state
resource management, or that the market is the best way to conserve nature. There is little evidence in this
review that the Latin American environment is better protected under neoliberal policies , but it is also not
clear that a revival of state regulation, state and common ownership, and trade protections would be affordable and effective in a global
economy. Most studies tend to be case specific and difficult to generalize, a chronic problem of comparative research, which is not set within a
rigorous a priori framework. It is also important to reiterate that this review focuses on several key countries and mainly on English language
publications. In many cases, environmental changes cannot be clearly linked to a specific neoliberal action because of multiple and sometimes
contradictory policy changes. In others, careful research shows that apparent positive or negative impacts are better explained by earlier
resource management decisions, by weak or uneven implementation of policy, or by inadequate regulatory regimes. There
are some
indications from the literature on water and forest reform that environment and livelihoods do better
where there are strong local institutions, where local people have diverse income sources, or where some subsidies are
provided during transitions. There is also evidence that the social and environmental effects of neoliberal policies are
politically volatile, sparking local protests and bringing national electoral defeat to governments too
closely identified with the neoliberal agenda.
I: War/Violence
Structural Violence
***Neoliberalism and violence are inextricably intertwined—violence is a reflection
and expression of capitalism
Springer,assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Victoria12 (Simon, “Neoliberalising violence: of the
exceptional and the exemplary in coalescing moments”, Area 44:2, Royal Geographical Society, 2012, Wiley Online)//AS
The existing relationship between neoliberalism and violence is directly related to the system of rule
that neoliberalism constructs, justifies and defends in advancing its hegemonies of ideology, of policy and
programme, of state form, of governmentality and ultimately of discourse. Neoliberalism is a context
in which the establishment, maintenance and extension of hierarchical orderings of social relations are recreated, sustained and intensified. Accordingly, neoliberalisation must be considered as an integral part of the
moment of violence in its capacity to create social divisions within the constellations of experiences that delineate
place and across the stories-so-far of space (Massey 2005). Violence has a distinctive ‘reciprocity of reinforcement’ (Iadicola and Shupe 2003,
375), where not only may inequality lead to violence, but so too may violence result in inequality . In this
light, we can regard a concern for understanding the causality of violence as being a consideration that posits where neoliberalism might make
its entry into this bolstering systematic exchange between inequality and violence. The empirical
record demonstrates a
marked increase in inequality under neoliberalism (Wade 2003), encouraging Harvey (2005) to regard this as
neoliberalism's primary substantive achievement. Yet to ask the particular question ‘does neoliberalism cause violence?’ is, upon further
reflection, somewhat irrelevant. Inequality alone is about the metrics and measuring of disparity, however qualified, while the link between
inequality and violence is typically treated as an assessment of the ‘validity’ of a causal relationship, where the link may or may not be
understood to take on multiple dimensions (including temporally, spatiality, economics, politics, culture, etc.). However,
the point is that
inequality and violence are mutually constitutive, which is precisely what Galtung (1969) had in mind
when he coined the term ‘structural violence’. Inequality begets violence, and violence produces further inequalities.
Therefore, if we want to disempower the abhorrent and alienating effects of either and rescind the
domination they both encourage, we need to drop the calculative approaches and consider violence
and inequality together as an enclosed and resonating system, that is, as a particular moment. As Hartsock
argues [t]hinking in terms of moments can allow the theorist to take account of discontinuities and incommensurabilities without losing sight of
the presence of a social system within which these features are embedded. (2006, 176) Although the enduring phenomenon of violence is riven
by tensions, vagaries and vicissitudes as part of its fundamental nature, within
the current moment of neoliberalism,
violence is all too frequently a reflection of the turbulent landscapes of globalised capitalism . Capitalism
at different moments creates particular kinds of agents who become capable of certain kinds of violence dependent upon both their distinctive
geohistorical milieu and their situation within its hierarchy. It is in this distinction that future critical inquiries could productively locate their
concerns for understanding the associations between violence and neoliberalism. By examining the contingent histories and unique
geographies that define individual neoliberalisations, geographers can begin to interpret and dissect the kaleidoscope of violence that is
intercalated within neoliberalism's broader rationality of power. It
is critically important to recognise and start working
through how the moment of violence and the moment of neoliberalism coalesce, to which I now turn my
attention.
Neoliberalism perpetuates structural violence against marginalized groups—to remain
silent is to be complicit in the abuse
Springer,assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Victoria12 (Simon, “Neoliberalising violence: of the
exceptional and the exemplary in coalescing moments”, Area 44:2, Royal Geographical Society, 2012, Wiley Online)//AS
But what is not spoken in Klein's account, nor is it foregrounded in most treatments of neoliberalism in the literature, is that neoliberalism
has gone beyond the ‘boorish’ phase of our relationship. It has
become so entrenched and comfortable in its place at the
neoliberalism has now turned abusive (Bumiller 2008). Abuse is a form of violence that
involves the mistreatment of another (an ‘Other’), leading to physical or emotional injury . It is utilised
to exclusively benefit the interests of the abuser, and is not at all about serving the interests of victims. Put differently,
abuse is related to exercising dominance, which is a course of action that explicitly jettisons any sort of
biopolitical logic concerned with cultivating life. This is precisely how neoliberalism operates in a
head of the table that
disciplinary capacity, employing a variety of regulatory, surveillance and policing mechanisms to ensure neoliberal reforms are
instituted and ‘locked in’, in spite of what the populace might desire (Gill 1995). Our silence on this unfolding violent
matrimony is what allows this abuser to become more and more sure in the application of its
domination, and increasingly brazen in the execution of what has become and overtly ‘necropolitical’
agenda (Mbembe 2003). To continue to embrace the maligned doctrine of neoliberalism and the malevolence it
unleashes is to stay the course of battery, exploitation and assault, and to abandon those most
embattled by its exclusions, and most scarred by its exceptional violence (i.e. the poor, people of
colour, the unemployed, women, the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community, ethnic
minorities, the young and old, disabled peoples, the homeless etc.) to the full fury of its wrath. Thankfully
geographers have been vocal in their calls for the indictment of neoliberal ideas (England and Ward 2007; Peck 2010; Smith et al. 2008), but
we are not yet at a point where we can declare a distinct qualitative break from the past. Even though the
legitimacy of neoliberalism has come under intensifying scrutiny since the onset of the most recent financial crisis in late 2008, and
neoliberalism may be ‘dead’ inasmuch as it has run out of politically viable ideas (Smith 2008), it
nonetheless remains ‘animated by technocratic forms of muscle memory, deep instincts of self-preservation, and
spasmodic bursts of social violence’ (Peck et al. 2010, 105). The continuing implications and exclusions of neoliberalism
should call us to action, it should provoke us to intervene and invigorate our collective strength with a
desire to make right such terrible wrongs. But beyond this imperative for compassion, a politics of affinity that never takes for
granted our shared humanity, lies the danger of complacency, the shadow of indifference and the menace of detachment among those of us
who have not yet been subjected to our homes being forcibly taken by armed bandits known as police, to our children's curiosity languishing
because a basic education is an expense we cannot shoulder, or to our spouses dying in our arms having been denied adequate health care.3
What those of us still on the winning side of neoliberalism do not account for or anticipate – and let there be no mistake that this is a system
that most assuredly creates winners and losers – is that in this abandonment of ‘Others’, we produce a relation of inclusive-exclusion. It
is
the ascendency of such neoliberal abuse that aligns it with sovereign power, a configuration that
allows us to conceptualise neoliberalism as a strategy that facilitates the very structure of ‘the ban’ in
the particular sense outlined by Agamben (1998 2005). An understanding of the functioning of this relation of the ban is imperative to undoing
the abusive moment we currently find ourselves in, precisely because it forces us to recognisethat
everyone (including myself and other
academic geographers) is implicated in the perpetuation of neoliberalised violence.
Neoliberalism imposes the slow violence of forgetting, blaming tragedies on the poor
and ignoring massive suffering
Nixon, Rachel Carson Professor of English at the University of Wisconsin-Madison 09 (Rob, “Neoliberalism, Slow Violence, and the
Environmental Picaresque”, Modern Fiction Studies 55:3, Fall 2009, MUSE)//AS
Looking back at Chernobyl, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Bhopal, Petryna laments how "many persons
who have survived these largescale technological disasters have been caught in a long-term and
vicious bureaucratic cycle in which they carry the burden of proof of Nixon 461 their physical damage while experiencing the
risk of being delegitimated in legal, welfare, and medical institutional contexts" (216). Such people,
above all the illiterate poor, are thrust into a labyrinth of self-fashioning as they seek to fit their bodily
stories tothe story lines that dangle hope of recognition, possibly, though elusively, even recompense. In so
doing, the poor face the double challenge of invisibility and amnesia: numerically they may constitute
the majority, but they remain on the margins in terms of visibility and official memory. From an environmental
perspective, this marginality is perpetuated, in part, by what Davis terms "the dialectic of ordinary disaster,"
whereby a calamity is incorporated into history and rendered forgettably ordinary precisely because
the burden of risk falls unequally on the unsheltered poor ("Los Angeles" 227). Such disasters are readily dismissed from
memory and policy planning by framing them as accidental, random, and unforeseeable acts of God, without regard for the precautionary
measures that might have prevented the catastrophe or have mitigated its effects. At
stake here is the role of neoliberal
globalization in exacerbating both uneven economic development and the uneven development of
official memory. What we witness is a kind of fatal bigotry that operates through the spatializing of time, by
offloading risk onto "backward" communities that are barely visible in the official media.
Contemporary global politics, then, must be recognized "as a struggle for crude, material dominance,
but also (threaded ever closer into that struggle) as a battle for the control over appearances" (Boal 31). That battle over
spectacle becomes especially decisive for public memory—and for the foresight with which public policy can motivate and execute
precautionary measures—when it comes to the attritional casualties claimed, as at Bhopal, by the forces of slow violence.
Neoliberalism marginalizes non-economically-useful people and legitimizes violence
against a huge swath of society
Springer,assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Victoria12 (Simon, “Neoliberalising violence: of the
exceptional and the exemplary in coalescing moments”, Area 44:2, Royal Geographical Society, 2012, Wiley Online)//AS
Like violence, neoliberalism is also notoriously difficult to define. Beyond a vision of naturalised market relations and unobstructed capital
mobility, and in spite of variance in doses among regions, states and cities, neoliberalism
typically seeks to: impede
collective initiative and public expenditure via the privatisation of common assets and the imposition of user fees; position
individualism, competitiveness and economic self-sufficiency as fundamental virtues; attenuate or nullify
all forms of social protections, welfare and transfer programmes while promoting minimalist taxation and negligible
business regulation; control inflation even at the expense of full employment; and actively push marginalised peoples into a
flexible labour-market regime of low-wage employment and precarious work (Peck and Tickell 2002). Put
bluntly, neoliberalism is a market-driven disciplinary logic (Gill 1995). Following this introduction, I begin by identifying how both violence
and neoliberalism can be considered as ‘moments’. From this shared conceptualisation of process and fluidity, I argue that
it becomes easier to recognise how neoliberalism and violence actually converge , whereby these two sets of
social relations may be considered inextricably bound. Building upon this conceived coalescence, in the following section I argue that the
hegemony of neoliberalism positions it as an abuser, which actively facilitates the abandonment of
‘Others’ who fall outside of ‘neoliberal normativity’, a conceptual category that cuts across multiple
categories of discrimination including class, race, ethnicity, gender, sex, sexuality, age and ability . I argue
that the widespread banishment of ‘Others’ under neoliberalism produces a ‘state of exception’,
wherein because of its inherently dialectic nature, exceptional violence is transformed into exemplary violence.
This metamorphosis occurs as aversion for alterity intensifies under neoliberalism and its associated violence against ‘Others’ comes to form
the rule. The purpose is to recognise that neoliberalisation – inasmuch as it claims a global domain – implicates
all of
humanity in a particular ‘moment’, a moment of abandonment wherein the social relations that
afford privilege to the few and privation to the many are the very same social relations that occasion
violence. To be clear, my approach should be read as a theoretically informed exhortation that condemns the suffering caused by
neoliberalised violence. My aim is to provide a ‘diagnosis concerning the nature of the present’ (Foucault 1983, 206) that other geographers
may employ in examining the violence that unfolds in various contexts undergoing neoliberalisation, where I hope to appeal to a common
empathy, solidarity and capacity for outrage.
War
Capitalism and war are inextricably linked—the neoliberal ideology demands constant
and predatory accumulation
Reyna, Associate researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology 99 (Stephen P., Deadly Developments: Capitalism, States
and War, Psychology Press, 1999, University of Michigan Libraries)//AS
Thomas Hobbes published Leviathan in l65l, beginning modem English discourse concerning the state. Hobbes' state consisted of the
"Soveraigne" and the "Subject" in a dominion (l968:228). I accept this Hobbesian notion of a state as a sovereign government and a subject civil
society, and my
concern in the present article is to introduce an approach that helps to explain the emergence
of the modem version of this Leviathan. So, in a sense, I tell a whale of a story, but do so using the logical approach introduced
below. The "logics" of what I call the new social anthropology. as opposed to those of mathematics, concern directions taken as a result of
complex actions, with it understood that "complexes" are groups of institutions in which force is concentrated' There
have been logics
of "capital accumulation" that move in the direction of increasing and concentrating capital force in
capitalist complexes. There have also been logics of "predatory accumulation" that move in the
direction of increasing and concentrating violent force within government complexes. Scholars have
recognized that changes internal to Atlantic European states"˜ capitalist complexes increased their capital accumulation and were influential in
the emergence of the modem state. Few scholars have contemplated any such role for predatory accumulation. and systematic analysis of the
relationships between the two logics in the making of the Leviathan has been virtually ignored. I argue in this article thata
militarycapitalist complex, based upon two mutually reinforcing logics of predatory and capital accumulation.
contributed to the formation of the modern state because the complex allowed the reciprocating
logics to produce more violent and capital force than was possible when they operated alone. 'Die military
capitalist complex. then. might be imagined as a sort of structural steroid that bulked up stately whales into Hobbes' "great Leviathan." a
creature with the forces of a "mortal God" ( l968:227) that-luckily for England-turned out by |763 to be England.
Neoliberalism’s class system pushes indigenous populations to the periphery,
stripping them of their identidy while also hurting the State’s ability to provide
education and health care. This spurs mass violence and revolutions
Parada, Professor of International Social Work and Graduate Research Seminar at Ryerson University,
6/18/2007
(Henry, “Regional Perspectives...from Latin America : Social work in Latin America History, challenges and renewal,” International Social Work
Vol 50.4, 560-64. Sage Publishing)//SG
Latin America1 has a long history of struggle for social justice and human rights. Recently, neo-liberal
ideologies and globalization have spurred numerous acts of resistance across Latin American states. The
neo-liberal agenda adopted by Latin America, also called capitalismo salvaje, or savage capitalism, has
intensified the poverty and social instability in the region and led to the further marginalization and
social exclusion of extensive populations(Renique, 2006: 37). Actions in Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina, Central America and Chile
are among such responses against the intrusion of international global capital into Latin America (Grassi and Alayon, 2005; Mendoza, 2005). In
this current context of resistance, social workers are struggling to define a role for their profession that is relevant to those with whom they
work. This is not a new challenge for the social work pro- fession in Latin America, which has struggled to find a place for itself since the first
school of social work was established in Chile in 1925.The
current situation differs, however, in the prominence of
social movements across the continent and particularly of indi- genous activists who, according to Landa
(2005: 12), ‘have raised their own voice, clearly indicating that they do not need to be repre- sented by
people outside their own communities’. This article exam- ines current attempts by the social work profession in Latin America
to shift its practice from one that works on behalf of others and thereby represents their voice, to one that works alongside others who speak
for themselves. The current context of resistanceThere
are numerous examples of the ongoing social and political
upheavals throughout Latin America against neo-liberalism and globalization. Mass mobilizations in
Peru, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecua- dor and Mexico have made it clear that the Washington Consensus has
been received with resistance(Ellner, 2006; Gindin, 2006; Mendoza, 2005; Saad-Filho, 2005a, 2005b). The indigenous
peoples, particularly from Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru have also challenged neo-liberalism.
Indigenous identity is closely related to oppression, poverty and marginalization(Nash, 2006: 126). Accordingly,indigenous people have presented a strong front against neo- liberalism, arguing that its
accompanying structural reforms have furthered their marginalization.Indigenous resistance to neo-liberal policies is
clearly seen in Bolivia’s two recent popular mobilizations, namely, the water and gas rebellions.In 2000, indigenous Bolivians
reacted to the privati- zation of water and the increase of household water bills by 200 per- cent. Then,
in October 2003, they protested against the repressive regime of Sanchez De Lozada, especially his gas
and oil policies, which provided generous benefits to foreign companies and little benefit to
Bolivians(Hylton and Thomson, 2006: 161–72). In Bolivia, a country with a population in which 62 percent claim indi- genous identity,
previous indigenous movements sought to establish alliances with unions and middle-class oppositional forces, but these relationships were
tentative and temporary due to distrust and overt racism. In contrast, the October 2003 social mobilization ‘confirmed thatBolivia
has
entered a new revolutionary cycle in which indi- genous actors have taken the leading role’ (Hylton and
Thomson, 2006: 161).Social movements, including the Bolivian rebellions, have affected the professional
identity of Latin American social workers. Indigen- ous peoples, women, workers, students and other
social groups have demanded to be part of the civil society from which they have been excluded for so
long(Conway, 2004; Renique, 2006). They are asking that social work engage in a new relationship, one which includes political listening by
academics and practitioners, as well as the development of social and political responses in the form of policies, advocacy and community
participation. Social movement participants argue that social workers should be engaged in allowing the voices of the excluded to be heard by
the privileged (Matus and Ponce de Leon, n.d.). The historical development of social work in Latin America Social work in Latin America has
gone through four important per- iods or paradigm changes. The first involved the establishment of social work as discipline with its own
knowledge, skills and prac- tices. There was a strong ‘philanthropic and moralizing . . . remedial’ tone in its practice (Aguerrebere, 2001: 22).
This form of social work emphasized individualistic interventions and reflected North American social work practices. A strong positivistic
paradigm influenced the training of social workers during this period, most of whom were educated at a technical level (Aguerrebere, 2001;
Velez, 2003). The main goal during this period was to establish a legitimate space for social work to be recognized as a discipline that was useful
to the state (Friedson, 1994). The second period was characterized by the attempt to integrate social science epistemology into social work,
using a somewhat eclectic approach. Tremendous emphasis was placed on the use of the so-called scientific method and on the development
of technical-methodological modes of social work practice. As a result, the gap between theory and practice widened. On the one hand, the
development of social science objectives and methodolo- gies required that social work adopt some of these forms of knowl- edge. On the
other hand, state institutional demands required that social work respond to different kinds of social problems, thereby creating a schism
between theory and practice (Velez, 2003). The third period, also called the re-conceptualization movement, is the most extensively studied
(Aguerrebere, 2001; Alayon, 2005; Dieguez, 2004; Grassi and Alayon, 2005; Mendoza, 2005). The re- conceptualization process was, in effect, a
political reaction to the dissatisfaction with social work as it was taught in Latin American universities, and to the kind of social work practiced
in state institu- tions (Aquin, 2005). Political events that influenced the development of this conceptual movement in Latin America included
the students’ revolt in Paris in 1968, the Cuban revolution, and certain American political actions such as the Vietnam war and the failed
attempts to invade Cuba by the Kennedy administration. Theoreti- cal influences included the theory of development, Marxism, Freire’s
concientizacio ́n proposals and the theology of liberation (Alayon, 2005). Many social workers talked of a ‘re-conceptualized . . . a cri- tical . . . a
dialectical . . . a Marxist social work practice’ (De Paula Faleiros, 2005: 57).Each
country in Latin America experienced reconceptualization differently, depending on the level to which social work had devel- oped as a
discipline. A heterogeneous movement, it responded to national political circumstances experienced by
social workers, social work academics and the general population. But they shared a strong reaction to North American
influence, not only in social work but in all socio-economic aspects of Latin American life.One consequence of reconceptualization was that social work as a discipline and as a profession was devalued, forcing many social
workers to abandon it for other forms of political action. By and large, the desire of social workers to become politically engaged with
marginalized groups resulted in a discipline that became vague and diffuse (Alayon, 2005; Araneda, 2005; Velez, 2003).The fourth period
of social work represents a response to the adoption of a neo-liberal agenda in Latin American
countries. At this time, new rules of capitalism, which affected Latin America and its relationship with
first-world countries, were introduced. These rules included the disciplining of labor and management to
benefit financial sectors, the diminishing intervention of the state in the areas of social welfare and
social services, the privatization of public companies and the strengthening of transnational corporations(Dumenil and Levy, 2005).The ensuing changes affected the capacity of the state to provide services such
as education, health care and pensions. Further, the state institutions that provided these services were the main sources of jobs
for social workers, thus leaving many of them unemployed. Those social workers who remained in the system had to transform their practices
once again. Social work was reintroduced as ‘neo-philanthropic in which intervention is not based on social rights but in an intervention based
on individual charity and moralistic values’ (Aguerrebere, 2001: 31; Velez, 2003). New managerialism as a form of practice has also become a
domi- nant discourse in Latin American national institutions. The new managerialism introduced a technocratic model, the main goal of which is
to widen the social control of social workers (Aguerrebere, 2001; Sewpaul and Holscher, 2004). Efficiency, efficacy, outcome- based measures,
market competitiveness and accountability are some of the new expectations of social workers who continue to work within the state welfare
system. As a result of the reality created by neo-liberalism and globaliza- tion, there is a need for social work to renegotiate its position through
new forms of networking and the creation of new Latin American social work organizations
Neoliberal expansion is used to justify a new kind of modern war
Roberts and Sparke, Professors of geography at the Universities of, respectively, Kentucky and Washington 03 (Susan and
Matthew, “Neoliberal Geopolitics”, Antipode 35:5, 2003, Wiley Online)//AS
Armed with their simple master narrative about the inexorable force of economic globalization,
neoliberals famously hold that the global extension of free-market reforms will ultimately bring
worldwide peace and prosperity. Like Modernity and Development before it, Globalization is thus narrated as the force that will
lift the whole world out of poverty as more and more communities are integrated into the capitalist global economy. In the most idealist
accounts, such as those of New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman (1999:xviii), the process of marketized liberalization is represented as
an almost natural phenomenon which, “like the dawn,” we can appreciate or ignore, but not presume to stop.
Observers and critics of
neoliberalism as an emergent system of global hegemony, however, insist on noting the many ways in
which states actively foster the conditions for global integration, directly or through international organizations such
as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization (Gill 1995). Under what we are identifying as neoliberal
geopolitics, there
appears to have been a new development in these patterns of state-managed
liberalization. The economic axioms of structural adjustment, fiscal austerity, and free trade have
now, it seems, been augmented by the direct use of military force. At one level, this conjunction of capitalism
and war-making is neither new nor surprising (cf Harvey 1985). Obviously, many wars—including most 19thand 20th-century
imperial wars—have been fought over fundamentally economic concerns. Likewise, one only has to read the reflections of one of America’s
“great” generals, Major General Smedley Butler, to get a powerful and resonant sense of the long history of economically inspired American
militarism. “I served in all commissioned ranks from Second Lieutenant to Major General,” Butler wrote in his retirement, [a]nd during that
period, I spent most of that time being a high-class muscle-man for Big Business, for Wall Street and for the Bankers. Neoliberal Geopolitics
887In short I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism. I suspected I was part of a racket at the time. Now I am sure of it. I helped make
Honduras “right” for American fruit companies in 1903. I helped make Mexico, especially Tampico, safe for American oil interests in 1914. I
helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central
American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. The record of racketeering is long. I helped purify Nicaragua for the international banking
house of Brown Brothers in 1909–1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American sugar interests in 1916. In China I helped to see
to it that Standard Oil went its way unmolested. (quoted in Ali 2002:260) If it was engaged in a kind of gangster capitalist interventionism at the
previous fin-de-siècle, today’s
American war-making has been undertaken in a much more open, systematic,
globally ambitious, and quasicorporate economic style. Al Capone’s approach, has, as it were, given way to the new world
order of Jack Welch.
I: VTL
The Neoliberal policies result in the loss of value of life and cultural diversity
von-Werlhof, Professor of Women’s Studies and Political Science at the University of Innsbruck,
Austria, 2008 (Claudia, “AlternativenzurneoliberalenGlobalisierung, oder: Die Globalisierung des
Neoliberalismus und seine Folgen, Wien, Picus 2007.” http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-consequencesof-globalization-and-neoliberal-policies-what-are-the-alternatives/7973)//JS
Social, cultural, traditional and ecological considerations are abandoned and give way to a mentality of
plundering. All global resources that we still have – natural resources, forests, water, genetic pools –
have turned into objects of “utilization”. Rapid ecological destruction through depletion is the
consequence.If one makes more profit by cutting down trees than by planting them, then there is no
reason not to cut them (Lietaer 2006). Neither the public nor the state interferes, despite global
warming and the obvious fact that the clearing of the few remaining rain forests will irreversibly destroy
the earth’s climate – not to even speak of the many other negative effects of such action (Raggam
2004). Climate, animal, plants, human and general ecological rights are worth nothing compared to
the interests of the corporations – no matter that the rain forest is no renewable resource and that
the entire earth’s ecosystem depends on it. If greed – and the rationalism with which it is economically
enforced – really was an inherent anthropological trait, we would have never even reached this day.
I: Feminism
Heteronormative
Neoliberal policies are distinctly heteronormative and treat women as disposable
Cornwall et. al, professor of anthropology and development in the school of global studies at the University of Sussex 08 (Andrea,
Jasmine Gideon, and Kalpana Wilson, “Introduction: Reclaiming Feminism: Gender and Neoliberalism “, IDS Bulletin 39:6, 12/08, Wiley Online
Library)//AS
The literature that emerged in the early 1990s showing the gender blindness of neoclassical
economics and the markedly negative effects of neoliberal policies on women (see, for example, Elson 1992;
Sparr 1995) has been complemented in recent years by a new wave of studies which1document some of the
perverse consequences of a swing of the pendulum as development agencies have turned their
attentions to women (see, for example, Batliwala and Dhanraj 2004). A new direction emerging in recent critical work is a
focus on the normative dimensions of development programmes, and, in particular on the implicit or
explicit heteronormativity that lies at the heart of the development industry (Bedford 2005; Griffin
2006). A number of studies highlight the extent to which the anti-poverty programmes that have arisen in part to mitigate
the effects of neoliberal economic reforms have a marked tendency to reproduce and reinforce
deeply conservative notions of womanhood and of women’s role within the family (Molyneux 2006). Others explore the
confluence of influences, including the scale of the influence exerted by neo-conservative elements within foreign and national institutions,
that have come to play a decisive role in shaping policy responses in many countries (see contributions by Bradshaw and Bedford, this IDS
Bulletin). Paradoxically, while
those in the mainstream development institutions who have championed
neoliberal economic policies have never really been able to grasp the concept of gender, they appear
to have acquired a growing interest in women. Where feminists once highlighted the systematic institutional bias against
women in economic policy, we now see institutions like the World Bank and the Department for International Development (DFID) lauding the
importance of giving women more of a role in economic development. Women
become, in the language of DFID’s glossy Gender Equality
at the Heart of Development (2007), a ‘weapon’ in the fight against poverty, as the World Bank proclaims that investing in
women entrepreneurs is ‘Smart Economics’ (Buvinic and King 2007). The scene has shifted. Women are no longer on the sidelines, or ignored
altogether. And yet
when we take a closer look at the way in which women come to be represented, it
becomes evident that what appears may be far from what feminists might have desired. Hawkesworth
evokes the tenor of the way women come to be represented in these new narratives: Women are simultaneously hailed as
resourceful providers, reliable micro-entrepreneurs, cosmopolitan citizens, and positioned as
‘disposable domestics’, the exploited global workforce, and as displaced, devalued and
disenfranchised diasporic citizens. (Hawkesworth 2006: 202)
Neoliberalism grounds economic value in masculinity—undermines feminism
Clarke, Professor of Social Policy (Social Policy and Criminology) in the Faculty of Social Sciences at The Open University 04 (John,
“Dissolving the public realm?: The logics and limits of neo-liberalism”, Journal of Social Policy 33:1, 2004,
http://oro.open.ac.uk/4377/1/download.pdf)//AS
I want to draw out some
of the different means of dissolving the public realm used by neo-liberalism (and in its
starting point must be the powerful and complex insistence on the
primacy of the private. In neo-liberal discourse, the ‘private’ means a number of inter-locking things, each of
which is naturalised by being grounded in extra-social or pre-social forms. First, it designates the market as the site of
private interests and exchange. Private interests in this sense are both those of the abstract individual (known as
‘economic man’ for good reason) and the anthropomorphised corporation, treated as if it was an individual. This
personifying of the corporation extends to its having needs, wishes, rights and even feelings. Corporations
alliances with neo-conservatism). The
are, in a sense, doubly personified – both in the persons of their heroic leaders (Chief Executive Officers) and in the corporate entity itself
(Frank, 2000). This personification enables some distinctive populist rhetorics characteristic of neo-liberalism. Both
types of individual
the burdens of taxation, the excesses of regulation, the interference
with their freedom and shackling of the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ by ‘big government’. Government/the
(economic man and the corporation) suffer
state/public institutions are challenged in the name of what Frank (2000) calls ‘market populism’. But the individualist definition of the private
is also a point of crossover between the market and the familial/domestic meaning of private. ‘Economic man’ is also ‘family man’, motivated
by the interests of himself and his family. The
individual of neo-liberalism is profoundly, normatively and
complexly gendered (Kingfisher, 2002: 23–5). Kingfisher argues that the ‘possessive individualist’ form of
personhood involves distinctive understandings of ‘independence’ and ‘self-sufficiency’: ‘Autonomy, the
pursuit of rational selfinterest and the market are mutually constitutive in this formulation...there is an equivalence between individualism and
self-sufficiency’ (2002: 18). This conception of the independent individual – detached from social relationships – is grounded in the distinction
between public and private in a different form:32 john clarke In this construction,
‘independence’ is displayed in the public
realm, while ‘dependence’ is sequestered to the private sphere ...the public, civil society generated by means of the
social contract is predicated on the simultaneous generation of a private sphere, into which is jettisoned all that which is not amenable to
contract. (2002: 24) This distinction between public and private is deeply gendered (Pateman, 1988; Lister,1997). It
has two implications for neo-liberalism. On the one hand, it is the site of potential alliances with a range of other political discourses that
sustain a gendered and familialised conception of social order (from Catholic familialism to Christian Socialism, for example). On the other, it is
a focus for tensions and conflicts around women’s dual role (articulating public and private realms in the ‘dual shift’ of
waged and unwaged labour). Welfare reform – in the US, UK and elsewhere – has been partly about the resolution of these tensions in relation
to lone motherhood (Kingfisher, 2002).
Neoliberalism relies on antiquated, heterosexist and patriarchal notions of societal
structure
Clarke, Professor of Social Policy (Social Policy and Criminology) in the Faculty of Social Sciences at The Open University 04 (John,
“Dissolving the public realm?: The logics and limits of neo-liberalism”, Journal of Social Policy 33:1, 2004,
http://oro.open.ac.uk/4377/1/download.pdf)//AS
Such changes
have involved significant – and largely invisible – transfers between the public and private
realm, including transferring costs from public resources to (typically unmeasured) household resources. This
form of privatisation assumes the existence of a stable nuclear family as the norm of household formation, and
the persistence of a gendered division of domestic/caring labour. The conception of infinitely elastic
female labour continues to underpin such privatisation, even in the face of substantial change in the patterns of women’s
paid employment. Policy makers have clung on to these beliefs with remarkable consistency despite the impact of social and economic change,
and despite
the political struggles that have challenged this complex of familial, patriarchal and
heterosexual norms. Of course, this ‘privatisation’ is not merely a process of transfer to an unchanged private space. The private
is reworked in the process – subject to processes of responsibilisation and regulation; and opened to
new forms of surveillance and scrutiny. Both corporate and state processes aim to ‘liberate’ the private – but
expect the liberated subjects to behave responsibly (as consumers, as parents, as citizen-consumers).
Whether such subjects come when they are called is a different matter.
Neoliberalism constructs gender-specific division of labor that ascribes traditional
identities based on gender and encourages patriarchy.
Wichterich, member of the scientific advisory council of Attac Germany andactive in WIDE (Women in
Development Europe),2009 (Christa, “Women peasants, food security and biodiversity in the crisis of
neoliberalism” Development Dialogue Issue 51, http://rosaluxeuropa.info/userfiles/file/DD51.pdf#page=173)//CS
Masculine and feminine roles in agriculture are constructed within the gender-specific division of labour and in the
context of the dual agricultural production system – commercial, chemical-intensive monocultures, on the one hand,
and mixed cultures geared towards local markets and self-sufficiency, on the other. Under the influence of local
regional and global market forces and in the socio-cultural allocation of gender-specific tasks
and capacities, traditional responsibilities and social ascription of masculinity and femininity are
entangled in ever-new ways and transform power relations(Krishna 2004; Rupp 2007). The Guatemalan
peasant women who design their kitchen garden like many spirals turning into each other of corn, sweet potatoes and
other vegetables are tied by a mixture of survival pragmatism, ancestor worship and natural philosophy to their land
and biodiversity. They treat both as an inheritance from their ancestors, from which they are not allowed nor want to
separate themselves through sale. The plots should remain in the clan or in the ethnic community, in order to ensure
their survival and well-being.The peasant women have had their own understanding of biodiversity
and of the seed as their own means of production ‘for centuries’. They see their work selfconsciously as value-creating activity and their knowledge as productive capacity, with the help of
which they have not only maintained the genetic stock, but have productively further developed it. Furthermore, they
have accumulated detailed knowledge of the nutritional value and healing powers of local species. Traditional
knowledge in these reproduction contexts is a constitutive element of survival spaces and a central livelihood resource
(Kuppe 2002).The women peasants therefore understand themselves as investors: they give value
to the plants and develop their productivity, which in its turn ensures that the women enjoy
esteem in the community. Their practical and strategic interest in biodiversity and in food
security often brings the women peasants into conflict with their men. Official government
agricultural advisors offer the men commercial seeds and praise the advantages and earning
possibilities of monocultures, recently above all those of organic fuel. In Burkina Faso, many peasants
followed the desire of the government and planted cotton, reducing the fields of the women, in order to have more
land available for the allegedly lucrative cotton. The women nevertheless continued to foster and care for biodiversity
in the kitchen gardens. It was precisely that which ensured their food supply when ¶ the cotton prices on the world
market fell into the basement. Peasant women in Tanzania had a similar experience. In a subversive action, they
planted banana trees and cabbage between the coffee trees, even though the government had forbidden mixed
farming on the export fields.
Expropriates Movement
Neoliberalism appropriates the feminist agenda for its own purposes while removing
their political agency
Cornwall et. al, professor of anthropology and development in the school of global studies at the University of Sussex 08 (Andrea,
Jasmine Gideon, and Kalpana Wilson, “Introduction: Reclaiming Feminism: Gender and Neoliberalism “, IDS Bulletin 39:6, 12/08, Wiley Online
Library)//AS
These challenges to feminist engagement come at a time when the wider
changes wrought by the impact of neoliberal
economic policies and ideology have taken their toll on feminist activism. Hawkesworth notes that neoliberal
policies "˜cut back the very aspects of the state that feminist activists seek to build up' (2006: 121) and were
accompanied by a gendered reconfiguration of responsibilities between dtizens and the state. Once the burden of social service
provision had been shifted decisively onto poor women and community level "˜civil society organisations', 'civil
society' itself was cast in an ever more significant role: as an all-purpose intermediary which would
simultaneously keep the state in check, make up for its shortcomings, use proximity to "˜the poor' to
help them to help themselves, and represent the masses who could not speak for themselves. As this
implies, 'civil society' has increasingly come to be regarded by development agencies and donors as a key space for intervention and control.
Donor funding for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on a massive scale has led to women's movements and
organisations in many countries undergoing a process of depoliticising 'NGOisation' (Fllvaiez 1998) - with damaging
consequences for the mobilisation of women, as Islah Jad (this IDS Bulletin) shows This has contributed to a lack
of political muscle, as once-active feminist organisations become (or are displaced by) increasingly depoliticised service providers,
reliant on contracts from the state or grants from the development industry, As the 'invited spaces' of neoliberal governmentality have come to
displace and be used to delegitimise the "˜invented spaces' (Miraftab 2004) of social mobilisation, "empowerment
has come to be
associated with individual self- improvement and donor interventions rather than collective struggle
(Sardenberg, this IDS Bulletin). Contemporary development policy narratives speak not just of women, but of the term that became a rallying
cry for southern feminists in the early 19905; 'women's empowerment'. With this has come a series of narratives about women as more
efficient and responsible that accentuate women's compliance with normative expectations. Women
appear in these narratives
as hard-pressed mothers struggling for the wellbeing and betterment of their families. Development is
presented as giving women a well- deserved chance to improve their circumstances, so as to be able to
benefit their families, communities and their nations The World Bank's Buvinic and King (2007) for example, offer a neat chain of
causalities that begins with empowering women and girls and leads to economic growth and poverty reduction. Similar stories are told in the
promotional materials of a number of agencies. Words
like 'agency' and even 'power' come to be appropriated for
this purpose (see, for example, Alsop 2005) Indeed, contributors to this IDS Bulletin highlight how, along with 'empowerment',
an entire lexicon of terms that were once associated with feminist activism have come to be laden
with the attributed meanings of development agencies. Srilatha Batliwala, author of a foundational 1994 report that
helped to put "˜women's empowerment' on the development map, reflects on how the term 'empowerment' has been eviscerated of its
original political content (Badiwala 2007). As Kalpana Wilson argues, 'agency'
has become a particularly troubling object
for neoliberal appropriation. Reduced to the exercise of individual preference - or even to the acquisition of assets, in the World
Bank's framework - 'agency' joins "˜choice' in a coupling of concepts that permits little scope for any talk about power, inequities or indeed any
structural constraints at all.
Neoliberalism strips empowerment of political meaning and imposes economic
standards of success while generalizing women’s condition
Cornwall et. al, professor of anthropology and development in the school of global studies at the University of Sussex 08 (Andrea,
Jasmine Gideon, and Kalpana Wilson, “Introduction: Reclaiming Feminism: Gender and Neoliberalism “, IDS Bulletin 39:6, 12/08, Wiley Online
Library)//AS
Neoliberal empowerment narratives not only empty ‘empowerment’ of any contentious political
content, they also make money – microcredit loans, conditional cash transfers, enhanced access to markets and livelihood assets
– the magic bullet, as if that were somehow enough to effect wholesale transformations in women’s
lives. As Charmaine Pereira, reflecting on the package of interventions promised in the Nigerian Economic Empowerment and Development
Strategy, notes: The assumption here is that a package that brings together single measures to address women’s concerns will, in and of itself,
bring about empowerment. This is
a far cry from challenging the ideologies that justify gender inequality,
changing prevailing patterns of access to and control over resources (as opposed to providing the
resources themselves), and transforming the institutions that reinforce existing power relations. [p45]
That a concern for women finds its way into national economic policies is, of course, some mark of success. Indeed one might think surely
feminists ought to be glad to see that the issues that they fought so hard to get onto the agenda are now appearing in the pronouncements of
development agencies with such regularity and apparent commitment. Yet, if we look at the shape that this success has taken, or been
translated into, a positive reading of development’s absorption of the language of ‘gender’ is harder to sustain. Josephine Ahikire talks of the
‘apparent divergence between the terms gender and feminism’ in Uganda. It
has come to be the case in many contexts that
‘gender’ has come to gain a softer, more conciliatory touch, its use a device to distance the user from
association with ‘feminism’. And when ‘gender’ is used by mainstream agencies to talk about women, as it generally is, the women
who come into view are not everywoman. Rather, the predominant representation of women is as those who lack
agency and opportunities. One of the problems, as Ahikire points out, is that the: … broad motive to highlight the
plight of women, the fact that women tend to be the worst victims of poverty, wars, disease (such as the
HIV/AIDS pandemic) unfortunately translates into a field of ‘lamentations’ that may in the end carry a
critical anti-feminist message. [p30] A consequence, Ahikire goes on to highlight, is that the language of vulnerability and
marginalisation that 4 has come to be associated with ‘gender’, runs the risk of infantilising women, lumping them together with children as
the deserving objects of intervention. It is precisely the nature of the response to the victim narrative that a number of the contributors to this
collection highlight as one of the contradictions produced by the convergence of Gender and Development and neoliberal thinking and practice.
Any vestige of a more dignified way of talking about women who are living in poverty falls away. The
stereotypical woman that these discourses evoke is always heterosexual, usually either with an
abusive or useless husband or a victim of abandonment struggling to survive as a female-headed
household. She is portrayed as abject and at the same time as eager to improve herself and her
situation if only she could be ‘empowered’.
Neoliberal policies marginalize and attempt to eliminate feminist politics—viewed as
illegitimate special interest
Teghtsoonian, Professor of Policy and Practice at the University of Victoria 03 (Katherine, “W(h)ither Women's Equality?
Neoliberalism, Institutional Change and Public Policy in British Columbia”, Policy and Society 22:1, 2003, ScienceDirect)//AS
Commentators in a number of jurisdictions have noted that governments
pursuing a neoliberal agenda have often
displayed a hostility to women’s policy agencies, which has been reflected in their transfer to more
peripheral locations within the public service, staffing and funding cuts, or outright elimination. This was
evident in Australia during the late 1990s, when the right-wing government led by John Howard eliminated a number of federal women’s policy
agencies and implemented significant cuts to the resources available to those that remained (Sawer 1999, 43-8). Similar policies have been
pursued by governments at the state level in Australia (Chappell 1995; Sawer 1999, 41), as well at the federal and provincial levels in Canada
(Burt 1997; Malloy 1999) as neoliberalism has taken root in the corridors of power. Such changes have often been carried out as part of a wider
restructuring and downsizing of the bureaucratic state. As a result, the
staff of women’s policy agencies have found that,
in addition to a reduction in the material resources available to them, their work has been made more
difficult by significant disruptions to their working relationships with staff in other government
departments. As Sawer has argued, writing in the Australian context, one result of this “increased volatility of bureaucratic structures and
the continuous change environment” is that “it is difficult to sustain the structures needed for long-term projects
such as improving the status of women, and there is a continuing loss of corporate memory. ... [In
addition], there is a devaluing of process, including the information sharing that has been central to
feminist work” (Sawer 1999, 42). The demotion or elimination of women’s policy agencies reflects that element within
neoliberalism that frames feminist and other identity-based forms of politics undertaken by
marginalized groups, as the illegitimate and unrepresentative expression of “special interests”. This
formulation contrasts these interests and the groups articulating them, presented as particularistic and self-serving, with the interests and
policy preferences of gender-neutral “ordinary citizens” and “consumers”, understood to be expressive of a broader public interest (Brodie
1995). In this discursive
framework, which was particularly30 - Katherine Teghtsoonian prominent in Canada during the 1990s, the
activities – indeed, the very existence – of women’s policy agencies seem suspect.
Domestic Violence
Neoliberal policies reentrench heterosexist structures and prevent aid for domestic
violence victims
Cornwall et. al, professor of anthropology and development in the school of global studies at the University of Sussex 08 (Andrea,
Jasmine Gideon, and Kalpana Wilson, “Introduction: Reclaiming Feminism: Gender and Neoliberalism “, IDS Bulletin 39:6, 12/08, Wiley Online
Library)//AS
While neoliberalism may be archetypically associated with the individual as atomistic rational agent, its roots
lie in liberal
theory, which has always excluded women from this notion of individuality. So perhaps we should not be
surprised if, as several of the contributions to this IDS Bulletin demonstrate, neoliberalism subsumes women into an image
of the protective mother who will translate any gains from the market into the means for household
survival, and will be prepared to make unlimited personal sacrifices to provide the household with a
safety net against the ravages of neoliberal macroeconomic policies. Ideologically, this works to re-embed
women within familial relations. As a result, the family becomes a key site for the exercise of neoliberal
governmentality. Sarah Bradshaw and Kate Bedford (this IDS Bulletin) draw attention to the extent to which Latin American
social policies both presuppose and reinforce a model of the family that has the heterosexual couple
at its heart. Bradshaw shows how contemporary social protection programmes divert attention away from
the female householdhead to the nuclear family. Bedford, focusing on a World Bank-funded family strengthening
programme in Argentina, explores the extent to which programmes like these are reinscribing and renaturalising a
particular form of heterosexual IDS Bulletin Volume 39 Number 6 December 2008 5intimate and familial relations. ‘Good
mothers’ come to be coupled with ‘responsible men’ as ‘partners’, as the state retreats further from supportive
social provision. Bedford shows the defining role that was played by the bank in the programme, naturalising private provision of care within
the family as ‘an efficient and empowering way to resolve tensions between paid and unpaid labour’. The
net result, she contends,
is reduced policy space for domestic violence, greater policy openings for conservative religious
organisations concerned with ‘the family’ and difficulties arguing for social provision outside the family, such as
institutionalised childcare. She highlights the ironies of the extent to which an articulation of the problem that seemed to address long-standing
feminist concerns led to a solution that few feminists might agree with: After all, many feminists wanted men to stop shirking domestic work
and International Financial Institutions to take care seriously. However we did not necessarily want childcare erased as a policy priority,
replaced by more shared (but still privatised) caring labour within couples ... [or] poor men held responsible for women’s poverty. [p64–5]
Neoliberalism overtakes feminist movements and prevents access to aid for victims of
domestic violence
Bumiller, Professor of Political Science and Women's and Gender Studies at Amherst College 08 (Kristin, “In an Abusive State: How
Neoliberalism Appropriated the Feminist Movement against Sexual Violence”, Duke Univeristy Press, 4/25/08,
http://books.google.com/books/about/In_an_Abusive_State.html?id=6m3GzvoBWYkC)//AS
By the late 19705, the
tenets of neoliberalism began to influence American public policy at home and abroad.
firstterm as president marks the shift to neoliberal principles of governance which are
associated with less restraint on free-market policies, pro-corporatism, privatization, and in particular, the transfer of
public services to private organizations. This shift significantly affected the already established feminist
anti-violence movement in its attempts to reform the criminal justice programs and build up victim
services. The call for state responsibility for preventing and treating victims was in direct contrast to
the new ethics of personal responsibility that was the cornerstone of the neoliberal agenda. This
contradiction was resolved, but the cost was the incorporation of the feminist anti violence movement into the
apparatus of the regulatory state. For example, the rationale for providing services for women was transformed by the neoliberal
Ronald Reagan's
agenda." The organizers ofthe shelter movement saw the necessity of encouraging women to take advantage of available government benefits,
but only as a temporary means to provide for their children. Importantly, seeking
government help was part ofa growing
recognition both within shelter organizations and in the feminist movement more generally of the
fundamental insecurity of marriage as an institution. Now, in many battered women's shelters women
are required to apply for all appropriate state benefits as part ofa process of showing that they are taking all necessary
steps to gain self-suH'iciency. These requirements entangle women in an increasingly value-laden welfare
program tied to the promotion of the traditional nuclear family, fear of dependency, and distrust of women as
mothers."• These ties, moreover, come with fewer benefits as the "de volution" of welfare systems has brought about cutbacks in services and
rescaling to the local level. "' At the same time, the welfare system has become more linked to other forms of state involvement, in~ cluding
probate court actions concerning custody, paternity hearings, child protective serwdces, and relationships with school officials. As a result,
when women seek help from shelters, it now produces an inevitable dependency on the state.
Ignores Identity Politics
Neoliberlaism simultaneously ignores and exacerbates women’s oppression and
removes the consideration of gender in politics
Teghtsoonian, Professor of Policy and Practice at the University of Victoria 03 (Katherine, “W(h)ither Women's Equality?
Neoliberalism, Institutional Change and Public Policy in British Columbia”, Policy and Society 22:1, 2003, ScienceDirect)//AS
But the
consequences of neoliberal resistance to understanding gender as a relevant and legitimate
dimension of politics extend far beyond the terrain of the state. Feminist scholars and activists alike have noted the
debilitating impact that the policy agenda flowing from neoliberal orientations has had for diverse
groups of women in a number of countries in the industrialized west, including Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the United States
(Brodie 1995; Bunkle 1995; Hancock 1999; Kingfisher 2002). Women’s economic and social well-being has been
undermined by significant reductions in the supports available to women who experience a variety of
barriers to participation in the paid labour force (including caregiving responsibilities, disability, and
racism); cuts to funding for community-based organizations advocating for, and providing services to, women; and an exponential increase in
unpaid caregiving work, as services are cut back and women take up the slack in their families and communities. And yet the gendered
impacts of key features of the neoliberal program are erased within neoliberal discourse. As Janine Brodie
has argued, the elements of neoliberalism “act simultaneously to intensify gender inequality and to
erode the political relevance of gender” (Brodie 2002, 99). It is important to note that the emergence of neoliberalism as a logic
informing government priorities has not waited on, or required, the electoral victory of parties of the right. In many cases, neoliberal impulses
have been reflected in the policies pursued by (ostensibly) social democratic administrations, coexisting uneasily with more progressive policy
directions (Hancock 1999). Certainly a tension between neoliberal and social justice commitments was visible in the governing agenda of the
left-of-centre New Democratic Party (NDP), in office in British Columbia during the 1990s (Teghtsoonian 2000), and was particularly
pronounced under the Fourth Labour Government in New Zealand between 1984 and 1990 (Larner 1996). Attending to these internal
complexities within government programs assists us in identifying important threads of continuity, as well as disjunctures, when the partisan
composition of government changes. Neoliberal continuities across the left-right divide are discernible not just in the content of particular
policies, but in the more general “strategies of rule” that neoliberalism prescribes (Larner 1996; 2000).W(h)ither Women’s Equality? - 31
Nikolas Rose (1996, 1999) argues that, rather
than trying to exert direct control over service providers and
agencies, governments deploying neoliberal strategies of rule govern indirectly, “at a distance”. Various
“technologies” of accountability, audit and budgetary discipline that are mobilized by government exert a
significant constraining influence on the decisions and self-understandings of organizations outside of
government, even as these appear to be autonomous agencies, free to define their organizational structures, priorities
and modes of working. Although Rose is interested primarily in understanding the network of relationships between government and the
panoply of agencies and organizations outside of it, we can observe many of the “technologies” that he identifies also being deployed within
government itself, accumulating over time under the aegis of governments of both the left and the right. As with other elements of
neoliberalism, there is an important gendered dimension to these strategies of rule which will be explored in the discussion below.
Neoliberal policies ignore women’s concerns—especially when they intersect with
other identity groups
Teghtsoonian, Professor of Policy and Practice at the University of Victoria 03 (Katherine, “W(h)ither Women's Equality?
Neoliberalism, Institutional Change and Public Policy in British Columbia”, Policy and Society 22:1, 2003, ScienceDirect)//AS
This failure to address the intersections among multiple dimensions of marginalization in women’s
lives arguably reflects the neoliberal antipathy to identity-based politics discussed earlier. We see this
orientation embedded in the Liberal Party’s approach to the value of “equality” as outlined in the “New Era” documents it produced prior to
the 2001 election indicating the directions that it planned to pursue if returned to office. Thus, in “A New Era of Equality” (the second-to-last of
thirty-three pages) the Liberals prioritized the need to get “a fair shake” for the province of British Columbia within the Canadian federal system
and to attend more carefully to the interests of “rural British Columbians”, rather than the interests of identitybased groups. These
latter
were delegitimized in the following terms:The NDP have ... treated equality issues as so-called ‘wedge
issues’, using women, aboriginals, seniors, gays and lesbians, multicultural groups and others as
political pawns to try to gain partisan advantage. That’s no way to build our future. We must start treating all citizens fairly,
equally, and with respect, regardless of where they live or who they are. A BC Liberal Government will be guided by the principle of equality. ...
Equality of opportunity, responsibility and rights is what our Constitution guarantees. And all British Columbians are entitled to no less. (BC
Liberals 2001, 32) With the exception of the promise to “ensure that all aboriginal governments have the same legal status in BC as they do in
every other province” (intended to minimize, rather than enhance, that status), the twelve commitments presented as avenues to “A New Era
of Equality” discuss plans for “British Columbians”, “Canadians”, “rural communities”, and “local government” – conceptual containers which
render invisible the specific interests of identity-based groups, including (multiply-marginalized) women.6 The transformation of Women’s
Equality into Women’s Services and Social Programs has been accompanied by a number of shifts in the unit’s responsibilities and priorities.
One of the most noticeable of these has been the return of responsibility for support for child care services, which had been transferred from
Women’s Equality to the Ministry for Children and Families in 1997. The return of child care services to the branch might appear to be a
positive move for women: the significant increase in the women’s policy agency budget resulting from this transfer could enhance its “clout”
within government. Further, the reintegration of child care services into a bureaucratic context charged with gender analysis might auger well
for ongoing sensitivity in policy decisions to women’s particular interest in access to affordable, quality child care for their children. And yet this
is not how events have unfolded. Instead, the Liberal government moved quickly to undo progressive changes to child care policy that had been
adopted by the previous administration. For example, it repealed the NDP’s Child Care Services Act, which went into effect on January 1, 2001
and was providing funding that reduced the cost to parents of after-school child care from $12 to $7 per day per child up to the age of twelve
years. In addition to the material benefit to families that this policy entailed (estimated by the government at $1,100 per child annually for the
average family), it was intended by the NDP government as one component of an on-going process of reframing access to quality, affordable
child care as a universal service, rather than as a meanstested benefit. By contrast, the Liberals
have insisted that government
subsidies should be restricted to those who are most in need; in their view, as Lynn Stephens has argued, reduced
government spending on child care is necessary in order to make the system “more affordable for taxpayers”.7 As a further contribution to this
latter goal, the funding provided by Women’s Services and Social Programs for the forty-seven child care resource and referral agencies
throughout the province will be cut to zero effective March 2004.8 Women’s Services will continue to fund and administer transition and
second-stage houses, to support related services for women and their children who are fleeing families in which they have been the targets of
violence by intimate partners, and to fund anti-violence projects more generally. However, the thirty-seven community-based Women’s
Centres, which provide a range of information, referral and advocacy services to women throughout the province, have suffered a very
different fate. The funding they receive from Women’s Services – which amounted to $1.9 million during the final year of the NDP
administration – is to be eliminated entirely as of 31 March 2004. In addition, the $4.7 million provided by the Ministry of Women’s Equality
under the previous government to support the province’s innovative bridging programs, designed to facilitate a transition to employment for
women who have experienced violence, will also be eliminated at the conclusion of the 2003/04 fiscal year (MWE 2001a, 15; CAWS 2002a, 12).
The elimination of these expenditures from the Women’s Services’ budget have been accompanied by deep and wide-ranging cuts to programs
and community-based organizations funded through other government departments.9 These cutbacks,
which have impeded girls
and women’s access to health services, education, housing, disability supports, social assistance
benefits, and legal and advocacy services, have been driven by the legislated requirement that the
provincial government bring in a balanced budget in fiscal year 2004/05 and subsequently. Their magnitude reflects
the need to compensate for sizable tax cuts that the Liberal government announced immediately after the 2001 election, and
which have delivered the greatest benefits to the most well-off individuals in the province (Lee 2001). with higher
incomes may benefit from the tax cuts, but most women in the province are paying a significant price one way or
another for the policy package as a whole. And, far from having an advocate for their interests within government, they have a
Minister of State for Women’s Equality who has indicated that “I agree with everything our government does”.10
Terminal Impact: Fem
Feminist movements are essential for peace—patriarchal institutions are a root cause
of war
Cockburn, feminist researcher and writer, is Honorary Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Warwick, 10
(Cynthia, “Gender Relations as Causal in Militarization and War”, International Feminist Journal of Politics 12:2, 2010, Taylor and Francis)//AS
Based on empirical research among women's antiwar organizations worldwide, the article derives a feminist
oppositional standpoint on militarization and war. From this standpoint, patriarchal gender relations are
seen to be intersectional with economic and ethno-national power relations in perpetuating a
tendency to armed conflict in human societies. The feminism generated in antiwar activism tends to be holistic, and
understands gender in patriarchy as a relation of power underpinned by coercion and violence. The
cultural features of militarization and war readily perceived by women positioned in or close to armed conflict, and their sense of war as
systemic and as a continuum, make its gendered nature visible. There are implications in this perspective for antiwar movements. If gender
relations are one of the root causes of war, a feminist programme of gender transformation is a necessary
component of the pursuit of peace.
Patriarchal institutions cause war—feminist movements are integral in peace-empirics
Cockburn, feminist researcher and writer, is Honorary Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Warwick, 10
(Cynthia, “Gender Relations as Causal in Militarization and War”, International Feminist Journal of Politics 12:2, 2010, Taylor and Francis)//AS
In many countries and regions around the world, women
are organizing inwomen-only groups and networks to oppose militarism and
prevent wars or bring wars to an end, to achieve justice and sustainablepeace. From early in 2005 I carried
out two years’ fulltime empirical researchinvestigating the constitution and objectives, the analyses
and strategies ofsuch organizations.2The research involved 80,000 miles of travel to twelvecountries on four continents, and
militarization,to
resulted in case studies of ten countrybased groups, fourteen branches of Women in Black in five countries andthree other transnational
networks – the Women’s International League forPeace and Freedom, Code Pink and the Women’s Network against Militarism.Yet this was
only a slender sample of the movement of movements that iswomen’s engaged opposition to militarization and war in the
contemporaryworld.In this article I summarize or encapsulate the unique feminist analysis of warthat women seemed to me to be evolving
from their location close to armedconflict combined with their positionality as women, and the activism towhich they had been provoked. I
draw out here only the boldest of itsthemes, the ‘strong case’ on gender and war. It is that patriarchal
genderrelations
predispose our societies to war. They are a driving force perpetuatingwar. They are among the causes
of war. This is not, of course, to say that genderis the only dimension of power implicated in war. It is
not to diminish thecommonly understood importance of economic factors (particularly an
everexpansive capitalism) and antagonisms between ethnic communities, statesand blocs (particularly the institution of the nationstate) as causes of war.Women antiwar activists bring gender relations into the picture not as analternative
but as an intrinsic, interwoven, inescapable part of the very samestory.
Patriarchal hierarchies must be resisted—cause war and violence
Tickner, distinguished scholar in residence atthe Schoolof International Services at American University92 (J. Ann, “Gender in
International Relations Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security”, Columbia University Press, 1992,
http://www.ces.uc.pt/ficheiros2/files/Short.pdf)//AS
Masculinity and politics have a long and close association. Characteristics associated with "manliness," such as toughness, courage, power,
independence, and even physical strength, have, throughout history, been those most valued in the conduct of politics, particularly
international politics. Frequently, manliness
has also been associated with violence and the use of force, a type
of behavior that, when conducted in the international arena, has been valorized and applauded in the
name of defending one's country. This celebration of male power, particularly the glorification of the male warrior,
produces more of a gender dichotomy than exists in reality for, as R. W. Connell points out, this stereotypical image of
masculinity does not fit most men. Connell suggests that what he calls "hegemonic masculinity," a type of culturally dominant
masculinity that he distinguishes from other subordinated masculinities, is
a socially constructed cultural ideal that, while it
patriarchal authority and legitimizes a
patriarchal political and social order. Hegemonic masculinity is sustained through its opposition to
various subordinated and devalued masculinities, such as homosexuality, and, more important, through its relation to
various devalued femininities. Socially constructed gender differences are based on socially sanctioned, unequal relationships between
does not correspond to the actual personality of the majority of men, sustains
men and women that reinforce compliance with men's stated superiority. Nowhere in the public realm are these stereotypical gender images
more apparent than in the realm of international politics, where the characteristics associated with hegemonic masculinity are projected onto
the behavior of states whose success as international actors is measured in terms of their power capabilities and capacity for self-help and
autonomy.
I: Biopower
With the increasing “pastoral” hegemony of the private sector, companies now
permeate economy, social and political institutions, public opinions, and the state
Ugalde, Ph.D in Political Science at National Autonomous University of Mexico, 1996
(Francisco Valdés, “The Private Sector and Political Regime Change in Mexico,” NEOLIBERALISM REVISITED – Economic Restructuring and
Mexico's Political Future, edited by Gerardo Otero, Westview Press, pg 139-40)//SG
Furtherinsight
into the civic strategy may be gained by applying Michel Foucault's concept of "pastoral
power" (Rouse, 1988; Foucault, 1983).Foucault used this notion to account forthe ideologicalcoherence between
theorgani- zation of adominant ideology and the -obedience paid by individualsto the so- cial and political order. The
concept of pastoral powerdeparts from the classical definition of ideology in modern times, in that the latterhas focused on
ideology's role in ordering the public spaceas opposed to its effects within the intimate sphere of individual subjectivity.The
original locus of pastoral power, in Foucault's view, was institutionalized Christianity: the central role of the
pastor and pastoral ritual in the Catholic Church. But despite the decline of ecclesiastical authority after the seventeenth
century,the function of the pastoral has endured as an "individualizing" power. Political rule in the modern
world, according to Foucault, is founded not only in the control of the "pub- lic:' conceived as distinct and separate from the "private,"
butin the very con- stitution of authority within the individual.This involved the process of secularization:The
religious hope of salvation was transmuted, throughthe mediation ofpastoral power, intosecularassurance of
the individual'sbiolog- ical life—health, welfare, social security. Instead of the church and the priest,multiple
institutions take over this function—the family, medicine, psychiatry, education, entrepreneurs, the
mass media.Since independence, Mexico has experienced two major epochs inthe orga- nization ofpastoral power.
During the first,such power was still exercised by the Catholic Church. After the liberal reformof the midnineteenth
century, the church'spastoral role was taken over by the state. This transition was consoli- datedafter the
revolution, when cultural rule was secularized through public education and health and the PRI's corporatist system.
Very recently, however, a third epoch appears to have been inaugurated, as theideological institutions and mechanisms
used by thestate were rendered increasingly obsolete and pri- vate communicationsfirms and organizations
became hegemonic in the cul- tural sphere. The advent of this last period signaled the final crisis and ruptureof the pact
between the state and the masses that had characterized the regime from the days of Lázaro Cárdenas's government until 1982.Throughthis
new "apparatus of private hegemony:' thesymbolicintegration of Mexican society is being shifted from the
pastoral power of the state toward the more modern, individualistic, and exclusionary pastoral power of
the pri- vate sector. Multiple social and political associations, clubs, mass media, show businesses, and other institutions compose this
apparatus. Despite pretensions of modernity and individualism, such pastoral power presides over a flock that is by no means constituted solely
of businesspeople. On the contrary, it in- cludes many other groups, but its ideological coloration is clearly probusiness.The
political
dynamic of the private sector is thus no longer limited to the economic sphere and the mere
representation of interests. It now involves a, growing concern for and participation in the dynamics of
society as a whole, including the economy, social and political organizations, public opinion, and the
state.
Neoliberalism’s seductive pedagogy necessitates the creation of a biopolitics,
conditioning society’s thoughts and rationalities
Giroux, Ph.D. @ Carnegie-Mellon University, Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster
University in the English and Cultural Studies Department, 2008
(Henry A., “Beyond the biopolitics of disposability: rethinking neoliberalism in the New Gilded Age,”
Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture, Vol. 14.5, pp 591)//SG
As the axis of all social interaction,neoliberal rationality
expands far beyond the operations of the corporate state,
the production of goods, and the legislating of laws(Carcamo-Huechante, 2006, p. 414). As a seductive mode of public
pedagogy,neoliber- alism extends and disseminates the logic of the market economy throughout society,
shaping not only social relations, institutions, and policies but also desires, values, and identities in the
interest of prescribing ‘the citizen-subject of a neoliberal order’ (Brown, 2005, p. 42). Under neoliberal rationality
and its pedagogical practices not only are the state and the public sector reduced to the phantom of market choices, but the citizensubjects of such an order navigate the relationship between themselves and others around the
calculating logics of competition, individual risks, self-interest, and a winner-take-all survivalist ethic
reminiscent of the social Darwinian script played out daily on ‘reality television’. Moreover, the survivalist ethic of
nineteenth-century social Darwinism has been invoked to reinforce notions of racial hierarchy and the current neoliberal agenda has systematically sought to recreate racial segregation and exclusion through the
restructuring of income policies.Neoliberalism also connects power and knowledge to the technologies,
strategies, tactics, and pedagogical practices key to the management and ordering of populations and to
controlling consent. Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality is crucial for understanding not only how modes of thought,
rationality, and persuasion are linked to technologies of governing but also how any analytic of government must consider the ways power
‘the conditions of consensus or the prerequisites of acceptance’(Lemke, 2002, p. 52). As Thomas Lemke
neoliberal modes of governmentality are important for developing the connection
‘between technologies of the self and technologies of domination, the constitution of the subject and
the formation of the state’(p. 50).5 As a powerful mode of public pedagogy,neoliberal ideology is located, produced,
and disseminated from many institutional and cultural sites ranging from the shrill noise of largely
conservative talk radio to the halls of academia and the screen culture of popular media(Giroux, 2008).
works to create
(2002) has pointed out,
Mobilizing modes of official knowledge, mass mediated desires, and strategies of power, these sites provide an indispensable political service in
coupling ‘technologies of the self and [neoliberal] political rationalities’ as part of a broader effort to transform politics, restructure power
relations, and produce an array of narratives and disciplinary measures (Lemke, 2005, p. 12).As
neoliberalism extends into all
aspects of daily life, the boundaries of the cultural, economic, and political become porous and leak into
each other, sharing the task, though in different ways, of producing identities, goods, knowledge, modes
of communication, affective investments, and many other aspects of social life and the social
order(Foucault, 2003; Rose, 2007).
Neoliberalism produces a new biopolitics based upon the practicality of populations
necessitating constant war. A politics of disposability reduces all nonviable
populations into a state of bare life
Giroux, Ph.D. @ Carnegie-Mellon University, Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster
University in the English and Cultural Studies Department, 2008
(Henry A., “Beyond the biopolitics of disposability: rethinking neoliberalism in the New Gilded Age,”
Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture, Vol. 14.5, pp 599-603)//SG
The mutually determining forces of every deepening inequality and an emerging repressive state apparatus have
become the defining features of neoliberalism at the beginning of the new millennium. Wealth is now redistributed
upwards to produce record high levels of inequality, and corporate power is simultaneously consolidated at a
speed that threatens to erase the most critical gains made over the last fifty years to curb the anti-democratic power
of corporations. Draconian policies aimed at hollowing out the social state are now matched by an increase in repressive legislation to
curb the unrest that might explode among those populations falling into the despair and suffering
unleashed by a ‘savage, fanatical capitalism’ that now constitutes the neoliberal war against the public
good, the welfare state, and ‘social citizenship’ (Davis & Monk, 2007, p. ix). Privatization, commodification, corporate
mergers, and asset stripping go hand in hand with the curbing of civil liberties, the increasing
criminalization of social problems, and the fashioning of the prison as the preeminent space of racial
containment (one in nine black males between the ages of 20 and 34 are incarcerated) (Associated Press, 2008). The alleged morality of
market freedom is now secured through the ongoing immorality of a militarized state that embraces torture, war, and violence as legitimate
functions of political sovereignty and the ordering of daily life. As
the rich get richer, corporations become more
powerful, and the reach of the punishing state extends itself further, those forces and public spheres that once provided
a modicum of protection for workers, the poor, sick, aged, and young are undermined, leaving large
numbers of people impoverished and with little hope for the future. David Harvey (2005) refers to this primary
feature of neoliberalism as ‘accumulation by dispossession’, which he enumerates as all of those processes such
as the privatization and commodification of public assets, deregulation of the financial sector, and the
use of the state to direct the flow of wealth upward through, among other practices, tax policies that
favor the rich and cut back the social wage (p. 7). As Harvey (2005) points out, ‘All of these processes amount to
the transfer of assets from the public and popular realms to the private and class privileged domains’, and
the overwhelming of political institutions by powerful corporations that keep them in check (p. 161). Zygmunt Bauman (2007) goes further and
argues that not
only does capitalism draw its life blood from the relentless process of asset stripping, but it
produces ‘the acute crisis of the ‘‘human waste’’ disposal industry, as each new outpost conquered by capitalist
markets adds new thousands or millions to the mass of men and women already deprived of their lands,
workshops, and communal safety nets’ (p. 28). The upshot of such policies is that larger segments of the population are now struggling under
the burden of massive debts, unemployment, lack of adequate health care, and a brooding sense of hopelessness. What
is unique
about this type of neoliberal market fundamentalism is not merely the anti- democratic notion that the
market should be the guide for all human actions, but also the sheer hatred for any form of sovereignty
in which the government could promote the general welfare. As Thom Hartmann (2005) points out, governance
under the regime of neoliberalism has given way to punishment as one of the central features of politics.
He describes the policies endorsed by neoliberals as follows: Government should punish, they agree, but it should never
nurture, protect, or defend individuals. Nurturing and protecting, they suggest, is the more appropriate role of religious
institutions, private charities, families, and � perhaps most important � corporations. Let the corporations handle your old-age
pension. Let the corporations decide how much protection we and our environment need from their
toxins. Let the corporations decide what we’re paid. Let the corporations decide what doctor we can
see, when, and for what purpose. But the punishing state does more than substitute charity and private aid for governmentbacked social provisions, or criminalize a range of existing social problems; it also cultivates a culture of fear and suspicion
towards all those others � immigrants, refugees, Muslims, youth, minorities of class and color, and the
elderly � who in the absence of dense social networks and social supports fall prey to unprecedented
levels of displaced resentment from the media, public scorn for their vulnerability, and increased
criminalization because they are both considered dangerous and unfit for integration into American
society. Coupled with this rewriting of the obligations of sovereign state power and the transfer of sovereignty to the market is a widely
endorsed assumption that regardless of the suffering, misery, and problems faced by human beings, they ultimately are not only responsible
for their fate but are reduced to relying on their own sense of survival. There is more at stake here than the vengeful return of an older colonial
fantasy that regarded the natives as less than human, or the emerging figure of the disposable worker as a prototypical figure of the neoliberal
order � though the histories of racist exclusion inform the withdrawal of moral and ethical concerns from these populations.10 There
is
also the unleashing of a powerfully regressive symbolic and corporeal violence against all those
individuals and groups who have been ‘othered’ because their very presence undermines the engines of
wealth and inequality that drive the neoliberal dreams of consumption, power, and profitability. What is distinct about these complex
registers of sovereignty is the emergence of a fundamentally new mode of politics in which state power not
only takes on a different register but in many ways has been modified by the sovereignty of the market.
While the state still has the power of the law to reduce individuals to impoverishment and to strip them of civic rights, due process, and civil
liberties, neoliberalism
increasingly wields its own form of sovereignty through the invisible hand of the
market, which now has the power to produce new configurations of control, regulate social health, and alter human life in new and profound
ways. This shift in sovereignty, power, and the political order points to the importance of biopolitics as an
attempt to think through not only how politics uses power to mediate the convergence of life and death,
but also how sovereign power proliferates those conditions in which individuals marginalized by race,
class, and gender configurations are ‘stripped of political significance and exposed to murderous violence’ (Ziarek, 2008, p. 90). The
notion that biopolitics marks a specific moment in the development of political modernity has been taken up in great detail by Michel Foucault
(1990; 2003). Foucault argues that since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with emerging concerns for the health, habitation, welfare,
and living conditions of populations, the
economy of power is no longer primarily about the threat of taking life, or
exercising a mode of sovereign power ‘mainly as a means of deduction � the seizing of things, time, bodies, and
ultimately the seizing of life itself’ (Ojakangas, 2005, pp. 5�6). For Foucault, biopolitics points to new relations of sovereignty
and power that are more capacious, concerned not only with the body as an object of disciplinary techniques that render it
‘both useful and docile’ but also with a body that needs to be ‘regularized’ (2003, p. 249), subject to corrective
mechanisms and immaterial means of production that exert ‘a positive influence on life, endeavour[ing] to administer,
optimize, and multiply it’ (1990, p. 137). For Foucault, power is no longer exclusively embodied in the state or its formal
repressive apparatuses and legal regulations (Lemke, 2005, p. 11). Instead, power also circulates outside of the
realm of the state and the constraints of a juridico-discursive concept � through a wide variety of political
technologies and modes of subjectification, produced through what Foucault calls governmentality or the pedagogical ‘tactics .
. . which make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus
the private, and so on’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 103). In this instance, biopolitics
does not collapse into sovereign power, just as
matters of consent and persuasion cannot be reduced to the disciplining of the body. As the boundary between
politics and life becomes blurred, human beings and the social forms and living processes through which they live, speak, act, and relate to each
other move to the center of politics, just as the latter processes and relationships become the center of new political struggles. Biopolitics
thus marks a shift in the workings of both sovereignty and power as made clear by Foucault for whom
biopolitics replaces the power to dispense fear and death with that of a power to foster life � or disallow
it to the point of death. . . . [Biopolitics] is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing
the living in the domain of value and utility. Its task is to take charge of life that needs a continuous regulatory and corrective mechanism.
(Ojakangas, 2005, p. 6) As Foucault (2003) insists, the logic
of biopolitics is largely productive, though it exercises what
he calls a death function when the state ‘is obliged to use race, the elimination of races, and the
purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power’ (p. 255). Neoliberalism as a mode of biopolitics not
only expands the sites, range, and dynamics of power relations, it also points to new modes of subjectification in which
various technologies connecting the self and diverse modes of domination (Lemke, 2002, p. 50), far removed from
the central power of the state, play a primary role in producing forms of consent, shaping conduct, and constituting ‘people in such ways that
they can be governed’ (Lemke, 2005, p. 3). According to Judith Butler (2004), as a mode of governmentality, biopolitics: is broadly understood
as a mode of power concerned with the maintenance and control of bodies and persons, the production and regulation of persons and
populations, and the circulation of goods insofar as they maintain and restrict the life of the population. . . . Marked by a diffuse set of
strategies and tactics, governmentality gains its meaning and purpose from no single source, no unified sovereign subject. Rather, the tactics
characteristic of governmentality operate diffusely, to dispose and order populations, and to produce and reproduce subjects, their practices
and belief, in relation to specific policy aims. Foucault maintained, boldly, that ‘the problems of governmentality and the techniques of
government have become the only political issues, the only real space for political struggle and contestation’. (p. 52) Foucault believed that
the connection between life and politics was the decisive moment of modernity, associated with but not
limited to state power, and concerned more with ordering, regulating, and producing life. Against Foucault,
Giorgio Agamben (1998) argues that biopolitics is the founding moment of politics and dates back to the
birth of sovereignty itself, while at the same time acknowledging that biopolitics ‘constitutes the decisive event of modernity and
signals a radical transformation of the political-philosophical categories of classical thought’ (p. 4). According to Agamben, biopolitics in
the current historical moment exhibits a more forceful and dangerous register of how power seizes life,
targeting it as something to strategically order, control, and possibly discard. In this view, biopolitics is
more ominous than Foucault suggests, taking on a more narrow and menacing guise in the new millennium.11 The secret
foundation of sovereignty, the state of exception and its logic of exclusion and reduction of human beings to ‘bare life’, has moved from the
margin to the center of political life. According to Agamben (2002, 2003), state power as
a mode of biopolitics is
irreparably tied to the forces of death, abandonment, and the production of ‘bare life’, whose ultimate
incarnation is the Holocaust with its ominous specter of the concentration camp. In this formulation, the Nazi
death camps become the primary exemplar of control, the new space of contemporary politics in which individuals are no longer viewed as
residents or citizens but are now seen as inmates, stripped of everything, including their right to live.12 The
camp now becomes ‘the
hidden matrix of politics’ (Agamben, 1998, p. 166), understood less as a historical fact than as a prototype for those spaces that
produce ‘bare life’. As Agamben (1998) puts it, ‘The camp is the space that is opened when the state of exception
begins to become the rule’ (pp. 168�69). The uniting of sovereign power and bare life, the reduction of the individual to homo sacer �
the sacred man who under certain states of exception ‘may be killed and yet not sacrificed’ � no longer
represents the far end of political life (Agamben, 1998, p. 8). For Agamben (1998), ‘Today it is not the city but rather
the camp that is the fundamental bio- political paradigm of the West’ (p. 181). In this updated version of the ancient
category of homo sacer, it is the human who stands beyond the confines of both human and divine law � ‘a
human who can be killed without fear of punishment’ (Bauman, 2003, p. 133). As modern states increasingly suspend their democratic
structures, laws, and principles, the
very nature of governance changes as ‘the rule of law is routinely displaced
by the state of exception, or emergency, and people are increasingly subject to extra-judicial state
violence’ (Bull, 2004, p. 3). The life unfit for life, unworthy of being lived is no longer marginal to sovereign power but is now fundamental to
its form of governance. As the camp has become ‘the nomos of the modern’ (Agamben, 1998, p. 166), state violence and
totalitarian power, which in the past either were generally short-lived or existed on the fringes of politics and history, have now become the
rule, as life is more ruthlessly regulated and placed in the hands of military and state power. This is not to suggest as some critics argue that
Agamben equates liberal democracies with totalitarian states. Instead, as Thomas Lemke (2005) argues, Agamben
does not mean to
reduce or negate those profound differences, but instead tries to elucidate the common ground for
these very different forms of government: the production of bare life, [asking] in what sense ‘bare life’ is
an essential part of our contemporary political rationality. (p. 6) In the current historical moment, as Catherine Mills
(2004) points out, ‘all subjects are at least potentially if not actually abandoned by the law and exposed to violence as a constitutive condition
of political existence’ (p. 47). Agamben’s (1998) claim that ‘biopolitics has passed beyond a new threshold � in modern democracies it is
possible to state in public what the Nazi biopoliticians did not dare say’ (p. 165) rings true at a time when war has become the highest national
ideal, the
CIA creates its own prisons called ‘black sites’, the government kidnaps people and sends them
to authoritarian countries to be tortured, American citizens are imprisoned offshore in Navy vessels
without the right to legal counsel, and an imperial presidency violates international law at will while
undermining constitutional law at home.
The biopolitics of disposability affect many populations and this number is simply
increasing resulting in otherness – the round is key to challenge the neoliberal
pedagogy
Giroux, Ph.D. @ Carnegie-Mellon University, Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster
University in the English and Cultural Studies Department, 2008
(Henry A., “Beyond the biopolitics of disposability: rethinking neoliberalism in the New Gilded Age,”
Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture, Vol. 14.5, pp 609-610)//SG
This logic of disposability is about more than the extreme examples portrayed by the inhabitants of Agamben’s camp. The biopolitics of
disposability both includes and reaches beyond the shocking image of the overcrowded refugee camps
and the new American Gulag that includes the massive incarceration mostly people of color, special prisons for immigrants,
torture sites such as Abu Ghraib, and the now infamousCamp Delta at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Disposable populations
now include the 60 million people in the United States living one notch about the poverty line, the growing
number of families living on bare government subsistence, the 46 million Americans without health insurance,the over 2,000,000
persons incarcerated in prisons, the young people laboring under enormous debt and rightly sensing
that the American dream is on life support, the workers who are one paycheck away from the joining the ranks of the
disposable and permanently excluded, and the elderly whose fixed incomes and pensions are in danger of disappearing.16 On a global
level, the archetypes of otherness and disposability can be found in ‘disease-ridden Africa’, the Orientalist
paradigm that now defines the Arab world, those geopolitical spaces that house the growing refugee camps in Europe, Africa, the Middle East,
and North America, and those countries from Iraq to Argentina thathave
suffered under neoliberal economic polices in
which matters of structural adjustment are synonymous with the dictates of what Naomi Klein (2007)calls
‘disaster capitalism’. The camp increasingly becomes the exemplary institution of global neoliberal
capital � succinctly defined by Zygmunt Bauman (2003) as ‘garrisons of extraterritoriality’, functioning largely as ‘dumping grounds for the
indisposed of and as yet unrecycled waste of the global frontier-land’ (p. 138). Abiopolitics that struggles in the name of
democratic education and politics becomes impossible unless individual and political rights are
protected and enabled by social rights. This means in part that collective opposition to the punishing state and the sovereignty of
the market has to be waged in the name of a democracy that takes up the struggle for a social state that not only provides social protections
and collectively endorsed insurance but also redistributes wealth and income so as to eliminate the inequalities that fuel and reproduce the
power of neoliberalism and its war on the welfare state, its promotion of an expanded military, its contracting out of major public services, and
its call for a law-and- order state of (in)security.Biopolitics
as a concept in this struggle is essential because it makes
visible a neoliberal regime in which politics not only makes life itself a site of radical unequal struggle,
but under the power of global capital produces a politics of disposability in which exclusion and death
become the only mediators of the present for an increasing number of individuals and groups.If the
exclusion of vast numbers of people marginalized by race, class, age, and gender was once the secret of modernity, late modern politics has
amplified its power to exclude large numbers of diverse groups from a meaningful social existence, while making the logic of disposability
central to its definition of politics, and, as I have argued, its modes of entertainment. But there is something more distinctive about neoliberal
biopolitics and a post-9/11 world than an obsession with necropolitics, where thestate
of exception becomes routine, a war
against terrorism mimics that which it opposes, and death-dealing modes of inequality strengthen,
despite the growing modes of global resistance, the increase in humanitarian aid, the escalating call for
more rights legislation, and the growing influence of international law (Comaroff, 2007, p. 207). Neoliberalism’s
politics of disposability not only are maintained merely through disciplinary and regulatory powers, but also work primarily as a
form of seduction, a pedagogy in which matters of subjectification, desire, and identities are central to
neoliberalism’s mode of governing. Pedagogy functions as a form of cultural politics and governmentality understood as a moral
and political practice that takes place in a variety sites outside of schools. In this instance,pedagogy anchors governmentality in
‘domain of cognition’ functioning largely as ‘a grid of insistent calculation, experimenta- tion, and
evaluation concerned with the conduct of conduct’ (Dillon, 1995, p. 330). But there is more at work here than the ‘domains
of cognition’ that shape common sense, there is also a pedagogy of fantasy and desire producing a kind of ‘emotional habitus’ through the ever
present landscapes of entertainment (Illouz, 2007).There
is in this case a pedagogical apparatus and mode of
seduction that in the name of entertainment invites spectators to watch an unfolding ‘theatre of cruelty’
expanding across the globe � to laugh at exclusion and humiliation � rather then be moved to challenge
it.And it is precisely at this intersection of pedagogy and politics that neoliberalism must be challenged.Opposing neoliberalism, in
part, suggests exposing the myths and conditions that sustain the shape of late modern politics as an
economic, social, and pedagogical project. This means addressing neoliberalism as both a mode of
rationality and as a unique intersection of governmentality and sovereignty that shapes every aspect of
life. Engaging neoliberalism as a mode of governmentality that produces consent for its practices in a variety of sites requires that educators
and others develop modes of pedagogical and political interventions that situate human beings as critically engaged social agents capable of
addressing the meaning, character, fate, and crisis of democracy.Against
a biopolitics of neoliberalism and its antidemocratic tendencies, educators, artists, intellectuals, and others might consider selectively reclaiming
John Dewey’s (1916/1966) notion of democracy as an ethical ideal and engaged practice informed by an
active public open to debate, dialogue, and deliberation.17 Dewey rejected any attempt to equate
democracy and freedom with a market society, and he denounced ritualistic definitions of democracy
that he felt reduced it to the periodic rituals of elections, conceding meaningful actions to formal
political institutions. According to Dewey (1927), democracy was a ‘way of life’ that demanded work, a special kind of investment,
desire, and willingness to fight those anti- democratic forces that produced what he called the ‘eclipse of the public’. Dewey believed that
democracy demanded particular competencies, modes of understanding, and skills that enabled individuals both to defend certain institutions
as vital public spheres and to equate public freedom with the capacity for debate and deliberation and a notion of politics that rejects any
commitment to absolutes. If democracy was to survive,Dewey
argued that it had to be nourished by pedagogical
practices that enabled young people and others to give it the kind of active and constant attention that
makes it an ongoing, never- ending process of replenishment and struggle. Hannah Arendt builds upon Dewey’s
concerns about what it means not only to rethink the meaning of democracy in dark times, but also to put into place those pedagogical
conditions that enable people to speak from a position of critical agency and to challenge modes of authority that speak directly to them.
While Arendt did not provide a theory of pedagogy, she argued passionately about connecting any
viable notion of democracy with an educated public. For her,neitherdemocracynor the institutions that nourished it
could flourish in the absence of individuals whocould think critically, exercise judgment, engage in spirited debate,
and create those public spaces that constitute ‘the very essence of political life’ (Arendt, 1977, p. 241). Arendt
recognized that any viable democratic politics must offer an informed and collective challenge to modes of totalitarian violence legitimated
through appeals to safety, fear, and the threat of terrorism. She writes:Terror
becomes total when it becomes independent
of all opposition; it rules supreme when nobody any longer stands in its way.If lawfulness is the essence of nontyrannical government and lawlessness is the essence of tyranny,then terror is the essence of totalitarian domination.
(Arendt, 1976, p. 162)
I: Governmentality/Foucault
Neoliberalism is far from free—imposes governmentality on citizens to discipline their
economic choices
Joseph, Professor of Politics at the University of Sheffield 13 (Jonathan, “Resilience as embedded neoliberalism: a governmentality
approach”, Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses 1:1, 2013, Taylor and Francis Online)//AS
Foucault’s lectures point to a number of shifts in discourses and practices of power and rule. These are caused by
the development of capitalism and demographic change and, therefore, take population as their main concern. Although
disciplinary power works directly on the body to place it under constant supervision and surveillance,
a new form of power, governmentality, works from a distance through a liberal rationality of
governance. Some analysts of Foucault’s work would emphasise that although Foucault’s concept of governmentality does tend to highlight
liberal practice, it is far more wide ranging than this.14 My view is that although this may be true, there are good reasons for
Foucault to concentrate on liberal forms of governmentality, and even better reasons for those of us who want to look
at the dominant forms of governance in the world today. Foucault is interested in liberal forms of governance because he is trying to
understand the newfound concern with population and its relation to the development of capitalism
in certainWestern countries. Hence he highlights the way these forms of governance operate through promoting the ‘natural
processes’ of the economic sphere.15 The rationality of liberal government stresses the need to respect the freedom of economic processes
through deliberate self-limiting of government.16 For Foucault Laissez-faire governance, based on the liberal principles of political economy,
finds its expression in civil society and is legitimated through the liberal concern that one must not ‘govern too much’.17 Liberal
rule
looks to the private sphere and civil society as a way to disguise the imposition of ‘market discipline’
as somehow an exercise in freedom. Neoliberalism extends this process through the artificial (often
forced) introduction of competitive practices in more and more spheres of social life.18 Part of this process is
the neoliberal assault on the institutions of the post-war settlement and the promotion of the norms and values of the market as a means of
‘destatification’. Hence we might expect the intensification of governmentality’s emphasis on limiting government and governing from a
distance by encouraging free conduct. But the
second part of this process involves the embedding of these norms
and values in a new set of social institutions and practices. Tickell and Peck19 describe this as the ‘roll-out’ phase of
institution building which reflects a shift from the earlier, more aggressive ‘roll-out’ phase, to a new emphasis on normalising the
logic of the market through softer ideas such as public – private partnerships, networked governance
and an individualised conception of civil society based on mobilising active citizens. Neoliberalism’s
promotion of free market norms is therefore much more than the simple ideology of free-market
economics. It is a specific form of social rule that institutionalises a rationality of competition,
enterprise individualised responsibility. Although the state ‘steps back’ and encourages the free conduct of individuals,
this is achieved through active intervention into civil society and the opening up of new areas to the logic of private enterprise and individual
initiative. This is the logic behind the rise of resilience. In the process of constructing and interpellating neoliberal subjects, neoliberal
discourse and practices appeal to them as citizens or consumers who are ‘free’ to take responsibility
for their own life choices, but who are expected to follow competitive rules of conduct. Governmentality
works by telling us to be enterprising, active and responsible citizens. Neoliberalism works through the social production of freedom and the
‘management and organization of the conditions in which one can be free’.20 Resilience contributes to this through its stress on heightened
self-awareness, reflexivity and responsibility. It
encourages the idea of active citizenship, whereby people, rather
than relying on the state, take responsibility for their own social and economic well-being. In particular, it
focuses on the risk and security aspects of this by encouraging preparedness and awareness.
Neoliberalism’s entwining of economic value calculus into every aspect of life renders
populations complacent to manipulation
Brown, Professor of political theory at the University of California, Berkeley, 03 (Wendy, “Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal
Democracy”, Theory and Event 7:1, 2003, MUSE)//AS
However, invaluable as Marx's theory of capital and Weber's theory of rationalization are in theorizing aspects of neo-liberalism, neither brings
into view the historical-institutional rupture it signifies, the form of governmentality it replaces and the form it inaugurates, and hence, the
modalities of resistance it outmodes and those that must be developed if it is to be effectively challenged. Neo-liberalism is not
an
inevitable historical development of capital and instrumental rationality; it is not the unfolding of laws of capital
or of instrumental rationality suggested by a Marxist or Weberian analysis but represents instead a new and contingent
organization and operation of both. Moreover, neither analysis articulates the shift neo-liberalism heralds from relatively
differentiated moral, economic, and political rationalities and venues in liberal democratic orders to their discursive and practical integration.
Neo-liberal governmentality undermines the relative autonomy of certain institutions from one
another and from the market -- law, elections, the police, the public sphere -- an independence that
formerly sustained an interval and a tension between a capitalist political economy and a liberal
democratic political system. The implications of this transformation are significant. If Marcuse worried about
the loss of a dialectical opposition within capitalism when it "delivers the goods," that is, when, by mid-twentieth century, a relatively
complacent middle class had taken the place of the hard-laboring impoverished masses Marx depicted
as the negating contradiction to the concentrated wealth of capital, neo-liberalism entails the erosion of oppositional
political, moral, or subjective claims located outside capitalist rationality but inside liberal democratic society, that
is, the erosion of institutions, venues, and values organized by non-market rationalities in democracies. When democratic principles
of governance, civil codes, and even religious morality are submitted to economic calculation, when no
value or good stands outside of this calculus, sources of opposition to, and mere modulation of, capitalist
rationality disappear. This reminds us that however much a Left analysis has identified a liberal political order with legitimating,
cloaking, and mystifying the stratifications of society achieved by capitalism and achieved as well by racial, sexual, and gender superordinations,
it is also the case that liberal democratic principles of governance -- liberalism as a political doctrine -- have functioned as something of an
antagonism to these stratifications. As Marx himself argued in "On the Jewish Question," formal political principles of equality and freedom
(with their attendant promises of individual autonomy and dignity) figure an alternative vision of humanity and alternative social and moral
referents to those of the capitalist order within which they are asserted. This is the Janus-face or at least Janus-potential of liberal democracy
vis a vis a capitalist economy: while liberal democracy encodes, reflects, and legitimates capitalist social relations, it simultaneously resists,
counters, and tempers them.
Neoliberalism transforms identity into economic calculus—imposes its value structure
on all aspects of society
Brown, Professor of political theory at the University of California, Berkeley, 03 (Wendy, “Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal
Democracy”, Theory and Event 7:1, 2003, MUSE)//AS
The
political sphere, along with every other dimension of contemporary existence, is submitted to an
economic rationality, or put the other way around, not only is the human being configured exhaustively as homo oeconomicus, all
dimensions of human life are cast in terms of a market rationality. While this entails submitting every action and
policy to considerations of profitability, equally important is the production of all human and institutional action as
rational entrepreneurial action, conducted according to a calculus of utility, benefit, or satisfaction against a
micro-economic grid of scarcity, supply and demand, and moral value-neutrality. Neo-liberalism does not simply assume that
all aspects of social, cultural and political life can be reduced to such a calculus, rather it develops
institutional practices and rewards for enacting this vision. That is, through discourse and policy promulgating its
criteria, neo-liberalism produces rational actors and imposes market rationale for decision-making in all spheres. Importantly then, neoliberalism involves a normative rather than ontological claim about the pervasiveness of economic
rationality and advocates the institution building, policies, and discourse development appropriate to such a claim. Neo-liberalism is a
constructivist project: it does not presume the ontological givenness of a thoroughgoing economic rationality for all domains of society but
rather takes as its task the development, dissemination, and institutionalization of such a rationality. This point is further developed in (2)
below. 2) In contrast with the notorious laissez faire and human propensity to "truck and barter" of classical economic liberalism, neo-
liberalism does not conceive either the market itself or rational economic behavior as purely natural.
Both are constructed -- organized by law and political institutions, and requiring political intervention
and orchestration. Far from flourishing when left alone, the economy must be directed, buttressed, and protected by law and policy as
well as by the dissemination of social norms designed to facilitate competition, free trade, and rational economic action on the part of every
member and institution of society. In Lemke's account, "In the Ordo-liberal scheme, the market does not amount to a natural economic reality,
with intrinsic laws that the art of government must bear in mind and respect; instead, the market can be constituted and kept alive only by dint
of political interventions . . . competition, too, is not a natural fact . . . this fundamental economic mechanism can function only if support is
The
neo-liberal formulation of the state and especially specific legal arrangements and decisions as the
pre- and ongoing condition of the market does not mean that the market is controlled by the state but
precisely the opposite, that the market is the organizing and regulative principle of the state and
society and this along four different lines: a)The state openly responds to needs of the market, whether
forthcoming to bolster a series of conditions, and adherence to the latter must consistently be guaranteed by legal measures" (193).
through monetary and fiscal policy, immigration policy, the treatment of criminals, or the structure of public education. In so doing, the state is
no longer encumbered by the danger of incurring the legitimation deficits predicted by 1970s social theorists and political economists such as
Nicos Poulantzas, Jurgen Habermas, or James O'Connor.6 Rather, neo-liberal
rationality extended to the state itself
indexes state success according to its ability to sustain and foster the market and ties state legitimacy
to such success. This is a new form of legitimation, one that "founds a state" according to Lemke, and contrasts with the Hegelian and
French revolutionary notion of the constitutional state as the emergent universal representative of the people. As Lemke describes Foucault's
account ofOrdo-liberal thinking, "economic liberty produces the legitimacy for a form of sovereignty limited to guaranteeing economic activity .
. . .a state that was no longer defined in terms of an historical mission but legitimated itself with reference to economic growth" (196). b)The
state itself is enfolded and animated by market rationality, not simply profitability, but a generalized calculation of cost and benefit becomes
the measure of all state practices. Political
discourse on all matters is framed in entrepreneurial terms; the state
must not simply concern itself with the market but think and behave like a market actor across all of its
functions, including law.7 c)Putting (a) and (b) together, the health and growth of the economy is the basis of state legitimacy both because the
state is forthrightly responsible for the health of the economy and because of the economic rationality to which state practices have been
submitted. Thus, "It's the economy, stupid" becomes more than a campaign principle; rather, it expresses the legitimacy principle of the state
and the basis for state action -- from Constitutional adjudication and campaign finance reform to welfare policy to foreign policy, including
warfare and the organization of "homeland security." 3)The
extension of economic rationality to formerly noneconomic domains and institutions extends to individual conduct, or more precisely, prescribes citizen-subject
conduct in a neo-liberal order. Whereas classical liberalism articulated a distinction, and at times even a tension, among the criteria for
individual moral, associational, and economic actions (hence the striking differences in tone, subject matter and even prescription between
Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations and his Theory of Moral Sentiments), neo-liberalism normatively
constructs and
interpellates individuals as entrepreneurial actors in every sphere of life. It figures individuals as
rational, calculating creatures whose moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for "self-care" -the ability to provide for their own needs and service their own ambitions. In making the individual fully responsible for her/himself, neoliberalism equates moral responsibility with rational action; it relieves the discrepancy between economic and moral behavior by configuring
morality entirely as a matter of rational deliberation about costs, benefits, and consequences. In so doing, it also carries responsibility for the
self to new heights: the rationally calculating individual bears full responsibility for the consequences of his or her action no matter how severe
the constraints on this action, e.g., lack of skills, education, and childcare in a period of high unemployment and limited welfare benefits.
Correspondingly,
a "mismanaged life" becomes a new mode of depoliticizing social and economic powers
and at the same time reduces political citizenship to an unprecedented degree of passivity and
political complacency. The model neo-liberal citizen is one who strategizes for her/ himself among various social, political and
economic options, not one who strives with others to alter or organize these options. A fully realized neo-liberal citizenry
would be the opposite of public-minded, indeed it would barely exist as a public. The body politic
ceases to be a body but is, rather, a group of individual entrepreneurs and consumers . . . which is, of course,
exactly the way voters are addressed in most American campaign discourse.8 Other evidence for progress in the development of such a
citizenry is not far from hand: consider the market rationality permeating universities today, from admissions and recruiting to the relentless
consumer mentality of students in relationship to university brand names, courses, and services, from faculty raiding and pay scales to
promotion criteria.9 Or consider the way in which consequential moral lapses (of a sexual or criminal nature) by politicians, business executives,
or church and university administrators are so often apologized for as "mistakes in judgement," implying that it was the calculation that was
wrong, not the act, actor, or rationale.
I: Children
Neoliberalism destroys societal values and structure and forces children into labor and
trafficking
De La Barra, Chilean political activist, international consultant and former UNICEF Latin America Public Policy Advisor 07-- (Ximena,
“THE DUAL DEBT OF NEOLIBERALISM”, Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Social Struggles in Latin America”, 9/1/09, edited by Dello Bueno and
Lara, Brill Online)//AS
A social and macro-economic system which so highly values individualism, competitiveness, and
aggressiveness is progressively destroying the micro-economic setting of families and contradicting
their traditional values of affection, solidarity and belongingness. The structure and capacity of the
family as a basic socio-economic unit has become progressively weakened, likewise degrading the
primary environment for protecting and promoting the rights and well-being of children. The worsening of
local economic conditions increases the pressure on young people to begin working at an early age. Children are attracted to the
labour market given the poverty of their family. They make desirable labourersbecause they are easy to exploit.
This way, while the neoliberal development model creates unemployed or underemployed adults, it
likewise yields alarming figures for child labour, child abandonment, school dropouts , and frustrated children
and adolescents. As this poverty cycle snowballs, the personal and social aspirations of the poor become
ever more impossible to fulfil. The International LabourOrganisation (ILO) has reported an estimated 246 million child labourers
worldwide, 180 million who are employed in the worst and most dangerous forms of child labour, 73 million of whom are under the age of 10.
No country is immune from this trend as evidenced by the fact that 2.5 million of the above work in the most developed
countries, with another 2.5 million found in transitional economies of the former Soviet republics. In addition, an estimated 8.4
million children are trapped in slavery, human trafficking, family debt servitude, sexual exploitation
and other illicit activities. It is estimated that 1.2 million children are victims of child trafficking, forced
to cross national border or lured into situations of sexual or commercial exploitation.3
Capitalism dehumanizes children and the proletariat as a whole—encourages an
ideology of violence
Kapur, Professor of Cinema at Southern Illinois Univeristy, feminist/Marxist analyst of media 06 (Jyotsna, “Rehearsals for war: Capitalism
and the transformation of children into consumers”, Socialism and Democracy 20:2, 5/8/06, Taylor and Francis)//AS
Of course, it
is a travesty that festivals of birth should be turned into celebrations of death, children's play into lessons in
war, and war sold as a style. However, if we learn anything from Marx it is that the ruling ideas of the
ruling class are always unstable and so have to be reasserted over and over againThe presence of
military iconography in youth culture today is one such contested space, an open display of the unbearable
contradictions of capital, which sows the seeds of its own destruction in every new ground that it breaks. Ever since
they were discovered as a niche market in the post-war US economic boom, children have been socialized as consumers, a
process that deepened radically in the last two decades of the 20th century.3 The demand that they now turn into soldiers
entails an entirely new orientation: from thinking of themselves as atomized indi- viduals who pursue
their ovm self-enhancement, they are now being asked to willingly sacrifice themselves for a cause bigger
than them- selves. The Bush regime has tried to curtail resistance by simply denying there is any contradiction between the self-sacrifice and
the self-enhancement. As Bush explains it, doing your patriotic duty today means that you must do both: shop at home and fight overseas in
order to protect "•our way of life and freedoms," which is to shop some more. In other words, you must shop till you, quite literally, drop!The
question anyone who has read Marx or lived on the wrong side of the tracks asks is, who does the shopping and who does the drop- ping, or,
even more pointedly, whose children do what? The
import- ance of children to the socialist movement can be
understood from the very meaning of the word proletariat, which, Terry Eagleton reminds us, was derived from
the word proles, meaning children. Prolicide refers to the act of killing one's children. The proletariat then is the class
too poor to serve the state by property who serves it instead by producing children as labor-power. It is
quite commonplace for those who are opposed to the US-led war against Iraq and Afghanistan to blame the consumerism of the people of the
US, particularly their “addiction” to oil, for the war. This position shifts the blame from a system to the people, making no distinctions between
those who own and manage the system and those who are exploited by it. It turns consumerism into a curable pathology rather than the
understandable outcome of social, economic, and political policy that needs to be transformed. A
lesson that we can learn from
the current transformation of children from consumers into soldiers is that war and consumerism are
both structural outcomes of capital.5 In other words, consumers do not need war – but capitalism needs
both consumers and war. Then, what needs to be changed becomes clear.
Neoliberalism does irreversible harm to children and future generations—will cause
massive poverty and suffering
De La Barra, Chilean political activist, international consultant and former UNICEF Latin America Public Policy Advisor 07-- (Ximena,
“THE DUAL DEBT OF NEOLIBERALISM”, Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Social Struggles in Latin America”, 9/1/09, edited by Dello Bueno and
Lara, Brill Online)//AS
The social development of children and adolescents is a particularly urgent aspect of the larger picture. For
them, there exists no second opportunity.Their biological and intellectual development cannot wait until their
family manages to escape poverty or until the promised benefits from economic growth manage to
trickle down. The harm due to malnutrition, poor health, and inadequate treatment during infancy is often
irreversible and destined to be transmitted across generations. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is very
clear in assigning responsibility for the development of children and adolescents to the families and the state. Additionally, the state
is assigned the duty of creating the necessary conditions for families to comply with their
responsibilities. Nevertheless, states have not created those conditions. They have failed to eradicate
unemployment and to create safety nets. By transferring coordination of basic service delivery for children to the market via
privatisation policies, impoverished families lose access. Simultaneous public investments in children and in the creation of stable formal
employment for adults, with dignified salaries and social benefits that cover not just workers but also their families, have now become the
indispensable priority for genuine development.
I: Poor/Indigenous
Neoliberalist ideologies impose on indigenous society and homogenize society
Bamford, associate professor of anthropology at the University of Virginia 02 (Sandra, “ON BEING ‘NATURAL’ IN THE RAINFOREST
MARKETPLACE”, Social Analysis 46:1, Spring 2002, Ingenta)//AS
Perhaps even more surprisingly, couched
within contemporary narratives is an attempt to reconcile the
perspective(s) of modern industrial society with the aims and intentions of the ‘rest of the world.’ It is
implicitly assumed that indigenous peoples the world over possess a desire to be incorporated within the
world capitalist economy. Brazilians really ‘want’ to manufacture potpourri, just like highland New
Guineans secretly covet owning and operating their own ‘Bed and Breakfast’ establishments . Indigenous
peoples are portrayed as sharing in common the same attachment to a capitalist economy that we do. In a somewhat Messianic vein, they
are presented not only as would-be-laborers in this system, but also as fledgling ‘scientists’ who can
solve the problems of our current environmental crisis. In the words of activist Alan Duning, indigenous peoples: possess
in their ecological knowledge an asset of incalculable value: a map to the biological diversity of the earth on which all of life depends. Encoded
in indigenous languages, customs and practices may be as much understanding of nature as is stored in the libraries of modern science (quoted
in Brosius 1977). Yet if
the entire world emerges as being one big, happy family, equally committed to the
values of science, capitalism and conservation, human diversity is not completely erased. Instead, it
assumes a ‘naturalized’ form.
Neoliberalism takes away the right to live from indigenous communities in Latin
America
Dierckxsens, Doctor of Social Sciences, University of Nijmegen, Netherlands, former Un demography official in Central America 07-(Wim, “Social Movements and the Capitalist Crisis:Towards a Latin American Alternative”, Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Social Struggles in
Latin America”, 9/1/09, http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/9789047410881)//AS
In view of a neoliberal environment that is ever more aggressive, the social and economic rights of
landless peasants and indigenous communities become reduced to almost nothing. The indigenous
communities are at risk of losing the right to their own survival. They offer little benefit to big capital
and theirlink to the market is so weak that their exclusion tends to be massive and definitive. There is
practically no possibility that they can be reinserted into the market economy. To not be linked to the market today and
having no future prospect for such a linkage tomorrow, the population is superfluous to the present system. Indeed, to
the extent that they occupy certain territories desired for their lands and natural resources, they
become transformed into an obstacle to the transnationals that must be eradicated. For their part, the
social mobilisations of the indigenous peoples do not solely revolve around the demand for land. Rather,
they increasingly exhibit the character of territorial defence and of struggle for another possible world where
the indigenous peoples’ way of life has a safe and secure place.
Resisting capitalism is critical to liberate the subjugated masses in Latin America
Renique, Associate Professor in the Department of History at the City College of the City University of New York ( Gerardo, “Latin America
today: The revolt against neoliberalism”, Socialism and Democracy 10--, 19:3, 9/20/10,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08854300500284561#.UcnZQvnVCSo)//AS
Peasant/Indian intervention in politics has long been manifested through everyday acts of resistance.
These remained fragmented and localized, however, until the second half of the 20th century. Landlord and state
responses to subaltern defiance rested on the systematic use of violence and the deepening of
colonial forms of domination and exploitation – what Anı´ balQuijano calls the coloniality of power. In his essay, Quijano
examines the political trajectory of Indian resistance in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador, describing the current power crisis in terms of the crisis of
coloniality. He
suggests that the achievement of autonomy and of a pluri-ethnic state will not only mark
the end of the Eurocentric nation-state but will also force the redefinition of both the national
question and the problem of political democracy.Gonza´lez Casanova argues similarly, in his essay on the EZLN,
thattheZapatista forms of autonomous self-government (caracoles or conches) express what he describes as a “culture of power” forged in 500
years of resistance to colonialism and to the Eurocentric logic of state power. In place of the latter, Zapatista forms
of people’s power
offer an idiosyncratic form of direct rule aimed on the one hand at strengthening democracy, dignity,
and autonomy, and, on the other, at building an alternative way of life, thereby helping to revitalize
the universal struggle for democracy, liberation, and socialism.
I: Urbanization
The influx of peasants into urban areas offsets the perceived “benefits” of neoliberal
policies
Otero, Ph.D in Sociology @ University of Wisconsin-Madison, Professor of Sociology at Simon Fraser
University, 1996
(Gerardo, “Mexico's Economic and Political Futures,” NEOLIBERALISM REVISITED – Economic Restructuring and Mexico's Political
Future, edited by Gerardo Otero, Westview Press, pg 234-35)//SG
Now thatthe
Mexican legislation regarding land tenure has been modified to allow the privatization of
ejidos, one possible outcome is thatlarge masses of former peasants will migrate to the cities, a trend that will build
downward pressures for already rock-bottom wages.Such "liberation" of labor power from the countryside, as Marilyn
Gates has put it,will offset much of the ben- eficial effect that increased capital investments could have on
Mexican workers' real wages. Will this mean that old-type maquiladoras are more likely to prevail instead of a move to a form of
integration into the world economy that relies on skilled labor and technology transfer, as in the optimistic scenarios of Gary Gereffi? The
latter scenarios would probably require a much more aggressive state policy, including an industrial policy, as both
Gereffi and Enrique Dussel Peters have argued, in order to prpmote a greater integration of maquiladoras and manufacturing exporting firms
with the rest of the local economy. During the early 1990s,
as much as 75 percent of foreign investment going p into
Mexico went to the stock marketin the form of portfolio capital.This is widely considered to be a volatile and
speculative type of investment. Its swiftflight during 1.994 largely accounts for the depth of the economic
crisis that followed the peso devaluationin December of that year. The composition of investment capital would have to be
modified substantially, as Gustavo del Castillo V. and Enrique Dussel Peters have argued, so that most new foreign investment would be
directed toward productive activities that create employ- ment and expand Mexico's exporting capabilities and international competi- tiveness.
Otherwise,
the masses of workers "liberated" from agriculture will not only remain largely unemployed but
will also constitute a heavy downward pressure on wages in Mexico as well as in the United States and
Canada.
I: Illegal Immigration
Latin Americans are forced out of their homeland to become illegal immigrants so
farmers can cut their labor costs
Green, PhD and MA in Anthropology and is the Director of the Center for Latin American studies at The University of
Arizona, 2011, (“The Nobodies: Neoliberalism, Violence, and Migration” Medical Anthropology: Cross-Cultural Studies in
Health and Illness, 30:4, 366-385)//JS
Gavin Smith (1999) called for an understanding of social institutions in terms of social reproduction, less
in terms of things, more in terms of forces, which allow us to examine the relationship between
individual suffering and the collective trauma of state-sponsored violence and neoliberal economic
policies. In this case institutions like Homeland Security, the Border Patrol, and the ICE work as
‘‘bridgeheads of power’’ facilitating certain practices often by means of order, such as raids, detentions,
and Operation Streamline. Again, for Antonio, the consequence is a shift in identity from an Indian
nobody, to an illegal alien—somebody mired in legal and political proceedings intent on relegating him
the status of nobody.By the mid-seventeenth century England had established what Foucault (1965)
referred to as the ‘‘great confinement’’—workhouses for the sick, the insane, and the destitute, not
with the intent of improving their fate, but as a mechanism to extract profit from their ‘‘free’’ labor.
Later, prison labor was captured in the form of chain gangs as a popular mode of production and of
discipline and punishment (Foucault 1977). A recent iteration of these processes is now notable in the
agricultural fields of Arizona. As migrants are deported as a result of ICE raids at the workplace,leaving
framers with a shortage of employees at harvest time, prison populations are the new workers filling
that gap. They work for a pittance of what it costs for undocumented migrants. In Arizona, for
instance,migrants are paid about US $40 per day for a 10- to 12-hour shift picking chilies, while
prisoners are paid only US $20 per day. As migrants are increasingly being locked up not only in the
ICE detention centers, but also a substantial number of them are in state and local prisons, one can
only imagine that some of those prisoners working on the chain gangs are migrants, who, in a perverse
Orwellian twist, have replaced themselves at a much lower wage, even as they await deportation from
their ‘‘crime’’: their refusal to be disposed of.
I: Development
Capitalism is a regime of exploitation that makes it impossible for development in
Third World countries.
Bell Lara, Professor of Sociology at the University of Havana and a Senior Researcher in the FLACSOCuba Program, 2006, (José, “Cuban Socialism in the Face of Globalization,” page 150, 2009,
http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/9789047410881)//CS
International competition leads the TNCs to search for lower productioncosts, relocating various
moments of the production process where they aremore profitable. The new technologies which are
available permit the spatialdecentralisation of production and an elevated division and subdivision
oflabour such that it becomes possible for a minimal skill level when appropriateto carry out specified
parts of the production process. For the first time inhistory, the creation of a world market of
production has been accompanied by a world labour market along with a world reserve army of workers
(Finkel1995: 62). Nurtured by all of its systemic potential and intimately interrelated with the process
of globalisation, the extraordinary scientific and technological revolution continues to unfold. There is
no doubt that modern biotechnology and the creation of new materials and information technologies
are central elements of the new scientific and technological revolution. Some authorsemphasise that
its central link of articulation is constituted by informationtechnologies as manifested in distinct
specialty areas such as microelectronics, optical electronics, robotics, informatics, telecommunications,
and so on.The common element of all these developments is that they are stronglybased in the
development of scientific knowledge: “the cycle of capital accumulation increasingly depends less upon
the intensiveness of labour inputsand even the intensiveness of productive physical capital so as to
concentrate itself in an accumulation based in knowledge-intensive production. Theconcentration and
centralisation of technological knowledge is more intensive and far more monopolistic than other forms
of capital, augmented bythe large gap between the North and South” (Gorostiaga 1991: 5). The weightof
this knowledge component in production can be evaluated by observingthat in high tech branches such
as microelectronics, the costs associated withthis factor represents around 70% of its total value. In
older industries suchas automobile production, the percentage is closer to 40% of the final product’s
total value (Marini 1996).These extraordinary developments are monopolised at the hegemonic
centres of capital and do not become readily transferred to the underdeveloped world. Better put,
productive processes become transferred but not the creation processes of scientific and cutting-edge
technologies.In fact, the present scientific-technical revolution has a distinctive trade In fact, the
present scientific-technical revolution has a distinctive trademark: the industrialisation of knowledge
through permanent systems of innovation that permit enterprises and nations to compete. When
innovation isthe rule rather than the exception, the human factor acquires a singular importance in the
production process. Above all, the fraction of the labour force which is highly skilled plays a
preponderant role in economic processes whose successful operation selectively requires a given
technical level within its labour inputs. In recognition of this phenomenon, the factor of “human capital”
is increasingly regarded as a leading sector in the dynamic areas of the world economy. Amidst these
rapid technological changes and the changing organisation of work within global capitalist
competition there can also be observed a growing worldwide rate of unemployment. This increase of
unemploymentand the structural demand for ever greater flexibility in the labour market isa concurrent
tendency of globalisation, something which makes work increasingly precarious for many and in the
final analysis results in greater levels of poverty and inequality across the globe. Capitalism continues
being a regime of exploitation, replete with multiple contradictions, which negates the possibility of
dynamic development for the underdeveloped world. This is to repeat the earlier assertion that
development and underdevelopment are two sides of the capitalist coin of expansion and world
domination in its globalised phase, something it shares incommon with the preceding period. Taking
this fact to heart would suggest that the possibility of genuine development is associated with a
rupture of dependent capitalist relations, something that in a strict sense would signify an exit from
the world system of capital.
Neoliberalism fuels codependency for Latin American countries and forces them to
abandon any possibility of development.
Buono and Bell Lara, Professors of Sociology and Senior Researcher in the FLACSO-Cuba Program,
2007(Richard A. Delloand José, “Neoliberalism and Resistance in Latin America,” 2007,
http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/9789047410881)//CS
The changes in the capitalist world system duringthe last two decades of the Twentieth Century
notonly transformed the post-WW II international orderbut also fuelled a process of systemic restructuration, giving rise to what today is referred to as globalisation. This complex process deepened
the structurally conditioned dependency of the underdeveloped countries, particularly in Latin
America, where external debt became converted into the articulating element of a consolidated
mechanism of dependency. More sophisticated than earlier forms of neo-colonial domination, this
evolving historical formation annuls any real possibility of development. It compels nationsto engage
in the act of compliance with “legitimate”commitments associated with servicing a debt thathas no
apparent relationship with a nation’s established development goals.The impossibility of repaying the
foreign debt and the recurrent crises resulting from meeting debt service payments have produced
processes of renegotiation that are in essence political-economic interventions. They are carried out
through internationalfinancial institutions such that the economic policies of the indebted countries
can be dictated to and thereby moulded into the purest possible forms of neoliberalism. In short, the
external debt has constituted the preferred agent for the implantation of neoliberal policies across
the whole of Latin America.But it must be understood that this was not entirely a process imposedfrom
abroad. There were powerful “national” interests in Latin America thathelped give rise to these debts
and their stakeholders have figured prominently among its principal beneficiaries. These are the
transnational fractionsof the local bourgeoisie, i.e., groups organically linked to the economic
reorientation towards export driven expansion. Along with financial groups, highlevel bureaucrats tied
to international agencies, and other fractions, theyconstitute a consolidated elite of collaborators with
the agents of globalisedcapital.
The internalization of neoliberalism ultimately restrains society and expands the
spectrum of the exploited.
Buono and Bell Lara, Professors of Sociology and Senior Researcher in the FLACSO-Cuba Program,
2007(Richard A. Delloand José, “Neoliberalism and Resistance in Latin America,” 2007,
http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/9789047410881)//CS
As a whole, this process can be comprehended as an internalisation of neoliberalism into the
structures of our societies, or perhaps more graphically, a kind of straightjacket that restrains society
and compels it to operate within specific structural limits. This application of the neoliberal
programme engendered long term effects, not only because it has orchestrated a correlation of forces
more favourable to capital, but also because its application has induced structural changes, reshaping
the social class composition of the entire continent.If indeed the spectrum of the exploited has grown
quantitatively, it hasalso experienced qualitative changes. These include the reduction of the industrial
working class, an extraordinary growth of the informal sector, downward social mobility resulting from
the impoverishment of broad sectors of the middle class, the decline of the public sector and state
employment, an increasingly precarious structure of employment, and a substantial loss of purchasing
power on the part of wage workers. The number of female headof households has grown and broad
sectors of young people and students are living in frustrating situations with an uncertain future.
Meanwhile, theadvance of agribusiness in the countryside has aggravated the problem of land
distribution and rural poverty, further intensifying the migration of peasants to urban areas.
I: Authoritarianism
Neoliberalism results in a lack of separation of union and state and creates
authoritarian corporatist arrangements.
Crow and Albo, Professors at Department of Political Science at York University, 2005 (Dan and
Greg, “Neo-liberalism, NAFTA, and the State of the North American Labour Movements,” Just Labour
vol. 6 & 7, Autumn 2005,
http://www.justlabour.yorku.ca/volume67/pdfs/02%20Albo%20Press.pdf?utm_medium=twitter&utm_
source=twitterfeed)//CS
Historically, the working class in Mexico has been enmeshed in corporatist structures of the state.
This has resulted in a lack of union autonomy from the state, and the
PartidoRevolucionarioInstitucional (PRI), the instrument of one-party domination within Mexicountil
recently (Rodriguez, 1998: 71). The largest Mexican union federation, the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico (CTM)
along with the ConfederaciónRevolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos (CROC), Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana
(CROM) and the Congreso del Trabajo (CT),all official unions tied to the authoritarian corporatist
arrangements, represent the majority of Mexico’s unionized workers. Authoritarian corporatist
arrangements have resulted in unions that have acted as coercive agents against their members.
Corrupt union bosses became de facto members of the state apparatus, and their privileged positions became dependent upon
keeping militant workers in check. As a result, union densities were higher than in other, comparable states, but were
nonetheless ineffectual at improving working conditions (Roman and Arregui, 1998: 128). In 2000, overall union density in
Mexico was ten percent lower than it was in the early 1980s. With union leaders often in collaborative relationships with
employers and the state, internal practices of democracy and independent action for unions were all but impossible. In
addition, state coercion was also prominent. Strike activity was 18 JUST LABOUR vol. 6 & 7 (Autumn 2005) traditionally
very low as the state made the conditions for work stoppages illegal in most cases.In those cases where strikes did
occur, direct physical coercion was regularly used (Cockcroft, 1998: 160).
I: Inflation
Due to the rapid decline and unsustainability of neoliberalism, we are currently experiencing the
highest food costs since 1845, and will continue to experience inflation until we turn away from
neoliberalism.
Moore, Assistant Professor of Environmental History atUmeå University, 2008 (Jason W., Ecological
Crises and the Agrarian Question in World-Historical Perspective,Lunds University Monthly Review,
pages 54-55, November 2008, http://www.sam.lu.se/upload/Humanekologi/Moore2008.pdf)//CS
lf it was not clear before, it became increasingly apparent over the course of 2008 that agriculture is one of the
decisive battlegrounds of neoliberal globalization-l would say the decisive battleground.This latest effort
to remake agriculture in the image of capital-this time, as a composite of agro- export platforms
whose variance with the global factory can be found only in the former's direct relation with the soilhas entered a phase of rapidly declining returns for capital as a whole. The worm has turned on the
neoliberal agro-ecological project.We shouldn't let the short-run profiteering around food or oil obscure this.
Rising food costs-the highest in real prices since 1845, or so The Economist reports (December 6, 2007)mean that the systemwide costs of (re)producing the world's working classes are going up, a situation
that cannot be resolved(as it was in the long nineteenth century) by incorporating vast peasant reservoirs in the
colonial world. Marx's "latent"• reserve army of labor has dwindled to a wisp of what it was a century ago, or even
twenty-five years ago, on the eve of China’s breakneck industrialization.
I: Race
Neoliberal politics distance themselves from the slow violence they cause—
particularly against nonwhite people
Nixon, Rachel Carson Professor of English at the University of Wisconsin-Madison 09 (Rob, “Neoliberalism, Slow Violence, and the
Environmental Picaresque”, Modern Fiction Studies 55:3, Fall 2009, MUSE)//AS
Three points are worth underscoring here. First, international
whiteness provides a second shield for national
whiteness, a protective dynamic that has profound consequences for the way slow violence has
unfolded across the global stage in a neoliberal age. Second, and relatedly, the internal distance between the
inviolable body and the vulnerable body is widened by being routed through international circuits of
power. Third, implicit in Ndebele's racial narrative of violation and retribution is the kind of
environmental narrative that Sinha's novel tells, whereby a corporate bastion of white power deploys a
battery of distancing strategies (temporal, legalistic, geographical, scientific, and euphemistic) in the long duree
between the initial catastrophe and the aftermath. Through this battery of attritional, dissociative
mechanisms the transnational company strives to wear down the environmental justice campaigns
that seek compensation, remediation, and restored health and dignity. Under cover of a variety of temporal orders, the
company can hope that public memory and demands for restitution will slowly seep out of sight,
vanishing into the sands of time.21
The seductive neoliberalist policy redefines how modern racism is utilized and
experienced
Roberts and Mahtani, Professors at the University of Toronto in the department of geography and planning,2010,
(David and Minelle, “Neoliberalizing Race, Racing Neoliberalism: Placing “Race” in Neoliberal Discourses”
http://ccrri.ukzn.ac.za/archive/archive/files/neoliberalizing_race,_racing_neoliberalism_placing_race_in_neoliberal_discourses__8f9de33fa7.pdf)//JS
We draw from these two examplesto demonstrate that while they both should be lauded in many
respects, in both cases, the resulting theorization treats racism as an inevitable result of
neoliberalization rather than mutually constitutive with neoliberalizing policies. The racist
eruptionsthat resultfrom neoliberal policies and practices are cited, butrace isimagined as a fixed
category, where individualracialized groups are seen as distinct and mapped onto neoliberal policy
outcomes. Neoliberalization is understood as a socioeconomic processthat has racial implications, but
little issaid about the waysthat neoliberalism modifies the way race is experienced or understood in
society. We suggest that thistheorization isincomplete. We recommend a move from analyses ofrace
and neoliberalism towards analysesthatrace neoliberalism. This kind of analysis more clearly delineates
how race and racism are inextricably embedded in the neoliberal project. To begin the process of
racing neoliberalism, it is essential to understand neoliberalism as a facet of a racist society that works
to both reinforce the racial structure of society, while also modifying the processes of racialization. As
other geographers have pointed out(McKitrrick 2006, Pulido 2006, Gilmore 2006)race is a fundamental
organizing principle in society. We suggest that there is a seductive, common-sense logic to
neoliberalism that reproduces racist ideologies. We highlight the fruitfulness ofthis way of
understanding race and neoliberalism in our case study
Racism creates numerous fatal health related problems
Crocker, B.S. in Criminal Justice and M.Ed. in School Counseling, 2007(John, “THE EFFECTS OF RACISM-RELATED STRESS
ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHYSIOLOGICAL WELL-BEING OF NON-WHITES” RIVIER ACADEMIC JOURNAL, VOLUME 3,
NUMBER 1, SPRING 2007 https://www.rivier.edu/journal/rcoaj-spring-2007/j88-crocker.pdf)//JS
Racism-related stress complicates the lives of non-whites in a number of very serious ways. In addition
to creating the widely discussed social inequalities, racism has been shown to have a negative impact on
one’s psychological and physiological well-being. The psychological distress caused by racism-related
stress can be debilitating and may increase the potential that one will adopt negative coping
strategies in an effort to alleviate their depression, anxiety, frustration, and anger. Negative coping
strategies, such as substance abuse and poor eating habits, affect one’s physiological and social wellbeingand do not serve to eliminate one’s problems. Prolonged exposure to racism-related psychological
distress can also cause psychosomatization, which can affect one’s physiological wellbeing in a
number of serious ways. One may experience increased blood pressure, hypertension, poor immune
system functioning, and a slower rate of healing as a result of stress-related psychosomatization. To
quote Harrell (2000, p. 48), “The evidence is compelling, and growing, that racism is pathogenic with
respect to a variety of physical and mental health outcomes.”
I: Colonialism
Neoliberalism is modern imperialism—oppressive, controlling, and elitist
Rosensvaig, adjunct professor of history and director of the Research Institute on
Popular Culture at the National University of Tucuma, 97 (Eduardo, “Neoliberalism
Economic Philosophy of Postmodem Demolition”, Latin American Perspectives 97:24, 11/97, JSTOR)//AS
Neoliberalism is an economic philosophy for early peripheral postmodemism. Messianic, authoritarian, and
exclusionary, it is mathematical mod eling designed in certain academic centers of the advanced world and
later in the periphery for the economic conversion of the Third World to a strategy of late colonialism-a
structure that makes possible transnational integration, national disintegration, and a veritable reactionary
"revolution"• in the distribution of national wealth. Technical cadres have been created for the demo
lition of the welfare and social service structures in the undeveloped countries under the impetus of the third wave of
civilization led by late capitalism. The supreme historic moment has come when the few are to concentrate the most through
new policies for taxation, finance, income, privatization, wages, and state regimes-the end of an epoch and
the spectacular beginning of a colonialism with a cybernetic face, an ontology of inequality.
I: Politics/Agency
Internalized neoliberal policies defeat political agency and any ability to create change
Hay, Professor of Political Analysis at the University of Sheffield04 (Colin, “The normalizing role of rationalist assumptions in the
institutional embedding of neoliberalism”, Economy and Society 33:4, 2004, Taylor and Francis)//AS
Second, in
internalizing neoliberal economic assumptions, governing political parties in the Anglophone
democracies have increasingly translated the political power conferred upon them at the ballet box into a selfdenying ordinance. In Britain, as elsewhere, political parties vying for office now couch their political rhetoric to
a considerable extent in terms of: (1) the nonnegotiable character of external (principally economic) imperatives; (2)
the powerlessness of domestic political actors in the face of such (ostensibly selfevident) constraints; and (3) the need,
in such a context, to displace responsibility to quasi-independent and supra-democratic authorities such an
independent central banks.1 Elections, it seems, are increasingly about appointing officers to be trusted to take the necessary technical
decisions dictated by shifting external circumstances; they are not public plebiscites on manifesto policy commitments.
As Peter Burnham (2001) has observed, politics today is about the management of depoliticization. The decision by the
Blair administration, only days after its election in 1997, to grant operational independence to the Bank of England despite the absence of any
supporting manifesto commitment is a case in point. It is in this context that a third factor, the
marketization of political
competition, acquires particular significance. It, too, has arguably contributed to declining political
engagement, participation and turnout (Levi 1996: 49). If the competition between parties for votes is assumed analogous to that between
businesses for market-share, then parties will behave in a quasi-Downsian manner. In a first-past-the-post two party electoral system, such as
Britain’s, they will tend to scrabble over the centre ground in a race towards the median voter (for a detailed elaboration of this logic, see Hay
1999a: 76_/104; also Downs 1957). The result, ceteris paribus, is bipartisan convergence.
I: Water Wars
Neoliberalist policies will result in the struggle for water because of the
unregulatedprivatization
von-Werlhof, Professor of Women’s Studies and Political Science at the University of Innsbruck,
Austria, 2008 (Claudia, “AlternativenzurneoliberalenGlobalisierung, oder: Die Globalisierung des
Neoliberalismus und seine Folgen, Wien, Picus 2007.” http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-consequencesof-globalization-and-neoliberal-policies-what-are-the-alternatives/7973)//JS
In the GATS, services are defined as “everything that cannot fall on your foot”, as someone once
remarked ironically. This means that they are no longer reduced to traditional services, but now extend
to human thoughts, feelings and actions as well. Even the elements – air, water, earth, fire (energy) –
are increasingly turned into commodities (in some places this process is already completed) in order to
make profit from the fact that we have to breathe, drink, stand and move (Barlow 2001, Isla 2003).In
Nicaragua, there exist water privatization plans that include fines of up to ten months’ salary if one
was to hand a bucket of water to a thirsty neighbor who cannot afford her own water connection
(Südwind 2003). If it was up to the water corporations – the biggest of which are French and German
(Vivendi Universal, Suez, RWE), which means that the privatization of water is mainly a European
business – then the neighbor was rather to die of thirst. After all, compassion only upsets business.In
India, whole rivers have been sold. Stories tell of women who came to the river banks with buffalos,
children and their laundry, as they had done for generations, only to be called “water thieves” and
chased away by the police. There are even plans to sell the “holy mother Ganges” (Shiva 2003).Fresh
water (just about 2% of the earth’s water reserves) is as such neither renewable nor increasable and of
such essential importance to local ecosystems that it seems utterly absurd to treat it is a commodity
that can be traded away (Barlow/Clarke 2003, Shiva 2003). Nonetheless, this is already happening. The
effects, of course, are horrendous. Coca-Cola has left parts of the southern Indian state of Kerala a
virtual desert by exploiting their entire ground water reserves.
I: Genocide
The affirmative reinforcement of American neoliberal politics will inevitably result in
genocide
Brie, member of the scientific advisory board of Attac Germany,2009, (Michael, “Ways out of the crisis of neoliberalism”
Development Dialogue No. 51 January 2009
http://www.dhf.uu.se/pdffiler/DD2009_51_postneoliberalism/Development_Dialogue_51_small.pdf#page=17)//JS
If the former politics of the USA is continued, it will mean an accelerated accumulation of elements of
barbarism in the USA itself and worldwide. The unleashing of capitalism will give rise to a further
decivilisation. Already ‘terror suspects’, ‘poverty refugees’ on the high seas, the victims of ecological
and social catastrophes as well as of state failures in the Third World have no human rights. They are
similar to those who were made ‘stateless’ by National Socialism. These victims are still ‘collateral
damage’ and there are no extermination camps. But there have been many steps taken in the direction
of lawlessness. If this development is not stopped, there will be a barbarisation of unleashed
imperialist capitalism, which will tip over into genocide.
I: Bare Life
Neoliberalism’s politics of disposability necessitates Otherization and the exclusion of
the “Other” reducing them to a state of “bare life”
Giroux, Ph.D. @ Carnegie-Mellon University, Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster
University in the English and Cultural Studies Department, 2008
(Henry A., “Beyond the biopolitics of disposability: rethinking neoliberalism in the New Gilded Age,”
Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture, Vol. 14.5, pp 604-605)//SG
Agamben’s notion of ‘bare life’ is clearly recognized at home in the horrific images that followed in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (Giroux, 2006),which exposed a politics of disposability that could not be defined by
invoking the colonial reference of the alleged barbarism of ‘less developed’ countries. On the contrary,TV cameras provided
countless images of hundreds of thousands of poor people, mostly blacks, some Latinos, many elderly,
and a few white people, stranded on rooftops, or isolated on patches of dry highway without any food,
water, or any place to wash, urinate, or find relief from the scorching sun.Newspapers printed shocking stories
about dead people, mostly poor African-Americans, left uncollected in the streets, on porches, in hospitals, nursing homes, electric wheelchairs,
and collapsed houses, prompting some people to claim that New Orleans resembled a ‘Third World Refugee Camp’ (Brooks, 2005). While the
dominant media reduced the Katrina debacle to government incompetence, the real agenda responsible forKatrina
reveals a political
rationality that is closer to Agamben’s metaphor of ‘bare life’. In this case,Katrina revealed the emergence
of a new kind of politics, one in which entire populations are now considered expendable,an unnecessary
burden on state coffers, and consigned to fend for themselves. At the same time, Katrina also revealed what Angela Davis (2005) insists ‘are
very clear signs of . . . impending fascist policies and practices’,which
not only construct an imaginary social environment
for all of those populations rendered disposable but also exemplify a site and space ‘where democracy
has lost its claims’ (pp. 122, 124).The biopolitics of neoliberalism as an instance of ‘bare life’ is not only
coming more and more to the foreground but is also restructuring the terrain of everyday life for vast
numbers of people. As an older politics associated with the social state and the ‘social contract’ (however damaged and racially
discriminating)13 gives way to an impoverished vocabulary that celebrates private financial gain over human lives, public goods, and broad
democratic values,the
hidden inner workings of ‘bare life’ become less of a metaphor than a reality for
millions of people whose suffering and misery moves from benign neglect to malign neglect (Agamben, 1998,
p. 9). Beyond the very visible example of Katrina, there is a host of less visible instances affecting those dehumanized by a politics of
disposability.The
logic of disposability as an instance of ‘bare life’ is visible in the Bush administration’s
indifference to the growing HIV crisis among young black women who ‘represent the highest percentage
(56 percent) of all AIDS cases reported among women, and an increasing proportion of new cases(60
percent)’ (Cromie, 1998). Hidden behind the rhetoric of color blindness and self-help that assists in camouflaging the racist under- pinnings of
the HIV epidemic spreads but gets almost no attention from ‘leaders in public
health, politics, or religion’(cited in ABC Primetime, 2006).14 The politics of bare life also informs the fury of the new nativism in the
much of contemporary society,
United States at dawn of the twenty-first century. Stoked by media panics and the hysterical populist rhetoric of politicians, racist commitments
easily translate into policies targeting poor youth of color as well as immigrant men, women, and children with deportation, incarceration, and
state-backed violence.Extending
the logic of disposability to those defined as ‘other’ through the discourse of
nativism, citizen border patrols and ‘migrant hunters’ urge the government to issue a state of
emergency to stop the flow of immigrants across the United States’ southern border(Buchanan & Holthouse,
2006, pp. 29�32). Leading public intellectuals inhabit the same theoretical discourse as right-wing vigilante groups. For example, internationally
known Harvard University faculty member, Samuel P. Huntington (2004), unapologetically argues in Who Are We? The Challenge to America’s
Identity that Western civilization, as it is said to be represented in the United States, is threatened by the growing presence of HispanicAmericans, especially Mexican-Amer- icans, shamelessly defined as the ‘brown menace’.15 The New York Times (2007a) claims that ‘toughness’
is the new watchword in immigration policy, which translates not only into a boom in immigration detention but also in some cases death to
the new biopolitics of disposability is also
evident in the fact that for many black men and women, the war on drugs signals the emergence of ‘the
prison as the preeminent US racial space’(Singh, 2006, pp. 83�84). Biopolitics combines with biocapital in one of its most
immigrants denied access to essential medicines and healthcare (p. A22). For them,
ruthless expressions as the carceral state increasingly runs for-profit prisons and uses inmates in prison jobs that provide profits for private
contractors while exposing the prisoners to ‘a toxic cocktail of hazardous chemicals’ (Moraff, 2007, pp. 1�3).The
logic of disposability
as an instance of ‘bare life’ also gains expression in the slave-like conditions many guest workers endure
in the United States. Routinely cheated out of wages, held captive by employers who seize their
documents, and often forced to live in squalid conditions without medical benefits, such workers exist in a state
that Congressman Charles Rangel characterizes as ‘the closest thing I’ve ever seen to slavery’, a statement amply supported by the Southern
Poverty Law Center report (2007), Close to Slavery: Guestworker Programs in the United States.The
growing armies of the ‘living
dead’ also include the 750,000 who are homeless in America on any given night(Eaton-Robb, 2007), along with
the swelling ranks of the working poor and unemployed who are either under insured or uninsured and unable to get even minimum health
care. Needless to say,the
examples.
logic of disposability as an instance of ‘bare life’ is clearly visible in all of these
I: Democracy
Expansion of neoliberalism in Latin America destroy any hope of democracy –
increases poverty, exploitation, and risk of economic decline
Spring, Professor and researcher at the National University of Mexico, 2008
(Ursula Oswald, “Globalization from Below: Social Movements and Altermundism — Reconceptualizing Security from a Latin American
Perspective,” Globalization and Environmental Challenges - Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace, Vol 3, 388-91.
SpringerLink.)//SG
Low confidence in institutions and the ambiguous role of the military all over Latin America indicates
also a low trust in democracy. Not only electoral frauds, very long and expensive election campaigns, favouring television
companies, but also corrupt governments, have destroyed the well-being of entire nations. Probably the most dramatic case is Argentina, a
world economic power in the early 19th century. During the crisis at the end of the 1990’s half of its population became impoverished. Similar
processes occurred in all other countries of the subcontinent by transferring wealth from the majority to a tiny minor- ity (tables 26.2, 26.3).
Figure 26.9 expresses this lack of confidence and a mixed feeling with democracy. Debates, collective decision-making, and solidarity belong to
their own system of traditional ruling (Olvera 2002). For
a neo- liberal world of monopolized mass media and centralized decision-making these traditions are too slow. On the other side, the imposition of a world market,
glo- bal capital flows, instant communications, social vul- nerability, imposition of the SAP by IMF, have
reduced hope in democracy and livelihood. In 2005, a study by the Latinobarómetro showed that a great
majority would again prefer a military dictatorship to an economic crisis. These results can be explained by two
decades of loosing income and well-being. Fur- thermore, in many countries in LA the trust in a dem- ocratic government, transparent elections
or changes in the conditions of life through election processes were disappointed, especially in Paraguay, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico with high
degree of distrust (figure 26.9). A social reaction has been a renewed political radicalization in most countries of LA (MST, piqueteros13,
Zapatistas; Ouviña 2005). This has cre- ated a complicated political and institutional situa- tion, but has offered LA an enormous potential for
growth, investment and well-being, and for civil soci- ety to organize better.Mexico,
having a border of more than 3,000 km
with the U.S., was not exempt from these processes of re- gressive globalization. The first economic
crisis and the first SAP agreement imposed by IMF started in 1976. In 1994, Mexico started with a severe
economic crisis in the era of neoliberalism and globalization. Similar crises occurred a few years later in
Asia, Rus- sia, Brazil, and Argentina. However, the crisis of the peasants started earlier, due to the
exhaustion of the model of stable development(CEPAL 1978; IMF 1977), but primarily due to the interests of
the na-tional elite to link up with globalization. The excessive bureaucracy and an inefficient bourgeoisie
controlling the government were unable to cope with a new phase of globalization(Kaplan 2002). The substitution of the import-based modernization process and the rapid urbanization were reducing the rural accu- mulation, and major financial
resources were drained into the urban and industrial sectors. As a result, the rural development was subsumed under the urban and since the
1950’s an important process of urbaniza- tion was underway, making Mexico City the biggest city in the Third World (Negrete/Ruíz 1991). Since
the 1960’s, peasants started to migrate to the U.S., later also to Canada with legal permissions and in the 1980’s, when U.S. migration policy
changed, they became illegal (figure 26.10).Environmental de-
struction, aggravated by climate change, highly subsidized world basic food prices, and since 1982 a rapid opening of the domestic to the global market had
drastically worsened the situation of peasants and in- digenous people. This process of exclusive
globaliza- tion was reinforced with the signing of NAFTA (Ar- royo/Villamar 2002),which reconfigured
traditional alliances and opposition along non-national lines. Un- equal terms of trade in the world market obliged producers to associate themselves within product lines: coffee, pineapple, and fair trade was an alternative for organized peasants to mitigate the
negative affects of dumping and overproduction in the world market. In this context, the Ejército Zapatista de Lib- eración Nacional (EZLN:
Zapatistas) in Chiapas14 surprised the Mexican government and the festivities of the bourgeoisie on 1 January 1994 with a declara- tion of war.
The military response was directly moni- tored by foreign governments and social groups due to a new internet channel controlled by the
Catholic Church (laneta.com), which was at the service of the uprisings. After ten days of intensive repression, inter- national pressure forced
the Mexican government to declare an armistice.Simultaneously, the
public expo- sition of indigenous discrimination
and poverty con-fronted the country with the ‘other Mexico’ (Bonfil 1987) of the poor, ill, abandoned,
and exploited. The apparently modern nation(last under the OECD countries)showed the world how regions and
social groups live in absolute poverty and underdevelopment similar to Haiti and Ethiopia, due to the
unequal de- velopment and resource exploitation.International and national solidarity started, forcing a peace agree- ment;
but both the chamber of deputies and senators objected to the agreed modification of the Constitu- tion, leaving the indigenous population in
the same marginal situation.
Democracy in the neoliberal state simply utilizes a politics of disposability to decide
who get to vote and and who gets to exist – effectively considering all others a
“disposed” population
Giroux, Ph.D. @ Carnegie-Mellon University, Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster
University in the English and Cultural Studies Department, 2008
(Henry A., “Beyond the biopolitics of disposability: rethinking neoliberalism in the New Gilded Age,”
Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture, Vol. 14.5, pp 606-607)//SG
At the dawn of the new millennium, it is commonplace for references to the common good, public trust, and
public service to be either stigmatized or sneered at by people who sing the praises of neoliberalism and
its dream of turning ‘the global economy . . . into a planetary casino’(Castoriadis, 2007, p. 47). Against this dystopian
condition, the American political philosopher, Sheldon Wolin, has argued thatbecause of the increasing power of
corporationsand the emergence of a lawless state (given immense power during the administration of George W. Bush),American
democracy is not only in crisis, it is also characterized by a sense of powerlessness and experiences of
loss. Wolin (2000) claims that this sense of loss is related ‘to power and powerlessness and hence has a claim upon theory’ (p. 3). In making a
claim upon theory,loss aligns itself with the urgency of a crisis, a crisis that demands a new theoretical
discourse while at the same time requiring a politics that involves contemplation, that is, a politics in which
modes of critical inquiry brush up against the more urgent crisis that threatens to shut down even the possibility of critique.For Wolin, the
dialectic of crisis and politics points to three fundamental concerns that need to be addressed as part of
a broader democratic struggle. First, politics is now marked by pathological conditions in which issues of
death are overtaking concerns with life. Second, it is no longer possible to assume that democracy is
tenable within a political system that daily inflicts massive suffering and injustices on weak minorities
and those individuals and groups who exist outside of the privileges of neoliberal values, that is, those
individuals or groupswho exist inwhat Achille Mbembe (2003) calls ‘death-worlds,new and unique forms of social existence in which
vast populations are subjected to conditions of lifeconferring upon them the status of the living dead’(pp. 39�40).Third,
theory in some academic quarters now seems to care more about matters of contemplation and
judgment in search of distance rather than a politics of crisisdriven by an acute sense of justice, urgency, and
intervention. Theory in this instance distances itself from politics, neutered by a form of self-sabotage in which ideas are removed from the
messy realm of politics, power, and intervention. According to Wolin (2000),
Even though [theory] makes references to real-world controversies,its
engagement is with the conditions, or the politics,
of the theoretical that it seeks to settle rather than with the political that is being contested over who
gets what and who gets included. It is postpolitical. (p. 15)
I: Generic
Neoliberalism’s renounces the social state as wasteful as justification for eliminating
government regulation of corporatism, increase tax breaks, and privatization of good,
enterprises, and public responsibility where the democratic state is replaced by the
corporate state
Giroux, Ph.D. @ Carnegie-Mellon University, Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster
University in the English and Cultural Studies Department, 2008
(Henry A., “Beyond the biopolitics of disposability: rethinking neoliberalism in the New Gilded Age,”
Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture, Vol. 14.5, pp 589-90)//SG
Since the late 1970s,we have witnessed the return of the Gilded Age under the aegis of a new and more
ruthless form of market fundamentalism that has been labeled neoliberalism (Touraine, 2001; Duggan, 2003;
Harvey, 2005; Brown, 2005; Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005; Smith, 2005; Ong, 2006; Martin, 2007; Giroux, 2008).3 As a political- economiccultural project,neoliberalism
functions as a regulative force, political rationale, and mode of
governmentality. As a regulative force,neoliberalism organizes a range of flows, including people, capital,
knowledge, and wealth, transforming relations between the state and the economyby renouncing big government
(a code word for the social state)as wasteful and incompetent� except as in the current financial crisis when the bankers who have
been ‘living lives fitting of Gilded Age extravagance’ are now relying on the support of the government to bail them out of financial debt.It
also eliminates government regulation of corporate behavior, provides enormous tax breaks for the rich
and for powerful corporations, pursues free trade agreements, and privatizes government assets, goods,
enterprises, and public responsibilities (Kotz, 2003, p. 16). Essential toneoliberalism’s regulative policies andgoals is
transforming the social state into a corporate state, one that generously sells off public property to transnational
corporations and military contracts to private defense contractors, andone that ultimately provides welfare to an opulent
minority. Government activities and public goods are now given over to the private sphere. Corporations and religious
organizations benefit from government largess while any activity that might interfere with corporate
power and profits is scrapped or dismantled, including environmental regulations, public education, and social welfare
programs.Schools and libraries are now privatized; forests are turned over to logging companies; military
operations are increasingly outsourced to private security firms like Blackwater while private security
services now protect the gated communities of the rich;prisons are now run as for-profit institutions by corporations; and
public highways are managed and leased to private firms. Increasingly, government services are being sold to the lowest bidder. In short,
capital is now being redistributed upwards, as power is being transferred from traditional political localities to transnational
corpora- tions whose influence exceeds the boundaries and constraints formerly regulated by the nation-state. As a mode of rationality,
neoliberalism enables and legitimates the practices of managerialism, deregulation, efficiency, cost-benefit analysis, expanding entrepreneurial
forms, and privatization, all of which function in the interest of ‘extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and social action’
(Brown, 2005, p. 42). As Wendy Brown (2005) points out,
under neoliberalism, [t]he political sphere, along with every
other dimension of contemporary existence, is submitted to an economic rationality; or, put the other
way around, not only is the human being configured exhaustively as homo oeconomicus, but all
dimensions of human life are cast in terms of a market rationality. While this entails submitting every action and policy
to considerations of profitability, equally important is the production of all human and institutional action as rational entrepreneurial action,
conducted according to a calculus of utility, benefit or satisfaction against a microeconomic grid of scarcity, supply and demand, and moral
value-neutrality.Neoliberalism does
not simply assume that all aspects of social, cultural, and political life can
be reduced to such a calculus; rather, it develops institutional practices and rewards for enacting this
vision. (pp. 40�41) Extending this mode of rationality,the neoliberal economy with its relentless pursuit of market
values now encompasses the entirety of human relations. As markets are touted as the driving force of everyday life, big
government is disparaged as inefficient, monopolistic, incompetent and thus a threat to individual and entrepreneurial freedom, suggesting
thatpower
should reside in markets and corporations rather than in governments and citizens. Under
neoliberal rationality, citizens assume the role of entrepreneurial actors, bonded investors, or avid
consumers while the state promotes market values throughout every aspect of the social order. Rather
than fade away as some proponents of globalization would have us believe, the state embraces neoliberal rationally as the regulating principle
of society in that it no longer merely endorses market relations, it now must ‘think and behave like a market actor across all of its functions,
including the law [just as] the health and growth of the economy is the basis of state legitimacy’ (Brown, 2005, p. 42). The social state now
‘This state’s relationship to its citizens resembles that between a corporation
and consumers’(Ferguson, 2008, p. 10).4 Under neoliberalism, everything is either made saleable or plundered for
profit while every effort is made to reconstruct the predatory state at work prior to the New Deal.Public
becomes the ‘market-state’ and
lands are looted by real estate developers and corporate ranchers; politicians willingly hand the public’s airwaves over to broadcasters and
large corporate interests without a dime going into the public trust. Within this rationality,the
democratic state is replaced by the
corporate state and ‘a generalized calculation of cost and benefit becomes the measure of all state
practices’(Brown, 2005, p. 42). As the state openly embraces and responds to the demands of the market,it invites corporations to
drive the nation’s energy policies, and war industries are given the green light to engage in war
profiteering as the government hands out numerous contracts without any competitive bidding.
Similarly, political and natural disasters are turned into entrepreneurial opportunities, which mark the
destruction of the social state, the sale of public infrastructures, the imposition of privatization schemes,
and the privatization of the politics of governance(Klein, 2007; Saltman, 2007a; Saltman, 2007b; Gordon & Gordon, 2008).
Neoliberal policies effect several aspects of Latin Americans
Klak,A PhD in geography and a BA in Geography and Business Administration ,2004(Thomas, The Spaces of Neoliberalism:
Land, Place,and Family in Latin America, The Professional Geographer, 56:1, 151-152)//JS
Since the book’s nine chapters are all aboutLatin America as a whole or case studies therein,there is no
need to repeatedly mention theregion as I survey the contents in the followingparagraphs. Editor
Jacquelyn Chase’s introductorychapter depicts neoliberalism as a hegemonicdiscourse requiring a
critical unpackingand sustained efforts both in scholarship and onthe ground to counter its hegemony.
Chapter 2,by Cristo´ bal Kay, is a characteristically clearlywritten, widely informed review of
agrarianreform over recent decades. Kay concludes thatagrarian reforms have had no single outcome
interms of beneficiaries and losers. However, themost general findings are that the traditionallanded
oligarchy has been reduced, capitalistfarmers have been the principal winners, andonly some
peasants have gained—certainly farfewer than promised.Chapter 3, by Carmen Diana Deere and
MagdalenaLeo´ n, extracts from their 2001 book,Empowering Women: Land and Property Rightsin Latin
America. That work is an insightful,gender-critical analysis of the cultural andinstitutional constraints
operating in twelveLatin American countries that kept womenfrom owning property until recently, and
of thebroader dimensions of inequality associatedwith those restrictions.DeereandLeo´ n’s chapterin
Chase’s book focuses on the tensions arisingbetween the struggles of indigenous peoplesfor collective
land rights and the struggles forgender equity in property rights. Chapter 4,by SorenHvalkof,
documents how indigenouspeople living in the upper Ucaya´li region of eastcentral Peru took collective
and legal action inthe 1990s to successfully secure 4.4 million ha ofland in the form of communal
ownership andreserves. The emancipatory effects are large, as‘‘hundreds of former peons left their
patrons tojoin and form new communities’’ (p. 102), hopefullywith a better life ahead.Chapter 5, by
Chase, describes the adjustmentsthat formerly secure working householdsare making in the town of
Itabira in MinasGerais, Brazil, where a large state mine wasprivatized in 1997. Chase stresses that over
recentdecades, women in this mining town havetaken firm control of their fertility, reducing therate
to below replacement level by 1991. Thishas helped them manage economic challenges,such as the
mine’s closing. Chapter 6, by HelenSafa, explores the gender dynamics in VillaAltagra´cia, a town
located 30 km from SantoDomingo in the Dominican Republic, whoselabor market was once dominated
by men workingin sugar production. By the 1990s, theprincipal employers sought women to
sewgarments in the export-oriented factories. Inwhat Safa terms ‘‘a reassertion of patriarchy’’
(p.152), men demeaned the female factory workersin various ways and took the better jobs. In
turn,women’s main response was to emigrate.Chapter 7, by Stephen Gudeman and AlbertoRiveraGutierrez, describes the behaviors andreactions of average Guatemalans when culturalnorms and
market practices intersect with environmentalconcerns. The Guatemalan communitiesfeatured in this
chapter go unnamed.It is unclear whether this is to protect theresidents or for other reasons that the
authorschoose not to disclose. Chapter 8, by AgustinEscobar Latapi and Mercedes Gonzales de laRocha,
depicts working-class survival strategiesin Mexico’s second largest city, Guadalajara,since the 1970s
and the end of the era of importsubstitution. Residents have had to developmore creative survival
strategies due to fallingwages and increasing consumer costs associatedwith neoliberal restructuring
of Mexico’s politicaleconomy. The most revealing aspect of thischapter is the way it depicts
Guadalajara ashaving been profoundly transformed over recentdecades as an outcome of changes
operatingat different geographical scales. Thesescale-varying changes include production
systems,policies, work opportunities, migration,and familial relations.The most intriguing chapter of the
book isleft for last. Chapter 9, by Oriol Pi-Sunyer,describes the complex interface of
tourism,development, and Mayan culture in QuintanaRoo, a southeastern Mexican state that wasuntil
recently ‘‘a region of refuge, a cultural andphysical space protected from outside pressuresby distance
and inaccessibility’’ (p. 230). Thechapter usefully shows how Mayan peoplecontend with a daunting
array of externallyoriginating forces, from international pressuresto develop archeological sites for
tourism andthe creation of locally insensitive protectedzones that are off limits to the people
whohave worked the land for generations to hugepopulation inflows, massive forest-clearing, aheavy
military presence, and neoliberal impactssuch as privatization.
I: Mexico
Neoliberal policies hurt Mexican workers, labor mobility, and economy—precludes aff
solvency
Otero, Professor of Sociology at Simon Fraser University 11 (Gerardo, “Neoliberal Globalization, NAFTA, and Migration: Mexico's Loss of Food
and Labor Sovereignty”, Journal of Poverty 15:4, 2011, University of Michigan Libraries)//AS
This article explores the way in which the U.S. economy has faced the crisis of the Fordist stage of capitalism since the 1970s by focusing on a
cheap-labor strategy to restore profitability. By
endorsing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), U.S. officials
ensured access to an abundant supply of labor south of the border. For their part, Mexico's political
technocrats placed their bet for economic growth on the comparative advantage of cheap labor. This has been
a losing bet for the workers of both countries: Neoliberalism and Mexico's integration into the North American
economy—without free labor mobility—have had a detrimental impact, particularly on Mexico. The counterpart
of its loss of food self-sufficiency by growing dependency on U.S.-grains imports has been the loss of
labor sovereignty. Defined as the ability of a nation to generate employment with livable wages for the vast majority of the population,
labor sovereignty has been a casualty of Mexico's economic integration with its northern neighbors .
The most visible result of this loss has been substantially increased out-migration rates, with vast numbers of displaced
Mexican workers flowing into the United States in search for work, most often unauthorized or undocumented.
More specifically, this article explores the relation between food self-sufficiency and labor sovereignty in the midst of Mexico's integration to its
northern neighbors, especially to the U.S. economy. It compares and contrasts food self-sufficiency in the three NAFTA countries around
production for the domestic market, per-capita calorie consumption, and overall food trade. The main proposition is that food-self-sufficiency is
a condition for a country to enjoy labor sovereignty, as defined above. Of the three NAFTA nations, Mexico is the least self-sufficient, and hence
the one that expels the largest rate of migrants. Although Mexico's exports of fruits and vegetables to the United States and Canada increased
substantially since the late 1980s, this sector did not generate nearly enough employment to absorb bankrupted peasants. Therefore,
Mexico has become dependent on the importation of basic-subsistence grains, which used to be
produced by smallholder peasant farmers. Many peasants became redundant in the Mexican economy, and their only way
out, literally, has been to migrate to the United States or Canada. Although most migrants to Canada (a small minority) enter that country as
part of state-sponsored guest worker programs (Otero & Preibisch, 2010), the vast majority of migrants to the United States do so as
undocumented or unauthorized workers. The
presence of large masses of low-skill workers in the United States,
authorized or not, raises huge issues of labor rights, discrimination, and exclusion. It has been documented
that there is an inverse relation between numbers and rights (Ruhs & Martin, 2008): the more migrant
workers there are in rich countries, the fewer their rights are, and vice versa. The fact is that employer demand for
workers is “negatively sloped” with respect to labor costs, which means that more rights for migrants typically means higher costs. In North
America, the United States tends to have much higher “numbers” than rights, whereas Canada tries to fit the Scandinavian model of fewer
numbers and more rights. But numbers of guest workers in Canada have started to outpace the numbers of immigrants as permanent residents
or citizens as of 2006, which raises the question whether both of NAFTA's rich countries are converging toward the numbers side of the
equation to the detriment of workers' rights. One question about the numbers-rights tradeoff is what can human and labor rights policy makers
and activists envision in addressing it? As is seen below, answers to this question will depend on the perspective one takes in migration
debates. Although this article briefly addresses this concern, its main goal is to address the root causes of Mexico's out-migration: its growing
food dependency and its consequent loss of labor sovereignty. Consistent with this focus, the main structural solutions to workers' rights would
lie in fixing Mexico's agrarian structure. Yet, though this issue is not addressed, those concerned with human and labor rights will have to
address its effects on migrants in the United States.
Their evidence is flawed – market liberalization reforms only results in hyperinflation,
stagnation, and increased debts
Gates, Ph.D in Anthropology @ University of British Colombia, Professor of Anthropology at Simon
Fraser University, 1996
(Marilyn, “The Debt Crisis and Economic Restructuring:Prospects for Mexican Agriculture,,” NEOLIBERALISM REVISITED – Economic
Restructuring and Mexico's Political Future, edited by Gerardo Otero, Westview Press, pg 47)//SG
The pace of economic liberalization via deregulation, tax reform, and priva- tization, gradual at first,
accelerated after 1986 when Mexico entered the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GATT). However, these major re-
structuring initiatives had little immediate effect in terms of the promotion of economic recovery.
Inflation rose to 160 percentby the end of 1987, the econ- omy overall continued to stagnatedespite diversification
efforts, and the inter- nal debt burgeoned to 15 percentof gross domestic product (GDP) (IMP Survey, 10 July 1989) even
though extensiveefforts were made to cut govern- ment costs, for example through the sale of inefficient state
enterprises.In response to these worsening conditions, the de la Madrid administrationintroduced a comprehensive antiinflationary
program in December 1987 based on a pact among the government, organized labor, the formal peasant organi- zations, and private business
sectors, the Pacto de Solidaridad Económica (PSE, the Pact for Economic Solidarity). This program of wage and price controls succeeded in
reducing inflation to 52 percent by the end of 1988. Nevertheless, economic
activity remained weak, as real GDP grew by
only 1.1 percent in1988 despite increased privatesector investment activity, and consumption rose by less
than 1 percent in real terms(IMP Survey, 10 July 1989).
Neoliberal policies in Mexico resulted in the privatization of lands depriving citizens of
the constitutional guarantee to receive land
Kim, Politics & History student and the University of Alberta in Alberta, 2012
(Dongwoo, “Modernization or Betrayal: Neoliberalism in Mexico,” Constellations, Volume 4.1 2012, pg 227)//SG
In February 1992,
Carlos Salinas took an even bolder step with his neoliberal economic policy and amended
Article 27 to effectively privatize the lands. Under the amendments, Mexicans were deprived of the
constitutional guarantee of receiving land from the government; the government lost the authority to
expropriate and distribute lands; and the farmers were allowed to purchase, sell, or rent out their properties on the market.44
Wesley Smith, writing for a conservative policy periodical, praised the implementation of this land reform as a policy that would effectively
improve “Mexico’s antiquated agricultural sector” and prepare the local economy for the implementation of NAFTA.45The Salinas
administration defended this policy on the grounds that this would dramatically improve the
productivity of the countryside, which did not fare well in comparison to the industrial sector, and also to attract foreign
investments.46 Rosaria Angela Pisa argues that thenew land reforms were used by the PRI regime to gain a tighter
control of the countryside, especially before the 1994 General Elections, which paralleled the idea of the democratic façade that it
had been perpetuating throughout the twentieth century.47 In all fairness,the productivity eventually increased in these
lands and the former ejido reform was not doing enough for Mexican farmers—but many felt uneasy
about this transition.Benito, a farmer, echoed this general feeling when he angrily said that his neighbor “shouldn’t be selling his land,
even if it is now the law.”48The trope of neoliberalism as the ultimate betrayal becomes clearer with the
rhetoric of imperialism. Many Mexicans and foreign observers displayed concerns about the possible
unbalance of economic benefits between the United States and Mexico. The NAFTA negotiation was in a way
described as selling out of Mexico to the foreigners. Ramón, a farmer from Mexquitic, associated the PRI presidents with “Spaniards,” drawing
“a multivocal symbol of capitalism, greed, and foreignness,” the characteristics that symbolized the United States.49 As such, the neoliberal
policies were then associated with the Salinas government and the American imperialists.
I: Revolutions
Neoliberal policies are perceived as the state’s betrayal of the government – triggers
revolutions
Kim, Politics & History student and the University of Alberta in Alberta, 2012
(Dongwoo, “Modernization or Betrayal: Neoliberalism in Mexico,” Constellations, Volume 4.1 2012, pg 221)//SG
The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN)launched an insurrection on the very date in which the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect—January 1st, 1994. Clearly,it was a powerful act of
protest and denouncement against the series of neoliberal economic policies, which culminated with the
successful negotiation of NAFTA, undertaken by the administration of Carlos Salinas. However,the Neo-Zapatistas, who claimed to speak
on behalf of other disempowered Mexican pueblo, denounced more than the neoliberal reforms themselves;they attacked the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI), which had been in power for more
than six decades since 1929,for being traitors to the Mexican pueblo. Indeed, many Mexicans, especially those in the
marginalized sectors of the economy, sympathized with the EZLN in this regard.Neoliberalism, introduced mainly by NAFTA,
challenged the values formed during the Mexican Revolution, which had become key elements of the
Mexican nationalism. These values were enshrined in the Constitution of 1917 andwhen the Salinas government
introduced neoliberal reforms, the Mexican pueblo regarded its actions as an effective betrayal and
denial of the promises of the Mexican Revolution. Furthermore, this perception of “betrayal” undermined
the political and social legitimacy of the PRI government, which had appropriated the images of the Revolution to
legitimize its dictatorial rule. In order to make the case that the introduction of neoliberalism was a betrayal of the promises of the Constitution
of 1917, I first lay out the historical context that led to the introduction of neoliberalism into Mexico and its discursive construction by the PRI
regime. Then, I demonstrate how these neoliberal reforms were considered traitorous to the marginalized people and contrasted from the
visions of the PRI government.
Alt
Total Rejection
Unique moment for rejection of capitalism—only a total rejection will suffice
Resnick and Wolff, professors of economics at Amherst and Visiting Professor in the Graduate Program in International Affairs of
the New School University (Wolff) 03 (Stephen and Richard, “Exploitation, Consumption, and the Uniqueness of US Capitalism”, Historical
Materialism 11:4, Brill)//AS
The toll taken on workers' lives has been profound, and never more than at present. Stressed and collapsed
household class structures, severe psychological and physical strains, civic isolation and personal
loneliness, violence and despair are US capitalism's weaknesses and failures just as surely as rising rates of exploitation
and real wages are its successes. 'I`heopportunities for a socialist critique to be embraced are therefore
abundant in the US. Responding to those opportunities will require a shift away from defining class in terms of
wealth and property and away from programmes focused too narrowly on raising real wages. That plays to US capitalism's strength
and not its weaknesses. Of course, low wages, poor working conditions, and job insecurities will remain targets of socialist critique, but
eradicating them will be only part of a renewed socialism. Much the
greater part will connect the dominant organisation
of the surplus - capitalist exploitation - to the host of profound problems and sufferings now
experienced by the mass of US citizens. Such a socialism would make the end of exploitation an
indispensable component of its programme and vision. To paraphrase the old man once more: not higher wages
but the abolition of the wage system is the point. To demand less for the victims of capitalist exploitation would be
the equivalent of demanding better rations for the slaves rather than the abolition of slavery.
A rejection away from the capitalist state is not a rejection of democracy, the status
quo creates a fake republic which only supports the elites, democracy can only be best
achieved in localized forms that come from a break in the capitalist order
Kurki, PhD @ University of Wales, Professor in International Relations Theory @ University of Wales,
Aberystwyth, 13 Feb 2013
(Milja, “Politico-Economic Models of Democracy in Democracy Promotion,” International Studies
Perspectives, pg 10-11)//SG
If reform liberals and social democrats saw a balance to be struck between capi- talism and democracy, there are others that go much further
and argue thatdemocracy
is impossible to achieve, or remains radically incomplete or imper- fect, under a
capitalist order. The Marxist critique of bourgeois democracy was central in developing this line of argument, but others—from
participatory democrats to critical theorists—have followed and refined it.Marxists are perhaps the most ferocious critics of capitalist
democracy. They see the notion as a fundamental contradiction, foryou
cannot have any meaningful democracy under
capitalism. Bourgeois capitalist democracy is seen as a narrow and compromised version of democracy.
The key claim of Marxism is thatdemocracy, as it has developed in its current form under the historical pressures
of a capitalist mode of production, can never function adequately in bringing about true democracy. A
representativeliberal system of democracy, Marxists argue,isnecessarilycompromised by the workings of power
structures within capitalist society. Capitalist democracy is just that: democracy for the capi- talists. It
excludes and silences the working classes and hides under the veil of false consciousness the deep
socioeconomic forms of oppression in society. For a true democracy to come into beingthe socioeconomic
structures of society will have to be radically transformed. Democracy will not work without economic justice and
equality. This means thatto gain a true democracy, there must be a change in the social and economic
underpinnings of a society too, not just in the “upper rungs” of political society.Marx’s writings also gave an
indication of what a democracy might look like before a global communist revolution had taken place. The delegative model of democracy that
Marx envisaged in his commentary on the Paris Commune (Marx 1978) entailed the equalization of wages and economic relations between
citizens and directly revocable forms of delegative representation of people on multiple levels of communes. Later,Marxists took these
ideas in a different direction: Lenin ended up advocating a vanguard party approach, while parliamentary Marxists continued to advocate at least a minimal role for parliamentary representation of
communist ideals(see e.g. Lenin, 1933; Mayo 1955; Carillo 1977). These variations raise some concerns about whether there is any real
coherent notion of democracy within Marxist thought. Whatever the case, what is of interest to us is that at the center of
the Marxist critique of democracy has been challenging the self-evidence of capitalist democracy, in
favor of true democracy, which, in whatever form, would have to entail equalization of eco- nomic
relations. In recent years, many more analyses have emerged supporting these findings: The clash between democratic and capitalist logics
has been highlighted by vari- ous researchers. Chomsky’s (see e.g. 1992; 1999) critiques of democracy in the West are well known, but nuanced
analyses have also been advanced by critical theorists and neo-Gramscians (Robinson 1996). Neo-Gramscians draw on Gramsci’s emphasis
onideological forms of domination
in modern society and emphasize, not unlike Marx, the need to
recognize and overcome the ideological attach- ment of the idea of democracy to a capitalist market
system¨It, moreover, does not aim for real democracy in target societies but rather remains content
with the advocacy of a truncated and narrow notion of democ- racy: liberal representative “electoral” democracy,
which is easily used by capital- ist elites as a way of cutting the power base of market-unfriendly forces, such as trade unions (Gills, Rocamora,
and Wilson 1993; Robinson 1996). Thus, the neo-Gramscians remain skeptical of arguments that portray capitalism and democracy as
complementary:Capitalism
is in fact disenabling of any “true” “deeper” sense of democracy and facilitates
only an inherently narrow and unsat- isfactory democratic vision.
The alternative is to form a pressure group to redefine human ideals and let the
process of breaking away from capitalism take hold
Serrano and Xhafa,a PhD candidate in Labour Studies at the University of Milan, Italy, 2011, (Melisa and Edlira, “The
Quest for Alternative beyond (Neoliberal) Capitalism” Pub. GLU http://www.global-labouruniversity.org/fileadmin/GLU_Working_Papers/GLU_WP_No.14.pdf)//JS
An alternative then involves “making possible tomorrow that which appears impossible today”
(Harnecker 2007, 70). This implies identifying what is progressive in the present reality and
strengthening it. It also implies the need for the popular movement to organize, grow and transform
itself into a decisive pressure group to move the process forward, fighting against errors and
deviations that arise along the way. Echoing Marx, Lebowitz (2003, 180) stresses that “even though the
needs they attempt to satisfy do not in themselves go beyond capital, the very process of struggle is
one of producing new people, of transforming them into people with a new conception of
themselves--as subjects capable of altering their world.” Without doubt, the initiatives and projects
undertaken in the case studies imbibe values and offer socio-economic arrangements that are not
within the capitalist canon. Though they are not dramatic breaks from capitalism and their survival
depends on competing successfully in local and global markets in a predominantly capitalist regime,
their achievements “embody forms of production and sociability beyond the capitalist values and
institutions” (De Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito 2006, xxi). In other words, they open spaces for
the further transformation of capitalist values and socio-economic arrangements. GLU | The Quest for
Alternatives beyond (Neoliberal) Capitalism 69 The quality of counter-consciousness is shaped partly by
an `independent change agenda’ or vision for social transformation (the contribution of intellectuals).
The process of counter-consciousness is multi-dimensional, empowering, and allows for the discovery
and development of new capacities and non-capitalist practices.
Do Nothing
Thus the alternative is to do nothing – Latin American countries reject neoliberalism
now and their societies create relations that are of mutual advantage
Dubhashi, Ph.D. at Pune University, former Vice-Chanceller, Goa University, and an erstwhile Secretary,
Government of India, December 20, 2008
(Padmakar, “Myth and Reality of Capitalism: Neo-Liberalism and Globalisation,” MAINSTREAM, VOL
XLVII, NO 1, http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1111.html)//SG
THE theory, rather myth, of neo-liberalisation that the market is always efficient and right and public service
is always inefficient and public intervention and regulation always wrong has not worked well in reality. In fact, it has proved a
disaster to the well-being of the common people who have not benefited from the so-called “trickledown effect”. As this realisation has grown, a reaction against neo-liberalism has set in. (a) Latin America—
Country after country has thrown out military rulers and their neo-liberal 7“democratic” successors.
They have elected Left-of-Centre governments: Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Lula de Silva in Brazil, Rafael Corera in Equador,
Krichner in Argentina, Michelle Bachlet in Chile and Evo Morales in Bolivia. (1) They have renationalised the ownership and
management of natural resources for their use for public benefit and public service. In Venezuela Chavez gave
top priority to cooperative enterprise by offering incentives. By 2006, there were 100,000 coops in the country employing more than 700,000
workers. (2)
They have started social welfare programmes discontinued during the military regimes and
their neo-liberal successors. (3) They have asserted their economic sovereignty and refused to go to the IMF and World Bank for
assistance, since they are no longer willing to accept their conditionalities. As a result the business of both these institutions has diminished.
In 2005, Latin American countries accounted
for 80 per cent of the IMF’s lending portfolio. In 2007 it was reduced to one per cent. The IMF’s worldwide
lending portfolio has fallen from $ 81 to $ 15 - $ 11.8. It has become a pariah and has started withering away. (4) They have countered
US domination by building “regional organisation” of Latin American countries. Under the auspices of
the organisation there is a barter between the health services provided by Cuba and petrol supplied by
Venezuela. Such barter exchanges have been found to be of mutual advantage.
They don’t want to listen any longer to their “expert advice” of “shock therapy”.
Neoliberalism is creating its own downfall—movements gathering political steam
against it—alt is to reject the neoliberal policies of the aff and allow it to fall
Lafer, political economist and is an Associate Professor at the University of Oregon's Labor Education and Research Center 04 (Gordon,
“Neoliberalism by other means: the “war on terror” at home and abroad”, New Political Science 26:3, 2004, Taylor and Francis)//AS
Finally, the
“global justice” movement that came together in the Seattle 1999 protests against the WTO
marked the potential birth of a massive and powerful new movement challenging corporate
prerogatives. It is easy to overestimate the importance of the Seattle protests.The few days of unity did not undo the many differences
between the various protest groups. And the months following Seattle were filled with “where do we go from here?” discussions that never
achieved a satisfactory answer. It is
not clear that the coalition that assembled in Seattle deserves to be called a
“movement.” However, even as a first step with an uncertain future, the import of these protests was
potentially earth-shaking. Essentially, the anti-WTO protests undid fissures that had fractured progressive
organizations for at least four decades. At least since the Vietnam war, the history of whatever might be called the American
“left” has been primarily characterized by fragmentation. In place of the Old Left’s unity around class, the New Left led to multiple and often
conflicting agendas organized around various forms of identity politics. While feminist, civil rights and labor organizations might come together
around specific political issues, the alliances were generally short-lived and superficial. Most important from an economic point of view, the
labor movement throughout the 1970s and 1980s was largely alienated from the most energetic social change movements. The incredible
accomplishment of Seattle was to forge a coalition that overcame these differences in opposition to a
common enemy. For union members, Seattle was possible because 20 years of jobs going overseas and management invoking the threat
to relocate as a strategy for slashing wages had made “globalization” a gut-level rank and file issue. Thus the process of
neoliberalism finally created its own antithesis in a labor movement that was ready to join with
youth, environmentalists and immigrant organizations in fighting the power. From a corporate viewpoint, the
divisions that for 30 years had so effectively kept the various parts of the “left” from coming together were threatening to dissolve.
The revolution is an inevitable and essential part of political change in Latin America—
otherwise political oppression and societal collapse will occur
LaFeber, Marie Underhill Noll Professor Emeritus of History and a Stephen H. Weiss Presidential Fellow in the Department of History at
Cornell University, one of the United States' most distinguished historians 93 -- (Walter, “Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central
America”, 1/17/93, http://books.google.com/books/about/Inevitable_Revolutions.html?id=RqMp5TsWCqkC)//AS
From at least the early nineteenth century, \Washington officials havebelieved they had to "win"• such revolutions. Otherwise, they feared,
anexhausted and unwary revolutionary government might be susceptible todangerous outside influences. By
its nature a revolution
is unpredictable.lt "can't be bound be th' niles iv th' game," humorist Finley PeterDunne (alias "Mr. Dooley") tried to tell Theodore
Roosevelt's genera-tion, "because it's again' th' rules iv th' game." Resembling loose cannonrolling across the deck on an out-of-control ship,
revolutions in an area assea-tossed as Central America could threaten interests that North Amer-icans have historically considered essential to
their safety.For
the United States, capitalism and military security went hand-in- hand. They have, since the
nineteenth century, formed two sides of the same policy in Central America. Early on, the enemy was Great Britain.After
1900 it became Germany. Only after \World War I were thosedangers replaced by a Soviet menace. Fencing out Communists (or Brit-ish, or
Germans) preserved the area for North American strategic inter-ests and profits. That goal was not argued. The problem arose
whenWashington officials repeatedly had to choose which tactic best pre-served power and profits: siding with the status quo for at least the
shortterm, or taking a chance on radical change that might (or might not)lead to long-term stability. Given the political and economic
pressures,that choice was predetermined. As former Secretary of State DeanAchmon observed, there is nothing wrong with short-term
stability."When you step on a banana peel you have to keep from falling on yourtail, you don't want to be lurching all over the place all the
time. Short-term stability is all right, isn't it? Under the circumstances." The "cir-cumstances"• Achcson alluded to were the revolutions that
began toappear in the newly emerging countries during the l9§O$.llWhen
applied to Central America, Acheson's view
missed a central tenet of the region's history: revolutions have served the functions of elections in the
United States; that is, they became virtually the only method of transferring power and bringing about
needed change."•/\cheson'sshort-term stability too often tumcd out to be Washington's method for
ensuring that Central American oligarehs did not have to answer to their fellow citizens.The revolutionaries
of the 17705 thus had less and less to say to therevolutionaries of the 19705 and 19805. The latter were more anticapital-ist, pro-statist, and
concerned much less with social stability than werethe former. These differences appeared as the upheavals increased innumber and intensity.
"The real issue facing American foreign policy_ .Hans Morgenthau remarked in the early |97os, "is not how topreserve stability in the face of
revolution, but how to create stability outof revolution.""• Morgenthau had rephrased Lodgc's point. Revolutions
in such areas as
Central America were inevitable. The only choice was whether North Americans would work with
those revolutionaries to achieve a more orderly and equitable society, or whether-as occurred inGuatemala
and Nicaragua-Washington officials would try to cap the upheavals until the pressure built again to blow the
societies apart with even greater force.
Ethical Obligation
***There is an ethical obligation to speak out against the violence neoliberalism
inflicts on the Other—critical to transformative politics
Springer,assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Victoria12 (Simon, “Neoliberalising violence: of the
exceptional and the exemplary in coalescing moments”, Area 44:2, Royal Geographical Society, 2012, Wiley Online)//AS
‘Neoliberalising
violence’ signifies the increasingly fantastic character of violence as our political
imaginaries knowingly and unknowingly come to embrace the anomie and social disarticulation of neoliberalism's
dystopia of individualism. Within neoliberalism's imaginative geographies of a global village, what is not spoken is the
desire for a particular homogeneity, an impulse to remake the ‘Other’ in ‘our’ image, whereby the
space of ‘the peculiar’, ‘the exotic’, ‘the bizarre’ is continually (re)produced through the relation of the ban. As an
ascendant form of sovereignty that attempts to (re)constitute class power (Harvey 2005) and maintain hegemony through the production of a
series of ongoing crises or ‘shocks’ used to pry national economies open to global markets (Klein 2007), neoliberalism
exaggerates
the abandonment that calls the state of exception into being. To Agamben (2005), the state of exception
relies on conditions of crises, wherein individual rights may be diminished, superseded and rejected in
the process of extending existing governmental power structures. Insofar as neoliberalism is a praxis of socio-spatial
transformation that proceeds as both a quantitative destruction and discreditation entailing the ‘roll-back’ of certain state functions, and a
qualitative construction and consolidation, which sees the ‘roll-out’ of reconfigured economic management systems and an invasive social
agenda centred on urban order, surveillance and policing, the
very logic behind neoliberalism's exigent modalities
melds with the state of exception. Indeed, the state of exception ‘marks a threshold at which logic and praxis blur with each other
and a pure violence’ is realised (Agamben 2005, 40). The abandonment of ‘Others’ that forms the state of exception
is a relation where ‘outside and inside . . . become indistinguishable’ (Agamben 1998, 21), and thus, as with all
fantasies and desires, at the heart of neoliberalism's chimera of strength and confidence lurks a deep sense
of anxiety. This is not a disquiet without consequence, but one that licenses particular violent geographies in ensuring that the ‘tableau of
queerness’ (Said 1978) never disrupts its visions of global sovereignty. And it is here that we find another sense of the
fantastic, one of heightened intensity and extraordinary degree, where the sheer volume of violence
that pervades our contemporary world signals the looming spectre of the ‘banality of evil’ . This is a
clichéd and mundane force, an evil whose potential resides within each and every one of us, and
whose belligerence is cultivated, harvested and consumed under the premises of neoliberalism . Fantasy
and reality collide under neoliberalisation, and our participation in this process allows for the normative
entrenchment of violence against the marginalised and disaffected ‘Other’ to signify a moment of abandonment.
Yet this thanatogeography of fantastic violence is not the conclusion of neoliberalism's violent fantasy; rather, it is its genesis. To the question
of ‘where does neoliberalism's exceptional violence end and its exemplary violence begin?’, the terrifying answer is to be found in Martin
Niemöller's celebrated poem ‘First they came. . .’: /First they came for the Socialists,/ and I did not speak out,/ because I was not a Socialist./
Then they came for the Trade Unionists,/ and I did not speak out,/ because I was not a Trade Unionist./ Then they came for the Jews,/ and I did
not speak out,/ because I was not a Jew./ Then they came for me,/ and there was no one left/ to speak for me./ In this somber realisation, and
in echoing Marx, radical
human geography must not merely seek to interpret the world; it must seek to change it by
aligning its theory and practice on all occasions and in all instances to the service of social justice
(Springer forthcoming b). By seeking to illuminate how processes of neoliberalisation are suffused with both
exceptional and exemplary violence, we open our geographical imaginations to the possibility of
(re)producing space in ways that make possible a transformative and emancipatory politics. This ‘age of
resurgent imperialism’ (Hart 2006) demands such courage of our scholarship. As members of the human collectivity, geographers have
an ethical obligation to speak out, not only for fear that any single one of us might be ‘next’, but more
importantly, as an act of solidarity with those who the violence of neoliberalism has already come for ,
and those who have been silenced by the complacency of a stifled collective imagination that views neoliberalism as a monolithic and
inexorable force.
Debate Space Key
***We must recognize that we have a choice in order to dismantle neoliberalism—
public debate is a critical arena
Hay, Professor of Political Analysis at the University of Sheffield04 (Colin, “The normalizing role of rationalist assumptions in the
institutional embedding of neoliberalism”, Economy and Society 33:4, 2004, Taylor and Francis)//AS
Accordingly, however
depoliticized and normalized neoliberalism has become, it remains a political and
economic choice, not a simple necessity. This brings us naturally to the question of alternatives. A number of points might here
be made which follow fairly directly from the above analysis. First, our ability to offer alternatives to neoliberalism rests
now on our ability to identify that there is a choice in such matters and, in so doing, to demystify and
deconstruct the rationalist premises upon which its public legitimation has been predicated. This, it
would seem, is a condition of the return of a more normative and engaging form of politics in which more is at
stake than the personnel to administer a largely agreed and ostensibly technical neoliberal reform agenda. Second, the present custodians of
neoliberalism are, in many cases, reluctant converts, whose accommodation to neoliberalism is essentially borne of perceived pragmatism and
necessity rather than out of any deep 522 Economy and Society Downloaded by [Emory University] at 12:12 28 June 2013 normative
commitment to the sanctity of the market. Thus, rather than defend neoliberalism publicly and in its own terms, they have sought instead to
appeal to the absence of a choice which might be defended in such terms. Consequently, political
discourse is technocratic
rather than political. Furthermore, as Peter Burnham has recently noted, neoliberalism is itself a deeply depoliticizing
paradigm (2001), whose effect is to subordinate social and political priorities, such as might arise from a more
dialogic, responsive and democratic politics, to perceived economic imperatives and to the ruthless efficiency of
the market. As I have sought to demonstrate, this antipathy to ‘politics’ is a direct correlate of public choice theory’s projection of its most
cherished assumption of instrumental rationality onto public officials. This is an important point, for it suggests the crucial role
played by stylized rationalist assumptions, particularly (as in the overload thesis, public choice theory more generally and even
the time-inconsistency thesis) those which relate to the rational conduct of public officials, in contributing to the depoliticizing dynamics now
reflected in political disaffection and disengagement. As this perhaps serves to indicate, seemingly
innocent assumptions may
have alarmingly cumulative consequences. Indeed, the internalization of a neoliberalism predicated on
rationalist assumptions may well serve to render the so-called ‘rational voter paradox’ something of a
self-fulfilling prophecy.12 The rational voter paradox _/ that in a democratic polity in which parties behave in a ‘rational’ manner it is
irrational for citizens to vote (since the chances of the vote they cast proving decisive are negligible) _/ has always been seen as the central
weakness of rational choice theory as a set of analytical techniques for exploring electoral competition. Yet, as the above analysis suggests, in a
world constructed in the image of rationalist assumptions, it may become depressingly accurate. Political parties behaving in a narrowly
‘rational’ manner, assuming others (electors and market participants) to behave in a similarly ‘rational’ fashion will contribute to a dynamic
which sees real electors (rational or otherwise) disengage in increasing numbers from the facade of electoral competition. That this is so is only
reinforced by a final factor. The
institutionalization and normalization of neoliberalism in many advanced
liberal democracies in recent years have been defended in largely technical and rationalist terms and
in a manner almost entirely inaccessible to public political scrutiny, contestation and debate. The
electorate, in recent years, has not been invited to choose between competing programmatic
mandates to be delivered in office, but to pass a judgement on the credibility and competence of the respective candidates for high office
to behave in the appropriate (technical) manner in response to contingent external stimuli. Is it any wonder that they have chosen, in increa
increasing numbers, not to exercise any such judgement at all at the ballot box?
Political space for resistance must be created through discussion
Jenson, chair of the political science department at the University of Montreal, 10 (Jane, “Diffusing Ideas for After Neoliberalism”, Global
Social Policy 10:59, 2010, Sage Publications)//AS
The first mechanism that supported the emergence of a social investment perspective is an environmental one. Political
space is an
essential ingredient in policy learning (Murphy, 2006: 210). Even while neoliberalism still held sway, this mechanism
worked to expand the political space for discussions of alternatives to standard neoliberalism whose
proponents had made TINA – there is no alternative – their mantra. Initially the two regions remained quite separate,
one space being created within the world of the agencies of development and a second in Europe. In the world of development agencies,
criticism targeted the structural adjustment paradigm, promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions and by ‘institutions
and networks of opinion leaders … including “think tanks, politically sophisticated investment bankers, and world finance ministers, all those
who meet each other in Washington and collectively define the conventional wisdom of the moment”’ (Murphy, 2006: 221, citing Paul
Krugman). Opposition
to the TINA mantra appeared in organizations less committed to this Washington
Consensus. The UN agency that many thought could – and should – confront the World Bank’s structural adjustment template was the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), but it chose not to do so. ‘UNDP’s low profile left the job of directing the public battle of
ideas to UNICEF’ (Murphy, 2006: 227, see also 223ff.).
Social Economy
Reject the neoliberal policies to realize the value of life instead of the aff’s
quantifiable relationship designed to make a profit
Golob, Podnar, &Lah, They are Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia,
2009 (Ursa, Klement, Marko, “Social economy and social responsibility: Alternatives to global anarchy
of neoliberalism?”International Journal of Social Economics Emerald Group Publishing Found on ABI
Inform)
The essence of social economy is, indisputably, a synergy between economic and social which
distinguishes social economy from neoliberalism that focuses on quantifiable things rather than on a
person. "Sociality" of social economy is reflected in the notion of balance on the market - an agreement
between buyers and vendors, whereasneoliberalism is occupied with a balance between supply and
demand on the abstract level ([30] O'Boyle, 1999). A motivation for economy within the framework of
social economy is care for common good, whereas neoliberalismadvocates the allocation of wealth
through the process of satisfying individual interests. Social economy defines an individual as a social
being, whereas neoliberalism defines an individual as an individual who follows his/her personal
interests ([29] O'Boyle, 1994). A social state is typical of socially oriented economy,
whilst neoliberalism defines the state as an accelerator of economy liberalisation and as a protector of
free market. The two also differ in their views of a company as a cell in economy. According to the
prevalent and in this field especially deep-rooted belief ofneoliberalism, a company's role is to
maximise its profit and to primarily care for the shareholders' interests. The alternative socialeconomic view, on the other hand, stresses the role of a company as an actor in solving social issues
and protecting the rights of various stakeholders (Table I [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]).
The social economy needs the support of all key factors of the neoliberal economy to
start a policy of interdependence rather than stabilizing tensions
Golob, Podnar, &Lah, They are Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 2009(Ursa,
Klement, Marko, “Social economy and social responsibility: Alternatives to global anarchy of neoliberalism?” International
Journal of Social Economics Emerald Group Publishing Found on ABI Inform)//JS
Modern global society is surrounded by new circumstances that require the creation of new meanings
and new activities. In this paper, we argued that a so-called commercial or for-profit economy should
not emerge as an opposite pole that cannot be integrated into the notion of social economy. However,
it should understand broadly the fact of the interrelation between the for-profit sector and society to be
able to advance its social elements in an evolutional way.Hence, the solution to this is the new model
of social economy which can be put in force only by simultaneous cooperation of all key actors in a
society, especially a driving force behind the existing economic system - the for-profit sector. Lately it
seems that its actors have, indeed, more actively take over their role within social economy, especially
since the beginnings of socially responsible behaviour.While most of the businesses are aware of the
constant public pressures and risks, they are not quite certain what to do with them. As argued by
[32] Porter and Kramer (2006) most changes until now have been rather cosmetic not substantial glossy CSR reports, media campaigns and isolated actions. To overcome this and the fact that
corporations mainly focus their actions on the tensions between business and society rather than on
their interdependence they suggest a strategic approach to CSR to pursue policies of shared value that
would be beneficial for both sides ([32] Porter and Kramer, 2006).
Social Democracy
Thus the alternative is to engage in the politics of a social democracy – one that
pursues export-oriented industrialization while taking into account social inclusion
and environmental sustainability resulting in the economic growth of all social groups
and classes
Otero, Ph.D in Sociology @ University of Wisconsin-Madison, Professor of Sociology at Simon Fraser
University, 1996
(Gerardo, “Mexico's Economic and Political Futures,” NEOLIBERALISM REVISITED – Economic Restructuring and Mexico's Political
Future, edited by Gerardo Otero, Westview Press, pg 242-43)//SG
Social DemocracyIn this scenariosome alliance around the PRD or a new centrist party would hold the main
posts in the national government, including the presidency and at least a coalition majority in Congress. Governatorial
posts would be distrib- uted among the three main parties, PR!, PAN, and PRD, and all posts would be
fillednot as the result of negotiations among the parties but of voters' choice.This government would still pursue an exportoriented industrialization, butthere would be a clear social charterand an industrial policy designed in conjunction with
the organizations of the entrepreneurial class and a strength- ened and democratized labor union movement.The overall logic
prevailing in this scenario would relfect a central concern: that all social groups and classes benefit from
economic growth. That is, there would be concerted efforts to achieve an equitable distribution of income so that firms' profits would be
based partly on the expanded consumption of the working masses.With regard to the maquiladora sector, policies would
be developed to ensure that Mexico would move fast along the path leading from the old model of
export process- ing to the stages of integration that involve higher technological contents and higher
skills in the labor force. Training programs to upgrade the labor force would also be instituted, andenvironmental
sustainability targeted.Although TNCs and international finance capital would clearly have an important place in this outcome,it
would be indispensable that Canadian and U.S. civil soci- eties steer development away from
neoliberalism in their countries and toward social democracy with a social-economy approach. From the
point of view of all subordinate groups and classes in North America, this would clearly be the most desirable outcome.
A social democracy assumes a government holding all interests equally – this has the
greatest capability for growth and sustainability whilst also being compatible with US
economic integration
Otero, Ph.D in Sociology @ University of Wisconsin-Madison, Professor of Sociology at Simon Fraser
University, 1996
(Gerardo, “Mexico's Economic and Political Futures,” NEOLIBERALISM REVISITED – Economic Restructuring and Mexico's Political
Future, edited by Gerardo Otero, Westview Press, pg 244)//SG
Each of the last three scenarios presumes different relations of class forces in Mexican society. Liberal democracy would be premised on an
increased cultural hegemony of middle-class values. Conversely, nationalist democracy (depicted as unviable in Table 12.1) would presuppose a
much greater and autonomous strength of the working class and other subordinate groups and classes. Finally, thesocial-democratic
scenario assumes a complex society in which the govern- ment represents the multiplicity of social
interests with no clear domination by. any sector. This would be a truly pluralistic society—with a societal democracy, in
Semo's terms—that may lie far ahead in Mexico's future. Nevertheless,the social-democratic scenario would have the
greatest capa- bilities for long-term stability and growth. Similarly, it would be the most com- patible
with the possibility that North American integration results in higher standards of living for the majority
of the population in the three NAFTA countriesrather than in a downward pressure in the U.S. and Canadian stan- dards of
living toward Mexican levels. One critical variable that could help this scenario develop would be the adoption
in the United States of a type of capi- talism more similar to that of the northern European and Japanese
variants. If this happened, workers and social-democratic entrepreneurs would have a greater influence in
U.S. policymaking.A strong solidarity presence of NGOs and other organizations of civil societies around the world would also be crit- ical
in order for Mexico to achieve and maintain a democratic political regime with a social-economy orientation.
It is necessary to democratize democracy in order to rid society of neoliberalism;
therefore, we must use the alternative of participative democracy.
Brand and Sekler,professor of International Politics at Vienna University and junior researcher in the area of
international politics in the Department of Political Science at Vienna University , 2009 (Ulrich and Nicola, “Postneoliberalism
– A beginning debate,” Development Dialogue, no. 51, page 6, January 2009,http://rosaluxeuropa.info/userfiles/file/DD51.pdf#page=173 )//CS
The decisive condition for the emergence of a new economic order and way of life is the struggle for
the democratisation of democracy.Today, democracy, this great achievement of the 20th century, has been debased
to a mere facade of imperial claims to power, of the implementation of the imperative of an unleashed capital valorization and
of the protection of egotistical property claims. It has been transformed into an oligarchy of globally acting
elites. The alternative to this is participatory democracy, in particular as it is developed in the context of the
World Social Forum.The main features of a new participatory democracy are above all four directions of
development: first, it involves the production of a universal public sphere, the assurance that all
decisions are accessible to those who are affected by them, that there is the obligationto listen to them, to
confront their criteria and their critiques. Second, democracy is only possible if it contributes to the
development of the other in a way based on solidarity. This is the case above all for those who today have been
touched by war, environmental destruction, failure of the state and lack of fundamental conditions for a self-determined life.
Third, democracy requires immediately communal, regional and firm-based codetermination with a
right to veto if one’s own essential needs are at stake. Fourth, democracy is only possible when
people are not threatened by a lack of jobs, poverty in old age, lack of basic goods for a selfdetermined life, or war. Only when these four conditions are met is the delegation of power to others in any way
responsible, for it is only then that it is not transformed into one’s own lack of power.Many elements of this new solidarity
development have emerged in the existing society dominated by capital. The old welfare state and all the other attempts to
control capitalism since the latter half of the19th century have already contributed to this. These kinds of postneoliberalism
approaches based on solidarity have also emerged in confrontation with neoliberalism. The social and political struggles
against capitalist globalisation on the local as well as the global level have also helped the nuclei of a
participatory democracy to emerge. People have begun once again to engage politically; against all forms of resistance,
they have developed elements for a mode of life based on solidarity.
Altermundism
Thus our alternative is to reject the affirmative’s neoliberal approach and to endorse a
new society without neoliberalism; The 1AC’s involvement of the elite traps us in a
cycle of exploitation and repression. Freedom can only be realized through a break in
the status quo.
Spring, Professor and researcher at the National University of Mexico, 2008
(Ursula Oswald, “Globalization from Below: Social Movements and Altermundism — Reconceptualizing Security from a Latin American
Perspective,” Globalization and Environmental Challenges - Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace, 2008, Vol 3, 38687. SpringerLink.)//SG
So far, for socially discriminated and marginalized groups, the
response to extreme poverty, environmental destruction,
and social anomie has created a bot- tom-up approach for realizing social alternatives or an- other
world, named Altermundism.Globally, new so- cial movementswere created and existing ones were reinforced. They have
evolved and are now collec- tively mobilizing against the neoliberal imposition. They come from the
traditional movements for peace, gender equality, indigenous and Afro-American dig- nity, religious movements,
transnational peasant or- ganizations, unemployed, impoverished middle classes, and critical intellectuals. The new set of
values in this global space is equity, justice, sustainability, equality, dignity, cultural diversity, and
solidarity with the most vulnerable (normally girls from poor coun- tries) promoting poverty alleviation and job creation.Due to global and
climate change, these groups have reinforced environmental security(see chap. by Dalby in this vol. and Dalby/Brauch/Oswald 2008)
through mitigation processes against disasters, sus- tainable development for environmental protection,
environmental services (Urquidi 1999), food sover- eignty, nature conservation, re-use and recycling of
waste. They have promoted human rights and strug- gled to abolish torture, discriminatory labour, and
to improve social conditions. They requested govern- mental transparency in public affairs, elections, an
im- proved state of law, and legal equality for everybody. Their process of democratization includes citizen’s participation
through popular budgets, and civil su- pervision of public work and planning. Tolerance and social consensus are trained and basic collective
inter- ests are negotiated. In the economic sphere, the con- solidation of local and regional markets, free trade combined with fair trade, is
complemented with soli- darity campaigns to sustain the most affected of neo- liberalism, and to mitigate the effects of disasters and extreme
poverty (Sader 2005).A characteristic of social movements is their inde- pendence from traditional parties and governmental organizations,
which gives them greater freedom for struggle. Although no worldwide “anti-globalization or anti-capitalist movement” (Wood/Kees 2001)
exists yet, their demands and struggles are clearly oriented in this direction. There is another important aspect. These
diverse
movements are not organized against something, but in favour of another world. For this reason,
besides the organized struggle, there are man- ifold and culturally diverse activities to maintain and
recreate a dignified livelihood for everybody. These goals endanger the status quo created by the world
economic elites who have launched activities far be- yond Davos. They are supported by the transnational mass media.
But the understanding of the increasing manipulation in the mass media has reinforced the struggle of
the social movements, giving them an op- portunity to understand the lack of ethics and the un- derlying
interests(León/Bruch/Tamayo 2005). Fur- ther, confronted with greater nonconformity and conflicts, the social movements are also
occupying a place in the negotiation process between the market and the state. Finally, they are also serving as a shield for progressive
governments to limit the interventions of elites and to permit structural changes in favour of the people and not only of capital (see MST in
Brazil pressuring for a democratic land reform and against landlords and the destruction of the Amazon).In some poor countries with limited
public educa- tion facilities, fanatic religious leaders train nationalis- tic and religious fundamentalist groups which spawned a new geopolitical
terrorism (Kaldor/An- heier/Glasius 2004). These new social movements are global and depend on modern infrastructure such as internet,
global funding, a worldwide financial sys- tem, religious solidarity and high technology for arms construction, terrorist artefacts and attacks
(Thieux 2004; Beck 2000; Held/McGrew/Goldblatt/Perra- ton 1999; see chap. by Saxe Fernández in this vol.). Their number has increased as a
response to the ‘war on terror’, which should apparently protect citizens from threats. However, it brought wider insecurity not only for the
countries affected by pre-emptive wars (Afghanistan, Iraq), but also through new terror- ist attacks against civilians, by reducing the rights of
citizens by anti-terrorist legislation (U.S. Patriot Act). This has created a legal dilemma where laws that are aimed to protect citizens from
terrorism are weaken- ing the rights of these citizens.The rise of terrorist groups has created contradic- tions within the solidarity of social
movements, where on one side bottom-up self-reliant processes are rein- forced by world solidarity and non-violent actions. On the other side,
paramilitary, undercover agents and white guards are protecting violently TNE installa- tions, mega-development projects, and forcing displacement of the indigenous and peasants from their land, etc. killing with impunity the innocent poor who are unable to experience justice in
the existing legal framework. The interests the elite are promoting through the ‘war on terror’ have created new insecuri- ties, which are
reinforced by the narrow military secu- rity and a reduction of national security items (Gaitán 2004; Oswald 2004). In some regions social move-
ments have turned to organized armed struggle, as lib- eration armies and guerrillas.However, peaceful
conflict resolution and
nonvio- lent opposition have dominated among the social movements, who struggle through bottom-up
organi- zation to challenge the regressive globalization. These activities may increase human, gender,
and environ- mental security (HUGE; see Oswald 2008), and offer opportunities for dignified livelihoods for the
poor- est.
Global Governance
Thus, we advocate for a new democratized system based on proportionate
representation, protection of human rights, and shifts in economic practices resulting
in the shift towards global governance. This is governed not through the State or the
Market but rather Civil Society
Szentes, Professor Emeritus of the Corvinus University of Budapest and member of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, 2008
(Tamas, “Globalisation and prospects of the world society,” CENTRAL EUROPEAN POLITICAL
SCIENCE, Vol. 9, pp 14-15, http://cepsr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ATT81762.pdf#page=9)//SG
(h) The conclusion that obviously follows from the above is thatthe world society urgently needs • a new, really global,
substantially reformed and democratised institutional system, which is based on the principle of
proportionate representation, ensures equal voting powerfor equal number of people, protects the human
rights of all the membersof human society, makes the articulation and reconciliation of diverse
interestsoperationally feasiblethrough and between cross-border political organisations of the individual classes, selfidentified strata and professional groups of the world society, and is equipped with a legal enforcement
power; • a substantial shift in development patterns, economic policies and social culture all over the
world, towards real human needs, protection ofnatural environment, cooperation and solidarity, as well as •the
organisation of the civil society on global scene. A real democratic transformation of the world order (as well as national
orders) requires an appropriate answer to the old question: whether the State or the Market should be the main
governing force. The only correct answer to this question is: none of them, but the Civil Society20, with
its social organisations if being independent from the state and market interest. Thus, a truly democratic world
order cannot rely on the spontaneity of the market, or on the dirigisme of some state-power. Instead, it must ensure the upper
hand to the global civil society unfolding and organising itself on world level, and playing the primary
role in global governance. Such a civil society needs both the market and a kind of global state- power in order to rule and control
both, namely by making use of the latter to regulate the spontaneous market, correct and compensate for its unfavourable social
consequences, ternationally disequalising and polarising effects, and by making use also of the former, thus
ensuring the freedom of
market activities, the independence of private business and normal operation of product, service and
factor markets, in order to prevent any centralised power from over-ruling the society. (i) Finally, in view of the
requirements of a truly democratic world order, which may ensure peaceful co-operation among all peoples on the basis of mutual
understanding and benefits, there appears an imperative need also for a “New Enlightenment”.The
latter, which can stem,like the former, 18th century Enlightenment, from knowledge, would free all social science
theories from ideological misinterpretation, from their apologetic misuseand manipulative distortionfor
legitimising political interests and practices, and would put an end to the “religious” belief in any of theoretical
streams and ideologies as a single “vehicle of Truth”. It would also detach religions from politics, i.e. make
impossible to use religion for generating hostile feelings against others, for justifying discrimination and for declaring “sacred wars”.
AT: GG Utopian
We’ll concede that the alt is Utopian however it’s try or die – every other alternative
results in extinction of human kind; global governance is the only option we have
Szentes, Professor Emeritus of the Corvinus University of Budapest and member of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, 2008
(Tamas, “Globalisation and prospects of the world society,” CENTRAL EUROPEAN POLITICAL
SCIENCE, Vol. 9, pp 14-15, http://cepsr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ATT81762.pdf#page=9)//SG
It is to be admitted thatall the above conclusions may appear as products of wishful thinking or utopian
ideas21, illusory visions. However, in fact,there seems hardly any other alternative scenario for the survival of the
world society and sustainability of its development, than substantially reforming the existing world
order, for which the above-outlined ideas, as mostly derived from lessons of the reforms of national systems, may be perhaps worth
considering.Unless a thorough new “Great Transformation”, by gradual reforms (pushed ahead by “countervailing forces”)of
the prevailing world order takes place, unless the international development gap, which implies also a gap in
skill, knowledge and technological level,is drastically reduced, and a democratic global governance is established,
there is no hope at all for lasting world peace, sustainable development, general respect of human rights
or even for the survival of human society.
Not Inev
***Rejecting the notion of inevitable neoliberalism is critical to resistance
Hursh and Henderson, associate professor of education at the University of Rochester and PhD at the Warner Graduate School of
Education and Human Development 11 (David and Joseph, “ Contesting global neoliberalism and creating alternative futures”, Discourse:
Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 32:2, May 2011, Routledge)//AS
Contesting neoliberalism necessitates that we situate neoliberal policies within the larger neoliberal
discourse promoting markets, competition, individualism, and privatization. Analysing education policies in the
USA, whether the push for mayoral control in Rochester, New York (see Duffy, 2010; Hedeen, 2010; Ramos, 2010), school reform policies under
Renaissance 2010 in Chicago, or Race to the Top under the Obama administration, requires that we understand how reforms such as using
standardized testing are presented as efficient, neutral responses to the problem of raising student achievement, rather than examining the
root causes of student failure, including lack of decent paying jobs and health care, and under-funded schools. Current
policies
reinforce neoliberalism and leave the status quo intact. Similarly, if we look at education in Sub-Saharan Africa, we must
situate schools within the hollowing out of the state, and the lack of adequate funding for education and other social services such as health
care. For example, in Uganda, as in several other Sub-Saharan countries, the global recession has contributed to drug shortages, making it
impossible to treat the growing number of AIDS patients (McNeil, 2010). Yet, under more social democratic policies the state would play a
larger role in providing health care. Furthermore, education is increasingly contested, as the plutocracy promotes education as a means of
producing productive, rather than critical, employees. Schools are more often places where teachers and students learn what will be on the test
rather than seeking answers to questions that cry out for answers, such as how to develop a healthy, sustainable environment or communities
where people are actually valued for who they are rather than what they contribute to the economy. Instead,
we must ask what
kinds of relations do we want to nurture, what kinds of social relations, what kind of work do we want
to do, and what kinds of culture and technologies do we want to create. These questions require that we rethink
schools so that teachers and students can engage in real questions for which the answer will make a difference in the quality of our lives.
These questions also require that we rethink our relationship to a specific kind of ‘free’ marketplace
that is not, in fact, inevitable. By problematizing the idea of neoliberal marketization, we can begin to
construct new markets that actually value commonly held resources and local communities.
Notions of inevitable neoliberalism are a product of discursive presuppositions—by
questioning them it can be overcome
Hay and Rosamond, Reader in Political Analysis in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of
Birmingham and Senior Research Fellow in International Politics in the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation at the
02
University of Warwick respectively,
, (Colin and Ben, “Globalisation, European Integration and the Discursive Construction of Economic
Imperatives”, Journal of European Public Policy 9:2, 4/02, http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ssfc0041/globalisation.pdf)//AS
And it is easy to see why. For the
effects of having internalised or deployed strategically assumptions about
globalisation may, in time, become almost as entrenched as if they were produced by an inexorable
globalising logic. The effects of tax competition are, after all, no less real if informed by assumptions about the mobility of capital which
are demonstrably false. Moreover, once established, the momentum of a process such as tax competition may be
difficult to halt.Does it matter, then, whether the effects frequently attributed to globalisation are
direct products of the demonstrable ‘material reality’ of globalisationor of more or less accurate constructions of
globalisation’s assumed imperatives or of an entirely duplicitous appeal to globalisation’s convenient exigencies? Whilst in one
sense it may not (the immediate outcome, after all, is the same), in another the difference is extremely significant. In one
account we identify an inexorable and fatalistic unfolding economic ‘logic of no alternative’ operating
beyond the control or purview of political actors whom we might hold accountable for its consequences. In the other
two we have an open-ended, contingent and — crucially — political dynamic to which potentially
accountable agents might be linked (see also Hay 2000). Differentiating between the effects of globalisation on the one hand and
the effects of dominant discourses of globalisation and the use made of such discourses on the other is, then, an integral aspect of restoring
notions of political responsibility and accountability to contemporary political and economic dynamics. It is a prime motivation for much of
what follows.
Localism
Reject the affirmative as a means to stop the hyper globalized world to let the
economic policy of localism take hold
Posey, He is a Professor in the Public Policy Administration Department at the University of Missouri Saint Louis,
2011(John, “The Local Economy Movement: An Alternative to Neoliberalism?” Pub. Springer Found on ABI Inform)//JS
In recent decades, the challenge of deindustrialization has posed a quandary for progressives at all levels
of government. Nationally, the left has been deeply divided over the issue of free trade vs.
protectionism. At the local level, urban advocates have been at odds over the degree to which the
demands of capital should be accommodated, recognizing that pursuing progressive empowerment
regimes can promote capital flight. Moreover, the abandonment or retrenchment of the social
democratic project, even in strongholds like Scandinavia (and even by left of center parties), shows that
the left never fully succeeded in articulating an alternative to neoliberalism. Over the last 2 years,
progressives have been at odds over bailouts and monetary policy. In all, it appears that the left is still
struggling to devise a humane response to economic turmoil.This essay has suggested that the local
economy movement could potential provide a unifying focus for a new progressive agenda. Localism can
help transcend boom/bust cycles and widening inequality for three reasons: 1) Providing some
insulation from the international economy can help governments avoidthe race to the bottom. 2)
Reducing the geographic scale of economic activity could help reembed the financial sector into the
real economy. 3) Localism can provide a counterbalance to the increasing concentration of
wealth.However, the possible losses of gains from trade could be a genuine downside to localism. This
essay suggested several reasons why diminished economies of scale 310 J. Poseymay not be such a large
sacrifice for nations or regions adopting a local ownership strategy. Additional theoretical and empirical
work needs to be done to analyze the magnitude of lost gains from trade under different localist
scenarios. In particular, it is worth studying whether localizing ownership of retail, restaurants and hotels
would have significant negative economic impacts for regions. It is also important to avoid
romanticizing the local, assuming that local is always better. Local systems must also be held
accountable with respect to labor standards and sustainability. Moreover, the urge to localize cannot
diminish activism at other geographic scales.Another possible objection is that the left should not be
seeking an alternative just to neoliberalism, but to capitalism itself.3 There is considerable evidence
that boom/ bust cycles are inherent to the capitalist system. This is an interesting question to consider.
My own tentative conclusion is that there are varieties of capitalism.Localism seems to offer a way to
reduce concentrations of wealth and counteract the disembedded nature of finance, while still
retaining the positive role of markets in society. Whether localism potentially could or should go beyond
this limited goal and produce a genuine alternative to capitalism would be an important debate to
have.The need to find an alternative to neoliberalism is urgent. Despite the various potential pitfalls,
promoting smaller enterprises that serve smaller geographic areas is a tool that governments can use to
promote equity and sustainability. The notion of rebuilding local economies points to a vision for a
more humane economy
Testimony
We should embrace testimonio (testimony) as a form of alternative expression in
order to resist neoliberal exploitation.
Williams,Associate Professor of Spanish and Latin American and Caribbean Studies at the University of
Michigan,2005(Gareth, The Other Side of the Popular: Neoliberalism and Subalternity in Latin America, pages 77-78,
http://books.google.com/books/about/The_Other_Side_of_the_Popular.html?id=BhqdmLWEfWcC)//CS
Within the transition to neoliberal models of development and domination, testimonio promised alternative forms of
expression and of subaltern/intellectual agency. In Against Literature John Beverley notes thattestimonio was
thought to represent "the possibility of regional, national, and/or transnational coalitions of
radicalized intellectuals and professionals with subaltern classes or social groups,"• for this was a
form of subaltern expression that, within the very structures of its textual composition, promised the
possibility of "a form ofa global "alliance politics’ ofthe left"• (90)."In a later essay, Beverley situates testimonio
within the reorganizationof the political atmosphere in the United States and abroad in the yearsleading up to the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989 and up to the defeat ofthe Sandinistas in the Nicaraguan elections of the following year:Testimonio began as
an adjunct to armed liberation struggle in LatinAmerica and elsewhere in the Third World in the sixties. But its canonization was
tied even more, perhaps, to the military, political, andeconomic force of counterrevolution in the years after 1973. It was
theReal, the voice of the body in pain, of the disappeared, ofthe losers inthe rush to marketize, that demystified the false
utopian myth of neoliberalism|, its claims to have finally reconciled history and society.At the same time, testimonio relativized
the moral liberal or even pro-gressive claim of the high-culture writers and artists of the boom tospeak for the majority of Latin
Americans. It marked a new site of discursive authority, which challenged the authority ofthe "great writer"¶ to establish the
reality principle of Latin American culture and development.Testimonio was intimately linked to international
solidarity networks in support of revolutionary movements or struggles around human rights,
apartheid, democratization; but it was also a way of testing the contradictions and limits of
revolutionary and reformist projects still structured in part around elite assumptions about the role of
cultural vanguards. Detached from these contexts, it loses its special aesthetic and ideological power, and runs the risk of
becoming anew form of costumbrismo, the Spanish term for "local color"• writing.("Rea1"• 281)"In other words, the
history of the emergence and institutionalization of testimonio as a specific response to the
hegemonic crisis of national fictive ethnicity and of national political organization in general is
anything but disinterested. As Beverley indicates, "the reception of testimonio today is bound up with the
globalization of both capitalist exploitation and the new forms of resistance to it, and thus traverses
directly that center of information retrieval and knowledge production which isthe university" (Against
90).Têstimonio, in other words, and in particular the canonization of the genre within metropolitan
power/knowledgeconfigurations, is intimately tied to broader questions of how to read culture in times dominated by a crisis of
hegemonic models; a crisis that haswrought fundamental shifts in the grounds of fictive ethnicity, in the ideaof social
integration, and, indeed, in the category of the nation itself as theprivileged terrain and exclusive horizon from within which to
producecritical reason as a whole."•
4-in-1
The alternative is to embrace the four-in-one perspective which will transform the
economy to one with a new life balance based on solidarity.
Brand and Sekler,professor of International Politics at Vienna University and junior researcher in the area of
international politics in the Department of Political Science at Vienna University , 2009 (Ulrich and Nicola, “Postneoliberalism
– A beginning debate,” Development Dialogue, no. 51, page 6, January 2009,http://rosaluxeuropa.info/userfiles/file/DD51.pdf#page=173 )//CS
The transition from an economy dominated by capital to a mixed economy based on solidarity makes
possible a fundamentally new life balance, which the Marxist-feminist FriggaHaug calls the ‘four-inone-perspective’. Wage labour, reproduction labour in the care of the self and others, the leisure of
free self-development and public engagement should be generalised as the part-time activities of all,
so that each and every person can dedicate around four hours of his or her day to each of these
activities (Haug 2008: 20ff .). Wage activity close to home must go down to below 30 hours a week. The ‘oppressive
subjugation to the division of labour’ (Karl Marx in the tradition of Charles Fourier and Robert Owen) would finally
be brought to Solidarity of common development, Co-determination, Social security, and peace.
Universal public sphere ways out of the crisis of neoliberalism to an end.Only such a new organisation
of life allows liberation from a psychology of ‘wanting to have’, out of which grew, together with the infinite
desire for self-valorisation of capital, the transformation of the world into an accumulation of dead things (‘commodities’),
destroying nature as much as the human and the soul – precisely the situation that dominates us today.
Zapatista
The alternative is to join the Zapatista movement – we must seek change from the
global system, not an individual state.
Collier and Quaratiello, Professor of Anthropology at Stanford, 2005 – (George A. and Elizabeth
Lowery, “Basta!: Land And The Zapatista Rebellion In Chiapas,” May 1, 2005, page 190,
http://www.pdfebookds.com/Basta-Land-And-The-Zapatista-Rebellion-In-Chiapas-PDF5-860216/)//CS
The Zapatista rebellion deserves credit for catalyzing "anti-neoliberalism"-the sense that economic
globalization was at the root of the plural and sometimes very different perceptions of
marginalization that people had been experiencing. The 1994 rebellion came as official socialism was
collapsing and Marxist insurgencies, such as occurred in Guatemala, seemed only to provoke genocidal repression.
The Zapatistas offered a less violent rebellioncoupled to a new and different hope, one that sought topeople
rather than divide them.The original Zapatista demands for land, housing, education, and health care
were not only ones that resonated with people around the world whose lifestyles were threatened or
deteriorating due to economic restructuring, but also echoed the past promises of capitalist as well as
socialist states. Unlike earlier communist insurgencies, they were not trying to overthrow a government. They
were merely asking the Mexican government to live up to its promises. When the Mexican government proved
incapable of responding to the legitimate demands expressed by the Zapatista- demands which were, after all,
enshrined in Articles 22 through 27 of the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights-it
gradually became evident that the global system, rather than individual states, was responsible for
governments' inability to meet the legitimate demands of citizens.
AT
AT: Cap Good
AT: Growth Solves
Growth can’t solve poverty—social development can exist without economic growth
De La Barra, Chilean political activist, international consultant and former UNICEF Latin America Public Policy Advisor 07—(Ximena,
“THE DUAL DEBT OF NEOLIBERALISM”, Imperialism, Neoliberalism and Social Struggles in Latin America”, 9/1/09, edited by Dello Bueno and
Lara, Brill Online)//AS
On the other hand, it
has been amply demonstrated that high levels of social development can be reached
even in the absence of robust economies. This can only happen if the correct priorities are set and the necessary political will is
present. One study of ten national case studies suggested that the redistribution of goods and income will not happen automatically and that
there is no guarantee that the distribution of income in a market economy is going to be neutral (Lewis
1997). The study concluded by affirming public policy makers will do well to build upon the potential synergy that exists between investments
in education, water and sanitation, and health and nutrition in order to maximise the possible levels of social development in a context of
highly limited resources. The study also concluded that
growth in itself will not reduce poverty in terms of income
nor in terms of human development, unless there are public policies that are specifically oriented to this objective (Lewis 1997).
Neoliberalism’s massive inequality results in a society in which 1% of the world
receives 57% of its income at the expense of everyone else – empirically proven that
neoliberalism doesn’t increase social well-being or economic efficiency
Navarro,M.D., Ph.D., Professor of Public Policy, Sociology, and Policy Studies at Johns Hopkins
University, 2007
(Vicente, “NEOLIBERALISM AS A CLASS IDEOLOGY; OR, THE POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE GROWTH OF
INEQUALITIES,” International Journal of Health Services, Vol. 37.1, pp 51-54)//SG
Another correction that needs to be made as a rebuttal to neoliberal dogma is thatneoliberal public policies have been
remarkably unsuccessful at achieving what they claim to be their aims: economic efficiency and social
well-being. If we compare the period 1980–2000 (when neoliberalism reached its maximum
expression)1 with the immediately preceding period, 1960–1980, we can easily see that 1980–2000 was
much less successful than 1960–1980 in most developed and developing capitalist countries. As Table 1
shows,the rate of growth and the rate of growth per capitain all developing (non-OECD)countries (excluding China)were
much higher in 1960–1980 (5.5% and 3.2%) than in 1980–2000 (2.6% and 0.7%). Mark Weisbrot, Dean Baker, and David Rosnick (7) have
documented thatthe improvement in quality-of-life and well-being indicators (infant mortality, rate of school enrollment,
life expectancy, and others)increased faster in 1960–1980than in 1980–2000 (when comparing countries at the same level of
development at the starting year of each period). And as Table 2 shows, the annual rate of economic growth per capita in
the developed capitalist countries was lower in 1980–2000 than in 1960–1980. But, what is also important to
stress is that due to the larger annual economic growth per capita in the OECD countries than in the developing countries (except China), the
that income inequalities
between these two types of countries have grown spectacularly, and particularly between the extremes (see Table 2).
But, most important, inequalities have increased dramatically not only among but within countries, developed
and developing alike.Adding both types of inequalities (among and within countries), we find that, as Branco Milanovic (8) has
documented,the top 1 percent of the world population receives 57 percent of the world income , and the
income difference between those at the top and those at the bottom has increased from 78 to 114
times.It bears emphasizing that even though poverty has increased worldwide and within countries that are following neoliberal public
policies, this does not mean the rich within each country (including developing countries) have been adversely affected. As a matter of fact,the
rich saw their incomes and their distance from the non-rich increase substantially. Class inequalities
have increased greatly in most capitalist countries.NEOLIBERALISM AS THE ROOT OF INEQUALITIESIn each of these countries,
difference in their rates of growth per capita has been increasing dramatically. This means, in practical terms,
then, the income of those at the top has grown spectacularly as a result of state interventions. Consequently, we need to turn to some of the
categories and concepts discarded by large sectors of the left: class structure, class power, class struggle, and their impact on the state. These
scientific categories continue to be of key importance to understanding what is going on in each country. Let me clarify that a scientific concept
can be very old but not antiquated. “Ancient” and “antiquated” are two different concepts. The law of gravity is very old but is not antiquated.
Anyone who doubts this can test it by jumping from the tenth floor. There is a risk that some sectors of the left may pay an equally suicidal cost
by ignoring scientific concepts such as class and class struggle simply because these are old concepts.We
cannot understand the
world (from the Iraq War to the rejection of the European Constitution) without acknowledging the existence of classes
and class alliances, established worldwide between the dominant classes of the developed capitalist
world and those of the developing capitalist world. Neoliberalism is the ideology and practice of the
dominant classes of the developed and developing worlds alike.But before we jump ahead, let’s start with the situation
in each country.Neoliberal ideology was the dominant classes’ response to the considerable gains achieved
by the working and peasant classes between the end of World War II and the mid-1970s. The huge increase in
inequalities that has occurred since then is the direct result of the growth in income and well-being of the dominant classes, which is a
consequence of class-determined public policies such as: (a)deregulation
of labor markets, an anti–working class move;
(b)deregulation of financial markets, which has greatly benefited financial capital, the hegemonic branch of capital in
the period 1980–2005; (c) deregulation of commerce in goods and services, which has benefited the highconsumption population at the expense of laborers; (d )reduction of social public expenditures, which has hurt the working class;
(e) privatization of services, which has benefited the top 20 percent of the population(by income) at the expense
of the well-being of the working classes that use public services; ( f )promotion of individualism and consumerism, hurting
the culture of solidarity; (g) development of a theoretical narrative and discourse that pays rhetorical
homage to the markets, but masks a clear alliance between transnationals and the state in which they are based; and (h)
promotion of an anti-interventionist discourse, that is in clear conflict with the actual increased state interventionism, to
promote the interests of the dominant classes and the economic units—the transnationals—that foster
their interests. Each of these class-determined public policies requires a state action or intervention that
conflicts with the interests of the working and other popular classes.
[Continued – Footnote] 1The starting point of neoliberalism and of the growth in inequalities was July 1979, with
Paul Volker’s dramaticincrease in interest ratesthat slowed down economic growth—plus the two oil shocks that
particularly affected countries highly dependent on imported oil (see 5). Volker increased interest rates (thus creating a
worldwide recession) as an anti–working class move to weaken labor in the United States and abroad. The rate increase also initiated, as Arrighi
(6) noted, a flow of capital to the United States, making it very difficult for other countries, especially poor countries, to compete for the limited
capital. The fact that petrol Euro dollars (which increased enormously with the oil shocks) were deposited in the United States made the
scarcity of capital particularly hard for poor countries to adapt to. This is the time when the stagnation of the poor countries started.The
countries most affected by these neoliberal public policies were the Latin American countries, which
followed these policies extensively, and the African countries (the poorest of the poor), which saw extremely
negative economic growth. In 2000, 24 African countries had a smaller GNP per capita than 25 years
earlier.
Proponents are wrong—neoliberalism only increases economic inequality
Hursh and Henderson, associate professor of education at the University of Rochester and PhD at the Warner Graduate School of
Education and Human Development 11 (David and Joseph, “ Contesting global neoliberalism and creating alternative futures”, Discourse:
Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 32:2, May 2011, Routledge)//AS
Globally,
neoliberal policies have been imposed on developing countries through the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Their policies used the ideal of free trade to open up markets to multinational
corporations often to the detriment of local production, especially in agriculture (Shiva, 2000), and scaled back
government spending on social services, if not privatizing them (Jomo, 2007). Consequently, in many developing countries the
role of government has been diminished to guaranteeing minimum standards and welfare and creating
conditions favourable for capital investment, leading to what some have described as the hollowing out of the state
(Clapham, 1996). As Harvey (2006) writes: “the fundamental mission of the neoliberal state is toa create a ‘good business
climate’ and therefore to optimize conditions for capital accumulation no matter what the consequences for
employment or social well-being. This contrasts with the social democratic state that is committed to full employment and the
optimization of the wellbeing of all its citizens subject to the condition of maintaining adequate and stable rates of accumulation.” (p. 25) While
the primary aim of neoliberalism is to restore corporate profitability over the welfare of its citizens, proponents
claim that giving
free reign to corporations and 174 D.W. Hursh and J.A. Henderson Downloaded by [Emory University] at 11:52 28 June 2013
unleashing individuals to pursue their own economic self-interests is
the best way to ensure economic growth and,
therefore, to provide for an improved standard of living for those in developed and developing countries and for the
poor worldwide. However, as Jomo (2007) and Berry and Serieux (2007) write, since the rise of globalization and
neoliberalism in the 1970s, economic growth has slowed and the ‘income inequality has worsened in
most countries in the world in recent decades’ (Jomo, 2007, p. xix). Even in the USA, long held up as the exemplar of
capitalist development, under neoliberalism household income has grown only because of the rise of two-worker households, men earn less
than their fathers did, and, as measured by the Gini coefficient, income inequality has grown (The Economist, 2010).
AT: Democracy
Democratization does not stem from the logic of capitalism – the democracy their ev
references is undemocratic
Szentes, Professor Emeritus of the Corvinus University of Budapest and member of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, 2008
(Tamas, “Globalisation and prospects of the world society,” CENTRAL EUROPEAN POLITICAL
SCIENCE, Vol. 9, pp 12-13, http://cepsr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ATT81762.pdf#page=9)//SG
(d) The unfolding of a “social market economy” in the developed European countries has been
accompanied and partly preceded by a process of democratisation, namely by the evolution of a pluralistic democracy
with a multi-party parliamentary system of more or less proportionate representation, regular free elections and equality of
voting rights and power. These achievements, which resulted by no means from the logic of the market
and capital, cannot be underestimated, even if they do not ensure a full and real democracy in its strict
sense.(Such cannot fully unfold if social inequalities and unequal access to appropriate information cause differences in assertion of
democratic rights, A pluralistic democracy presupposes the articulation, representation and reconciliation of the diverging, conflicting interests
of all the different segments, strata or classes of the civil society and their proportionate participation in the process of decision-making and
control over public issues.) In the prevailing world system not
only an appropriate institutional and legal superstructure
is lacking, but also a process of democratisation. No pluralistic democracy has developed, and no
democratic representation and voting regime exist. The operation of all the existing international
organisations,including all the UN bodies, is based upon the principle of state representation, which renders a
false equalitybetween a state with a few thousand inhabitants and another one with more than a billion. The world society as a
whole, with its social stratification, is not represented proportionally at all. The voting system of the
international bodies, whether implying, accordingly, a “one state – one vote” principle (as at the UN General Assembly) or a system of
“qualified votes” (as within IMF and WB), is markedly undemocratic.
The capitalist democracy is flawed for 2 reasons
1. It prompted the recent financial crisis due to mismanagement, AND
2. The idea of democracy promotion is no longer a legit goal
Kurki, PhD @ University of Wales, Professor in International Relations Theory @ University of Wales,
Aberystwyth, 13 Feb 2013
(Milja, “Politico-Economic Models of Democracy in Democracy Promotion,” International Studies
Perspectives, pg 2-3)//SG
Yet, the present socioeconomic and political juncture has thrown some deep doubt on the relatively firm
post–Cold War consensus that democracy and capi- talism are, first, superior systems, and second, naturally
compatible and mutually reinforcing. Specifically, two different kinds of “crises” have challenged the self- evidence of “capitalist democracy”2
as the model to aim for. First,
the last year has brought with it the unfolding of a global financial crisis, which has
prompted many to question the self-evident superiority of the (neo)liberal capi- talist model (Krugman 2008;
Soros 2008). While there has by no means been a complete change of mind among international actors on the virtues of capital- ism, this
economic system and its more extreme “liberties” are now evaluated with more skepticism.Certainly, the
perceived natural connection between capitalism and democracy, the assumption that these systems are somehow automati- cally
complementary, has been viewed with somewhat more skepticism given the mismanagement and mis-regulation that has been exposed in
Western capitalist democracies and, also, the perceived injustices attached to the publically funded bail-outs of failing firms and financial
institutions. Second,
the idea of democracy promotion,3 a policy area in which the consen- sus on capitalist
democracy has so powerfully been embedded, has also faced a crisis over the last few years. It is no
longer self-evident that Western projection of “capitalist democracy” is a legitimate or viable goal. The
the spectacular failures of democracy
promotion in the Middle East during the Bush years and the alignment of democracy promotion with
violent regime change, but also by the increasing reluctance by many target states around the world to
accept the “Western wisdom” on democracy and what it entails(Diamond, 2008).The promotion of a liberal
notion of democracy, and its unquestioned attachment to the promotion of market capitalism, has
caused some consternation among those political actors and leaderswho would like to envisage alternative non“recession” in the fortunes of democracy promotion has been brought about not only by
liberal or non-capitalist models of democracy in their home countries (Robinson and White 1998; Abrahamsen 2000).
[Continued – Footnotes] 2This notion of course is in and of itself a rather troublesome one within the literature, precisely because it con- joins
economic and political agendas, something that appears as strangely uncomfortable for many democracy promoters influenced by liberal
principles that separate “economic” and “political” agendas from each other. Yet, such notion has been used even by some of the liberal
democratizers, such as Clinton’s democracy promotion team (see e.g. Hippler 1995:13). 3By democracy promotion I refer here, alongside
Burnell (2000) to various democracy assistance and support mechanisms, which can range from more coercive forms of intervention and
conditionality to more subtle forms of persuasion to democratize, such as grass-roots civil society support. The latter trends are today dominant
in democ- racy promotion, hence the abandonment by some of the term “promotion” in favour of “assistance” or “support”.
They are wrong - Capitalism doesn’t spur democracy – they both just arose at the
same time spurring the misconception that one is a product of the other. By their
logic, capitalism creates fascist dictatorships
Kurki, PhD @ University of Wales, Professor in International Relations Theory @ University of Wales,
Aberystwyth, 13 Feb 2013
(Milja, “Politico-Economic Models of Democracy in Democracy Promotion,” International Studies
Perspectives, pg 7-8)//SG
The Lipsetian approach is generalizing in nature and seeks predictive knowl- edge about when we may expect democracy to arise (when x-level
of economic development, then y-level of democracy).This
form of analysis has been complemented by many detailed
studies by sociologists and economists. Bollen and Jackman (1985), Barro (1996, 1999) and Muller (1995), Robinson (2006), and
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), for example,have recently tested the rela- tionship between economic wealth,
income, inequality, and democracy.Their findings are mixed:They do not find direct and self-evident
relationships between these factors and democracy, even if they note some correlative associa- tions
between them.Yet, what is even more crucial for us to note is that this literature does not focus on the analysis of the relationship
between capitalism and democracy per se, but rather, in fact,the analysis of the relationship between wealth (or income
or inequality) and democracy. It is important to note then thatthese studies make arguments of quite a different
order to those who argue for a “necessary connection”. There is third kind of an argument that can be
made about the relationship between capitalism and democracy.This line of thought conceives of capitalism and
democracy as processes simply “akin” to one another, and as such, as “function- ally comparable”. Itdoes not propose then that
capitalism necessarily causes democracy or vice versa but merely that both systems work with
comparable logics. Joseph Schumpeter was one of the first to argue that democracy is in its workings akin to capitalism. In his
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1946), he turned to a competitive “market” model as the basis for understand- ing democracy.What
democracy in Schumpeterian sense entailed was that democracy meant literally the competitive
election of leaders and nothing else. Much in the same sense as firms compete with each other in the market, poli- ticians
compete for the votes of the electorate.Democracy then functions akin to the market. This, interestingly, for Schumpeter did
not mean, however, that democracy as a form of political government was exclusively compatible with capitalism. In fact, he found otherwise
and predicted the collapse of capitalism (1946).Schumpeter’s
theory has been hugely influential in twentieth-century
political science, because of the rise of the so-called economic theory of democracy famously developed
by Anthony Downs(1957). This theory argued that there is an analogical convergence between how markets work and how modern
democ- racy works, that is, democracy is perceived to function like a market system. What this meant is thatwe can model political
systems in accordance with assumptions made about the workings of liberal markets. This approach,
which has emphasized the importance of taking into account the “economic realities” of political
action(Downs 1957:149), has proved a very powerful way of analyzing party politics and democratic functions in the late twentieth
century.What
is notable about its proliferation is that while the “analogy” logic assumes nothing
“necessary” about the complementary relationship between capitalism and democracy(see e.g. Przeworski,
1991: ch 1),this theory has made it attractive, and easy, for researchers assume that these systems are in
natural unison with each other.There is, moreover, a fourth kind of engagement we need to consider here: a historical sociology
approach.Some scholars have argued that the relationship between capitalism and democracy needs to be
studied on a historical and sociological basis recognizing their contingent relationship. Perhaps the most crucial
historical analysis of the relationship between capitalism and democracy has been that of Barrington Moore (1966). Moore argued that it
wasshifts
in class structures precipitated by the rise of capitalism that has brought about the rise of
democ- racy in the Western context. A fairly unique and historically specific negotiation of class forces, with the role of the middle
classes being central, explained the tying together of democracy and capitalism during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.Democracy
and capitalism then are complementary, or have been in specific Western European settings, but not in
a necessary, or at least universally or logically necessary sense. Indeed, Moore pointed out that capitalist
social relations can also lead to different forms of political organization: authoritarian governments
as well as fascist dictatorships . Democracy and capitalism, then, while complementary in certain
contexts, are not necessarily linked but rather co-incidentally and contextually complementary only.
AT: Mexico
Mexico proves short term benefits of capitalism are outweighed by long term harms –
leads to a complex survival of the fittest mentality amongst the working class
Lugo Ph.D in Anthropology at Stanford, Professor of Latina/Latino Studies at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008
(Alejandro, “Fragmented Lives, Assembled Parts: Culture, Capitalism, and Conquest at the U.S.-Mexico Border,” University of Texas at Austin
Press, pp 127-132)//SG
Getting to Work: Bus Drivers, Factory Workers, and Security GuardsThe
capitalist forces of globalization operating on the
streets of Ciudad Juarez must effectively connect the industrial parks with the working-class neighborhoods. The key material nexus in this process is the rutera, which is continuously used by workers to get to work.The majority of
maquila workers, after thirty years of industrialization, still cannot afford to buy their own car, so they ride
the rutera, or the ruta, as they sometimes call it. Ruteras are vans or buses that are a product of the maquiladora industry itself. They have
been in existence since the mid-196os. 1he articulation of neighborhoods, industrial parks, and buses, however, is not without tension. In
fact,for
late industrial capitalism to succeed in this endeavor, the factory workers and the bus drivers
must be pitted against one other. On the one hand, the bus drivers must constantly strive to be efficient for both factory workers
and (indirectly) multinational corporations.10 On the other hand, the factory workers need a reliable labor force of drivers to allow them to
comply with corporate expectations of arriving at the factory on time. Yet, just like the workers, only in their case on the streets,the
drivers
are challenged daily by the necessary balancing of time and space within a chaotic urban environment,
itself largely created by the needs of late industrial capitalism.Since the mid-198os, most ruteras have
been buses(which resemble American public-school buses). In the early 1980s, they were minibuses. Before that, in the late 1970s, they
were vans, usually Chevy vans. Before the vans, between 1968 and 1976, most ruteras were four-door cars. The size of the rutera has grown
according to the growth of the maquiladora industry. If people have a hard time getting off the buses today, imagine trying to get out of the
crowded four-door cars on time. In the beginning of the maquiladora industry, cars were preferred to normal buses because the former were
faster and could get to the industrial parks on time . Before the industry arrived, there were only 2 types of expensive public transportation in
Ciudad Juarez: transportes urbanos and transportes del valle (buses that circulated in the urban areas and those that connected the rural valley
and the downtown section, respectively). Today, the "rural" areas that previously surrounded the city have practically disappeared; the
agricultural fields have become new working-class neighborhoods and maquiladora industrial parks (including the major ones, San Lorenzo,
Bermudez Park, andRio Bravo in Zaragoza, now a working-class suburb of Juarez). In this process, by the mid-198os, the rutera concept (using a
fast-paced vehicle to transport factory workers on time) took over, and thus most ruteras today are buses that circulate and penetrate all
corners of the border metropolis, from Malec6n Avenue (along the river in the north) to the Juarez Airport (in the south) and from Colonia
Anapra in the west (now bordering Sunland Park, New Mexico) to Zaragoza in the far east (see Figures 4.1- 4.3).Consequently,
as the
city and the maquiladora industry grew, larger vehicles were needed. Today, the maquiladoras have
helped create an urban environment in which huge buses push speed limits in the narrow streets of an
unplanned and crowded city. The end results have been chaotic: automobile accidents have increased,
often sending maquila workers, who are on their way to work, to the hospital.11 Also, workers have had to adapt
their bodies to the wobbling movements of the buses that (while trying to beat other buses) constantly speed up and stop, sometimes from
block to block, on mostly unpaved streets in the periphery, just as they have to adapt their waist and buttocks to the wobbling moves of the
chairs on which they sit at the factories (two factories where I did participant observation had this "chair problem"-see Chapter 7; also see
Fernandez-Kelly 1983).Since the beginning of maquiladora industrialization in Ciudad Juarez, there have never been enough buses or vans for
the thousands of factory workers who need such public transportation to get to their jobs daily. Consequently, the driver (always a male), is
always expected to pick up as many people as possibleand get everywhere on time.During
key rush hours (between 4:30 and 6:ooAM,
takes a while for someone to get out of the
rutera; he or she has to struggle (push and shove) in the extremely crowded van or bus just to get to the
door. Moreover, once in a while, a person does not want to walk the extra block. Sometimes people demand to be dropped off at exactly the
between 3:30 and 5:00PM, and between 11:30 PM and 1:00AM),it actually
place they want, not one block before, even if the rutera has been stopping consecutively in the previous eight or ten blocks.12 Thus, in the
actual transporting of people from their neighbor- hoods to the factories, the individuals who probably feel the most tension in this
environment are the drivers, who must drive and produce efficiently for the maquiladora industry (which in turn provides the passengers).
Drivers are the individuals responsible for taking hundreds of people to work (50- 60 people easily fit on one bus at any given time). They are
constantly caught in a contradiction between getting to the industrial parks on time and picking up everybody who is going to work, at least
until the bus is full. Sometimes, workers would pressure the driver because he is causing them to be late.13 But the historical and material
conditions responsible for the environment they inhabit are not recognized by the actors themselves. Instead, the workers and the driver end
up blaming each other. Many times on the bus, I heard workers comparing andcomplaining about drivers, especially on the way to work.'4The
factory workers, however, must balance a much more immediate economic dilemma when riding the
ruteras: In no uncertain terms, being late or· being absent has serious economic consequences for the
workers. In most factories, if the workers arrive late, after 6:oo AM, they lose the weekly and monthly
bonuses as well as other benefits for that particular month (see Figure 6.5). At one of the transnationals where I worked,
a worker can be ten minutes late with- out punishment. Between 6:10 and 6:30, tl1ey let you in, while keeping track of those who are tardy.
After three "tardies," they "talk" to the worker, giving him or her a warning. Also, after 6:30, the guards might not let you in, sending you home
for the day because the company might not want to pay you for nine hours when you have worked only eight and one-half. The guards
themselves are capable of returning the workers as they see fit, as we will see below. These local inspections outside the factory are an
everyday occurrence. As I recorded in my field journal (which I used to write at the end of the working day) while carrying out participant
observation on the streets of Ciudad Juarez:It rained all night. I didn't think I was going to make it. I was late today.It was already 5:25 AM. I also
got wet in the rain. Four men and a woman were at the bus stop. Two ruteras (buses) drove by but didn't stop. Three guys began running
toward Surgikos (three blocks away), where the rutera usually unloads some of the people. The other guy and I did not run; we walked in the
same direction. The woman decided to return home instead. Another rutera passed by; we waved, but it didn't stop. When we arrived at
Surgikos, the three guys were still there, waiting. No one had picked them up. By 6:05 another rutera arrived. It was so fulL I tried to get in, but
the driver couldn't even close the door, so he asked me to get down. I did. I waited till6:25. It kept on raining. Finally, I caught a rutera. . .. It had
men and women. . .. This driver drove quite fast. This rutera went through San Lorenzo, a major industrial park; then we got to Bermudez Park,
the largest and oldest industrial park in Ciudad Juarez, where this factory is located. 1arrived at the factory at 6:45AM . I was not the only one
who was late. A woman walked in in front of me. The factory guards did not stop us. (Field journal, September 6, 1989)The next day, I wrote:I
got up at 4:30, brushed my teeth, washed my face, put my clothes on, and took off running. I arrived at the same corner around 4:45 AM, at
least half an hour earlier than the day before. A young woman around seventeen or eighteen years of age, brunette (morena), with long hair
down to her waist, was already there waiting for the rutera. She told me that there is only one bus between s:oo and 5:15 AM and that it
usually stops to pick up peopleat this corner. This "bus stop" on September 16th Street is about a 15-20- minute walk from where I live in the
Colonia Hidalgo, one block away from Hermanos Escobar Street. The other ruteras, she said, usually don't stop because they come full from
downtown, where they are stationed (there they pick up the people who have to ride to downtown from their neighborhoods in the western
and southwestern peripheries: the most populated sectors of the city [see city population map, Figure 4.2]). Most people living in different
parts of the city-west, southwest, east, and southeast-take one rutera to downtown; then another one from downtown to San Lorenzo or to
Bermudez Park. A lot of people who live on the east and southeast of the city work in other smaller industrial parks (i.e., Juarez Park, Oneida, or
Zaragoza) and take different routes [see city map, Figure 4.1].15The first two ruteras that passed by were full to the maximum. They did not
stop. So around 5:40 (we should start working at 6:ooAM), the young woman told me that we would have to walk about four more blocks eastward, toward Surgikos. There, she said, the rutera unloads some people, confirming my experience of the day before. Actually, we had not
walked because it had been sprinkling. We walked as quickly as we could. At ten till six, she said, "Vas a llegar tarde" (You're going to be late).
Yes, indeed I was.The rutera finally came, unloaded a few, and we got on and took off.The
driver, unlike the previous one the
day before, drove much slower and was picking up everybody without really worrying about many of us
being late. I had been on the bus for a block or two when the radio announced the time: 6:15. One male voice from the back of the rutera
sarcastically told the driver: "Chofer, sube a todos los que quieran (Driver, pick up whoever wants to get on the rutera)." I arrived at the
factory at 6:30AM. I was thirty minutes late. The guard told us (another guy was late as well):"Run before I don't
let you in." He gestured to us to run in quickly. We ran toward the gate. I guess sometimes the guards help workers
in this process: or do they help the company?
AT: Free Trade Good
Development of first world nations is not due to neoliberal economics but has
involved protectionism – Britain, US, Japan, and Korea are all examples of this
Dubhashi, Ph.D. at Pune University, former Vice-Chanceller, Goa University, and an erstwhile Secretary,
Government of India, December 20, 2008
(Padmakar, “Myth and Reality of Capitalism: Neo-Liberalism and Globalisation,” MAINSTREAM, VOL
XLVII, NO 1, http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1111.html)//SG
THE “official” history of globalisation has spread the myth that the rich countries, of which Britian was the first, owed
their economic development and prosperity to free market and free trade liberal laissez faire policies, low barriers to
the international flow of goods and labour and principles of sound money (low inflation) and balanced budgets. The facts are
otherwise. The protectionist policies initiated by the first Prime Minister of Britain, Robert Walpole (1721-42), continued
until the middle of the 19th century. It helped the British manufacturing industries to establish themselves.
At the same time it banned cotton textile imports from India, destroyed the Irish woolen industry and banned the construction of new steel
mills in America as also manufacture of high technology products. It
wanted colonies to be producing primary
commodities to supply raw material at low cost to British manufactures. Once the British industry
became internationally competitive, Britain adopted the free trade policy since it was in her interest. In
1846 the Corn Law was repealed and tariff on many manufactured goods was abolished. It was not long before America realised the harmful
effects the of the British policy. As the first Finance Minister of the USA, Alexander Hamilton, in his report on the state of manufactures
submitted to the US Congress, pointed
out, a backward country like the USA should protect its industry in
“infancy”. He was the first, not Freindrich List of Germany, who coined the word. Since the USA needed a big progress of industrialisation,
the USA progressively raised import tariffs to an average of 45 per cent by 1800. When President Lincoln of the
Republican Party come to power, he raised tariffs to the highest level in US history. Thrifts on manufacturing imports remained at 50 per cent
until World War I. Following
the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, came in 1930 the Smoot Hawley Act which
raised tariff even higher. It is with the help of those protectionist policies that the US became the fastest
growing economy. The USA was the most protectionist country in the world right up 1930. It was only after the Second
World War that the US with its unchallenged industrial supremacy liberalised its trade and started advocating the cause of
free trade. But it is still aggressive in taking non-tariff measures when necessary; for example, without liberal
federal funding for R & D, the US would not have been able to maintain its technological lead over the rest of
the world in key industries like computers, semi-conductors, life sciences, the internet and aero space. It was only
after they became the world’s dominant industrial powers that Britain and the USA themselves practised free-market economics. However,
they forced non-Western countries like India, China and Japan to practise free trade even though their
economies needed protection.
Other countries which followed the footsteps of Britain and the USA on the path of industria-lisation were France, Germany and Japan. The
myth is that they were homes to protectionism. But the truth is they had lower tariffs than Britain and the USA. It was only after realising,
following 1945, that the “hands-off” policies of the state were responsible for its relative economic decline and defeats in two world wars, that
the French state took to a much more active role in the economy through “indicative planning”, nationalisation of
key industries
and active role of the state owned banks in channelling investment in strategies areas. Countries like Finland,
Norway, Italy and Austria which were relatively backward at the end of World War II used similar strategies like high tariffs, state owned
enterprises (SOEs) and directing bank credit to strategic industries. Japan,
which led the “miracle economies” in East Asia after
not do so through a neo-liberal policy. Though it did not keep industrial tariffs at a high level, it controlled
import through foreign exchange regulation. Exports were promoted to earn the foreign exchange
needed to buy up better technology from abroad. Its MITI (Ministry for Industrial Trade and Industry) became well known for
its orchestrated drive for industrial development programmes. Through directed credit programme, it subsidised credit
into key sectors. Foreign investment was barred in key industries. Foreign companies were required to
transfer technology and had to buy specific pro-portions of inputs locally. There were strict ceilings on foreign ownership up
to a maximum at 49 per cent. An outstanding example of development in key sectors in Japan was the Toyota Automobile.
It started as a manufacturer of textile machinery. It moved into car production in 1933. The Japanese Government
kicked out General Motors and Fort in 1939 and with its own money bailed out Toyota. After 25 years of trying
World War II, did
it slowly established itself as a car manufacturer. Today Toyota’s luxury brand Lexus has become an icon for globalisation. Korea’s
economic growth over the last four-and-a-half decades has been spectacular. From being one of the poorest countries of the
world, it has come on par with some European countries like Portugal and Slovenia in terms of per capita income. A myth has been propagated
that to achieve this miracle Korea pursued a neo-liberal economic strategy. The reality was different. Korea
used measures like tariff
protection, subsidies and various forms of government support to nurture new industries. The government
owned all banks and directed credit for them. Big projects were undertaken directly by state owned
enterprises, POSCO, the steel maker, being the best example. The Korean Government controlled foreign exchange to use hard-earned
foreign currencies for importing vital machinery and inputs. The Korean Government controlled foreign investment as
well.
AT: Globalization Good
The aff’s logic is flawed –globalization only benefits the privileged while pushing
developing countries farther behind
Szentes, Professor Emeritus of the Corvinus University of Budapest and member of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, 2008
(Tamas, “Globalisation and prospects of the world society,” CENTRAL EUROPEAN POLITICAL
SCIENCE, Vol. 9, pp 6, http://cepsr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ATT81762.pdf#page=9)//SG
The “revolution” of communication and information technologies can, on the one hand, make easier for
several developing countries to catch upwith the most advanced ones,but, on the other hand, may increase, by its
very uneven spread and effects,the international development gap.Progress in science and human knowledge, which by its very
nature has always been “transnational”, crossing the state borders or other barriers, makes the human society capable to produce in sufficient
volume all the really necessary goods for the survival and well-being of everybody, and has opened new perspectives for the development of
the economy by generating technological “revolutions”. However,the
absolute majority of the world population is still
excluded from the benefits of this progress and from the process of development itself. The adaptation and
efficient use of modern technologies depend on the quality of labour, i.e. onthe development level of human capital, in
regard to which the international gap is even deeper than in per capita DGP.Whilesome of the developing
countries(like several Asian ones, e.g. China, India, South-Korea), whichgave priority to education and the teaching of
computer technology and knowledge, managed to substantially accelerate their development, the still
high ratio of illiterate people in many developing countries contributes to the reproduction of their
underdevelopment. Moreover, nowadays a new type of illiteracy appears, namely the lack of knowledge of computer language, which
tends to widen the development gap further.The very uneven access to science and the danger of misusing scientific
results call for global governance.
The disadvantages far outweigh any perceived benefits
Szentes, Professor Emeritus of the Corvinus University of Budapest and member of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, 2008
(Tamas, “Globalisation and prospects of the world society,” CENTRAL EUROPEAN POLITICAL
SCIENCE, Vol. 9, pp 7-8, http://cepsr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ATT81762.pdf#page=9)//SG
(b) Today the main actors of the world economy are the transnational companies. International trade is basically
shaped by them, rather than those "comparative advantages" spelled out in conventional trade theories.The economic development
of countries depends much more on their foreign direct investment policy, than on the efforts of national
producers.They follow, of course, their own business interests and strategic aims, which hardly coincide with those of the host (or even their
home) countries.Their
worldwide activity, foreign direct investments and operation of their affiliates in the
host countries bring about both potential advantages and disadvantagesfor the latter. Althoughneo-liberal
scholars are inclined to over-emphasise and overestimate the former, while radical nationalists the
latter, no generalisation is justifiable, as it is only in concrete cases and under concrete conditions that one can conclude about
which and how much of the potential advantages and of the potential disadvantages are realised.The potential advantages and benefits from
the direct investments of TNCs and the operation of their affiliates include not only• the access to additional financial resources, investments or
reinvestments over and beyond the host country’s own financial capacity, but also• the access to foreign, more up-to-date production
technologies, know-how, management and organisational skills,• international business contacts, additional information facilities and new
markets within the TNCs’ network, participation in their organised cross-border trade (avoiding the uncertainties of market fluctuations),•
employment and in-service training opportunities for local labour and• secured supply facilities for the local “supporting” firms, contracted
manufacturersand service industries, etc.The
potential disadvantages, dangers or lossesinclude• the reduction of the
scope of “national” decision-making on the structure of production, on the commodity and geographical
patterns of trade, i.e. a reduction of the “national sovereignty” over the economy,• the influence on the
policy-makers (by strong lobbies or even corruption),•the transfer of “inappropriate” technologies,• the drain of
resources, the appropriation of business facilities, state supports,variousprivileges and allowances, the seduction of the
most qualified experts, technicians andlabourers, i.e.a kind of “domestic brain drain”, and• the application of restrictive
business practice, etc., which all adversely affect thesmaller local firms,•the avoidance of taxation by applying “transfer
prices”, the repatriation of profitsover and beyond a “normal” measure,• “trade creation” at the expense of local
suppliersand “trade diversion” at the expenseof traditional partners,• therisk of their disinvestments and capital flight
causing thereby sudden drop inemployment and deterioration of the balance of payments, etc..The patterns of
motivations and interests of TNCs have become much more complex,multidimensional and changeable
than ever before.One of the most distinctive features of the contemporary TNCs, as compared to those big
companies often called “international monopolies”, which played dominant role in the international capital flows and FDIs before the Second
World War,is
their great flexibility in organisational structure, business strategy and location policy. Such a
flexibility and the fact that their operation is less tied to a certain country, tend to intensify the
challenge they set to their partners, both home and host countries, and also opens much greater opportunities for those of the
latter following an appropriate policy for real national interest.Their policy of decentralisation of corporate management
may increase flexibility and responsiveness, and may give relatively more independence to local firms in the host
countries,but its is accompanied by a “functional hierarchy” within their international production
systems(i.e. a very unequal allocation of the higher functions, the knowledge-intensive and, particularly, the R&D activities in the “valuechain”), andalso centralization of the strategic decisions in their “home base”.True, they are inclined to transfer even
their “home base” to other countries, if they find better conditions there. Due to their more or less monopolistic behaviour, their
activities often involve restrictive business practices harmful to the local firms,their competitors and all those
outside their corporate system.The transnational companies are seeking not only for foreign resources, large and
sophisticated market, higher efficiency(i.e. a higher aggregate rate of profit),strategic, ownership and location
advantages, but also advantages of internalisation10 as well as externalisation. While internalisation ensures the
advantage of the facility for the TNCs to supervise a wide range of production and service activities and various business functions and also the
advantage of centralisation of the decision-making on strategic issues,externalisation also
brings about significant
advantages, particularly by increasing their flexibility in business operations. Externalisation involves the
methods of outsourcing, contracting and subcontracting, and tele-employment. Theapplication of
thesemethods brings about obvious benefits, but alsorisks for the participants,whomay become heavily dependent
on the companies concerned. It may result in substantial changes in the global industry structures, and
open a wide field for the rise of a global stratum of “contract manufacturers” as well as remote-employees, thus providing new opportunities
also for the less developed economies.
AT: Privatization Good/SOE Bad
___ (SOE Bad) Saying State Owned Enterpises fail is simply propaganda pushed by
privatization agendas. Brazil, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and many European States
prove SOE’s are more beneficial in many instances
___ (Privatization Good) Their privatization good evidence is simply propaganda to
subvert any instance of State Owned Enterprises. Brazil, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and
many European States prove SOE’s are more beneficial in many instances
Dubhashi, Ph.D. at Pune University, former Vice-Chanceller, Goa University, and an erstwhile Secretary,
Government of India, December 20, 2008
(Padmakar, “Myth and Reality of Capitalism: Neo-Liberalism and Globalisation,” MAINSTREAM, VOL
XLVII, NO 1, http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1111.html)//SG
NEO-LIBERAL thinkers have spread the myth that state owned public enterprises do not work since people
do not take care of things that are not theirs. Public enterprises secure finances from the govern-ment treasury and fritter them away. This
was the justification for the massive privatisation programme resolutely implemented by Margaret Thatcher in
Britain in the early 1980s. It is forgotten that private enterprises like big corporates have dispersed share ownership
and are run by hired managers as in the case of state owned enterprises. Key private enterprises in
trouble also get subsidies and government bailouts as in the case of Rolls Royce, nationalised by the Conservative
Government in 1967 and British Leyland and British Aerospace by the Labour Government in 1977. The Swedish ship-building
industry was nationalised by its first Right-wing government in 44 years. SOEs, like private companies, have to work in a
market environment. SOEs are often success stories like the Singapore Airlines. Government linked
companies in Singapore not only operate public utility industries like telecommunication, power and transport but
also ship-building, shipping, banking, engineering and semi conductors. Eighty-five per cent of housing is provided by
publicly owned entities. The Housing and Development Board of Korea also provides another example of successful
public enterprise in the form of POSCO (Pohang Iron and Steel Company). Within 10 years of starting production in
1973 (financed by the Japanese Bank after being rejected by the World Bank in the late 1960s), it became one of the most
efficient steel producers. Taiwan has had a very large SOE sector accounting for 15 per cent of national
output. China has also come up with a unique type of hybrid form of ownership called Town and Village Enterprises formally owned by local
authorities but which operate as if they are privately owned by local political leaders. The economic success of many European
countries such as France, Italy, Austria, Finland and Norway was achieved with very large SOEs sector at
the forefront of technological moderni-sation. The Brazilian state owned company, Petrobras, is a world
class firm with leading edge technologies. Embraer, the Brazilian manufacturer of “regional jet”, has become a world
class firm. German car marker Volkswagen has the State Government of Lower Saxony as the largest share
holder with 18.6 per cent shares. Large scale projects with long-gestation period and enterprises which are natural monopolies can best be
taken up by the state. Also people in remote areas can be provided essential services only by state enterprises.
Disinvestments of SOEs is not always easy. Privatisation must be done at the right scale, at the right time, at the right price and to the right
buyer. The
sale of the Cochabamba water system in Bolivia to the American company, Bechtel, in 1999,
that resulted in immediate tripling of water rates is a bad example of privatisation. SOEs’ performance
can be improved without privatisation by providing competition.
Ev Bias
Pro-neoliberalist evidence has succumbed to an upper-class propaganda strategy—
masks the problems inherent in neoliberalism
Harvey, Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York 07-- (David,
“Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 610, 3/07, Sage)//AS
So why, then, in the face of this patchy if not dismal record, have so many been persuaded that
neoliberalization is a successful solution? Over and beyond the persistent stream of propaganda emanating from the
neoliberal think tanks and suffusing the media, two material reasons stand out. First, neoliberalizationhas been accompanied by increasing
volatility within global capitalism. That success was to materialize somewhere obscured the reality that neoliberalism was gener ally failing.
Periodic episodes of growth interspersed with phases of creative destruction, usually registered as severe financial crises. Argentina was
opened up to foreign capital and privatization in the 1990s and for several years was the darling of Wall Street, only to collapse into disaster as
international capital with drew at the end of the decade. Financial collapse and social devastation was quickly followed by a long political
crisis. Financial turmoil proliferated all over the developing world, and in some instances, such as Brazil and Mexico, repeated waves of
structural adjustment and austerity led to economic paralysis. On the other hand, neoliberalism
has been a huge success
from the standpoint ofthe upper classes. It has either restored class position to ruling elites, as in the United States and
Britain, or created conditions for capitalist class formation, as in China, India, Russia, and elsewhere. Even countries that have suffered
extensively from neoliberalization have seen the massive reordering of class structures internally. The wave of privatization that came to
Mexico with the Salinas de Gortari administration in 1992 spawned unprecedented concentrations of wealth in the hands of a few people
With the media dominated
by upper-class interests, the myth could be propa gated that certain sectors failed because they were
not competitive enough, thereby setting the stage for even more neoliberal reforms. Increased social
inequality was necessary to encourage entrepreneurial risk and innovation, and these, in turn,
conferred competitive advantage and stimulated growth. If conditions among the lower classes
deteriorated, it was because they failed for personal and cultural reasons to enhance their own
human capital through education, the acquisition of a protestant work ethic, and submission to work discipline and flexi bility. In
(Carlos Slim, for example, who took over the state telephone system and became an instant billionaire).
short, problems arose because of the lack of competitive strength or because of personal, cultural, and political failings. In a Spencerian world,
the argument went, only the fittest should and do survive. Systemic
problems were masked under a blizzard of
ideological pronouncements and a plethora of localized crises.
Their neolib good arguments are premised on the notion of neoliberal theory
however, in practice, neoliberal’s interventionism strips away social rights – the
benefits of neoliberalism are only realized amongst the elite of America
Navarro,M.D., Ph.D., Professor of Public Policy, Sociology, and Policy Studies at Johns Hopkins
University, 2007
(Vicente, “NEOLIBERALISM AS A CLASS IDEOLOGY; OR, THE POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE GROWTH OF
INEQUALITIES,” International Journal of Health Services, Vol. 37.1, pp 49-51)//SG
Let’s be clear right away that neoliberal theory is one thing and neoliberal practice another thing
entirely. Most members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)—includingthe U.S. federal
government—have seen state interventionism and state public expenditures increase during the past 30
years. My area of scholarship is public policy, and, as such, I study the nature of state interventions in many parts of the world.I can
testify to the expansion of state intervention in most countries in the developed capitalist world. Even in
the United States, Reagan’s neoliberalism did not translate into a decline of the federal public sector. As a matter of fact, federal public
expenditures increased under his mandate, from 21.6 to 23 percent of gross national product (GNP),as a con- sequence
of a spectacular growth in military expendituresfrom 4.9 to 6.1 percent of GNP during the Reagan years (2).This growth
in public expenditures was financed by an increase in the federal deficit (creating a burgeoning of the federal debt)
and increase in taxes. As the supposedly anti-tax president, Reagan in fact increased taxes for a greater number of people (in peace time) than
any other president in U.S. history. Andhe
increased taxes not once, but twice(in 1982 and in 1983). In a demonstration of class
power,he
reduced the taxes of the top 20 percent(by income)of the population enormously, at the cost of
increasing taxes for the majority of the population.It is not accurate, therefore, to say that President Reagan reduced the
role of the state in the United States by reducing the size of the public sector and lowering taxes. What intervention, such thatit benefited
even more the upper classes and the economic groups(such as military-related corporations)that financed his
electoral campaigns. Reagan’s policies where indeed class policies that hurt the majority of the nation’s working class. Reagan was
profoundly anti-labor, making cuts in social expenditures at an unprecedented level. It bears repeating that Reagan’s policies were not liberal:
they were Keynesian, based on large public expenditures and large federal deficits. Also,the
federal government intervened very
actively in the nation’s industrial development(mainly, but not exclusively, through the Defense Department). As Caspar
Weinberger (3), secretary of defense in the Reagan administration, once indicated (in response to criticisms by the Democratic Party that the
U.S. government had abandoned the manufacturing sector), “Our Administration is the Administration that has a more advanced and extended
industrial policy in the western world.” He was right. Noother Western
government had such an extensive industrial
policy. And today, the huge growth of the U.S. biomedical industry is to a large degree stimulated by an
active state intervention. Indeed, the U.S. federal state is one of the most interventionist states in the
Western world.There exists very robust scientific evidence that the United States is not a liberal state (as it is constantly defined) and that
the U.S. state is not reducing its key role in developing the national economy, including in the production and distribution of goods and services
by large U.S. corporations—which, incidentally, are wrongly referred to as “multinationals” but are actually “transnationals.” This empirical
evidence shows thatthe
U.S. federal government’s interventionism (in the economic, political, cultural, and
security spheres) has increased over the past 30 years. In the economic sphere, for example, protectionism has not
declined. It has increased, with higher subsidies to the agricultural, military, aerospace, and biomedical sectors. In the social arena,public
interventions to weaken social rights (and most particularly labor rights) have increased enormously
(not only under Reagan, but also under Bush Senior, Clinton, and Bush Junior), and surveillance of the
citizenry has increased exponentially. Again, there has been no diminution of federal interventionism in the United States, but
rather an even more skewed class character to this intervention during the past 30 years. Neoliberal narrative about the
declining role of the state in people’s lives is easily falsified by the facts. Indeed, as John Williamson, one of the
intellectual architects of neoliberalism, once indicated, “We have to recognize that what the U.S. government promotes
abroad, the U.S. government does not follow at home,” adding that “the U.S. government promotes
policies that are not followed in the U.S.” (4, p. 213). It could not have been said better. In other words, if you want to
understand U.S. public policies, look at what the U.S. government does, not what it says. This same situation occurs in the majority of
developed capitalist countries.Their states have become more, not less, interventionist. The size of the state (measured
by public expenditures per capita) has increased in most of these countries. Again, the empirical information on this point is strong. What has
been happening is not a reduction of the state but rather a change in the nature of state intervention—further strengthening its class character.
Their evidence remains ignorant of the striking myths of the neoliberal world Dubhashi, Ph.D. at Pune University, former Vice-Chanceller, Goa University, and an erstwhile Secretary,
Government of India, December 20, 2008
(Padmakar, “Myth and Reality of Capitalism: Neo-Liberalism and Globalisation,” MAINSTREAM, VOL
XLVII, NO 1, http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article1111.html)//SG
Prof Galbraith of Harvard University had been, through his copious and widely read books, a sustained critic of unbridled capitalism and its
adverse consequences on the living of the common people. Thus in his celebrated book, The Affluent Society, he drew pointed attention to the
glaring contradiction between private opulence and public squalor. In his New Industrial State, he showed how the
operations of the
“techno structure” of the corporations which now dominate the economy, have completely overthrown the
“conventional wisdom” of traditional economics. The “myths” sedulously fostered by the latter have no relation to the reality
of the economic world. The slim volume “Economics of Innocent Fraud”, his last offering, distills the essence of Galbraith several criticisms of
the capitalist economy.1 The capitalist economy now a days masquerades in some what neutral impersonal term “the free market economy”.
This enables it to escape from the responsibility of its historic crimes and blunders—subjugation of workers by
the owners of the means of production, monopolistic abuses, roles of European arms and steel combines in engineering world wars and cyclical
booms and busts ravaging the economy. Galbraith exposes a series of myths attributed to the market economy. The
myth is that in the
market “consumer sovereignty” prevails. The reality in the market is that the consumer sovereignty has
been impaired by the manipulation of consumer demand through advertisement, salesmanship with the help of
the powerful medium of television and
mislending product differentiation The myth is that the economy rewards work
in proportion to the discomfort experienced in course of work. The reality is that those who do not have to
do physical work and enjoy it are the best paid. The myth is that the market economy consists of
innumerable producers including small business and family agriculture. In reality, it is dominated by big corporations.
The myth is that the corporations are governed by the decisions of shareholders and their representative Boards
of Directors. The reality is that the corporations are managed by its “bureaucracy” who award munificent
compensation to themselves despite falling profits and stock market prices. The myth is that the economy consists of two
sectors—the private sector and the public sector. The reality is that on expanding part of what is called the public
sector it is for all practical purposes in the private sector. Military expenditure (euphemistically termed defence expenditure)
by government is determined by the military industry complex. Even foreign and military policies of the government are
determined by it. The myth is that the upturns and downturns of the economy can be forecast by
“consultants” and experts with the help of economic and statistical analysis. The reality is that they are unpredictable.
Sometimes well-published predictions by consultants are intended to serve personal gain. The Federal Reserve
system, especially under Allen Greenspan, was endowed with the capacity to use monetary measures such as modification of bank rate to
manage the economy. In reality the Central Bank action had minimal effect and no decisive role. The myth had been that the
standards of
corporate finances are maintained by professional auditors and accountants. The reality is that they had
been parties to corporate scandals. The myth is that corporate scandals can be avoided by appropriate regulation. The reality is
that public officials, including those of the Security and Exchange Commission, can be unduly compliant and corporate influence does extend to
regulators. The
myth is that the economic well-being of the people is measured by the GDP. The reality is
that the negative social affects of the so-called productive activity like pollution, destruction of
environment, the neglect of citizen’s health and education, threat of military action and mass
destruction are not taken into account. No wonder human progress is marked by unimaginable cruelty
and death caused by wars. It is these myths and frauds which are the basis of the structural adjustment
programme, the so-called economic reforms, which were imposed on the developing countries by the international
economic organisations, namely, the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO under the influence of global
capitalism led by the USA and its allies.
AT: Inev
Notions of inevitable neoliberalism are products of repressive neoliberal ideology—
resistance to the dominant discourse of the aff is key
Hursh and Henderson, associate professor of education at the University of Rochester and PhD at the Warner Graduate School of
Education and Human Development 11 (David and Joseph, “ Contesting global neoliberalism and creating alternative futures”, Discourse:
Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 32:2, May 2011, Routledge)//AS
So far we have described some of the forces that led to the rise of neoliberalism, its principal features, and suggested that while
neoliberalism is presented as beneficial to all, it has generally benefited the already privileged while
harming most everyone else. In this section, we want to raise the question of how it is that neoliberal economic and political policies
have come to be so widely accepted, often to the total exclusion of other viewpoints. To answer that question, we show how proponents
of neoliberalism have described neoliberal policies as the inevitable outcome of capitalist
development where decisions are market-based, and, therefore, businesses should have few or no regulations, as
in the recent deregulation of energy and transportation industries, and repeal of sections of the Glass-Steagall Act regulating the finance
industry in the USA. Moreover, it assumes that government should play a smaller role in improving social welfare through spending on
education, housing, or other social services. Furthermore, we use concepts from critical geography to conduct a spatial analysis of cities and
countries as both contingent and particular (Harvey, 2009, p. 166), and situated within networks and hierarchies. It is important, as we imply
above, that we examine cities, such as Chicago, as part of a competitive global network of cities. It
is similarly important to
understand countries, such as Mexico, within the context of US policies, including the NAFTA and
immigration laws, and in relationship to transnational corporations. Similarly, Nigeria’s oil war can be understood in
terms of the relationship between the politically powerful who benefit from the oil royalties, the government, the poor whose land is fouled by
the oil, and the oil industries themselves (see Maas, 2009). Therefore, we begin by suggesting that we
need to critique neoliberal
policies for the way in which they attempt to limit public discourse, what can be said and thought. In
particular, neoliberalism is often promoted as inevitable so that governing bodies in cities, provinces, and
countries are portrayed as having no choice but to adopt neoliberal policies. Moreover, neoliberalism
supports discourses that marginalize particular groups of people and where they live. This occurs, for example,
when urban neighbourhoods, as in Chicago, are described as blighted, dangerous, and therefore, needing to
be demolished, or nations are portrayed, such as in Africa, ‘as a land of failed states, uncontrollable
violence, horrific disease, and unending poverty’ (Ferguson, 2006, p. 10). Lastly, neoliberal discourses often
reduce notions of social justice to access to markets, ignoring differences in access to monetary, legal and social
resources. Such an approach also eliminates the need to discuss different conceptions of social justice or
the purpose of society, asserting that economic and technical responses to political questions are
sufficient.
“Inevitable neoliberalism” is due to self-perpetuating politics that kill political
resistance—contesting this is critical
Hay, Professor of Political Analysis at the University of Sheffield04 (Colin, “The normalizing role of rationalist assumptions in the
institutional embedding of neoliberalism”, Economy and Society 33:4, 2004, Taylor and Francis)//AS
Once again, the
justification for policy is presented not in its own terms, but as a necessary
accommodation to the ‘harsh realities’ of new economic timesin a (superficially) dispassionate, almost
technocratic manner. Appeal is again made to processes beyond the control of political actors which
must simply be accommodated _/ and hence to a dull logic of economic compulsion which is nonnegotiable. The policy implications of such an account are painfully clear. As globalization serves to establish
competitive selection mechanisms within the international economy, there is little choice but to cast all regulatory
impediments to the efficient operation of the market on the bonfire of welfare institutions, regulatory
controls and labour-market rigidities. Plausible, familiar and compelling though such a logic may well appear, it is important to
isolate the parsimonious rationalist assumptions on which it is predicated. For it is these, rather than any inexorable process
of globalization, which ultimately summon the necessity of an accommodation with neoliberal (supplyside) microeconomics. They are principally five-fold, and each can be challenged on both theoretical and empirical grounds (the
empirical critique is elaborated in Hay (2005)) _/ see Table 3.
Neoliberalist governments have already been overthrown in several Latin American
countries.
Buono and Bell Lara, Professors of Sociology and Senior Researcher in the FLACSO-Cuba Program,
2007(Richard A. Delloand José, “Neoliberalism and Resistance in Latin America,” 2007,
http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/9789047410881)//CS
In our view, the emerging scenario is anything but pessimistic. We believe that these real social
consequences of neoliberalism have provided the fundamental basis for its own negation. The
ideological monopoly of neoliberalism has without doubt been fractured, and if indeed the antineoliberal turn of the masses has not managed to totally sweep away those policies, it has put them
in check while opening up new spaces for other possible development strategies.Various Latin
American governments have been brought down over recent years as a result of mass street actions,
including the spectacular cases of Peru (2000), Argentina (2001), Bolivia (2003 and 2005), and Ecuador
(2000 and 2005), the latter case of which in a certain sense is paradigmatic. The common pattern in
these processes of mass popular mobilisation directed at their governments has been one of
“emergency response.” Under certain socialconditions, mass action has proven able to sweep away
those regimes thatattempted at all costs to impose the most extreme varieties of neoliberalpolicies.
AT: Sustainable
Neoliberalism is on the path to failure—cannot be permanently resurrected
Birch and Mykhenko, Assistant Professor in theDepartment of Social Science at York University and Lecturer in Human Geography,
Urban Adaptation, and ResilienceSchool of Geography,Univeristy of Birmingham respectively, 10 (Kean and Vlad, “The Rise and Fall of
Neoliberalism: The Collapse of an Economic Order?”, Zed Books, 8/31/10, University of Michigan Libraries)//AS
The rapid
action by the major governments worldwide in a bid to save giant transnational corporations
ultimately shattered the ideological disguise carefully constructed by the
twentieth-century neoliberal doctrinaires. In a startling admission, a leading ideologist of neoliberalism has
confirmed: "Another ideological god has failed. The world of the past three decades has gone' (Wolf
from the financial meltdown has
2009b). At the time when editorials of the Financial Times, the world's major financial capitalist newspaper, regularly condemn "˜the system's
structural failure' (Editorial 2009a; Editorial 2009b; Editorial 2009c1), and the IMF (2009c;} sings various governments' praises for "wideranging, coordinated public intervention' that has supported demand and rescued financial markets from themselves: it
seems all too
clear that the neoliberal economic ideology is finished, And with the hopes of a swift recovery dashed by every new
release of depressing employment data {`Groom 2009b; Hughes and Rappeport 2009; IMF 2009d; Rappeport 2009; Rappeport et al. 2009),
many more years of pain to come ought to undermine the remaining support for the political creed
which has so spectacularly crashed.
AT: No Root Cause
Neoliberal policies are the root cause of violence, oppression, warming, and
instability– the price to pay is too high
Greenberg, Ph.D in Anthropology at University of Michigan, 2012
(James B., Thomas Weaver (Ph.D. in Anthropology at University of California at Berkeley), Anne Browning-Aiken (Ph.D. in Anthropology at
University of Arizona), William L. Alexander (Professor of Anthropology at University of Arizona), “The Neoliberal Transformation of Mexico,”
Neoliberalism and Commodity Production in Mexico, University Press of Colorado, pp 334-335)//SG
Neoliberalism also underlies the growing problems of crime and violence affecting Mexico more broadly.
The policies that ruined smallholder agriculture also made the country receptive to growing marijuana and poppies, thereby open- ing spaces
into which drug cartels moved (see the chapter by Emanuel and chapter 9 by Weaver, this volume). The money from the drug trade has had a
pernicious effect on Mexican society, creating extensive problems of corruption and increas- ing levels of violence (Campbell
2009).Neoliberal
policies have driven millions of Mexicans into economic exile and helped turn Mexico
into a major source of drugs. Both drugs and victims of structural violence spill across the border, as does the violence that too often
accompanies them, reminding us that we live in a global society and thatneoliberalism in Mexico also has direct
consequences for the United States.As we have seen with the near collapse of global financial mar- kets, problems are
contagious in an increasingly integrated global economy. Just as the consequences of neoliberal policies
in Mexico spill over into the United States, the impacts of US applications of neoliberalism reverberate in
Mexico. As the popular saying goes, “When the United States catches a cold, Mexico catches pneumonia.” Tight credit affects commodity
chains, so the consequences of the neoliberal debacle in US financial markets are felt strongly in Mexico. In sum, our major area of unease
regarding neoliberalism is that, as an eco- nomic framework, the lopsided version of development it delivers comes at too high a price.While
neoliberalism may further global capitalism’s frantic drive for expansion and increased profit, it has not
resolved intra- and inter-nation prob- lems of inequality, environmental degradation, unequal
distribution of resources and gains, global warming, lack of healthcare, instability of pension funds, corruption, and clientelism. Instead, it has increased violence and oppression and generally worsened
working and living conditions.
AT: Perm
Neoliberalism coopts and appropriates resistance movements—coexistence is
impossible
Clarke, Professor of Social Policy at the Open University 08 (John, “Living with/in and without neo-liberalism”, Focaal 51, 2008,
http://oro.open.ac.uk/18127/1/10_Clarke.pdf)//AS
By cohabitation I mean
to identify the problem of how neo-liberalism lives with “others” in the world. As a
must find ways of engaging with other projects, seeking to displace, subordinate,
or appropriate them. Most attention has been focused on the work of displacement—the exclusion, marginalization, or residualization
political–cultural project it
of other projects, discourses, and ways of imagining the world and life within it. There are also the processes of subordination and
appropriation. Each of these terms accounts for the continued place of alternative political– cultural projects in a neo-liberal dominated or
directed assemblage. Subordination
points to the allocation of secondary or subsidiary roles for other
institutions, practices, and discourses: allowed to function but in more confined spaces, with narrowed scope (residual versions
of the “social” or “welfarism,” perhaps; Clarke, 2007). Appropriation points to a more active process that some have
described as cooption or incorporation. For example, Kothari (2005), writing about the politics of development, argues that the
neo-liberal agenda “co-opted the ‘alternative’ critical discourses” of development. As a consequence: Forms of
alternative development become institutionalized and less distinct from conventional, mainstream development discourse and practice. …
This strategy of appropriation reduced spaces of critique and dissent, since the inclusion and appropriation of
ostensibly radical discourses limited the potential for challenge from outside the mainstream to orthodox development planning and practice…
approaches were adopted they were embedded within a neoliberal discourse … and became increasingly
to regimes of professionalisation which institutionalized forms of knowledge, analytical
skills, tools, techniques and frameworks. (Kothari 2005: 438–9) This view of co-optation hints at the discursive and
political work of articulation—taking existing discourses, projects, practices, and imaginaries and
reworking them within a framing neoliberal conception of development and its place in the world. Just as Kothari points
.As these
technicalised, subject
to the incorporation of alternative/critical approaches to development, and work on “difference” points to the reworking of radical politics of
difference into a normalized model of the individual consumer citizen (Richardson 2005), so other
wouldbe transformative
political projects have been appropriated and reworked through a neo-liberal frame. Dagnino (2006), writing
about struggles over citizenship in Brazil, points to the “perverse confluence” between key organizing ideas and principles of social movements
and neoliberal politics, especially those of “participation” and citizenship, which were centrally articulated by radical movements: Living with/in
and without neo-liberalism | 139 s10_fcl510110 4/9/08 9:27 PM Page 139There is thus a perverse confluence between, on the one hand,
participation as part of a project constructed around the extension of citizenship and the deepening of democracy, and on the other hand,
participation associated with the project of a minimal state that requires the shrinking of its social responsibilities and its progressive exemption
from the role of guarantor of rights. The perversity of this confluence reflects the fact that, although pointing to opposite and even antagonistic
A particularly important aspect of the perverse
confluence is precisely the notion of citizenship, which is now being redefined through a series of
discursive shifts to make it suitable for use by neo-liberal forces. This new redefinition, part of the struggle
between different political projects, attests to the symbolic power of citizenship and the mobilizing capacity it
has demonstrated in organizing subaltern sectors around democratizing projects. The need to neutralize these
features of citizenship, while trying to retain its symbolical power, has made its appropriation by neo-liberal forces
necessary (Dagnino 2006: 158f.; emphasis in original). Dagnino talks about the political frustration and confusion resulting from the
directions, both projects require an active, proactive civil society…
“apparently shared discourse” (2006: 162) in ways that are echoed by Bondi and Laurie’s observations about the “sense of uncertainty,
ambivalence and perplexity about the politics of the processes we were observing and analyzing” (2005: 394). This “confusion” emerges
precisely at the point of appropriation, articulation, and transformation exercised by the neo-liberal re-framing of existing radical and
alternative discourses. Neo-liberalism
is marked by a capacity to bend these words (and the political and
cultural imaginaries they carry) to new purposes.
Capitalism is doomed to fail—rejection is key to avoid rampant exceptional violence
Springer,assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at the University of Victoria12 (Simon, “Neoliberalising violence: of the
exceptional and the exemplary in coalescing moments”, Area 44:2, Royal Geographical Society, 2012, Wiley Online)//AS
The point
of our critiques should not be to temper neoliberalism with concessions and niceties, as
capitalism of any sort is doomed to fail. The logics of creative destruction, uneven development and
unlimited expansion – which stoke the fires of conflict and contradict the finite limitations of the earth
– are capitalism’s undoing regardless of the form it takes (Harvey 2007). Hence, what instead needs to be occurring in
our scholarship on neoliberalism is a more thorough radicalisation of our agenda, where the purpose becomes
to consign neoliberalism and all other forms of capitalism to the waste bin of history, so that the
‘exceptional’ and ‘exemplary’ violence of this maligned chapter of human existence become disturbing
abominations from our past, not enduring realities of our present, or conceded inevitabilities of our future. What I
mean by exceptional violence is that violence which appears to fall outside of the rule, usually by being so profound in its manifestation.
Exceptional violence forces those who bear witness to its implications to recognise its malevolence
precisely because of the sheer shock and horror that is unleashed. Consequently, exceptional violence is jarring and elicits a
deep emotional response. Yet, exceptional violence is only exceptional in the reaction it provokes and, as the
proverb ‘the exception proves the rule’ hints, exceptional violence is not beyond the bounds of the
normative, but instead actually always exists in a co-constitutive relationship with exemplary violence, or that violence which forms the
rule.
Anti-neoliberal resistance requires removing foreign neoliberal engagement—they
cannot coexist
Albo, Department of Political Science, York University, 06 (Gregory, “The Unexpected Revolution: Venezuela Confronts Neoliberalism”,
Presentation at the University of Alberta, International Development Week, 1/06, http://socialistproject.ca/theory/venezuela_praksis.pdf)//AS
There has been a traditional view on the Left on the steps for undertaking an anti-capitalist transformation:
seize the commanding heights of the economy; close-off financial speculation and bring the banks into the public fold; seal-off
international private capital flows; impose central production mandates on industry and point the state bureaucracy toward new
public goals; develop forms of workers' governance and rights in workplaces; and form any number of commissions to
address pressing social needs. These are, indeed, tasks that in some senses cannot be avoided: the challenge has
been partly in the timing, specifying the new means of administration and co- ordination, and fostering the extension of popular and
democratic capacities. The presumption has been of a disciplined party acting at the centre of the state could work with cadres and workers
across a decentralized base to allow the unleashing of an inherent anti-capitalist logic. In historical social revolutions, this vision has proven
fraught in both theory and practice. These tasks are all aligned, moreover, quite differently when there has not been a singular political rupture
breaking the old regime. In the case of Venezuela the initial agenda involved consolidating the political base for the Chavez regime and
fostering the organizational formation of new social forces. This has meant - to the extent a temporal ordering can be discerned at all-
developing an anti-neoliberal programme as the foundation from which to deepen the processes of
socialization and nationalization. In other words, the project has been to develop a new co- operative,
participatory and solidaristic logic that could consolidate against the logic of private property and
capital accumulation to break the material and visionary constraints of neoliberalism. With such an
overarching objective of opening new political spaces, it is not easy to catalogue all the new initiatives of the Bolivarian programme. Some of
the key policy fronts for deepening the class struggle can, however, be highlighted.
Perm fails--The revolution is coopted by institutional politics and any capitalist
involvement
Katz, economist, researcher at the National Council of Science and Technology (CNCT), professor of economics at the University of Buenos
Aires 07-- (Claudio, “Socialist Strategies in Latin America”, Monthly Review 59:4, 9/07, ProQuest)//AS
The Latin American left is once again discussing the paths to socialism. The
correlation of forces has changed through
popular action, the crisis of neoliberalism, and U.S. imperialism's loss of offensive capability. lt is no longer relevant
to juxtapose a revolutionary political period of the past with a conservative present. The social
weakness of the industrial working class does not impede anti-capitalist progress, which depends on
the exploited and the oppressed uniting in common struggle. What is crucial is the level of popular consciousness. The
latter has forged new anti-liberal and anti-imperialist convictions, but an anti- capitalist link, which an open debate about twenty-first century
socialism could foster, is still missing. The constitutional framework that replaced the dictatorships does not impede the left's development. But
the left must avoid institutional co-optation without turning its back on the electoral process. Electoral participation can be
made compatible with the promotion of people's power. Movements and parties fulfill a complementary function since social struggle is not
self-sufficient and partisan organization is neces- sary. Yet it
is essential to avoid sectarian posturing and to include im
mediate improvements as part of the revolutionary agenda. This principle governs all socialist strategy.
AT: Perm (Venezuela)
Any US involvement in Venezuela corrupts antineoliberal movements
Albo, Department of Political Science, York University, 06 (Gregory, “The Unexpected Revolution: Venezuela Confronts Neoliberalism”,
Presentation at the University of Alberta, International Development Week, 1/06, http://socialistproject.ca/theory/venezuela_praksis.pdf)//AS
Economic and political isolation are, therefore, a crucial question for the international balance of forces
Venezuela faces. Strengthening the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, and attempts at new ties with China, have been one
set of intemational efforts. These diplomatic manoeuvres, on the one hand, strengthen the economic capacity of
Venezuela and its diplomatic leverage, and, on the other hand, attempt to lessen the degree of
dependence on oil exports to the US. Yet, as important as these steps are, they do little to create an alternate
sphere of influence to the US or an anti-neoliberal agenda contesting the world market. The critical question
remains, irrevocably, developments across Latin America. But apart from Cuba, other Latin American states have provided, at best, fleeting
political support. Cuba has, moreover, been critical to the material and administrative capacities of the Chavez regime to improve health care
(through thousands of doctors implicitly paid for by oil shipments at favourable prices) and also, to a degree, other areas of social policy.
Cuba has also provided crucial diplomatic and economic advice, but it is not so clear what the latter amounts to in
terms of deepening Venezuelan planning capacities given the economic straits that Cuba itself is in and its own difficulty of formulating a postSoviet development model. The stark reality is the fact that no other Latin American state - and most notably the big powers of Brazil and
Argentina with Centre-Left governments - has yet to attempt their own departure from neoliberalism. This has meant that external economic
conditions for Venezuela apart from the oil sector remain unfavourable: for exports due to fiscal austerity and cheap currency policies across
the continent and for regional efforts to foster internal development and diversification due to neoliberal export-oriented policies insisted upon
by IMF conditionalitiesChavez's
Bolivarian project of a more politically integrated Latin America has kept him
attuned to continental political initiatives (which regionally still look like little more than conventional neoliberal free trade
agreements),'6 and won him a wide audience amongst the poor and Left in Latin America as the only "˜fighter'
and "˜patriot' in the current panoply of leaders. But the project has little in the way of concrete measures yet to speak of that would support
and generalizl an alternate economic model. Oil export
dependence on the U.S. market thus remains a central
parameter in all economic and political calculations.
AT: Alt fails
Latin American anticapitalist revolutionary ideas are unconventional and successful
Albo, Department of Political Science, York University, 06 (Gregory, “The Unexpected Revolution: Venezuela Confronts Neoliberalism”,
Presentation at the University of Alberta, International Development Week, 1/06, http://socialistproject.ca/theory/venezuela_praksis.pdf)//AS
ln spite of so many determined efforts of the past to impose a uniform architecture, there is no blueprint
for making a revolution against capitalism. And there is just as clearly no single design for the Lett today to
break out of the straitjacket of neoliberalism, and re-open possibilities for more democratic and egalitarian social orders. The
thing about social revolutions is that they keep coming around in unexpected ways in unexpected places.
Who would have dared predict the emption that was Seattle in November l999, when the powers behind neoliberal globalization seemed
completely unassailable? And who would have predicted then - certainly none of the sages of the global social justice movement who quite
consciously moved to the margins the issue of winning state power as another failed blueprint- that Venezuela under Hugo Rafael Chavez Frias
would emerge as the key zone insisting that alternatives to neoliberalism must not only be asserted but tried? This is
exactly the
importance of Chavez and the Bolivarian revolutionary process, as the Chavistas refer to their struggle,
for the Left at this juncture in the struggle against neoliberal globalization."˜
AT: LGBT
Neoliberal policies repress identity politics and LGBT activism
Smith, professor in the Department of Social Science at York University05 (Miriam, “Resisting and reinforcing neoliberalism: lesbian and
gay organising at the federal and local levels in Canada”, Policy and Politics 33:1, 2005, IngentaConnect)//AS
This article explores the
impact of neoliberalism on group and social movement politics through a
comparison of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT)2 organising at the local level in the city of Toronto
and LGBT organising at the federal level3 in Canada. The constitution of neoliberalism as a set of policies and as a
discursive construction of the new ‘common sense’ of politics entails a reformulation of the
relationship between the individual, the market, the state and the intermediary organisations – interest
groups, voluntary sector organisations and social movement organisations – that represent and articulate the interests and
identities of civil society (Jenson and Phillips, 1996; Jenson, 1999). In Canada, as in other countries, the credibility and capacity
for collective political advocacy has been undercut by attacks on the labour movement (Panitch and Swartz,
2003), by social policy downloading to the local level, by the dismantling of federal programmes that used
to fund advocacy for disadvantaged groups, and by the accelerating trend of public consultation through depoliticised models
of ‘partnership’, ‘charity’ and service provision (Jenson and Phillips, 1996; Jenson, 1999; McKeen and Porter, 2003). The delegitimation
of advocacy and collective action reinforces the discursive and ideological impact of neoliberalism,
helping to cement political and electoral coalitions behind neoliberal political leaders and to shift the terms of political discourse
in ways that reduce democratic choice and present neoliberal policies and social practices as natural
and unavoidable (Brodie, 1996; Hindess, 1997).
Neoliberal policies cut social welfare critical for LGBT youth—dooms them to violence
and poverty
Smith, professor in the Department of Social Science at York University05 (Miriam, “Resisting and reinforcing neoliberalism: lesbian and
gay organising at the federal and local levels in Canada”, Policy and Politics 33:1, 2005, IngentaConnect)//AS
Supporting Our Youth (SOY) is a Toronto non-profit organisation that offers services¶ and support to LGBT youth in the city5¶ . SOY was
organised in response to perceived¶ needs in the LGBT youth community in Toronto, which were defined in part by¶ LGBT professionals
working in social services. In their view, LGBT
youth are¶ more vulnerable to poverty, suicide, street involvement
and violence than straight¶ youth because they are more likely to lack family support or to have been
turned¶ out of the family home before they are able to be independent. These vulnerable¶ youth face a social services
system that does not recognise their specific needs for¶ shelter, food, education, freedom from violence and adult
nurturing and guidance¶ (Lepischak, 2002; Purdy, 2002; SOY, 2003). In the view of those working in local¶ social service groups such as SOY,
cuts to social services, welfare and education in¶ the city of Toronto have had important and specific effects
on LGBT youth.¶ According to SOY’s leaders, local voluntary sector groups in Toronto are on the¶ receiving end of social service cuts –
where the ‘rubber hits the road’ – when they¶ see young people who live in the street because of their inability to
access affordable¶ housing and who are victims of suicide, violence and gay-bashing in part because¶
they do not have a home (Purdy, 2002; Lepischak, 2002; Xtra, 23 May 1996). As¶ one SOY leader explains:¶ I think that the reductions
in welfare and the more stringent qualifications¶ have had a huge impact. The cost of housing has escalated and no new housing¶ has been
built to support it…. So the availability of housing is shrinking and¶ … so people are staying on the streets or in the shelter system longer,
having¶ a much harder time getting out of that system and into some kind of stable¶ housing. I also think that we are seeing kids coming out
younger and younger¶ now, and the reactions that they are getting from their families aren’t any¶ better…. Some of the youth … have been in
the shelter system for like five¶ years or six years.… I think the cuts have had a huge major negative effect.¶ (Lepischak, 2002)
AT: Solves Econ/Stability
Neoliberalism kills economic and political stability
Albo, Department of Political Science, York University, 06 (Gregory, “The Unexpected Revolution: Venezuela Confronts Neoliberalism”,
Presentation at the University of Alberta, International Development Week, 1/06, http://socialistproject.ca/theory/venezuela_praksis.pdf)//AS
First, neoliberalism has consolidated across Latin America over the last two decades, as intemational debt repayments and
economic crisis pushed state after state to abandon postwar models of import substitution development for fiscal austerity and export
strategies to earn foreign exchange.7 The
results have been anything but satisfying: except in a few cases for a few periods,
GDP growth across Latin America has been sluggish since the l980s, barely exceeding l percent per year since 2000, with
per capita output often even declining, as it has since 2000. Venezuela's economic decline over this period has been as
stark as any: from l978 to 1990 real GDP fell almost continuously, only systematically recovering with the American boom of the l990s, but
with negative GDP growth rates again retuming with the political turmoil of 2002-3. With the oil industry back in production at historically high
world prices, economic growth has booming in Venezuela since 2004, as discussed below.8 The
adoption of export-oriented
economic strategies and liberalised capital movements across Latin America make moves toward
more "˜inward' strategies to meet basic needs singular and fraught with obstacles. The nascent
developmental - most often authoritarian - states of the past have, moreover, been gutted of bureaucratic
capacities during the long reign of structural adjustlnent policies. In Venezuela, the structural adjustment policies
came in the political u-tum of the l989 Carlos Perez govemment toward neoliberalism, partly at the prompting of the IMF, and after the collapse
of the banking sector in the early 1990s the agreements with the IMF in 1994 and 1996. But as the fifth largest oil producer in the world and
with global oil prices staying well above $50 US a barrel since 2004, Venezuela now has a conjunctural advantage that frees some of these
constraints.° The political tumioil of the attempted coup and disruption of oil production, however, caused economic damage in the billions
that is still being made up.
AT: Alt Bad
Their epistemology is flawed – ultra-right or left parties influence the violence their
evidence indicates. Neoliberalism necessitates violence. Alt is key to solve
Szentes, Professor Emeritus of the Corvinus University of Budapest and member of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, 2008
(Tamas, “Globalisation and prospects of the world society,” CENTRAL EUROPEAN POLITICAL
SCIENCE, Vol. 9, pp 5-6, http://cepsr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ATT81762.pdf#page=9)//SG
It is to be noted thatthe neo-liberal (and monetarist) economic policy, which has spread in the last few
decades all over the world, hardly corresponds to those principles and considerations outlined by the
theoretical “fathers” of economic liberalism. The latter (from Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and other classical economists to
Alfred Marshall, the greatest representative of neo-classical economics) alwaysemphasised the protection of the interest of
the community versus selfish individuals, the responsibility of governments in public health, education, culture,and for
taking care of the poor, and also urged efforts to improve the living and cultural level of the working
majority.7 Quite contrary to their views, todaythe neo-liberal policy-makers or their advisors wish to make all the
fields of social life, including education, health, culture and science, subject to spontaneous market
forces, reject the economic role and responsibility of the State in correcting the unfavourable social
effects of the market,and oppose income-redistribution in favour of the poor strata, as well as international financial assistance. 8. The
views on the effects of globalisation are extremely divergent. Neo-liberals, in general, attribute favourable effects to globalisation, such as the
tendency of equalisation of factor incomes, thus also national income levels, and harmonisation of business conditions, economic growth and
equilibrium, or in politics: democratisation, etc. They may refer to those naïve and apologetic theses still appearing in most of the standard
textbooks of “International Economics”. Many others, including scholars with critical views on world capitalism, and numerous political activists
belonging to right-wing nationalist or radical ultra-leftist circles, strongly oppose globalisation.The
"anti-globalisation" movements
organised by the latter share the belief that the process of globalisation can be stopped by
demonstrations, street protests and disorder. They are in a sense similar to those movements in the
past, protesting against mechanization(and manifested in the machine-breaking actions of "Luddites"), which blamed the
introduction of machines for causing mass unemployment, i.e. identified the effect of technical development with the consequences of the
given circumstances under which it was making progress. As it turned out,the
growth of unemployment does not necessarily
follow from the use of machines, and the efforts to stop mechanisation were doomed to fail. Very
oftensuch disequalising effects and harmful consequences are attributed to globalisation itself, as actually
following from the given circumstances, i.e. from the prevailing order of structural and institutional relations, international and intra-national
systems of the world, under which globalisation has been proceeding. No doubt, insofar asglobalisation
is proceeding under the
conditions of large-scale inequalities between partners, and no counter- balancing mechanism,
counteracting measures of appropriate institutions exist (as yet), it tends to reinforce inequalities and
asymmetries of interdependence between those involved. However, demonstrations and resistance campaigns can by no
means stop (at best, may slow down only) the process of globalisation. What may actually follow from both the above-mentioned biased
approaches is the diversion again of the attention away from the need to changethe
which is burdened by unequal and disequalising conditions.
prevailing order of the world system,
AFF
2AC blocks
Cap Solves War
Capitalism solves war
1. Empirics—21st century has been the least violent in history because of
economic interdependence
2. Trade solves motives for war—no incentive to attack
3. Cap causes economic interdependence that prevents war—intertwined
economies mean governments have more to lose
4. Neoliberalism is the chief pacifying and stabilizing force in Latin America
Parish and Peceny, Professors of Political Science ,University of New Mexico, respectively 02-(Randall and Mark, “Kantian Liberalism and the Collective Defense of Democracy in Latin America”, Journal of Peace Research 39:2, 2002,
http://jpr.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/39/2/229.full.pdf)//AS
We argue that systemic
forces are becoming increasingly important in shaping a liberal peace in the interAmerican system. Only in the past decade has this system taken on a consistently liberal character. The
prevalence of authoritarian governments, insular economic models, and US preoccupation with Cold War security meant that the system rarely
functioned as a liberal union prior to the 1990s. Today, however, nearly all Latin American states are governed by directly elected civilian
regimes. The Organization of American
States (OAS), the principal international institution in the region, is therefore composed
almost entirely of liberal states for the first time in its history. In addition, virtually every state in the
region has embraced liberal economic reforms and full integration into global markets. Finally, the
system’s strongest power, the United States, behaves more like a liberal state in the post-Cold War
era, actively promoting multilateral cooperation and democratic institutions. Together, a stronger OAS,
increasing trade interdependence, and a more liberal regional hegemony have brought about an
unprecedented transformation of the inter-American system. While a variety of studies have begun to emphasize
these factors (Farer, 1996; Lowenthal&Treverton, 1994; Pastor, 1992; Remmer, 1993), none has fully integrated them in a theoretical
framework that draws explicitly on the liberal argument.
5. Capitalism empirically prevents war—no motive for expansion, overlap in
national goals, and global market competition—data supports
Gartzke, associate professor of political science and a member of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, 07 (Erik, “The
Capitalist Peace”, American Journal of Political Science 51:1, 1/07, JSTOR)//AS
The discovery that democracies seldom fight each other has led, quite reasonably, to the conclusion that democ-
racy causes peace,
at least within the community of liberal polities. Explanations abound, but a consensus account of the dyadic
democratic peace has been surprisingly slow to materialize. I offer a theory of liberal peace based on capi- talism and
common interstate interests. Economic devel- opment, capital market integration, and the
compatibility of foreign policy preferences supplant the effect of democ- racy in standard statistical
tests of the democratic peace. In fact, after controlling for regional heterogeneity, any one of these
three variables is sufficient to account for effects previously attributed to regime type in standard
samples of wars, militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), and fatal disputes.' If war is a product of
incompatible interests and failed or abortive bargaining, peace ensues when states lack dif- ferences worthy
of costly conflict, or when circumstances favor successful diplomacy. Realists and others argue that
state interests are inherently incompatible, but this need be so only if state interests are narrowly
defined or when conquest promises tangible benefits. Peace can result from at least three attributes of mature
capitalist economies. First, the historic impetus to territorial expansion is tempered by the rising
importance of intellectual and financial capital, factors that are more expediently enticed than conquered. Land does little
to increase the worth of the advanced economies while resource competition is more cheaply pursued through markets than by means of
military occupation. At the same time, development actually increases the ability of states to project power when incompatible policy
objectives exist. Development affects who states fight (and what they fight over) more than the overall frequency of warfare. Second,
substantial overlap in the foreign policy goals of developed nations in the post-World War II period
further limits the scope and scale of conflict. Lacking territorial tensions, consensus about how to order the international
system has allowed liberal states to cooperate and to accommodate minor differences. Whether this affinity among liberal states will persist
in the next century is a question open to debate. Finally, the
rise of global capital markets creates a new mechanism
for competition and communication for states that might otherwise be forced to fight. Separately, these
processes influence patterns of warfare in the modern world. Together, they explain the absence of war among states
in the developed world and account for the dyadic observation of the democratic peace. The notion of a
capitalist peace is hardly new. Montesquieu, Paine, Bastiat, Mill, Cobden, Angell, and othersaw in market forces the power to end war.
Unfortu- nately, war continued, leading many to view as overly op- timistic classical conceptions of liberal peace. This study can be seen as
part of an effort to reexamine capitalist peace theory, revising arguments in line with contempo- rary insights much as Kantian claims were
reworked in response to evolving evidence of a democratic peace. Existing empirical research on the democratic peace, while addressing
many possible alternatives, provides an incomplete and uneven treatment of liberal economic processes. Most democratic peace research
examines trade in goods and services but ignores capital markets and of- fers only a cursory assessment of economic development (Maoz and
Russett 1992). Several studies explore the im- pact of interests, though these have largely been dismissed by democratic peace advocates
(Oneal and Russett 1999a; Russett and Oneal 2001). These omissions or oversights help to determine the democratic peace result and thus
shape subsequent research, thinking, and policy on the subject of liberal peace. This
study offers evidence that liberal
economic processes do in fact lead to peace, even accounting for the well-documented role of liberal
pol- itics. Democracy cohabitates with peace. It does not, by itself, lead nations to be less conflict prone, not even to- ward
other democracies. The argument and evidence provided here are bound to draw criticism. Skepticism in the face of controversial claims is
natural, reasonable, even essential for the cumu- lation of knowledge. The
democratic peace observation is supported by
an exceptionally large and sophisticated body of research.2 At the same time, excessive deference to previous
conclusions privileges conventional wisdom.3 A willingness to doubt that which we have come to believe is a hallmark of scientific inquiry.
Indeed, the weight of existing evidence does not directly contradict this study as previous research has typically failed to address the claims of
classical liberal political economists like Mon- tesquieu, Richard Cobden, and Norman Angell. As with previous research, this study finds
support for a liberal peace, though the key causal variables, and some major policy implications, are considerably changed.
6. Capitalism promotes peace and makes war less desirable
Bandow, A senior fellow at the Cato Institute and served as special assistant to President Reagan,2005, (Doug,
“Spreading Capitalism Is Good for Peace” Cato Institute http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/spreading-capitalismis-good-peace)//JS
The shift from statist mercantilism to high-tech capitalism has transformed the economics behind war.
Markets generate economic opportunities that make war less desirable. Territorial aggrandizement no
longer provides the best path to riches. Free-flowing capital markets and other aspects of
globalization simultaneously draw nations together and raise the economic price of military conflict.
Moreover, sanctions, which interfere with economic prosperity, provides a coercive step short of war
to achieve foreign policy ends.Positive economic trends are not enough to prevent war, but then,
neither is democracy. It long has been obvious that democracies are willing to fight, just usually not each
other. Contends Gartzke, “liberal political systems, in and of themselves, have no impact on whether
states fight.” In particular, poorer democracies perform like non-democracies. He explains: “Democracy
does not have a measurable impact, while nations with very low levels of economic freedom are 14
times more prone to conflict than those with very high levels.” Gartzke considers other variables,
including alliance memberships, nuclear deterrence, and regional differences.Although the causes of
conflict vary, the relationship between economic liberty and peace remains. His conclusion hasn’t gone
unchallenged. Author R.J. Rummel, an avid proponent of the democratic peace theory, challenges
Gartzke’s methodology and worries that it “may well lead intelligent and policy-wise analysts and
commentators to draw the wrong conclusions about the importance of democratization.” Gartzke
responds in detail, noting that he relied on the same data as most democratic peace theorists. If it is
true that democratic states don’t go to war, then it also is true that “states with advanced free market
economies never go to war with each other, either.” The point is not that democracy is valueless. Free
political systems naturally entail free elections and are more likely to protect other forms of liberty - civil
and economic, for instance.However, democracy alone doesn’t yield peace. To believe is does is
dangerous: There’s no panacea for creating a conflict-free world.That doesn’t mean that nothing can be
done. But promoting open international markets - that is, spreading capitalism - is the best means to
encourage peace as well as prosperity.Notes Gartzke: “Warfare among developing nations will remain
unaffected by the capitalist peace as long as the economies of many developing countries remain
fettered by governmental control.” Freeing those economies is critical.It’s a particularly important
lesson for the anti-capitalist left. For the most part, the enemies of economic liberty also most stridently
denounce war, often in near-pacifist terms. Yet they oppose the very economic policies most likely to
encourage peace.If market critics don’t realize the obvious economic and philosophical value of markets
- prosperity and freedom - they should appreciate the unintended peace dividend. Trade encourages
prosperity and stability; technological innovation reduces the financial value of conquest;
globalization creates economic interdependence, increasing the cost of war.Nothing is certain in life,
and people are motivated by far more than economics. But it turns out that peace is good business.
And capitalism is good for peace.
Cap Good—Environment
Capitalism solves environmental problems
1. Tech innovation—abandonment of capitalism disincentivizes developing
solutions for the environment because there’s no profit motive
2. Only way to build coalitions to stop environmental degradation—cap brings
people together in urban areas and motivate change
3. Private economic enterprise is more efficient and environmentally friendly—
incentive to maintain resources to profit—productivity motive ensures
environmental safety
4. Only capitalist nations can afford to worry about the environment—excess
wealth is key to investment—proven by US investment in the environment
5. Globalization’s improvement of technology substantially improves society as a
whole
Szentes, Professor Emeritus of the Corvinus University of Budapest and member of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, 2008
(Tamas, “Globalisation and prospects of the world society,” CENTRAL EUROPEAN POLITICAL
SCIENCE, Vol. 9, pp 6, http://cepsr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ATT81762.pdf#page=9)//SG
As a matter of fact, globalisation has got more than one, single "face". It has potentially favourable and unfavourable effects
alike.It brings about a challenge but also an opportunity. This follows also from the double-edge impact of its main motive
forces: (a)The “revolution” in communication and information technologies substantially facilitates the
expansion of economic relations between countries, internationalmigrationandtourism, and
thenetworkingactivitiesof transnational companiesbuilding up and managing international production systems. It increasesthe
tradability of services and also the scope of those services within the TNCs’ network, such as performed by
regional headquarters, local marketing and procurement centres, accounting and financial bureaus, or even some R&D
centres.Althoughspeaking
about the “death of distance” is an obvious exaggeration(even in a strictly geographical
sense, not to mention the “economic” and “cultural distance”9),the spread of remote employment opens new
opportunities for those developing countries equipping their labour with appropriate skill and
apparatus.The easier access to remote resources and markets, the reduction both of time and cost of transports, and
the drastic fall in the costs of international as well as intercontinental information flows, etc., undoubtedly bring the various parts
of the world closer to each other and promote the cross-border integration of production processes.The
new information techniques, such as Internet, satellite and fibre-optic networks of worldwide telecommunication, etc.,make not
only the costs decreasing but also the co- ordination even of those knowledge- and skill-intensive
functions allocated in remote areas much easier than ever before.They facilitate also the quick responsiveness of the
companies concerned and their affiliates or contract-manufacturers within the network, to any change on the demand or the supply side of the
market.
6. Foreign investment is better for the environment—critical example and
empirically improves overall environmental standards
Liverman and Vilas, Regents Professor of Geography and Development, and co-Director of the Institute of the Environment at the
University of Arizona and Environmental Change Institute, Oxford University Center for the Environment respectively 06 (Diana and Silvina,
“NEOLIBERALISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN LATIN AMERICA”, Annual Review of Environmental Resources, 6/23/06, University of Michigan
Libraries)//AS
Several authors (53, 54) suggest that neoliberal
policies, especially privatization, foreign investment, and export
orientation, have brought improvements in environmental policies and practices to the mining
industry in most developed countries. They argue that private mining firms are more efficient in extracting minerals
and thus better at protecting the environment because they have better production methods,
technologies, and environmental practices (in essence that there are scale, technique, and composition effects) and because
they wish to avoid liability risks, comply with home country regulations, and conform to export market
expectations. As a result, companies that remained state or locally owned had to adapt to higher
production and environmental standards to remain competitive in the international market. Borregaard et al. (53)
studied the Chilean copper mining industry following privatization and found that foreign mining companies adopted
environmental policies that go far beyond national regulations while introducing environmental
measures between 5 and 10 years earlier than their national counterparts (both private and public). The authors
cite studies that show that environmental impact assessments conducted by foreign mining companies were
instrumental in defining the environmental impact assessment framework for the Chilean
Environmental Law and that foreign environmental technology and management systems have enabled the transfer and diffusion of
technology within the country. Improvements in Chilean mining practices occurred in the context of the transition to more democratic
government from the military regime that had repressed public, including environmental, protest. Additional pressure came from several law
suits filed and processed against mining companies during the late 1980s and from lobbying by U.S. copper producers to raise import tariffs of
Chilean copper on environmental grounds during the early 1990s (53). The
International Institute for Environment and
Development (IIED) (51), finding that historical problems of waste, water acidification, high-energy
consumption, and atmospheric pollution have been greatly minimized, except in old pre-1990 mining sites, agrees
with the positive influences of foreign investment on environmental performance in Chile. However, they also find that water extraction in
northern arid areas (where mining activities are concentrated) is of considerable concern and has created conflicts with other traditional users
such as farmers and indigenous groups. The use of underground water in some northern regions in Chile has reduced the availability of surface
water for irrigation and even for supplies to small towns.
7. Capitalism allows for market-based solutions to the environment—more
efficient and accepted by the public
Cox, crop geneticist and writer 04 (Stan, “Can capitalism be harnessed to solve environmental problems, or is capitalism itself the
problem?”, Grist, 4/24/04, http://grist.org/article/cox-economy)//AS
Paul Hawken couldn’t agree less. [Editor's note: Read a Grist interviewwith Hawken.] When
it comes to ideas for encouraging
economic growth while preserving “natural capital” — natural resources and the ecological systems
that support life — Hawken’s got a million of ‘em. He’s a business leader and environmentalist whose book Natural
Capitalism, coauthored with Amory and Hunter Lovins, is packed with such ideas: everything from a proposal to establish
markets in conserved energy (“negawatts”) to a blueprint for a super-efficient Hypercar, which, say the
authors, has the capacity to haul the hydrogen economy from theory to reality .¶ Hawken told me, “Amory and I
fully believe that a 99 percent reduction in the throughput of energy and resources is possible and will
eventually occur.” Wow! How? One key is developing better technology; another is placing proper
economic values on the ecosphere and its components. Once that’s done, Hawken and Lovins predict big
gains in efficiency and a profusion of market-based environmental solutions.¶ Now, when efficiency is proposed
as a key to sustainability, it brings to mind a paradox first posed by the 19th-century British economist William Stanley Jevons in his book The
Coal Question. He noted that greater efficiency in the use of one resource, say coal, will increase profits, stimulate investment and growth, and
lead to even greater consumption of coal and other resources.¶ When
I asked Hawken about the paradox of efficiency,
he said we have to take a whole-systems approach, and then Jevons’ argument won’t hold: “Dramatic
increases in resource productivity must be accompanied by changes in subsidies and taxes that will
lead to full-cost accounting. What we have now is the idea that it is too expensive to be radically
productive. We tend to think it’s cheaper to double-glaze the planet than to convert to renewable energy.” What’s needed, he argues, is a
complete revolution in worldview.¶ Hawken says that public policy and technology can push each other in the right
direction: “For example, running cars on hydrogen is about five times the expense as gasoline. But if the car gets five times the efficiency
per BTU, then there is no real cost difference. If you go to factor 10, then society is actually saving money by converting to hydrogen as a
primary fuel source for transport. And we
8.
can begin to draw down [carbon dioxide] levels.Ӧ
Cap K2 Freedom
1. Capitalism key to human choice—allows economic choice and democracy
critical to human happiness
2. Key to VTL—humans are defined by ability to choose
3. Capitalism key to democracy and political activism—only in a free and capitalist
society can people choose their own governments
4. Alternatives to cap eliminate individual freedom of speech and criticism—
empirically proven by previous attempts at communism/socialism
5. Critiques of neoliberalism ignore valuable social movements and thinking—
dooms progressive politics
Barnett, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Open University 10 (Clive, “PUBLICS AND MARKETS What’s wrong with Neoliberalism?”, The
Handbook of Social Geography, 2010,
http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/emergentpublics/publications/barnett_publicsandmarkets.pdf)//AS
What’s really wrong with neoliberalism, for critics who have constructed it as a coherent object of
analysis, is the unleashing of destructive pathologies through the combined withdrawal of the state and
the unfettered growth of market exchange. ‘Individual freedom’ is presented as a medium of uninhibited
hedonism, which if given too much free reign undermines the ascetic virtues of self-denial upon which struggles for ‘social justice’ are
supposed to depend. Underwritten by simplistic moral denunciations of ‘the market’, these theories cover
over a series of analytic, explanatory, and normative questions. In the case of both the Marxist narrative of
neoliberalization, and the Foucauldian analysis of neoliberal governmentality, it remains unclear whether either tradition
can provide adequate resources for thinking about the practical problems of democracy, rights and social
justice. This is not helped by the systematic denigration in both lines of thought of ‘liberalism’, a catch-all
term used with little discrimination. There is a tendency to present neoliberalism as the natural end-point or rolling-out of a
longer tradition ofliberal thought – an argument only sustainable through the implicit invocation of some notion of a liberal ‘episteme’
covering all varieties and providing a core of meaning. One
of the lessons drawn by diverse strands of radical political
theory from the experience of twentieth-century history is that struggles for social justice can create new
forms of domination and inequality. It is this that leads to a grudging appreciation of liberalism as a
potential source for insight into the politics of pluralistic associational life. The cost of the careless
disregard for ‘actually existing liberalisms’ is to remain blind to the diverse strands of egalitarian
thought about the relationships between democracy, rights and social justice that one finds in, for example: post-Rawslian political
philosophy; post-Habermasian theories of democracy, including their feminist variants; various postcolonial liberalisms; the
flowering of agonistic liberalisms and theories of radical democracy; and the revival of republican theories of
democracy, freedom, and justice. No doubt theorists of neoliberalism would see all this as hopelessly
trapped within the ‘neoliberal frame’ of individualism, although if one takes this argument to its logical conclusion, even
Marx’s critique of capitalist exploitation, dependent as it is on an ideal of selfownership, is nothing more than a variation on Lockean individual
rights.
Cap Solves Poverty
1. Cap solves poverty—only way to give opportunity for societal progress via
economic advancement
2. Capitalism leads to greater wealth overall—solves poverty because excess
wealth goes into social spending—empirically proven in Latin America
3. Capitalism is the only economic system that allows for social advancement—
alternatives doom people in poverty to remain so
4. Poverty has massively decreased since capitalism has become dominant—more
people with jobs and much less starvation
5. Globalization and neoliberalism empirically increase welfare spending and
redistribution of wealth
Rudra, Associate Professor of International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh 02 (Nita, “Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare
State in Less-Developed Countries”, International Organization 56:2, Spring 2002, JSTOR)//AS
Conventional wisdom suggests that all states, regardless of their partisan com- positions and national differences, would
embrace neoliberal policies in order to maintain international competitiveness in a globalizing world."
Consequently, the demise of the welfare state is expected for two reasons. First, generous welfare benefits are not regarded as good marketdisciplining devices on labor. Both the resulting upward pressures on labor costs and the dampening effects on work incentives are claimed to
adversely affect export competitiveness. Second, global- ization discourages governments from raising revenue. "Footloose capital,"• or the
capacity to withdraw and shift both productive and financial capital with greater ease, has made it increasingly difficult for governments to
generate revenues through taxation." This "race to the neoliberal bottom" in tax rates is compounded by governments' lowering taxes to
compete with other states for international investors and to prevent capital flight. By the same token, state borrowing, which leads to higher
debt and interest rates, also deters investment. The last two decades have thus become witness to the reification of Charles LindbIom`s
"markets as prisons" idea." With
increasing global competition, governments supposedly find it more difficult
to protect citizens from market-generated risks and inequalities. By analyzing fourteen OECD countries, Geoffrey
Garrett presents the most recent and convincing challenge to the notion that welfare states are
crumbling under these pressures." Garrett"˜s analysis extends the globalization-welfare debate initiated by Karl Polyani, Jolm Gerard
Ruggie, and Peter J. Katzenstein.'5 He demonstrates that international market exposure actually induces greater
government spending on redistribution programs that compensate for market-generated inequalities.
Key to Garrett"˜s analysis is the ability of labor-market institutions to effectively negotiate between government and labor. He convincingly
argues that if
labor markets are highly centralized and well developed, then labor and government can
effectively coordinate economic performance with redistribution policies. He concludes that globalization
has in fact strengthened left-labor movements, and, consequently, cross-national partisan differences in the developed
world have been sustained.
6. Neoliberal policies have led to an era of enormous economic and social
progress
Navarro,M.D., Ph.D., Professor of Public Policy, Sociology, and Policy Studies at Johns Hopkins
University, 2007
(Vicente, “NEOLIBERALISM AS A CLASS IDEOLOGY; OR, THE POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE GROWTH OF
INEQUALITIES,” International Journal of Health Services, Vol. 37.1, pp47-49)//SG
A trademark of our times is the dominance of neoliberalism in the major economic, political, and social
forums of the developed capitalist countries and in the international agencies they influence—including
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, theWorld Trade Organization (WTO), and the technical
agencies of the United Nations, such as theWorld Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agriculture
Organization, and UNICEF. Starting in the United States during the Carter administration, neoliberalism expanded its
influence through the Reagan administration and, in the United Kingdom, the Thatcher administration,to become an
international ideology. Neoliberalism holds to a theory (though not necessarily a practice) that posits the following: 1. The state (or
what is wrongly referred to in popular parlance as “the government”) needs to reduce its interventionism in economic and social activities. 2.
Labor and financial markets need to be deregulated in order to liberate the enormous creative energy of the markets. 3. Commerce and
investments need to be stimulated by eliminating borders and barriers to allow for the full mobility of labor, capital, goods, and services.
Following these three tenets,according
to neoliberal authors, we have seen that the worldwide implementation
of such practices has led to the development of a “new” process: a globalization of economic activity
that has generated a period of enormous economic growth worldwide, associated with a new era of
social progress.For the first time in history, we are told, we are witnessing a worldwide economy, in which
states are losing power and are being replaced by a worldwide market centered in multinational
corporations, which are the main units of economic activity in the world today.This celebration of the process of
globalization is also evident among some sectors of the left. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, in their
widely cited Empire (1), celebrate the great creativity of what they consider to be a new era of
capitalism. This new era, they claim, breaks with obsolete state structures and establishes a new
international order,which they define as an imperialist order. They further postulate that this new imperialist order is maintained
without any state dominating or being hegemonic in that order. Thus, they write (1, p. 39):We want to emphasize that the
establishment of empire is a positive step towards the elimination of nostalgic activities based on
previous power structures; we reject all political strategies that want to take us back to past situations
such as the resurrection of the nation-state in order to protect the population from global capital. We
believe that the new imperialist order is better than the previous system in the same way that Marx believed that capitalism was a mode of
production and a type of society superior to the mode that it replaced. This point of view held by Marx was based on a healthy despisement of
the parochial localism and rigid hierarchies that preceded the capitalist society, as well as on the recognition of the enormous potential for
liberation that capitalism had.
Globalization (i.e., the internationalization of economic activity according to neoliberal tenets)becomes,
international system that is stimulating a worldwide activity that operates
without any state or statesleading or organizing it. Such an admiring and flattering view of globalization andneoliberalism
in Hardt and Negri’s position,an
explains the positive reviews that Empire has received from EmilyEakin, a book reviewer for the New York Times, and other mainstream critics,
notknown for sympathetic reviews of books that claim to derive their theoreticalposition from Marxism. Actually, Eakin describes Empire as the
theoreticalframework that the world needs to understand its reality
Transition Causes War
1. Transition causes war—massive societal upheaval
2. Either alt solves or creates so much instability that society will never recover—
any large-scale change will turn society upside down
3. People used to capitalism are angered when wealth is taken away—will lash
out
4. Transition from capitalism causes economic collapse—proven by USSR—
economic collapse causes desperate lashout and tension
5. Rebelling against neoliberalism inevitably leads to a violent struggle
characterized by the struggle to meet basic needs.
Ceceña, Professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, 2009(Ana Esther, National
Autonomous University of Mexico; Director of the ObservatorioLatinoamericano de Geopolítica and
active in the Americas Demilitarisation Campaign, “Postneoliberalism and its bifurcations” Development
Dialogue Issue 51, http://rosalux-europa.info/userfiles/file/DD51.pdf#page=35)//CS
Both things have happened after 30 years of neoliberalism. The voraciousness of the market took the appropriation of nature
and the dispossession of human beings to the extreme. Territories were ravaged by desertification and their inhabitants driven
out. People revolted, and ecological catastrophe, which had reached an extreme point of irreversibility, started to manifest
itself in a violent way. People rebelled against the advance of capitalism, blocking the ways that were
taking it towards even greater appropriation. Armed insurgencies impeded access to the rainforest;
civil revolts put an end to the building of dams, to intensive mining, to the construction of heavy-load
roads, to the privatisation of oil and gas, and to the monopolisation of water. The market, by itself,
was not able to defeat those people who were already out of its reach because they had been expelled;
and from there, from the non-market, they were struggling for human and natural life, for life’s
essential elements, for another relationship with nature, for an end to the pillaging. The end of
neoliberalism begins when the extent of dispossession arouses the fury of the people and compels
them to burst onto the scene.
FW
Discussing state action is critical to understanding the function of capitalism in
society—it shapes the discourse
Schmidt, Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration Department of International Relations, Boston University 07 (Vivien, “Bringing
the State Back Into the Varieties of Capitalism And Discourse Back Into the Explanation of Change”, Center for European Studies Working Paper
Series 152, 2007, University of Michigan Libraries)//AS
Taking state action seriously means considering the distinctive role of the state not only in “stateinfluenced” market economies—as a distinguishing feature—but also in liberal and coordinated market
economies, as well as in the supranational institutional context. This, however, requires going beyond the “labeling”
approach to an “analyzing” one, and pushes us to consider state action in all its complexity, by
deconstructing state action into its component parts in terms of policy, ‘polity,’ and politics. Deconstructing State
Action State action, as defined herein, is constituted by the government policies and practices that emerge out of the political interactions
among public and private actors in given political institutional contexts. State
action, put more precisely, needs to be understood
in terms of “policy,” meaning the substantive policies affecting business and labor; “polity,” meaning
how such policies as well as the interactions among political and economic actors are shaped by
political institutional context; and “politics,” by which I mean not just strategic interactions among political
actors but also political actors’ substantive ideas and discursive interactions.
Policy focus is key to resisting neoliberalism—discursive theorizing actively
contributes to ongoing neoliberalism
Rosamond, Professor of Political Science, University of Copenhagen 06 (Ben, “Disciplinarity and the Political Economy of
Transformation: The Epistemological Politics of Globalization Studies”, Review of International Political Economy 13:3, August 2006, JSTOR)//AS
What if scholars doubt the authenticity of the 'globalization hypothesis'? The issue
then becomes one of whether our
present disciplinary arrange ments allow for effective refutation and critical rebuttal of truth claims
that are made around the idea of globalization.Arguments about the need to re-think how we
acquire knowledge about or in the context of globaliza tion tend to presuppose a climate of
transformation rather than stasis. The assumption of most doubters seems to be that solid, rigorous work using
the established tools, axioms and norms of political science, economics and economic history (to name
but three fields where such work is especially evident) is capable of showing clearly how claims about globalization as
either a structural condition or a set of effects amount to mythology.or hyperbole. Sociologists of knowledge
and disciplinary historians often re mind us of how the evolution of (a) forms of academic knowledge and (b) the evolution of modernity are
an incautious rush to formulate a 'global(ization) studies' that presumes
a priori that its object is globalized may fall into the trap of contributing to the constitution of that
globalized reality. Put simply, the very practice of describing a world without borders where power shifts
markedly from the public to the private domains, where the authority and autonomy of the state is
reduced and where policy possibilities are heavily circumscribed is likely to accelerate the
achievement of very reality. This is of particular importance to those scholars of globalization who choose to study this object out
co-constitutive. It follows, therefore, that
of critical motivations and a desire to contribute to the initia tion of a more just, equitable, democratic and redistributive world order than
presently prevails (Rosow, 2003). It could be argued that the
most effective strategy for retaining such possibilities
might, paradoxically, be to do in what much of the political science of globalization already does:
engage with the common sense understandings of economic or hyper globalization and produce
results that qualify or refute the claims that are routinely made (Rosamond, 2003). Consequently, those who feel
uncomfortable discipline-based discus sions of globalization need to find more powerful arguments in favour of overturning epistemological
certainty
Their framing is wrong – evaluating capitalism doesn’t come first
Lugo, Ph.D in Anthropology at Stanford, Professor of Latina/Latino Studies at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008
(Alejandro, “Fragmented Lives, Assembled Parts: Culture, Capitalism, and Conquest at the U.S.-Mexico Border,” University of Texas at Austin
Press, pp 226-228)//SG
The emphasis in this book on war, contestation, and power relations in society and culture along class, gender, and color lines, more than on a
faithful commitment to Communist utopias, constitutes a strategy of resistance and opposition to the extreme conservatism permeating
Durkheimian thinking, whichdominated academic social thought throughout most of the twentieth century. The latter influential paradigm,
however, was tied more to Thomas Hobbes, who wrote for an earlier British monarchy, than to Durkheim himself, who was reacting against
late-nineteenth-century labor unrest (Anderson 1998). In as- signing the generalized transformations of societies to specific historical periodsfor example, to 1870s historical events or, for that matter, to 1970s political occurrences and outcomes- one runs the danger of reducing the
complexity of human relations to socially situated experiences (practice), which are in turn transformed into generalized visions of the world
(structure). The problematic trick presents itself when the latter (structure) are confused with the former (practice), not in the recognition that
one can lead to the other. The impermanence of either "structure" or "practice" allows for the analysis of the unintended consequences of
"culture" and its politics, past and present."Situated knowledges" (Haraway 1986) in themselves are not necessarily, and have not always been,
part of the "war of position" that Gramsci promoted. Durkheim's
position about the state, morality, and society was
situated as well, but relative to the state's need of the times, to restore so-called social order - both
from capitalist rapacity (the greedy capitalist) and from worker unrest. Under late capitalism,
Durkheim's vision of the sovereign state is in fact being politically challenged by multinational
corporations, particularly in Mexico, but more specifically at the U.S.-Mexico border, and by a muchneeded border theory that is produced by border subjects who claim citizenships that transcend
boundaries (see Anzaldua 1987; Lugo 1997, 2ooob; Morales 1996; R. Rosaldo 1993).Throughout most of the history of social science
thinking, and even as early as 1642, Hobbes argued in his Leviathan ([1642]1958), and in Latin (that is, be- fore "the nation"), that the state
of nature is inherently about chaos, disorder, and war, and that the only remedy is to impose a
sovereign-the king-so that order and harmony will exist. Thus, we must realize that actual social life does
not tend to obey "official mandates" or the most recent "theoretical paradigms." Human relations did not
necessarily transform themselves from "chaos" to "order" under Hobbes, nor from "order" to "chaos" under Marx, nor (back again) from
"chaos" to "order" under Durkheim, nor will they change from pure "order" to pure "dis- order" under Gramscian, postmodernist, and
borderland thinking?2 Thus,
just as culture changes, so does the state; needless to say, our concepts about
them are also transformed according to distinct historical specificities.Social life changes and reproduces itself both
through cultural-historical contingencies and through the arbitrary, though still symbolically constituted, im- position of a politically legitimated
force. It is our business to study the former and a matter of human integrity not only to scrutinize the latter but, more importantly, to prevent
it. It is necessary that we continue our analytic flow from "Culture" to "culture," from the "State" to the "state," from "Order" to "order," from
"Patterns" to "patterns," from "Chaos" to "chaos," and from "Border Crossings" to their "border inspections," as well as from "gender studies of
women and gender studies of men" to "studies of gender" that comprehensively include both women and men. As Geertz persuasively noted in
1973, the anthropologist still "confronts the same grand realities that others ... confront in more fateful settings: Power, Change, Faith,
Oppression ... but he [sic) confronts them in obscure enough [I'd say clear enough) places . .. to take the capital letters off them" (1973a, 21). It
seems, after all, that one
of postmodernism's major contributions to sociocultural analysis is, as Benitez-Rojo argues
"lens," which "has the virtue of being the only
one to direct itself toward the play of paradoxes and eccentricities, of fluxes and displacements" (1992,
271), that is, toward the simultaneous play of order and disorder, coherence and incoherence, chaos and
antichaos, contestation and shareability, practice and structure, culture and history, culture and
capitalism, and finally, patterns and borderlands (R. Rosaldo 1993) . We should not privilege a priori one or
the other; instead, we must continuously suspend each category in order to analyze the eccentricities of
each. It seems to me that only by following these suggestions was I able to juxtapose the analysis of "assembled parts" in maquiladoras with
the analysis of the fragmented lives of the maquila workers who assembled them, and I was able as well to examine the
everydayness of late industrial capitalism as compared with the encounters of conquest and colonialism
in the sixteenth century-all in the larger contexts of history and the present, the global economy and the
local strategies of survival, and, finally, in the more intricate, micro-contexts of culture and power, as we
saw in the preceding chapters. Ultimately, and without leaving the question of meaning behind, I suggest that we, as social analysts,
in The Repeating Island: The Caribbean and the Postmodern Perspective, its
must face the challenge to truly balance the interpretation of human culture and its borderlands with their respective inspections.
Considering state action is key to understanding capitalism and a discursive approach
Schmidt, Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration Department of International Relations, Boston University 07 (Vivien, “Bringing
the State Back Into the Varieties of Capitalism And Discourse Back Into the Explanation of Change”, Center for European Studies Working Paper
Series 152, 2007, University of Michigan Libraries)//AS
The Varieties
of Capitalism (VoC) literature's difficulties in accounting for the full diversity of national
capitalisms and in explaining institutional change result at least in part from its tendencyto downplay
state action and from its rather static, binary division of capitalism into two overallsystems. This paper argues first of all that by taking
state action-used as shorthand for government policy forged by the political interactions of public and private actors in given
institutionalcontexts-as a significant factor, national capitalisms can be seen to come in at least three varieties: liberal, coordinated, and stateinfluenced market economies. But more importantly,
by bringing the state back in, we also put the political back into
political economy-in terms of policies,political institutional structures, and politic s. Secondly, the paper shows
that although recent revisions to VOC that account for change by invoking open systems or historical
institutionalistincrementalism have gone a long way toward remedying the original problem with regard to stasis, they
still fail to explain institutional change fully. It is not enough to turn to rational choice institutionalist
explanations focused on the micro-foundations of action, as some do, since this doesnot get at the
dynamics behind changing preferences and innovative actions. For this, I argue, itis necessary to add discursive
institutionalist explanations focused on the role of ideas and discourse. Bringing the state back into
the substantive account of capitalism actually promotes thismethodological approach, since an
important part of politics is political communication and deliberation on the choice of policies within
given institutional contexts, economic as well as political.
Policy must be the primary consideration—it is how value and discourse are
implemented and understood—studies on justice cannot be divorced from policy
Ball, Karl Mannheim Professor of Sociology of Education at the University of London, 90 (Stephen J, “Politics and Policy Making in
Education”, Routledge, 1/1/90,
http://books.google.com/books/about/Politics_and_Policy_Making_in_Education.html?id=YkYOAAAAQAAJ)//AS
Policy is clearly a matter of the "˜authoritative allocation of values'; policies are the operational
statements of values, "˜statements of prescriptive intent' (Kogan 1975 p.55). But values do not float free of their social
context.We need to ask whose values are validated in policy. and whose are not. Thus, "˜The authoritative
allocation of values draws our attention to the centrality of power and control in the concept of policy' (Prunty 1985 p.l36). Policies
project images of an ideal society (education policies project definitions of what counts as education) and to a great extent I am
concerned here to relate contemporary education policy to the ideal of society projected in Thatcherism. (ln terms of social and economic
policy l take Thatcherism to be a specific and stable ideological system.) Logically, then, policies cannot
be divorced from
interests, from conflict, from domination or from justice. All of these aspects of policy analysis are
embedded in this study. But l do not intend to attempt to portray education policy simply as a matter of ' the inevitable and
unproblematic extension of Thatcherism.
Util
A practical deontological approach is utopian – consequential thinking is inevitable.
Spragens, professor of Political science at Duke, 2000 (Thomas, Political Theory and Partisan Politics,
2000, p. 81-2, PDNSS1796)//CS
My thesis that all three layers/forms of political association areimportant in a well-ordered liberal
democracy also implies the untenabilityof Rawls's argument that agreement regarding norms of
social justice is apossible and sufficient way to overcome the deficiencies of the modusvivendi
approach. In the first place, as I have argued in more detailelsewhere, the fundamental unfairness
of life and the presence of gratuitous elements in the moral universe make it impossible to settle
rationally upon a single set of distributive principles as demonstrably fair (See also, Spragens
1993). Simply put, the problem is that the contingencies of the world ineluctably allocate assets
and sufferings quite unfairly. We can cope with and try to compensate for these "natural
injustices," but only at the price of introducing other elements of unfairness or compromising
other moral values. The other major problem inthis context is that real world human beings are not
deontologists: their moral intuitions about distributive justice are permeated and influenced by
their moral intuitions about the good. The empirical consequence of thesetwo difficulties is the
falsification of Rawls's hermeneutic claims aboutan overlapping consensus. Rational people of good
will with a liberal democratic persuasion will be able to agree that some possible distributive
criteria are morally unacceptable. But, as both experience and theliterature attest, hopes for a
convergence of opinion on definitiveprinciples of distributive justice are chimerical.
Utilitarianism protects rights without rejecting all policies that infringe on rights.
Harvey, J.D., Yale Law School, ‚2002 (Philip, “Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking
Economic And Social Rights Seriously”, Spring 2002, 33 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 363, l/n,
PDCL1068)//CS
Perhaps the clearest illustration of this compromise or balancing principle is the distinction drawn in
constitutional jurisprudence between the standard of review applied by courts in deciding whether
legislative enactments comply with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Laws
that do not infringe on certain constitutionally protected rights will pass muster if there is a mere
rational basis for their enactment, whereas laws that do infringe on such rights require more
compelling justification, with the level of justification varying depending on the right at issue. Human
rights claims have bite precisely because they declare that certain actions may be improper, even if
those actionsare supported by a majority of the population, indeed, even if the actionsin question would
increase the total utility of the population as a whole.But it is not necessary to take the position that
rights-based claims should always trump conflicting utility-maximizing purposes. It should be possible
to honor multiple goals in public policy decision-making.
No Absolutism
Absolutism fails – we lose ourselves to moral constraints instead of being moved by
real concern.
Waldron, professor at the New York University School of Law and Professor of Social and Political
Theory at All Souls College, Oxford University, 1993 (Jeremy, “Liberal Rights,” Cambridge Studies in
Philosophy and Public, March 1993,
http://www.cambridge.org/us/knowledge/isbn/item1143178/?site_locale=en_US)//CS
I have some sympathy with this, but, as I also argue in Chapter 9, the insistence on absolutism does
not make the conflicts go away; it doesn't make the situations that appear to call for trade-offs
disappear. Thosesituations are not some-thing that consequentialists and their fellowtravelers have
perversely invented in order to embarrass moral absolutists.It is not the theorist's fault that there
are sometimes several drowning people and only one lifeguard. As I said earlier, the world turns out
notto be the sort of place to which absolute moral requirements are an aptresponse. If we insist on
the absoluteness of rights, there is a danger that we may end up with no rights at all, or, at least,
no rights embodying the idea of real concern for the individuals whose rights they are. Atbest, we
will end up with a set of moral constraints whose absoluteness is secured only by the contortions
of agent-relativity that is, by their being understood not as concerns focused on those who may be
affected byour actions but as concerns focused on ourselves and integrity.
Perm
Generic
Sole discursive focus ignores the effect it has on theorizers themselves—both embrace
and resistance are possible at once
Rosamond, Professor of Political Science, University of Copenhagen 99 (Ben, “Discourses of globalization and the social construction of
European identities”, Journal of European Public Policy 6:4, 1999, Taylor and Francis)//AS
At issue is the extent to which a series of material shifts has rendered the world economy a singular entity, where territorialized control over
economic governance ceases to be relevant or efficacious. The significance of this debate should not be diminished, but it trades very much on
the question of the objective transformation of the global economic environment – the move to a ‘world in itself’. But it is also useful to think
about the subjective dimensions of globalization – a ‘world for itself’. Here the key question is neither the longevity nor the empirical
demonstrability of globalization, but rather the extent to which knowledge of globalization as the defining attribute of contemporary life has
become widespread. Research from this starting point thinks less about material structures and more about ideational structures and patterns
of political discourse. This
discursive dimension can be thought about in two senses. The first concerns the
use of ‘globalization’ as a discursive device to render the world manageable, to define the range of individual and
collective policy choice, to clarify external threats and constraints and to imagine the repertoire of available strategic opportunities. The
second sense treats globalization as a ‘discourse of power’ associated with the emergence of
particular interests in the global political economy and the legitimation of neo-liberal policy solutions
(Gill 1995). It is also striking how the debate within both large portions of the academic world and policy circles has been captured by a
particular conception of globalization: globalization as the progressive spread of economic liberalization across the globe (Robertson and Haque
Khondker 1997; Sjolander 1996). At one level the
term has spilled out of the academic world into the world of
policy dis- course, though, as Robertson and Haque Khondker note, in a highly corrupted fashion. The
subtleties and nuances of sociological theories of globalization with their emphasis on dissonance, local mediation, particularization
and complexity (Appadurai 1990; Lash and Urry 1994; Robertson 1992; Rosamond 1995) do not register. Economic globalization is
privileged and is then redefined in simplistic terms as a form of homogenization of practices and policies which induces a ‘logic of no
alternative’ in policy terms (Hay and Watson 1998). In other words, conceptions
of globalization as discourse also need to
think seriously about the sorts of knowledge that the term draws upon and signifies (Scholte 1996), especially
since, as Nikolas Rose has observed, ‘the truth effects of discourses of economic globalization are somehow independent of the reality of the
analysis’ (cited in Hay and Watson 1998: 26). Certain conceptions
of globalization may be ‘hegemonic’, but this
does not foreclose the possibility that alternative discourses may coexist and challenge the dominant strand.
‘Globalization’ may be used to signify market liberalization, but this may induce radically opposed
interpretations of its significance and what policy options follow . Both ‘embrace’ and ‘resistance’ are possible .
Moreover, ‘globalizing élites’ may engage in strategic theorizing about globalization, but this does not
mean that they are immune from the shaping capacities of the intersubjective structures that their
discursive practice creates.
Combination of discursive and political resistance is the only way to resist neoliberal
practices
Hursh and Henderson, associate professor of education at the University of Rochester and PhD at the Warner Graduate School of
Education and Human Development 11 (David and Joseph, “ Contesting global neoliberalism and creating alternative futures”, Discourse:
Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education 32:2, May 2011, Routledge)//AS
Contesting neoliberalism, then, needs to occur at three levels, the discursive, the political, and the
pedagogical. First, we need to analyse the ways in which particular discourses have become dominant
and the interconnections between what is occurring at the local, national, and global levels. Understanding events in Chicago,
Mexico, or Uganda requires that we examine how global neoliberal discourses and policies promote
the withering away of the state except for its role in promoting a climate conducive to capital investment
through low taxes, deregulation, and the availability of finance capital.
A policy reform approach to capitalism is the only effective avenue for change
Hutton, Britishpolitical economist, 10 (William, “Modern capitalism is at a moral dead end. And the bosses are to blame”, The Observer,
3/4/10, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/apr/04/will-hutton-capitalism)//AS
Lambert is right – modern capitalism has arrived at a moral dead end, interested largely in feathering
the nests of its leaders while imposing enormous costs on the rest of society and accepting no reciprocal
obligations. Neither Lewis nor Arup would have dreamt of needing to be paid 81 times the salary of an average worker to do their job or of
investing a nanosecond in trying to evade or avoid tax. They aimed to build enduring innovative organisations and to do so was a matter of
enormous satisfaction in itself. And don't think of them as quasi-socialists – there are no unions in either firm because none is needed. To
change matters requires both moral conviction and a political readiness to engineer a series of deep
reforms in the way company ownership is discharged, corporate governance is conceived, executives are remunerated and workers
represented. Today's secularisation of society and decline of religion have meant that the kind of value system that succoured Packard, Arup
and Lewis in their moral beliefs is disappearing. I doubt if any CEOs signing letters much worry about morals or religion and even practising
Christian business leaders, such as HSBC's chair Stephen Green, while wringing their hands and searching their souls, do not offer a bold lead.
For all its merits, hardly a passage in Green's recent book, Good Value, compares to the standard set by Lewis or Arup, even if his heart is
plainly in the right place. Butyou also need morally convinced politicians prepared to take the risk of reform.
We have none. The Tories are fired up by the thought of curbing the state and building a Big Society, but not by correcting capitalist excess.
New Labour, 13 years in office, has not dared, apart from the odd speech by Paul Myners and Peter Mandelson at the last, to propose any
significant reform. On this question, this Easter, it presents a moral vacuum. The banks have got away virtually scot free after the greatest
bailout in history. We need a reformed capitalism driven by innovation and
is no such prospectus on offer. That's amazing after what we have lived through. The aliens rule.
a sense of responsibility, yet there
Cuba
Cuba proves perm solves – globalization and the tenets of socialism can occur side by
side. Neoliberalism won’t take over
Carmona - Professor of Economics at the Universidad San Pablo. Spring 2000
(Antonio, “Cuba: Reforms and Adjustments Versus Transition,” International Journal of Political Economy. Vol 30.1, pp. 86-87. JSTOR)//SG
Planning at thislate stage differs from the planned economy of the cold war. It is no longer five-year plans that
mobilize the forces of production, but the urgency ofmeeting the basic needs ofthe state in order to carry out
production and redis- tribution. Since the Fourth PCC Congress, the government has taken measures to adjust
the country to the world marketone year at a time. But during this decade, native restructuring plans can be identified by the
central objectives noted by Cu- ban political economists and the PCC. The objectives of the socialist project dur- ing the periodo
especialhave been to recuperate Cuba's capacity to produce for profit in the international market, diversify
the various sectors of theeconomy in accordance with the present conditions o fglobalization, that is, produce only what can
be sold, and retain the maximum level of economic socialization in order to preserve the fundamental
conquests ofthe revolution--in short, to reintegrate into the world-market system while maintaining the
fruits o f socialist development. O f course, this action must be performed in an orderly fashion to maintain stability and legitimacy.
It goes without saying that political and legal structures must ac- company any attempt to open up-even ifonly
slightly-to the world market. Carranza et al. argue that structural change in Cuba's economy must penetrate all sectors of the general
population.27 Without a premise for political change, economic reforms cannot be successful. The political wing of the project entails the
reproduction of popular political power and its manifestation in the new sec- tors of the national economy. This means fortifying the roles of
trade unions and other social organizations to defend the interests of workers in conflicts that will or can occur in the new context. Also,
participatory democracy must be enhanced in order to defme national interests better. Finally, there is the need to build civil society, whereby
the masses become less dependent on the government or official popular organizations. Today, nongovernmental organizations
are blooming in Cuba, and independent councils are being set up to meet the needs of the general
population in many instances where the government has failed. These can be seen in organizations from nursing homes
for the elderly to church recreational youth centers and neighborhood clean-up projects.28 During the autumn of 1997, just before the PCC
held its Fifth Congress, the government set out to have documents presented by political economists read in the sugar mills, in schools and
universi- ties, at neighborhood watch committees, and at other popular organizational meet- ings. At every popular meeting,
the
documents describing the economic and political scenario for Cuba for the end of this decade were
discussed, in addition to rem- edies for preventing problems such as low production, inefficiency, new
fmancial structures, and so on. All changes are in the name ofpreserving Cuba's project of continuous
development for an independent nation and safeguarding the triumphs of the revolution.Of course, this is
how PCC-inspired rationality is sold to the Cuban population in community meetings, discussions in the workplace and in universities. The rest is
all nice and quaint but remains in the hands ofoficialismo, reproduced in government propaganda and newspapers. In real terms, the government is trying to stimulate an internal economy while saving a residual welfare state. How, then, does this differ from transition economies in
Eastern Europe?
Link
No Link: Democracy
Don’t buy their democracy link – it’s outdated. Their evidence is predicated on
democracy promotion in the Clinton and Bush administrations – under Obama,
democracy promotion does not necessitate the expansion of liberal capitalism
Kurki, PhD @ University of Wales, Professor in International Relations Theory @ University of Wales,
Aberystwyth, 13 Feb 2013
(Milja, “Politico-Economic Models of Democracy in Democracy Promotion,” International Studies
Perspectives, pg 14)//SG
Clearly, there have been some important rhetorical shifts in the democracy promoters’ understanding of
democracy in the last few years. The crisis of democracy promotion and of Western economic performance has
forced some rhetorical redirection to take place in democracy promotion. The Obama admin- istration has moved
away from a Hayekian line embedded in both Clinton’s democracy promotion agenda (Hippler 1995:13) and Bush’s
freedom agenda (White House 2009) toward a more cautious “developmental” approach, which generally down-grades the
high-flying democracy rhetoric of the Bush years and, crucially, ties democracy’s success to successful
economic development more generally. Yet, this shift has not been, it seems, conceptualized in as clear terms as this article
would recommend. It follows that continuities and also incoheren- cies exist: While renewed emphasis is placed in the Obama
administration on democracy as a way of supporting “religious freedoms” and “workers rights”,
suggesting reform liberal avenues, democracy is still associated with “peace”, “open markets”, and “prosperity”, revealing
continuing liberal, if “reform liberal” inclinations (State Department 2010). Thus, the Obama administration has abandoned
the rhetorical edge of Hayekian kind it seems: Liberal capitalism and democracy are still seen as
conjoined but the linkage between the two is not seen as tight and necessary in the same sense as
under Bush (economic free- dom > democracy). But has a clear alternative account emerged—complemen- tarian or otherwise? No, rather
there has been a shift toward an incredibly vague treatment of the capitalism–democracy relationship. Instead of advancing a narrow Hayekian
the discourse now simply states the complementariness of these ideals, without specifying the logic
on the basis of which these two systems are linked together. The same trends toward “vagueness through rhetorical
line,
revisions” are evident in the European Union: The European Commission has increasingly moved toward a somewhat more discursively open
and social justice-oriented develop- ment and human rights policy (see e.g. European Community 2006). Yet the precise meaning of capitalism–
democracy relationship is left vague and open. Having moved from a confident assertion of liberal markets and democracy, the Union is
somewhat apologetically insisting on their complementary relationship but without specifying the logic, causal or philosophical, for their
interconnec- tions. The language of social democracy and participatory democracy thrown in to the discourse does not help to clarify what kind
of a logic on this relationship the European Union stands for. There are real limits then to the rethinking of politico-economic models of
democracy promotion in current democracy promotion practice. Many of these seem to be set by the lack of clear reference points in terms of
alternative con- ceptual or theoretical frameworks to appeal to. While the Hayekian line seems too much, it is unclear for these liberal actors
what they should put in its place.
No Link: Cuba Tourism
No Link – Tourism in Cuba will not change Cuban economic policies
Carmona - Professor of Economics at the Universidad San Pablo. Spring 2000
(Antonio, “Cuba: Reforms and Adjustments Versus Transition,” International Journal of Political Economy. Vol 30.1, pp. 93-94. JSTOR)//SG
Tourism accounts for the greatest dollar accumulation in Cuba. In 1997, there were over 1.2 millionvisitorsdue to this
industry whobrought in approximately U.S.$1 billion. Cuba's dependency on tourism continues to grow and simulate
prerevolution economics; ofcourse, the difference here is thattourism remains in the hands o f the Cuban government
and not solely U.S. enterprises. In 1996, Castro made his comment on tourism and the economy. He stated thattourism would
not change the economic culture in Cuba or replace the other traditional economies, whereas in the Fifth PCC
Congress tourism turned out to be the salvation o f the Cuban economy. This salvation, however, brings with it other social problems like
prostitution, access to drugs from abroad, and violent theft. So far, state control of these problems has manifested itself in the form of police
repression.42
Neolib Good
Alt Worse
The alt fails – their movement against hegemonic centers and neoliberalism is the root
cause of the problems they critique. Their over-simplification of the world serves as
the jumping point for the expansion of poverty and social exclusion which exacerbates
economic crises
Spring 08, Professor and researcher at the National University of Mexico; the first MRF-Chair on Social Vulnerability at United National
University Institute for Environment and Human Security, 2008
(Ursula Oswald, “Globalization from Below: Social Movements and Altermundism — Reconceptualizing Security from a Latin American
Perspective,” Globalization and Environmental Challenges - Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace, 2008, Vol 3, 38891. SpringerLink.)//SG
There is another explanation, shared in the South, which links up the structural poverty and regressive
globalization with the upsurge of social movements, struggling against the hegemonic centres and the
im- position of their neoliberal model, the exploitation of natural resources and the destruction of social
net- works, and cultural and immaterial goods. This expla- nation is related to Latin America, where during 1968
students started revolutions for wider political partic- ipation and democratization. In 1971 the peasant cen- tre
Túpac Katari was founded in Ecuador, and in 1974 the first indigenous congress took place in San Cristóbal de las Casas in Chiapas, Mexico.
The progress of social exclusion led in Mexico to the first economic crisis in 1976, followed by other
countries in LA, Asia, and Africa. They aggravated the survival of the poor and induced a massive migration process from the rural
areas to the towns, which is still under- way, above all in India and China. Later, as a result of several military coups, in 1977 a long campaign of
the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires started, and in 1979 together with the foundation of the MST the first land occupation
occurred in Brazil in the Fazenda Malai in Rio Grande do Sul. In the same year the Trade Union of Workers and Peasants (CSUT-CB) was founded
in Bolivia, later transformed into Central Obrera Boliviana (COB), and in Mexico the Independent National Peasant Movement Plan de Ayala
All these social movements of the in- digenous, peasants, workers, and women, relied on their
internal resources coming from communities able to create their proper and independent space of
struggle. The consolidation of alternative processes was brutally repressed, e.g. in the 1968 student massacre in Tlatelolco, Mexico; in 1954
(CNPA).
by a military coup and dic- tatorship16 in Guatemala and Paraguay; later in 1964 in Brazil; 1968 in Panama; 1970 in Bolivia; 1973 in Chile and
Uruguay; 1976 in Ecuador and Argentina, 1991 in Haiti and 1992 in Venezuela. In addition there were civil and guerrilla wars in Central America,
The massacres against the in- digenous people
and ethnocide in Colombia, Guate- mala, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru reinforced repres- sion (Tlatelolco,
Mexico; Uruguay, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Paraguay). In different parts of Latin America the movements understood
during the 1980’s that it was necessary to train and educate their mem- bers in order to create stable
organizations able to transform society from the inside. Health and educa- tion together with food sovereignty was picked
in Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico and in other countries.
up by most movements. MST consolidated its organization with 4 million members and it is supported by addi- tional 480,000 families. MST set
up 3,000 camps for landless peasants and established 1,500 schools, eacher training colleges and the peasant university Florestan Fernandes.
Their philosophy which influ- enced deeply Via Campesina (2005) and the WSF is “the
question of power can not be resolved
by the oc- cupation of the palest, which is the easiest thing, but by creating new social relations” according
to Pedro Stédile, a leader of MST. Transformation of the soci- ety is not like a reality show, that are often transmitted on television,
but a transformation of daily life in the place where the people live, work, and meet; the pub- lic space
where the system of domination and exploi- tation is understood in any action and imposition.
Rebelling against neoliberalism inevitably leads to a violent struggle characterized by
the struggle to meet basic needs.
Ceceña, Professor at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, 2009(Ana Esther, National
Autonomous University of Mexico; Director of the ObservatorioLatinoamericano de Geopolítica and
active in the Americas Demilitarisation Campaign, “Postneoliberalism and its bifurcations” Development
Dialogue Issue 51, http://rosalux-europa.info/userfiles/file/DD51.pdf#page=35)//CS
Both things have happened after 30 years of neoliberalism. The voraciousness of the market took the appropriation of nature
and the dispossession of human beings to the extreme. Territories were ravaged by desertification and their inhabitants driven
out. People revolted, and ecological catastrophe, which had reached an extreme point of irreversibility, started to manifest
itself in a violent way. People rebelled against the advance of capitalism, blocking the ways that were
taking it towards even greater appropriation. Armed insurgencies impeded access to the rainforest;
civil revolts put an end to the building of dams, to intensive mining, to the construction of heavy-load
roads, to the privatisation of oil and gas, and to the monopolisation of water. The market, by itself,
was not able to defeat those people who were already out of its reach because they had been expelled;
and from there, from the non-market, they were struggling for human and natural life, for life’s
essential elements, for another relationship with nature, for an end to the pillaging. The end of
neoliberalism begins when the extent of dispossession arouses the fury of the people and compels
them to burst onto the scene.
Positive political change occurs only within neoliberalism—notions of revolution are
romantic ideals
Barnett, Professor of Geography at The Open University 05-- (Clive, “The consolations of ‘neoliberalism’”, Geoforum 36:1, 2005,
http://oro.open.ac.uk/26332/1/consolations_of_neoliberalism2.pdf)//AS
Recent theories of “neoliberalism” have retreated from the appreciation of the longterm rhythms of
socio-cultural change, which Stuart Hall once developed in his influential account of Thatcherism as a variant of authoritarian
populism. Instead, they favour elite-focused analyses of state bureaucracies, policy networks, and the
like.One consequence of the residualization of the social is that theories of “neoliberalism” have great difficulty
accounting for, or indeed even in recognizing, new forms of “individualized collective-action” (Marchetti
2003) that have emerged in tandem with the apparent ascendancy of “neoliberal
hegemony”:environmental politics and the politics of sustainability; new forms of consumer activism oriented
by an ethics of assistance and global solidarity; the identity politics of sexuality related to demands for changes
in modes of health care provision, and so on (see Norris 2002). All of these might be thought of as variants of what we might want to call
bottom-up governmentality. This refers to the notion that non-state and non-corporate actors are also engaged in
trying to govern various fields of activity, both by acting on the conduct and contexts of ordinary everyday life, but also by
acting on the conduct of state and corporate actors as well. Rose (1999, 281-284) hints at the outlines of such an analysis, at the very end of
his paradigmatic account of governmentality, but investigation of this phenomenon is poorly developed at present. Instead, the
troublefree amalgamation of Foucault’s ideas into the Marxist narrative of “neoliberalism” sets up a
simplistic image of the world divided between the forces of hegemony and the spirits of subversion
(see Sedgwick 2003, 11-12). And clinging to this image only makes it all the more difficult to acknowledge the
possibility of positive political action that does not conform to a romanticized picture of rebellion,
contestation, or protest against domination (see Touraine 2001).
Good: Wealth redistribution/Class hierarchy
Globalization and neoliberalism empirically increase welfare spending and
redistribution of wealth
Rudra, Associate Professor of International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh 02 (Nita, “Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare
State in Less-Developed Countries”, International Organization 56:2, Spring 2002, JSTOR)//AS
Conventional wisdom suggests that all states, regardless of their partisan com- positions and national differences, would
embrace neoliberal policies in order to maintain international competitiveness in a globalizing world."
Consequently, the demise of the welfare state is expected for two reasons. First, generous welfare benefits are not regarded as good marketdisciplining devices on labor. Both the resulting upward pressures on labor costs and the dampening effects on work incentives are claimed to
adversely affect export competitiveness. Second, global- ization discourages governments from raising revenue. "Footloose capital,"• or the
capacity to withdraw and shift both productive and financial capital with greater ease, has made it increasingly difficult for governments to
generate revenues through taxation." This "race to the neoliberal bottom" in tax rates is compounded by governments' lowering taxes to
compete with other states for international investors and to prevent capital flight. By the same token, state borrowing, which leads to higher
debt and interest rates, also deters investment. The last two decades have thus become witness to the reification of Charles LindbIom`s
"markets as prisons" idea." With
increasing global competition, governments supposedly find it more difficult
to protect citizens from market-generated risks and inequalities. By analyzing fourteen OECD countries, Geoffrey
Garrett presents the most recent and convincing challenge to the notion that welfare states are
crumbling under these pressures." Garrett"˜s analysis extends the globalization-welfare debate initiated by Karl Polyani, Jolm Gerard
Ruggie, and Peter J. Katzenstein.'5 He demonstrates that international market exposure actually induces greater
government spending on redistribution programs that compensate for market-generated inequalities.
Key to Garrett"˜s analysis is the ability of labor-market institutions to effectively negotiate between government and labor. He convincingly
argues that if
labor markets are highly centralized and well developed, then labor and government can
effectively coordinate economic performance with redistribution policies. He concludes that globalization
has in fact strengthened left-labor movements, and, consequently, cross-national partisan differences in the developed
world have been sustained.
Neoliberal policies have led to an era of enormous economic and social progress
Navarro,M.D., Ph.D., Professor of Public Policy, Sociology, and Policy Studies at Johns Hopkins
University, 2007
(Vicente, “NEOLIBERALISM AS A CLASS IDEOLOGY; OR, THE POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE GROWTH OF
INEQUALITIES,” International Journal of Health Services, Vol. 37.1, pp47-49)//SG
A trademark of our times is the dominance of neoliberalism in the major economic, political, and social
forums of the developed capitalist countries and in the international agencies they influence—including
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, theWorld Trade Organization (WTO), and the technical
agencies of the United Nations, such as theWorld Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agriculture
Organization, and UNICEF. Starting in the United States during the Carter administration, neoliberalism expanded its
influence through the Reagan administration and, in the United Kingdom, the Thatcher administration,to become an
international ideology. Neoliberalism holds to a theory (though not necessarily a practice) that posits the following: 1. The state (or
what is wrongly referred to in popular parlance as “the government”) needs to reduce its interventionism in economic and social activities. 2.
Labor and financial markets need to be deregulated in order to liberate the enormous creative energy of the markets. 3. Commerce and
investments need to be stimulated by eliminating borders and barriers to allow for the full mobility of labor, capital, goods, and services.
Following these three tenets,according
to neoliberal authors, we have seen that the worldwide implementation
of such practices has led to the development of a “new” process: a globalization of economic activity
that has generated a period of enormous economic growth worldwide, associated with a new era of
social progress.For the first time in history, we are told, we are witnessing a worldwide economy, in which
states are losing power and are being replaced by a worldwide market centered in multinational
corporations, which are the main units of economic activity in the world today.This celebration of the process of
globalization is also evident among some sectors of the left. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, in their
widely cited Empire (1), celebrate the great creativity of what they consider to be a new era of
capitalism. This new era, they claim, breaks with obsolete state structures and establishes a new
international order,which they define as an imperialist order. They further postulate that this new imperialist order is maintained
without any state dominating or being hegemonic in that order. Thus, they write (1, p. 39):We want to emphasize that the
establishment of empire is a positive step towards the elimination of nostalgic activities based on
previous power structures; we reject all political strategies that want to take us back to past situations
such as the resurrection of the nation-state in order to protect the population from global capital. We
believe that the new imperialist order is better than the previous system in the same way that Marx believed that capitalism was a mode of
production and a type of society superior to the mode that it replaced. This point of view held by Marx was based on a healthy despisement of
the parochial localism and rigid hierarchies that preceded the capitalist society, as well as on the recognition of the enormous potential for
liberation that capitalism had.
Globalization (i.e., the internationalization of economic activity according to neoliberal tenets)becomes,
international system that is stimulating a worldwide activity that operates
without any state or statesleading or organizing it. Such an admiring and flattering view of globalization andneoliberalism
in Hardt and Negri’s position,an
explains the positive reviews that Empire has received from EmilyEakin, a book reviewer for the New York Times, and other mainstream critics,
notknown for sympathetic reviews of books that claim to derive their theoreticalposition from Marxism. Actually, Eakin describes Empire as the
theoreticalframework that the world needs to understand its reality
Capitalism is key to challenging dominant social orders
Lipschutz, Professor of Politics at the University of California at Santa Cruz 07 (Ronnie, “CAPITALISM, CONFLICT AND CHURN: HOW THE
AMERICAN CULTURE WAR WENT GLOBAL”, Conflicts and Tensions, 2007, Sage Publications,
http://www.ic.ucsc.edu/~rlipsch/pol160A/Anheier.pdf)//AS
I begin with a general discussion of the relationship between culture, conflict, and globalization. I argue, from an historical materialist
perspective, that capitalism
eats away at the foundations of social structures and hierarchies through the
‘creative destruction’ and ‘churn’ that it generates, in the present case linked to globalization (Schumpeter 1942; see also Cox and Alm
1992; Boo 2004a, 2004b). Churn weakens the ideologies and relations that naturalize and justify particular
institutionalized forms of domination, social organization and hegemony. When these begin to erode, the
legitimacy of a social order comes under challenge. One result is cultural conflict, of the sort we see in America
today. In the second part of the chapter, I give a brief historical account of this phenomenon in the United States, beginning with challenges to
Puritanism in the 1730s and ending with the current religious revival and cultural conflict that began during the 1970s.This cycle
is
important because, since the early eighteenth century, there have been interesting, if mostly
unremarked, cultural-religious conflicts correlated with phases of global capitalist expansion and
social change. In this section, I also extend my analysis from the territory of the United States to the ROW (Rest of the World). I argue that
the great, world-girdling struggle(s) of the early twenty-first century, between ‘freedom’ and ‘terror’, might be better seen as the latest episode
in recurrent patterns of cultural conflict within the American social system, now extended beyond the country’s borders. Finally, I conclude with
some theoretical speculations on the arguments presented in this chapter.
Good: Peace
Capitalism empirically prevents war—no motive for expansion, overlap in national
goals, and global market competition—data supports
Gartzke, associate professor of political science and a member of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, 07 (Erik, “The
Capitalist Peace”, American Journal of Political Science 51:1, 1/07, JSTOR)//AS
The discovery that democracies seldom fight each other has led, quite reasonably, to the conclusion that democ-
racy causes peace,
at least within the community of liberal polities. Explanations abound, but a consensus account of the dyadic
democratic peace has been surprisingly slow to materialize. I offer a theory of liberal peace based on capi- talism and
common interstate interests. Economic devel- opment, capital market integration, and the
compatibility of foreign policy preferences supplant the effect of democ- racy in standard statistical
tests of the democratic peace. In fact, after controlling for regional heterogeneity, any one of these
three variables is sufficient to account for effects previously attributed to regime type in standard
samples of wars, militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), and fatal disputes.' If war is a product of
incompatible interests and failed or abortive bargaining, peace ensues when states lack dif- ferences worthy
of costly conflict, or when circumstances favor successful diplomacy. Realists and others argue that
state interests are inherently incompatible, but this need be so only if state interests are narrowly
defined or when conquest promises tangible benefits. Peace can result from at least three attributes of mature
capitalist economies. First, the historic impetus to territorial expansion is tempered by the rising
importance of intellectual and financial capital, factors that are more expediently enticed than conquered. Land does little
to increase the worth of the advanced economies while resource competition is more cheaply pursued through markets than by means of
military occupation. At the same time, development actually increases the ability of states to project power when incompatible policy
objectives exist. Development affects who states fight (and what they fight over) more than the overall frequency of warfare. Second,
substantial overlap in the foreign policy goals of developed nations in the post-World War II period
further limits the scope and scale of conflict. Lacking territorial tensions, consensus about how to order the international
system has allowed liberal states to cooperate and to accommodate minor differences. Whether this affinity among liberal states will persist
in the next century is a question open to debate. Finally, the
rise of global capital markets creates a new mechanism
for competition and communication for states that might otherwise be forced to fight. Separately, these
processes influence patterns of warfare in the modern world. Together, they explain the absence of war among states
in the developed world and account for the dyadic observation of the democratic peace. The notion of a
capitalist peace is hardly new. Montesquieu, Paine, Bastiat, Mill, Cobden, Angell, and othersaw in market forces the power to end war.
Unfortu- nately, war continued, leading many to view as overly op- timistic classical conceptions of liberal peace. This study can be seen as
part of an effort to reexamine capitalist peace theory, revising arguments in line with contempo- rary insights much as Kantian claims were
reworked in response to evolving evidence of a democratic peace. Existing empirical research on the democratic peace, while addressing
many possible alternatives, provides an incomplete and uneven treatment of liberal economic processes. Most democratic peace research
examines trade in goods and services but ignores capital markets and of- fers only a cursory assessment of economic development (Maoz and
Russett 1992). Several studies explore the im- pact of interests, though these have largely been dismissed by democratic peace advocates
(Oneal and Russett 1999a; Russett and Oneal 2001). These omissions or oversights help to determine the democratic peace result and thus
shape subsequent research, thinking, and policy on the subject of liberal peace. This
study offers evidence that liberal
economic processes do in fact lead to peace, even accounting for the well-documented role of liberal
pol- itics. Democracy cohabitates with peace. It does not, by itself, lead nations to be less conflict prone, not even to- ward
other democracies. The argument and evidence provided here are bound to draw criticism. Skepticism in the face of controversial claims is
natural, reasonable, even essential for the cumu- lation of knowledge. The
democratic peace observation is supported by
an exceptionally large and sophisticated body of research.2 At the same time, excessive deference to previous
conclusions privileges conventional wisdom.3 A willingness to doubt that which we have come to believe is a hallmark of scientific inquiry.
Indeed, the weight of existing evidence does not directly contradict this study as previous research has typically failed to address the claims of
classical liberal political economists like Mon- tesquieu, Richard Cobden, and Norman Angell. As with previous research, this study finds
support for a liberal peace, though the key causal variables, and some major policy implications, are considerably changed.
Neoliberalism is the chief pacifying and stabilizing force in Latin America
Parish and Peceny, Professors of Political Science ,University of New Mexico, respectively 02-(Randall and Mark, “Kantian Liberalism and the Collective Defense of Democracy in Latin America”, Journal of Peace Research 39:2, 2002,
http://jpr.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/39/2/229.full.pdf)//AS
We argue that systemic
forces are becoming increasingly important in shaping a liberal peace in the interAmerican system. Only in the past decade has this system taken on a consistently liberal character. The
prevalence of authoritarian governments, insular economic models, and US preoccupation with Cold War security meant that the system rarely
functioned as a liberal union prior to the 1990s. Today, however, nearly all Latin American states are governed by directly elected civilian
regimes. The Organization of American
States (OAS), the principal international institution in the region, is therefore composed
almost entirely of liberal states for the first time in its history. In addition, virtually every state in the
region has embraced liberal economic reforms and full integration into global markets. Finally, the
system’s strongest power, the United States, behaves more like a liberal state in the post-Cold War
era, actively promoting multilateral cooperation and democratic institutions. Together, a stronger OAS,
increasing trade interdependence, and a more liberal regional hegemony have brought about an
unprecedented transformation of the inter-American system. While a variety of studies have begun to emphasize
these factors (Farer, 1996; Lowenthal&Treverton, 1994; Pastor, 1992; Remmer, 1993), none has fully integrated them in a theoretical
framework that draws explicitly on the liberal argument.
Capitalism promotes peace and makes war less desirable
Bandow, A senior fellow at the Cato Institute and served as special assistant to President Reagan,2005, (Doug,
“Spreading Capitalism Is Good for Peace” Cato Institute http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/spreading-capitalismis-good-peace)//JS
The shift from statist mercantilism to high-tech capitalism has transformed the economics behind war.
Markets generate economic opportunities that make war less desirable. Territorial aggrandizement no
longer provides the best path to riches. Free-flowing capital markets and other aspects of
globalization simultaneously draw nations together and raise the economic price of military conflict.
Moreover, sanctions, which interfere with economic prosperity, provides a coercive step short of war
to achieve foreign policy ends.Positive economic trends are not enough to prevent war, but then,
neither is democracy. It long has been obvious that democracies are willing to fight, just usually not each
other. Contends Gartzke, “liberal political systems, in and of themselves, have no impact on whether
states fight.” In particular, poorer democracies perform like non-democracies. He explains: “Democracy
does not have a measurable impact, while nations with very low levels of economic freedom are 14
times more prone to conflict than those with very high levels.” Gartzke considers other variables,
including alliance memberships, nuclear deterrence, and regional differences.Although the causes of
conflict vary, the relationship between economic liberty and peace remains. His conclusion hasn’t gone
unchallenged. Author R.J. Rummel, an avid proponent of the democratic peace theory, challenges
Gartzke’s methodology and worries that it “may well lead intelligent and policy-wise analysts and
commentators to draw the wrong conclusions about the importance of democratization.” Gartzke
responds in detail, noting that he relied on the same data as most democratic peace theorists. If it is
true that democratic states don’t go to war, then it also is true that “states with advanced free market
economies never go to war with each other, either.” The point is not that democracy is valueless. Free
political systems naturally entail free elections and are more likely to protect other forms of liberty - civil
and economic, for instance.However, democracy alone doesn’t yield peace. To believe is does is
dangerous: There’s no panacea for creating a conflict-free world.That doesn’t mean that nothing can be
done. But promoting open international markets - that is, spreading capitalism - is the best means to
encourage peace as well as prosperity.Notes Gartzke: “Warfare among developing nations will remain
unaffected by the capitalist peace as long as the economies of many developing countries remain
fettered by governmental control.” Freeing those economies is critical.It’s a particularly important
lesson for the anti-capitalist left. For the most part, the enemies of economic liberty also most stridently
denounce war, often in near-pacifist terms. Yet they oppose the very economic policies most likely to
encourage peace.If market critics don’t realize the obvious economic and philosophical value of markets
- prosperity and freedom - they should appreciate the unintended peace dividend. Trade encourages
prosperity and stability; technological innovation reduces the financial value of conquest;
globalization creates economic interdependence, increasing the cost of war.Nothing is certain in life,
and people are motivated by far more than economics. But it turns out that peace is good business.
And capitalism is good for peace.
Good: Econ
Globalization’s improvement of technology substantially improves society as a whole
Szentes, Professor Emeritus of the Corvinus University of Budapest and member of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, 2008
(Tamas, “Globalisation and prospects of the world society,” CENTRAL EUROPEAN POLITICAL
SCIENCE, Vol. 9, pp 6, http://cepsr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ATT81762.pdf#page=9)//SG
As a matter of fact, globalisation has got more than one, single "face". It has potentially favourable and unfavourable effects
alike.It brings about a challenge but also an opportunity. This follows also from the double-edge impact of its main motive
forces: (a)The “revolution” in communication and information technologies substantially facilitates the
expansion of economic relations between countries, internationalmigrationandtourism, and
thenetworkingactivitiesof transnational companiesbuilding up and managing international production systems. It increasesthe
tradability of services and also the scope of those services within the TNCs’ network, such as performed by
regional headquarters, local marketing and procurement centres, accounting and financial bureaus, or even some R&D
centres.Althoughspeaking
about the “death of distance” is an obvious exaggeration(even in a strictly geographical
sense, not to mention the “economic” and “cultural distance”9),the spread of remote employment opens new
opportunities for those developing countries equipping their labour with appropriate skill and
apparatus.The easier access to remote resources and markets, the reduction both of time and cost of transports, and
the drastic fall in the costs of international as well as intercontinental information flows, etc., undoubtedly bring the various parts
of the world closer to each other and promote the cross-border integration of production processes.The
new information techniques, such as Internet, satellite and fibre-optic networks of worldwide telecommunication, etc.,make not
only the costs decreasing but also the co- ordination even of those knowledge- and skill-intensive
functions allocated in remote areas much easier than ever before.They facilitate also the quick responsiveness of the
companies concerned and their affiliates or contract-manufacturers within the network, to any change on the demand or the supply side of the
market.
Globalization results in massive economic engagements
Szentes, Professor Emeritus of the Corvinus University of Budapest and member of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, 2008
(Tamas, “Globalisation and prospects of the world society,” CENTRAL EUROPEAN POLITICAL
SCIENCE, Vol. 9, pg 7, http://cepsr.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ATT81762.pdf#page=9)//SG
The potential advantages and benefitsfrom the direct investments of TNCsand the operation of their
affiliatesincludenot only • the access to additional financial resources, investmentsor reinvestments over and beyond
the host country’s own financial capacity, but also •the access to foreign, more up-to-date production technologies,
know-how,management and organisational skills, • international business contacts, additional information facilities
andnew marketswithin the TNCs’ network,participation in their organised cross-border trade(avoiding the uncertainties
of market fluctuations), •employment and in-service training opportunities for local labour and • secured
supply facilities for the local “supporting” firms, contracted manufacturers and service industries, etc.
Good: Democracy
Capitalism and democracy go hand in hand – economic liberty reinforces the
independence of actors and their ability to defend their interests in society
Kurki, PhD @ University of Wales, Professor in International Relations Theory @ University of Wales,
Aberystwyth, 13 Feb 2013
(Milja, “Politico-Economic Models of Democracy in Democracy Promotion,” International Studies
Perspectives, pg 5-6)//SG
A number of authors have argued that capitalism and democracy are comple- mentary and mutually
reinforcing in a “necessary” sense. Notably, it is argued that there is something inherent in the nature of capitalism that reinforces
the work- ings of democracy and, specifically, liberal democracy. One key argument formany of those who see a necessary
connection between capitalism and democracy has been that both democracy and capitalism arise from
their shared guiding values. In short, capitalism and democracy have, as social systems, a single and shared value source, which
accounts for their compatibility. For John Locke (1960),the shared value linking capitalism and democracy was the
natural right to property.People are first and foremost property owners, and it is from their natural right to property that both a right
to representative government and a right to free exchange of labor and goods arise from.Adam Smith (1970) also saw liberal
economic capitalism as closely connected to repre- sentative government. For him, the connection
between them was embedded not just in shared values but in the complementary functions of
capitalism and democracy. For Smith, for the liberal market system to work effectively, there was a need for rule of law and
representative institutions to guide social life.This relationship was necessary: For markets to function, there had to
be some stability of expecta- tion, which is what rule of law and representative government provided. At
the same time, economic liberty was seen to reinforce the independence of individual actors and hence their ability to defend their interests in
society.Increased
inde- pendence and wealth of the populace supports a more confident pluralist society,
and crucially, these developments reduce social conflict and encourage the emer- gence of higher values
and “civilized” life in societies (Berry 1997). Early nineteenth-century liberals JamesMillandJeremyBenthamalso believed in a
necessary connection between capitalism and democracy, but for them, it Another viewpoint thatidentifies capitalist values as
crucial to the develop- ment of democratic rights is set out in Friedrich Hayek’s (1960, 1973)and Milton
Friedman’s (1962) work. Their analyses, which set the scene for the development of neoliberalism in economics and politics, state an a
priori prefer- ence for liberal economic values, but also clearly argue thateconomic liberty is essential for political liberty.
Friedman (2002:3) makes this argument powerfully: “By relying primarily on voluntary co-operation and private
enterprise, in both economic and other activities, we can insure that the private sector is a check on the
powers of the governmental sector and an effective protection of freedom of speech, or religion and
thought”. Quite simply, economic liberty is a “necessary condition for political freedom” (Friedman 2002:4).
Friedman, paradoxically, saw the link between economic and political freedoms to be constituted precisely by the fact that capitalist model of
economic activity separates the economic from the political: “The
kind of economic organization that provides economic
freedom, namely competitive capitalism, also promotes political freedom because it separates economic
power from political power and in this way enables the one to offset the other” (Friedman 2002:9). A variety of
arguments then have been made for the necessary connection between democracy and capitalism. Whether through resort to shared values,
arguments about human nature, or view of capitalism and democracy as func- tionally mutually supportive, the claim is made that capitalism is
a necessary condition for democracy, and vice versa. For many, this has led to further con- clusions: For example, thatif
state controls
are forced on capitalism, democratic governance is endangered; that when capitalism spreads,
democratic governance is made possible; and if capitalism is successful in generating economic growth,
pressures toward democracy will appear (Berger, 1986; see Almond 1991:469; McFaul 2004; Mandelbaum 2007; Diamond
2008)
Democracy and free trade are directly related
Seyf, PhD in Agricultural Economics and Management, MA Economics, BA in Business Studies, and Dip Economic
Development, 2012, (Ahmad, “Democracy and free market are Incompatible” The Financial Daily 5/10/12 Found on ABI
Inform)//JS
There may be some differences between neoliberal advocates of democracy, but there is a common
element among them that free market and democracy produce and reproduce one another. To put it
differently, democracy promotes free market and free market in turn promotes democracy. Some even
go as far as suggesting that without a free market economic system, there could be no democracy.
Democracy strengthens free market. If a government is expected to change without violence and
revolution, then, there must be a proper system in place to monitor and control and when needs be,
combat the abuse of power. At the same time, if politicians could not be removed by non-violent
means, what guarantee is there that they would not stay in power for ever, or, would respect private
property, or would not impose heavy taxes? If any historical evidence is needed, look at Iran or Egypt.
Under this situation, there would be little incentive for investment, and wealth creation and capital
accumulation. Market mechanism will be distorted, and as a result there would be little or no
development either. On the contrary, when there is democracy, abuse of power will be controlled, and
free market system would function effectively and efficiently and the economy develops too.
At the same time, free market would also reinforce democracy and democratic institutions. It would
lead to economic development and pave the way for the creation of a class of wealthy individuals who
are not dependent on the state and this class would desperately need democracy to ensure that no one
would abuse power.
Good: Agency
Critiques of neoliberalism ignore valuable social movements and thinking—dooms
progressive politics
Barnett, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Open University 10 (Clive, “PUBLICS AND MARKETS What’s wrong with Neoliberalism?”, The
Handbook of Social Geography, 2010,
http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/emergentpublics/publications/barnett_publicsandmarkets.pdf)//AS
What’s really wrong with neoliberalism, for critics who have constructed it as a coherent object of
analysis, is the unleashing of destructive pathologies through the combined withdrawal of the state and
the unfettered growth of market exchange. ‘Individual freedom’ is presented as a medium of uninhibited
hedonism, which if given too much free reign undermines the ascetic virtues of self-denial upon which struggles for ‘social justice’ are
supposed to depend. Underwritten by simplistic moral denunciations of ‘the market’, these theories cover
over a series of analytic, explanatory, and normative questions. In the case of both the Marxist narrative of
neoliberalization, and the Foucauldian analysis of neoliberal governmentality, it remains unclear whether either tradition
can provide adequate resources for thinking about the practical problems of democracy, rights and social
justice. This is not helped by the systematic denigration in both lines of thought of ‘liberalism’, a catch-all
term used with little discrimination. There is a tendency to present neoliberalism as the natural end-point or rolling-out of a
longer tradition ofliberal thought – an argument only sustainable through the implicit invocation of some notion of a liberal ‘episteme’
covering all varieties and providing a core of meaning. One
of the lessons drawn by diverse strands of radical political
theory from the experience of twentieth-century history is that struggles for social justice can create new
forms of domination and inequality. It is this that leads to a grudging appreciation of liberalism as a
potential source for insight into the politics of pluralistic associational life. The cost of the careless
disregard for ‘actually existing liberalisms’ is to remain blind to the diverse strands of egalitarian
thought about the relationships between democracy, rights and social justice that one finds in, for example: post-Rawslian political
philosophy; post-Habermasian theories of democracy, including their feminist variants; various postcolonial liberalisms; the
flowering of agonistic liberalisms and theories of radical democracy; and the revival of republican theories of
democracy, freedom, and justice. No doubt theorists of neoliberalism would see all this as hopelessly
trapped within the ‘neoliberal frame’ of individualism, although if one takes this argument to its logical conclusion, even
Marx’s critique of capitalist exploitation, dependent as it is on an ideal of selfownership, is nothing more than a variation on Lockean individual
rights.
Neoliberalism is flexible and accommodating to gender and class struggles—they can
coexist
Newman, Emeritus Professor, Faculty of Social Science, The Open University Visiting Professor, Social Policy, University of Bath 13-(Janet, “Spaces of power: feminism, neoliberalism and gendered
Labour”, Social Politics 20:2, Summer 2013, http://oro.open.ac.uk/36727/2/22228FF7.pdf)//AS
Feminism, I want to suggest, was the source of emergent forms of politics and practice which in turn
opened up what I term ‘prefigurative pathways’. Some such pathways were articulated into would-be
hegemonic forms of rule to become a new ‘dominant’ formation. But in the process neoliberalism itself had to
adapt and flex to take account of particular strands of feminism: its claims and demands, and the cultural and
politics shifts it had generated. And, as Clarke and Newman (1997), Gilroy (1992, 2004), Hall et al (1978), Weeks (2009), and others show,
neoliberalism also encountered other antagonisms generated through the politics of race, class,
colonialism, and LGBT struggles, each of which were not containable within the confines of an exclusively British reading of
history, nor support narratives of the wholesale erasure of struggle and dissent. Such struggles were often configured with
traces of ‘residual’ formations that continued as effective forces into the present in ways that disrupt readings
of ‘epochal’ change. his form of analysis problematises concepts of ‘after’ and ‘post’ neoliberalism referred to in the Introduction. But the
argument I want to develop here is rather different. I want to propose that new
orderings of the ‘dominant’ were most
likely to emerge in conditions where counter projects and movements formed a ‘perverse alignment’
with neo-liberal logics. This concept is inspired by the work of the Brazilian
scholar EvelinaDagnino who traced a ‘perverse confluence’
between the popular participatory project (represented in the success of struggles against the military dictatorship in Brazil) and the neoliberal conception of a minimal state. The perversity is located in the fact that despite
‘pointing in opposite and even
antagonistic directions, both projects require an active, proactive civil society’ (Dagnino, 2007: 335: see also
Newman and Clarke, 2009: 139). This offers a different, but sympathetic, reading of the ‘elective affinities’ between feminism and
neoliberalism referred to by Fraser. I want to use it here to suggest the significance of the different ‘perversities’ generated in the multiple
spaces of power traced in the previous section.
Good: Mexico
Economic liberalization and privatization streamlined the Mexican economy,
improved coexistence among citizens, and improved society
Gates, Ph.D in Anthropology @ University of British Colombia, Professor of Anthropology at Simon
Fraser University, 1996
(Marilyn, “The Debt Crisis and Economic Restructuring:Prospects for Mexican Agriculture,,” NEOLIBERALISM REVISITED – Economic
Restructuring and Mexico's Political Future, edited by Gerardo Otero, Westview Press, pg 48-49)//SG
Differences in presidential style did, however, become apparent.Whereas
the trademark of the de la Madrid
administration was caution, bold and rapid reform became the dominant motif under Salinas. De la Madrid
talked exten- sively about moral renovation, butSalinas engaged in a tough and comprehen- sive anticorruption
campaignthat resulted in the apprehension of the notorious leaders of two of Mexico's strongest unions, a drug czar, a top fi- nancier, and
other significant public figures, often political allies. De la Madrid held state agencies to austerity budgets;Salinas trimmed the
government fat to the bone in many sectors, introduced significant government decentraliza- tion,
streamlined economic procedures via extensive deregulation and tax re- form, and initiated a
widespread privatizationdrive resulting in the sale or closure of over 800 public enterprises, even finding buyers for some of the most
inefficient ones such as Aeroméxico and Teléfonos de Mexico (Teichman, Chapter 8, this volume).6 Themost dramatic changesunder
President Salinaswere in the economic sphere, particularlywith respect to rapid and comprehensive measures
to con- tinue the economic openingvia relaxationin the foreign investment lawand tariff reduction. These reforms
were integrated within an overall program of . national economic and political modernizationexplicitly
designed to "strengthen [Mexico] in the global context and improve coexistence among Mexicans . . . to create a viable economy in a strongly
competitive international environment and thus to generate employment and opportunities for all . . . to forge a more just, more generous,
more valuable society for each one of us, more respected in the world" (Salinas de Gortari, 1990:1, my translation). In the political do- main,
Salinas envisioned "democracy consubstantial with the economic mod- ernization of our country . . . a
public service that serves rather than being served by power . . . a new political culture" (Salinas de Gortari,
1990:1, my translation).Another high-profile areaduring the early part of the Salinas administrationwas the further
renegotiation of the foreign debtunder the widely publicized Brady Plan. This agreement, reached in March 1990, cut
Mexico's debt service Payments by $4 billion a year. Although less than was anticipated originally,it was sufficient to
boost private-sector and foreign investor confidence in the economy and bring interest rates down to their lowest level
since 1981. Most important, the savings appeared to give Salinas the impetus to devote attention to Mexico's
chronic social problemsand to devise specific initiatives to promote the recapitalization of agriculture, the
Achilles heel of the Mexican economy. The efforts of President Salinas to promote economic dynamism in agricul- ture were directed initially to
attempt to eradicate the corruption fostered by the "industry of disasters" and improve the efficiency of the agricultural devel- opment
agencies. Late in 1989, it was announced that BANRURAL, the rural credit bank for ejidos, would cease to employ field inspectors who had been
in a prime position to initiate insurance and other frauds. At the same time,
the agricultural insurance agency ANAGSA was
abolished, having become notori- ous for corrupt practices as blatant as collecting indemnification for
phantom crops. This agency was replaced in June 1990 by a new insurance company, AGROASEMEX,a parastatal affiliate of the
Aseguradora Mexicana, which was to operate with only one-third the personnel employed by ANAGSA and without field inspectors. So far, this
cleanup campaign has uncovered hundreds of major frauds at all levels, including among ejidal officers. However, petty swin- dles appear to
have increased in the latest phase of the debt crisis, largely in re- sponse to massive decline in real wages to less than half of 1982 levels. With
average salaries of less than $300 a month, agrarian bureaucrats often feel com- pelled, at the very least, to cheat on their gasoline allowances,
to extort boxes of produce from the ejidatarios, and to rob their employers of time by padding their work sheets.
Good: LGBT
Capitalism essential to LGBT rights movements
Githens, Assistant Professor Department of Leadership, Foundations, and Human Resource Education at the University of Louisville 09
(Rod P, “CAPITALISM, IDENTITY POLITICS, AND QUEERNESS CONVERGE: LGBT EMPLOYEE RESOURCE GROUPS”, New Horizons in Adult
Education and Human Resource Development 23:3, Summer 2009, University of Michigan Libraries)//AS
Within HRD, many voices have called for broadening the scope of the field to include societal issues and
the development of more humane and ethical workplaces (e.g., Bierema&Cseh, 2003; Bierema&D'Abundo, 2003; Fenwick, 2005; Hatcher, 2006;
O'Donnell, 2007). ERGs provide one such location for this type of development. However, ERGs balance their activist agendas with the need to
contribute to the organization. Corporate
motivation for supporting these efforts is not necessarily altruistic
and is often enabled by the capitalistic goal of improving organizational effectiveness (Gedro, 2007).
Influenced by approaches that focus both on LGBT-specific identities and broader conceptions of
sexuality, known as queer theory, these employee groups have continued the long tradition of
advancing LGBT issues through capitalism. Through a conceptual and historical discussion, I argue that these groups
resulted from the unique convergence of capitalism and two sometimes-opposing social organizing
strategies: queer politics and identity politics. Although these groups exist in various forms and in multiple types of
organizations, I focus on formally-recognized ERGs within for-profit corporations (for a discussion of other types of groups, see Githens&
Aragon, 2007). This article’s purpose is to explore the ways in which the
productive tensions between capitalism, identity
politics, and queerness have manifested themselves in LGBT ERGs and created structures and
activities that result in development for individuals, organizations, and societies.
Capitalism provides the vehicle for LGBT acceptance and identity
Githens, Assistant Professor Department of Leadership, Foundations, and Human Resource Education at the University of Louisville 09
(Rod P, “CAPITALISM, IDENTITY POLITICS, AND QUEERNESS CONVERGE: LGBT EMPLOYEE RESOURCE GROUPS”, New Horizons in Adult
Education and Human Resource Development 23:3, Summer 2009, University of Michigan Libraries)//AS
In modern Western culture, before the creation of the concept of homosexuality in the 19th century, people who had sex with others of the
same gender were merely engaging in sinful behavior (D'Emilio& Freedman, 1997). With
the creation of homosexuality as
anew pathologicalcondition to label those individuals, they were no longer merely regular people engaging in sinful acts, they
were a distinct group of people. Shortly thereafter, the formation of formal and informal groups based on
this sexual identity was a subversive effort to exert power and shift a negative attribute into a powerful
collective force by taking advantage of this pathological identity (D'Emilio& Freedman, 1997; Foucault, 1978). As I
explain later, the evolution of capitalism has provided the structures through which this unique identity
has emerged (D'Emilio, 1993). These forces have resulted in numerous advances in the acceptance of
LGBT individuals in society. However, some have argued that LGBT identity politics has reached its limits and that LGBT individuals
should argue for individual liberties rather than equality as a minority group (e.g., Yoshino, 2006). Others advocate queer and universalizing
approaches (rather than identity-based approaches) in which sexuality is seen as fluid and existing on a continuum (Sedgwick, 1990). They
argue that such approaches are more appropriate because of the opportunity for opening productive discussions by examining the
normalization of heterosexuality. Broader queer approaches have the potential to open up conversations and include a wider range of
individuals. However, the
adoption of more complex queer approaches has implications for how sexuality is
addressed in workplace settings. Instead of seeking to create an understanding of and recognition of LGBT persons, queer
approaches by 20 employee activists would seek to complicate sexuality and gender by dealing with the multifaceted approaches to
“performing” gender and sexuality. I also consider the warnings of those who contend that radical deconstruction in queer theory leads to a
loss of grounding that can result in immobilization due to the rejection of sexual identity as a meaningful category (e.g., Green, 2002). I explore
the practical ramifications of taking such an approach and the problems surrounding the normalization of queerness by corporations.
Capitalism allows freedom of identity and rights advancements for the LGBT
community
Githens, Assistant Professor Department of Leadership, Foundations, and Human Resource Education at the University of Louisville 09
(Rod P, “CAPITALISM, IDENTITY POLITICS, AND QUEERNESS CONVERGE: LGBT EMPLOYEE RESOURCE GROUPS”, New Horizons in Adult
Education and Human Resource Development 23:3, Summer 2009, University of Michigan Libraries)//AS
D’Emilio(1993) argues that the rise in gay and lesbian identity in the U.S. is a direct result of the
structures created by capitalism. He explains that homosexual acts and tendencies have occurred throughout history; however,
the idea of being gay or homosexual is a relatively new phenomenon (also see Foucault, 1978). D’Emilio concludes
that the emergence of such identities was a slow process that started in the colonial era when
capitalism began replacing the widespread system of individual household production. Over decades, the
number of selfsufficient households declined. These households had relied on the nuclear family (i.e., husband, wife,
children) for production, but became part of a system of wage labor that deemphasized self-sufficiency. With household
production, individuals needed to move into heterosexual relationships because of the central role that procreation played in living a
Capitalism, on the other hand, allowed for selling one’s labor and purchasing goods that
were produced outside of the family. This shift resulted in a steady, gradual decline in household production and a decline in
the importance of procreative relationships in maintaining a decent life (as evidenced by declining birthrates). As a result, individuals
with same-sex attractions were no longer compelled to enter opposite-sex relationships. Over the span of
sustainable life.
decades, people with same-sex attractions slowly started entering same-sex relationships and developing social networks that included others
who also had same-sex attractions. D’Emilio (1993) explains that this gradual change and the slow emergence of gay identities culminated in
World War II, which resulted in the explosion of gay identity formation. The war took thousands of men and women from around the country
and placed them into samesex environments, in addition to placing those who already identified as gay into those environments. Same-sex
sexual relations occurred throughout the war, and many gays and lesbians remained in large cities after the war ended, which resulted in the
formation of urban 21 communities based on sexuality. Later, the Stonewall riots occurred (in 1969), which is seen as the formal beginning of
the gay and lesbian liberation movement. D’Emilio
explains that the structures of capitalism (e.g., movement to
cities that resulted from the decline in self-sufficient households) allowed the gay and lesbian
movement to form a grassroots network that was activated after the events in 1969. In the last 30 years, this
network was responsible for the pressuring of corporate leaders that resulted in astounding success in changing workplace policies. Most
post-World War II capitalists did not embrace gays and lesbians. In fact, there is a well-documented history of oppression by employers,
especially during and after the McCarthy era (D'Emilio& Freedman, 1997). After Stonewall, activists began targeting prominent companies like
AT&T, who were openly discriminatory in their hiring practices toward gays and lesbians (Raeburn, 2004a). The first LGBT ERG formed in 1978
(Raeburn, 2004a); however, it took years of work on the part of activists before most companies started adopting nondiscriminatory policies.
Interestingly, corporations have been more progressive in their practices toward LGBT individuals than governmental agencies (for a discussion
of federal government employment practices during the Clinton administration, see Hirsch, 2000).
Many companies adopted
LGBT-friendly policies before state and local nondiscrimination laws were changed to include sexual
orientation.3 Most companies do not adopt these policies for purely altruistic reasons. One reason
for adopting inclusive policies is to capture a larger share of what is perceived as a lucrative LGBT
consumer market.4 By adopting these LGBT-friendly policies, companies often alienate other customers, particularly religious
fundamentalists (for an excellent discussion of the complicated history of LGBT relations at Disney, see Truesdell, 2001). Many companies are
willing to confront this risk. However, I argue that one
of the most important reasons companies have adopted
these policies is due to pressure by employee activists and to keep LGBT employees happy. It is
important to examine the conditions that created an environment where employers sought to ensure
the satisfaction of LGBT workers, while risking the loss of customers. As capitalism created the structures for the creation of gay
and lesbian identities, newer forms of capitalism have also created conditions in which a substantial portion
of an individual’s identity is wrapped up in work (Ciulla, 2000). In the 1950s, workplaces sought to improve productivity
through enhancing human relations at work and implementing paternalistic employment practices (e.g., comprehensive pension programs,
career-long employment). In the current era, these paternalistic practices have been replaced by new
approaches that are
designed to increase worker productivity through helping employees create meaning through their
jobs (Ciulla, 2000). Today, individual identity is intertwined with work, especially for many white-collar workers. As a result of this shift, work
is no longer a place individuals go to sell their labor; instead, individuals go to work to seek meaning in their lives. With this
identification of the workplace as a center of personal identity, it has become essential that
employers keep their workers happy inorder for workers to have meaningful careers (which leads to
maximizing productivity). For a few decades, workers and employers assumed that most people would spend an entire career with one
organization. Currently, most jobs are not secure and workers expect to have free choice in employment—moving from job-to-job in order to
find the most meaningful and wellpaying position. Workers are no longer consumers only after work hours when shopping for goods and
services. They are now consumers at work. Especially during strong economic times, workers expect to find an ideal job and they are not afraid
to leave an employer to seek a better deal elsewhere. With the replacement of defined-benefit pension plans by 401(k) plans, workers have
little incentive to remain with an employer if they are not satisfied. Those who advocate free choice and autonomy celebrate this consumer
mentality in employment. Later, I will return to a discussion of the dangers of this consumer mentality.
On the upside, this
consumerism in employment has allowed LGBT employee activists to encourage change in
workplaces.In contrast, politicians and government administrators have not been as eager to adopt these suggested changes (neither in
government employment practices nor in employment laws).
Neolib Sustainable
Mexico proves cap is sustainable and has long term benefits in the long run –
outweighs the cost
Lugo, Ph.D in Anthropology at Stanford, Professor of Latina/Latino Studies at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008
(Alejandro, “Fragmented Lives, Assembled Parts: Culture, Capitalism, and Conquest at the U.S.-Mexico Border,” University of Texas at Austin
Press, pp 228-230)//SG
By examining Gramsci's notion of the state and its dispersal, Foucault's notion of power and its deployment, Anderson's critique of the nation,
and R. Rosaldo's critique of culture, I have tried to spell out my critique of cultural analysis, Cultural Studies, and culture and border theory as
these overlap one another in nationalist, capitalist, late-capitalist, colonialist, and related projects of politically legitimated force. My specific
argument throughout this final chapter, how- ever, has been fourfold. First, I have argued that our own folk conceptions of culture and society
have been historically constituted by such dialectic dualities as beliefs and practices (Boas 1940), "symbolic structures and collective behavior"
(Geertz 1973a, 251), structure and agency (Bourdieu 1977; R. Rosaldo 1980, 1993), human action and intention (Ortner 1984), and culture as
constituted and culture as lived (Sahlins 1981, 1982, 1985)?3 Second, I have asserted that our
received academic conceptions of
culture and border, and of social life for that matter, have been heavily (but, for the most part, unconsciously)
influenced by our capacity and incapacity to acknowledge the distinct transformations that the nature of
the Westernized "state" has gone through in the past two hundred years (the academic recognition of
everyday experiences along the U.S-Mexico border region is a manifestation of this transformation,
especially with the creation of Free Trade [Border) Zones around the world). Third, I have contended that these academic
conceptions of culture and border have been the historical products of either political suppressions or political persuasions and other types of
resistance (i.e., the emergence of minority scholars who have experienced life at the borderlands) to the center's domination. Finally, I have
argued in this chapter that culture, constituted by both beliefs and practices, is not necessarily always shared or always contested, and that the
crossroads and the limits or frontiers of these beliefs and practices (border theory) create, in turn, the erosionfrom within of the monopoly of
culture theory as "cultural patterns" (to follow Martin-Rodriguez 1996, 86).Regarding anthropology as a discipline, we must ask: What is the
role of anthropologists in the production of a cultural theory of borderlands in the inter- disciplinary arena? Anthropologists today can certainly
redefine themselves vis a vis the emergent and newly formed academic communities that now confront us. At the turn of the twenty-first
century, as Renato Rosaldo has argued, anthropologists must strategically (re)locate/(re)position themselves in the current scholarly battlefield
of power relations.To be effective in this conceptual political relocation, however, both anthropologists and nonanthropologists who think
seriously about the cultural must ask themselves the following question (which Roland Barthes would pose to anybody regarding the nature of
interdisciplinarity): Is the concept of culture an object of study that belongs to no particular discipline? Only an antidisciplinary mood would
allow us to answer in the affirmative. A cultural theory of border- lands challenges and invites academics to recognize the crossroads of
interdisciplinarity, where "ambassadors" are no longer needed. Once the challenge and the invitation are accepted, border theorizing in itself
can simultaneously transcend . and effectively situate culture, capitalism, conquest, and colonialism, as well as the academy, at the crossroads
(including the inspections), but only if it is imagined historically and in the larger and dispersed contexts of the nation, the state, the nationstate, and Power (Foucault 1978).Finally, at certain times we must question the tropes we tend to privilege the most-"culture," "nature,"
"humanity," "class," "race," "mestizaje," "border," "gender," "power." In this case, I prefer the "nonimagined community" as op- posed to the
"imagined one," for as Anderson told us, imagined communities kill people and people die for them. More importantly, we
need to
understand and explain the symbolic process - the structure of the conjuncture, that is, the complex
articulation of culture, capitalism, and conquest both in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as well
as in the late twentieth century and into the present- that has made it possible, over the past five
hundred years, for so many millions of people, in this case in the Americas, not so much to die as to die
slowly (and at times abruptly) so that others may live well-off.
Neolib Inevitable
Neoliberalism is an inevitable system—it thrives on crisis and reinterpretation—
current and future crises will not overcome it
Peck et. al, Professor of geography at the University of British Columbia 10 (Jamie, Nik Theodore, Neil Brenner, “Postneoliberalism and
its Malcontents”, Antipode 41, January 2010, Wiley Online)//AS
“Neoliberalism's transformation from a marginalized set of intellectual convictions into a full-blown
hegemonic force”, Mudge (2008:709) writes, “began with economic crisis”. More than this, as an historically specific,
fungible, contradictory, and unstable process of market-driven sociospatial transformation, neoliberalization has been
repeatedly and cumulatively remade through crises. Even during the first half-life of neoliberalism—
when it existed largely as an ideational project, almost completely detached from state power—it represented a
form of crisis theory (Peck 2008). The neoliberalism of the late 1940s, the 1950s, and the 1960s was an amalgam of free-market
utopianism on the one hand, and a pointed, strategic critique of the prevailing Keynesian order on the other. This project later
achieved traction in the structural dislocations and macroregulatory failures of the 1970s—the crisis
moment that it had long anticipated and which it was designed to exploit. In this sense, neoliberalism
was both conceived and born as a crisis theory. In the wake of the Reagan–Thatcher ascendancy, as neoliberalism
mutated into a series of state projects, recurrent crises and regulatory failures would continue, in effect, to
animate the lurching, uneven advance of transnational neoliberalization. Indeed, crises might be considered to be
a primary “engine” of neoliberalism's transformation as a regulatory project, since (historically and geographically, socially and institutionally)
specific crises of Keynesian welfarism and developmentalism established the socioinstitutional stakes and the fields of action for the first
rounds of regulatory struggles, during the project's roll-back phase, while crises
and contradictions of neoliberalism's own
making have since shaped cumulative rounds of roll-out, reconstruction, and reaction (Brenner and
Theodore 2002a;Peck and Tickell 2002). The legacies of these tawdry, crisis-driven historical geographies of neoliberalism remain starkly
present in the current conjuncture. They underscore the claim that the
uneven development of neoliberalism is
contextually genetic rather than simply contingent (Brenner et al 2010), that neoliberalism is a reactionary credo in more
than just a pejorative sense (Peck 2008). It follows that programs of neoliberal restructuring are substantially
absorbed not only with the (always-incomplete) task of dismantling inherited institutional forms, but also with the open-ended
challenges of managing the attendant economic consequences, social fallout, and political
counteractions. Neoliberal strategies are deeply and indelibly shaped by diverse acts of institutional dissolution, but this
destructive moment is more than just a “brush-clearing” phase; it is actually integral to the origins,
dynamics, and logics of neoliberalization. Each and every actually existing neoliberalism carries the
residues, therefore, of past regulatory struggles, which recursively shape political capacities and orientations, and future
pathways of neoliberal restructuring. Perversely, programs of neoliberal restructuring are in many ways sustained
by repeated regulatory failure; typically, they “progress” through a roiling dynamic of
experimentation, overreach, and crisis-driven adjustment.
Neoliberalism is inevitable and any attempt to reform it will fail – Alt can’t solve
Snyder, He is a Professor of Political Science at Brown University 2001 (Richard, Politics After Neoliberalism: Reregulation
in Mexico Pub. Cambridge University Press in 2001 pg 216)//JS
In sum, cross-sectoral variation in the number of producers, the flexibility of assets, and dependence on
trade should have an important impact on how reregulation works. Depending on the sector, politicians
may be more or less likely to make the first move in reregulation processes, international factors may
impose stronger or weaker constrainst on the strategies available to domestic actors, and the politics
of reregulation may pivot around distinct issues ranging from access to export markets to protection
from cheap imports. Despite differences such as these, the core regularities: (1) neoliberal reforms will
result in a new politics of reregulation, not an end to regulation; (2) different kinds of new institutions
for market governance will emerge; and (3) these institutions will result from strategic interactions
among ambitious politicians and organized societal interest as they compete to control the policy
areas vacated by neoliberalism.
Even if neoliberalism is disposed of, it will inevitably make a violent return.
Burbach, Director at the Center for the Study of the Americas, 2001 – (Roger, “Globalization and
postmodern politics: From Zapatistas to high-tech robber barons,” pages 3-4, 2001,
http://pol.atilim.edu.tr/files/kuresellesme/kitaplar/globalization_and_postmodern_politics.pdf)//CS
lt is often forgotten that just a short time ago socialism and third world revolutionary movements,
rather than Western capitalism, had an air of inevitability.ln the 1960s and 1970s the consolidation of the Cuban
revolution, the rise of revolutionary struggles in much of Latin America, the stunning defeat of the United States in southeast Asia, the
installation of national liberation governments in the Portuguese colonies of Africa, the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, and the victory of the
Sandinistas in Nicaragua numbered among the more critical setbacks experienced by the United States and its allies.But
the empire
struck back with violence and impunity. Even where it did not achieve outright victory, it so weakened
the revo-lutionary societies through military and economic aggression that by the 1990s they effectively
ceased to be viable alternatives. ln South America, the victory of the U.S. against all major challenges was
already complete by the mid-1970s.'l`he elected Socialist government of Salvador Allende in Chile was violently overthrown in
1973, and by 1976 nationalist governments and revolutionary movements throughout the southern cone had been crushed asthree-quarters of
the continent's population fell under the rule of U.S.-backed military regimes. With the victory of the Sandinistas in 1979,Central
America
became the new battleground. With hindsight it is little short of astounding thatthis region, so historically
dominated by the United States and with a population of only about 20 million, became a critical
arena of revolutionary struggle in the 1980s. In an effort to crush these movements, U.S.-supported
regimes, particularly inGuatemala, lil Salvador and Honduras, along with the CIA-backedcontra army in Nicaragua,
waged a brutal war against the revolu- tionary movements, killing well over 100,000 innocent
civilians.
Government regulation of the market is inevitable - Anti-neoliberalism reforms only
Neolib Critiques False
Offense
Critical theories of neoliberalism reduce the social to an object to manipulate
Barnett, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Open University 10 (Clive, “PUBLICS AND MARKETS What’s wrong with Neoliberalism?”, The
Handbook of Social Geography, 2010,
http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/emergentpublics/publications/barnett_publicsandmarkets.pdf)//AS
This chapter has suggested various
conceptual limitations of theories of neoliberalism andneoliberalization. These
theories are characterised by static idealizations of the contradictions between ‘the state’ and ‘the
market’ which actually reiterate the simplistic views they ascribe to neoliberal purists. They tend to suppose
that changes in state activities are the outcome of ‘ideational projects’, a view sustained by invoking expressive concepts of ideology,
culturalist conceptions of hegemony, and instrumental conceptions of discourse. They tend
in turn to project a distinctive
22geographical imaginary of cascading scales and spaces of diffusion, enabling highly abstract deductions
about capital accumulation to be articulated with more concrete notions of the state, gender
relations, racial formations, and other ‘contextual’ factors. And it is assumed that social formations are reproduced
functionally through various mechanisms of naturalization, whether ideological or, in the Foucauldian inflection, through processes of
Theories of neoliberalism render ‘the social’ a residual aspect of more fundamental processesin
three ways. Firstly, social practices are reduced to residual, more-or-less resistanteffects of restructuring
processes shaped by the transparent class interests of capital. This means that social relations of gender, ethnicity, or race,
subjectification.
for example, are considered as contextual factors shaping the geographically variable manifestations of general neoliberalizing tendencies.
Secondly, ‘the
social’ is also reduced to a residual effect by being considered only in so far as it is the
object of state administration in the interests of economic efficiency, or to strategies of ‘governmental rationality’.
Thirdly, and related to this, ‘the social’ is construed as the more-or-less manipulable surface for ideological
normalization or discursive subjectification.
Conceptions of neoliberalism as a monolithic political force are incorrect and
dangerous
Barnett, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Open University 10 (Clive, “PUBLICS AND MARKETS What’s wrong with Neoliberalism?”, The
Handbook of Social Geography, 2010,
http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/emergentpublics/publications/barnett_publicsandmarkets.pdf)//AS
Neoliberalism has become a key object of analysis in human geography in the last decade. Although the
words neoliberal and
been around for a long while, it is only since the end of the 1990s that they have taken
on the aura of grand theoretical terms. ‘Neoliberalism’ emerges as an object of conceptual and empirical
reflection in the process of restoring to view a sense of political agency to processes previously dubbed
globalization (Hay 2002). This chapter examines the way in which neoliberalism is conceptualised in human geography. It argues that, in
theorisizing neoliberalism as ‘a political project’, critical human geographers have ended up
reproducing the same problem they ascribe to the ideas they take to be driving forces behind contemporary
transformations: they reduce the social to a residual effect of more fundamental political-economic
rationalities. Proponents of free-markets think that people should act like utility-maximising rational egoists, despite lots of evidence that
they don’t. Critics of neoliberalism tend to assume that increasingly people do act like this, but they
think that they ought not to. For critics, this is what’s wrong with neoliberalism. And it is precisely this evaluation that
suggests that there is something wrong with how neoliberalism is theorized in critical human geography.
neoliberalism have
Theories of neoliberalism are morally simplistic and subscribe to the same idealized
view they criticize
Barnett, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Open University 10 (Clive, “PUBLICS AND MARKETS What’s wrong with Neoliberalism?”, The
Handbook of Social Geography, 2010,
http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/emergentpublics/publications/barnett_publicsandmarkets.pdf)//AS
The concept of neoliberalization implies that neoliberalism is both parasitic on and corrosive of other
social processes, but as already suggested, the source of this doubly destructive energy is never quite
specified in these theories. The immediate objects of criticism are a range of substantive and observable social harms: rising levels of
socio-economic inequality, authoritarianism, corrupt government, the concentration of wealth. But these immediate objects of
criticism are seen as inevitable outcomes of a system which has encouraged the disembedding of
economic relations from broader structures of normative steering. It is the imputed content of neoliberalism as a narrowly
individualistic, egoistic rationality that is the source of the status ascribed to it as a ‘strong discourse’, at once parasitic and corrosive. It is on
these grounds that it neoliberalism is viewed as nothing short of “a programme of the methodical destruction of collectives” (Bourdieu 1998).
The view that neoliberalism unleashes pathological human tendencies otherwise properly held in check by collective conventions is a
distinctive updating of Polanyi’s view of market capitalism as an unnatural formation. What
is at work here is a theoretical
imaginary in which the extension of accumulation by market exchange is understood to necessarily
undermine forms of social integration previously knitted together through the state. Theories of
neoliberalism display an intense ambivalence towards ‘the state’. On the one hand, they follow a classical Marxist
view in which the state is a territorial sovereign systematically involved in the reproduction of capital accumulation. On
the other, they hark back almost nostalgically to a social democratic view in which the state stands
opposed to the market as a counterweight, representing an opposing principle of social integration and political legitimacy. In
accepting the same simplistic opposition between individual freedom and social justice presented by
Hayek, but simply reversing the evaluation of the two terms, critics of neoliberalism end up presenting
highly moralistic forms of analysis of contemporary political processes. In resisting the idealization of the market
as the embodiment of public virtue, they end up embracing an equally idealized view of the forum as the
alternative figure of collective life (see Elster 1986). For example, while Harvey insists that neoliberalism is a process driven by
the aim of restoring class power, he ends his analysis by arguing that it is the anti-democratic character of 23neoliberalism that should be the
But it is far from clear whether the theories of neoliberalism and
neoliberalization developed by political economists, sometimes with the help of governmentality studies, can contribute to
reconstructing a theory and practice of radical democratic justice. In Harvey’s analysis, the withdrawal of the state is
focal point of opposition (Harvey 2005, 205-206).
taken for granted, and leads to the destruction of previous solidarities, unleashing pathologies of anomie, anti-social behaviour and criminality
(ibid, 81). In turn, the vacuum created by the withdrawal of the state leads to social solidarities being reconstructed around other axes, of
religion and morality, associationism, and nationalism. What has been described as the rise of the “movement society”, expressed in the
proliferation of contentious politics of rights-based struggles and identity politics, Harvey sees as one aspect of a spread of corrosive social
forms triggered by the rolling-back of states. In the wake of this rolling-back “[e]verything from gangs and criminal cartels, narcotrafficking
networks, mini-mafias and favela bosses, through community, grassroots and non-governmental organizations, to secular cults and religious
sects proliferate” (ibid, 171). These are alternative social forms “that fill the void left behind as state powers, political parties, and other
institutional forms are actively dismantled or simply wither away as centres of collective endeavour and of social bonding” (ibid.).
Defense
Anti-neoliberal theories are too simplistic and abstract—they ignore evidence to the
contrary
Barnett, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Open University 10 (Clive, “PUBLICS AND MARKETS What’s wrong with Neoliberalism?”, The
Handbook of Social Geography, 2010,
http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/emergentpublics/publications/barnett_publicsandmarkets.pdf)//AS
In theories of neoliberalism and neoliberalization, the theoretical preference for very high levels of
abstraction is associated with a tendency to make a geographical virtue out of the consistent failure
to theorize the state as anything other thana functional attribute of the reproductive requirements of
capital. Particular state-formations and patterns of political contention are acknowledged only as local,
territorialized, contextual factors that help to explain how the universalizing trajectory of neoliberalism ,
orchestrated from the centre and organised through global networks, nonetheless always generate ‘hybrid’ assemblages
of neoliberalism. This style of theorizing makes it almost impossible to gainsay the highly generalised
claims about neoliberalism as an ideology andneoliberalizationas a state-led projectby referring to
empirical evidence that might seem to contradict these grand concepts. For example, it is almost taken-for-granted that
the hegemony of neoliberalism is manifest in the reduction of state expenditures on welfare in face of
external pressures of neoliberal globalization. Empirical evidence for welfare state decline is, in fact, far from
conclusive. Welfare regimes have actually proved highly resilient in terms of both funding and provisioning (see Taylor-Gooby 2001). At the
same time, the extent to which open market economies foster rather than menace high-levels of national welfare provision is also hotly
debated (Taylor-Gooby 2003). In both cases, the
idea of any straightforward shift from state to market seems a
little simplistic (Clarke 2003). But from the perspective of geography’s meta-theories of neoliberalization, all of this is so much grist to
the contextualizing mill. Contrary evidence can be easily incorporated into these theories precisely because
they layer levels of conceptual abstraction onto scales of contextual articulation.
Anti-neoliberal critiques fail to understand the social condition—ignore key aspects of
social science
Barnett, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Open University 10 (Clive, “PUBLICS AND MARKETS What’s wrong with Neoliberalism?”, The
Handbook of Social Geography, 2010,
http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/emergentpublics/publications/barnett_publicsandmarkets.pdf)//AS
Any serious consideration of democracy, rights and social justice cannot afford to ignore the fields of
social science in which issues ofrationality, motivation, and agency are most fully theorized. These
often turn out to be fields normally considered too ‘liberal’ for the tastes of critical human geographers (cf.
Sayer 1995). These fields can serve as potential sources for revised understandings of the tasks of critical theory, ones which do not
fall back into ahistorical, overly sociologized criticisms of any appearance of individualism or self-interest as
menacing the very grounds of public virtue and the common good. Problems of coordination, institutional
design, and justification are central to any normatively persuasive and empirically grounded critical theory of
democracy. For example, the problem central to social choice theory – the difficulty of arriving at collective preference functions by
aggregating individual preferences – is a fundamental issue in democratic theory, around which contemporary theories of deliberative
democracy are increasingly focussed (Goodin 2003). Likewise, AmartyaSen’s (2002) critique of public choice theory’s assumption that people
are ‘rational fools’ provides the most compelling criticism of the onedimensional understanding of rationality, motivation, and agency upon
which orthodox economic and public policy depends. This critique informs the “capabilities approach” which connects key problems in welfare
economics to a theory of egalitarian rights and political democracy (Sen 1999; Corbridge 2002). These are just two examples of
work
which takes seriously the problematization of agency, motivation and rationality in ‘rational choice’
social science in order to move social theory beyond the consoling idea that rampant individualism
can be tamed by moral injunctions of the public good and weak claims about social construction.
Criticism of neoliberalism is morally vague and impractical
Barnett, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Open University 10 (Clive, “PUBLICS AND MARKETS What’s wrong with Neoliberalism?”, The
Handbook of Social Geography, 2010,
http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/emergentpublics/publications/barnett_publicsandmarkets.pdf)//AS
Critical theories of neoliberalism and neoliberalizationprovide a compelling moral narrative in which recent
history is understood in terms of a motivated shift away from public and collective values towards
private and individualistic values. Critical narratives of neoliberalism reinforce the image of there being a clear-cut divide
between two sets of values – those of private, individualistic self-interest on the one hand, and those of public, collective interests on the
other. There
is a preconstructed normative framing of these theories around a set of conceptual and moral
binaries: market versus state; public versus private; consumer versus citizen; liberty versus equality; individual utility
versus collective solidarity; self-interested egoism versus other-regarding altruism. Theories of neoliberalism go hand in
hand with a standard form of criticism that bemoans the decline of public life, active citizenly virtue, and values of egalitarianism and
solidarity.
These theories project ahead of themselves criteria of evaluation (cf. Castree 2008): neoliberalism
reduces democracy, creates poverty and inequality, and is imposed either from the outside or by
unaccountable elites. The conceptual analysis of neoliberalism is therefore always already critical, but at a cost. They are
condemned to invoke their favoured positive values (e.g. the public realm, collective solidarity, equality, democracy, care,
social justice) in a moralistic register without addressing normative problems of how practically to
negotiate equally compelling values. And in so far as theories of neoliberalism dismiss considerations of rational action,
motivation, and decentralised coordination as so much ‘ideology’, they remain chronically constricted in their capacity to
reflect seriously on questions ofinstitutional design, political organisation and economic coordination
which, one might suppose, remain an important task for any critical theory. 3
Concepts of globalization and neoliberalism overstate the reach of globalization—it’s
fearmongering
Cooper, professor of history at New York University 01 (Frederick, “What is the concept of globalization good for? An African historian’s
perspective”, African Affairs 100, 2001,
http://media.library.ku.edu.tr/reserve/resspring07/intl453_OAltan/week8_Perspectivesonglobalization.pdf)//AS
THERE ARE TWO PROBLEMS WITH THE CONCEPT OF GLOBALIZATION, first the "˜global', and second
the "˜-ization'. The implication of the first is that a single system of connection - notably through capital and
commodities markets, information flows, and imagined landscapes - has penetrated the entire globe; and the implication
of the second is that it is doing so now, that this is the global age. There are certainly those, not least of them the
advocates of unrestricted capital markets, who claim that the world should be open to them, but this does not
mean that they have got their way. Nevertheless, many critics of market tyranny, social democrats who lament
the alleged decline of the nation-state, and people who see the eruption of particular- ism as a counter-reaction to market
homogenization, give the boasts of the globalizers too much credibility. Crucial questions do not get asked:
about the limits of interconnection, about the areas where capital cannot go, and about the specificity of the structures
necessary to make connections work. Behind the globalization fad is an important quest for understanding the
interconnectedness of different parts of the world, for explaining new mechanisms shaping the movement of capital,
people, and culture, and for exploring institutions capable of regulating such transnational movement. What is missing in
discussions of globalization today is the historical depth of interconnections and a focus on just what the
structures and limits of the connecting mechanisms are. It is salutary to get away from whatever ten- dencies there may
have been to analyze social, economic, political, and cul- tural processes as if they took place in national or continental containers; but to
adopt a language that implies that there is no container at all, except the planetary one, risks defining
problems in misleading ways. The world has long been - and still is - a space where economic and political relations are very uneven;
it is filled with lumps, places where power co- alesces surrounded by those where it does not, where social relations become dense amidst
others that are diffuse. Structures and networks penetrate certain places and do certain things with great intensity, but their effects tail off
elsewhere.
No Root Cause
Apocalyptic takes on the effects of neoliberal policies are wildly incorrect—empirically
disproven
Clarke,Professor of Social Policy (Social Policy and Criminology) in the Faculty of Social Sciences at The Open University 04 (John,
“Dissolving the public realm?: The logics and limits of neo-liberalism”, Journal of Social Policy 33:1, 2004,
http://oro.open.ac.uk/4377/1/download.pdf)//AS
Globalisation has been identified as a major driving force – an inexorable economic transition
responsible for undermining nation states, rendering public spending indefensible, dismantling
welfare states and over-riding democratic political control. This apocalyptic view has a number of
problems, only some of which I want to touch on here (there is a growing literature debating the subject, see, inter alia, Deacon,1997;
Gough,2000; Sykes, Palier and Prior,2001, and Yeates, 2001 in social policy). First, the apocalyptic or ‘strong’ (Yeates, 2001) view
of globalisation overstates the extent and scale of change in the public realm in many of the advanced
capitalist societies of the West. Those researching welfare systems have emphasised the (surprising)
resilience of public spending and provisioning, and have suggested the need to contrast globalisation with attention to
national and local political and social institutions (Esping-Andersen, 1997; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Kuhnle, 2000; Taylor-Gooby, 2001a).
Nevertheless, there
is a danger of forcing a binary choice here: either transformative globalisation or the
persistence of the nation-state/welfare state. Obscured by such binary choices are a range of destabilising processes of
apparently settled institutions, formations, borders and boundaries – including the ways in which nations, states and welfare are being aligned
(these arguments are developed in Clarke, forthcoming, a and b).
A different view of globalisation would foreground
questions of social and spatial unevenness – rather than treating it as a unified, unilinear and monological process (see, inter
alia, Brah, Hickman and MacanGhaill, 1999; Gupta, 1997, 2000; Ong, 1999). It would avoid the profoundly reductive form of
economic determinism of apocalyptic views of globalisation – celebrating, or bewailing, the irresistible capacity of
global capital to conform the world to its desires. I think there are political and theoretical reasons to resist such
determinism, not least because it marks the coincidence of neo-liberal fantasies and left-wing
nightmares in overstating the coherence, power and achievements of capital (see the discussions by GibsonGraham, 1996; and Morris, 1998). Instead, I want to insist on treating contradiction and contestation as integral elements of these processes. I
want to argue that there are contradictions within and between the processes of globalisation, manifested in unevennesses, disturbances and
encounters with old and new resistances and refusals. It seems to me that such starting points might allow us to think of globalisation in a more
differentiated, more uneven, more contradictory and more unfinished way than the view from an apocalyptic political economy. It might also
allow us to think of neo-liberal
globalisation as one strategy that aims to conform the world to its grand
plan, rather than being the whole (and only) globalisation (Massey, 1999). The attempt to create the conditions for USdominated formations of transnational capital to be mobile, flexible and30 john clarke profitable is certainly the dominant tendency of
contemporary globalisation, but it is by no means the only. There are other transnational relations, processes and realignments – from ‘global
care chains’ (Hochschild, 2001), through regional and inter-regional migrations (Castles and Davidson, 2000) and new forms of international
solidarity and political action (most obviously the antiglobalisation movement). It is also significant that neo-liberal
globalisation
looks more dominant and compelling from the point of view of the Anglophone West (especially the
US/UK axis). From elsewhere, it more obviously resembles one way of constructing capitalist
modernity. For example, AihwaOng has argued that the attempt to construct a ‘Confucian capitalism’ involves China and other Asian states
‘in the process of constructing alternative modernities based on new relations with their populations, with capital and with the West’
(1999:35).
Neoliberalism in itself isn’t the root cause of the hegemonic acts described by the
alternative
Peck, PhD and BA in geography, 2013 (Explaining (with) neoliberalism. Territory, Politics,
Governance 1(2): forthcoming)//JS
Doing away with the concept of neoliberalism will not do away with the conditions of its stillhegemonic existence; neither, on its own, would it render alternatives any more realizable. Rather, it
is imperative that the array of alternatives—from the reformist though to the radical—are positioned
relationally in ideational, ideological, and institutional terms. This is not, then, a plea for a relentlessly
‘neoliberalocentric’ perspective, for it is arguably more important than ever to ensure that the reach
and ambition of critical endeavors—methodological, theoretical, and political—extend across the entire
field of socioeconomic difference, a task in which Polanyian forms of comparative socioeconomics, for
instance, might have constructive roles to play (see PECK, forthcoming). Consistent with such an
approach is the observation that the necessary incompleteness of the neoliberal program of freemarket reform means that it must always dwell among its others, along with the rather cold comfort
that its ultimate destination is unattainable. Actually existing alternatives (progressive and otherwise)
will never be completely expunged. The residues of preexisting social formations will never be entirely
erased or rendered inert. Double movements against the overextension of market rule will not only
continue, but can be expected to intensify, presenting new challenges but also opening up new
moments for social action. Crises, in forms old and new, will recur. Realistically speaking, it is on this
uncertain and uneven terrain that all forms of postneoliberal politics will have to be forged. And there
is analytical work to be done too, not least across the interdisciplinary field of critical urban and regional
studies. There is much to be gained from this work being conducted across, as well as within,
methodological traditions and theoretical registers, although a particularly important contribution
remains to be made by the ‘ethnographic archeologist’, as BURAWOY (2003, p. 251) dubbed them some
time ago, ‘who seeks out local experiments, new institutional forms, real utopias if you wish, who places
them in their context, translates them into a common language, and links them one to another across
the globe’.
No Impact
Cuba
Investment in Cuba will not result in exploitation and the spread of neoliberalism
Carmona - Professor of Economics at the Universidad San Pablo. Spring 2000
(Antonio, “Cuba: Reforms and Adjustments Versus Transition,” International Journal of Political Economy. Vol 30.1, pp. 92. JSTOR)//SG
The constitutional reform allowed the amplification of the 1982 Decree Law No. 50, on foreign
investment. In September 1995, theNational Assemblyof Popular Powerapproved theNewLaw on Foreign
Investment, allowing foreign individu- als and companies, including Cubans living abroad, to invest in production
and property in Cuba.36 This law codifies property rights for all foreign investors and does not discriminate according to nationality,
meaning thatU.S. enterprises are welcome in Cuba. It also codifies the rights of nationals who work for foreign companies, and
the profit-ratio for state-private joint ventures.According to the law, and in accordance with the constitutionabolishing the
"exploitation of man by man," all Cuban workers remain employees of the stateand will receive state payment
and securities, whereasthe government and foreign enterpriseswill reap and share profits in dollars.The profits
made by theCubangovernmentin turnwill be used for the fortification of the welfare state,that is,to
strengthen public- health services and educational facilities, as well as to repay foreign debt.
AT: Democracy
The twin pillars of neoliberalism and democracy have been successful in Latin America
and will show better results once reforms evolve past the first generation.
Johnson 2003 – Senior Policy Analyst (Stephen, “Is Neoliberalism Dead In Latin America?”, The
Heritage Foundation, September 4, 2003, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2003/09/isneoliberalism-dead-in-latin-america)//CS
For historical reasons, liberalism and supporting pillars of democracy and markets came late to many
Latin American states and have had troubled histories in others. Core traditions such as the belief that sovereignty
resides in the state and that only strong leaders can impose order seemed reasonable at the time of independence when minority European
elites were pretty much the state and ruled over an uneducated populace.¶ But follow-on
immigration, better education, and
the need to keep up with economic progress elsewhere brought changes that challenged these
traditions. In parts of Latin America that had known mostly dictatorship, a wave of democratization
and preliminary market reforms swept through the region in the 1980s