1AC
Plan
Text: The United States should legalize physician assisted suicide by granting all those
with terminal illnesses the constitutional right to undergo pre-mortem
cryopreservation.
Reanimation Adv
Rapidly advancing cryopreservation technology can be a genuine solution to the
suffering of millions, unfortunately restrictions on euthanasia obstruct the physicians
ability to adequately vitrify the body and brain- legalizing cryothanasia would
optimize the chances for successful reanimation
Zoltan Istvan 08/21/2014 "Should Cryonics, Cryothanasia, and Transhumanism Be Part of the
Euthanasia Debate?" http://www.huffingtonpost.com/zoltan-istvan/should-cryonics-cryocide_b_5518684.html Zoltan Istvan is a bestselling author and graduate of Columbia University
An elderly man named Bill sits in a lonely Nevada nursing home, staring out the window. The sun is
fading from the sky, and night will soon cover the surrounding windswept desert. Bill has late-onset
Alzheimer's disease, and the plethora of medications he's on is losing the war to keep his mind intact.
Soon, he will lose control of many of his cognitive functions, will forget many of his memories, and will
no longer recognize friends and family. Approximately 40 million people around the world have some
form of dementia, according to a World Health Organization report. About 70 percent of those suffer
from Alzheimer's. With average lifespans increasing due to rapidly improving longevity science, what are
people with these maladies to do? Do those with severe cases want to be kept alive for years or even
decades in a debilitated mental state just because modern medicine can do it? In parts of Europe and a
few states in America where assisted suicide--sometimes referred to as euthanasia or physician aid in
dying--is allowed, some mental illness sufferers decide to end their lives while they're still cognitively
sound and can recognize their memories and personality. However, most people around the world with
dementia are forced to watch their minds deteriorate. Families and caretakers of dementia patients are
often dramatically affected too. Watching a loved one slowly loose their cognitive functions and
memories is one of the most challenging and painful predicaments anyone can ever go through.
Exorbitant finances further complicate the matter because it's expensive to provide proper care for the
mentally ill. In the 21st Century--the age of transhumanism and brilliant scientific achievement--the
question should be asked: Are there other ways to approach this sensitive issue? The transhumanist
field of cryonics--using ultra-cold temperatures to preserve a dead body in hopes of future revival-has come a long way since the first person was frozen in 1967. Various organizations and companies
around the world have since preserved a few hundred people. Over a thousand people are signed up to
be frozen in the future, and many millions of people are aware of the procedure. Some may say cryonics
is crackpot science. However, those accusations are unfounded. Already, human beings can be revived
and go on to live normal lives after being frozen in water for over an hour. Additionally, suspended
animation is now occurring in a university hospital in Pittsburgh, where a saline-cooling solution has
recently been approved by the FDA to preserve the clinically dead for hours before resuscitating them.
In a decade's time, this procedure may be used to keep people suspended for a week or a month before
waking them. Clearly, the medical field of preserving the dead for possible future life is quickly
improving every year. The trick with cryonics is preserving someone immediately after they've died .
Otherwise, critical organs, especially the brain and its billions of neurons, have a far higher chance of
being damaged in the freezing. However, it's almost impossible to cryonically freeze someone right
after death. Circumstances usually get in the way of an ideal suspension. Bodies must first be brought
to a cryonics facility. Most municipalities require technicians, doctors, and a funeral director to legally
sign off on a body before it can be cryonically preserved. All this takes time, and minutes are precious
once the last heartbeat and breath of air have been made by a cryonics candidate. Recently, some
transhumanists have advocated for cryothanasia, where a patient undergoes physician or selfadministered euthanasia with the intent of being cryonically suspended during the death process or
immediately afterward. This creates the optimum environment since all persons involved are on hand
and ready to do their part so that an ideal freeze can occur. Cryothanasia could be utilized for a number
of people and situations: the atheist Alzheimer's sufferer who doesn't believe in an afterlife and wants
science to give him another chance in the future; the suicidal schizophrenic who doesn't want to exist in
the current world, but isn't ready to give up altogether on existence; the terminally ill transhumanist
cancer patient who doesn't want to lose half their body weight and undergo painful chemotherapy
before being cryonically frozen; or the extreme special needs or disabled person who wants to come
back in an age where their disabilities can be fixed. There might even be spiritual, religious, or
philosophical reasons for pursuing an impermanent death, as in my novel The Transhumanist Wager,
where protagonist Jethro Knights undergoes cryothanasia in search of a lost loved one. There are many
sound reasons why someone might choose cryothanasia. Whoever the person and whatever the reason,
there is a belief that life can be better for them in some future time. Some experts believe we will begin
reanimating cryonically frozen patients in 25 to 50 years. Technologies via bioengineering,
nanomedicine, and mind uploading will likely lead the way. Hundreds of millions of dollars are being
spent on developing these technologies that will also create breakthroughs for the field of cryonics and
other areas of suspended animation. Another advantage about cryonics and cryothanasia is their
affordability. It costs about $1,000 to painlessly euthanize oneself and an average of $80,000 to
cryonically freeze one's body. It costs many times more than that to keep someone alive who is suffering
from a serious mental disorder and needs constant 24-hour a day care over many years. Despite some
of the positive possibilities, cryothanasia is virtually unknown to people and is often technically illegal
in many places around the world . Of course, much discussion would have to take place in private,
public, and political circles in order to determine if cryothanasia has a valid place in society.
Nevertheless, cryothanasia represents an original way for dementia sufferers and others to consider
now that they are living far longer than ever before.
Technological avenues for immortality are forthcoming and cryonic reanimation is the
key ingredient - brain uploading could be feasible as early as 2025
Marcus Edwards 2012 "The Path to Immortality"
http://wiki.eyewire.org/en/The_Path_to_Immortality Edwards is a contributor for the EyeWire project,
a game to developed to help Sebastian Seung's Lab at MIT map the brain. Eyewire has grown to over
150,000 players from 140+ countries.
It often seems that man is on an unending journey to escape death. From the immortality potions of
ancient China to modern scientific endeavors, it may appear as if we are fighting a losing battle. Even
with the current developments in medicine and biology, we have been unable to achieve any sense of
immortality. Though the life expectancy of people living in developed countries has risen dramatically in
the last two hundred years, none have yet eluded death. But imagine for a moment a process for
prolonging the human life expectancy from age 76 to eternity. Would this be possible? The answer may
lie in the field of cryonics. Cryonics is dedicated to freezing the human body to extremely low
temperatures with the hopes that they may one day be revived by some future technology. What
interests me in particular is not the cryopreservation of the body, but of the brain. Not surprisingly, the
preservation of the brain is known as neuropreservation. After reading Connectome, I asked myself if
merely preserving the brain would similarly preserve the connectome— the theoretical home of
memories, consciousness and personality. Like many before me, I am enthralled with the possibility of
achieving immortality, though I still have some reservations about achieving this through
neuropreservation. The technologies to freeze the brain have existed for decades, but how to revive the
brain from the inevitable damage that results from freezing it for long periods of time has never been
achieved. The world’s leading cryopreservation company, Alcor, may have an answer. Alcor was
founded in 1977, and since then has become the foremost authority on cryonics. The company is
currently researching new methods of freezing the bodies of clients so that they may withstand eternity,
but many of their scientists believe full-body storage is not necessary. Like Dr. Seung, these researchers
believe that the brain is the home of human identity. This mindset has created a new division of
cryonics: “The Neuropreservation Option.” This has become the most popular option since its inception,
as many clients have come to believe that the preservation of the brain preserves the personality and
the soul. Not surprisingly, it is also much more affordable to preserve a brain than an entire body. Since
the cryopreservation process lasts long after the legal death of the clients, they are required to pay the
full amount in advance. Alcor currently charges $200,000 for a full-body preservation while
neuropreservation costs less than half that; still a pricey $80,000. But is the cost worth it? If the human
brain can be revived, there are still many unknown factors. How will the brain be repaired? What body
will the brain occupy? Will the society that greets you even want you back? As for repairing the brain,
one solution has already been proposed. Nanotechnology has grown substantially in recent years, and
many proponents of neuropreservation argue that nanobots, minuscule robots designed for a specific
function, may provide a solution. Nanobots are not yet advanced enough to be able to repair such
delicate brain tissue. However, advancements in the future may eventually lead to just that. While many
forms of nanotechnology are currently in the research and development phase, progress in the field will
likely allow for more advanced procedures. Scientists at Harvard and MIT have been able to specifically
target cells with nanobots filled with chemotherapy chemicals. This drastically reduced the damage
done by the chemotherapy chemicals typically caused by imprecise delivery methods. In spite of these
seemingly miraculous possibilities, I often wonder if there is any point. In Connectome, Dr. Seung posed
the question: Does cryogenically preserving a brain similarly preserve the connectome? If not, then it
may be futile to maintain frozen brains. Assuming his hypothesis that the neural connections are where
consciousness resides, damage to the connectome would result in an irreversible loss of personality. But
if the connectome is preserved by the extreme cold, neuropreservation could one day be a viable
means of achieving an undetermined life span. Even if the connectome endures, another problem
exists. The brain may physically house identity, but it has little purpose without some body to aid its
function. Researchers have proposed several solutions to this problem. Recently, media sources have
advertised cloning as a method for giving the brain a body. There is no fear of rejection because the cells
and DNA of the clone would be identical to the brain in storage, but this raises many ethical questions:
Suppose a client walks into Alcor asking for a neuropreservation. He pays the fee, lives for several more
years and then dies. His brain is sent to an Alcor facility where it is frozen. Over a century from now, his
brain is revitalized using nanobots then placed inside a clone that was created specifically for that
purpose. His brain is successfully implanted and he lives a successful life until he dies and the process
begins again. I have several problems with this proposal. What would happen to the clone that was
raised simply for the purpose of becoming a vessel? The line between what legal rights a clone would
have compared to a “normal” human is far too blurry to become practical across the world. Indeed,
members of Alcor claimed that cloning is a “crude” method of providing the brain with a body and that a
“more elegant means” must be achieved. It may not seem elegant, but far less crude than the cloning
option is growing an entire body around the rejuvenated brain. Much like a zygote rapidly multiplies into
an infant, a body could be grown around the brain. Imagine using bioengineered catalysts and reactions
to facilitate the growth of an entire body around the actual brain. A person could be “born” much like a
child, the only difference being that an adult body grows instead. The brain—and presumably the
identity—of the patient would already be preserved, so a spine would have to be created around the
brain, forming the intricate neural connections that make life possible. In spite of what many
researchers at Alcor may think, the path to immortality may not be so complex (from a biological
perspective). In Connectome, Dr. Seung also proposed the idea of mapping connectomes, uploading that
information to a microprocessor and using that information to achieve digital immortality . Many of the
technologies to achieve this extraordinary feat are already in place . Microchips are relatively cheap
and are expected to be able to process the amount of information a human brain contains by the year
2025. This could mean that mapping connectomes with increasingly advanced imaging techniques could
automate the process, leaving it entirely up to computers. Connectomes could eventually be mapped
with unprecedented speed, meaning that any human could have his identity recorded on a microchip
when they die, then have it transferred to a computer program prolonging his life indefinitely. While
many of the ideas I proposed are only in their beginning stages, the technologies involved are advancing
rapidly. Perhaps in the future scientists will look back at us, wondering why we ever believed it was
impossible to live forever, just as we question those pessimists who believed that a journey to the moon
would never be within our grasp. Dr. Ralph Merkle, inventor of public key cryptography, once said
“Cryonics is an experiment. So far the control group isn’t doing that well.” He knew as well as any other
that no one has a chance to escape death without trying, and optimism is necessary to keep the spirit of
such dreams alive. One day, not too far off, we may scoff at death, knowing that we are not bound to
our current biological forms. Whether it be through microchips, cryonics, or some distant technology of
the future, we may all hope to walk the path of immortality, carefully treading in a realm once thought
to be reserved for the gods alone.
The transition to a postmortal society will be smooth and collective
R. Michael Perry 2000 "Forever For All: Moral Philosophy, Cryonics, and the Scientific Prospects of
Immortality" http://www.foreverforall.org/pdfs/foreverforall.pdf Perry graduated from the University of
Chicago in 1969 with a B.S. in Mathematics. He earned a M.S. in Computer Science from Colorado
University in 1979 and a Ph.D. in Computer Science from the same institution in 1984.
One positive change will involve an attitude toward fellow beings . Today the thought is often
expressed that we are primarily machines to perpetuate our genes. The concerns of such beings are
focused in rather obvious ways by natural selection, with the emphasis on im-mediate survival needs,
mating, and progeny. This we have carried with us, thus far having no choice, even though our lifestyles
have been modified greatly by our creation of civilization. Even so, the outlook is not so bleak--the roots
of an immortal lifestyle can be seen in our world today, where we are still as we biologically evolved.
Despite the pressures to develop a narrowness of interests and an unconcern for strangers, we have
formed into societies. We at least pay nodding respect to such concepts as the rights to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness. Nature has, in fact, prepared us somewhat for the great leap we must now
make, though we will have to take the initiative and work beyond the easy answers.¶ For the
posthuman future we can imagine that consideration of others will intensify , for simple reasons of
self-interest. When we are no longer focused on creating progeny during a brief struggle for existence
that must soon end in our demise but on leading rich and hopefully endless lives, our perspectives will
broaden. Among other things, we may conjecture that any two individuals must encounter each other
again and again, or develop some pathological mutual aversion that will detract from both lives. It
should become increas-ingly clear that there is much to gain, personally, through considera-tion for
others and acts of benevolence. In this way, then, I foresee a postmortal society that is a harmonious
whole, strife and violence having given way to more reasoned interaction.¶ The increased consideration
for others should carry over to others of the past who might be resuscitated from a preserved state. It is
easy to feel a certain fascination with such an idea even now. I think this feeling will be strong, at least
for some people in the future, and probably for most if not all. The generally increased valuing of life
must surely translate to concern for those who cannot now participate but could be helped to
participate, given the means available. Persons of the past would have unique contributions to make in
the lives of those then living, which should hold a special interest. This should be true even if such
persons would initially be out of place; they could offer their own perspectives and perceptions in
exchange for the new¶ learning they would receive.¶ I think too that resuscitating frozen people, to the
extent that it becomes possible, will also be inexpensive by future standards. This seems particularly
likely when the possibilities for automation are taken into account. With operations directed by devices
that are largely self-repairing and self-maintaining and can proliferate com-ponents in vast swarms as
needed (though only as needed), even very complex procedures should become feasible and fast.
Included, I imagine, will be whatever is required to repair and resuscitate a fro-zen human. This should
not be a great resource drain, though even if it is the chances are good that it will be carried out anyway.
Immortality extends life's quantitative potential to infinity- brain uploading
independently elevates its intrinsic value to unknown heights
Nick Bostrom 2003 “Transhumanism FAQ”
http://www.transhumanism.org/index.php/WTA/faq21/63/ Nick Bostrom is a Swedish philosopher at
St. Cross College, University of Oxford known for his work on existential risk, the anthropic principle,
human enhancement ethics, the reversal test, and consequentialism. He holds a PhD from the London
School of Economics (2000). He is the founding director of both The Future of Humanity Institute and
the Oxford Martin Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology as part of the Oxford Martin School
at Oxford University.
Uploading (sometimes called “downloading”, “mind uploading” or “brain reconstruction”) is the process
of transferring an intellect from a biological brain to a computer. One way of doing this might be by first
scanning the synaptic structure of a particular brain and then implementing the same computations in
an electronic medium. A brain scan of sufficient resolution could be produced by disassembling the
brain atom for atom by means of nanotechnology. Other approaches, such as analyzing pieces of the
brain slice by slice in an electron microscope with automatic image processing have also been proposed.
In addition to mapping the connection pattern among the 100 billion-or-so neurons, the scan would
probably also have to register some of the functional properties of each of the synaptic
interconnections, such as the efficacy of the connection and how stable it is over time (e.g. whether it is
short-term or long-term potentiated). Non-local modulators such as neurotransmitter concentrations
and hormone balances may also need to be represented, although such parameters likely contain much
less data than the neuronal network itself. In addition to a good three-dimensional map of a brain,
uploading will require progress in neuroscience to develop functional models of each species of neuron
(how they map input stimuli to outgoing action potentials, and how their properties change in response
to activity in learning). It will also require a powerful computer to run the upload, and some way for the
upload to interact with the external world or with a virtual reality. (Providing input/output or a virtual
reality for the upload appears easy in comparison to the other challenges.) An alternative hypothetical
uploading method would proceed more gradually: one neuron could be replaced by an implant or by a
simulation in a computer outside of the body. Then another neuron, and so on, until eventually the
whole cortex has been replaced and the person’s thinking is implemented on entirely artificial hardware.
(To do this for the whole brain would almost certainly require nanotechnology.) A distinction is
sometimes made between destructive uploading, in which the original brain is destroyed in the process,
and non-destructive uploading, in which the original brain is preserved intact alongside the uploaded
copy. It is a matter of debate under what conditions personal identity would be preserved in destructive
uploading. Many philosophers who have studied the problem think that at least under some conditions,
an upload of your brain would be you. A widely accepted position is that you survive so long as certain
information patterns are conserved, such as your memories, values, attitudes, and emotional
dispositions, and so long as there is causal continuity so that earlier stages of yourself help determine
later stages of yourself. Views differ on the relative importance of these two criteria, but they can both
be satisfied in the case of uploading. For the continuation of personhood, on this view, it matters little
whether you are implemented on a silicon chip inside a computer or in that gray, cheesy lump inside
your skull, assuming both implementations are conscious. Tricky cases arise, however, if we imagine
that several similar copies are made of your uploaded mind. Which one of them is you? Are they all you,
or are none of them you? Who owns your property? Who is married to your spouse? Philosophical,
legal, and ethical challenges abound. Maybe these will become hotly debated political issues later in this
century. A common misunderstanding about uploads is that they would necessarily be “disembodied”
and that this would mean that their experiences would be impoverished. Uploading according to this
view would be the ultimate escapism, one that only neurotic body-loathers could possibly feel tempted
by. But an upload’s experience could in principle be identical to that of a biological human. An upload
could have a virtual (simulated) body giving the same sensations and the same possibilities for
interaction as a non-simulated body. With advanced virtual reality, uploads could enjoy food and drink,
and upload sex could be as gloriously messy as one could wish. And uploads wouldn’t have to be
confined to virtual reality: they could interact with people on the outside and even rent robot bodies in
order to work in or explore physical reality. Personal inclinations regarding uploading differ. Many
transhumanists have a pragmatic attitude: whether they would like to upload or not depends on the
precise conditions in which they would live as uploads and what the alternatives are. (Some
transhumanists may also doubt whether uploading will be possible.) Advantages of being an upload
would include: Uploads would not be subject to biological senescence. Back-up copies of uploads could
be created regularly so that you could be re-booted if something bad happened. (Thus your lifespan
would potentially be as long as the universe’s.) You could potentially live much more economically as an
upload since you wouldn’t need physical food, housing, transportation, etc. If you were running on a
fast computer, you would think faster than in a biological implementation. For instance , if you were
running on a computer a thousand times more powerful than a human brain, then you would think a
thousand times faste r (and the external world would appear to you as if it were slowed down by a
factor of a thousand). You would thus get to experience more subjective time, and live more, during any
given day. You could travel at the speed of light as an information pattern, which could be convenient in
a future age of large-scale space settlements. Radical cognitive enhancements would likely be easier to
implement in an upload than in an organic brain.
Restricting an individual's right to life extension is akin to manslaughter
Zoltan Istvan 01/31/2014"When Does Hindering Life Extension Science Become a Crime?"
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-transhumanist-philosopher/201401/when-does-hinderinglife-extension-science-become-crime Zoltan Istvan is a bestselling author and graduate of Columbia
University
Every human being has both a minimum and a maximum amount of life hours left to live. If you add
together the possible maximum life hours of every living person on the planet, you arrive at a special
number: the optimum amount of time for our species to evolve, find happiness, and become the most
that it can be. Many reasonable people feel we should attempt to achieve this maximum number of
life hours for humankind . After all, very few people actually wish to prematurely die or wish for their
fellow humans' premature deaths. In a free and functioning democratic society, it's the duty of our
leaders and government to implement laws and social strategies to maximize these life hours that we
want to safeguard. Regardless of ideological, political, religious, or cultural beliefs, we expect our leaders
and government to protect our lives and ensure the maximum length of our lifespans. Any other
behavior cuts short the time human beings have left to live. Anything else becomes a crime of
prematurely ending human lives. Anything else fits the common legal term we have for that type of
reprehensible behavior: criminal manslaughter.
Biostatic time travel solves grief, death anxiety, and philosophical inquiry
Charles Tandy 2009"Entropy and Immortality" Journal of Futures Studies, August 2009, 14(1): 39-50
http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/141-A03.pdf He is a Senior Faculty Research
Fellow in Bioethics
at Fooyin University's Research Center for Medical Humanities in Taiwan
Perfection of future-directed time travel in the form of suspended-animation (biostasis) seems feasible
in the 21st century.13 I believe it even seems feasible to eventually offer it freely to all who want it.
Jared Diamond has pointed out that: " If most of the world's 6 billion people today were in cryogenic
storage and neither eating, breathing, nor metabolizing, that large population would cause no
environmental problems. "14 This might allow them to travel to an improved world in which they
would be immortal. Since aging and all other diseases would have been conquered, they might not have
to use time travel again unless they had an accident requiring future medical technology. But the ontoresurrection imperative demands more than immortality for those currently alive. In extraterrestrial
space we can experiment (e.g. via Einsteinian or Gödelian past-directed time travel-viewing) with
immortality for all persons no longer alive. Seg-communities (Self-sufficient Extra-terrestrial Greenhabitats, or O'Neill communities – e.g., see O'Neill, 2000) can assist us with our ordinary and terrestrial
problems as well as assist us in completion of the onto-resurrection project. Indeed, in Al Gore's
account of the global warming of our water planet, his parable of the frog is a central metaphor.
Because the frog in the pot of water experiences only a gradual warming, the frog does not jump out. I
add: Jumping off the water planet is now historically imperative. Indeed, it seems unwise to put all of
our eggs (futures) into one basket (biosphere). I close with these words from Jacques Choron: "Only
pleasant and personal immortality provides what still appears to many as the only effective defense
against...death. But it is able to accomplish much more. It appeases the sorrow following the death of a
loved one by opening up the possibility of a joyful reunion...It satisfies the sense of justice outraged by
the premature deaths of people of great promise and talent, because only this kind of immortality
offers the hope of fulfillment in another life. Finally, it offers an answer to the question of the ultimate
meaning of life, particularly when death prompts the agonizing query [of Tolstoy], 'What is the purpose
of this strife and struggle if, in the end, I shall disappear like a soap bubble?' Above it was shown that
mental-reality and all-reality are dimensions of reality which are not altogether reducible to any strictly
physical-scientific paradigm. A more believable (general-ontological) paradigm was presented. Within
this framework, the issue of personal immortality was considered. It was concluded that the
immortality project, as a physical-scientific common-task to resurrect all dead persons , is ethically
imperative. The imperative includes as first steps the development of suspended-animation ,
superfast-rocketry, and seg-communities.
Prefer expert consensus on cryonics
Gregory Benford et al. 2005 "Scientists’ Open Letter on Cryonics"
http://www.evidencebasedcryonics.org/scientists-open-letter-on-cryonics/, Benford is has Ph.D. in
Physics from UC San Diego. He is also Professor of Physics at the University of California; Irvine, and 62
other Ph.D. signatories
To whom it may concern, Cryonics is a legitimate science-based endeavor that seeks to preserve
human beings, especially the human brain , by the best technology available. Future technologies for
resuscitation can be envisioned that involve molecular repair by nanomedicine, highly advanced
computation, detailed control of cell growth, and tissue regeneration. With a view toward these
developments, there is a credible possibility that cryonics performed under the best conditions
achievable today can preserve sufficient neurological information to permit eventual restoration of a
person to full health. The rights of people who choose cryonics are important , and should be
respected. Sincerely (63 Signatories)
Transhumanism Adv
Pre-mortem cryopreservation is inevitably going to be a question of PAS- drawing
the legal 'death for life' distinction now will set a standard that endorses the
discipline
Ryan Sullivan 2011"Pre-Mortem Cryopreservation: Recognizing a Patient's Right to Die in Order to
Live"
http://www.quinnipiac.edu/prebuilt/pdf/SchoolLaw/HealthLawJournalLibrary/04_14QuinnipiacHealthLJ
49%282010-2011%29.pdf Sullivan is J.D. from the University of Nebraska, he received his masters from
California University of
Pennsylvania and bachelors from Colorado State University.
A brief look at the massive compilation of scientific, biological and medical advancements of the last
two centuries demonstrates that human ingenuity is limitless. Given enough time, it seems anything is
possible, even the prospect of immortality . The science of low-temperature preservation has already
become mainstream - used today to preserve blood, organs, and even human embryos. Recent
developments in cryobiology and nanotechnology have converted cryonicists' once-abstract faith in
future science into a tangible, achievable aspiration. Although the technology required for successful
human reanimation may still be many years away, the right to pre-mortem cryopreservation should
be made available now, so that those future advancements may be reached. The terminally-ill
patient's interest in achieving cryonic preservation before ailments destroy all hope of reanimation
is legitimate and substantial . When balancing the interests of the individual against the countervailing
interests of the state, the court should consider the particular circumstances surrounding the patient's
request for assistance in achieving clinical death. The right to pre-mortem cryopreservation should be
distinguished from the right to assisted suicide. The terminally-ill cryonicist fervently seeks to extend his
life - there is no suicidal intent. Thus, the state's interests in preserving life and preventing suicide are
not offended. Further, the ethical integrity of the medical profession will not be tarnished by allowing
medical professionals to assist terminally- ill patients in protecting their only chance for survival, no
matter how remote this chance may appear to be. The physician assisting in pre-mortem preservation
should be treated no differently than the brain surgeon who clinically suspends the life of his patient in
order to save his life.236 That doctor knows it is his patient's only chance of survival; the same is true for
the terminally-ill brain cancer patient seeking pre-mortem cryopreservation. Additionally, the concerns
of abuse and manipulation of the elderly that some courts have asserted when denying the right to
assisted suicide are not present here. Rather, the patient is a competent individual, fully aware that his
only option for future survival is immediate preservation. For the above reasons, a patient suffering
from a degenerative brain disease should be granted a constitutional right to assistance in achieving
pre-mortem cryogenic preservation. Denying this right ensures either a prolonged, agonizing death
with absolutely no hope of future life, or a cruder, unassisted form of suicide. No state interest is served
by either of these outcomes. If the state's interest in preserving life is truly compelling, states should
support patients who seek assistance in realizing their only conceivable chance of future life.
Our advocacy establishes a personhood contingency standard for the reanimated that
transcends normative conceptions of identity- this facilitates a consciousness shift
towards collective transhumanism
James J. Hughes 2001 "The Future of Death: Cryonics and the Telos of Liberal Individualism"
http://www.transhumanist.com/volume6/death.htm Hughes holds a doctorate in sociology from the
University of Chicago, where he served as the assistant director of research for the MacLean Center for
Clinical Medical Ethics.
The current definitions of death, worked out twenty years ago to address the technology of the
respirator, are already falling apart. Some are suggesting we dispense with “death” as a unitary marker
of human status, while others are pushing for the recognition of a neocortical standard. The twenty first
century will begin to see a shift toward consciousness and personhood-centered ethics as a means of
dealing not only with brain death, but also with extra-uterine feti, intelligent chimeras, human-machine
cyborgs, and the other new forms of life that we will create with technology. The struggle between
anthropocentrists and biofundamentalists, on the one hand, and transhumanists on the other, will
be fierce . Each proposal for a means of extending human capabilities beyond our “natural” and “Godgiven” limitations, or blurring the boundaries of humanness, will be fought politically and in the courts.
But in the end, because of increasing secularization, the tangible advantages of the new technologies,
and the internal logic of Enlightenment values, I believe we will begin to develop a bioethics that accords
meaning and rights to gradations of self-awareness, regardless of platform. This transformation is
unlikely to cause the cryonically suspended to be automatically reclassified as living however. For
pragmatic reasons, and due to the uncertainty of information loss, the cryonically frozen are likely to
remain dead until proven living. They will be in the status of the soldier missing in action, who has been
thought dead, his wife remarried, his estate settled, who is suddenly rescued by some future nanoRambo. Once there has been tangible proof that the prisoners are still in their camp, there will be a reevaluation of the status of the frozen. Getting frozen will then come to be seen as a plausible alternative
to death, rather than a bizarre way to preserve a corpse. By this point, however, few people will
presumably need to make use of this option. Since this change in the public perception of the status of
the frozen is many decades off, and the frozen will be seen as “dead” in the meantime, cryonics
organizations should focus more attention on collaborating with choice in dying organizations . Most
proposed assisted suicide statues would not allow cryonic suspension as a method. But with secular
trends that support further liberalization, and the growing organization of the majority in support of
assisted suicide, it seems likely that the coming decades will see laws that allow cryonicists to choose
suspension as a part of their “suicide” method. The suggested shift toward a personhood standard for
social policy would dramatically effect the reanimated. A personhood standard would open the
possibility that the legal identity of a reanimated person would be contingent on their recovery of some
threshold of their prior memory and personality. Advance directives of the suspended should address
the question of whether they are interested in repairing and reanimating their brain, even if nanoprobes
or other diagnostic methods suggest that the resulting person will not be them, but some new person.
Finally, I have touched on the truly unpredictable, the equivalent of a bioethical, moral and legal
Singularity: the fundamental problematizing of the self. Once technology has fully teased out the
constituent processes and structures of memory, cognition and personality, and given us control over
them; once we are able to share or sell our skills, personality traits and memories; once some individuals
begin to abandon individuality for new forms of collective identity; then the edifice of Western ethical
thought since the Enlightenment will be in terminal crisis. The political and ethical trends that are
predictable now, as the Enlightenment works towards its telos, will become unpredictable. As
transhumanists work to complete the project of the Enlightenment, the shift to a consciousness-based
standard of law and ethics, we must also prepare political values and social ethics for the era beyond
the discrete, autonomous individual.
Shifting to an information theory of death solves the legal dysfunctions that lead to
cybernetic war
Martine Rothblatt, J.D., Ph.D. 2006"Forms of Transhuman Persons and the Importance of Prior
Resolution of Relevant Law" Volume 1, Issue 1, 1st Quarter
http://www.terasemjournals.org/PCJournal/PC0101/rothblatt_02e.html Rothblatt started the satellite
vehicle tracking and satellite radio industries and is the Chairman of United Therapeutics, a
biotechnology company. She is also the founder of Terasem Movement, Inc.
If it seems as though making the leap to believe in the possibilities of trranshuman persons is too great,
remember that in 1958, it was just as big a leap to cast aside the concept of national sovereignty being
based from the core of the earth and reaching in a cone out into space and replace it with the idea that
national sovereignty ending at some point. Law must evolve with evolving technology. Copernicus’
theory of the earth’s rotation numbered the days of old-school sovereignty. The notion of sovereignty
sweeping out to the cosmos in a fixed cone is rendered irrelevant when we accept that the earth is
rotating on an axis because everybody’s cone would sweep the same sectors of cosmic space. Going all
the way back to Copernicus, the legal artifice of national sovereignty was already becoming illogical. In
the very same way, Turing’s theory of machine consciousness has begun to number the days of oldschool citizenship. Turing asked, what if you could converse with a machine and you couldn’t tell the
difference between conversing with a machine and conversing with a person? Is not that machine as
conscious as the person ? If we don’t evolve law with evolving technology, we will face conflicts of
dysfunctional law. The founders of space law did their best to avoid space conflict (between the US
and the Soviet Union in particular) over conflicts of law. Today, we are not at risk for a war with Russia
over transhuman rights, but could there be a war between humans and transhumans, between flesh
and electronic substrate? That’s certainly a common theme of dystopic[1] science fiction plots and it is
something that we can avoid with prior legal development. How might we do in ten, twenty or fifty
years? Image 8 depicts some possibilities. Certainly, the bigger challenge we undertake, the longer it will
take. A shift to an information theory basis of death is not that big of a change. We just recently made a
big leap in the past century from heart death to brain death. So perhaps this is not that big of a leap. It
may take a relatively short period of time. At the other end of the spectrum is unifying artificial
intelligence and citizenship, which might be a pretty big leap for society to take and may take quite a bit
longer. The time to start the dialogue is now.
Nanotech is inevitable – transhumanism allows safe stewardship that prevents grey
goo
Treder and Phoenix 3 [PUBLISHED JANUARY 2003 — REVISED DECEMBER 2003, “Safe Utilization of
Advanced Nanotechnology”, Chris Phoenix and Mike Treder, Mike Treder, Executive Director of CRN, BS
Biology, University of Washington, Research Fellow with the Institute for Ethics and Emerging
Technologies, a consultant to the Millennium Project of the American Council for the United Nations
University and to the Future Technologies Advisory Group, serves on the Nanotech Briefs Editorial
Advisory Board, is a member of the New York Academy of Sciences and a member of the World Future
Society. AND Chris Phoenix, CRN’s Director of Research, has studied nanotechnology for more than 15
years. BS, Symbolic Systems, MS, Computer Science, Stanford University]
Many words have been written about the dangers of advanced nanotechnology. Most of the
threatening scenarios involve tiny manufacturing systems that run amok, or are used to create
destructive products. A manufacturing infrastructure built around a centrally controlled, relatively large,
self-contained manufacturing system would avoid these problems. A controlled nanofactory would pose
no inherent danger, and it could be deployed and used widely. Cheap, clean, convenient, on-site
manufacturing would be possible without the risks associated with uncontrolled nanotech fabrication
or excessive regulation . Control of the products could be administered by a central authority;
intellectual property rights could be respected. In addition, restricted design software could allow
unrestricted innovation while limiting the capabilities of the final products. The proposed solution
appears to preserve the benefits of advanced nanotechnology while minimizing the most serious risks.
Advanced Nanotechnology And Its Risks As early as 1959, Richard Feynman proposed building devices
with each atom precisely placed1. In 1986, Eric Drexler published an influential book, Engines of
Creation2, in which he described some of the benefits and risks of such a capability. If molecules and
devices can be manufactured by joining individual atoms under computer control, it will be possible to
build structures out of diamond, 100 times as strong as steel; to build computers smaller than a
bacterium; and to build assemblers and mini-factories of various sizes, capable of making complex
products and even of duplicating themselves. Drexler's subsequent book, Nanosystems3, substantiated
these remarkable claims, and added still more. A self-contained tabletop factory could produce its
duplicate in one hour. Devices with moving parts could be incredibly efficient. Molecular manufacturing
operations could be carried out with failure rates less than one in a quadrillion. A computer would
require a miniscule fraction of a watt and one trillion of them could fit into a cubic centimeter.
Nanotechnology-built fractal plumbing would be able to cool the resulting 10,000 watts of waste heat. It
seems clear that if advanced nanotechnology is ever developed, its products will be incredibly powerful.
As soon as molecular manufacturing was proposed, risks associated with it began to be identified.
Engines of Creation2 described one hazard now considered unlikely, but still possible: grey goo. A small
nanomachine capable of replication could in theory copy itself too many times4. If it were capable of
surviving outdoors, and of using biomass as raw material, it could severely damage the environment5.
Others have analyzed the likelihood of an unstable arms race6, and many have suggested economic
upheaval resulting from the widespread use of free manufacturing7. Some have even suggested that the
entire basis of the economy would change, and money would become obsolete8. Sufficiently powerful
products would allow malevolent people, either hostile governments or angry individuals, to wreak
havoc. Destructive nanomachines could do immense damage to unprotected people and objects. If the
wrong people gained the ability to manufacture any desired product, they could rule the world, or cause
massive destruction in the attempt9. Certain products, such as vast surveillance networks, powerful
aerospace weapons, and microscopic antipersonnel devices, provide special cause for concern. Grey goo
is relevant here as well: an effective means of sabotage would be to release a hard-to-detect robot that
continued to manufacture copies of itself by destroying its surroundings. Clearly, the unrestricted
availability of advanced nanotechnology poses grave risks, which may well outweigh the benefits of
clean, cheap, convenient, self-contained manufacturing. As analyzed in Forward to the Future:
Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy10, some restriction is likely to be necessary. However, as was
also pointed out in that study, an excess of restriction will enable the same problems by increasing the
incentive for covert development of advanced nanotechnology. That paper considered regulation on a
one-dimensional spectrum, from full relinquishment to complete lack of restriction. As will be shown
below, a two-dimensional understanding of the problem—taking into account both control of nanotech
manufacturing capability and control of its products—allows targeted restrictions to be applied,
minimizing the most serious risks while preserving the potential benefits.
Grey goo development causes extinction
April Freitas 2000 “Some Limits to Global Ecophagy by Biovorous Nanoreplicators, with Public Policy
Recommendations,” Foresight Institute, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Molecular
Manufacturing, J.D. from Santa Clara University, authoring the multi-volume text Nanomedicine, the
first book-length technical discussion of the potential medical applications of hypothetical molecular
nanotechnology and medical nanorobotics, 2009 recipient of the Feynman Prize in Nanotechnology for
Theory
Perhaps the earliest-recognized and best-known danger of molecular nanotechnology is the risk that
self-replicating nanorobots capable of functioning autonomously in the natural environment could
quickly convert that natural environment (e.g., "biomass") into replicas of themselves (e.g., "nanomass")
on a global basis, a scenario usually referred to as the "gray goo problem" but perhaps more properly
termed "global ecophagy." As Drexler first warned in Engines of Creation [2]: "Plants" with "leaves" no
more efficient than today's solar cells could out-compete real plants, crowding the biosphere with an
inedible foliage. Tough omnivorous "bacteria" could out-compete real bacteria: They could spread like
blowing pollen, replicate swiftly, and reduce the biosphere to dust in a matter of days. Dangerous
replicators could easily be too tough, small, and rapidly spreading to stop - at least if we make no
preparation. We have trouble enough controlling viruses and fruit flies. Among the cognoscenti of
nanotechnology, this threat has become known as the "gray goo problem." Though masses of
uncontrolled replicators need not be gray or gooey, the term "gray goo" emphasizes that replicators
able to obliterate life might be less inspiring than a single species of crabgrass. They might be superior in
an evolutionary sense, but this need not make them valuable. The gray goo threat makes one thing
perfectly clear: We cannot afford certain kinds of accidents with replicating assemblers. Gray goo
would surely be a depressing ending to our human adventure on Earth, far worse than mere fire or
ice, and one that could stem from a simple laboratory accident. Lederberg [3] notes that the microbial
world is evolving at a fast pace, and suggests that our survival may depend upon embracing a "more
microbial point of view." The emergence of new infectious agents such as HIV and Ebola demonstrates
that we have as yet little knowledge of how natural or technological disruptions to the environment
might trigger mutations in known organisms or unknown extant organisms [81], producing a limited
form of "green goo" [92].
Extinction in 72 hours
Mark Pesce, BS Candidate at MIT, October, 1999, “Thinking Small,” FEED Magazine,
http://hyperreal.org/~mpesce/ThinkingSmall.html
The nanoassembler is the Holy Grail of nanotechnology; once a perfected nanoassembler is available,
almost anything becomes possible – which is both the greatest hope and biggest fear of the
nanotechnology community. Sixty years ago, John Von Neumann – who, along with Alan Turing founded
the field of computer science – surmised that it would someday be possible to create machines that
could copy themselves, a sort of auto-duplication which could lead from a single instance to a whole
society of perfect copies. Although such a Von Neumann machine is relatively simple in theory, such a
device has never been made – because it’s far easier, at the macromolecular scale, to build a copy of a
machine than it is to get the machine to copy itself. At the molecular level, this balance is reversed; it’s
far easier to get a nanomachine to copy itself than it is to create another one from scratch. This is an
enormous boon – once you have a single nanoassembler you can make as many as you might need – but
it also means that a nanoassembler is the perfect plague. If – either intentionally or through accident
– a nanoassembler were released into the environment, with only the instruction to be fruitful and
multiply, the entire surface of the planet – plants, animals and even rocks - would be reduced to a
“gray goo” of such nanites in little more than 72 hours. This “gray goo problem”, well known in
nanotechnology acts as a check against the unbounded optimism which permeates scientific
developments in atomic-scale devices. Drexler believes the gray goo problem mostly imaginary, but
does admit the possibility of a “gray dust” scenario, in which replicating nanites “smother” the Earth in a
blanket of sub-microscopic forms. In either scenario, the outcome is much the same. And here we
encounter a technological danger unprecedented in history: If we had stupidly blown ourselves to
kingdom come in a nuclear apocalypse, at least the cockroaches would have survived. But in a gray
goo scenario, nothing – not even the bacteria deep underneath the ground – would be untouched.
Everything would become one thing: a monoculture of nanites.
Transhumanism solves the human condition
Nick Bostrom 2009 “IN DEFENSE OF POSTHUMAN DIGNITY"
http://www.psy.vanderbilt.edu/courses/hon182/Posthuman_dignity_Bostrom.pdf Nick Bostrom is a
Swedish philosopher at St. Cross College, University of Oxford known for his work on existential risk, the
anthropic principle, human enhancement ethics, the reversal test, and consequentialism. He holds a
PhD from the London School of Economics (2000). He is the founding director of both The Future of
Humanity Institute and the Oxford Martin Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology as part of
the Oxford Martin School at Oxford University.
The prospect of posthumanity is feared for at least two reasons. One is that the state of being
posthuman might in itself be degrading, so that by becoming posthuman we might be harming
ourselves. Another is that posthumans might pose a threat to “ordinary” humans. (I shall set aside a
third possible reason, that the development of posthumans might offend some supernatural being.) The
most prominent bioethicist to focus on the first fear is Leon Kass: Most of the given bestowals of nature
have their given species-specified natures: they are each and all of a given sort. Cockroaches and
humans are equally bestowed but differently natured. To turn a man into a cockroach—as we don’t
need Kafka to show us—would be dehumanizing. To try to turn a man into more than a man might be so
as well. We need more than generalized appreciation for nature’s gifts. We need a particular regard and
respect for the special gift that is our own given nature.5 Transhumanists counter that nature’s gifts
are sometimes poisoned and should not always be accepted. Cancer, malaria, dementia, aging,
starvation, unnecessary suffering, cognitive shortcomings are all among the presents that we wisely
refuse. Our own species-specified natures are a rich source of much of the thoroughly unrespectable
and unacceptable—susceptibility for disease, murder, rape, genocide, cheating, torture, racism. The
horrors of nature in general and of our own nature in particular are so well documented6 that it is
astonishing that somebody as distinguished as Leon Kass should still in this day and age be tempted to
rely on the natural as a guide to what is desirable or normatively right. We should be grateful that our
ancestors were not swept away by the Kassian sentiment, or we would still be picking lice off each
other’s backs. Rather than deferring to the natural order, transhumanists maintain that we can
legitimately reform ourselves and our natures in accordance with humane values and personal
aspirations.
Meta-analysis of behavioral studies indicate evolutionary tendencies lie at the root of
all human violence
Mohammed Tadesse 2006, “The Fundamental Causes of Armed Conflict in Human History:
Reinterpretation of Available Sources,” Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern
Africa, Ph.D, Harayama University
Through a long process of cultural development, human beings are able to score remarkable
achievements in their life. However, people are still unable to avoid conflicts of violent /armed
character, which are destructive in their nature. Archaeological findings, anthropological interpretations
and historical records indicate that people have been engaged in armed conflicts since the prehistoric
period. Naturally, the following questions may ensue: What is the nature of this phenomenon? What are
the roots and responsible causes of waging limitless destructive wars without interruption? Why are
people not in a position to overcome conflicts of armed nature for the last time? Although it seems too
ambitious, the paper tries to deal with this crucial problem, which indiscriminately affects all. In all
periods of human history, armed conflict has been an important issue of intellectual debate. Great
thinkers, politicians, historians, theologians, military theoreticians, and behavioural scientists have
exerted maximum efforts to examine and explain the nature of the problem from different perspectives.
However, their findings are diversified and influenced by different factors. Some of the conclusions
made by these experts have also led their audiences to a muddle. Therefore, it is essential to re-examine
the problem for three major reasons: i) Curiosity to learn about the nature and causes of the problem;
ii) Misdiagnosis of the nature, sources and/or causes of armed conflict by experts and non-experts; and
iii) Unwillingness on the part of the world to learn from its tragic history. The study tries to analyse the
following questions: Is violent / armed conflict an eternal phenomenon that cannot be controlled or a
social phenomenon that can be controlled? What are the fundamental causes of armed conflicts in the
history of humankind? Hence, attempt is made to: a) Re-examine different approaches and theories of
scholars in explaining the nature and course of armed conflict; b) Reinterpret the nature of armed
conflict in human history, whether it is an innate genetic characteristic of human beings, a social
construct or determined and moulded by both; and c) Enrich the existing knowledge on the matter and
probably provide some valuable conceptual explanations to the problem. The problem is mainly
conceptual in nature, which dictates the method of collecting and analysing the data. Thus, the paper
uses a body of concepts from behavioural sciences to apply a thematic approach and scientific methods
and techniques, which enable to look for evidences, describe the nature and causes of the problem, and
formulate broad statements. The paper uses secondary sources of multidisciplinary character (findings
of biology, psychology, anthropology, archaeology, relevant historical and other social science
theoretical books, thesis, articles, religious books, etc.). Based on the available materials, the researcher
has reviewed and classified different views of scholars regarding the nature of aggressive behaviour in
general and armed conflict in particular. Finally, the data is analysed using a descriptive method of
study. The findings are as follows: 1. On the nature of armed conflicts: i) the evolutionary
development of human intelligence is the primary responsible factor (under conditions) for the origin
of aggressiveness in human behaviour, which gradually planted the culture of war in the history of
humankind. ii) The present state of human warrior culture is inevitable and a continuous process of
evolutionally development and it remains part of human life for a long period. 2. On the causes of
armed conflict: Conflicts of violent/armed character are not products of a single factor. Conflicts result
from the denial or ignoring or suppression of human biological as well as socio- psychological
(ontological) needs. Just for the sake of simplicity, the paper classifies the responsible motives, needs, or
causes of armed conflict into fundamental and specific causes: i) The fundamental causes, which are
common for all violent conflicts, are grouped into primary and secondary sources. a) Under primary
source of fundamental character come: - Human nature - Socio-psychological needs - Economic factors
b) Under secondary source of fundamental character come: - Politics and - Culture (the presence of
warrior tradition) ii) Specific causes. Each war that had taken place in different periods of human history
has its own specific causes of functional character. The specific causes of certain wars may not be the
responsible causes for the other and /or all spoils of wars. In one way or the other, specific causes also
belong to the fundamental causes. Let us see some of the conflicting events of historical character that
can be marked as specific causes, which were used to: ¬ Adopt strangers (assimilation); ¬ Enslave
others; ¬ Enlarge territory; ¬ Colonize; ¬ Achieve unification; ¬ Establish sphere of influence; ¬ Settle
border conflict; ¬ Separate from the main historical nation-state; ¬ Achieve irredentism, etc. The
following initiatives can be taken as possible options to maintain relative security before the outbreak of
armed conflict, and if not, to minimize the destruction: 1. Human beings, by their nature of evolutionary
development, do not possess the ability to avoid conflicts forever and to maintain peaceful life for the
last time. But the findings of this research confirm the possibility of either delaying the development of
the responsible factors for the origin of armed conflict and/ or minimizing its all round destruction. This
is viable only if the concerned bodies are able to diagnose the sources of armed conflict and take all
preventive -measures, which also include maintaining reasonable force of defence and balance of power
in their respective areas. Hence, there should not be any magnanimity to disarm the nation unilaterally;
2. Although the paper needs further investigation, it can be used for: - Enriching the theoretical basis
and help others to study related topics of specific character - Differentiating the "rational" from the
"accidental" causes of violent conflicts
No risk of a turn because technology to destroy the world already exists- means
there’s only a chance that transhumanism solves extinction by eliminating the drive
for violence
Mark Walker 2009 “Ship of Fools: Why Transhumanism is the Best Bet to Prevent the Extinction of
Civilization ,” The Global Spiral, Feb 5,
http://www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10682/Default.aspx Walker is an assistant professor
at New Mexico State University and holds the Richard L. Hedden Chair of Advanced Philosophical Studies
This line of thinking is further reinforced when we consider that there is a limit to the downside of
creating posthumans , at least relatively speaking. That is, one of the traditional concerns about
increasing knowledge is that it seems to always imply an associated risk for greater destructive capacity.
One way this point is made is in terms of ‘killing capacity’: muskets are a more powerful technology than
a bow and arrow, and tanks more powerful than muskets, and atomic bombs even more destructive
than tanks. The knowledge that made possible these technical advancements brought a concomitant
increase in capacity for evil. Interestingly, we have almost hit the wall in our capacity for evil: once you
have civilization destroying weapons there is not much worse you can do. There is a point in which the
one-upmanship for evil comes to an end—when everyone is dead. If you will forgive the somewhat
graphic analogy, it hardly matters to Kennedy if his head is blown off with a rifle or a cannon. Likewise, if
A has a weapon that can kill every last person there is little difference between that and B’s weapon
which is twice as powerful. Posthumans probably won’t have much more capacity for evil than we have,
or are likely to have shortly. So, at least in terms of how many persons can be killed, posthumans will not
outstrip us in this capacity. This is not to say that there are no new worries with the creation of
posthumans, but the greatest evil, the destruction of civilization, is something which we now, or will
soon, have. In other words, the most significant aspect that we should focus on with contemplating the
creation of posthumans is their upside. They are not likely to distinguish themselves in their capacity
for evil , since we have already pretty much hit the wall on that, but for their capacity for good.
Debating the issues surrounding transhumanism is essential because the coming
technology can and will redefine our very nature
Liz Klimas 2013 "‘Transhumanist Movement’ Is Coming: The Ethical Dilemma Posed by Rapidly
Advancing Technology" http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/02/06/transhumanist-movement-iscoming-the-ethical-dilemma-posed-by-rapidly-advancing-technology/ Klimas graduated from Hillsdale
College with a Bachelor of Science, she also has interned for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) and the Association for Women in Science.
“Technology is fire. If you can control it, it’s great. If it controls you, you’re in trouble.” This was the
theme of the latest episode of the Glenn Beck program on TheBlaze TV. Sure, some technology and
ideas Beck showcased on his show Wednesday night might sound crazy and remind you of a science
fiction flick — Beck himself acknowledges this — but they’re not, he said. Take drones for example.
There was a time when people couldn’t imagine the capabilities of an unmanned aerial vehicle. Now
such drones are being used in strikes against hostile adversaries, which Beck said is good. But just this
week a memo from the Obama administration said U.S. citizens could be subject to drone strikes if they
are a “senior operational” leader of al-Qaeda or “an associated force.” “The president is using drones
right now and nobody is really talking about the ethics of this,” Beck said on the show. “We should have
seen this day coming but we didn’t. At least as a society, we didn’t.” It is the conversation about the
ethics of use of what might now seem like science fiction that Beck says has happen. “It’s not the app,
it’s not the gun, it’s not the drone, it’s what you do with it,” he said. Part of the ethical issue regarding
the use of technology that Beck has focused upon at length is the transhumanist movement. The
groundwork for merging the human body with machines to the point where the concept of the
Singularity would be reached, an idea strongly supported by futurist Ray Kurzweil, is well on its way.
Beck pointed to the recent breakthrough of 3D-printed human embryonic stem cells that scientists hope
will someday allow for 3D-printed organs. He noted a “million dollar bionic man” named Rex that is
outfitted with technology to hear, speak, move and even has artificial organs. So if humans are fixing
their physical beings to live longer, as they already are today in many respects, how will this affect
society? As an example, Beck called up how soldiers are being mended and returning home physically
fixed to an extent, but their internal scars are not being addressed. The recent shooting of acclaimed
sniper Chris Kyle and his friend Chad Littlefield by a Marine reservist who reportedly had PTSD is an
example. Another question if humans are to live longer is if the Earth will be able to support that. In
another example, Beck highlighted a water purification system called Slingshot by Deka that can make
clean drinking water from any, and we mean, any liquid. If this product were to be made smaller and
more cost-effective, millions of people would be saved from conditions that result from a lack of potable
drinking water. But some have been saying for years that the Earth is reaching a “tipping point” with
regard to its growing population and that more growth would cause “severe impacts” on quality of life.
Beck posed the moral dilemma regarding whether this machine would even get to the people who need
it based on this argument of finite resources and global warming. And what of the human mind?
Kurzweil’s ideas are that humans will not only augment their organs and other physical features with
technology but their minds as well. Technology is on its way for computers to begin reading our minds.
Take the soon-to-be-released MindMeld app. MindMeld” from Expect Labs is described by San
Francisco-based founders as an “always on Siri,” according to Technology Review. Here’s more from
about how the app works: Users can sign up or log in through Facebook and hold free video or voice
calls with up to eight people through the app. If a participant taps on a button in the app during a call,
MindMeld will review the previous 15 to 30 seconds of conversation by relying on Nuance’s voice
recognition technology. It will identify key terms in context—in a discussion to find a sushi restaurant,
for example, or one about a big news story that day—and then search Google News, Facebook, Yelp,
YouTube, and a few other sources for relevant results. Images and links are displayed in a stream for the
person who tapped the button to review. With a finger swipe, he or she can choose to share a result
with others on the call. Furthermore, where will the line between “what is life and what isn’t?” be
drawn, Beck asked. “ We’re in trouble, but the future is bright if we go in with open eyes ,” he said. ”If
we lose the concept of the soul and become the creator at the same time, what does the phrase ‘we’re
all endowed by our creator with certain unalienable rights’ mean?” Have we past the point of no return?
Yale computer science professor David Gelernter, who was a guest on Wednesday’s show, used paint as
an example to illustrate his point. He said paint has changed over centuries and has improved, but has
the human artist exponentially gotten better? No, because human nature itself hasn’t changed,
Gelernter said. Still, the ethical discussion about technology coming down the pike is important now
none the less, because it could reach a point where it might be used to alter human nature itself.
“We have to talk about technology — the good side and the bad side,” Beck continued. “We need to
have the moral and ethical debate.”