Trinity River Federal Levee System
Emergency Action Plan
City of Dallas
II.
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The purpose of this Emergency Action Plan (EAP) is to establish procedures to be followed in
the event of an emergency associated with the Trinity River Federal Levee System along the
Trinity River. This Levee System consists of the Dallas Floodway East and West Levees, the
Central Wastewater Treatment Plant (CWWTP) Levee, and the Rochester Levee. An emergency
situation could be triggered by an unusually large storm or earthquake, malicious human
activity such as sabotage, vandalism or terrorism, or failures of the levee system that may be in
the form of slides due to embankment failure, boils due to underground seepage, breaches, or
pump station outages. This EAP is intended to be a dynamic document, continually improved.
The City of Dallas seeks to have a plan that will be clearly understood, practical, and useful if
emergencies that endanger lives and property should develop. This EAP should be used in
situations related to the Trinity River Federal River Levee System concurrently with the City of
Dallas Master Emergency Operating Plan (MEOP) as several of the Annexes are referenced in
this document.
A copy of this report will be distributed to all involved agencies and City of Dallas departments.
Additionally, a GIS database is included that contains all geospatial information, such as
evacuation routes and shelter locations, developed for this EAP.
This EAP outlines responsibilities and procedures which:
 Identify actions recommended to be taken for different emergency levels beginning
with notification flowcharts.
 Identifies the roles responsible parties will take to alert, evacuate, and transport citizens
to safe locations.
 Identifies the critical areas where emergency response personnel will be needed to
evacuate the population if Emergency Level 3 is reached.
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Trinity River Federal Levee System
Emergency Action Plan
City of Dallas
III.
PROJECT SITE DESCRIPTION
The Trinity River Federal Levee System consists of the following levees:
 Dallas Floodway East Levee (East Levee)
 Dallas Floodway West Levee (West Levee)
 Central Wastewater Treatment Plant (CWWTP) Levee
 Rochester Levee
These levees, displayed in Figure 1, are located within the City of Dallas, Dallas County, Texas.
Figure 1A shows the zoning classification for land in areas protected by the levees. Figure 1B
shows the floodplain data from the 2007 Dallas County Preliminary Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) Digital Flood Insurance Rate Map (DFIRM) Database (Reference
1).
The following descriptions of each levee are referenced from the Levee Remediation Plan Draft
Report by HNTB, dated February 8, 2010 (Reference 2).
Dallas Floodway East Levee (East Levee)
The East Levee (11.7 miles) extends from river miles 497.9 to 505.5 of the Trinity River and 3.8
miles along the Elm Fork and Bachman Branch. The downstream end of the East Levee includes
a portion referred to as the East Tie-back Levee which runs in a northeast-southwest direction
and incorporates two closure gates, one across an access road and one across an active double
railroad track, as well as a concrete floodwall. The crest width of the East Levee is
approximately 16 feet. The levee side slopes for the East Levee are approximately 3:1 on the
flood side upstream of the Continental Bridge, 4:1 downstream of the Continental Bridge and
3:1 to 4:1 on the land side. The East Levee begins near Cockrell Avenue and the DART Rail line
and ends upstream between Interstate 35E and Harry Hines Boulevard just north of Regal Row
(Reference 2).
Dallas Floodway West Levee (West Levee)
The West Levee (10.9 miles) extends from river miles 498.1 to 505.5 of the Trinity River and 3.6
miles along the West Fork and Mountain Creek. The crest width of the west levee is
approximately 16 feet. The levee side slopes for the West Levee are approximately 3:1 on the
flood side upstream of the Continental Bridge, 4:1 downstream of the Continental Bridge and
3:1 to 4:1 on the land side. The West Levee begins near the DART Rail and ends upstream just
south of Interstate 30 at Loop 12 (Reference 2).
Central Wastewater Treatment Plant Levee (CWWTP Levee)
The CWWTP Levee System (2.5 miles) is located downstream of the West Levee. The CWWTP
Levee surrounds the plant; it is a circular levee that begins and ends at the plant entrance off of
Sargent Road. The width of the crest is typically 15 feet. The levee side slopes are
approximately 4:1 on the flood side as well as the land side (Reference 2).
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Emergency Action Plan
City of Dallas
Rochester Levee
The Rochester Levee (2.9 miles) is located downstream of the East Levee. US Highway 175 is
located to the north and State Highway 310 is located to the west. To the south, the levee is
adjacent to Rochester Park, a large area that is undeveloped and wooded since it is very close
to the confluence of White Rock Creek. The Rochester Levee includes six gate closures, three
railroad crossings and three roadway crossings, as well as a sheet pile floodwall and a
mechanically stabilized earth (MSE) retaining wall. The crest width of the levee is
approximately 15 feet. The levee side slopes are generally 4.5:1 on the flood side and 4:1 on
the land side. The Rochester Levee begins near the intersection of Haven and Lamar Streets,
wraps around Rochester Park and ends near Railroad Avenue and Highway 175 (Reference 2).
Overview of Inundation Area
The potential levee breach inundation area is that area designated on the Dallas County Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Digital Flood Insurance Rate Maps (DFIRMs) as the
Shaded Zone X – Protected by Levee Floodplain. Levee breach analysis has not been performed
for any of the levee systems. The areas on the land side of the East Levee are primarily
industrial centers and businesses including the Dallas Central Business District. The West Levee
primarily protects residential areas in Oak Cliff and West Dallas. The CWWTP Levee protects
the plant, and the Rochester Levee protects residences, businesses, Rhoads Terrace Park, and
City of Dallas Service Center.
The residential population estimates shown in Figure 1 were calculated for the areas within the
polygons labeled “Levee Failure Potential Affected Areas” using 2000 Census data. These
polygons are larger than the FEMA Shaded Zone X areas to include areas that are also at risk of
being flooded by a levee failure due to ground elevations approximately the same or lower than
the ground elevations in the Shaded Zone X Floodplain. For example, the Union Pacific Railroad
was selected as the southern boundary of the West Levee’s inundation area because the
ground north of it has very similar elevations as those found within the Shaded Zone X
Floodplain.
Census data taken in the year 2000 is the best available residential population count data. An
approximate residential population count was obtained by using census blocks in the affected
areas. Residential population is not the only group at risk behind the levees though. Due to the
number of people that work behind the levees, the population count may vary for different
times of the day. Business population estimates were provided by the Office of Economic
Development based on 2008 US Census Local Employment Dynamics (LED). Further
information is provided in Section VI. Flood Emergency Preparedness, Part A. Population at Risk.
The land use classifications, whether commercial/industrial, Multi-Family Residential (MFR), or
Single-Family Residential (SFR), were found using 2009 Dallas Central Appraisal District (DCAD)
data that accurately reflects a parcel’s zoning classification.
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Emergency Action Plan
City of Dallas
IV. EMERGENCY DETECTION, EVALUATION, AND CLASSIFICATION
A.
EMERGENCY DETECTION
The Trinity Watershed Management (TWM) Department’s Flood Control Division (Flood
Control) is responsible for detection of problems that may lead to emergencies as part of
their general Operation & Maintenance (O&M) tasks for the levee system. Flood Control
personnel’s ability to detect hazardous situations is in large part due to their familiarization
with normal operating conditions and experience performing repairs of the levees. The
information below is provided to assist the City of Dallas in determining the appropriate
emergency level for events that are outside the range of normal operation and
maintenance procedures. The classification of emergencies will initiate more detailed
communication between departments to describe the severity of the event.
In addition to Flood Control personnel, unusual or emergency events at or near the levees
may be detected by government personnel (local, state or federal), landowners, or the
public. All reports of an unusual or emergency event should be verified by Flood Control.
When emergency conditions are developing, Flood Control will begin coordinating with
TWM to address the situation. For additional guidance on operations and repairs, TWM
will contact the USACE Fort Worth District Engineer. USACE contact information is
available in the Notification Flowcharts in Section I and the Communications Plan included
in Appendix A.
Events that may create emergency situations include natural precipitation events and
operating malfunctions. Significant events include heavy rain, long-duration storms,
frequent storms, and winter storms. In addition, during heavy rainfall events, reservoirs
upstream of the Trinity River in the City of Dallas may be releasing flood flows. The rate at
which Trinity River flood levels rise may vary considerably and will affect the potential
emergency level. Operation malfunctions of pump station equipment or entire pump
stations may occur and lead to flooding on the landside of the levees. Pump station failures
may not directly affect the levees but pose severe flooding risk that Flood Control must
address as part of operations of the levee system. Although earthquakes and acts of
terrorism would be rare events, it is possible that such events may damage the levees.
Flood Control strives to maintain the levee system’s ability to protect lives and property in
Dallas during flood and other emergencies by monitoring and performing O&M procedures
daily.
B.
EMERGENCY LEVEL EVALUATION
Emergencies are classified according to their severity and urgency. Once an unusual
occurrence or emergency level is detected and verified, the City of Dallas, TWM
Department is responsible for classifying the event into one of the following three
emergency levels. Immediate implementation of remedial actions may delay, moderate,
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Trinity River Federal Levee System
Emergency Action Plan
City of Dallas
or prevent the failure of the levees. Several adverse or unusual conditions listed in Section
C below may be affecting the levees at the same time, requiring implementation of several
modes of remedial actions. Close monitoring of the levees must be maintained to confirm
the success of any remedial actions performed.
Emergency Level 1 – Non-Failure Concern
This classification indicates a situation is developing; for example, a storm comparable
to the 1-percent-annual-chance storm is expected. In the Dallas area, the 1-percentannual-chance design storm is characterized by approximately 9.5 inches of rainfall in
24-hours. However, smaller, frequent storms may produce similar flooding conditions
to the 1-percent-annual-chance design storm. The conditions of the levees should be
closely monitored, especially during storm events, to detect any development of a
potential or imminent levee failure situation.
The communications plan for Emergency Level 1 should be implemented to alert key
personnel and check readiness of all equipment and facilities. See Notification
Flowcharts in Section 1 and the Emergency Level 1 Communications Plan in Appendix A.
Emergency Level 2 – Potential Failure Concern
This classification indicates a developing situation that could result in levee failure. An
Emergency Level 2 Condition is applicable when the water level is rising and the levees
may potentially be overtopped, there is a breach in the levee embankment that will
cause flooding, or severe flooding exists in the interior drainage district due to pump
station failure. Emergency services of the Police and Fire-Rescue Departments should
be on alert to initiate evacuations or road closures if flooding concerns increase.
The communications plan for Emergency Level 2 shall be implemented to alert the
population in the potential inundation zone. See Notification Flowcharts in Section I
and the Emergency Level 2 Communications Plan in Appendix A.
If the levee conditions worsen and failure becomes imminent, OEM must be notified
immediately of the change in the emergency level to evacuate citizens within the
potential inundation zone.
Emergency Level 3 – URGENT – Levee Failure Imminent
This classification is an extremely urgent situation when a levee failure is imminent or
has occurred and cannot be prevented. Flash flooding will occur adjacent to the levees.
The City of Dallas, and other entities such as the Red Cross, will be tasked to work
together to provide timely assistance to the population at risk. The Communications
Plan for Emergency Level 3 shall be implemented. See Notification Flowcharts in Section
I and the Communications Plan in Appendix A.
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Trinity River Federal Levee System
Emergency Action Plan
City of Dallas
C.
GUIDANCE FOR DETERMINING THE EMERGENCY LEVEL CLASSIFICATION
Patrolling of the levees is initiated and continued when the Trinity River United States
Geological Survey (USGS) Commerce Street gage is at 30 feet or more. Appropriate
advance measures will be taken to ensure the availability of adequate labor and materials
to meet emergencies. During flood periods, the levees shall be patrolled continuously to
locate possible sand boils, sloughing or slides, scour and erosion, or potential overtopping.
Table 1, Guide to Determining Emergency Level Classification is provided for assistance in
determining the emergency level for various situations.
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Trinity River Federal Levee System
Emergency Action Plan
City of Dallas
Table 1 - Guide for Determining Emergency Level Classification
Event
Situation
Pump Station
Failure*
A pump station is down and electricity will be restored within 2-3 hours. The Trinity River
level is low and gravity gates will suffice.
A pump station fails during a storm and more rain is in the forecast. Power outage will not be
restored within 2-3 hours.
A pump station fails and water level in the sumps is close to critical elevation. Forecast
shows more rain.
A pump station is down when sumps are not yet high but rain continues and power will likely
not be restored within 3 hours.
During a rain event, a pump station sustains damage that cannot be quickly fixed and more
rain is predicted.
Approximately 5-10 scattered, shallow slides have occurred and rain is in the forecast.
Approximately 20 shallow slides have occurred after a severe storm and more rain is in the
forecast.
Two slides occur in approximately the same location on the riverside and landside of a levee.
Sloughing Two slides occur almost across from each other on the riverside and landside of a levee and
Slides
severe rain is in the forecast.
Sudden or rapidly increasing slides of the embankment slopes.
A slide forms into the crest of a levee during a storm and the Trinity River water level is
expected to reach the slide.
Desiccation cracks in the embankment that are 2-3” wide and 6 feet in depth and rain is in the
Desiccation
forecast.
Cracks
Sand boil observed discharging clear water.
Boils
Sand boil observed with rapid flow rate increase and cloudy discharge.
Moderate amount of turbulence and scour is slowly eroding the embankment. Initiate close
Scour
monitoring of scour site.
Trinity River level is 10 feet below the crown and more rain is forecasted. Close monitoring
Overtopping** of low spots along the levee will be conducted.
Trinity River level is within 5 feet of the crown and more rain is forecasted.
Measureable earthquake felt or reported within 50 miles of the levees.
Earthquake
Earthquake resulted in visible damage to the levees.
Verified bomb threat that, if carried out, could result in damage to the levees.
Detonated bomb has resulted in damage to the levees.
Security
Threat
Detonated bomb resulted in damage to the levees during a severe rainfall event or heavy rain
is forecasted.
Damage to levees that resulted in some seepage flow.
Vandalism
Damage to levees that resulted in uncontrolled water release during severe storm event
Part of the levee breaks away leaving a large opening for water to flood the land protected by
the levee. A levee breach may be caused by severe slides, seepage, boils, overtopping,
Breach
earthquakes, security threats, or vandalism.
Emergency Level 1: Non-failure Concern; Unusual Event; Slow Developing Situation; Flooding Condition
Emergency Level 2: Potential Failure Concern; Possible Levee Failure – Situation rapidly developing
Emergency Level 3: Urgent – Levee Failure Imminent
Emergency
Level
Level 1
Level 2
Level 2
Level 2
Level 2
Level 1
Level 2
Level 2
Level 3
Level 2
Level 3
Level 1
Level 1
Level 3
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 1
Level 2
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 1
Level 3
Level 3
*The City of Dallas has an agreement with electric providers stating that the pump stations are a Priority One
Facility during power outages and will be restored first (within 2-3 hours) along with hospitals and other critical
facilities. Flood Control will contact electric providers if there are power outages at any pump station. In
addition, pump stations have generators, and Flood Control has a fuel truck to supply fuel.
** See Figure 2 – Identified Levee Low Points for Priority Sand-Bagging in Overtopping Scenario
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Trinity River Federal Levee System
Emergency Action Plan
City of Dallas
D. EXAMPLES OF EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
Emergency actions for two levee failure scenarios are included below. A detailed levee
breach analysis has not been performed as part of this EAP.
EMERGENCY EXAMPLE #1 – WEST LEVEE BREACH
This example assumes a levee breach at station 301+00 on the West Levee, which
corresponds to location approximately 900 feet east of Westmoreland Road. At this station
the levee has the lowest protection as compared to the Standard Project Flood (SPF)
(Reference 3). The levee crown is 1.6 feet lower than the SPF elevation. Assume that
prolonged rainfall has caused a levee slide into the crown at station 301+00 and significant
wave action and rises in the Trinity River water surface elevation cause a levee breach.
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Trinity River Federal Levee System
Emergency Action Plan
City of Dallas
Assumptions
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
An SPF flood is occurring. The rate at which the Trinity River may rise is approximately
0.7 feet per hour.
When the Trinity River reaches 30 feet on the USGS gage at Commerce Street, it is
approximately 33 feet below the levee crown at Commerce Street. Assuming that it is
32 feet below the crown of the levee at station 301+00, the Trinity River will need to rise
17 feet before it is approximately 15 feet below the levee crown at station 301+00.
Thus it will take approximately 24 hours or 1 day for the Trinity River to rise 17 feet at
this rate.
Strong erosion near the levee crown and the extended rainfall will initially cause a
breach at station 301+00.
The overtopping at station 301+00 will increase erosion and the overtopping zone will
extend approximately 300 feet between stations 298+00 and station 301+00.
Event Outline
Monday 17:00 hours: TWM Field Observers are monitoring the levee system during a heavy
storm. Flood Control notifies the USACE Fort Worth District Engineer when the USGS gage
at Commerce Street reaches 30 feet.
The weather forecast information indicates that
rainfall will continue. At this point, an emergency situation is not occurring. O&M
Guidelines are being implemented
Tuesday 17:00 hours: 24 hours or 1 day has passed since the Trinity River reached 30 feet at
the USGS Commerce Street Gage. The Trinity River is 15 feet below the crown of the levee.
TWM determines that a Level 1 Emergency is occurring.
Level 1 Emergency Response

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TWM notifies the USACE Fort Worth Office District Engineer and OEM
Flood Control informs and places its personnel on standby. Flood Control checks the
status of equipment and supplies. Additional earth-filled sacks are filled. Flood
Control continues to monitor the levees.
OEM contacts the Police, Fire-Rescue, and Street Services Departments to alert them
of the situation.
Using Reverse 911, OEM contacts the special needs facilities located in the area
protected by the West Levee. Refer to Emergency Level 1 Communications Plan in
Appendix 1. OEM asks special needs facility staff if they may need transportation
assistance in case an evacuation is needed.
OEM notifies sources of transportation (Dallas Independent School District, DART,
and Greyhound Bus Lines Company) of situation.
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Trinity River Federal Levee System
Emergency Action Plan
City of Dallas
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The Police Department reviews its evacuation and traffic control plans for all
evacuation zones on the West Levee. Police Department notifies law enforcement
units of emergency.
Streets Department checks on the status of the routes. Streets Department cancels
paving repair work on Bernal Drive in Evacuation Zone WL-3 that is scheduled to
start early the next day. Streets Department also checks the availability of its
supplies including barricades.
Police and Fire-Rescue Dispatch issue a warning to affected residents using Reverse
911. Citizens who wish to evacuate early as a precaution will have ample time to
organize and evacuate safely.
Wednesday 00:00 Hours: TWM notifies OEM that a Level 2 Emergency is occurring because
the Trinity River has risen to a level of 10 feet below the crown of the levee.
Level 2 Emergency Response
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Flood Control closely monitors low spots along the levee that may be overtopped
including the area near station 301+00. Personnel are deployed to low spot areas
with equipment and supplies that will be needed to top the levee crown if it
becomes necessary. Refer Appendix C, Figure 2 – Indentified Levee Low Points for
Priority Sand-Bagging in Overtopping Scenario.
TWM updates the USACE Fort Worth District Engineer on the situation including the
condition of the levees, the rate of water level rise, and weather conditions.
The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is activated and senior level personnel from
the Police, Fire-Rescue, and Street Services Departments staff join OEM staff.
OEM increases public warnings in addition to Reverse 911 by requesting
broadcasters to disseminate Emergency Alert System (EAC) broadcasts, issue news
through cable override, and send special news advisories to radio, television, and
cable news stations. OEM provides the media with the evacuation routes maps
provided in this EAP and updates them of evacuation route changes that have been
made by the Police Department
The likelihood of a having an evacuation is greater. OEM will recommend that
citizens in all evacuation zones along the West Levee evacuate (Zones WL-1 through
WL-10).
Information to the public will include the location of pickup points where Cityprovided transportation will be available. Refer to Appendix C, Figure 6-WL1,2,3,4
and Figure 6 – WL5,6,7,8,9,10 Potential West Levee Evacuation Zones that identify
recreation centers that may be used for pickup locations.
Using Reverse 911, OEM updates special needs facilities and enables standby
transportation assistance.
Streets Department identifies government facilities and vital equipment that should
be protected by placing sandbags at doors, removing vital equipment, and other
means.
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Trinity River Federal Levee System
Emergency Action Plan
City of Dallas


OEM will notify shelters that a large-scale evacuation may occur.
Police Department coordinates with OEM to request TxDOT assistance to divert
incoming traffic along I-30.
Wednesday 05:00 Hours: The Trinity River level continues to rise and slide forms in the
levee crown, increasing the risk of a levee breach. TWM determines that a Level 3
Emergency Level has been reached.
Level 3 Emergency Response
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Flood Control calls all personnel on duty and deploys additional supplies to station
301+00 along the levee.
TWM contacts the USACE Fort Worth District Engineer for guidance on which
remedial methods should be taken to mitigate damage the slides have caused to the
embankment.
Flood Control checks on all available supplies. Requests to the Streets Department
for additional labor, supplies, and equipment are made to OEM. If additional
assistance is needed, Flood Control will purchase supplies or request services from
commercial suppliers and contractors.
OEM determines that a mandatory evacuation is warranted and contacts the Mayor
to request that a mandatory evacuation order be issued. The Mayor is informed of
the emergency situation and agrees that a mandatory evacuation order is needed to
protect lives.
OEM updates special needs facilities to notify them of the mandatory evacuation
using Reverse 911 and the media. The City-provided transportation assistance on
standby at these facilities will begin evacuating the facility.
Wednesday 07:00 Hours: The Trinity River is 5 feet below the crown of the levee and waves
increase erosion at the slide. Emergency Response for a Level 3 Emergency is underway.


OEM issues EAS broadcasts, special news advisories, and cable overrides informing
the population that a mandatory evacuation order has been issued. Normally at this
hour, many people are not listening to TV or radio, but the majority of the affected
citizens have most likely heard warnings issued as part of the Emergency Level 1 and
2 response, and they are listening to the news. The Police and Fire-Rescue
Departments will deploy a greater number of personnel to notify affected citizens in
person.
Police and Fire-Rescue Departments will use route alerting vehicles in the
evacuation zones to alert citizens of the need to evacuate. Refer to Figure 5 – Depth
Below Top of Levee. Warnings should be issued first to the areas within the
Evacuation Zones that have the greatest depth from the Top of Levees. Refer to
Figure 4 – Special Needs Population Locations which provides the location and
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Emergency Action Plan
City of Dallas

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
population counts of special needs populations within each evacuation zone. Refer
to Figure 6 – Potential Evacuation Zones to coordinate traffic control.
OEM contacts the National Weather Service, rainfall has stopped at approximately
08:00 hours Saturday morning, but the Trinity River is still expected to peak.
Flood Control and TWM continue to monitor the Trinity River level closely.
OEM will contact the American Red Cross and the City of Dallas Department of Parks
and Recreation so that shelter locations will be opened because the evacuation will
need to last several days. It will take time for the Trinity River level to fall, damage
assessments to be conducted and needed repairs to be performed.
OEM will coordinate damage assessments and recovery tasks. When it is considered
safe for evacuees to return to their homes and businesses, the Mayor will authorize
the return of evacuees.
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EMERGENCY EXAMPLE #2 – CWWTP and ROCHESTER LEVEES OVERTOPPED
The Trinity River overtops the CWWTP first and then the Rochester Levee near Budd Street.
The upstream end of the Rochester Levee is located south of Haven Street near South
Lamar Street. The business and residential populations in the area protected by the
Rochester Levee are 51 and 3,428 persons respectively. Approximately 100 employees
work at the CWWTP during business hours with approximately 8 employees working nights
and weekends.
The flowline at the flood closure gate at Budd Street is 404.38 feet, and the top of the
closure structure is 417 feet (Reference 4).
Assumptions:


Based on the top of closure structure elevation of 417 feet, it is assumed that the
top elevation of the levee near Budd Street is approximately 418 feet.
It is probable that the CWWTP and Rochester Levees may be overtopped at
approximately the same time during a severe storm period. The crest elevation of
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Trinity River Federal Levee System
Emergency Action Plan
City of Dallas

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

the CWWTP levee is approximately 416 feet (Reference 5) and the crest elevation of
the Rochester levee is approximately 418 feet.
CWWTP personnel will be able to evacuate relatively easily because there are
approximately 100 employees working during business hours. Advance warning for
a storm that will overtop the levee will provide enough time to evacuate the
CWWTP.
If the CWWTP levee is overtopped, OEM will most likely be assisting areas that are
not protected by levees but that are overtopped as a result of 1- and 0.2-percentannual-chance storms. Residential and business areas at risk of flooding during
these storm events are generally located on both sides of the levee between the
CWWTP and the DART Railroad crossing the Trinity River. (Reference 1).
A 1-percent-annual-chance storm is occurring and the Trinity River water surface
level rise rate is assumed to be approximately 1 foot per hour.
No problems are occurring at this time on the East and West Levees.
Event Outline
Friday 08:00 Hours: The Trinity River Level is 15 feet below the CWWTP levee crown at
approximately elevation 401 feet. NWS forecast indicates that heavy rainfall is expected for
the next 24 hours. TWM determines that a Level 1 Emergency situation is occurring.
Level 1 Emergency Response:

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TWM Field Observers are monitoring the operation of the Rochester Pump Station
and elevations of the Trinity River near the Rochester Levee. Flood Control
personnel check the National Weather Service updates during every shift.
Flood Control informs and places its personnel on standby. Flood Control checks
the status of equipment and supplies. Additional earth-filled sacks are filled if
needed.
TWM notifies the USACE District Engineer of the situation.
TWM notifies OEM of the situation.
OEM contacts DWU to alert them of the emergency situation. DWU will notify
CWWTP and alert personnel.
Using Reverse 911, OEM contacts special needs facilities in the affected area and
asks if they may need transportation assistance. Refer to Emergency Level 1
Communications Plan in Appendix 2.
OEM notifies sources of transportation (Dallas Independent School District, DART,
and Greyhound Bus Lines Company) as needed.
Police and Fire-Rescue Dispatches will send a warning of the situation to citizens in
the possible inundation areas using Reverse 911.
OEM notifies the Police, Fire-Rescue, and Street Services Departments to alert them
of the situation.
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OEM, Police, Fire-Rescue, and Street Services Departments review Figure 5-R1 and
Figure 5-CWWTP1 included in Appendix C of this EAP for information on possible
evacuation routes.
OEM, Police, Fire-Rescue, and Street Services Departments review Figure 3-RL1 to
review special needs population information in the area protected by the Rochester
Levee.
The Police Department reviews its evacuation and traffic control plans for the
inundation zones on the CWWTP and Rochester Levees. Police Department notifies
the law enforcement units who may be called in to assist.
Streets Department checks on the status of the routes. Streets Department also
checks the availability of supplies including barricades.
Flood Control will close the Flood Gates at Budd Street when the Trinity River
elevation reaches 404 feet.
Friday 13:00 Hours: The Trinity River Level is approximately 406 feet, which is a level that is
approximately 10 feet below the CWWTP levee crown. TWM determines that emergency
response for a Level 2 Emergency should be implemented.
Level 2 Emergency Response
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TWM notifies OEM of the change in emergency level. The EOC is activated and
senior level personnel from the Police, Fire-Rescue, and Street Services Departments
join OEM staff in the EOC.
TWM updates the USACE Fort Worth District Engineer on the situation including the
condition of the levees, the rate of water level rise, and weather conditions.
Flood Control closely monitors low spots along the CWWTP levee that may be
overtopped. Personnel who will assist in sand bagging the levee, if it becomes
necessary, take necessary equipment and supplies to the CWWTP. Refer to
Appendix C, Figure 2 – Indentified Levee Low Points for Priority Sand-Bagging in
Overtopping Scenario. Refer to Figure 5-R1 that shows the location of possible
staging areas near the Rochester Levee.
Flood Control will close the Bexar Street Gates when the Trinity River level reaches
407 feet.
Police and Fire-Rescue Dispatches issue a new Reverse 911 message to citizens in
the Rochester evacuation zone, 5-R1.
OEM increases public warnings in addition to Reverse 911 by requesting
broadcasters to disseminate EAS broadcasts, issue news through cable override, and
send special news advisories to radio, television, and cable news stations. OEM
provides the media with the evacuation routes maps provided in this EAP and
updates them of evacuation route changes that have been made by the Police
Department.
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City of Dallas



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

The likelihood of a having an evacuation is greater. OEM will recommend that
citizens in the entire Rochester evacuation zone and the CWWTP evacuate.
Information to the public will include the location of pickup points where Cityprovided transportation will be available. Refer to Figure 5-R1 which shows a
recreation center at the end of Bethurum Avenue in the Rochester evacuation zone
that may be a pickup location.
OEM will update special needs facilities using Reverse 911. OEM deploys
transportation assistance to them to be on standby. Currently the only special
needs facility in the Rochester evacuation zone is the HS Thompson Elementary
School.
Streets Department identifies government facilities and vital equipment that should
be protected by placing sandbags at doors, removing vital equipment, and other
means.
OEM will notify the American Red Cross and the City of Dallas Department of Parks
and Recreation that their assistance to manage shelters may be needed.
Police Department will notify Streets Departments that incoming traffic along State
Highway 310 may need to be diverted.
Friday 18:00 Hours - The Trinity River is approximately 5 feet below the CWWTP levee
crown at elevation 411 feet. TWM determines that a Level 3 Emergency Level is
warranted. It is approximately 7 to 8 feet of the overtopping the Rochester Levee.
Level 3 Emergency Response:

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
In coordination with TWM and USACE, Flood Control implements topping using
earth-filled sacks on the CWWTP to protect the levee from erosion and to protect
the CWWTP equipment.
TWM notifies OEM of change in emergency level.
Flood Control closes the flood gates at Railroad Avenue when the Trinity River level
reaches 411.
OEM notifies Police, Fire-Rescue, and Street Services Departments of change in
emergency level.
Police and Fire-Rescue Departments assist CWWTP personnel, a total of
approximately 8 people, to evacuate. CWWTP keeps a boat on-site to assist in
evacuating since the roads to exit the CWWTP are likely flooded.
Flood Control notifies personnel to assist in the CWWTP levee sand bagging.
Flood Control notifies personnel to be on standby to top low points along the
Rochester levee.
Flood Control checks on all its available supplies. Requests to the Streets
Department for additional labor, supplies, or equipment will coordinated through
the OEM. If additional assistance is needed, Flood Control will purchase supplies or
request services from commercial suppliers and contractors.
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City of Dallas

Since the Rochester Levee is higher than the CWWTP levee, OEM decides to wait to
notify the public to evacuate at least until sunrise. The Trinity River is within 7 to 8
feet of the levee crown.
Friday 20:00 Hours – The Trinity River is within 5 feet of the Rochester levee crown.
Flood Control personnel have finished topping the low spots on the CWWTP levee and
have evacuated the CWWTP.

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
OEM notifies the Mayor of the emergency situation affecting the Rochester
evacuation zone and requests that a mandatory evacuation order be issued. The
Mayor agrees that the situation warrants a mandatory evacuation to protect the
safety of citizens in the affected area.
Police and Fire-Rescue Departments employ route-alerting vehicles to alert citizens
in the Rochester evacuation zone. They also go door-to-door in the lowest areas
relative to the top of the levee to make sure that affected citizens are on alert and
that special needs populations, including the elderly and disabled, are assisted.
Flood Control will close the flood gate over Railroad tracks near Municipal and Budd
Station when the elevation reaches 412. The flood gates will be closed at the
Railroad tracks near Budd Street and at the over Railroad tracks when the elevation
reaches 413.
Using Reverse 911 and the media, OEM updates special needs facilities to notify
them of the need to evacuate.
OEM requests that the American Red Cross and the City of Dallas Department of
Parks and Recreation open and operate shelters.
Police Department with assistance from Streets Department leads the evacuation
effort. Law enforcement personnel implement the traffic control plan.
Police and Fire-Rescue Departments return to try and convince citizens who do not
want to evacuate to leave.
Police Department plans and implements plan to restrict access to the evacuation
zones.
Friday 23:00 Hours – The Trinity River overtops CWWTP as observed by helicopter.
Saturday 01:00 Hours – The Trinity River overtops Rochester Levee near Budd Street.
Saturday 08:00 Hours – Rainfall stops.
Sunday 06:00 Hours – Trinity River noticeably begins to recede. As done in past
emergencies, CWWTP employees will be flown in to the plant by helicopter if conditions
are safe. If significant damage has occurred to the plant, it will take several days before
crews can access the roads to the plant. Police, Fire-Rescue, Street Services, DWU, and
the Public Works Department will begin the Recovery Phase.
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City of Dallas
V. GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES
A. RESPONSIBILITIES OF INVOLVED PARTIES
This section discusses the responsibilities of City departments and associated agencies in
response to a levee emergency. The Trinity Watershed Management (TWM) Department is
responsible for communication with other departments involved and keeping them up to
date on the status of the emergency. The Office of Emergency Management (OEM) is
responsible for notifying multiple departments and agencies, including the Dallas Police and
Fire-Rescue Departments, to activate those departments’ EAP responsibilities. In addition
to the Notification Flowcharts found at the beginning of this report, this section provides
guidance for TWM and OEM on communicating the emergency situation to others and
actions to take once the emergency level has been determined.
TWM Field Observers
TWM field observers are staff of the Flood Control Division which is part of the TWM
Department. These individuals are stationed in the field. The observers play a vital role
during a levee emergency and therefore their responsibilities have been included separate
from Flood Control or TWM.
When heavy rain is expected and flooding may occur TWM Field Observers shall be
responsible for closely monitoring the Trinity River’s flood stage. The observers will ensure
that the interior drainage facilities are working properly, as discussed in the Operation and
Maintenance (O&M) Manual - Dallas Trinity River Levee & Floodway System, hereafter
referred to as the O&M Manual. The TWM Field Observers shall report situations of
concern to the Flood Control Assistant Director.
Flood Control Division, TWM Department
The City of Dallas Flood Control Division (Flood Control) within the TWM Department is
responsible for ensuring that the necessary field operations are performed to operate and
maintain the levee system. In the situation of a potential emergency, Flood Control is
responsible for notifying the TWM Director.
Flood Control is responsible for ensuring the following precautions, maintenance, and
operational requirements from the O&M Manual occur for the proper functioning of the
floodway and pumping plants:
 Both banks of each channel shall be patrolled during periods of high water.
 Appropriate measures shall be taken to protect the levee, outfall channels, and the
river from being damaged by erosion.
 Particular attention will be taken to prevent the formation of logjams and other
obstructions in the river at bridges and outfall channels.
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
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
A log will be maintained at each pumping plant which will serve as a permanent
record of operations at the plant.
A written report shall be made to the USACE Fort Worth District Engineer describing
each instance of major breakdown of plant equipment, flood damages, and
extensive vandalism or sabotage which in any way will interfere with normal
operations of the flood control system.
Incidents which disable the plant will be reported to USACE and OEM by telephone,
and telephone reports will be confirmed by written reports.
The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Automated Local
Evaluation in Real Time (ALERT) systems, which remotely monitor and operate the
pumping plants and sumps, shall be properly maintained, regularly tested, and
updated as needed.
O&M Plans to operate and adjust the flood gates, sluice gates, and emergency
control structures shall be executed to ensure reliable function when needed.
Flood Control shall contact other City of Dallas Departments for additional
personnel, supplies, or equipment if needed to make repairs during nonemergencies. During an emergency, OEM will coordinate assistance for Flood
Control.
Flood Control will conduct annual trial erections of each type of flood closure
structure per the O & M Manual.
Trinity Watershed Management (TWM) Department
TWM’s responsibilities involve coordination with Flood Control to provide assistance in
determining the proper course of action when problems arise. TWM will contact the USACE
for guidance on repairs and to request emergency assistance with repairs if necessary.
TWM levee emergency response responsibilities include:
 Coordinate with Flood Control to respond to observed or reported conditions,
incidents, or unusual events.
 Determine the Emergency Level Classification. Refer to Table 1 – Guidance for
Determining Emergency Level Classification.
 Immediately notify OEM when a Level 1, 2, or 3 Emergency is determined.
 Request timely guidance and/or emergency response assistance from USACE.
 Notify OEM when there is a change in the emergency level.
 Work with OEM to facilitate a tabletop and a full scale drill of a levee emergency
scenario to ensure the effectiveness of the EAP (see Section VI, D(1)).
 Provide leadership to ensure the EAP is reviewed and updated annually and copies
of the revised EAP are distributed to all EAP Record Holders (see Section VI, D(2)).
Department of Street Services
The Department of Street Services (Street Services) will assist Flood Control and the Police
Department when requested. Street Services will coordinate with OEM to assist Flood
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Emergency Action Plan
City of Dallas
Control, the Police Department, and other departments during emergencies as needed.
Flood Control may need additional resources to solve or mitigate the emergency. Streets
Services will assist with personnel, equipment, or supplies as requested by Flood Control.
Street Services will also provide support to the Police Department during an evacuation as
requested. Street Services will aid traffic control efforts by placing signs that will help direct
traffic along evacuation routes. Barricades may also be needed to block traffic from flooded
areas. The Police Department may also request assistance with blocking major roads and
highways. Street Services will also need to participate in a tabletop and full scale drill of a
levee emergency scenario to ensure the effectiveness of the EAP.
Department of Parks and Recreation
The Department of Parks and Recreation is responsible for the preparation of shelters to be
opened and operated during an evacuation. Parks and Recreation will coordinate with the
American Red Cross and other volunteer organizations to provide shelters and mass care.
In addition, Parks and Recreation’s responsibilities include participation in a tabletop and
full scale drill of a levee emergency scenario to ensure the effectiveness of the EAP.
Dallas Water Utilities (DWU)
When the CWWTP Levee is in danger of failing, OEM will contact Dallas Water Utilities
(DWU). DWU will be responsible for implementing CWWTP’s emergency response plan. To
prepare for emergencies, CWWTP has procedures in place to notify its employees, which
may be as much as 130 employees during a shift. DWU will coordinate with OEM to request
assistance with evacuation of employees. DWU will need to participate in a tabletop and a
full scale drill of the EAP if a drill concerning the CWWTP levee is conducted.
Office of Emergency Management (OEM)
OEM will coordinate the emergency response efforts of the Police, Fire-Rescue, Street
Services, and other City Departments so that TWM will focus on remedial actions to prevent
levee failure. OEM will receive the emergency level classification from TWM and will make
appropriate contacts. Refer to the Notification Flowcharts in Section I and the
Communication Plan in Appendix A.
Beginning with Emergency Level 2, OEM will activate the Emergency Operations Center
(EOC) and key personnel designated by each department will staff the EOC to closely
coordinate emergency response activities. OEM will ensure that responders in the
evacuation zones are provided with timely information and any necessary backup of
additional personal or resources.
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City of Dallas
OEM Emergency Response Responsibilities:
 Contact and update key department personnel. Implement the communication
plans in Appendix A.
 Activate the EOC when necessary and coordinate all emergency actions and
personnel.
 Warn the public by using Reverse 911, EAS and news broadcasts, cable override, and
other means as necessary.
 Determine when to begin evacuation of threatened areas.
 Request that a mandatory evacuation order be issued from the Mayor if necessary.
 Maintain communication with media.
 Work with TWM to facilitate a tabletop and a full scale drill of a levee emergency
scenario to ensure the effectiveness of the EAP.
Dallas Fire-Rescue Department
The Dallas Fire-Rescue Department will serve as primary response along with the Police
Department to assist with evacuations as needed.
Fire-Rescue Emergency Response Responsibilities:
 Coordinate with the Police Department to send Fire-Rescue Teams to alert citizens
of the need to evacuate.
 Assist citizens with evacuations especially the special needs populations.
 Participate in review/update process.
 Participate in a tabletop and a full scale drill of a levee emergency scenario to ensure
the effectiveness of the EAP.
Dallas Police Department (DPD)
The Police Department’s primary responsibility is enforcing laws and protecting lives and
property during emergencies. If OEM recommends an evacuation, the Police Department
will lead and conduct evacuation efforts. The Police Department will assess the current
situation, determine resource needs and implement policing strategies to safely guide
evacuees to shelters. Pedestrian and traffic perimeters will be established prohibiting
access to affected areas and actions taken to safeguard vacated property. The Police
Department will also assist with credentialing and access when an impacted area is
reopened. Information provided in this section is primarily a summary of the City of Dallas
MEOP, Annex G, Law Enforcement.
Preparedness Responsibilities:
 Police Dispatch will operate the local warning system in coordination with OEM.
 Identify preplanned evacuation routes for known risk areas and prepare traffic
control plans.
 Identify key facilities and determine possible security requirements*.
 Review and update plans and procedures.
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City of Dallas


Train primary and auxiliary law enforcement personnel to conduct emergency
operations.
Participate in a tabletop and a full scale drill of a levee emergency scenario to ensure
the effectiveness of the EAP.
*Key facilities may include government direction and control facilities, operating locations
for emergency response units, utilities, medical facilities, and key communication services
(MEOP, G-7). Actions may need to be taken before an evacuation begins to protect key
facilities from flood damage.
Emergency response responsibilities of the Police Department will ensure that an
evacuation is as safe as possible for the population at risk. With support of the Fire-Rescue
Department, the Police Department will have law enforcement personnel in the evacuation
areas to ensure that citizens know an evacuation is either strongly recommended or
mandatory as determined by OEM and the Mayor. To reach the public that may not be
reached by primary warning systems such as outdoor warning sirens and the Emergency
Alert System (EAS) other means of warning will be necessary. In most areas, law
enforcement units and other vehicles equipped with sirens and public address systems can
be used for route alerting. In some areas, such as large office or residential buildings, doorto-door warnings may be necessary (MEOP, G-5).
Police Emergency Response Responsibilities:
 Maintain law and order.
 Determine preferred evacuation routes based on the situation and using the
preplanned primary and alternate routes defined. If necessary, modify routes to
ensure safety of evacuees.
 Coordinate with OEM to contact TxDOT if their assistance is needed to divert traffic
on state highways.
 Provide status information on evacuation routes to OEM for dissemination to the
public through the media.
 Warn the public by route alerting and/or door-to-door notifications as necessary.
 Coordinate and perform traffic control operations for evacuations.
 Ensure disabled vehicles are removed from evacuation routes.
 Carry out crowd control where needed.
 Provide security for shelter and mass care facilities as well as evacuated areas.
In the recovery phase, after an evacuation, the Police Department is responsible for
securing evacuated areas. To minimize looting, access will be controlled by roadblocks and,
where appropriate, barricades. Access controls should be supplemented by periodic roving
patrols, particularly within areas that are readily accessible by pedestrians. In areas that
have suffered severe damage, access must be controlled to protect health and safety as
well as property (MEOP G-6). In the immediate aftermath of an emergency situation, OEM
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Trinity River Federal Levee System
Emergency Action Plan
City of Dallas
may request the Police Department units conduct reconnaissance to identify specified areas
affected and provide an initial estimate of damages (MEOP, G-8).
Police recovery phase responsibilities:
 Provide security for evacuated areas.
 Provide security for key facilities in the evacuation zones.
 Perform traffic control for return of evacuees, if needed.
 Provide access control for damaged areas, issuing passes/permits if required.
 Assist in damage assessments.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) District Engineer
The City operates and maintains the levee system under the regulatory control of the
USACE. During non-emergency conditions, the USACE inspects and approves any significant
changes in the levee system. During emergencies, USACE will provide guidance to address
the emergency. This information will assist TWM determine an emergency level and choose
the preferred remediation methods.
USACE may provide support in flood fighting efforts to prevent a levee failure. During an
emergency, TWM will contact the USACE Fort Worth District Engineer. Through this
coordination, TWM and USACE will determine if the City of Dallas will need assistance.
USACE will provide immediate assistance in response to life-threatening or propertydamaging situations. USACE will coordinate with the City of Dallas for levee repair during
and after the event.
B. DURATION, TERMINATION, SECURITY, AND RECOVERY
Duration and Termination
TWM is responsible for evaluating a declared emergency condition, establishing the
duration of the emergency activity, and notifying OEM. TWM, in coordination with Flood
Control, is responsible for making the decision that an emergency condition no longer exists
on-site at the levees or levee system facilities. OEM is responsible for declaring termination
of an emergency condition off-site. It will be the responsibility of TWM to promptly notify
OEM when the emergency condition is no longer necessary.
As part of the termination process, TWM will be responsible for conducting and critiquing
the overall emergency response efforts to support the preparation of a report documenting
the emergency procedures and actions. The critique process will include a discussion of the
events that occurred prior, during and after the emergency. Participants involved in the
overall emergency response will review and evaluate their particular actions. The critique
process shall be used to determine what, if any, practicable improvements should be made
for potential future emergencies, and conversely identify deficiencies in the procedures,
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Emergency Action Plan
City of Dallas
manpower, materials, and equipment.
Worth District Office.
The report will be submitted to the USACE Fort
Security
Flood Control is responsible for maintaining security measures at the emergency site during
an emergency situation, and may delegate this authority to the Police Department for
specific security activities.
Recovery
The basic goal of the recovery phase is to demobilize and return to the pre-emergency
situation. TWM is responsible for implementing all actions necessary to achieve this goal
on-site at the levee(s). OEM is responsible for implementing recovery off-site in the affected
areas. The TWM Director is responsible for directing all on-site recovery activities. The
basic recovery actions common for levee emergency conditions include:
 Secure access to emergency site.
 Restore basic facilities and services, and
 Assess damage
Depending on the severity of the damage, TWM and/or OEM may recommend that the
Mayor issue a disaster declaration and contact the Governor as discussed in the MEOP,
Annex G, Section IV A.2.
A damage assessment report will be prepared by TWM to quantify the economic damages
and to evaluate the impacts to the levees and levee facilities. Damage assessment will be
performed in two stages. The first stage will include estimating the overall impacts in a
broad sense and will be prepared as soon as possible following the emergency. The second
stage will include a detailed evaluation and formal report of all impacts.
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City of Dallas
VI. FLOOD EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
The City of Dallas has developed this EAP as part of the City’s Flood Emergency Preparedness
efforts. Data was compiled to identify and locate the population at risk from levee failure,
including those special needs individuals and facilities. The City has identified evacuation zones
and routes to facilitate an organized response to any flood emergency relating to levee issues.
This EAP and the data included will be assessed and revised annually to ensure the plan is
current.
A. POPULATION RISK
Areas potentially affected by levee failure have been divided into several evacuation zones.
These zones are illustrated in Figure 2: Levee Failure Evacuation Zones and are the basis for
the following section. The boundaries of the evacuation zones were selected based on flood
risk and to identify areas which could be easily described to emergency workers and the
public. The East Levee potential risk zone is divided into 8 zones, the West Levee into 10
zones, and Rochester and CWWTP levees are each one zone.
1. Population Estimates
a. Residential Population
The residential population of each of the evacuation zones was determined using
the 2000 US census block data. These numbers are shown in Table 2: Population
Estimates. New census data will change these numbers but, in general, the existing
data gives a good indication of population characteristic for the purpose of the EAP.
b. Business Population
Table 2 also shows an estimate of the business population for each of the
evacuation zones. The business population estimates for the East Levee, West Levee,
and Rochester Levee areas were provided by the City of Dallas Office of Economic
Development based on the 2008 US Census Local Employment Dynamic (LED) and
approximated using ratios derived by Dunn & Bradstreet (January 2010). The Central
Wastewater Treatment Plant business population is based on information received
from Dallas Water Utilities. As seen in Table 2, the East Levee has a very high
business population that was considered when developing evacuation routes.
2. Special Needs Population
During severe flooding events, it is essential to address the emergency procedure needs
of the disabled, children, and elderly population as well as critical facilities such as
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Emergency Action Plan
City of Dallas
hospitals, schools, nursing homes and correctional facilities. Figure 4: Special Needs
Population and Facilities identifies the individual special needs population and facilities
and should be considered when prioritizing evacuations. The tables located on Figure 4
breaks the special needs population and facilities in 5 categories; Over 65, Disabled,
Multi-Family Residences, Childcare Facilities, and Schools. The Over 65 and Disabled
properties were based on parcel data and are individually shown on the figures. There is
currently no data available on the number of special needs persons living in Multi-Family
(MF) Residences, therefore all are all shown. Table 2 includes the total special needs
population based on the identified Over 65 and Disabled. These numbers do not include
the population of Special Needs Facilities that may be located in the area.
Table 2 – Population Estimates
Evacuation
Zone
WL-1
WL-2
WL-3
WL-4
WL-5
WL-6
WL-7
WL-8
WL-9
WL-10
EL-1
EL-2
EL-3
EL-4
EL-5
EL-6
EL-7
EL-8
R-1
CWWTP-1
Total
Residential
Population
Business
Special Needs
Population
Population
West Levee
50
1,481
5
2,650
2,129
99
5,286
1,157
328
2,000
44
161
2,666
1,051
49
5,286
235
412
545
144
61
753
1,987
48
224
1,506
5
374
899
19
East Levee
0
23,630
0
0
11,311
0
0
13,622
4
700
784
93
0
27,785
2
0
6,235
0
7,700
7,096
0
0
2,860
1
Rochester Levee
3,428
51
83
Central Wastewater Treatment Plant Levee
0
100
0
31,662
104,107
1,370
Total
1,536
4,878
6,771
2,205
3,766
5,933
750
2,788
1,735
1,929
23,630
11,311
13,626
1,577
27,787
6,235
14,796
2,861
3,562
100
137,139
A list of all residences categorized as Over 65 or Disabled is located in Table D.4. This
table should not be considered a complete list but can be used as a guide to identify
special needs individuals that may need assistance in the event of an emergency.
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City of Dallas
Evacuees with pets seeking public shelter can create potential problems. For health
reasons, pets are not allowed in emergency shelters operated by the Red Cross and
most other organized volunteer groups. However, a number of studies indicate that
some people, particularly the elderly, will not leave their homes if they cannot take their
pets with them. Loose pets remaining in an evacuated area may also create a public
safety concern. Hence, it is desirable to make reasonable arrangements for evacuees
who come to public shelters with pets. The City of Dallas Code Compliance Department
will coordinate these arrangements.
3. Special Needs Facilities
Special needs facility managers are responsible for the welfare and safety of their
students, clients, patients, and inmates. Virtually all of these facilities are required to
maintain an emergency plan that includes provisions for an emergency evacuation.
If an evacuation of a hospital, nursing home, or correctional facility is required, patients
and inmates should be transported, with appropriate medical or security support, to a
comparable facility. The facility operator is responsible for making arrangements for
suitable transportation and coordinating use of appropriate host facilities. In the case of
short-notice or no-notice emergency situations, facilities may be unable to make the
required arrangements for transportation and may need assistance from the City of
Dallas with transportation and identifying suitable reception facilities.
Medical patients, homeless, registered sex offenders, and prisoners should not be
housed in shelters and mass care facilities with the general public.
If an evacuation is required, OEM will contact Dallas County Schools to coordinate the
evacuation of the schools in the potential inundated areas. A list of schools in each
evacuation zone is located in Table D.3. Students will normally be transported in school
buses to other schools outside of the risk areas, where they can be picked up by their
guardians. It is essential that these plans are communicated to the public in a timely
manner so families may make proper arrangements.
4. Priority Areas by Flood Depth
Figure 5 – Depth Below Top of Levee illustrates the difference in elevation between the
top of the levees and the surrounding ground surface. It should be used as a guide
when determining evacuation priorities. Once the levee emergency is identified, the
first responders should use the figure to identify the closest low lying areas and
evacuate accordingly.
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B. EVACUATION
Evacuation is one means of protecting the public by moving people away from the hazard.
An evacuation may be necessary if a situation develops along the Trinity Federal Levee
System that threatens lives or properties. State law provides a county judge or mayor with
the authority to order the evacuation of all or part of the population from a threatened
area within their respective jurisdiction. Hence, the Mayor may order a mandatory
evacuation of the City of Dallas upon issuing a local disaster declaration. The Mayor may
also take subsequent action to control re-entry, curtail movement, and deny building
occupancy within a disaster area. Refer to MEOP, Annex E: Evacuation for more detail on
evacuation procedures.
1. Evacuation Routes
Evacuation routes are identified in each of the levee evacuation zones. The roads
chosen were typically larger arterials that are elevated higher than the surrounding
local streets. Figure 6 – Potential Levee Evacuation Zones show the evacuation zones
and routes. During a flood emergency, DPD will closely monitor the evacuation routes
to ensure no flooding occurs on these routes. DPD will quickly decide if alternative
routes are needed and will communicate this with OEM. Also shown in Figure 6 are
various locations that can be used as potential evacuation staging areas. These areas
were identified by locating large, unsecure parking lots near the evacuation areas that
would be presumably empty during a flood emergency.
2. Transportation
In an emergency situation, the transportation of people, equipment, and supplies may
have to be facilitated or restricted from areas at risk and in support of response and
recovery activities. The City of Dallas will provide assistance for arranging for or
providing the transportation needed to support emergency operations. OEM will
coordinate transportation needs and contact Dallas County Schools and Dallas Area
Rapid Transit (DART) if needed. The following considerations should be taken into
account.
a. It is anticipated that the primary means of evacuation for most individuals will be
personal automobiles. However, transportation will be available for people who do
not have vehicles.
b. Special needs facilities may require governmental assistance.
c. Public schools normally maintain transportation resources. In the event of an
emergency, the OEM should coordinate with Dallas County Schools Office of Risk
and Emergency Management to mobilize school buses and drivers to assist with
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City of Dallas
evacuations. In addition, Dallas County Schools currently has buses equipped with
wheelchair lifts and buses that may be converted to accommodate stretchers.
d. Emergency transportation may be provided by school buses, city buses,
ambulances and other vehicles.
e. Public information messages emphasizing the need for citizens to help their
neighbors who lack transportation or need assistance could significantly reduce the
requirements for public transportation during an evacuation.
3. Traffic Control
a. In the event of a levee failure emergency, evacuees should rely on the evacuation
routes illustrated in Figure 6 - Potential Levee Evacuation Zones.
b. Actual evacuation movement will be controlled by the Dallas Police Department
(DPD). The initial response will be in coordination with pre-planned evacuation
routes; however police commanders will continuously assess effectiveness and
implement modifications as dictated to ensure the safety of evacuees and first
responders.
c. When possible, two-way traffic will be maintained on all evacuation routes to allow
continued access for emergency vehicles and special needs transport.
d. For large-scale evacuations when time permits, traffic control devices, such as signs
and barricades, will be provided by Street Services upon request.
e. DPD will request wrecker services when needed to clear disabled vehicles from
evacuation routes.
f. DPD will restrict traffic flow in to the affected areas as to not limit evacuation
traffic.
4. Shelters
Shelter and mass care needs may range from very short term operations for a limited
number of people to lengthy operations for large number of evacuees. The primary
objective could range from providing protection from the weather, comfortable
seating, and access to rest room to more where feeding, sleeping, and shower facilities
are desirable and a variety of assistance must be provided to evacuees.
As outlined in City of Dallas MEOP, Annex C – Shelter & Mass Care, the American Red
Cross (ARC) has been charted under federal law to provided mass care to victims of
natural disasters.
The American Red Cross Dallas Area Chapter is located at:
4800 Harry Hines Blvd.
Dallas, Texas 75235
Phone: 214-678-4800
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City of Dallas
The City of Dallas Department of Parks and Recreation will work with the American Red
Cross to open and operate shelters.
Figure 7 – Shelter Locations shows the location and address of shelters the City has
identified for use during an emergency. Each evacuation zone has been assigned a
shelter to be used in the event of an emergency. This information can be found in Table
D.1 – Shelter Assignments for Evacuation Zones.
5. Security Plan by DPD
Security in evacuated areas is extremely important. Those who have evacuated may
not do so in the future if their property is damaged or stolen during their absence due
to the emergency. Law enforcement should establish access control points to limit
entry into evacuated areas and, where possible, conduct periodic patrols within such
areas to deter theft by those on foot. To the extent possible, Dallas Fire-Rescue will
take measures to insure continued fire protection. Patrols should be established along
the fringes of flooded areas to prevent unauthorized access to flooded structures
C. SURVEILLANCE PLAN – ONGOING ACTIVITIES BEFORE & DURING AN EMERGENCY
1. Climate Data Collection and Precipitation/Run-Off Forecasting
Flood Control has many tools available for monitoring weather patterns including: local
and national radar, satellite, severe weather, weather risk, storm tracking, current
weather, historical, forecast temps, forecast precip, forecast graphics, City forecasts,
and weather briefings. Data is available from the following sources: USNowRad,
Regional NowRad, STORMcast, Ft Worth NexRad, Abilene NexRad, NexRad (Dallas
Area), US Satellite, Regional Satellite, Texas Satellite, US Precip Type, Regional Precip
Type, and Watches and Warnings. Additional information on these systems can be
found in the Dallas Trinity River Levee & Floodway System Operation and Maintenance
(O&M) Manual. It is important to closely monitor these systems to have amble time to
begin emergency procedure should inclement weather develop.
2. River Level Forecasting
There are 7 pump stations along the Trinity River Federal Levee system. Each pump
station has various sensors used to monitor water surface elevations. Flood Control has
the Pump Status tool that displays sump levels, sump rise, pump status, river level,
number of pumps running, and rain since midnight.
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The system has the ability to graphically display the river stage over the last 24 hours.
This is an essential tool that should be used prior to, during, and after an emergency
event.
3. Emergency Detection, Observation, and Monitoring Methods
The Main Window of Flood Control’s SCADA system shows an overview of all pumps
and the river stage. The Alarm Window shows any areas of concern throughout the
system. In addition to the technology available, Flood Control will have staff in the field
constantly patrolling the levees during a flood event.
D. EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN MAINTENANCE
1. Annual Coordination Meetings, Drills, and Exercises
The City of Dallas will conduct at least one functional emergency training exercise
annually. The first exercise will be a tabletop exercise scheduled within 3 months of the
EAP being published. In this exercise, the two scenarios included in Section IV will be
played out with a representative from every department involved. One full scale
training exercise will then be performed 6-12 months after the EAP is published. These
exercises will test the response capabilities of the City departments involved, as well as
the private organizations, DISD, community leaders, and other agencies involved in
Trinity Levee disaster response. All involved will provide critical feedback including the
need for more detailed information or clarification of the EAP. These exercises will be
conducted by OEM and performance reviewed and assessed to determine if revisions
and updates to the EAP are needed.
2. Reviews and Updates
The Trinity EAP shall be reviewed annually by local officials and should be revised or
updated by a formal change at least every five years or in the event of changes in
essential personnel. The plan should also be updated following any actual emergencies
or exercises to reflect deficiencies and lessons learned. An effort should be made to
update variables essential to evacuation procedures including: residential and business
population, special needs population and location, evacuation routes, and shelter
facilities. This update is the responsibility of OEM and TWM, and the updated EAP
should be distributed to all departments, agencies, and individuals involved.
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VII. FLOOD EMERGENCY RESPONSE
A. INITIALIZE FLOOD EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Once TWM has determined an emergency level, the following steps should be taken for
flood emergency response:
 Reference the Notification Flowcharts in Section I.
 Reference the Communications Plan located in Appendix A.
 The City of Dallas Departments and agencies involved in emergency response will
implement their responsibilities described in Section V. General Responsibilities and
Section VI. Flood Emergency Preparedness.
 Flood Control and TWM will implement the Levee System Repair Plan described in
this Section
B. LEVEE SYSTEM REPAIR PLAN
1. Implementation
Problems that may arise could include sand boils, seepage, sloughs, wave wash, scour,
and possible overtopping of neglected low spots in the levee. In the event of a levee
problem, Flood Control and TWM will determine the proper course of action to repair
the levee based on the severity of the issue. The USACE, Fort Worth District Engineer
will also be informed of the situation to be able to provide technical advice on repair
methods. Continued surveillance and attention to the weather and river forecasts will
be performed to assure the safety of the repair teams and other personnel.
2. Methods
The O&M Manual provides general information on standard practices that have been
used on levees during high water emergencies. The methods described herein have
been developed during years of experience with various problems that often arise
during periods of high water. These methods are not intended to restrict Flood Control
or others involved, to a rigid set of rules for every condition that may arise. If problems
not covered by these suggestions arise, where Flood Control is in doubt as the
procedure to be performed, USACE should be consulted, and Flood Control will be
expected to follow sound engineering methods in meeting emergency situations. Flood
Control will contact TWM who will then coordinate with USACE in this situation
(Reference 4).
The levee system may be subject to certain dangers during high-water periods from
current or wave action. These dangers diminish with the degree of maintenance that
the levee system receives during normal water periods. However, certain unexpected
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City of Dallas
conditions that arise during flood periods may threaten the levee system but may be
met with assurance if prompt action is taken and proper methods of treatment are
used. Measures to cope with sand boils, seepage, sloughs, wave wash, scour, and
possible overtopping of low spots in the levee are described below. These methods
have proven effective during many years of use by USACE. It should be emphasized that
it is of extreme importance that the value of any part of the levee system should not be
underestimated. It is the coordinated function of the entire protection works that
protects the district against floods (Reference 4).
Seepage
Seepage is the percolation of water through the earthen levee. Although not dangerous
in itself, it may menace the stability of the levee by saturating the soil and causing
sloughing of the landside slope. In order to prevent sloughing of the levee where the
slope is steep and saturated, all V-shaped seep drains should be cut in the landside
slope to remove the seepage water. If the levee should become saturated over a
relatively large area, it may become necessary to take the measures described below to
prevent sloughing (Reference 4, Section V).
Sloughing
Sloughing is in the slipping or flowing out of position of a portion of the landside slope of
the levee due to its being saturated through seepage to the point where that part of the
levee becomes unstable. If there are reaches in the levee where the material in the
levee section is of such nature that prolonged high stages of the river may cause
sloughing conditions on the landside slope, then such soft areas should be thoroughly
drained. After this operation, a single layer of willow brush, if obtainable, or any small
trees or limbs, should be laid up and down the slope, laying the butts upward and tops
downward, and weighted with earth-filled sacks. Wood strips may be used if willows,
small trees, or limbs are not available. If the slope begins to slough down, a log or heavy
timber should be laid on top of the willows at the toe of the material sloughed off and
this log or timber fastened to long stakes, which have been driven several feet into the
ground. A buttress of earth-filled sacks should then be built at the toe and extended up
the slope. The buttress at the toe should be built in the shape of a small banquette.
Sandbags or weights should not be placed more than two-thirds of the distance from
the toe of the material sloughed off to the bottom of the slough (Reference 4, Section
V).
Sand Boils
A sand boil is a definite stream of seepage water flowing from the earth, usually near
the landside toe of the levee. The source of this seep water is usually from pervious
materials underlying the levee. These danger spots are serious in any location and
should be watched closely, especially those within 100 feet of the levee toe. A sand
boil, which discharges clear water in a small steady flow, usually is not a serious menace
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City of Dallas
to the safety of the levee and ordinarily need not be ringed. However, if the flow
increases or carries a material load of sand and silt, corrective action should be taken
immediately to prevent possible levee failure (Reference 4, Section V).
Sacked Earth Rings
The accepted method of treating a sand boil is to construct a watertight ring of
sacked earth around the boil, building up a head of water within the ring sufficient
to slow the velocity of flow through the boil so that more material is not displaced.
This process will be necessary at least until the flow runs clear and there is no longer
sand and silt in the flow. The ring should not be built to a height that stops the flow
of water completely because of the probability that the excessive local pressure
head thus created may cause additional failures and boils nearby. The base of the
sack ring is prepared by clearing the ground of debris, sod, loose sand or other
objectionable material, to a width sufficient for the base of the ring. The base
should be sufficiently scarified to provide a watertight bond between the natural
ground and the sack ring (Reference 4, Section V).
Scour
Current scour is the erosion of the riverside slope of the levee by abnormally high
current velocities. Current conditions which have a scouring effect may be detected by
the appearance of eddies and general turbulence of the water. If erosion is evident,
immediate steps should be taken to protect the levee against current scour. Ordinarily
current scour can be prevented or stopped by the use of sack paving, board panels, or
by vertical board deflection. These methods may be used in cases where there are
minor current attacks and the depth of water is not great. These types of current
protection should extend as far under water as practicable (Reference 4, Section V).
Deflection Dikes
Where sack paving or vertical board protection are not satisfactory, brush deflection
dikes are generally used and are constructed of brush, but treetops may be
substituted. A double line of 4X4-inch or 3X6-inch posts is driven on four-foot
centers, the lines of posts being about four-feet apart and at the required angle to
deflect the current away from the levee. The posts should be driven to the
maximum practicable penetration, with their tops approximately two feet above the
anticipated high-water surface. The posts should be well braced as conditions
warrant with cross members and wiring and downstream bracing. Additional
anchorage may be provided if required by use of cable or heavy wire placed at an
angle of 45 degrees and tie to stakes in the slope. The brush dike frame is filled with
alternate layers of willow, or some other suitable brush, and sacked gravel or large
stone, which is used to hold the brush in place. The first layer of filler should consist
of earth or gravel filled sacks, being so placed as to take out irregularities at he
bottom and to provide a smooth base for the brush filler. Bundles of brush filler are
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City of Dallas
laid to form a solid mat. The brush should be rammed tightly into place. Each layer
of brush should be about one foot in thickness and weighted down with one or two
layers of sack earth or stone. The brush and sack filler should extend about one foot
above the anticipated high-water surface. The outer end of the dike is revetted with
a mat of earth or gravel filled sacks to retard scour at that point (Reference 4,
Section V).
Overtopping
Overtopping of a levee is the flowing of water over the levee crown. Though unlikely,
the danger from overtopping cannot be overestimated. Once a breach has been
opened in the levee by the water flowing over the crown and thus washing the material
away, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to close it. It is therefore imperative that the
levee or a section of the levee that is depressed due to settling or other causes be
topped by one of the following methods:
 Placing sacked earth
 Placing flashboard and earth
 Building mud boxes
Choosing a Topping Method
Where the height is less than three feet and minor wave action is expected, sack
topping may be used and earth fill or sacked earth placed behind it. Capping in
excess of three feet in height usually requires mud box construction. The height to
which any type of topping should be carried for any point along the levee can best
be established by running a line of levels and determining a profile to reach. Any of
the types of capping need only be built to a height sufficient to take care of a
predicted profile plus about two feet of freeboard.
Sack Topping
Sack topping consist of constructing a small banquette on the crown of the levee to
the required width as described below. The crown of the levee is scarified by
plowing furrows, or by other means to a depth of two or more inches and to within
one foot of the riverside edge of the levee crown. This step is very important as it
provides a good bond between the levee crown and the capping. Additional
bonding can be obtained by digging a trench to accommodate a row of sandbags
parallel to the crown. The sack earth is then placed to within one foot of the
riverside edge of the crown to the desired height. The sacks should be laid in
alternate directions with the bottom layer placed length-wise along the levee and
the next layer cross-wise). All sacks should be well tramped into place after each
layer has been placed. The topping should have sufficient base width to prevent
failure. The face should have a slope of approximately 1H:1V or steeper if the sack
topping is placed on an earth levee and 2.5H:1V if placed on a smooth base such as
concrete or asphalt, but in no case should the base be less than three times the
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City of Dallas
height. The top layer of sacks should be at least 3-feet wide. If the wave action
increases in severity, gravel-filled sacks should be placed against the front facing of
the sacked earth topping (Reference 4, Section V).
3. Communication Between Agencies
Communication with USACE
Flood Control contacts TWM who will contact USACE, Forth Worth District Engineer to
report emergency repairs or major issues, report operations, or to request advice on
emergency repairs. If needed, USACE will provide immediate flood response assistance
to protect life and property.
For USACE post flood response assistance, authority is provided by Public Law 84-99.
OEM may request post flood assistance by contacting the State Office of Emergency
Management. The Governor or his authorized representative would then request
assistance from USACE in writing. If approved, post flood response assistance will be
provided for a maximum of 10 days from the date of receipt of the Governor’s written
request for assistance (Reference 6).
Communication with Railroad
Flood Control has procedures to determine when flood wall closures should be
constructed at railroad passages on the Lower East Levee and when flood gates should
be closed on the Rochester Levee. Two open railroad passages on the Lower East Levee
exist and ten flood gates are present on the Rochester Levee. For flood gates located at
railroad passages, Flood Control will notify the Union Pacific Railroad Company prior to
the river levels reaching critical elevations at the flood gates. Flood Control will utilize
the elevations reported in the O&M Manual to initiate preparations to close the gates
and activate the closures. (Reference 4, Section IV). Following is the contact information
for the Union Pacific Railroad:
Union Pacific Railroad
Main Contact: Steve Martchenke
Phone Number: 817-353-7625, Cell Phone Number: 817-368-2130
4. Personnel, Materials and Equipment Resources
Table 3 includes resources and personnel available to help with flood wall and flood
gate closures. If additional resources are needed, OEM will coordinate assistance from
Streets Services and/or Dallas Water Utilities (Reference 4, Section IV).
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City of Dallas
Table 3 – Available Resources and Personnel
Quantity
Description
Flood
Street
Dallas Water
Control Services
Utilities
3
2
0
Skid Steers
2
4
0
Rubber Tire Loader
2
4
0
Gradall
7
4
4
Track Equipment
2
4
10
Backhoe
4
2
0
Cutting Torches
15
10
10
Dump Trucks
60
50
20
Personnel
Total
5
6
6
15
16
6
35
130
Materials required to close flood walls and gates include approximately 400 sand bags,
37 HASCO bags, and 400 cubic yards of fine sand. Approximately 37 HASCO bags are
required to fill a Model F-4315 flood protection barrier (Reference 4, Section IV).
5. Closure Teams
All Flood Control personnel will be ready and used as needed during emergency closures
of the Flood Wall opening. Field Crews including mowing crews, channel crews, levee
maintenance crews, concrete crews and technical crews including mechanics,
electricians, and technicians will work together in accomplishing the task. If needed,
departments of Street Services and Water Utilities will assist.
6. Closure Drills – Field Exercises and Trial Repairs
At least once a year, as part of Flood Control’s O&M preventative maintenance, a trial
erection of each type of closure structure is performed. As part of maintenance
requirements, Flood Control personnel have experience repairing slopes that are
damaged by high water (Reference 4, Section IV).
C. EMERGENCY SUPPLIES AND RESOURCES
1. Equipment
Flood Control has the following equipment available for flood control operations and
flood fighting activities (Reference 4, Appendix V).
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City of Dallas
Table 4 - Flood Control Division: Flood
Operations and Flood Fighting Equipment
Equipment
Track Loader
Track Equipment
Gradall
Skid Steers
Rubber Tire Loader
Tractor and Mowers
Backhoe
Bucket Trucks
Fork Lift
Maintainer
Roll-off Truck
Pick up/Crew Cabs
12-yd Dump Trucks
Haul Truck
Fuel Truck
Chipper
Jet/Vac Truck
Service Vans
CCTV vans/trucks
Service Trucks
Quantity
5
7
2
3
1
10
2
2
1
2
1
23
21
3
1
1
2
3
5
3
Flood Control may request additional pumps from Dallas Water Utilities if needed.
Table 5 - Equipment - Pumps
Type
Flood Control
DWU
2-inch submersible
1
0
3-inch submersible
1
0
4-inch trailer
1
4
6-inch trailer
1
2
8-inch trailer
0
2
Total
1
1
5
3
2
2. Materials
The City of Dallas, TWM Department has the following items in stock and readily
available. The on-hand supply of ready-mix concrete and sand and gravel varies. Prior
to a heavy rain event, Flood Control should purchase supplies needed from local
vendors. Flood Control has approximately 500 sand bags on hand and additional sand
bags are available from Street Services and Dallas Water Utilities.
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City of Dallas
Table 6 - Materials
Items
Rip Rap
Sand and Gravel
Sandbags
Pumps
Pipe
Ready-mix Concrete
Contact
Flood Control
Flood Control
Flood Control
Flood Control
Flood Control
Flood Control
Location
Texas Industries
Texas Industries
2645 Irving Blvd.
BARCO Pumps
2645 Irving Blvd.
Local Vendor
The following table includes local vendors that Flood Control may contact to make
additional purchases as needed.
Table 7 - Local Equipment and Materials Vendors
Heavy Equipment Service
Sand and Gravel Supply
Ready-Mix Concrete Supply
and Rental
Hertz EQ
TXI
Custom Crete
10966 Harry Hines Blvd
1341 W. Mockingbird Ln.
2624 Joe Field Rd. Dallas, TX
214-352-4891
972-647-3770
972-243-4466
Holt Rental
Earth Haulers
Southern Star
2000 E. Airport Freeway
11500 Mosier Valley Rd
8000 Freeway Pkwy Suite 2000
972-721-2998
972-242-3280
972-621-0999
Pumps
Sand Bags
BARCO
Concrete Access
2205 South industrial Blvd
3130 Commonwealth
214-428-5691
214-630-4277
Odessa Pumps
Builders Supply
2430 W. Main
2001 Bryan Street
972-249-7870
214-880-3500
3. Workforce
The Flood Control Division has a total of 109 personnel to assist in flood fighting
activities (Reference 4, Appendix V).
4. Contractors
City of Dallas does not currently have any contractors under contract.
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City of Dallas
VIII. RECOVERY
The City of Dallas MEOP, Annex J, Recovery Plan should be used as the guide for recovery
efforts unless otherwise stated below. It is assumed that those who possess this manual also
possess the City of Dallas MEOP.
As stated in MEOP, Annex J, there are five steps in the disaster recovery program:
1. Pre-Emergency Preparedness - Prior to an emergency, this Emergency Action Plan shall
be developed and maintained and key recovery staff members appointed, including the
Damage Assessment Officer, Public Assistance Officer, and Individual Assistance Officer.
These individuals shall obtain training and develop operating procedures for recovery
activities. Requirements shall be determined and basic training provided for personnel
assigned to serve on staff damage assessment teams and assist in recovery programs.
2. Initial Damage Assessment – An initial damage assessment is required to support a
request for state and federal assistance. This assessment will be conducted as soon as
possible, often while some emergency response activities are still underway. Local
damage assessment teams will carry out the initial assessment under the direction of
the Damage Assessment Officer. During this phase, the Mayor should declare a local
state of disaster, as such a declaration allows local officials to invoke emergency powers
to deal with the disaster, and is required to obtain state and federal disaster recovery
assistance.
Guidance on issuing a local disaster declaration is provided in MEOP, Annex U, Legal.
3. Requesting Assistance - State and federal disaster assistance must be requested in a
letter to the Governor, which must be accompanied by a Disaster Summary Outline
(DSO) reporting the results of the initial damage assessment and the local disaster
declaration. Based on the information contained in the DSO and other information, the
Governor may issue a state disaster declaration for the affected area and may request
that the President issue a federal disaster declaration. Refer to MEOP, Annex J, Section
V.C for specific procedures on requesting assistance.
Sample request for Emergency Declaration letters can be found in Appendix 1 to MEOP,
Annex U, Legal.
4. Short Term Recovery Activities - Prior to a federal disaster or major emergency
declaration, state disaster response and recovery assistance, which typically consists of
equipment, personnel, and technical assistance, may be deployed as soon as it is
requested through the Disaster District Committee (DDC) in Garland. During the initial
stages of recovery, state agencies and volunteer groups may assist disaster victims with
basic needs, such as temporary shelter, food, and clothing. A local donations
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City of Dallas
management program may be activated to distribute donated goods and funds to
disaster victims and assign volunteer workers to assist victims and local government.
See MEOP, Annex O, Human Services, and MEOP, Annex T, Donations Management,
regarding these programs.
5. Post-Declaration Recovery Programs - Recovery programs authorized by the Stafford
Act and other statutes begin when the President issues a disaster or major emergency
declaration or when other types of disaster declarations are issued. See MEOP, Annex J
Section V.D regarding these programs.
The USACE, authorized by P.L. 84-99, may provide support to local and state entities for
emergency management activities including disaster preparedness, emergency
operations, and rehabilitation.
Primary responsibility for the recovery function is assigned to the OEM. A complete list of
responsibilities can be found in MEOP, Annex J, Section VI. Organization & Assignment of
Responsibilities.
Following an Emergency all departments and agencies will:
1. Identify and prioritize areas to survey
2. Refresh damage assessment team members on assessment procedures
3. Deploy damage assessment teams
4. Complete damage survey forms and forward to the Damage Assessment Officer
5. Catalog and maintain copies of maps, photos, and videotapes documenting damage for
further reference
6. Provide technical assistance for preparation of recovery project plans.
7. Maintain disaster-related records
A. HEALTH AND SAFETY HAZARD ASSESSMENT
Hazard Mitigation is a long-term, on-going process, that identifies planning and
implementation actions applicable to both pre-incident and post-incident situations. The
City’s methodologies and progressive steps to identify the hazards and reduce the risk
associated with these hazards can be found in MEOP, Annex P, Hazard Mitigation.
Coordination is needed to determine the extent of the issues associated with the Trinity
River Levee System and the impact had on each predefined evacuation zones.
The City of Dallas shall assist with essential support to victims of any levee related incident.
This includes food, clothing, and mental health services. Information on these programs as
well as volunteer organizations can be found in MEOP, Annex O, Human Services.
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City of Dallas
B. ROAD ASSESSMENT
It is the responsibility of the Public Works and Transportation Department to survey roads,
bridges, traffic control devices, and other facilities, and note damage and estimated cost of
restoration. Only damage sustained as a result of an event directly related to levee issues
should be noted.
The infrastructure responsibilities of the Public Works and Transportation Department
during the recovery effort can be found in MEOP, Annex K, Public Works and Engineering.
C. UTILITY ASSESSMENT AND SAFETY
A detailed Utility Assessment Plan can be found in MEOP, Annex L, Utilities.
In the event of pump station failure, priority should be given to restoring those facilities in
order to assist in the recovery efforts. Information on the pump stations can be found in the
O&M Manual.
D. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
The Damage Assessment procedure can be found in MEOP, Annex J, Recovery Plan, Section
V.B.
Priority should be given to the assessment of damage to the levees and flood control
facilities.
E. SECURITY AND COMPROMISED AREAS
It will be necessary to control an evacuated area to protect public health and safety and
deter theft. That responsibility falls onto the Dallas Police Department and is illustrated in
MEOP, Annex G, Law Enforcement.
F. CLEAN-UP/DEBRIS MANAGEMENT
The Debris management procedure can be found in the MEOP, Annex K, Public Works and
Engineering, Appendix 2.
Priority should be given to removing debris from the evacuation routes illustrated in this
plan. These routes will be used for emergency personnel as well as returning evacuees. A
majority of the evacuation routes are local roads and are the responsibility of the City of
Dallas. If Interstate 30 and Interstate 35 are impacted the Texas Department of
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City of Dallas
Transportation (TxDOT) is responsible for the clearing and disposal of debris on the highway
and right of way.
Following an event, Temporary Debris Storage and Reduction (TDSR) Facilities should be
established. These TDSR Facilities should not be located in the risk zones identified in this
plan.
G. EVACUEE RETURN
The return of evacuees to their homes or business in evacuated areas requires the same
consideration, coordination, and control as the original evacuation. All the above sections
must be addressed before evacuees can return. MEOP, Annex E, Evacuations Section V. J
addresses the procedure for returning evacuees. If possible the same evacuation routes
identified in this plan should be used for returning evacuees. It is essential that evacuees do
not return to the evacuated area until a full inspection of the levee has been conducted and
any issues resolved.
It may be necessary to use public transportation to return evacuees to their homes and
businesses. The City should continue to coordinate the transportation of equipment,
supplies and passengers as needed. The transportation plan can be found in MEOP, Annex S,
Transportation.
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IX.
APPROVAL OF THE PLAN
We the undersigned individuals, as authorized by the laws and regulations of the State of Texas,
hereby adopt this Emergency Action Plan and agree to execute it.
Kelly High, Director
Trinity Watershed Management
Kenny Shaw, Director
Office of Emergency Management
Gilbert Aguilar, Director
Department of Street Services
Mary K. Suhm, City Manager
City of Dallas, Texas
Eddie Burns, Sr., Fire Chief
Dallas Fire-Rescue
Police Chief
Dallas Police Department
44
Trinity River Federal Levee System
Emergency Action Plan
City of Dallas
X.
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PLAN
Copies of this Emergency Action Plan have been provided to all individuals or groups who are
signatory parties to the plan. Large scale maps are on file with the Office of Emergency
Management for evacuation purposes. The following table includes a list of Record Holders of
the Emergency Action Plan.
Table 8 - Record Holders of Emergency Action Plan
Copy Number
City of Dallas Department
Contact
Master and 1-7
Office of Emergency Management
Kenny Shaw, Director
8
Trinity Watershed Management
Kelly High, Director
9
Trinity Watershed Management
Dhruv Pandya, Assistant Director
10
Trinity Watershed Management
Steve Parker, Program Manager
11
Street Services
Gilbert Aguilar, Director
12
USACE – Fort Worth District
13
Dallas Police Department
14
Dallas Fire-Rescue
45
Trinity River Federal Levee System
Emergency Action Plan
City of Dallas
XI.
REFERENCES
1. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Dallas County Preliminary Digital Flood Insurance
Rate Map (DFIRM) Database, 2007.
2. Levee Remediation Plan Draft, Dallas Floodway System. HNTB, dated February 8, 2010.
3. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Dallas Floodway System - Periodic Inspection Report No. 9, 2007.
4. City of Dallas, Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Manual - Dallas Trinity River Levee & Floodway
System, Revised 2007.
5.
Central Wastewater Treatment Plant Flood Protection Improvements for Dallas Water Utilities.
Survey Information. Halff Associates, Inc. March 2007.
6. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
“Emergency Management – Emergency Assistance.”
http://www.swf.usace.army.mil/pubdata/ppmd/EmerMgt/emergency_assistance.asp
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