Heidegger on Education: Between Man and Animals1
Tony See
Abstract
Although much has been devoted to the examination of Heidegger’s ontological and
political philosophy, relatively little has been devoted to an examination of
Heidegger’s educational ideas. With the rare exception of Iain Thomson’s Heidegger
on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education (2005) among others, the
bulk of the work seems to be directed at his political commitents or his ontological
thought. This is unfortunate given that even a cursory survey of Heidegger’s writings
today would indicate that the philosopher had a persistent concern with issues in
education throughout his philosophical career. This paper seeks to turn our attention
to Heidegger’s educational ideas by first looking at how three of his major works are
relevant to education.
Introduction
In the winter semester of the University of Freiburg in 1929-30, Martin Heidegger
taught a course entitled The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude,
Solitude (Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysics: Welt – Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit). In
1975, while preparing the manuscript of this course for publication and just a year
1
This is adapted from a keynote lecture in the Institute of Education (IOE), University of London (UOL)
in June 2013, with participants and speakers from the National Institute of Education (NIE), Singapore.
1
before his death, he inscribed a dedication to Eugene Fink in the text that is to be
published as vol. 29-30 of the Gesamtausgabe. The text recalls how Fink had
wished that this text was to be published before all others, and the quiet inclusion of
this dedication, after more than four decades, suggests that the course was in some
ways fundamental to Heidegger’s overall project.2
A first hint can be found when we look more closely at the title. Although the
title of the course suggests that the course was about the “fundamentals” of
metaphysics, implying that it was about the “basics” of metaphysics, a closer
inspection reveals that the course was about anything but “basics.” The word
“fundamental” is a translation of the German word “Grund” which can be read as
“ground.” This suggests that Heidegger’s course was about the very “Ground” of
metaphysics itself, on what actually grounds metaphysics in the sense of a “premetaphysics.” The term “Grundbegriffe” in turn suggests that Heidegger was
interested in the “grounding concept” of metaphysics. This is expressed as an
analytic of “boredom” in human experience in the first part of the course, and an
analytic of “animal experience” in the second part. It is to this latter part that we are
concerned with today because it relates directly to the question of education, art and
technology.
Heidegger began his analysis of animal experience by way of making a
threefold distinction between the world of “stone,” “animal” and finally “human
beings.”
These are distinguished by the structure of 1) the stone is worldless
(Weltlos), 2) the animal is “poor in the world” (Weltarm) while 3) man is “world-
2
Giorgio Agamben (2004). The Open: Man and Animal, Translated by Kevin Attell, Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press. 49.
2
forming” (Weltbildend).3 This threefold structure defines each being’s relation to the
world and their distinction from each other in the world. The stone can be seen as
being “worldless” in relation to animals, and the animal is “poor in the world” in
relation to human beings, who are “world-forming.”
Here we are concerned with the question of why Heidegger was particularly
concerned about the distinction between human beings and animals, and in
particular with animal experience? We find that Being and Time, published in 1927,
explored at great lengths the analytic of Dasein, the “being-there” that replaced the
Cartesian subject, Heidegger did not complete his analytic of Dasein in relation to
animals – in other words, after seemingly innumerable pages devoted to the
existential conditions of Dasein such as “fallenness,” “conscience” and “mood,” he
did not in the end complete his analysis of Dasein in relation to animals, the
distinction between man and animal remains a posit for the continuation of
discussion. The publication of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, with its
focus on this very issue, could be seen as an important supplement to Heidegger’s
Being and Time, a supplement which seems to be so important that it has to be read
first in the Heidegger corpus.
Man and Animal
What is of special interest to us is the distinction between man’s and animals’
relation to the world. The “world” here, is as what Heidegger defined, not the material
Heidegger, Martin – The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude,
Translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, 1995. 192.
3
3
world or the idealistic world, but the phenomenological “world” and it is defined in
terms of “the totality of beings” accessible to beings. 4 And in the context of this
“world,” the animal is regarded as being “poor in the world,” not in the sense that it is
lesser than human beings, but that it is “deprived” of something (Entbehren). 5
Deprived of what? The animal is, despite all of its intelligences, strengths and
capabilities, sense and sensibilities, “poor in the world” because it is characterized by
“absorption in itself” (Eingenommenheit in sich), what Heidegger would call a state of
“captivation” (Benommenheit), that is, animals are characterized by their captivation
by the beings they have access to, they are in a perpetual state of captivation.6
Heidegger did consider the possibility of animals having temporary moments of noncaptivation, but these are not its natural state.7 The ontological status of animals is
such that it can be “open” (offen) but not openable (offenbar), that is, they are open
to the world and yet, not open in some sense. In other words, beings are fully
accessible to animals, and yet, animals cannot access them for some reasons.
Animals have a relation to beings, and yet, they also have a non-relation to beings,
there is a sort of relation of non-relation. This is because although beings are open to
animals, the animal’s structure is such that it has a “disinhibiting ring” which only
gives it access a certain kings of beings and not others (Enthemmung) and this limits
what it can affect or not affect its behavior. In other words, objects are open to
animals but the animals’ openness are restricted.8 The animals see objects, to be
4
Ibid. 193.
5
Ibid. 195.
6
Ibid. 239.
7
Ibid. 239.
8
Ibid. 255.
4
sure, but there is no “unconcealment” of the object. Therefore, Heidegger would use
the phrase “poor in the world” to describe animal experience.9
In contrast to animals, man is distinct in that he is “world-forming.” This does
not mean that man somehow created the world, but only that the world has to be
constituted or worked out in some sense by human beings. Heidegger’s statement in
fact contains two meanings. Firstly, that Man is world-forming in the sense that he
has a pre-logical openness to being, - there is a sort of indeterminate openness to
beings, there is no “inhibiting ring” that prescribes what beings man can or cannot
access in the world. 2) Secondly, man is “world-forming” in the sense that he has to
act to “complete” the beings “in the direction of the whole.” This completion of the
incomplete is not merely the addition of something missing, but “forming of the
already prevailing” whole that we do not at all explicitly grasp at the very beginning,
but which becomes progressively clearer if we persists in our acts of completion.
Heidegger gave an example for this through the example of a child – a child at a
certain level, when on seeing that a board is badly positioned, will sometimes go and
reposition the board in a proper manner without prior instruction.10 Of course, a child
can also be very destructive you might say, toppling the coffee on the table, bursting
into horrendous screams at the top of its voice, smashing your favorite cup and
tearing your favorite Heidegger books to shreds etc. but these are not philosophical
moments, what is philosophical and demand questioning is how would a child come
to bring order to disorder when it grows up. Using a semi-Kantian language, what is
there is something rather than nothing?
9
Agamben, The Open, Ibid. 55.
10
5
Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Ibid. 348-349.
Philosophy and the Positive Sciences
The idea that there is a distinction between man and animal in the Fundamental
Concepts of Metaphysics was not merely an afterthought, upon seeing that the
analysis of Dasein in Being and Time was incomplete. The seed of the idea can be
traced to the early Heidegger. In his early Freiburg lecture course Towards the
Definition of Philosophy, it can be seen as that as early as the summer of 1919,
almost ten years before the publication of Being and Time in 1927, the young
Heidegger was already concerned about issues in the German educational system,
in particular, on the issue between philosophy and the positive sciences. Here, the
young Heidegger emphasized that philosophy proper is distinct from the sciences
because the sciences belong to the category of “worldviews” which do not question
their own assumptions but proceeds to question and investigate regions of beings
already prescribed. The sciences in general proceed with certain postulates or first
principles and they do not in general question these principles. If the sciences were
to question these first principles it would immediately transform science into a
philosophy.11 Biology, for instance, studies how living beings function, and it can tell
us in every greater scientific detail the logos, or the order and structure of living
beings, and it can even help us to gain control of life-forms, to dominate life-forms
through systematic planning, but it cannot tell us finally what life is.12 This remains
out of reach of the positive sciences. In fact, the positive sciences may even have
Thomson, Ian – “Heidegger and the Politics of the University,” Journal of the History of Philosophy,
41/ 4, 515 – 542.
11
12
6
Thomson, Politics of the University, Ibid. 528.
vested interest in not addressing these questions, because to engage these
questions means that the status of the positive sciences itself would come into
question. This does not mean that science is necessarily opposed to philosophy, in
fact, the very possibility of science depends on the possibility of questioning i.e.
philosophy. In very general terms, science wants to restrict questioning to particular
regions so that it can proceed with its inquiries, so that projects may be pursued, and
investigations performed, but the obsession with mere performance of inquiry may
divert our “captivated” attention from the very aims of the inquiry itself, which is none
other than truth as unconcealment. Therefore, the positive sciences live in a
precarious existence in relation to philosophy – it is derived from philosophical
questioning but it cannot acknowledge philosophical questioning. In Heidegger’s
words, the theoretical world is derivative of the lived existential experiences and
questions not otherwise, the theoretical world is not the naturally given, and it is
accessible only through a constant and renewed divesting of the life of the natural
world. 13
Education: Between Art and Design
What has all this got to do with education, art and design? It is our contention that
just as there is a clear distinction between man and animals, and between
philosophy and the sciences, we would rethink university education in the direction of
the former in distinction from the latter. To use a term from Fine Arts, there should be
“art” and not merely “design” in education. To be sure, I am using “design” in a more
13
7
Heidegger, Towards the Definition of Philosophy: Ibid. 179.
restricted sense to mean designing with clear purposes, with an end in mind, to
mean having clear and directed goals in mind from the very beginning, a method that
clearly serves the techno-capitalist complex, in a manner that reminds us of what
means-end reasoning used by the thinker Max Horkheimer. 14 We are aware that
there are expanded and richer senses of the term “design” which gives way for
possibilities, creativity and so on.
From a Heideggerian perspective, the critical problem with an education that
is overly obsessed with design, with prescribed ends in mind, is that while it may
open up regions of phenomenon, perhaps, in a more robust and utilitarian way, it
may also at the same time close off other possibilities more permanently. In other
words, education using these methods would be more akin to furthering man’s
animal instincts instead of instead of opening up ethical, aesthetic and even
philosophical possibilities. Likewise, it is true that while design thinking may make for
better control of phenomena and even assist us in the dominance of particular
regions of beings, yet, it may inhibit the opening of other regions of phenomena, and
in this way, closes off possibilities. In a way that reminds us of Herbert Marcuse’s
“One Dimensional” Man, this would only render human beings, who are responsible
for “world-formation” into mere beings that passively submit to the dictates of
captivating phenomena.
An interesting question which could be raised is what would a Heideggerian
“design” curriculum look like? What would it look like in detail? What would it require
the students to do in the first ten weeks? What would be the course aims and course
outcome? What are the credits per hour that we should allocate? One could go on
14
8
Max Horkheimer – Eclipse of Reason, London and New York: Continuum, 2004.
indefinitely down to the delivery of content per minute. One difficulty in addressing
questions like these is that these are language systems that are adopted from the
positive sciences and they are already loaded with certain assumptions that we are
challenging in the first place. If Heidegger’s analysis of the distinction between man
and animal ends with all too clear instructions on what the final ends of education
might be, in other words, if Heidegger came up with a clear set of rules for
implementing a “Heideggerian” curriculum, one which needs no questioning itself,
then we would fall back into the framing set by the positive sciences. What
Heidegger’s thinking can offer us are guidelines for a new way of looking at and
“designing” education.
Before we end today’s discussion, let us also take a look at teaching itself. It
is interesting that the later Heidegger moves from education to teaching itself for the
two are related. In What is Called Thinking?, a work that the later Heidegger devoted
to thinking, he devoted a significant portion of the work to consider the question of
teaching. Essentially, if we truly regard thinking to be important, then we must ask
what sort of teaching and what sort of teachers enable thinking to take place, that
“lets” learning occur. Heidegger would call this “Letting-Be” (Gelassenheit). In What
is Called Thinking? Heidegger states:
Teaching is even more difficult than learning because what
teaching calls for is this: to let learn. The real teacher, in fact,
lets nothing else be learned than—learning.... The teacher is
ahead of his apprentices in this alone, that he has still more to
9
learn than they—he has to learn to let them learn.15
Teaching then, is not indoctrination, not the introduction of some content to some
unsuspecting students. But neither is it not doing anything, and allowing the students
to do whatever they want. Teaching is having teachers that know how to let students
learn the meaning of learning itself. This in turn requires teachers that are still in
some sense, in the process of learning.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have discovered that although much scholarship has been devoted
to the ontological and political philosophy of Heidegger, he was also preoccupied
with the question of education throughout his career. This is evidenced in three main
works cited in this paper: as early as the 1919-20 Freiburg period when he gave the
Towards the Definition of Philosophy courses, through Being and Time in 1927 to the
later period when he completed What is Called Thinking? The difference is,
Heidegger did not deal with the question of education in isolation but in relation to
ontology and the meaning of human existence in contradistinction from animals. If
his thinking did not provide us with a systematic educational theory, however, a
number of principles may be derived. Let us end with a consideration of the following
“Heideggerian” principles for education:
15
10
Heidegger, Martin – What is Called Thinking? New York: Harper, 1968. 15.
1) Education can begin with the recognition of human
openness in distinction from their animal counterparts.
2) Education can help students engage philosophical
indeterminancy
instead
of
relying
on
scientific
certainties..
3) Education can be more creative and open-ended
instead of being instrumental and closed-ended.
4) Education can engage in auto-critique and provide
necessary conditions but not sufficient conditions for
thinking to take place.
5) Education can place an emphasis in teaching as
“letting-be” (Gelassenheit), that is, to let thinking come
into being.
Bibliography
Agamben, Giorgio – The Open: Man and Animal, Translated by Kevin Attell,
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2004.
Heidegger, Martin – The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude,
Solitude, Translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995.
11
Heidegger, Martin – Towards the Definition of Philosophy, Translated by Ted Sadler,
London: Continuum, 2008.
Heidegger, Martin – What is Called Thinking? New York: Harper, 1968.
Horkheimer, Max – Eclipse of Reason, London and New York: Continuum, 2004.
Thomson, Iain – “Heidegger and the Politics of the University,” Journal of the History
of Philosophy, 41/ 4, 515 – 542.
Thomson, Iain – Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of
Education, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
12