Introduction
By December 1813 the only obstacle to a victory for Sixth Coalition, in the protracted
Napoleonic Wars, was its own diplomatic and military disunity.1 Until this point
Britain had acted as paymasters of the coalition against the French Emperor, but now
sought to have a greater diplomatic influence on the end of the war and the
subsequent settlement of Europe.2 The Secretary of Sate for Foreign Affairs, Viscount
Castlereagh, was chosen by the British cabinet to represent Britain in the allied
negotiations on the continent. The government deemed it essential to dispatch a senior
minister to secure their primary objectives, particularly after terms had been offered to
Napoleon at Frankfurt in November that endangered some key national interests.3
Thus Castlereagh spent the majority of his time on the continent between January
1814 and February 1815, acting on behalf of the British government at the allied
negotiations at Châtillon, Chaumont, Paris and Vienna. 4 This study asserts that
Castlereagh continually and consistently acted to fulfil the aims of the British
government during this period. It argues that despite briefly defying the orders of his
Cabinet at the end of 1814, Castlereagh predominantly followed the wishes of his
government and successfully guaranteed its aims by January 1815.
Castlereagh departed for the continent with a clear set of objectives, agreed by the
Cabinet on 26th December 1813.5 The primary evidence will illustrate that the foreign
minister followed these instructions and any further orders from Lord Liverpool, the
Prime Minister, and his cabinet implicitly until October 1814. At the Congress of
Vienna however, Castlereagh’s perception of how to guarantee these aims
successfully differed from the other members of his government, particularly during
the negotiations over the Polish and Saxon settlements. The challenges faced in
negotiating a settlement for Poland appeared to cause Castlereagh to develop a vested
interest in the fate of central Europe.6
The focus of the topic is that of a British perspective. This will help to support the
notion that Castlereagh consistently acted within the interests of his government,
helping to secure lasting peace in Europe, and to allow Britain to consolidate its status
as an international hegemonic power.7 The importance of the Russian, Prussian,
Austrian and French ministers in the negotiation process cannot be understated and an
appreciation of their influence on Castlereagh’s thoughts and actions will be included
if only in a secondary nature. This focus of the investigation has also contributed to
the selection of evidence, which will primarily concentrate on the correspondence
between Castlereagh and other senior officials in the British government. Liverpool
1
C. K. Webster, The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815 (London, 1937), pp.1-11.
ibid, pp. 10-11.
3
M. Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy After Napoleon
(London, 2013), p. 50.
4
J. W. Derry, Castlereagh, (London, 1976), p. 13
5
Memorandum of the Cabinet, 26th December 1913, Foreign Office: Continent Conferences:
Delegation Archives (henceforth F.O. Cont.), The National Archives (henceforth TNA), FO 139/1.
6
H. G. N. Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna: a study in Allied Unity 1812-1822 (London, 1947),
P.122.
7
P. W. Schroeder, The transformation of European politics 1763-1848 (London, 1996), p. 537.
2
and Earl Bathurst, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, took charge of the
domestic discussions of British foreign policy and were Castlereagh’s principle
contacts at home.8 Thus the correspondence between these men offer the greatest
insight into Castlereagh’s thought process and actions while on the continent.
Most primary material had been selected from collections of these regular
communications. The General Correspondence before 1906: Continent Conferences
(FO 139) and Continent Conferences: Delegation Archives (FO 92) are both useful
collections of Foreign Office Records, which include the correspondence, memoranda
and protocols between the ministers in Europe and the British government in this
period.9 Material taken from contemporaneous dispatches will illustrate Castlereagh’s
thoughts and actions during his time in Europe, and also highlight the response and
orders of his government on aspects of the negotiations. The investigation will also
utilise correspondence found in other collections to add depth to the analysis of
Castlereagh’s actions as a representative of Britain, such as the Correspondence,
Despatches, and other papers of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquess of
Londonderry (1853) and Supplementary Despatches, Correspondences and
Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington (1862).10 These include, for
example, Castlereagh’s communication to Wellington regarding the indirect
importance of the Polish settlement to British securities. These despatches hold the
principle evidence in support of this paper’s evaluation, as they will best help to
understand to what extent Castlereagh followed the aims of British government from
Châtillon to Vienna.
The influence of parliamentary and public opinion grew substantially during
Liverpool’s government, as publications and pamphlets such as Tory Quarterly, Whig
Edinburgh, Radical Westminster and The Times were often explicitly sceptical of
government policies.11 While evidence of this nature contributes to a wider
understanding of policy formulation, it had a minimal effect on Castlereagh’s actions
while on the continent and, moreover, it took two weeks for news to reach the foreign
minister when at Vienna.12 Public sentiment would be relayed to him by
correspondence from Bathurst or Liverpool. An understanding of whether
Castlereagh’s actions were affected by public opinion can be extracted from these
communications alone.
Sassas The focus of the paper is such that parliamentary debates do not contribute to
an understanding of Castlereagh’s actions on the continent. Although Castlereagh
held the position as Leader of the House of Commons after Spencer Perceval’s
assassination in 1812, his extended absences from England meant that he faced few
interrogations of his negotiation policy from the Commons. 13 As the sources will
illustrate Castlereagh’s actions were subject to approval in parliament, but this was
generally just part of the ratification process. The Cabinet faced little resistance to
sending Castlereagh to Europe, and as Bew highlights, even a Whig MP, Sir Robert
Heron, argued that the pressing continental matters should be placed in the hands of
8
N. Thompson, Earl Bathurst and the British Empire 1762-1834 (1999), p. 72.
F.O
10
reference
11
D. Beales, From Castlereagh to Gladstone 1815-1885 (London, 1969), p.75.
12
G. Dallas, 1815 the Roads to Waterloo (London, 2001)
13
Derry, Castlereagh, p.7
9
Liverpool’s ministers at this time.14 Once again Castlereagh’s primary source of news
of any public or parliamentary development were his correspondence from London,
and thus they are understandably the central focus of this paper.
This investigation is unique in nature in analysing Castlereagh’s role in securing
British aims between December 1813 and January 1814, by predominantly examining
correspondence between Castlereagh and the cabinet. Thus the investigation can
suggest more assertively that Castlereagh did follow the direct desires of his
government and achieve success for Britain. It will profit from a narrower focus that
other works have lacked, and be less influenced by its contemporary environment for
it.
Perceptions of Castlereagh
Castlereagh’s career as a whole was criticised vehemently by contemporaries and
later liberals, who wished to exaggerate the juxtaposition between George Canning,
the liberal, and Castlereagh, the reactionary.15 He was perceived as a repressor of
liberalism and nationalism and ‘repelled contemporary poets.’16 Lord Bryon and
Percy Bysshe Shelley memorialised him harshly after his suicide in 1822.17 Lord
Robert Cecil failed to redeem his reputation in the Quarterly Review in 1862, and this
meant that Castlereagh was generally viewed with ignominy in the nineteenth
century.18 The publication of his correspondence, by half brother Charles Stewart,
also failed to improve this perception, because there was ‘little historical explanation
or analysis through its twelve volumes.’19
The historian responsible for changing this perception was C. K. Webster, who in his
various works on the foreign secretary and the Congress of Vienna expatiates the
central role Castlereagh had in securing British aims on the continent.20 Webster
wrote these texts with close analysis of the communication archived in the Foreign
Office Continental Records, the collection of Castlereagh’s correspondence and
Wellington’s despatches. The sophistication of Webster’s works has warranted it to
be a ‘definitive’ study of the subject.21 This investigation therefore follows Webster’s
methodological approach to primary material and, further corroborates that
Castlereagh’s role in these continental negotiations was crucial to achieving British
objectives. This paper does however intend to challenge Webster’s seminal work on
one aspect.
14
Bew, J. Castlereagh: From Enlightenment to Tyranny (London, 2011), p. 331.
Derry, Castlereagh, p.11.
16
C. J. Bartlett, Castlereagh (London, 1966)
17
G. G. Byron, ‘Epigram’, The Works of Lord Byron; with his Letters, Journals and his Life, (ed.)
Thomas Moore Esq., (London, 1832), v. VII, p. 72: Shelley, P. B. The Mask of Anarchy: A Poem, (ed.)
Leigh Hunt (London, 1832).
18
R. Cecil, ‘Castlereagh’, Essays by the late Marquess of Salisbury: Biographical (London, 1905), pp.
1-69: S. R. Graubard, ‘Castlereagh and the Peace of Europe’, Journal of British Studies 3.1 (1963),
p.79
19
Derry, Castlereagh, p.3.
20
Webster, C. K. The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815 (London, 1919): British Diplomacy 1813-1815:
Select documents dealing with the reconstruction of Europe (London, 1921): The foreign policy of
Castlereagh 1812-1815 (London, 1931)
21
D. Perkins, ‘Review: The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1812-15: Britain and the Reconstruction of
Europe, Webster’, The American Historical Review 37 (2) (1932), pp. 323-324.
15
Webster wrote that Castlereagh attempted to emulate the foreign policy of William
Pitt the Younger; arguing that these men both prioritised a balance of power in
Europe instead of advancing the hegemony of the British Empire.22 H. Nicholson
reiterates the view presented by Webster in, The Congress of Vienna: A study in
Allied Unity (1946), which has, however, been criticised for a lack of independent
thought.23 Importantly there has been recognition that these views were formulated in
proximity to both World Wars.24 Discussing the foreign policy of Vienna in an
analogous manner is something that H. Kissinger continued in A World Restored:
Metternich, Castlereagh and the problems of peace 1812-22 (1954), and this can
perhaps simplify Castlereagh’s approach to foreign policy.25 Indeed Graubard
observed that historians were merely reiterating Webster’s notion that Castlereagh
followed Pitt’s policy in these negotiation, without challenging the idea itself.26
J. W. Derry was among the first to challenge this view and argued that Castlereagh
‘did not approach the problems of foreign policy in any doctrinal spirit.’27 In doing so
Derry was more assertively endorsing others who had suggested that Castlereagh’s
policy was personal and related to the priority to secure British interests.28 Historians
increasingly began to appreciate that Castlereagh had complete control of foreign
policy while on the continent, and the analysis of sources will support this.29
The investigation will highlight that while Castlereagh appreciated Pitt’s plans for
Europe, he negotiated in his own manner to secure British aims above any other
objectives.
Castlereagh’s endeavours were in fact unique to his circumstance, and he followed a
policy that he believed would ensure the security of British interests. His actions
during the protracted Polish negotiations, held during the Congress of Vienna, have
become a contentious issue, though. Castlereagh has been branded an idealist for
pursuing an over calculated solution for Poland, and that his pursuit of equilibrium
caused his priorities to change.30 Indeed even Kissinger describes Castlereagh’s
Polish solution as ‘mechanical’.31 Castlereagh’s priorities did not change, however,
and as the sources will indicate, he believed that creating equilibrium in Europe was
crucial to safeguarding the securities he had obtained at the beginning of 1814.
More recently Schroeder has argued that ‘balance of power politics’ ?, and that ‘under
the lead of the hegemonic powers’ the ministers returned to practices of political
equilibrium.32 This study substantiates this perception of Vienna, and argues that
22
Webster, The foreign policy of Castlereagh, p. 491.
Graubard, ‘Castlereagh’, p. 82.
24
R. Langhorne, ‘Reflections on the significance of the Congress of Vienna’, Review of International
Studies 12.4 (1986), pp. 313-324.
25 Q. Wright, ‘Review: A World Restored, Kissinger’, The American Historical Review 63.4 (1958),
pp. 953.
26
Graubard, ‘Castlereagh’, p. 82- 83.
27 Derry, Castlereagh, p.146.
28 Bartlett, Castlereagh, p. 142.
23
29 D. Hurd, Choose Your Weapons: The British Foreign Secretary – 200 Years of Argument, Success and Failure (London,
2010), p. 30.
30
Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 155.
H. A. Kissinger, ‘The Congress of Vienna: A Reappraisal’, World Politics 8.2 (1956), pp. 264-280.
32
P. W. Schroeder, ‘Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of power?’, The American Historical
Review 97.3 (1992), p704.
31
although Castlereagh lost Poland to Russia, he succeeded in resisting Prussia’s
intentions over Saxony. Castlereagh did achieve equilibrium in Europe, although not
in the manner he hoped, and successfully ensured that Britain retained its status as a
world power.33 Schroeder’s perception of the negotiations in central Europe is more
nuanced, and helps to illustrate that Castlereagh pursued equilibrium to achieve
British aims above other ambitions. Castlereagh did defy orders to achieve this
security, however, as the correspondences indicate, and it is at this point where
Castlereagh appears to be acting of his own accord and not those of his government.
Castlereagh, up until November 1814, had secured the majority of British aims in
negotiations prior to Vienna, and the more delicate aspects of the Congress caused a
divide between him and the Cabinet. The complications of the Polish and Saxon
arrangements almost led to the crisis of war, and resulted in a secret defensive alliance
between France, Austria and Britain on the 3 January 1815.34 The threat of war
against Russia and Prussia illustrated a clear disregard by Castlereagh of the interests
of the Cabinet, Parliament and the British public. This study will argue however that
Castlereagh gained greater perspective at Vienna, and that despite appearing to follow
a doctrinal policy over Poland and defying government concerns by threatening war
that he consistently attempted to fulfil the aims of his government. Thus between his
departure, in January 1814, and his return, in February 1815 the foreign minister
intended to follow the orders of his government and successfully guaranteed British
securities for years to come.
This study is comprised of four chapters. Chapter One, ‘Departure and the Treaty of
Chaumont’, discusses Castlereagh’s objectives prior to departure and great success in
achieving these primary aims by March 1813. Next the investigation focuses on
Castlereagh’s role in deciding Napoleon’s replacement upon the French throne, and
how government opinion shaped his policy in: ‘Châtillon abandoned – The Peace of
Paris’. The second half of the paper discusses Castlereagh at the Congress of Vienna
from September 1814, and more specifically on his experiences of the Polish and
Saxon settlements, and the threat of European war. Chapter Three, ‘Castlereagh and
Poland’, illustrates how Castlereagh’s perspective of these negotiations changed
considerably during October 1814, and explains why he surrendered his position of
‘natural mediator’ in order to resist Russian aggrandisement.35 The final chapter
analyses the significance of his government’s orders to withdraw Britain from the
Polish negotiations, amidst a fear of European war. ‘Disobedience and fear of war’
also argues that Castlereagh ignored these orders for the benefit of Britain, allowing
him to secure peace on the continent and finally secure the criteria outlined in the
Memorandum of the Cabinet 26th December 1813.
33
Schroeder, The transformation of European politics p. 578.
Schroeder, ‘Vienna Settlement’, p. 702.
35
Nicholson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 169.
34