Business Case and Intervention Summary
Kenya Accountable Devolution Programme
Intervention Summary
What support will the UK provide?
1. The Department for International Development (DFID) will provide £4.36 million of largely
technical assistance to support the transition to devolved government in Kenya. This support
will be given through an Accountable Devolution programme over two and half years from
July 2012 to the end of 2014. Included under this budget are two DFID advisory staff whose
time will be shared equally between the World Bank and DFID Kenya offices.
2. Kenya’s 2010 Constitution seeks to improve governance in the country in part through the
establishment of an entirely new tier of 47 elected county governments.The programme will
contribute to delivering the early stages of a transitional process in which county governments
are progressively established. The programme has three components:

The first is to provide support to a Government of Kenya (GoK) process for identifying when
it is best to move functions, such as health service delivery, from central to local
government; how much money it will cost to move and operate these functions locally;and
measuring how well county governments are doing in delivering those functions.

The second component looks at what financial and staff management systems would be
best suited for the new county governments and help design them.

The third component seeks to make the new governments more accountable1 to Kenyan
citizens by making information about their county governments available through a range of
publically available sources and in an accessible and understandable way.
3. The activities that deliver these three components prepare for the transition to devolution by
putting in place early in the process some basic foundations. They support all three
components and are a combination of:
i)
high quality advice and analysis that will inform many of the main decisions that central
government and counties need to take about the form of fiscal decentralisation, human
resource management, division of functional responsibilities between levels of government;
ii) similar advice on accountability or demand-side objectives around devolution, together with
designing, piloting and some roll-out of tools that support these objectives; and
iii) Some limited training for county officials to support them understand and implement aspects
of (i) and (ii).
4. The programme is a not intended as comprehensive programme of support for devolution. A
comprehensive programme providing support across government cadres in all aspects of
1
Ackerman defines accountability as 'a pro-active process by which public officials inform about and justify
their plans of action, their behaviour and results and are sanctioned accordingly', Ackerman, 2005, Social
Accountability in the Public Sector, World Bank, Social Development Papers, 2005.
PFM, capacity building and service delivery maybe developed in the future but is not yet
judged appropriate. Rather the Accountable Devolution programme will increase the
likelihood of devolution being successful by bringing international experience to bear on
fundamental transitional issues which – while country-specific – havealready been grappled
with in many different contexts.
Why is UKsupport required?
5. The UK and Kenya have considerable shared interests across economic, defence, diplomatic
and development fields both within the country and wider east Africa. All of these interests
would be negatively affected by increased political instability in Kenya and would benefit from
better governance in the country.
6. The most immediate threat to better governance are national elections in March 2013.Beyond
that event a significant threat to stability,as well as perhaps the best opportunity to build trust
in government and improve services, lieswith the performance of the 47 new county
governments. If devolution is ultimately successfully delivered it is likely to help address
issues of spatial inequity which have fuelled a sense of injustice among so many Kenyans. In
doing so it will help address one of the underlying drivers of conflict in Kenya and improve the
country’s political stability.
7. Experience tells us that devolution processes take a long time. Kenya’s Transition Authority
for devolutionwill run for three, probably four, years while the full process for devolving all the
functions identified for local government will take much longer. This transitional programme
of support is aimed at the critical first two and half years of that process. Evidence from
elsewhere suggest this initial period is key to the success of managing a large scale
decentralisation such as that being attempted in Kenya. While the Government of Kenya
(GoK) will channel significant financial resources of its own into devolution it will do so with
limited recent experience and expertise in this area. The UK’s key contribution through this
short focused programme is to provide and build,in certain selected areas, some of the
international experience and technical expertise needed to better manage the transition at this
critical time.
8. This programme will also help deliver DFID’s commitments under its Operational Plan 20112015 for Kenya: to empower local communities to improve the delivery of public services; for
Kenyans have access to information on budgets and plans at delivery level; and to make
elected representatives and senior officials more accountable to citizens.
What are the expected results?
9. The Accountable Devolution programme will helpcentral government and counties take key
decisions on fiscal decentralisation, human resource management and the division of
functional responsibilities between levels of governmentwhile increasing Kenyans ability to
demand improved service delivery from these new governments. Specifically, the programme
will seek to deliver the following results:

A smoother transition to devolution, whereby the roles and responsibilities of county
institutions are clear, costed, and the transfer of functions and funds to them is based on
clear and transparent criteria, with 10 counties using the county performance monitoring
system.

A more transparent, efficient, and equitable distribution of resources to counties, through
development of a coherent framework for inter-governmental financing, with 10 counties
with approved budgets.

Greater accountability of county governments for the use of public financial resources and
the actions of their civil servants, through helping put in place basic public financial and
public service management and performance monitoring frameworks, with 5 counties
having newly developed county Public Financial Management systems.

Lay the foundations for county government service delivery that is more accountable and
responsive to citizen demand, putting in place mechanisms for transparency, citizen
participation and feedback, measured by an increase to 15% in user-confidence in selected
counties.

Half a million more women and men have access to information on their county
governments through the dissemination of country performance data in citizen-friendly
formats.
Strategic Case
A. Context and need for a DFID intervention
Context
10. Kenya’s new Constitution marks a critical juncture in the nation’s history. It is widely
perceived, by Kenyans from all walks of life, as a new beginning. Born of the political
opportunity created by the 2008 post-election violence the Constitution, adopted in 2010, has
delivered significant reforms and presages still more far reaching change.
11. Given the consequences of the violence around the elections in 2007, including the impetus
to develop a new Constitution, it is understandable that the elections in 2013 have come to
dominatethe international community’spolitical analysis and much of its governance
programming. Yet arguably the constitutional change with the greatest potential impact on
improved governance and thus medium to long term political stability is devolution. Many feel
that post-Independence Kenya has been characterized by centralization of political and
economic power in the hands of a few, resulting in an uneven and unfair distribution of
resources and corresponding access to social services; the opposite of an inclusive state.
12. Devolution is at the heart of the new Constitution and potentially a key vehicle for addressing
inequities. Decentralization has been increasingly seen and adopted worldwide as a check
against discretionary use of power by central elites as well as a way to enhance the efficiency
of social service provision, by allowing for a closer match between public policies and the
desires and needs of local constituencies.1
13. From a social and institutional perspective, Kenya’s devolution makes a lot of sense. Kenya is
a very diverse country with ten major ethnic groups. Needs are very different between the
arid and semi-arid North and the highlands, between the rural Northern Rift and the urban
centres of Mombasa, Nairobi, and Kisumu, and between the coast and western Kenya.
Kenya’s 47 counties will soon have an average population of one million people. This means
they will be relatively homogenous, but not big enough to become strong regional blocks. In
theory, counties will be better placed than the national government to deliver social services
because they have specific challenges and the local knowledge to address them. Even if
there are modest improvements in service delivery, people often prefer certain decisions, not
least on service delivery,to made closer to them, rather than by a central government that
can be seen as too distant and harder to influence.
14. Kenya’s devolution is not only a critical milestone in this country’s history; it’s also remarkable
in global terms. Many countries –both rich and poor– have transferred power and resources
to lower levels of government. Precious few have done so to entirely new sub-national units,
which they set-up from scratch. Kenya will undergo a dual transition: a transfer of power and
resources from the centre to the sub-national level and a simultaneous reorganization of local
government, with the creation of forty-seven new county governments (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Kenya's devolution presents massive challenges for political and administrative
restructuring (World Bank, 2012, Devolution without Disruption)
15. The legacy of colonialism left behind basic institutions of local government, which provide a
platform on which to build. Nevertheless, decentralization has failed Kenya before. This
experience serves as a sobering reminder that “decentralizing” bad government can merely
diffuse and exacerbate old problems of corruption and elite capture.2 Devolution is also a
2Horowitz, L. and Palaniswamy, N. (2010),
In Pursuit of Votes, The Capture of the Allocation of Local Public
Goods by the Central State in Ghana, IFPRI Discussion Paper 01039, Development Strategy and Governance
Division.
massive undertaking from a logistical point of view. In one go, on day one after the next
national elections, Kenya’s system of government will be profoundly re-modelled and the
transition will inevitably encounter teething problems. The scale and speed of devolution and
other constitutional reforms bring major risks for service delivery disruption, capacity
constraints and leakage of public resources.
Poor implementation risks not only
disillusionment with devolved government but a wider loss of confidence in constitutional
mandated reforms.
16. With a constitutional guarantee of a minimum level of unconditional transfer from the centre
(at least 15% of national income), Kenya’s counties will have the means and the autonomy to
begin to address local needs.A sense of devolution’s scale and potential significance can be
gathered from the scale of resources deployed. The budget for the elections in 2012/13 is
KSH17bn, the most expensive in Kenya’s history, while that for devolution in the same year is
more than eight times that figure at KSH148bn (£1bn). But the institutional capacity to deliver
elections, while incomplete, greatly exceeds the current capacity to deliver devolution.
17. The full process for devolving all the functions identified for local government will take many
years, a decade or more is possible. Legislation has timetabled three years from the
establishment of the Transition Authority, June 2012, for the transition to devolved
government. Of those three years only 9 months now lie before the new counties are in place
in March 2013. Evidence presented later in this Business Case suggests the initial period of
the transition is key to the success of managing a large scale decentralisation such as that
being attempted in Kenya.2,3This implies the need for a rapid programme of focused
assistance to put some key cornerstones in place for the new the counties prior to March
2013. While Kenya will channel significant financial resources of its own into devolution it will
do so with limited recent experience and expertise. Therefore, a key contribution that the
international community can offer is early support to provide and build some of the experience
and technical expertise in devolution needed to manage the transition. Much of this will focus
on design processes at the national level but adaptation and application at the local.With
some of the fundamentals already addressed and with theexperience from the pre-election
period to draw on the programme’s technical assistance would then be available for the new
government in 2013. A government’s whose mandate will include delivering the large bulk of
the transition process.
The need for DFID intervention
18. The scale of the devolution process in Kenya will require a review of the International
Community’s development assistance to Kenya. For example, the level of capacity building
needs at the level of the countries alone may require the development of entirely new
programmes. The scale of likely demand will require significant long-term project funding to
strengthen accountability and responsiveness, both nationally and of devolved services in
new counties. Given the likely scale of external support from next year, coordination within the
international community on implementing devolution will have to be significantly strengthened.
This will mean bringing together not only existing programmes but also a shared
understanding, and perhaps approach, of the design and implementation of new devolution
focused interventions.
19. More immediately the next year or two will be critical as the foundations of the devolution
3Kyriacou, A. and Roca-Sagalés, O. (2008), Fiscal Decentralization and the Quality of Government: Evidence
from Panel Data, Hacienda Publica Espanola, 189-(2/2009), Instituto de EstudiosFiscales
architecture are laid. This initial phase of devolution will in large part determine whether these
long term complex reforms succeed. While the major parameters of the devolution process
have been laid out in the Constitution and the emerging devolution legal framework, many
important regulations and policy details still need to be decided upon and implemented.
International experience suggests that devolution exercises can founder if these are not
adequately addressed early on.4
20. To help meet the more immediate but still significant challenges of the first months and years
of the transition the international communityis likely to be asked to provide technical
assistance on devolution to government counterparts.DFID already provided assistance to the
Task Force on Devolution through the Public Sector Reform (PSR) programme and the World
Bank to the Treasury, Commission on Revenue Allocation and Ministry of Local Government.
Going forward we can expect requests for assistance from the Transition Authority, Ministry of
Local Government’s successor5, Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution,
Auditor General, Controller of Budget, civil society and last but not least the new county
governments themselves.
21. Drawing on the recommendations and timetable in the Task Force on Devolution’s
comprehensive 2011 report and on the new Public Financial Management Act, the Transition
Authority Act, and the draft County Government Bill DFID and the World Bank have been able
to develop a devolution programme that focuses over two and half years a pool of long and
short term technical assistance in the following areas:

Support to a GoK process for identifying when it is best to move functionsfrom central to
local government; how much money it will cost to move and operate these functions locally;
and measuring how well county governments are doing in delivering those functions.

Provide recommendations on what financial and staff management systems would be best
suited for the new county governments and help design new and or identify adaptations to
existing systems.

Make the new governments more accountable to the Kenyan citizens by making
information about their county governments available through a range of publically available
sources and in an accessible and easy to understand way.
The next section looks in more detail at each of these three components of the programme.
Component 1.Transferring functions and financing to counties
22. A golden rule of devolution is that “financing follows function” which is why the function
assignment process is so important. Within this transition period work is required to support
the transfer of functions (including performance management) and thus the
associatedfinancingfrom national to county government to:

Provide a strong evidential basis for the assignment and costing of national and devolved
functions to ensure devolved services are adequately funded.

Produce clear and transparent criteria to guide the transfer of functions and funds to
4
Tanzi, V., 1995, Fiscal Federalism and Decentralisation: A Review of Some Efficiency and Macroeconomic
aspects. World Bank.
5Its
successor is currently referred to in legislation as the “Department responsible for devolved government”.
county governments and support implementation of these functional assessments.

Develop a coherent framework for inter-governmental financing, including policies and
specific instruments – i.e. conditional grants from national to county governments – to
support the funding of essential devolved services; and

Undertake public dialogue and consultation on the above, including a regular county
governance round-table with Government of Kenya and the international community. The
area of public involvement in the design and delivery of devolved government is considered
in more detail in the next section but one on citizen engagement.
Component 2. Establishing county level public financial and public sector management
23. As outlined above, Kenya is currently attempting to undertake reforms to its public sector of
almost unprecedented ambition and scope. It also needs to be done quickly, both at national
and county level: many of the new counties will soon be recruiting their own staff directly, as
well as receiving significant increases in the volume of funds being managed sub-nationally.
The technical demands on central coordinating agencies are consequently huge and there is
a risk that the devolution process could be undermined by lack of capacity to deal with the
sheer volume of tasks that need to be undertaken to put core systems in place, in particular
for PFM and basic establishment management. In order to help GoK to make devolution a
reality, there is an urgent need for a flexible demand driven window for government requests
for practical inputs to help build core systems for public finance management (PFM), public
sector management, data production and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) at county level.
There is a need to provide rapid access to international level expert advice to support the
implementation of these core systems. While fully establishing these systems will require a
huge and concerted work programme over a period of many years. However, over the next
two years there will be a number of opportunities to fund strategic systems focused pieces of
work that lay the foundation for successful devolved government.
24. Requests for international community support from the National Treasury and other
stakeholders’ for development of PFM and public service management systems at county
level are likely to include:

County levelPFMguidelines, templates and procedures;

establishment of the audit function at county level, with possible clearing of the backlog
of local government/county level audit reports;

development of a coherent and consistent county public service management
framework;

in collaboration with the successor of the Public Service Transformation Department,
develop and pilot leadership (in line with Chapter 6 of the Constitution and pending
legislation)and programme management training at county level;

undertake institutional diagnostic work that will inform the design of future medium term
support in public sector governance in selected sectors or counties; and

development and testing of service standards in selected sectors and counties.
This work needs to be closely aligned both with GoK and international communities PFM and
public service management reforms at the national devolving the best of those programmes
initiatives including adoption of the rapid results approach, and deepening the implementation
of performance contracts across county government.
Component 3.Improving the level and quality of engagement of citizens with local government
25. According to a survey undertaken in Kenya last November by Afrobarometer less than 5% of
Kenyans had contact with or sought out help from a local government employee or counsellor
in the previous year. The transition period provides an opportunity to encourage greater
involvement by Kenyan citizens in their forthcoming counties through the creation and
strengthening of lines of accountability, and opportunities for participation, between them and
service providers and government. Kenya’s role as a regional hub of innovation in information
and communication technology provides the basis on which to further develop information
systems and accountability. ICT has been the country’s fastest-growing sector over the past
decade, Kenya has high cell phone penetration and Kenya is the source of a number of
innovations that have achieved a global reputation, including M-pesa, Ushahidi, and, more
recently, the launch of the largest open government data portal in the Africa region.
26. There are a significant number of initiatives on-going or planned which can be used to
improve accountability at the local level – most of which target civil society directly. Thus in
parallel to support for mechanisms to transfer functions from the centre to the counties there
is a need to scale up of social accountability initiatives including:

The national roll-out of a county performance assessment tool to ensure the
institutionalisation of a focus on results, to promote competitive incentives between counties
and quickly flag service delivery problems in devolved functions.

Measures to mainstream information disclosure, citizen feedback and recourse
mechanisms, and participatory tools (e.g., citizen report cards, community scorecards,
social audits, etc.) into local service delivery and related institutions.

Technical advice that can improve the policy and legal environment for social
accountability (e.g., Open Government Partnership, draft Freedom of Information bills,
planned public participation bill, etc.).

In close coordination with other civil society funders, enhance the ability of non-state
actors to engage in service delivery monitoring, including contributing to the design and
roll-out of policy and institutional reforms (county data, financial and monitoring systems,
recourse mechanisms, service delivery monitoring) that enable civil society organizations to
hold service-delivery agents accountable.

Support development, piloting and scale-up of ICT technologiesfor:improved
transparencyof government service delivery;enhanced citizens feedback and monitoring;
and greater participation by marginalized populations.
Delivering UK and DFID objectives
27. The programme will provide indirect support to those institutions responsible for putting the
new county governments in place and for the services they are mandated to deliver. In doing
so it will help deliver on DFID Operational Plan 2011-2015 for Kenya commitments: to
empower local communities to improve the delivery of public services; for Kenyans have
access to information on budgets and plans at delivery level and to make elected
representatives and senior officials are more accountable.
If devolution is successfully
delivered it is likely to help address issues of spatial inequity which have fuelled a sense of
injustice among so many Kenyans. In doing so it will address one of the underlying drivers of
conflict in Kenya and help achieve one of the main objectives of the overall UK Government
strategy for Kenya to build the country’s political stability.
28. The proposed programme provides additional social and governance expertise and analysis
to bear on both DFIDK and the World Bank’s sector programmes. As the devolution process
has accelerated the sectoral teams in both organisations have been insufficiently serviced by
their current governance expertise. The increase in Bank and DFID specialist governance
capacity is intended to rectify this and ensure our sectoral programmes can continue to
deliver effectively through the transition to devolution. This capacity to adjust programmes to
the devolution process will help ensure they deliver DFID’s OP commitments across our
sectoral programmes.
B. Impact and Outcome that we expect to achieve
29. Impact: The transition to counties minimises disruption to service delivery resulting in greater
confidence in local government and the services it delivers.15% of the public have confidence
in their counties ability to deliver its functions and 500,000 more women and men have
access to county-level information including on their counties’ performance.
30. Outcome: The transfer of functions and funds is based on clear and transparent criteria with
both services and financing subject to greater internal and external accountability.
Specifically:
i.
Five counties pilot new PFM systems
ii.
Ten counties produce County Assembly approved budgets
iii.
Ten counties use a County Performance Monitoring Tool
iv.
Ten percentof the target population are aware of county budget process and budget
31. Outputs
32. One, supporting the transfer of functions and financing to counties. Clear and transparent
criteria and associated assessments to guide the transfer of functions and funds to county
governments. Specifically, the performance assessment tool is used by 10 counties, the
mandated functions for each of the 47 counties are costed and transfer assessment criteria
published.
33. Two, setting up county level public financial management and public sector management
systems. The development of county level PFM and county audit guidelines. Guidance to
inter-governmental coordination institutionson joint decision making between the county and
central ministries.Model county public service regulations produced.
34. Three, improving the level and quality of engagement of citizens with county governments.
County level social accountability study produced with clear alternatives and
recommendations on entry points to strengthen social accountability measures at county
level. Ten percent more curated county level datasets available through public access
websites. Six thousand usersper year access the Kenya Open Date portal to look at the
county data.
35. Successfully achieving the proposed impact and outcomes of the intervention will depend on
political leadership, elections in 2013 being judged as largely legitimate, and strong civic
engagement in the development of the devolved systems. However, even if the context is not
ideal the Accountable Devolution programme will provide substantial support to both supplyand demand-side systems, which will be critical to achieve the linked objectives of both
greater accountability and improved quality of devolved service delivery. Given the complexity
and challenges of the devolution process, the programme seeks to lay the foundation for
improved county governance and service delivery. In the short run, a result would be putting
supporting systems are in place, while current levels of service delivery are largely
maintained. Given the large degree of uncertainty and significant risks, particularly after the
2013 elections, the results have been defined at the lower end of the spectrum of potential
results.
Appraisal Case
What are the feasible options that address the need set out in the
Strategic case?
36. The key elements of the theory of change that will deliver the expected outcome and impact
are as follows:
37. A growing body of evidence and experience indicates that devolution itself does not guarantee
that public finances, services, and decision-making will become more responsive to the
people.6 In many contexts, decentralization is accompanied by service delivery disruptions,
and increased waste, leakage, and inequity. Surveys and case study research suggest that a
serious impediment to effective devolution is the weakness of local institutions intended to
play a major role in the accountability framework. Local officials—even more than their
national counterparts—may be subject to the risks of capture and clientelism. Oversight
institutions at the local level generally lack the independence and capacity to check these
risks.
38. Global experience highlights the need to balance the increased discretion (political,
administrative, and fiscal) of the new county governments with greater accountability, as
illustrated by the experience of education sector decentralisation in Uganda.7 How Kenya's
transition process builds a framework for these systems, and how accountability is built into
new county institutions, are likely to be critical determinants of the success of devolution.
Furthermore, the experience of devolution in other countries indicates the importance of
building mechanisms that ensure sub-national governments are not only accountable upward,
but that they are also accountable downward to citizens. Establishing formal government
systems is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for good governance at devolved level.
Similarly, demand-side social accountability initiatives by themselves face major challenges of
sustainability and scale, and are typically heavily reliant on donor financing.8 Integrating
demand- and supply-side systems is therefore a focus of proposed support.
39. Carefully targeted support to county level accountability will therefore be a key input into the
overall design and implementation of Kenya's devolution. Assistance will be needed to:
A. Develop national standards and processesthat sequence and build the framework for
sub-national accountability (e.g., transition arrangements, inter-governmental
coordination, civil service restructuring, rules for transparency and accountability).
International experience highlights the seeming paradox that the success of
decentralization depends upon strong central coordination and standards.
B. Develop internal accountability mechanisms in county institutions (PFM and other
monitoring tools) that guard against misuse and elite capture. The decentralization
6
Scott, Z. (2009), Decentralisation, Local Development and Social Cohesion: An Analytical Review, GSDRC
Research Paper, May 2009, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre and Admad, J., Devarajan,
S., Khemani, S., and Shah, S. (2005), Decentralization and Service Delivery, World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper, 3603, May 2005, World Bank.
7Yilmaz, S., Beris, Y., and Serrano-Berthet, R. (2008), Local Government Discretion and Accountability: A
Diagnostic Framework for Local Governance, Social Development Working Papers, Local Governance and
Accountability Series, Paper No. 113, July 2008.
8
Horowitz, L. and Palaniswamy, N. (2010), In Pursuit of Votes, The Capture of the Allocation of Local Public
Goods by the Central State in Ghana, IFPRI Discussion Paper 01039, Development Strategy and Governance
Division.
literature is full of examples of how granting local governments additional discretion
without simultaneously supporting accelerated development of accountability
mechanisms can lead to service delivery decline and ultimately a backlash against
decentralisation, see for example recent experience in the Philippines.9
C. Enhance voice and inclusion in Kenya's forthcoming counties through mechanisms
that build accountability between citizens, service providers and government. A
growing body of research (including from India, Philippines, and Indonesia10)
indicates that measures that enhance accountability to citizens are critical in order to
achieve responsive and accountable local government.
40. Given the dynamism and uncertainty in Kenya's on-going process of constitutional
implementation and devolution, there is need for a relatively broad scope and high degree of
flexibility in a devolution focused intervention. This will allow activities to respond to
government requests for advice and international experience on specific challenges while also
maintaining a core focus on building a system of devolved government that is accountable to
citizens. This flexibility is also a key part of responding to the risks inherent in the complex
task of devolution. Many major legislative, regulatory and policy decisions on devolution
design have not yet been taken, though the constitutional timeline dictates that they are taken
soon. Providing sustained real-time support will be essential as Kenya proceeds with its
ambitious plans.
41. We have identified two intervention approaches for an accountable devolution programme to
deliver the intended outcomes. A third option is to not provide additional resources beyond
those already committed.
The options are:
Option 1: To strengthen county and national supply-side systems, including PFM, PSM,
and M&E (high impact, medium risk).
42. This option would concentrate support to the establishment of county-level PFM, PSM, and
M&E systems, improving internal accountability, as well as identifying costs and criteria for
devolution of functions.
43. These systems will form a foundation for effective county governance and service delivery. A
basic prerequisite of effective devolution is to clarify what levels of government are
responsible for what functions, and to put in place standards and basic systems to set policy
priorities, manage public financial and human resources, and monitor needs and progress.
These systems will be critical in order for county governments to manage the functions that
are devolved to them. Helping the government manage key parts of the complex devolution
transition process will also be supported.
44. While the legal framework to support devolved government is now taking shape, many issues
9
Yilmaz, S., Beris, Y., and Serrano-Berthet, R. (2010), Linking Local Government Discretion and Accountability in
Decentralisation, Development Policy Review, 2010, 28(3): 259-293, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.In addition
see Conning, J. And Kevane, M., 2001, Community Based Targeting Mechanisms for Social Safety Nets, World
Bank, and Crook, R. And Manor, J., 1998, Democracy and Decentralization in South Asia and West Africa,
CambridgeUniversity Press.
10White, R., and Smoke, P. editors (2005), East Asia Decentralizes, Making Local Government Work, World
Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC.
remain to be resolved during implementation. In particular, there will need to be close
coordination between the recently established Transition Authority, national government
central agencies and sector departments and the 47 county governments to ensure a smooth
transition to devolved management of service delivery in health, agriculture and water. Since
the constitution emphasizes the ‘distinct’ nature of national and county governments with
limited scope for the national government to influence how counties spend money and deploy
staff, new institutions for inter-governmental coordination are to be established that will
address complex multi-agency coordination problems. In addition, the horizontal allocation of
funding among counties is going to be subject to very significant change, as Kenyans demand
a more equitable distribution of resources. Ensuring that this redistribution is managed so as
to avoid or reduce disruption to basic service delivery or overburdening under prepared
counties with funding they cannot usefully spend will be a huge challenge.
45. With the recent passage of a number of devolution related Bills, a clearer picture is beginning
to emerge of the specific implementation challenges that national and county governments
and the relevant inter-governmental coordination institutions will face in establishing
functioning systems for PFM, public sector management and M&E. Many elements of these
systems have simply never existed before at District or local authority level, or will need to be
changed significantly (e.g. local authorities currently use a different Chart of Accounts to
national government and a different accounting methodology). At the national level, Kenya is
under-going a significant reform of the public financial management system, in part a
response to the introduction of devolution, in part a response to the Constitution’s principles of
public finance, and in part a continuation of a reform programme that has been gathering
momentum over the last two years.11 Planned reforms for next two years include establishing
independent offices, including the Controller of the Budget, a National Audit Office, and roll out
of additional IFMIS modules across local government, and program-based budgeting. Public
sector reforms implemented under the GoK’s Public Sector Reforms Programme (Phase II)
and its likely successor support the constitutional requirements for increased accountability
including the roll out of the rapid results instruments and performance contracts to the county
level.
46. There is currently a large amount of technical implementation work to be undertaken by the
agencies coordinating the devolution process and leadership and capacity development for
the new counties. Yet there is a lack of support to the development of the detailed guidelines,
procedures and templates that will allow the counties to quickly build systems for PFM, public
sector management and M&E often from scratch in a way that creates single national PFM
system and public sector management framework. The development of these systems will
require long term institutional and capacity building support beyond the time frame for the AD
programme. However, focused preparatory and foundational work needs to start and the AD
programme provides the opportunity to do this. Counties will have to apply to the Transition
Authority to demonstrate their readiness to assume devolved funding and functions. Yet if they
are not provided adequate support there is a risk that they will struggle to meet the readiness
criteria set by the Transition Authority or that those few that are able to do so go in different
directions.
47. This option will also be important to deepen many of the strands of support provided by the
World Bank and AusAidincluding i) transition issues, especially as they relate to sector
specific service delivery issues; ii) specific advice and experience of inter-governmental
coordination in practice iii) building on the work already started in costing devolved functions
and iv) develop the County Performance Assessment tool.
48. The objective of this option is to ensure that a selection of key government teams managing
11
Government of Kenya, Public Financial Management Act (2012) Kenya.
the transition of systems to devolved government through national and county level work have
access to sound advice, associated analytical work, and international experience in the early
period of the transition to devolution.
49. It is hoped that this will help reduce disruption to basic service delivery during the transition
and that ultimately devolved services register improvements. This option will also provide the
initial foundations for the development of systems and procedures to manage public funds and
services consistent with national frameworks. It will provide a flexible and fast responding
funding window through which government can match its identified needs to expert advice. It
should allow a quick start on the implementation of systems for PFM, public sector
management and M&E,ahead of establishment of the next counties next March, for which
counties will require guidelines, procedures and templates in line national legislation and
regulations in the remaining two years of the programme.
Option 2: Complement Option 1 support for supply-side governance systems with support
for demand-side mechanisms in county systems (high impact, medium risk).
50. This option would add support for public transparency and accountability systems into the
interventions described in option 1, including county-level engagement of citizens, civil society
organizations, CountyAssemblies and media in the design and implementation of the countylevel systems.
51. This option recognises that building robust supply-side system at county level is a necessary,
but not sufficient condition to ensure transparent and accountable systems. As other countries
have discovered, it is difficult to implement devolution based on supply-side reforms alone.
There is a growing recognition that bottom-up demand for accountability from citizens is a key
ingredient for effective service delivery. These require civil society capacity, which Kenya has
developed. However, demand-side initiatives managed by civil society alone face problems of
cost and sustainability. An effective environment for citizen engagement requires government
and public systems that allow citizens to interact with government and service providers. This
means systems that enable government and the full range of civil society organisations to:
more efficiently share and de-mystify policy, budget, and performance information; efficiently
gather citizen feedback and complaints; and measure and incentivise government responses.
52. Kenya has several of the factors needed for scaling up demand-side accountability. As noted,
Kenya’s Constitution (August 2010) emphasizes citizen participation and provides for stronger
checks and balances across government, strengthened legislature and judiciary, and citizen
access to information. The Kenyan media is outspoken and independent by regional
standards and the capacity for investigative journalism is gradually improving. Kenya also has
a rich network of civic organizations – both secular and faith-based, profit and non-profit,
research, policy and advocacy, international, national and community-based linked with
communities across the country. Kenya’s dynamic ICT sector boasts globally recognized
applications, high cell phone penetration and widespread mobile money (M-PESA). Citizen
dissatisfaction with service delivery is also a potential driver of positive reform. External
partners, including the World Bank, Netherlands, Norway, Australia, and DFID have supported
a number of social accountability initiatives in recent years. DFID’s Drivers of Accountability
programme has included support for citizen monitoring of budget processes, service delivery,
Open Data, and is looking at innovative ICT applications that enable citizen feedback. DFIDK
working with its existing programme to improve the accountability of the public servants and
elected representatives within the Kenyan government (the Driver of Accountability
Programme (DAP)) will be looking at how new and existing DAP partners (civil society, media
and independent commissions) can take advantage of the opportunities for greater
engagement with the devolution process that the Accountable Devolution programme will
provide.
53. There are also several promising Government initiatives to enhance transparency and
accountability. These include the Kenya Open Data Initiative (KODI), which includes a
number of county-level datasets, as well as the production of district annual progress reports,
although these reports are not very easily accessible. These can help address a key
challenge with decentralization: the critical role of information in spurring interregional
competition -- systems have largely been overlooked in the context of decentralization12. The
quantity and quality of produced decentralized data has improved over the last years,
although a number of sectors have started from a very low base. With increased focus on data
production at county level ensuring quality (both minimum and common standards) is
increasingly important in order to provide evidence for policy-makers. The Government has
also included provisions for enhancing budget transparency and citizen participation in draft
bills on public financial management and devolved government. The Government has
expressed its intent to formally join the Open Government Partnership, and bills are also being
formulated on citizen access to information and citizen participation.
54. Paradoxically, despite Kenya’s relative openness, the vibrancy of Kenya media and the vitality
of its CSOs, Kenya continues to face major problems with corruption and inefficiency in public
service delivery. These governance impediments undermine poverty reduction, exacerbate
inequality, and impede growth. A key problem is the ability of civil society to hold service
providers to account for finances and outputs. Audits regularly uncover major problems with
accounting and financial management in development programs and projects, including those
financed by donors. CSOs undertake initiatives (usually with donor funding) to monitor
specific government programs, but these have concentrated on a small part of the budget
(Constituency Development Fund and Local AuthorityTransfer Fund are notable successes in
terms of transparency but less clear they have changed behaviour) and are too often
undertaken completely outside of government processes.
55. Generally, Government institutions have limited systems and capacities to share information
or engage the public in setting or monitoring public policy decisions or expenditures. Although
Kenya makes some national budget and service delivery data available, local level budget,
expenditure, and output data is usually difficult to obtain. The Constitution and devolution
provide a rare opportunity to mainstream better transparency and participation in national and
county service delivery and financial management, but sustained effort and support is needed
to realize these systemic changes. Civil society efforts to engage in the legal and institutional
reforms following promulgation of the Constitution have generally been fragmented Kenya’s
open data initiative is one of the most visible manifestations of Constitutional provisions on
citizen access to information, but as global experience from the UK, the US and other
countries has shown, sustained effort is needed to translate data into formats that are relevant
to data users, citizens, and policymakers.
56. The objective of this option is to improve accountability of service providers to citizens
through: 1. Providing technical advise to mainstream transparency and participation measures
in the procedures policies and institutions responsible for service delivery and public financial
management, particularly at county level; 2. Promote demand-side uses of open data on local
service delivery performance; 3. Facilitate testing and scaling up innovative applications of
ICT to enhance service information provision, citizen feedback, and inclusion by engaging
users and producers of county performance data.
12
“The decentralization process itself tends to fragment and weaken information flows from the local level
over the short term, and research suggests that significant efforts are needed to preserve these channels and
develop new standards and instruments for measuring and disseminating information on regional
performance.” In East Asia Decentralizes, World Bank. 2004
Option 3: Counter-factual option of no further support
57. The feasibility of an “no additional support from DFID and the World Bank” option is based on
the assumptions that one, the current short to mid-term DFID and World Bank governance
portfolio will be able to deliver the support and results of this programme, and two, planned
financial resources and technical advice from other development partners and Government of
Kenya will be sufficient to support the formation of transparent and accountable counties after
the general elections in 2013. However, the two assumptions underlying the feasibility of this
option are unlikely to hold for at least three reasons:

GoK readiness for devolution is already a serious concern with work to prepare for the new
counties behind schedule and GoK recognising capacity gaps - there is a high probability of
a slow and disrupted start to the transition without technical assistance;

Support to devolution needs to commence now, particularly work on financial systems and
transparency -if delayed key governance building blocks will be missing; and

Assistance is likely to be more fragmented and less effective without the World Bank taking
the lead in its area of comparative advantage (functional analysis and costings, PFM and
data access).
58. The counterfactual option is therefore, not subject to a full appraisal. Options 1 and 2 are
appraised fully below and compared to the no additional investment no additional returns of
the counter factual.
B. Assessing the strength of the evidence base for each feasible option
59. In the table below the quality of evidence for each option is rated as Strong, Medium or
Limited. The evidence base on devolution is mixed. In many cases efforts to improve design
and management capacity early in a transition, to carefully sequence stages, take a
coordinated approach across government and complement it with efforts to improve the
accountability of the process do appear to have helped deliver much of decentralisation’s
promise. However, there is evidence of processes where both efforts to provide the
assistance for early systems work and accountability systems have nonetheless lead to poor
implementation, disappointment and even recentralisation. In these highly complex, medium
and long term programmes it is not easy to identify the variables that have the greatest impact
on the outcomes. The implementation sequence that works in one country may fail in another
due to a different political environment. Given this, overall the evidence is assessed as
medium but with recognition that the range of experience elsewhere suggests there remains a
significance risk of the programme failing to deliver due to factors not addressed by its early
international technical inputs, early engagement with a common systems design and improved
accountability approach.
Option
1
13
Evidence
rating
Medium
Justification
As referenced above, international evidence of the links between
devolution, accountability and service provisions – including in Australia,
Indonesia, and South Africa, Uganda, and the United Kingdom 13 – is
Eaton, K., Kaiser, K., and Smoke, P. (2010), The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms, Implications for
Aid Effectiveness, World Bank, 2010, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC.
decidedly mixed.Eaton, K., Kaiser, K., and Smoke, P. (2010) in a large
cross country study highlight the political challenges and failure arising
from poor sequencing and partial or peace meal approaches to
devolution. To succeed, devolution has to be well managed, and does
not automatically enhance accountability and service delivery, and can in
fact undermine both suggest that benefits of decentralization processes
are not automatic.
In addition to the overall devolution architecture, there are important
issues and risks to be addressed at the level of the individual counties.
While devolution is in part about a transfer of responsibility for activities
already undertaken by districts and local authorities, it will also bring a
number of wholly new functions for which no capacity currently exists at
local level – most notably PFM, public sector management and
performance monitoring. Without support for the development of clear
systems and guidelines, The risks associated with extensive devolution
processes are substantial.
Currently, public sector management capacity varies considerably from
district to district. There is a risk of decentralizing corruption to county
level with increased financial flows channelled through systems which do
not have the capacity to spend the money. Many of the counties set to
gain most from increased transfers as a result of the proposed allocation
formula are precisely those that will struggle hardest to spend the money,
as evidenced by their inability to fully disburse the modest amounts they
currently receive.14
In 1996, the World Bank supported the first Public Expenditure Tracking
Survey (PETS) in Uganda to address concerns about service provision at
local levels following a large scale decentralization process. In the
education sector, the survey found that only 13% of earmarked funds
reached schools in the period 1991-95. The results indicated that
increasing citizen's awareness, and ability to monitor system abuses, is
important to reduce corruption. The findings were widely disseminated
and the Government of Uganda began publishing monthly
intergovernmental public funds transfers through media, including radio
and newspapers, and a follow-up PETS showed that 80-90 percent of
transfer reached local schools in 1999-2000, approximately an increase
of $18.5m. At a cost of $60,000 the PETS study was highly cost
effective15. However, there is a caveat as these examples should also be
seen in the context of a wider set of reforms – this example also
illustrates that information alone is not always enough (see Hubbard, P.
2007 ref 15.)
Option
2
Medium
The experience of devolution in other countries indicates the
importance of building mechanisms that ensure sub-national
governments are not only accountable internally and upward to national
institutions but that they are also accountable downward to citizens in
the counties, Ackerman (2005) ref. 1.
Establishing formal government systems is a necessary, but not
14
World Bank, June 2012, Devolution without disruption page 11.,KFDK programme.
Putting the Power of Transparency in Context: Information’s
Role in Reducing Corruption in Uganda’s Education Sector, Centre for Global Development, Working Paper
Number 136, December 2007.
15 For further information see Hubbard, P. (2007),
sufficient condition for good governance at devolved level. Similarly,
demand-side social accountability initiatives by themselves face major
challenges of sustainability and scale, and are typically heavily reliant
on donor financing, see Yilmaz, S. et al (2007) ref. 7. Integrating
demand- and supply-side systems is therefore a focus of the proposed
program.
Findings from Bangalore, India, from a series of Citizen Report Card
(CRC) initiatives indicate that user satisfaction with public services,
including water, and the regulation of public lands increased by
approximately 50% following wide dissemination of previous reports
through the media, public meetings and presentations to public service
provider agencies. The 1999 CRC recommended that 1. systematic
feedback from the public should be promoted, and 2. efforts to reduce
transparency and efficiency in public services should be increased. A
World Bank evaluation16 concluded that at a cost of $22,000 (two
studies and dissemination, plus public outreach) the report card
appears to have been highly cost-effective.
Lastly, Bardhan17, in his review of decentralization, concludes that for
decentralization to be effective community opportunities for participation
and voice have to be increased, since decentralization is about making
local governance more responsive to the needs of the local communities.
What is the likely impact (positive and negative) on climate change and environment for each
feasible option?
Categorise as A, high potential risk / opportunity; B, medium / manageable potential risk / opportunity;
C, low / no risk / opportunity; or D, core contribution to a multilateral organisation.
Option
1
2
Climate change and environment risks
and impacts, Category (A, B, C, D)
C
C
Climate change and environment
opportunities, Category (A, B, C, D)
B
A
60. The direct environmental impact of the programme is expected to be relatively limited, as the
programme will mainly be providing technical assistance to strengthen governance at county
level. However, there are opportunities for positive indirect environmental impacts through
strengthening both the counties to ability to respond to citizens’ concerns and citizens’ ability
to make their concerns known to county governments. Given the supply and demand
elements there is some difference in the environmental impact of the two options. It is likely
that county administrations with strengthened planning, budgeting and implementation
capacity, as a result of the programme, would be better able to address environmental
challenges. This is likely to be further enhanced through the activities that increase
engagement from citizens and civil society for whom environmental concerns are of growing
importance, particularly in the more climatically marginal (in production terms) areas of Kenya.
The assumptions underpinning this judgement, and the attribution to specific interventions
would need to be explored further.
There are clearly opportunities, as under the
16
World Bank, 2004, Influential Evaluations, Evaluations that Improved Performance and Impacts of
Development Programs, World Bank, Washington DC.
17
Bardhan, P, 2005, Decentralization of Governance and Development, The Journal of Economic Perspectives,
Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 185-205.
DFIDK’sexisting Drivers of Accountability (DAP) programme, to link DFIDK’s current Climate
Change and resilience programming, in particular its work in more marginal areas with the
activities under this programme. Given this the climate change and environment category
grade for risk are considered C while the opportunity grade for Option 1 is considered B
(medium opportunity) and for Option 2 is A(high opportunity).
C. What are the costs and benefits of each feasible option?
61. This economic analysis:
(A) Describes the approach to appraisal;
(B) Provides further detail on the actual activities that would be funded under each Options.
(C) Describes the main costs and cost drivers of the programme and
(D) Reasons that they will credibly contribute to substantial future benefits related to devolution.
(A) The approach to appraisal
62. The activities are preparatory and foundational to devolution. They are a combination of:
i)
(Output 1) high quality advice and analysis that will inform many of the main decisions that
central government and counties need to take about the form of fiscal decentralisation,
human resource management, division of functional responsibilities between levels of
government
ii) (Output 2) similar advice on accountability/demand-side issues around devolution, together
with designing, piloting and some roll-out of tools that support these objectives
iii) (Both Output 1 and 2) Some limited training for county officials to support them understand
and implement aspects of (i) and (ii).
63. But this programme is a not a comprehensive programme of support for devolution (such as
the large PSCAP programme in Ethiopia) which provides support for local government cadres
in all aspects of PFM and a range of other areas. The Accountable Devolution programme
will increase the likelihood of devolution being successful by bringing international experience
to bear on issues which – while country-specific – have been grappled in many different
contexts.
64. The benefits attributable to the programme are not possible to value accurately. The best that
can be done is to describe the order of magnitude of the resources that will be managed by
counties in the future; and to explain in qualitative terms how this preparatory work will
increase the likelihood of devolution – including further more hands-on donor support to the
nuts and bolts of implementation and capacity building – delivering higher returns.
(B) Activities to be funded under each Option
65. The following extensive tables set out in detail the type of activities that this programme will
fund and describes the type of benefits that will flow. Benefits are discussed further in the
following section.
Detailed activities under Options 1 and 2 considering costs against output and outcome benefits
Option 1: Support to building county-level supply-side transparency and accountability systems
(components 1 & 2)
Activities
Output Benefits
Outcome Benefits
Activity 1: Support the transition to devolved
government (GBP103,383). The Transition to
Devolved Government Act establishes a Transition
Authority to help manage the transition to devolved
government over a three year period (which may be
extended by a further year by the National Assembly).
The Authority will be charged with developing criteria
to determine the asymmetric transfer of functions to
county governments. It will also be responsible for
assessing the capacity of county governments and
recommending measures to ensure they are able to
assume their assigned functions. It will also be
responsible for coordinating capacity building support
to national and county governments for this.
- A smoother transition to
devolution, with clear and
transparent criteria and
associated assessments to
guide the transfer of
functions and funds to
county governments.
-Study on user satisfaction
(to be conducted regularly)
The key benefits of
option 1 are that if
successful they can:
Activity 2: Support to intergovernmental
coordination arrangements
(GBP97,118).International experience suggests
frictions between levels of government undermine
service delivery. The Intergovernmental relations Act
(IRA) establishes intergovernmental mechanisms
(such as the National and County Government
Summit, the Intergovernmental Relations Technical
Committee and the Council of Governors) and the
Public Financial Management Bill (PFMB) establishes
a Budget and Economic Council. This activity
supports these intergovernmental coordinationmechanism (between Counties, the Senate
and line ministries).
- Clearer communication
and decision-making
between county-level
decision-makers, including
the Governor’s team,
planning and budgeting
officers, and ministry staff,
through the,legally
mandated by yet to be
established, intergovernmental coordination
institutions.
Activity 3: Estimating the costs of devolved
services (GBP90,852). The efficiency and
effectiveness of county service delivery will depend on
whether intergovernmental transfers provide adequate
resources for counties to carry out their devolved
functions. This involves estimating the costs of
counties, both in the aggregate to ensure an
appropriate ‘vertical’ split of revenues between
national and county levels, and at county level to
inform the ‘horizontal’ allocation across counties that
balances the competing objectives of increased equity
on one hand, and maintenance of existing services on
the other.
- A firmer evidential basis for
the assignment and costing
of national and devolved
functions to ensure
devolved services are
adequately funded.
Activity 4: Intergovernmental finance for results
(GBP 109,649). Exploiting links with Activities 1 – 3
and 5, this activity will support the development of
inter-governmental financing arrangements that
provide clear incentives for improved service delivery
results. Experience suggests that inter-governmental
financing arrangements need to be treated holistically,
and this Activity will seek to do so by providing support
- The development of a
coherent framework for
inter-governmental
financing, including policies
and specific instruments, i.e.
conditional grants from
national to county
governments to support the
Ensure that internal
county transparency
and accountability
mechanisms are in
place, including:
1. CountyPFM
systems in place,
measured by the
share of counties that
are using the new
county-level PFM
system.
2. Counties are using
the County
Performance
Monitoring Tool on a
pilot basis, measured
as a share of total
counties. The tool
contains mix of
performance
measures, including
financial performance
and development
results.
3. Counties with a
budget approved by
the county assembly
(percent of all
counties)
to GoK on 4 inter-related financing issues.
Activity 5: Roll-out of county level performance
tool, developing county M&E guidelines, and
building data production capacity (GBP87,719).A
county performance monitoring system (consisting of
an assessment and monitoring tool as well as
administrative arrangements for implementing it) will
establish a basis for both central government and
county assemblies to hold county governments
accountable, signal capacity gaps that need support,
foster positive competition between counties and
focus leaders’ attention on key indicators of success.
Activity 6: Public financial management (GBP
253,759). The Public Financial Management Bill
provides the legal framework for public financial
management at county level. This will be particularly
challenging as many PFM related functions will need
to be established more or less from
scratch.Regulations are being drafted to provide more
detailed legal guidance for county PFM. Realizing this
legal framework in the form of functioning core PFM
systems at county level will require significant
additional work however, to be developed in close
consultation with GoK partners including the National
Treasury.
Activity 7: Public sector management (GBP
241,228).The Constitution gives county governments
substantial autonomy over their public servants.
County governments may establish and abolish
offices, appoint persons to those offices, and exercise
discipline or remove persons from those offices. The
County Governments Bill and the Public Service
Commission Bill both regulate the framework of public
service employment by county governments and
national government respectively. Interim provisions
will be needed before counties develop their own laws
(the Transition Authority could usefully propose an
approach to government).
funding of essential
devolved services.
- National roll-out of the
county performance
assessment tool to ensure
the institutionalisation of a
focus on results, promote
competitive incentives
between counties, and
quickly flag service delivery
problems in devolved
functions
- A flexible resource window
to respond to National
Treasury and other
stakeholders’ specific
requests for support to PFM
systems development at
county level, which may
include development of
guidelines, templates and
procedures.
-Support to the
establishment of the audit
function at county level, with
possible clearing of the
backlog of local
government/county level
audit reports.
- A new framework should
set national standards
guiding counties in their dayto-day management of
public servants by setting
the general framework for
management, specifying
who is responsible for
regulating the detail of how
county public servants
should be managed.
- Develop and roll out
selected leadership and
CapacityBuilding
programme at both central
and county level in line with
Chapter 6 of the new
constitution
Option 2: Option 1 plus a component for enhancing the engagement of citizens in county level service
delivery (components 1, 2 and 3)
Activities
Output Benefits
Outcome Benefits
Activity 1: Mainstreaming social accountability
measures in service delivery and PFM reforms,
including in county institutions (GBP 516,917).
This activity will support government and civil society
-Measures to mainstream
information disclosure,
citizen feedback and
recourse mechanisms, and
The key benefits of
option 2 are that if
successful they can:
to design and embed social accountability measures
in ongoing reforms and in sub-national institutions
responsible for service delivery, with a focus on
measures that enhance inclusion. It will support
practical, real-time analysis (including of the political
economy) to identify entry points and then mobilize
technical assistance to enhance transparency and
citizen feedback in service delivery systems. This
technical assistance will build on ongoing WB work to
assess entry points for enhancing social
accountability in the design and roll-out of countylevel systems and capacity
Activity 2: Co-creation of Open Data- and ICTbased solutions to enhance service delivery and
reduce disparities between and within counties.
(GBP187,970). This will complement activities
supported under the Kenya Open Data Initiative via
the Kenya Transparency and Communications
Infrastructure project and the proposed EFO. It will
support the convening of development professionals,
data suppliers, ICT developers with key groups of
data users (academia, media, civil society,
policymakers) in 3 sectors
participatory tools (e.g.,
citizen report cards,
community scorecards,
social audits, etc) into local
service delivery and related
institutions.
Activity 3: Leveraging project-level social
accountability experience into broader reforms.
(GBP 222,431).In Kenya a multitude of social
accountability measures are being implemented by
civil society, by government programs and projects,
and in external-partner funded programs. However,
implementation of these initiatives is often
inconsistent, and the impacts and lessons, both
positive or negative, are rarely assessed or distilled
into action-oriented recommendations that can be
applied to other projects, programs, or to enhance
Kenya’s enabling environment for social
accountability in service delivery.
Activity 4. Improving the use and dissemination of
M&E and data production at county level (GBP
119,048).This activity will support wider use of
produced county-level M&E products, including the
County Annual Progress Reports. Outreach and
dialogue with local stakeholders, including civil society
will be involved in the use of the findings in a
participatory way, as well as providing input on
planning processes based on the findings of the
County APR and other M&E products. In addition, the
supported county M&E system will both provide sex
disaggregated data and provided a basis for county
gender analysis.
- Enhanced ability of nonstate actors to engage
effectively in service
delivery monitoring,
including contributing to the
design and roll-out of policy
and institutional reforms
that enable civil society
organizations to hold
service-delivery agents
accountable.
-Policy advice on reforms
that can improve the
enabling environment for
social accountability
Ensure that downward
county transparency
and accountability
mechanisms are in
place, including:
Counties transparent
and published budgets
(percent of all
counties)
- Support development,
piloting and scale-up of ICT
technologies for:
- Improved government
service delivery
program/project
transparency, including
enhanced citizens
feedback, monitoring, and
enhanced participation of
marginalized populations.
- CSOs and citizens at
county level introduced to
decentralised M&E
systems.
- Involvement of CSOs and
citizens at county level in
participatory planning and
monitoring of county-level
performance.
(C) The costs of the programme
66. The table below summarises the main costs of each option to deliver the activities set out in
the detailed tables above. The bases for these costs and the main cost drivers in the
programme are discussed under the VFM section below.
Breakdown of activity and staff costs per option
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
Total
£m
£m
£m
£m
Option 1: Strengthening county and national supply side systems including PFM, PSM and M&E (high impact,
medium risk)- Components 1 &2 only
Support to county/national level interventions
Option 1: Activity costs
0.30
0.39
0.29
0.98
Option 1: Staff costs
0.33
0.47
0.38
1.18
Total costs option 1
0.63
0.86
0.67
2.16
Option 2: Support for supply side governance systems with support for demand side mechanisms in county
systems (high impact medium risk)- Components 1,2 and 3
Option 2: Activity costs
0.62
0.80
0.62
2.05
Option 2: Staff costs
0.65
0.91
0.75
2.31
Total costs option 2
1.27
1.71
1.38
4.36
(D) Programme benefits
67. Decentralization experiences have varied greatly from country to country. This is consistent
with the evidence which suggests that moving resources and institutions from the centre to the
sub-national level does not in itself lead to improved service delivery or costs savings.
68. The evidence discussed in the Theory of Change indicate that this programme will contribute
to strengthened systems underpinning services. Very modest efficiency gains will result in
large cost savings but this programme alone will not lead to these savings – rather the
activities in this programme are likely to be necessary but are not intended to be sufficient to
achieve the gains.
69. The GoK has allocated in its budget estimates for FY 2012/13 (yet to be approved by the
National Assembly) KSH 148bn (just over £1.0bn) for devolution. The functions include, water
and irrigation, health, roads, energy, agriculture, and urban services.
70. Benefits may ultimately come from devolution through the following routes linked to getting
best value from the budgets managed at county level:

Reductions in losses from corruption or rent seeking – due to increased transparency and
accountability if local mechanisms to support integrity lead to improvements

Improvements in efficiency in implementation of fiscal decentralisation and other systems
related to devolution. Given that devolution is going ahead, investing in systems and
capacity to strengthen implementation will lead to efficiencies (savings) in expenditure

Similarly expenditure will be more effective if counties implement procedures that give
citizens input into choice of activities.
71. In addition, central government will continue to resource purpose-specific grants in areas of
shared responsibility. This programme will provide the ground work to help central ministries
design effective national programmes and help counties to integrate funds from the central
budget into their county-level planning.
(E) Assessment of costs and benefits
72. The ‘do nothing’ case in this instance is that a devolution process takes place which is less
well informed and supported by high quality, timely advice and specific training. Under the ‘do
nothing’ case, GOK and donors would embark on comprehensive support to counties without
building blocks.
This exposes it to the risk of not achieving any of the possibly highly
significant financial benefits from efficiency gains at a later stage in the transition. Given the
relatively modest invest indicated by this programme the risks around a do nothing approach
seem high with both a reasonable high probability and high impact.
73. Both options lay the basis for improvements in the use of very large sums of money. The
clearest single quantifiable – and compelling – argument for favouring Option 2 over Option 1
is that increased demand side measures will reduce corruption compared to Option 1.
However, risks of increasing corruption as functions and funds are decentralised to the new
counties under Option 1 are still high, even when well-managed with technical support to
establishing robust PFM, PSM, and M&E systems. It is therefore our assessment that
demand-side systems should be built into the new systems.
74. Option 2, also meets the need to include the civil society and other county-level stakeholders
in order to maximize the chances of improving transparency and accountability is evident,
both from international studies and local dialogue with stakeholders Kenya. A well-managed
devolution process, with a good mix of demand- and supply side mechanisms built into new
county-level systems, would further reduce the risks of elite capture of the budget process and
interruptions to service delivery.
Attribution to DFID
75. DFID's contribution to the Kenya Accountable Devolution Programme will amount to
approximately 75% of the programme’s total budget. The balance is provided by Ausaid and
the World Bank who collectively will fund approximately one and half posts under the
programme. One option on attribution would be to separate the results identified in the job
descriptions of the Ausaid and World Bank resourced posts. However, in practicemembers of
the team supported under Kenya Accountable Devolution Programme team will regularly be
working together on the same deliverables. For example, the PMF expert and social
development adviser on systems for making county financial information available to the
Kenyan public. Given this performance monitoring will adopt an approach of attributing three
quarters of results achieved under the programme to DFID in line with the organisation’s
relative contribution to the total budget.
D. What measures can be used to assess Value for Moneyfor the intervention?
76. The two broad classes of the proposed accountable devolution programme costs are staffing
costs and capacity development costs. The DFID and World Bank core staff costs are more or
less the fixed cost, although staff grades may be varied, while the costs related to county- and
national level capacity development may vary, both due to uncertainty around implementation
pace and as a result of changing county government demand. Since highly specialised
expertise on devolution initially is the key binding constraint in Kenya, the proposed number of
two DFID secondees, to support social accountability and PSM, and the three World Bank coterm staff, on devolution, open data, and PFM, are assessed to be essential to the success of
the programme.
Economy
 Cost of DFID secondees and WB co-term staff vis contacting via
private firm
 Resource costs that DFID is not charged for but are incurred by
the WB
Efficiency
 Quality of outputs (reports, training, advice) in relation to the
expense and quality/relevant experience of consultants deployed
 Cost per trainee compared to comparators
Effectiveness
 Qualitative assessment of impact of reports, advice and training
in influencing the quality of rules and guidelines relating to
decentralisation
77. All specific funding decisions will be based on how it furthers progress towards the overall
objective of the Accountable Devolution Programme and making best use of available funding.
Operational decisions will be made to maximise returns, e.g. taking the example of training,
minimising the number of staff trained to achieve the results (required capacity) that will be
required to reach the overall result.The main cost drivers of these programmes are:

Costs of WB contracted staff and consultants procured technical assistance including
DFID secondees and World Bank co-term staff (50% of total programme costs)

The estimated unit costs for DFID secondees (A2) and World Bank co-term staff (GG) are
based on existing salary scales provided by DFID and World Bank HR. The current total
annual cost, accommodation and others costs included, averages around £170,000.

External short term consultant rates range from £200 to £500 per day for local consultants,
while highly specialised international decentralisation consultants with world class
reputation in highly specialist rates may go as high as £800 per day, excluding transport
costs. A limited number of short term consultants are foreseen to be hired to support very
specific technical advisory tasks.
78. Financial cost advantages to DFID of using World Bank (established premises, support staff,
vehicles in Nairobi although these all have an opportunity cost). However, an imputed cost
for rent/hire etc of these services should be factored into a full economic analysis. This is
difficult to measure. DFID Kenya should incorporate this model into any wider the cost
effectiveness.
79. Unit costs for training are based on on-going World Bank projects, which indicate that current
training costs in Kenya at the moment are around £65 per day, including accommodation, but
excluding transport to the training venue. Thus, training ten country officers from each of the
47 counties for two weeks would cost around £300,000 excluding transport. Due to the
substantial number of uncertain factors around the devolution process, the exact number of
county- and national-level staff to be trained is not clear.
80. Increased efficiency/effectiveness will also be derived from synergies with building existing
World Bank technical assistance and project relations to government institutions, including ongoing PFM/PSM, M&E, data production, and social accountability work.
81. Furthermore, in some in Kenya counties capacity unit costs may be higher, both due to
remoteness of the counties as well as poor infrastructure, lower level initial capacity and
insecurity. This may be the case in remote arid- and semi-arid lands, counties with high shares
of nomadic populations (harder and more expensive to reach), and counties with internal
conflict (Turkana and Pokot) and/or external conflicts that spill over into the counties (counties
near the Somali conflict).
E. Summary Value for Money Statement for the preferred option
82. The monetized return of Options 1 and 2 compared to doing nothing cannot be calculated
meaningfully – because this programme is not a comprehensive programme of capacity
building that means that budget improvements can credibly be linked to the interventions.
83. However, the demand and supply-side activities increase the likelihood of Kenya’s devolution
leading to county budgets that have (i) reduced losses through corruption, (ii) more efficient
management of public resources; and (iii) more effective use of budgets e.g. better aligned
with citizen’s wishes. Devolution carries fundamental risks such as increased corruption and
capture of budgets by vocal elites. But the preparatory activities envisaged will increase the
chances of these negative effects being minimized.
84. The additional £2.2m of Option 2 over two and half years does represent a cost-effective
approach to increasing the likelihood of achieving the overall programme objectives of
increased transparency and accountability in the forthcoming new county systems –
especially through its potential impact on reduced corruption
85. DFID and the World Bank will continue to engage the Government of Kenya institutions and
development partners involved in the devolution process to ensure the Kenya Accountable
Devolution Programme funds are spent cost-effectively with programme objectives guiding
exact spending. This will be done both bilaterally, through a joint GPF programme steering
committee, and through the Democratic Governance Donor Group, which DFID currently
chairs to ensure maximum value for money throughout programme implementation
86. A well-managed devolution is likely to yield significant benefits that outweigh the short terms
costs and risks with the appropriate and timely support of Development Partners. Some of the
benefits such as empowerment of local people and communities in the management of their
own affairs are difficult to quantify, but certainly very significant.
Commercial Case
Indirect procurement
A. Why is the proposed funding mechanism/form of arrangement the right one for this
intervention, with this development partner?
87. A decisionon the funding mechanism for the Accountable Development programme
considered

the track record of delivery mechanisms supporting similar work within Kenya

the time taken to utilise existing mechanisms versus the time taken to establish
new ones (given 9 months before counties come into existence)

a commitment toclarify on results to be achievedand providing the capacity to
monitor programme implementation

the plans of the implementing organisation to use its resources to support
devolution work in the future

the need to manage fiduciary risk particularly when working with government
institutions

the capacity of DFID Governance & Security section to manage multiple contracts
88. The World Bank’s track record of delivery on devolution and the other bilateral and
multilateral options available in the period before the launch of the new counties is
described in detail in paragraphs 93 and 94 below. In summary, no bilateral or other
multilateral (in particular other parts of the UN system) can draw on the experience the
World Bank’s has had in working with GoK on the devolution process or match its expertise
in country. The regular publically available analysis being produced by the Bank on
devolution is the first reference point for understanding devolution’s status and current
challenges.
89. Clarity on results: The programme logframe has been produced and signed off by the
World Bank. The logframe was developed with input (including a number of meetings) from
the DFID Kenya Accountability and Results Team’s economist and statistics adviser. The
job description for the World Bank Staff Co-Term managing open data, data management
and M&E will include responsibilities for coordinating results monitoring for the whole
programme.
90. The AD programme outlined in this business case intends to use the
GovernancePartnershipFacility(GPF) as one of the mechanisms to support its delivery. It
will channel £2.9m of the preferred option total of £4.36mthrough the GPF up to the end of
February 2014. The GPF was designed to support the World Bank in the implementation of
its Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategies (GAC) through programs that rigorously and
systematically address country level governance impediments to development. The process
of change through which this is expected to happen is outlined in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2. Outline of theory of change of impact of GPF on Bank governance operations
91. The aim of the GPF is to enhance the World Bank’s technical strengths in sectors such as
human development, infrastructure, as well as public sector reform and public financial
management to provide more effective support for governance reforms. Another aim is also
to stimulate innovation and strategic shared learning, better knowledge management and
monitoring of results in order to generate public goods in the area of governance and anticorruption.
92. In Kenya the GPF funds have beenthrough Window 1 of the facility and focus on social
accountability designed to bring about change through funding activities that increase
decentralised sector governance, transparency and accountability of public finances and
strengthen citizen voice and participation in service delivery. This approach is also in line
with the overall objectives of Accountable Devolution programme.
93. The World Bank team in Kenya initially focused on fiscal decentralisation but the scope and
number of members has grown as the devolution process has progressed and GoK
demands increased. The Bank has used a mix mainly of its own staff albeit from a range of
existing programmes, some GPF time, and some consultancy support to resource the
team. This has been a challenge as one of the Bank’s primary tools for support to
governance closed in the second half of 2011. A new overarching Bank governance
programme for Kenya is planned to go before the Board for approval in early 2014. It is
intended to include a significant element on devolution. In the absence of a broad
governance project selected governance support will be delivered by a combination of
technical assistance from Bank staff, analytical pieces, and activities under existing and
new projects, including the Kenya Transparency and Communication Infrastructure project
and the Judicial Performance Improvement project. However, before the approval in 2014
of the Bank’s new governance project, there will be important gaps in the Bank’s support to
devolution, which the additional Accountable Devolution programme support will help to
address.
94. The World Bank has developed a comparative advantage in the area of devolution in
Kenya.The Bank’s recent Devolution without Disruption report launched by in the June
2012 Development Partnership Forum (the main biannual Development Partner and GoK
event) is evidence of its strengths in this area. It’s particular advantage lies in its staff
capacity in-country (in the areas of PFM systems and fiscal decentralisation more widely,
PSR, social accountability) and its existing relationship and dialogue with some of the key
devolution institutions in the GoK in particular the Treasury, the CRA, CIC and to a lesser
extent the Ministry of Local Government.
95. Currently bilateralsworking in Kenya have only limited expertise on devolution in country.
UNDP has been working with the Ministry of Local Government to develop a donor basket
on devolution. Thus far the MoLG/UNDP basket has attracted relatively limited donor
support for the programme. However, the significant focus of that programme on civic
education around the implications of devolution could prove to be very complementary to
the proposed AD programme. DFID or World Bank staff, already well represented on
donor governance and devolution, should engage with the UNDP/MoLG programme to help
ensure that complementarity.
96. The Bank’s plans to use its resources to support future devolution are described in
paragraph 14. In summary a new overarching Bank governance programme for Kenya is
planned to go before the Board for approval in early 2014. It is intended to include a
significant element on devolution and the experience gained under this programme is likely
to influence the development of that programme. In the interim, outside of this programme,
the Bank’s governance support will be delivered by a combination of technical assistance
from Bank staff, analytical pieces, and activities under existing and new projects, including
the Kenya Transparency and Communication Infrastructure project and the Judicial
Performance Improvement project.
97. As a result of DFIDK’s current assessment of fiduciary risk with GoK systems we do not
provide direct funding to government institutions in Kenya. The World Bank’s financial
management systems do provide a high degree of assurance in the use of funds. In Kenya
the World Bank is keenly aware of these risks with their systems in Kenya further
strengthened following misuse of Bank resources. The GPF mechanism also adds its
quality assurance, financial oversight and monitoring systems.
98. The proposed programme involves working with multiple external partners both government
and non-government and the management a number of contracts (e.g. short term
consultancies). The DFID Kenya Governance and Security section does not have the
capacity to manage the new contractsthat will be developed under the programme. The
World Bank will be able to service the contract management demands through programme
and so DFID will not be required to consider contracting additional DFID staff time.
B. Value for money through procurement
99. Procurement for the programme will be carried out in accordance with the World Bank's
"Guidelines: Procurement of Goods, Works, and Non-Consulting Services, under IBRD
Loans and IDA Credits & Grants by the World Bank Borrowers "dated January 2011 and
"Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits
& Grants by World Bank Borrowers" dated January 2011, and the provisions stipulated in
the Trust Fund Grant Agreement.The World Bank in Kenyaalready has a well
developedprocurement capacity.
100.
The engagement of a single organisation to manage the programme will avoid
fragmentation between programme components as well as promoting a whole programme
approach to monitoring and evaluation. This will be particularly important on components
on standards and systems development and accountability where the two sets of
interventions are intended to complement each other.
Financial Case
D.
What are the costs, how are they profiled and how will you ensure accurate
forecasting?
101.
Total costs under the preferred option will be £4.36 million over two and half years from
July 2012 to December 2014.Programme costs are profiled as follows:
2012/13
2013/14
2014/15
Total
£m
£m
£m
£m
1.27
1.71
1.38
4.36
102.
The programme covers four financial years. The spend will be split between
interventions and financial years as follows:
Support to county/national
level interventions
Component 1: Supporting the
devolution process and
decentralized service delivery.
Component 2: Improving
decentralized data access,
social accountability functions,
monitoring & evaluation.
Component 3: Public financial
management and public sector
reforms.
Total £4.36m
2012/13
£m
2013/14
£m
2014/15
£m
0.31
0.38
0.31
0.63
0.86
0.66
0.32
0.48
0.41
1.26
1.72
1.38
103.
£2.90m will be put through the joint World Bank Governance Programme Fund,
£0.61m will be put through a complementary EFO (helping to cover costs not eligible under
the GPF) and £0.85m will be direct terms and conditions costs for the DFID secondees.
Global Partnership Facility
104.
The Accountable Devolution programme intends to use the GPF (co-funded by
AusAid) as one of the mechanisms to support its delivery. The GPF would channel £2.90m
of the programme total £4.36m (under Option 2) but be limited to the current GPF end date
of February 2014 (as the overall GPF end date at the time of approval of your projects).
External Financed Output
105.
An EFO will be set up at the onset of programme to finance the Open Data Initiative
and field allowances that will not be covered under the GPF component. Outputs from the
Open Data Initiative are reflected in the logframe. The funds committed through this EFO
will amount to £610,000.
106.
Procurement under the EFO will be carried out in accordance with the Bank’s
corporate procurement rules. The Bank will recover the direct and indirect costs of
operational work performed under the EFO, but the Bank will not recover its other
management overheads or administration costs associated with the EFOs or charge a
start-up or management fee.
107.
The EFO cannot be used as a single funding mechanism for the programme as the
maximum value for an activity funded through an EFO is $1 million (£640,000). The normal
lifespan for an EFO is 24 months, which may run across three World Bank financial years,
but which cannot be extended beyond 36 months in total.
108.
Accurate forecasting will be assisted by the engagement of the World Bank as a
single “Service Provider” who will be responsible for providing quarterly expenditure and
forecast updates on each of the programme components on a basis. These will be
presented at quarterly review meetings will be held with the World Bank, DFID and AusAid.
B. How will it be funded: capital/programme/admin?
109.
All interventions will be funded from programme funding. The total amount will come
from within the agreed Kenya Governance pillar OP allocation for 2012/13-2014/15.
110.
Funding is not considered sensitive, novel or contentious at this point. Due to the
political environment, the Deputy Head of DFID Kenya will be updated regularly on
programme implementation and any significant changes to risk factors.
C. How will funds be paid out?
111.
£2.90m of funds will be paid by DFID Kenya to the World Bank through the existing GPF
trust fund. The specific mechanism will be a revised Administrative Arrangement between
DFID and the World Bank to include DFIDK commitment. DFID will disburse funds to the GPF
who will then disburse to the World Bank in Kenya. Secondees costs will be paid directly from
the programme through DFID systems.
112.
A schedule of disbursements outlining amounts and time scales will be annexed to the
GPF and EFO agreements. Disbursements are likely to replicate the budget outlined in
paragraph 100, with three EFO and three GPF disbursements being spread over the whole
programme period i.e. an initial amount then two annual disbursements.
D. What is the assessment of financial risk and fraud?
113.
Resources placed directly into Kenyan government institutions’ own financial
management systems are at high risk of not being fully accounted for, misused, or stolen.
This is particularly the case in the run up to an election. DFID will not therefore, transfer
money directly to government institutions or rely solely on those institutions own financial
management or procurement systems.
114.
To reduce the risks of misuse and fraud support to the TA, Commission for
Implementation of the Constitution, Commission on Revenue Allocation, Ministry of Local
Government and Counties will be channelled through the World Bank systems and be subject
to the Bank’s financial management system and procurement systems and oversight. The
Bank are aware of the risks and have fiduciary risk assessments and financial monitoring
mechanisms in place. Drawing on their own resources as well as DFID and AusAid’s the
Bank are able to bringing greater resources to monitoring and oversight than ordinary
available for any single bilateral. In addition, the fact that the great majority of support to GoK
institutions under the programme is through expert/technical assistance provided by World
Bank or DFID staff or by World Bank procured consultants significantly reduces the risk of
misuse of the programme’s funds. Nonetheless, even with the use of World Bank systems
there remains a low but significant risk of misuse of funds. The Bank’s own recent experience
of misuse of funds in the arid lands and education programmes has increased their sensitively
to this risk and additional safeguards have been implemented (not least increased
engagement by beneficiaries in monitoring services delivery by Bank support, integral to this
programme’s approach). This risk and its consequences have been highlighted to the World
Bank and the requirement under the agreements that it to report immediately any areas of
concern or of potential risk to DFID.
E. How will expenditure be monitored, reported, and accounted for?
115.
The grant will be managed by a lead World Bank Task Team Leader based in Nairobi.
Expenditure will be monitored through World Bank standard monitoring systems: that is an
annual project status report including financial report to DFID, AusAid and the GPF. In
addition, financial updates will be provided by the World Bank at quarterly programme
Steering Committees. DFID programme staff will further access information on distribution of
DFID funds for the purpose of this trust fund agreement through the World Bank Secure
Client Connection Website.
116.
The quarterly and annual reporting will be scrutinised by the DFID Kenya Governance
and Security section to ensure value for money principles are being met and unit costs are
realistic.
Management Case
A.What are the Management Arrangements for implementing the intervention
117.
DFIDK’s resources to the Accountable Devolution programme will be managed under
threecomponents on DFID systems i) Governance Partnership Facility (GPF) ii) an
Externally Financed Output (EFO)and iii) Programme Funded component.
118.
The funding arrangements will be as follows:

GPFfunds will be paid by DFID Kenya to the World Bank through the existing GPF trust
fund. The specific mechanism will be a revised administrative arrangement between DFID
and the World Bank to include DFID Kenya commitment. DFID will disburse funds to the
GPF who will then disburse to the World Bank in Kenya. The fund will be set up as a hybrid
trust fund to allow for both Bank and recipient execution.

EFO: DFID will sign an administrative arrangement provided by the Bank using their
standard format. The Project staff will be responsible for analysing and comparing reports on
the implementation of agreed activities with financial reports. Both the timing and content of
implementation and of financial reports will be specified in the Administration Arrangement.

Programme Fundedcomponent: Two DFID secondees will be recruited under DFID HR
systems. AnMoU will be signed with the bank specifying the deliverables. A separate
component will be set up on DFID the system to monitor their costs. The duty of care will
rest with DFID.
119.
All agreements with the World Bank will be for the delivery of specific outcome and
outputs as described in a single Accountable Devolution programme logframe and budget.
(Annexes 1 and 2).
120.
The programme will be managed by an overall World Bank Task Team Leader (TTL)
who will liaise directly with the DFID Governance and Security Section Head and the relevant
contact in AusAid.A joint Accountable Devolution partner Steering Committee, with an
accompanying MoU, will meet quarterly to discuss and review program implementation
issues, as well as mechanisms to coordinate broader development partner support to
implementation of the new Constitution at county level (devolution, social accountability, open
data, M&E, and PFM/PSR).
121.
Under the management of the overall TTL three individual trust funds, one for each of
the three components will be set up. Each of the three components will also have a World
Bank TTL who will be responsible for the implementation of the agreed activities, delivering
the outputs and achieving the defined results. The overall TTL will provide reports to the
World Bank’s Country Management Unit (CMU) on project implementation and consult on
issues of particular importance or sensitivity by any of the programme’s partners.
122.
The two DFID secondees will report to either component or overall TTLs in the World
Bank and to the Head of Governance and Security section in DFIDK. The secondees
objectives will be agreed jointly by their line managers in DFID and the World Bank.
123.
General linkages to existing donor coordination bodies in governance will be
established via the DGDG, currently chaired by DFID and the Interim Donor Standing Forum
on Devolution, currently chaired by the World Bank. The DGDG will provide overall guidance
and coordination to ensure the Accountable Devolution program reinforces existing
governance activities and avoids introducing duplication.
B. What are the risks and how these will be managed?
Risk
Probability
Impact
Mitigating action
Lack of central direction,
coordination and
oversight to the
devolution process.
Medium in run
up to the
elections
Medium
The devolution process thus far has
needed to navigate the divisions within the
coalition government. Despite the
challenges progress has been made albeit
slower than planned. The Transitional
Authority is the now legally mandated lead
agency in the transition period. Support to
ensure it functions effectively will help
mitigate risks from political drift.
County elections in
2013 being judged as
illegitimate
Low/Medium
High
Citizen accountability work becomes more
significant. Technical assistance on
systems development, costing and
functional assessment criteria can still be
implemented.
Weak civic engagement
in the development of
the devolved systems
Low
Medium
Programme will provide substantial support
to both demand as well as supply side
systems. Link existing accountability
programmes and their partners to the
Programme delivery
implementation of the accountability
components of the programme.
Limited capacity and/or
will in newly formed
counties to implement
complex governance
reforms often from
scratch
Medium/ High
Medium
Support central and decentralized
stakeholders to develop standards and
guidelines for county system, including
PFM, public sector management, and
M&E, and a county performance
monitoring and assessment tool to guide
capacity development
Coordination and
ownership among a
large number of national
and county level
agencies possibly
between levels of
government under
differing political party
control.
Medium
Medium
Political economy analysis of each county
after the elections. Programme’s work on
the legally mandated intergovernmental
coordination mechanisms will be key to
managing this risk.
Absence of a culture of
transparency at county
level and vested
interests
Medium
Medium
Establish county performance monitoring
and assessment tool and build on progress
made under the current Kenya Open Data
Initiative (KODI) and similar to grow/push a
culture of transparency at county level
Loss of UKaid from
financial mismanagement or fraud
Low
Medium
No direct funding of GoK. Monitor World
Bank’s risk assessments, financial
reporting and procurement practice.
Delays in start of
activities limits impact
and results
Medium
Medium
Work with the Commission on
Implementation of the Constitution who
monitor devolution delivery against GoK
timelines. Commence activities ahead
schedule where possible and work flexibly
to support those in government who are
able to implement.
Programme Management
C. What conditions apply(for financial aid only)?
D. How will progress and results be monitored, measured and evaluated?
124.
Monitoring: See paragraph 119 on a single consolidated programme logframe and
budget. The log frame will be updated annually and adjusted on a needs basis to enable
implementing teams to respond flexibility to new demands. See paragraphs 113-115 on risk
and programme monitoring processes. In addition, DFID staff will make regular visits, jointly
with other donors where appropriate, to assess progress on results within target counties.
The two DFID secondees will work in both the Bank and DFID offices. They will be required
to regularly update DFIDK on the progress and opportunities around devolution but also the
progress of the Accountable Devolution programme.
125.
Evaluation. Towards the end of programme, DFID will commission an independent
programme evaluation to assess overall results achieved and the extent to which the
programme has met its expected outcomes. The external evaluation to review the
assumptions in the theory of change and answer the following questions: to what extent did
the programme i) help the government resource and devolve functions; ii) put in place the
basic financial and public service management systems; iii) facilitate joint service delivery by
counties and central government; and iv) allow citizens to change local government policy and
practice.
126.
We have some of the baseline for an evaluation. The World Bank completed a detailed
examination of the state of the devolution process and the challenges ahead in June 2012
which builds on the extensive research and consultation that the Task Force on Devolution
reflected in its reports in 2011.
127.
The purpose and structure of the evaluation will be determined at an early stage drawing
on DFID Kenya’s Results Adviser. Precise questions and methodology will be drawn up the
first 20 months of the programme.
Logframe
128.
Quest No 3574941 of logframe for this intervention:
Annexes
Annex 1. Programme Logframe
Annex 2. Programme consolidated Budget (sheet two DFID support)
Annex 3. PPRC feedback check list and response
Annex 4. Business Case Approvers Check list