Authority Structures and Service Reform in Multilevel Urban Governance: The
case of wastewater recycling in California and Australia
Sara Hughes
University of California, Santa Barbara
Current affiliation: National Center for Atmospheric Research
3090 Center Green Drive
Boulder, CO 80305
shughes@ucar.edu
(810) 835-1748
Research on urban service delivery strategies lacks a multilevel approach
able to account for the influence of authority structures on effective
reform. A comparative analysis of efforts to increase recycled wastewater
production in the U.S. (specifically California) and Australia is used to
evaluate the effectiveness of centralized or decentralized urban governance
systems in reform efforts and, more importantly, the institutional and
political mechanisms underlying these differences. The results show that
Australia, the more centralized system, has more effectively set and
implemented an urban water governance agenda that includes recycled urban
wastewater. However, in both places local resistance has been a barrier to
effective change. These findings demonstrate that reform capacity and policy
success may differ between governance systems while common barriers and
political dynamics persist.
Keywords: multilevel governance, recycled water, service delivery, urban
governance
1
The service delivery decisions made by cities have significant
consequences for progress in policy issues that stretch beyond city
boundaries such as land conservation, water conservation, and climate change
adaptation and mitigation (Maciocco et al. 2009; Ernston et al. 2010;
Gustavsson et al. 2009). In many cases, due to increasing resource scarcity
and conflicts among users, cities are being asked or encouraged to change the
way they provide services in order to produce broader benefits. Research in
this area has led to progress in understanding how local institutional
arrangements shape and constrain the decisions cities make about resource
management and service strategies (Brody et al. 2008; Lubell et al. 2005;
Marks and Zadoroznyj 2005; Sharp et al. 2011; Zahran et al. 2008; Sager
2004). However, the production of urban service delivery strategies is not
confined to local political processes, nor are they shaped exclusively by
local institutional structures. A full understanding of the origins,
effectiveness, and politics of urban service delivery strategies requires a
multilevel governance approach that is currently lacking (DiGaetano and Strom
2003; Sellers and Lidstrom 2007).
This study approaches urban governance as a multilevel process in order
to examine the role institutionalized authority structures play in efforts to
reform urban services. The aim is to evaluate whether centralized or
decentralized urban governance systems are more effective in their reform
efforts and what institutional and political mechanisms underlie these
differences. The study does not seek to identify an ideal authority structure
but to evaluate the reform pathways and dynamics generated by different urban
governance structures. A better understanding of how
differences in the
distribution of authority are engaged by and through the policy process can
provide needed insights into multilevel urban governance and opportunities
for more effective policy design (Pierre 2005; Brenner 2009; Sellers 2002).
2
A comparison of efforts to increase the production of recycled urban
wastewater for purposeful reuse in the U.S. (specifically California) and
Australia is used to examine the effects of authority allocation on
effectiveness in urban service reform. Urban wastewater recycling is a useful
case because it can decrease the amount of water a city must draw from rivers
and reservoirs to meet the needs of its residents, industry, and businesses
but local governments are often unable to overcome the high capital
requirements, transaction costs, and political resistance associated with
wastewater recycling on their own. The U.S. and Australia are two of the
leading countries in recycled wastewater development, and in both places
targets have been developed in the wake of multi-year droughts. Urban water
governance in the U.S. is highly decentralized and therefore California is
used as a useful window into the U.S. case because it shares a similar
environmental management context with Australia – a dry climate, overallocated water systems, and high urban population densities and income
levels – but differs in the allocation of authority for urban water services.
This case selection thus allows for a comparative analysis of efforts to
change urban service delivery strategies in a multilevel governance context.
The next section of the article provides a review of existing research
on multilevel urban governance in decentralized and centralized contexts and
the scale politics of urban governance reform. The second section describes
the case selection, data, and methods used in the comparative analysis.
Interviews with key informants, policy documents, meetings, agency records,
and newspaper accounts are used to analyze the policy efforts of California
and Australia to increase the production of recycled urban wastewater. The
analysis shows that while Australia has been more successful in setting an
urban water governance agenda that includes recycled urban wastewater, in
both places local resistance has been a barrier to effective change. These
findings demonstrate that reform capacity and policy success may differ
3
between governance systems while common barriers and political dynamics
persist.
Multilevel Governance and Urban Service Delivery Strategies
The incentives and opportunities generated at multiple sites and scales of
governance can shape the decisions cities make about service strategies and,
subsequently, the consequences for broader policy goals (Bulkeley and Betsill
2005; Sellers 2002; Gustavsson et al. 2009). A key source of institutional
variation between urban governance systems is the level of authority given to
local governments, which can help determine the participants, objectives,
instruments, and outcomes of urban governance (Rothstein 1996; Pierre 1999).
There is a long history of debate in the political and administrative
sciences surrounding the ideal allocation of authority for effective
policymaking (Ostrom and Ostrom 1971; Howell-Moroney 2008; Dietz et al. 2003;
Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981). Empirical and meta-analytic research have
failed to link one particular mode of multilevel governance with effective
policy delivery (Newig and Fritsch 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2003). Rather than
determining whether one mode of governance is superior to another, the aim of
this article is to link policy pathways and barriers that exist in
decentralized and centralized systems to the politics and effectiveness of
reform efforts.
The degree to which authority in a multilevel governance system is
centralized or decentralized will have consequences for the policy pursued at
higher levels to promote urban service delivery reform and the capacity of
different levels of government to implement change. In decentralized systems
the lack of authority at higher levels means that they are unlikely to have
the necessary constitutional or political means with which to explicitly
steer the course of action cities will take but they could provide
leadership, set goals, and provide incentives in ways that initiate action at
4
the local level. Decentralized systems are likely to have a greater number of
veto players, or actors with the ability to prevent progress in reform
efforts (Tsebelis 2002), and as governance complexity increases so can
competition for resources and votes (Mullin 2009; Berry 2008). Higher levels
of government can act as enablers that support local governments to take on
activities that contribute to broader goals (McGranahan and Satterthwaite
2003). Even if there is not the authority to mandate change from above,
motivating strategies such as incentives and targets can be used to help
steer urban governance toward their desired outcomes.
In highly centralized multilevel governance systems higher levels of
government are in a better position to dictate the course of urban decision
making due to their ability to structure opportunities and incentives for
local decision makers and potentially greater implementation capacity. If
authority is concentrated in a central government, they could develop
planning strategies that align local actions and decision making with central
priorities. When central governments have more authority they may be more
likely to provide funding to local governments, to create incentives and
opportunities for coordination among the necessary parties, and to provide
political cover or legitimacy for local politicians and decision makers who
need to support the changes.
In decentralized systems of governance higher levels of government can
provide incentives for actions at the local level and provide space for local
innovation, processes which can result in more effective policymaking through
creativity and specificity. Decentralized governance can lead to more
successful reform efforts because of its reliance on local knowledge and
capacity and its ability to provide greater flexibility in policy design.
Local governments are often more closely tied to the local context, which can
reduce transaction costs and improve implementation.
5
There are also reasons decentralized governance can be less effective.
Citizens can face greater transaction costs when expressing preferences or
concerns in decentralized contexts because of the need to interact with
multiple decision making bodies. The administrative costs of multiple
jurisdictions in an area may drive up the price of government as many urban
reforms require investment, coordination, and political support for success.
Some studies have shown greater levels of regulatory capture at the local
level (Ashworth et al. 2002). Others have found that local autonomy can
actually inhibit innovation, particularly when local governments are given
responsibility without flexible and available funding mechanisms (Basolo and
Scally 2008). Finally, local governments are likely to engage in policymaking
that has inter-jurisdictional spillover effects – such as environmental and
natural resource management – and in the aggregate these local decisions may
lead to irrational or undesirable outcomes and can undermine national or
state level policy goals (Azfar et al. 2004).
The success of decentralized systems may ultimately hinge on the
particular institutions and capacities of local governments (Krane et al.
2004). In decentralized systems the central government can act as an enabler
that supports local governments to take on activities that contribute to
environmental policy goals even if it does not have the authority to mandate
using incentives and targets (McGranahan and Satterthwaite 2003). In
centralized systems central governments can more directly structure
opportunities and incentives for local decision makers and develop planning
strategies that align local actions and decision making with central
priorities (Sellers 2002). As a result, there is no clear expectation for
whether more or less local control in urban governance will result in more
effective policy efforts to change urban service delivery strategies.
However, in either case central governments can play an important role and
unique pathways to urban service reform and implementation are likely.
6
The analysis that follows examines whether urban governance systems
with more or less local control are able to more effectively change urban
service delivery strategy and the policy pathways and barriers underlying
these differences.
Case Selection, Methods, and Data
The development of urban recycled wastewater is used as the policy case with
which to examine the multilevel governance dynamics of urban service delivery
reform. Cities everywhere are being encouraged to find ways to minimize their
impact on surrounding watersheds and reduce the need for further investment
in water sourcing (Gleick 2003; Novotny and Brown 2007). Recycling urban
wastewater for productive reuse is an increasingly attractive option for
managers and decision makers because of its potential to increase supply,
reduce environmental pressures, and treat wastewater at the same time (Thomas
and Durham 2003; Anderson 2003).
However, developing recycled water can also generate political
conflicts and governance challenges. The facilities to purposefully treat and
distribute recycled water require significant upfront capital investment that
local water agencies are often not able or willing to invest on their own.
Developing recycled water also means existing governance units are
interacting in new, and at times conflicting, ways that can create high
transaction costs (Asano 2002; Angelakis et al. 2003; Australian Academy of
Technological Science and Engineering 2004). Recycled water can also be
politically contentious because some perceive its use as a public health risk
(Marks and Zadoroznyj 2005). Developing policies that balance the benefits
and challenges of developing recycled water is a difficult task and the
outcomes are likely to depend on the political structures of decision making.
The U.S. and Australia have been leaders in developing recycled water, being
two of only four governments worldwide that have recycled water projects and
7
regulations in place (Angelakis et al. 2003), and are used as case studies of
policy pathways and scale politics in urban service reform.
Urban water management in Australia has become increasingly
centralized, with the Commonwealth government initiating a series of reforms
for the water sector tied to national competitiveness and efficiency. Despite
constitutional authority lying with the states, the federal government (the
Commonwealth) has significant control over water management (Halligan and
Power 1992; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; McKay 2005). This accumulation of
centralized power in Australia is not confined to water (Wiltshire 1992), and
has resulted in federal-state conflicts and local government being relegated
to a subordinate role (Stilwell and Troy 2000). In most states the water
supply and wastewater services of the capital city are managed jointly
through single full-service, state owned corporations.
Urban water management in the U.S., however, is highly decentralized.
In order to gain traction on the governance of urban service reform, the
experiences in California are used as a window into the U.S. experience.
California has been the target of national water management legislation in
the U.S. and has made explicit commitments to prioritize recycled water for
the long-term sustainability of their water resources. California has a
decentralized governance system for urban water decision making and planning:
authority is allocated to nearly 300 local water departments, special
district governments, and private water suppliers within the state. These
agencies set water prices, ensure their supplies meet demand, monitor water
quality, develop new water sources, and implement conservation and best
management practices. As state and federal investment in large water projects
have declined over the last twenty years, local responsibility for ensuring
water supplies meet water needs has further increased (Milkovich 2003).
Australia and California share geographic and demographic features that
provide conditions for comparing the effects of authority allocation through
8
a most similar system design (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Both California
and Australia are subject to recurring droughts, which have played a role in
shaping urban water management policies and strategies
(Hundley 2001; Smith 1998; Cody et al. 2009). California experienced drought
conditions from 1987 to 1992 and again from 2007 to 2011, with then-Governor
Schwarzenegger declaring a state of emergency in February, 2009. Australia
experienced drought conditions from 1991 to 1995, 2001 to 2003 and again from
2006 to 2011. In both cases, drought, population growth and environmental
uncertainties have put water scarcity on the political agenda and prompted
action on recycled water at higher levels of government.
Data were collected through a targeted identification and analysis of
government reports, policy documents, newspaper articles, and agency records
based on recommendations from policy actors, academics, and internet
searches. Observational methods were also used at public forums and meetings
that took place in both California and Australia between 2007 and 2010 and
that centered on discussions of urban water management or wastewater
recycling. Semi-structured interviews with key informants were used to
validate and refine the conclusions. Interview participants were chosen using
a snowball sampling method (Bernard 2000), beginning with central actors in
urban water management. Participants were asked a series of questions
regarding their role in urban water management, the policies and programs
surrounding wastewater recycling, and the obstacles and achievements they
perceive. These three sources of data are used together in the following
sections to examine the degree to which California and Australia have been
successful in increasing recycled wastewater production and how institutional
differences have influenced the effectiveness and political dynamics of their
efforts.
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9
Reform Efforts and Effectiveness in California and Australia
California
In 1991, in the midst of a major drought, California’s state legislature
passed the Water Recycling Act (WRA). Recognizing that due to “periodic
drought conditions” and the fact that “the development of traditional water
resources in California has not kept pace with the state’s population,” the
WRA declared that recycled water should be developed as a new, reliable water
source that would help meet the state’s water needs. The WRA identified
recycled water development as a safe and economical way to reduce water
demand for the sensitive Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and aimed to generate
statewide water supply benefits by motivating local water agencies to reach a
volumetric recycled water development goal. At the time, local recycled water
projects were generating around 350,000 acre feet (432 GL) of recycled water
each year (California Recycled Water Task Force 2003). The WRA set a goal of
doubling production to 700,000 acre-feet (864 GL) per year by 2000, and 1
million acre-feet (1233 GL) per year by 2010.
To achieve the water recycling targets set in the WRA the state
established guidelines for contracts between recycled water suppliers and
retail water suppliers; it required that recycled water be priced by both
public and private agencies at a level comparable to or less than potable
water in order to provide economic incentives; and it required the California
Department of Water Resources to report to the Legislature on the
opportunities and constraints that exist for recycled water project
construction. Subsequent to the passing of the WRA, California voters
approved Proposition 13 in 2000 and Proposition 50 in 2002, both of which
were intended to provide millions of dollars in bond money to develop water
quality, conservation, and recycling projects throughout the state.
10
Today, California recycles approximately 500,000 acre-feet of treated
municipal wastewater, which is around 10% of available treated wastewater,
falling short of its 700,000 acre-feet by the year 2000 goal and its 1
million acre-feet by 2010 goal (California Department of Water Resources
2009). The production of recycled water is highly concentrated in southern
California, with Orange, San Diego, and Los Angeles counties producing around
half of the state's recycled water supplies. However, Over half (54%) of this
recycled municipal wastewater is used for urban water supply, industry, and
landscaping purposes with the remaining 46% of it used for agricultural
irrigation (California Department of Water Resources 2009).
Australia
Australia has also been driven by drought and increased competition for
scarce water resources to take action on urban water service reform. In 1994
the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) undertook water sector reforms
that culminated in the National Water Reform Framework (the Framework). The
Framework signaled the Commonwealth’s intent to steer water management goals
for the country through jointly developed principles and programs. The
reforms positioned changes in water management as part of the country’s
broader efforts to facilitate economic development and revitalization through
efficiency (Australian Academy of Technological Science and Engineering
2004). However, subsequent state and local efforts to implement these changes
did not keep pace with demographic and environmental shifts in Australia
(Commonwealth of Australia 2004). In 2002 the Australian Senate conducted an
inquiry into urban water management motivated by growing water demand,
declining environmental health and climate change as well as the fact that
the country was in the midst of a serious drought.
One result of the Senate inquiry of 2002 was an assessment of the
economic and institutional barriers to greater use of recycled water. The
11
Senate committee proposed a greater role for the Commonwealth as a way to
overcome these barriers and recommended initiating a national research
initiative on water recycling, including its socio-economic, technology,
environmental, and health related dimensions. The committee ultimately
recommended the establishment of a National Water Partnership that would
simplify the institutional arrangements around urban water management and
encourage state and local level targets for water recycling projects (Allison
et al. 2002). In 2004 this call was taken up by COAG with the establishment
of the 2004 National Water Initiative (NWI).
The NWI is an intergovernmental
agreement that establishes a national vision and “blueprint for water
reform”; by 2006 every state government had agreed to implement the NWI
(National Water Commission 2009a; Byrnes et al. 2006).
There are three requirements of the NWI related to urban recycled water
development. First, the parties also agreed to jointly set national health
and environmental guidelines for priority elements of water sensitive urban
designs, initially recycled waste and storm water, by 2005 (Commonwealth of
Australia 2004). Second it requires that the states and territories apply
national health and environmental guidelines for recycled water to their
individual projects in ways that are “congruent with pricing policies for
potable water, and stimulate efficient water use no matter what the source”
and deliver plans to the Commonwealth to this effect by 2006 (Commonwealth of
Australia 2004). The plans should promote recycled water whenever
economically efficient.
The third component of the plan is a Commonwealth
commitment of AUD$1 billion for water projects administered though the Water
Smart Australia program.
Today Australia is using around 19.4% of its treated wastewater in
planned recycled water projects (Table 2). Wastewater recycling in cities
increased but the Commonwealth has never set volumetric goals for wastewater
recycling. Cities and states are setting targets for themselves as a way to
12
meet the Commonwealth's overall planning goals. The states have also made
their own investments in developing the scientific knowledge and regulatory
frameworks to manage health and safety risks, prompted in part by community
concerns regarding water quality (National Water Commission 2009b).
Wastewater recycling by urban utilities has risen by 117% since 1999-2000
(National Water Commission 2009b). Sydney produces 33 billion liters of
recycled water up from about 20 in 2006, a 65% increase (Sydney Water 2010).
Melbourne's recycled water has increased from 2% of its wastewater in 1999 to
14% today with a goal of 100 GL per year by 2012 (Melbourne Water 2005).
Adelaide currently has the highest proportion of wastewater reuse of
Australian cities at 30% (National Water Commission 2009b).
The national health and environmental guidelines for water recycling
were set through the leadership and efforts of the Commonwealth and endorsed
by each of the jurisdictions in 2006 (National Water Commission 2009a).
Unlike California, Australia has developed policy mechanisms for the recycled
water it produces to be used for indoor municipal purposes. The guidelines
take a risk management approach based on human health and environmental
quality. The water reforms in Australia initiated a rush of water planning in
every state and territory – plans that ultimately reflected the new shared
principles (Hussey and Dovers 2007). The Commonwealth has now accredited all
9 state plans as being congruent with national priorities (National Water
Commission 2009b).
Program funding has been awarded to projects that seek to provide
better management or use of water resources. Unlike California, which has
been facing unprecedented budget shortfalls, the Commonwealth has
consistently had large budget surpluses in the last decade and has
distributed more than AUD$1 billion to water recycling and desalination
projects to the states. However, only 18% of committed program funding
(AUD$270 million) was awarded competitively through two open funding rounds.
13
The remaining funds have been awarded based on election commitments made in
2004 and 2007, and to National Icon or ‘Other’ projects, where the assessed
merit of proposals was not always the key criterion in determining funding.
[PLACE TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The Challenges of Decentralized Reform
California has consistently fallen short of its goals for the development and
use of recycled wastewater. In 2001 the state established the Recycled Water
Task Force for the purpose of reviewing and reporting on the opportunities
and constraints for recycled water projects in California. The task force was
composed of 40 representatives from federal, state and local government,
public health professionals, the private sector, environmental organizations,
academia, and public interest groups. In 2003 their report, “Water Recycling
2030: Recommendations of California’s Recycled Water Task Force,” concluded
that there is the potential in the state to recycle up to 1.5 million acrefeet of municipal wastewater by 2030, which would require an investment of
$11 billion.
The major obstacles they identified to further developing recycled
water were lackluster support from the public, a lack of coordinated funding
for infrastructure and research, and fragmented responsibilities among state
agencies (California Recycled Water Task Force 2003). Not everyone has been
supportive of the state’s goals and there have been conflicts at the local
level when water agencies and local governments attempt to meet the goals.
Efforts to develop recycled water have been labeled “toilet to tap” projects,
and various campaigns led by citizens groups, newspapers, and bloggers have
labeled recycled water as the equivalent of sewage. In addition to
perceptions of the palatability of recycled water, there is an element of
distrust in local resistance. Some see the state government as incapable of
14
adequately protecting residents’ health, either through incompetence or
industry capture. For example, a retired California soil scientist wrote an
article in 2007 discrediting the 2002 Recycled Water Task Force for having
too many recycled water industry representatives (Pecarich 2007).
The state’s requirement that recycled water be priced by both public
and private agencies at a level comparable to or less than potable water has
largely been met by those agencies that do serve recycled water (California
Recycled Water Task Force 2003). However, high capital costs continue to be a
barrier to competitive pricing of recycled water (California Department of
Water Resources 2009).
The State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB), the primary regulatory
body for water resources in the state, was not involved in recycled water
development until Proposition 13 and Proposition 50 passed and they were
tasked with distributing the funds (Table 3). Voters in California approved
$763.9 million in bond funds for Proposition 13, which in part provides loans
and grants for the construction of water recycling facilities. It is not
clear how much money has been dedicated to this program but it is ongoing and
the majority of funds have been distributed as loans rather than grants; the
SWRCB has stated that very limited grant funding is available. Proposition 50
provided $3.4 billion for a range of water supply and treatment purposes
throughout the state. Of these funds, $180 million were dedicated to urban
and agricultural water conservation, recycling, and other water use
efficiency projects. According to the state’s fiscal year 2003-2004 budget,
only $60 million was dedicated to water recycling, which is 1.8% of
Proposition 50 funds. The funds are distributed based on a priority ranking
scheme and are contingent on agencies being in compliance with other state
water planning requirements.
[PLACE TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
15
The political consequences of the state’s efforts to increase the
planned production and use of recycled wastewater also include the generation
of entirely new arenas for urban governance within the multilevel system. The
introduction of water recycling targets in California, and the federal funds
available to support them, encouraged and empowered local recycled water
producers, retail water suppliers, and entities responsible for groundwater
replenishment to initiate contracts amongst themselves to facilitate recycled
water distribution and help secure markets for their services. Regional
coalitions of local water agencies have emerged, the most prominent example
being the Bay Area Recycled Water Coalition (BARWC).
The aim of the BARWC is
to bring agencies together so that, rather than compete individually for
Federal partnerships, they can support each other’s projects and adopt a
regional focus on recycled water development projects that are “highly
leveraged and locally managed” (BARWC 2010). The BARWC currently has fourteen
member agencies from the San Francisco Bay Area and seventeen recycled water
projects; when fully implemented the projects will provide 104,000 acre feet
per year of recycled water supplies. Another example of an emerging regional
coalition is the South Bay Water Recycling project which involves a regional
effort by seven water utilities near San Jose whose aim is to initially
construct 100 km (60 miles) of reclaimed water distribution pipelines to
serve San Jose, Santa Clara, and Milpitas (Okun 2000). The impetus for the
project was to restrict wastewater discharges into South San Francisco Bay
but, as it developed, the benefits in making customers "drought-proof" has
become the key selling point for bringing customers online (Okun 2000).
A National Agenda’s Local Implementation
There have been challenges to implementing the Commonwealth’s National Water
Initiative. State level water planners had to learn a new language: the
16
language of central government agencies (National Water Commission 2009b). As
a result states were slow in delivering their NWI-consistent state plans.
Implementation experiences have also shown that the national guidelines don't
support small scale projects well as they focus on “large-scale systems that
have significant resources directed toward their establishment and operation”
(National Water Commission 2009b). The institutional complexity surrounding
water recycling projects has also presented coordination challenges among the
responsible agencies.
Despite the strength of federal water planning efforts in Australia,
public opinion is still able to prevent the agenda moving forward. Local
resistance to recycled water development has been a major barrier to
implementation in some places. Opposition arises largely from a perceived
health risk and, with rains returning to some areas of Australia, a lack of
support to fund new water projects (Hunter and Wahquist 2009). Anti-recycled
water development has been an Opposition party platform in many areas,
drawing heavily on public perceptions of health risks in particular. The head
of the Environment and Natural Resources Committee (Labor Party) said in
December, 2009 that, “the politics will always be complicated. We need it to
get a lot drier and have a much more informed public…We need to move beyond
the knee-jerk ‘yuck factor’ response” (Hunter and Wahquist 2009). Local
policy bans remain within the authority of local governments and in some
places have been effective in limiting the uses of recycled water, even where
cost effective. For example, in 2006 residents in Toowoomba, New South Wales
voted against a proposal to introduce recycled water into the drinking water
system despite support for the project from local political leaders (AAP
2006a).
With the Commonwealth taking on such a central role in water planning,
the roles of other actors have shifted as the system adapts. States have a
new and more important planning role than in the past as they hold primary
17
responsibility for translating national priorities into more localized
planning actions and strategies. State water planners are responsible for
meeting the performance standards set by the Commonwealth and in turn setting
targets for local water agencies (Marks and Zadoroznyj 2005). The lack of
federal guidance on small scale recycling projects has also created a vacuum
for state governments to fill. South Australia has developed a comprehensive
plan for its capital city, Adelaide, in which water recycling projects are
funded by encouraging consumers to voluntarily contribute to a scheme that
funds projects which reuse water (Department of Water, Land, and Biodiversity
Conservation 2004). Sydney Water is making efforts to promote localized water
recycling schemes, including changing regulations to make it easier to
recycle water locally and even in people’s homes (Sydney Water 2010).
As in California, these political processes have generated new spaces
within the urban governance system, specifically experimental suburbs that
have emerged within cities. Cities are encouraging new, recycled watercentered suburban neighborhoods, particularly in Melbourne, Adelaide, and
Sydney. For example, the Western Sydney Recycled Water Initiative is a
largely private endeavor whose production of recycled water has allowed for
further growth in the northwest part of the city. Melbourne has passed an
ordinance that makes recycled water mandatory for 40,000 new homes in the
eastern part of the city. The Mawson Lakes planned community in Adelaide,
which includes a dual-pipe recycled water system, has been developed as an
environmentally progressive suburb. The presence of these recycled water
development schemes is becoming a critical factor in meeting water demands,
particularly in new or growing areas of cities, and there are early signs of
potential conflicts over these resources (Hopkins 2007). These very localized
projects with high levels of private sector involvement actively seek to
alter growth, development, and land use patterns in cities and could be the
source of new urban water governance arenas.
18
Reforming Urban Water Service Strategies in a Multilevel Context
The preceding analysis evaluated the efforts of California and Australia to
increase the production of recycled urban wastewater given their unique
structures of multilevel urban governance. The results show that Australia,
the more centralized system, has more effectively set and implemented an
urban water governance agenda that includes recycled wastewater. The
Commonwealth government in Australia has been successful in setting and
funding a shared urban water governance agenda that includes regulating and
developing recycled wastewater. California, on the other hand, has struggled
to harmonize its regulatory framework and reduce the transaction costs
encountered by local agencies when developing recycled wastewater but is
consistently developing and updating its volumetric targets. The results also
reveal the pathways and barriers to urban water management reform generated
by institutionalized allocations of authority. In both places local
resistance appears as a barrier to reform regardless of authority structure
and efforts to reform urban water management authority are helping to create
new spaces for urban governance to occur (Figure 1).
[PLACE FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Policy Pathways in the Multilevel Governance of Urban Services
The results of this comparative study reveal unique reform strategies,
differences in effectiveness in achieving policy aims, and common barriers in
Australia’s and California’s attempts to reform urban water management, and
specifically to increase the production of recycled urban wastewater.
Australia’s success comes in part from its ability to lay a coordinated
foundation when developing urban recycled water. The Commonwealth first
established a coordinated and common framework for managing water resources
19
and then required state level water managers translate this framework into
actionable and locally relevant plans. This allowed questions of governance
and financing to be addressed at the beginning stages of the change process,
before water managers were asked to accomplish specific tasks. Cities and
states have adopted their own targets and are implementing them according to
the shared framework with substantial support from the Commonwealth. However,
this also means that the continued success of the Commonwealth’s reforms
depends on the ability of state water plans to be implemented (Hussey and
Dovers 2007). An additional challenge Australia faces is adapting its
framework and planning process to the scale needs of water users, as
illustrated by the states’ request that small-scale recycled water projects
be included when developing guidelines. Local innovations and regulatory
needs are shaping the national strategy through feedback mechanisms between
the state and federal governments.
California, on the other hand, lacks the capacity to establish a common
framework and instead set targets first. As a result the state has been
continually addressing issues of governance and financing over the last
twenty years through legislation and state ballots but fragmented authority
over recycled urban wastewater and severe underfunding remain. A minimum of
28 additional pieces of state legislation have been passed since 1991 related
to the production, use, and regulation of recycled water in California. The
California Recycled Water Task Force estimates that $11 billion is required
for the state to meet its recycled water potential while current investments
as a result of the Water Recycling Act are around $240 million. The state has
not fully resolved the issues of high capital costs and secure markets in
recycled water development, or how best to leverage federal funds.
Local resistance to recycled water development was a common barrier to
meeting policy aims. In both cases political pressures stemming from health
concerns of residents and water users were able to successfully prevent some
20
projects from moving forward. For example, despite Australia’s more
centralized governance system, residents in Towoomba were able to influence
local politicians’ decisions to fund and build recycled water facilities
despite their contribution to the overarching goals of water reform. In
California the local resistance was one of the major impediments preventing
water agencies from moving forward with recycled water projects (California
Recycled Water Task Force 2003). This is likely because local resistance in
California was coupled with a lack of financial incentives for local agencies
to take action.
Urban Governance Structure and Urban Governance Spaces
In both California and Australia the politics involved in implementing
changes to urban service delivery strategies created new spaces for urban
governance to occur. In California the creation of new space was driven in
part by institutional fragmentation, as cities “widened their space of
engagement” (Lundqvist and von Borgstede 2008) in order to leverage federal
funding and overcome transaction costs. In the example of BARWC, agencies
have decided to engage in a regional effort to leverage funds and develop
projects with broad benefits. While coordination and cooperation has also
been part of developing recycled wastewater in southern California, the
coalitions of agencies that are forming in northern California are unique in
that they have created an entirely new “level” in the urban water governance
system – the regional coalition. This difference in coalition building
between northern and southern California may be due to the fact that water
agencies in southern California have historically been recipients of state
and federal investment; agencies in northern California may see coalition
building as a strategy to compete with the large, experienced agencies in the
south for state and federal dollars.
21
In Australia new spaces were also created but of a different kind. As
cities implement the Commonwealth reforms new areas of engagement are
emerging in the form of experimental suburbs. These suburbs are an important
new governance space that is particularly attractive to the private sector.
This experimentation is a consequence of Australia’s top down approach to
urban water reform that has left room for local planning and implementation,
and is likely contributing to the effectiveness of the Commonwealth’s new
policies and framework (van Roon 2007). The involvement of the private sector
and other informal networks in the development of these experimental suburbs
is an important area for future research as it may have significant
consequences either for achieving or blocking change (Graham and Marvin 2001;
Partzsch 2009; Olsson et al. 2006; Huitema and Meijerink 2009).
While it is clear that the distribution of authority in urban
governance helps shape reform outcomes and dynamics, there are also other
factors at play. For example, both California and Australia have experienced
periodic but severe drought conditions over the last thirty years. However,
the most recent drought in Australia has been described as a one in 1,000
year event, particularly from 2006-2007 (AAP 2006b). The severity of these
conditions could help to explain Australia’s success in wastewater recycling,
as this was also the time when guidelines were being set and funds were being
distributed. In addition, the cost of wastewater recycling will vary between
cities depending on existing infrastructure and topography.
For example,
retrofitting water delivery systems and buildings to include recycled
wastewater is more expensive then including the additional pipes in new
construction. Cities also have different supply augmentation options beyond
recycled wastewater. For example, some cities may be able to engage in water
trading with nearby agricultural users while others may not, and some cities
may face stricter dam operating requirements than others. These inter-city
22
differences may aggregate in ways that reinforce or undermine higher level
policy goals.
The Allocation of Authority and Multilevel Governance of Urban Service Reform
This study has examined how differences in the allocation of authority within
multilevel urban governance systems influence the policy pathways and scale
politics of efforts to reform urban service delivery strategies. The U.S. and
Australia were used as comparative cases. California served as the window to
the U.S. experience based on its shared demographic and geographic features
with Australia, but differences in the level of local control over urban
water planning and management: high levels of local control in California and
relatively low levels of local control in Australia. Questions of how and
where to scale the governance of public services, and particularly water
management, are increasingly important as authorities and policy problems
continue to shift (Moss and Newig 2010; Batterbury and Fernando 2006). This
study has shown that reform capacity and policy success can differ between
types of governance systems while common barriers and political dynamics
persist.
Differences in the institutionalized allocation of authority in
multilevel urban governance may have the greatest effect on the capacity for,
and implementation of, successful urban service delivery strategy reforms
from above. The Commonwealth government in Australia was more successful in
implementing an urban water reform strategy due to its greater institutional
and financial capabilities. It uses a greater percentage of its treated
wastewater in planned water recycling projects (19% vs. 10% in California),
has policy mechanisms through which recycled water can be incorporated into
municipal drinking water supplies, and has successfully set and implemented a
national urban water governance agenda. However, as Dahl (1994) points out,
the gains in effectiveness made through institutional features – centralized
23
or decentralized decision making – may come at the expense of democratic
criteria such as fairness or legitimacy. In both places local resistance has
acted as a barrier to effective reform and reconfigurations of authority
through implementation has generated new spaces in which urban governance can
now occur. This local resistance – and other political and institutional
differences within and between cities – may aggregate in ways that shape
multilevel urban governance and is an important area for further research.
The findings demonstrate the critical role of political action and
resistance in both centralized and decentralized urban governance systems and
supports previous research showing that local autonomy can be an obstacle to
innovation when coordinated state and local action is required for success
(Basolo and Scally 2008). If reforming urban service delivery strategies
remains on the political agenda, we may expect to increasingly observe these
dynamics in multilevel urban governance systems. Future research should
examine these spaces further: who governs in new spaces and with what
consequences for equity and efficiency? How do they relate to the existing
governance system? How long do they last? Further, while setting central
targets with local implementation flexibility is an attractive policy option,
the findings in this study suggest that this strategy is not effective
without appropriate incentives, coordination, and oversight.
The premise of this study was that there is not one ideal form of urban
governance able to promote reform without contention or inefficiency. Rather,
each mode of urban governance – decentralized and centralized – has unique
and dynamic barriers and opportunities to effective policy making that are
shaped by institutions and actors operating at multiple scales. The analysis
broadens our understanding of institutional dynamics in urban service reform
by evaluating policy pathways in unique urban governance contexts and the
political reconfigurations of urban governance that occur as a result of
reform. The findings in this paper demonstrate the value of a comparative
24
study and represent an additional step toward a more robust understanding of
multilevel urban governance and effective urban service reform.
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Table 1: Comparison of geographic and political features of water recycling
in California and Australia.
California
Australia
Population
Water Management
System
Per Capita Urban
Water Use
Motivations to
Recycle Water
Urban Governance
Structure
36.5 million people
21.7 million people
95% in cities
88% in cities
2/3 in southern arid
region
2/3 in 5 large, coastal
cities
Highly managed
infrastructure network
Highly managed
infrastructure network
Increasing restrictions on
diversions
Increasing restrictions on
diversions
Consistent drought periods
Consistent drought periods
878 liters per person per
day
320 liters per person per
day
Provide reliable water
supplies to mitigate risks
from drought and climate
change
Meet environmental targets
Provide reliable water
supplies to mitigate risks
from drought and climate
change
Meet environmental targets
Reduce need for imported
water supplies
Improve efficiency
Decentralized
Centralized
Sources: (Australian Academy of Technological Science and Engineering 2004;
Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006a; Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006b;
Hanak 2005; Landis and Reilly 2004; United States Census Bureau 2007)
34
Table 2: Comparison of outcomes from efforts to increase the use and
production of recycled wastewater in California and Australia.
California
Australia
Current Level of
Planned Wastewater
Recycling
647 gigaliters per year
425 gigaliters per year
10% of treated wastewater
19.4% of effluent
234 suppliers
Over 500 suppliers
1.8 gigaliters per year
Recycled Wastewater
for Indoor
Residential Use
0
16% of households
receiving
Recycled Wastewater
for Indirect and
Outdoor Direct Use
207.2 gigaliters per year
38.5 gigaliters per year
1233 gigaliters per year
by 2010
23% of treated wastewater
Individual city targets
range from 10%-33%
recycling of effluent
USD$11 billion
AUD$1 billion
Wastewater Recycling
Target
Projected Investment
Sources: (California Department of Water Resources 2004; California Recycled
Water Task Force 2003; Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and
Arts 2009; Hanak 2005; National Water Commission 2008; Radcliffe 2006; State
Water Resources Control Board 2002)
Table 3: Source and distribution of state bond money associated with urban
water reform in California.
Funding Source
Proposition 13
Proposition 50
Year Initiated
Funding Amount
2000
$763.9 million
2002
$3.4 billion
Amount Dedicated to
Recycled Water
Unclear, distributed
primarily as loans to
municipalities and water
districts
$60 million
Sources: (California State Water Resources Control Board
(http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/grants_loans/propositions/prop
13.shtml) and California Department of Public Health
(http://www.cdph.ca.gov/services/funding/Pages/Prop50.aspx))
35
Figure 1: Summary of major findings on urban governance structure and urban
service reform. Australia, the more centralized governance system, has been
more successful in developing and implementing urban water service reform.
However, in both places local resistance was a barrier to change and the
political dynamics of implementation helped to generate new spaces for urban
governance.
36