Keynote Address
on
“The role of middle power countries in building the framework
for a nuclear-weapons-free world”
by
H.E. Ambassador LIBRAN L. CABACTULAN
Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the United Nations in New York and
President of the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the
Roundtable organized by the Middle Powers Initiative
With the support of the Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs
“Building the Framework for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World: Laying Out the Map”
1 May 2012, Diplomatic Academy, Vienna
I would like to thank the Middle Powers Initiative for its kind invitation for me to join you
today. I am particularly pleased to accept this invitation because MPI played a role in
what we were all able to achieve at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
Threshold of New Opportunities
It has been two years almost to the day since we strengthened the foundations of the
NPT during the last Review Conference. Today we stand on the threshold of new
opportunities to build on what we had achieved.
With the start this week of the preparatory process leading up to 2015, we must renew
our faith in our common cause of nuclear disarmament.
Clearly, this is a crucial moment and the MPI is to be congratulated for once again
organizing a timely and meaningful dialogue on this vital topic.
Middle Powers Initiative and Civil Society
The involvement of organizations like the Middle Powers Initiative and other members of
civil society is important. In addressing national security issues, states must have a
good understanding of security.
In understanding security today, policy makers must take more into account – from the
state’s internal features to the role of the economy and even human factors. Picturing
the state system and its threats should not be made in a simplistic way. It must take
into account the complex and interdependent factors influencing state and non-state
actors in international relations.
The role of the state has changed since the end of the cold war. The state is not a
unitary actor in the international system but rather one of many. And among that many
are groups like the Middle Powers Initiative.
Shaping History
The Big Powers shaped history. They dominated events and changed the world.
Whole eras and historic periods are almost always exclusively named because of them.
The Cold War was indelibly defined by the two Big Powers.
There is still some debate on what appropriate appellation should be given to the PostCold War era. Different concepts have been thrown about: clash of civilizations,
multilateralism, asymmetrical, democratization, and human security, to name a few.
Significantly, many of these notions of what to call the Post-Cold War era are not
necessarily centered on the Big Powers.
I believe that the Post-Cold War period need not be another period in history defined by
the Big Powers. There is enough time and opportunity for others to make the
difference, to define the world we are in today.
It may be the moment for the Middle Powers to define this era, as the catalyst that
brings about dramatic and historic change, by leading the way in building the framework
for a nuclear weapons-free world.
I believe that the map that we will lay out in building the framework towards a nuclear
weapons free world should have the Nuclear Weapons Convention as its inevitable
destination.
The Imperative of International Law – ICJ Advisory Opinion
The Nuclear Weapons Convention is truly our inevitable destination because there no
longer is any legal ambiguity as to the obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons.
The 1996 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons of the International Court of Justice
and the actions and statements of a vast majority of states after 1996 made sure of this.
The unanimous conclusion by the Court that there exists an obligation to pursue in good
faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its
aspects under strict and effective international control was groundbreaking, to say the
least. With this, Article VI obligations of the NPT were given new life.
But more than that, as to the illegality of these weapons, I believe that these are illegal
under international law, particularly international humanitarian law.
This is the position the Philippines took in our written and oral pleadings before the
International Court of Justice in1996. It was much to our regret that the Court did not
categorically rule that nuclear weapons were illegal under international law.
The Philippines no longer finds itself deep within the nuclear shadow of the United
States. We have enshrined in our constitution a prohibition on nuclear weapons.
But we remain cognizant of the fact that the dangers posed by nuclear weapons
continue to exist for everyone.
In addition, things have started warming up in my part of the world. Flashpoints with
decidedly nuclear dimensions remain prominent: the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan
Straits, the South China Sea, and further West, the standoff between India and
Pakistan, and the situation in the Middle East. To this potentially volatile mix is added
the possibility that violent non-state actors might somehow possess fissile material or
the weapons themselves.
Of all the weapons ever conceived by the mind of man, nuclear weapons are inherently
indiscriminate, far beyond proportionality, unimaginable in unnecessary suffering, and
inescapably and grievously harmful to the environment. It is a weapon where the notion
of control is meaningless and the idea of military necessity absurd.
Nuclear weapons are at the apex of man’s genius at finding ways to destroy his fellow
human being.
In our written and oral pleadings, we had asserted norms other than humanitarian law.
We had put forward the legal proposition that nuclear weapons violate the Charter – that
the very existence of these terrible weapons renders the political independence and
territorial integrity of sovereign states illusory.
The Philippines also helped lead efforts to criminalize nuclear weapons. In the
negotiations in the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court (ICC)
and up to the Diplomatic Conference in Rome that adopted the ICC Statute, the
Philippines vigorously pushed for the inclusion of nuclear weapons in the list of
prohibited weapons.
The Legal Link
There is a legal link between the NPT and the illegality of nuclear weapons under
international humanitarian law. The NPT came into existence with the objective of
eliminating these weapons precisely because their destructive force makes them
inherently inhumane.
The NPT’s preamble makes this abundantly clear. It is what truly underpins our Article
VI obligations under the NPT.
It is the unimaginable pain, suffering and destruction of nuclear weapons that drove the
United Nations General Assembly to devote their very first resolution to the elimination
of these weapons.
At the 2010 Review Conference, I thought that it was high time to start emphasizing this
legal link. I also believed that this could be done without compromising any of the three
pillars of the NPT.
It is for this reason that I felt I had to encourage discussions in the Review Conference
on this issue. I was glad that NAM tackled this head on. I was pleasantly surprised by
the support that also came from some non-NAM countries. I would also like to
acknowledge the crucial role that the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well
as that of civil society and academe, played in the formulation and eventual adoption of
this language.
I had hoped that the discussion would be taken up in the Working Group on Nuclear
Disarmament. I wanted any language on humanitarian law to be directly linked to
nuclear disarmament.
It was with much satisfaction, and much unavoidable animated discussion, that we were
able to place this in the disarmament portion of the “Conclusions and recommendations
for follow-on actions” of our Final Document. That language states:
The Conference expresses deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian
consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirms the need for
all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including
international humanitarian law.
I will have to admit that there were some initial difficulties. There were those who felt
that this linkage was too remote. Others felt that the fine legal dimensions of this issue
were still unsettled. A few intimated that the very existence of the NPT and the nonexistence of a nuclear prohibition convention militated against the views of NAM.
In the end, language that allowed for some perceived wiggle room for those with certain
concerns was found.
The Time is Now
The momentum towards nuclear disarmament received a major boost with the arrival of
the Obama administration in 2009. President Obama’s rhetoric across an array of
nuclear issues seemed to point not just to a change of direction, but to a reversal of
course in US nuclear policy.
This broad approach was dramatically affirmed in Obama’s memorable and influential
April 2009 Prague speech, in which he committed the United States to take seriously its
obligation under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to pursue nuclear
disarmament.
The Secretary-General’s five-point proposal on nuclear disarmament also helped to
build the momentum. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon proposed that NPT parties
consider negotiating a nuclear weapons convention, backed by a strong system of
verification.
This momentum was crucial in the success of the 2010 Review Conference. I cannot
emphasize this enough. We could not have gone as far as we did without it.
But that momentum lost some of its steam in 2011. There were scant signs of progress
in bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty into force. Negotiations on a
treaty to prohibit further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons remain
frozen. Proliferation risks increased.
Further bilateral arms reduction negotiations between the US and Russia stalled. There
were hardly any indications of willingness by nuclear armed states, both inside and
outside the NPT, to embark on serious multilateral arms reduction negotiations of a kind
which could eventually lead to a nuclear weapons free world.
There also appeared to be a shift in focus from nuclear disarmament to the far corner of
nuclear safety with the Nuclear Security Summit Process.
As we enter this new cycle of preparatory meetings, we must stand by our decisions in
the Outcome Document of the 2010 Review Conference on nuclear disarmament.
The nuclear weapons states themselves must abide by their commitment in Action 3 to:
. . . undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of
nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through
unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.
We must also recall that for the first time, NPT Contracting Parties officially referred to
the Nuclear Weapons Convention in the Outcome Document of the
Review
Conference.
In the Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions on Disarmament of
Nuclear Weapons, the Review Conference calls on all nuclear-weapon States to
undertake concrete disarmament efforts, and affirms that all States need to make
special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and
maintain a world without nuclear weapons. It notes the five-point proposal for nuclear
disarmament of the Secretary-General, highlighting his proposal to consider
negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention.
Such a concept aligns itself with the commitment by nuclear weapons states to
effectively disarm by utilizing multilateral measures.
It was still not time then to start drawing a specific work plan on this. But I believe that
the time to start is now.
NPT-Based Approach
In terms of approach, not surprisingly, I favor an NPT-based approach. I support the
Secretary-General’s view that the NPT State Parties themselves should take the lead.
For this to succeed, we must work for the NPT’s universality. We must also address the
working methods of the preparatory process and the review conference itself.
A Step Closer to a Middle East Free from Weapons of Mass Destruction
A nuclear weapons convention would not be possible if the problem of proliferation in
the Middle East, particularly in the context of our 1995 Resolution, is not addressed.
This is a problem that is deeply rooted in the complex conflict that has plagued the
region for centuries.
On top of everything else, additional dimensions have emerged, particularly the strong
suspicions that Iran is on the verge of developing or already possess nuclear weapons.
This now begs the question as to whether our own framework must include the issue of
proliferation in the Middle East.
Whether it is consciously included in the framework or addressed separately, I am
almost certain that a nuclear weapons convention would not be possible unless the
issue of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East is adequately solved. But that does not
mean that building our framework will have to wait.
In that vein, I am glad that we had taken head on the difficult task of revisiting, in a
meaningful manner, the 1995 Middle East Resolution during the 2010 Review
Conference.
In spite of many difficulties, complications and a house divided, we were able to agree
to the inclusion in the Final Document of organizing the international conference and the
appointment of a facilitator.
This was significant progress, given the long stalemate that we have had on this issue.
The time to begin true dialogue on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution is long
overdue.
The Secretary General has appointed the right person for the job. Undersecretary of
State Jaako Laajava of Finland is an experienced statesman and well placed to make
things happen.
I understand that he is acceptable to all states in the Middle East and that he has
started broad and inclusive consultations. He will need the support of the Middle
Powers in laying the groundwork in implementing the 1995 Resolution.
Middle Powers and the Course of History
In building this framework, we must recognize that elements that could constitute the
foundation of our framework exist or are available. There is much wisdom to be gained
from the structure and experience of current treaty-based disarmament regimes.
More impressively, much work has been done by dedicated and committed groups and
individuals on preparing model draft for the Nuclear Weapons Convention.
You are to be congratulated and thanks for all your efforts. You have presented states
with a veritable menu from which to choose from. The Middle Powers are in a position
to make sure that states will have the appetite.
How strong our framework will be will ultimately depend on bringing on board all
nuclear-armed states. The sturdiness of our framework will also have to rely on the
successful resolution of current proliferation problems. The most serious obstacle to
making all these happen is the persistent belief that nuclear deterrence works and is still
necessary.
Even though the task is daunting, the Middle Powers must sustain and invigorate their
efforts, so that soon we will have a viable framework for a universal, verifiable,
irreversible and enforceable Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
And when that happens – not if it happens – then the Middle Powers will change the
course of history and define our era.
Thank you.