International Relations Theory
PSC 5513
Fall 2011
Tues. 3:00-5:50
Kaufmann 233
Jonathan Monten
207 Building 4
jmonten@ou.edu
Office Hours: TBA
Course Description
This course is designed to introduce students to the major questions, approaches, and debates in
contemporary international relations theory. The course examines the main theoretical schools of
thought in international relations, with a particular focus on how scholars working within these
schools construct and test causal arguments. The goal of the course is to give students a
foundation for the academic study of international politics, and to become more intelligent
consumers and producers of international relations research scholarship.
Course Requirements
Grading for this course breaks down as follows. Further information about the two writing
assignments will be given as the semester proceeds.
Seminar Participation:
Seminar Presentation:
Response Paper:
Research Design Paper:
30%
15%
15%
40%
Required Books
The following books are required for the course. Other required readings will be available
through the course website. I will provide a list of additional recommended readings for those
interested in particular topics.
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton,
2001).
John Ikenberry, After Victory:
Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of
Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence,
and International Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
1
Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
Schedule of Readings
August 30: Realism 1: Anarchy and the Balance of Power
Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
J. David Singer, “The Level‐ of‐ Analysis Problem in International Relations,” World
Politics, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1961): 77‐ 92.
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), chap. 1,
4, 5, and 6.
Robert Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press,
1986), chap. 6‐ 7.
David A. Lake, “Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations,”
International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1996): 1‐ 33.
Hedley Bull, “Society and Anarchy in International Relations,” in Herbert Butterfield and
Martin Wright, eds., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International
Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 35‐ 50.
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International
Organization, Vol. 59, No. 1 (2005): 39‐ 75.
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1981), chap. 1-2.
Duncan Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization,
Vol. 39, No. 4 (1985): 579‐ 614.
September 6: Realism 2: Offensive, Defensive, Neoclassical
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (W.W. Norton, 2001).
Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (1978):
167-214.
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3.
Randall Schweller, “Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" Security
Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996).
Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International
Security Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring, 1985), pp. 3-43.
Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).
2
Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics
51:1 (1998): 144-172.
September 13: Liberalism 1: International Institutions
Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and
International Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (1997): 513‐ 53.
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1983), pp. 1‐ 22 and 355‐ 368.
G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of
Order After Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), chapters 1‐ 3.
John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International
Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1994/95): 5‐ 93.
Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of
International Organizations,” International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 4 (1999): 699‐ 732.
John Gerard Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2
(1982): 379‐ 415.
September 20: Liberalism 2: Democracy
Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace.
Charles Lipson, Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace
(Princeton University Press, 2005).
John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” International Security
Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125.
Kenneth Schultz, “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two
Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War,” International Organization, Vol. 53,
No. 2 (1999): 233‐ 266.
Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” American Political
Science Review 97 (2003): 585-602.
September 27: Liberalism 3: Economic Interdependence
3
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in
Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).
Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace.
Patrick J. McDonald, The Invisible Hand of Peace: Capitalism, The War Machine, and
International Relations Theory (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
October 4: Domestic Politics
Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two‐ level Games,”
International Organization, Vol. 42, No.3, (1988): 424‐ 460.
Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile
Crisis (Longman, 2nd ed., 1999).
Hein Goemans, War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World
War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow, The
Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: the International Sources of Domestic
Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 32 No. 4 (1978): 881‐ 912.
October 11: Rationalist Theories of War: Bargaining, Credibility, and Commitment
Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1960).
James Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization, Vol. 49,
No. 3 (1995): 379‐ 414.
Dan Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 1,
No. 1 (2003), pp. 27-43.
Stephen Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies,”
International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1999): 5‐ 48; and responses in Vol. 24, No. 2:
56‐ 73 and 97‐ 106.
James Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International
Disputes,” American Political Science Review, No. 88, No. 3 (1994): 577‐ 592.
Michael Tomz, “Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental
Approach,” International Organization, Vol. 61, No. 4 (2007): 821‐ 40.
Kenneth Schultz, “Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises,” American
Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 4 (1998): 829‐ 844.
4
Jessica L. Weeks, “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,”
International Organization, Vol. 62, no. 1 (January 2008): 65-101.
October 18: Constructivism 1
Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power
Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1992): 391‐ 42.
John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together: Neo‐ Utilitarianism and the
Social Constructivist Challenge,” International Organization, Vol. 52, No.4 (1998):
855‐ 885.
Thomas Risse, “'Let's Argue!' Communicative Action in International Relations,”
International Organization 54:1 (2000), pp. 1–39.
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change,” International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1998): 887‐ 918.
Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions,
and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), chap. 1.
James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View,”
in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, editors, Handbook of
International Relations (London: Sage, 2002), 53‐ 72.
October 25: Constructivism 2
Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies,
Moscow 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), chapter 1.
Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, editors, Security Communities (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), chapters 1‐ 2.
Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of
Nuclear Non‐ Use,” International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 3 (1999): 433‐ 468.
Alastair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,”
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 4 (2001): 487‐ 515.
Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott, eds.,
Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009), chap. 1.
Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1996), chap. 1-2 and one additional empirical chapter.
Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,"
International Security 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 141-170.
November 1: Topics in International Political Economy: Trade and Protectionism
5
Ronald Rogowski, “Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade,” American
Political Science Review 81:4 (December 1987), 1121-1137.
Michael J. Hiscox, “Class versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and
the Politics of Trade,” International Organization 55 (Winter 2001), 1-46.
Witold J. Henisz and Edward D. Mansfield, “Votes and Vetoes: The Political
Determinants of Commercial Openness,” International Studies Quarterly 50 (2006), 189211.
Kenneth Scheve and Mathew Slaughter, “What Determines Individual Trade-Policy
Preferences?” Journal of International Economics Vol. 54 No. 2 (August 2001): 267-292.
Helen V. Milner and Keiko Kubota, “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and
Trade Policy in the Developing Countries,” International Organization 59 (2005), 157193.
November 8: Topics in International Political Economy: Globalization and Policy
Convergence
Nancy Brune and Geoffrey Garrett, “The Globalization Rorschach Test: International
Economic Integration, Inequality, and the Role of Government,” Annual Review of
Political Science 8 (2005): 399-423.
Layna Mosley, Global Capital and National Governments (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003).
Emilie Hafner-Burton, “Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trading Agreements
Influence Government Repression,” International Organization 59:3 (2005), pp. 593629.
November 15: Topics in International Security: Democracy and Military Effectiveness
Dan Reiter and Alan Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton University Press, 2002).
Alexander Downes, "How Smart and Tough Are Democracies? Reassessing Theories of
Democratic Victory in War," International Security 33, no. 4 (Spring 2009): 9-51.
Michael C. Desch, "Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters."
International Security 27, no. 2 (Fall 2002): 5-47.
November 22: Topics in International Security: Soft Balancing
William C. Wohlforth. "The Stability of a Unipolar World." International Security, Vol.
24, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 5-41.
Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United
States' Unipolar Moment,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Autumn 2006), pp. 741
6
John Ikenberry, ed. America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2002).
Robert Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” International Security 30:1
(Summer 2005), pp. 7-45.
William Wohlforth and Stephen G. Brooks "Hard Times for Soft Balancing,”
International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005).
November 29: Discussion of Research Designs
December 6: Evaluating Progress in International Relations Theory
Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, “Introduction: Appraising Progress in
International Relations Theory,” in Elman and Elman, editors, Progress in International
Relations Theory: Appraising the Field (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson, and Michael Tierney, The View from the
Ivory Tower: TRIP Survey of International Relations Faculty in the United States and
Canada (Williamsburg, VA: Program on the Theory and Practice of International
Relations, College of William and Mary, 2007).
7