The Cosmological Argument (inspired by D. Zimmerman, CSUSB 11/13/14)
The cosmological argument comes in many different forms. In one way or another, however, each
version argues from the existence of the cosmos to the existence of a being that is the creator or
sustainer of it. In his visit to CSUSB, Dean Zimmerman suggested an argument along the following
lines.
Say theories in different categories compete when some theory in one or another of the categories
must be true. On a C-story every actual concrete thing is contingent; on a N1-story some actual
concrete thing is necessary (but none is self-existent); and on a N2-story some actual concrete
thing is a self-existent necessary being. Then,
1.
2.
Our cosmos exists.
C-, N1- and N2-stories are competing proposals which result in explanation of the
existence of our cosmos.
3.
For any data D, if D and some competing proposals result in explanations of its
being so, then its being so is a reason to accept whichever of the proposals results
in the best explanation of it.
––––––––
4.
The existence of our cosmos is a reason to accept whichever of the C-, N1- or N2stories results in the best explanation of it.
5.
No C-story results in a good explanation for the existence of our cosmos.
6.
No N1-story results in a good explanation for the existence of our cosmos.
7.
Certain N2-stories result in a good explanation for the existence of our cosmos.
––––––––
8.
The existence of our cosmos is a reason to accept some N2-story.
And Zimmerman thinks the best N2 stories are ones on which the self-existent necessary being is
the greatest of all necessary beings – and that this being is god.
Possible Objections. This is not meant to be a complete catalog of objections and replies, or a
complete discussion of any objection or reply. Rather, these are some ideas to get your creative
juices flowing. It is unlikely that you will get much traction against (1) or (2). (4) is a conclusion.
Perhaps (3), (5), and (7) are the most natural places to object.
Against (3): Sometimes the best explanation of some data is not correct: Perhaps Hannah is not in
her room; the best explanation is that she is in the basement; but she really has been kidnapped!
Of course, (3) does not say that the best explanation is always correct, but only that the data may
constitute a reason to accept it. All the same, this example raises the thorny question what makes
an explanation best and how good explanations constitute reasons. The issue is complicated in
case our concepts of good explanation are conditioned in a context regulated by natural law, and
might have no application to questions about the existence of the cosmos and natural law as such.
Thus there is room to hold that inference to the best explanation does not give reasons in every
context, and so that (3) is false. Even though our version of the argument does not depend on the
principle of sufficient reason, consideration of this issue may parallel considerations raised for and
against the principle of sufficient reason from the readings.
Against (5): Different reasons for and against (5) come up in the readings. Here’s another idea:
One philosopher, David Lewis, famously proposes that for every way a world or cosmos could be,
some cosmos is. And he thinks of these worlds as real concrete things. If this is right, if there are
so many cosmoses, then there is a sort of explanation for ours: given the nature of the universe of
cosmoses, some cosmos had to be this way. Thus a C-story is (part of) at least as good an
explanation for the existence of the cosmos as from a N2-story, and (5) is false. Discussion of this
objection will depend on the plausibility of the Lewis hypothesis.
Against (7): Zimmerman (and our authors) seem to suppose that self-existent necessity is by itself
a sort of explanation. But one may wonder whether this is so. Thus, Lewis actually explains what
is possible based on what worlds there are, not the other way around. But he does not say how or
why there are the worlds there are: that’s just the way it is, and so we end up with the possibilities
and necessities there are. But if this is so, then one might wonder what explains the necessities,
and in particular what explains the necessity of a self-existent necessary being. If there is no
explanation for the self-existent necessary being, (7) may seem false. One sort of reply is a
proposal like Roy’s on which necessities result from, and so are explained by, some prior set of
constraints (which may themselves be unknown).