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Defining Steps for Canada in a Nuclear Weapons-free World
Notes for Panel - Political and Legal Steps : New Initiatives for
Canada
Thank you Mr. Chair,
Introduction
It is a great honour to be invited to participate in this panel, and indeed
this conference, with so many distinguished colleagues whose work I
have long admired. Given the excellent presentations and discussion to
this point, I may have precious little to add, but welcome the opportunity
to express my views.
Canada’s role on this issue must, of course, be considered in broader
context – of what is, is not, and what should be happening on the world
stage.
It seems obvious that lack of progress toward nuclear disarmament, can
be attributed, in part, to decades long inertia in the Conference on
Disarmament, a forum limited to 65 members and that operates on the
basis of consensus decision making, a recipe for slow or no progress, as
has been the case for almost two decades.
Given that there is little prospect, at least in the short term, of reforming
the rules regarding membership and decision making practices within
the CD, there is little choice in my view but to take the process outside
the Conference on Disarmament.
But where?
One option is to take an approach along the lines the Ottawa or Oslo
Conventions. (i) Pursue negotiations outside the formal UN framework
with rules of procedure that allow for voting in the event of an impasse.
There is no denying that Ottawa and Oslo produced historic treaties that
are steadily being universalized.
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Unfortunately, the UN was formally sidelined in the process, despite the
fact that both Ottawa and Oslo enjoyed the full support of the UN
Secretary General of the day.
This need not and, in my view, should not be the case with Nuclear
Weapons.
Indeed, this could be an opportunity to demonstrate that the UN can
effectively address what is arguably the greatest challenge facing
mankind.
It will require bypassing the CD, but not necessarily the UN as a whole.
I suggest the matter can be addressed effectively in or through the
General Assembly.
Article 18 states that decisions of the General Assembly on important
questions shall be made by a two thirds majority.
And Article 22 of the UN Charter states that the General Assembly may
establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the
performance of its functions.
Similar processes resulted in the Law of the Sea Convention, The Statute
for the International Criminal Court, and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
among others.
Recommendation I – As a first recommendation, I strongly endorse
passage of a resolution in the General Assembly to establish a subsidiary
body formally mandated to negotiate a complete ban on nuclear
weapons and their elimination;
WITH Rules of Procedure modeled on the General Assembly that allow
for voting in the event of an impasse;
And welcoming input from international organizations and civil society.
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Such a resolution could be brought forward at the next meeting of the
General Assembly next September following work done in 2016 by the
Open Ended Working Group (OEWG).
If this doesn’t work, then take the process outside the UN; but the UN
should be given first kick at this deadly can, in my view.
II
Whither to proceed without participation of Nuclear Weapons States?
There is little doubt that most, perhaps all nuclear armed states will use
every diplomatic and political means at their disposal to try to kill such
negotiations. At minimum, they will boycott the process and bring
intense pressure on their allies to do the same.
This begs the question, is there any point proceeding without the active
participation of at least some Nuclear Weapons States?
I strongly believe there is - for the following reasons:
First, as has been pointed out, the obligation to pursue effective
measures towards nuclear disarmament (NPT Article VI) applies equally
to all States Parties to the NPT;
Second, as the International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons
(ICAN) and others suggest, a new Convention explicitly banning nuclear
weapons will fill any legal gap that may exist, and will further
strengthen the international norm against nuclear weapons;
Third, if enough countries come on board, over time, a new legal norm
could become customary international law, binding upon all states.
The best reason to forge ahead, however, is simply the existential threat
posed by these weapons. We have no time to spare!
Recommendation Number II, therefore, is:
Proceed with the negotiations, with or without Nuclear Weapons States.
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III
With respect to the type of instrument to be negotiated As you know, in 1997 a group of lawyers, scientists, physicians, former
diplomats, disarmament experts and activists drafted a model Nuclear
Weapons Convention, which was submitted by Costa Rica to the UN as
a discussion document. It was updated in 2007.
It is quite detailed and the UN Secretary General has suggested that it
could serve as an excellent starting point for negotiations on a new
Convention.
Some States and ICAN propose a less detailed, somewhat less
prescriptive starting point, initially emphasizing a ban, perhaps leaving
details including timelines for destruction to be determined during the
implementation process, or through subsequent protocols negotiated
with the involvement of nuclear armed States.
I highly commend the work of ICAN.
I suggest, however, that participating States, even if all are non-nuclear
armed states, should include in their new treaty an ambitious deadline
for stockpile destruction which will become binding upon nuclear armed
states, when they eventually come on board.
Like the Mine Ban and Cluster Munitions treaties, there can be – indeed
should be provision for extensions where warranted.
Equally important to my mind, are inclusion of:
verification measures to be undertaken by an independent expert body
such as the IAEA, beyond those already being carried out;
An article imposing positive obligations on State Parties to make best
efforts to discourage the use of nuclear weapons by all;
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I would also urge early agreement to establish a facility to provide
institutional support with treaty implementation, adequately financed,
ideally through assessed rather than voluntary contributions.
The rationale is this:
(i)
Inclusion of a deadline for destruction and means of verification
render any new Convention adequate in itself to move us
beyond prohibition toward elimination, without need of further
negotiations, possibly saving a decade or several in a two or
multi- staged negotiating process.
(ii)
Verification measures I believe are essential to provide a
sufficient level of confidence to achieve the ban in the first
place;
(iii) Finally, I believe that the inclusion of all these elements will,
significantly increase the chances of participation by nuclear
armed states. They will want to influence the establishment of
any new international norm, against which they might
eventually be measured.
If nuclear armed states don’t participate? Proceed anyway. Negotiate,
then universalize.--It works.
IV
So, where does Canada fit into the equation?
First, we have to stop being part of the problem and become part of the
solution.
I suggest that our new Prime Minister and his Cabinet should be
vigorously encouraged to join forces with the 128 other nations that
support the Humanitarian Pledge and call for the prohibition and
elimination of nuclear weapons.
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I support the proposal that Canada should host a meeting of like-minded
states in the near future.
I suggest however, that the primary objective of this meeting should be
to draft the text of new resolution, mandating negotiations, and that
Canada collaborate with like-minded states to bring this resolution
forward at UNGA 71. If Canada is not prepared to play a leadership role,
at minimum, our country should support any such resolution brought
forward by others.
With respect to NATO, difficult as this will be, I recommend that
Canada should also be vigorously encouraged to engage NATO allies to
develop an aggressive strategy to eliminate the nuclear option from
NATO’s security doctrine.
--My final two recommendations are to Canadian civil society, including
this august group.
I urge that your designated representatives seek an early meeting with
our new Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defense and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs - together if possible - to make the case for
effective Canadian leadership on this issue.
Finally, that Canadian civil society further strengthen ties with others
around the world to dramatically ramp up the international campaign to
eliminate nuclear weapons; to create unprecedented popular support and
political will.
(Conclusion)
We need to develop a greater sense of entitlement to a nuclear weapons
free world, and to generate a greater sense of urgency!
What if the recent attacks in Beirut and Paris had been nuclear and
millions not hundreds had died?
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How urgent would nuclear disarmament be? I suggest that it would
become a diplomatic and political imperative overnight! But by then it
may be too late.
I wish to leave you with a thought penned by the venerable Albert
Einstein in 1945:
“The trouble with taking little steps, one at a time, in the hope of
reaching the ultimate goal, is that while they are being taken, we
continue to keep the bomb without making our reason convincing for
those who do not have it. That of itself creates fear and suspicion, with
the consequence that the relations of rival sovereignties deteriorate
dangerously. So while persons who take only a step at a time may think
they are approaching world peace, they actually are contributing by
their slow pace to the coming of war. We have no time to spend in this
way. If war is to be averted, it must be done quickly!”
That was 70 years ago. It is too late to move quickly. It is not too late to
move effectively!
Earl Turcotte
Nov. 30, 2015
earl.turcotte@gmail.com
613-839-2777
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