FAPE (Group of 2)
 Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 553
IDELR 656 (1982)
http://www.wrightslaw.com/law/caselaw/ussupct.rowley.htm
The court clarified that children with disabilities were entitled to access to an
education that provided educational benefit. They were not entitled to the
“best” education, nor were they entitled to an education that would
“maximize” their potential. (i.e. Rowley Standard)
 Doe v. Board of Education of Tullahoma City Sch., 20 IDELR 617 (6th Cir.
1993)—“basic floor of opportunity (i.e. Chevy not a Cadillac)
http://openjurist.org/9/f3d/455/doe-doe-v-board-education-tullahoma-cityschools
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that “FAPE” is a “serviceable
Chevrolet, not a Cadillac.” This analogy referred to the fact that public school
must provide entitled student with a public education that allows him to make
“meaningful progress,” but they are not responsible for maximizing his
potential.
 Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 441 IDELR 130 (3d Cir. 1988)
http://www.leagle.com/decision/19881024853F2d171_1996.xml/POLK%20v.
%20CENTRAL%20SUSQUEHANNA%20INTERMEDIATE%20UNIT%2016
The court concluded that the legal standard for evaluating an appropriate
education was whether special education offered a meaningful benefit. In
stating that special education had to offer some benefit, the Supreme Court
meant a meaningful benefit: some does not mean some as opposed to none;
rather, it connotes an amount of benefit greater than mere trivial
advancement.
 Hall v. Vance County Board of Education, 557 IDELR 155 (4th Cir. 1985)
http://www.wrightslaw.com/law/caselaw/NC_Hall_Vance_4th_851010.pdf
The court found that Rowley allowed for a case-by-case determination of what
substantive standards met the criteria that an IEP was to be reasonably
calculated to enable the student to receive educational benefits. In this case,
test scores indicated that minimal progress had been made. In light of the
student's intellectual potential the court found minimal results to be
insufficient. The court stated that Congress certainly did not intend for a school
system to provide a program that produced only trivial academic
advancement.
Child Find/Evaluation (Group of 1)
Department of Education V. Cari Rae (D.Hawaii 2001) 158 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1194
http://www.leagle.com/decision/20011348158FSupp2d1190_11231.xml/DEPA
RTMENT%20OF%20EDUC.,%20ST.%20OF%20HAWAII%20v.%20CARI%20RAE%2
0S.
A district’s IDEA obligation to evaluate a student, either through its child find or
referral processes, is triggered when the district has reason to suspect a
disability, and reason to suspect that special education services may be needed
to address that disability
Timothy W. V. Rochester New Hampshire, Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954 (1st Cir.)
http://www.leagle.com/decision/19891829875F2d954_11671.xml/TIMOTHY%2
0W.%20v.%20ROCHESTER,%20N.H.,%20SCHOOL%20DIST.
No child is too disabled to be educated. This case established a “Zero Reject
Rule.” Meaning all children are eligible even if she/he is considered
uneducable.
Least Restrictive Environment (LRE) (Group of 2)
 Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education, 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989)
http://www.kidstogether.org/right-ed_files/daniel.htm
This court, relying on Roncker, also developed a two-part test for determining
if the LRE requirement is met. The test poses two questions: (1) Can an
appropriate education in the general education classroom with the use of
supplementary aids and services be achieved satisfactorily? (2) If a student is
placed in a more restrictive setting, is the student "integrated" to the
"maximum extent appropriate"? (Standard in AL, DE, GA, FL, LA, MS, NJ, PA,
TX).
 Oberti v. Clementon, 995 F.2d 1204 (3rd Cir. 1993)
http://www.kidstogether.org/right-ed_files/oberti.htm
This is the case that begins the change from the IDEA's "mainstreaming"
approach to the concept of "inclusion." Clearly, inclusion is judge-made law,
not legislative action. Rafael Oberti was an autistic student who was disruptive
in his general classroom placement, and the school wanted to move him to a
more restrictive placement. The court held that "inclusion is a 'right,' not a
privilege for a select few. Success in special schools and special classes does
not lead to successful functioning in integrated society, which is clearly one of
the goals of the IDEA." Remember that the word "inclusion" did not appear in
the IDEA; it is a judge-made law.
 Board of Education, Sacramento City Unified School District v. Rachel H., 14
F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994)
http://www.kidstogether.org/right-ed_files/rachel.htm
Rachel Holland was a third-grade student with an IQ of 44. Her parents argued
that with appropriate aids and services, she could be educated in the general
classroom. The court ruled that in determining the appropriate placement, the
educational benefits of the general education classroom with supplemental
aids and services must be compared to the educational benefits of the special
classroom. The nonacademic benefits of interaction with nondisabled students
also must be considered. Further, the effect of the student's presence on the
teacher and on other students must be evaluated. This three-pronged test is
often called the Holland test.This case is the high-water mark of the inclusion
movement. (Standard in AS, AR, CA, HI, ID, MT, NV, OR, & WA).
 Light v. Parkway 41 F.3rd 1223 (8th Cir. 1994)
http://leagle.com/decision/1994126441F3d1223_11088.xml/LIGHT%20v.%20P
ARKWAY%20C-2%20SCHOOL%20DIST.
Lauren Light was "violent, dangerous, and disruptive" in her general classroom
placement. Her school behavior included 30 incidents of violence that caused
her classmates to seek medical attention from the school nurse. In rejecting
the parents' request for a "stay-put" and a return to the general classroom, the
court held, "A student who is violent, dangerous, and disruptive of the
education of others is never properly placed in a regular classroom setting."
This case marked a turn in the judicial belief that inclusion is a right. Further,
the court indicated that all of the circumstances surrounding a student must be
taken into account when determining the proper placement. For some
students, a general classroom may not be appropriate even with aids and
services.
Individualized Education Program IEP (Group of 3)
 Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Educ., 556 IDELR 389 (U.S.
1985)
http://www.wrightslaw.com/law/caselaw/ussupct.burlington.htm
Court clarified procedural safeguards, parent role in educational decisionmaking; tuition reimbursement for private placement; child's placement during
dispute about FAPE. Decision illustrates how the statement of goals in an IEP
can be used to assess the adequacy of the program the school provided.
 Spielberg v. Henrico County Public School, 441 IDELR 178 (1988-89 EHLR
441:178) (4th Cir. 1988)
http://openjurist.org/853/f2d/256/spielberg-spielberg-v-henrico-countypublic-schools#fn3_ref
Court found that the school district formed the intent to change the placement
for a 19-year-old student with autism and profound mental retardation from
an out-of-state private residential placement to an in-state public day program.
Having decided to transfer the student, the district then conducted a
reevaluation supporting its conclusion and convened an IEP meeting to revise
the IEP accordingly. All this occurred shortly after an annual IEP meeting
confirming the student’s need for residential placement. The court found, and
the 4th circuit confirmed, that the IDEA forbids such predetermination because
the proposed change in placement was made without regard to student’s
individual needs. (i.e. shoehorning or predetermination)
 Larson by Larson v Independent School District No. 361, 40 IDELR 231 (D. Minn.
2004)
http://www.wrightslaw.com/law/caselaw/case_Kerr_ISD_318.html
District court ruled that IEP failed to adequately provide the student’s present
level of performance and objective criteria against which achievement could
be measured. The “present level of performance” sections of the IEP
contained only conclusory statements about the student’s abilities, and the
IEPs did not fully explain how his disability affected his involvement in the
educational process. Court awarded compensatory education of 225 minutes
direct special education services and a private assessment.
 Amanda C. v. Clark Co Sch. Dist. & Nevada Dept. of Ed (9th Cir. 2001)
http://www.wrightslaw.com/law/caselaw/2001/9th.amandaj.clarkco.nevada.
htm
Court cites research about ABA/Lovaas treatment; describes purposes of the
IDEA; IEPs and procedural safeguards. District's failure to provide parents with
evaluations adversely affected parents' ability to make decisions and damaged
child; district failed to provide FAPE; standard of review in two-tier system;
credibility of witnesses.
 Evans v. Rhinebeck Central Sch Dist, (S.D. NY 1996)
http://www.wrightslaw.com/law/caselaw/case_Evans_Rhinebeck_FAPE.html
Excellent case about tuition reimbursement, procedural and substantive issues,
FAPE, dyslexia, objective measurement of progress. The IEP must include
measurable criteria to assess the student’s progress
 M.L. v. Federal Way School District (WA) (9th Cir. 2004)
http://www.wrightslaw.com/law/caselaw/04/9d.ml.fedway.wa.htm
Court found that the failure to include a regular education teacher on the IEP
team was a serious procedural error that led to a loss of educational
opportunity and a denial of FAPE.
Procedural Safeguards and Parent Participation (Group of 2)
 Deal v Hamilton County Board of Education, 42 IDELR 109 (6th Cir. 2004)
http://www.wrightslaw.com/law/caselaw/04/6th.deal.hamilton.tn.htm
District court ruled district denied parents opportunity to meaningfully
participate in the IEP process when it placed their child in a program
without considering his individual needs. The 6th Circuit Court concluded
that, although the parents were present at the IEP meetings, their
involvement was merely a matter of form and after the fact because the
district had, at that point, pre-decided the student’s program and
services.
 Doug C. v. Hawaii, (9th Cir. 2013)
www.wrightslaw.com/law/caselaw/2013/9th.doug.c.v.hawaii.pdf
Court ruled that the failure to include the parent at the IEP meeting
violated the procedural requirement of IDEA and invalidated the IEP. In
quoting a 2003 Ninth Circuit case, the Court explained that “We held that
parental “involvement in the ‘creation process’ requires the [agency] to
include the [parents in an IEP meeting] unless they affirmatively refused
to attend.”
 Buser v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 20 IDELR 981 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affd, 22
IDELR 626 (5th Cir. 1996)
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-5th-circuit/1086662.html
Court ruled that even though parents are “equal participants in the IEP
process, they do not have veto power. The IDEA does not allocate “one vote”
each to the school district and parents; parents do not have an equal vote in
formulating an IEP.
 Justin Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist. (6th Cir. 2000)
http://www.wrightslaw.com/law/caselaw/2013/9th.doug.c.v.hawaii.pdf
A school district's failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the
Act will constitute a denial of a FAPE only if such violation causes substantive
harm to the child or his parents. Substantive harm occurs when the
procedural violations in question seriously infringe upon the parents'
opportunity to participate in the IEP process.
Discipline (Group of 2)
 S-1 v. Turlington, 552 IDELR 267 (5th Cir. 1981)
The mere fact that a student with a disability knows right from wrong did not
make his misconduct unrelated to his disability.
 Doe v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir.1986)
http://www.leagle.com/decision/19861582795F2d787_11445
The Court established the standard in determining the nexus between
conduct and disability is “conduct that is caused by, or has a direct and
substantial relationship to, the child’s handicap. Put another way, a
handicapped child’s conduct is covered by the definition only if the handicap
significantly impairs the child’s behavioral controls.”
 Honig v. Doe 559 IDELR 231 (U.S. 1988)
http://www.wrightslaw.com/law/caselaw/ussupct.honig.doe.htm
Supreme Court prohibited certain disciplinary actions that result in a change
of placement for a student with disabilities. Generally, an entitled student
cannot be suspended for more than 10 school days of his misconduct was
caused by, or was related to his disability. If the misconduct includes bringing
a weapon or drugs to school, if the student has inflicted serious bodily injury
on another person, or if he otherwise poses a danger to himself or other,
different rules apply. In all events, suspensions of more than 10 school days
are subject to special rules and limitations when the student is disabled under
either the IDEA or Section 504. District must continue to provide educational
services.
 Community Consolidated Sch. Dist. #93 v. John F. (IL 2000)
http://www.wrightslaw.com/law/caselaw/IL_dist93_johnf_00_10.pdf
It was reasoned that several procedural errors were made by the school
district to deprive John of FAPE under the IDEA. John’s parents were entitled
to a notice that the school district would consider a change in his placement at
earlier hearings so they could prepare for those meetings. It was also
reasoned that the school district found that John’s violation was a
manifestation of his disability and should have amended his IEP and behavior
plan. If the school district decided that John’s placement was not meeting his
needs, it should have considered several other options. Lastly, it was reasoned
that homebound tutoring was not a legal placement under the IDEA and his
parents’ agreement to this option was not truly an agreement because they
were not presented with any other options. The district had no right to
remove John as a disciplinary consequence of offenses involving drugs and
weapons. The procedures the district followed after the parents objected to
their son’s placement were confusing. The school district failed to clearly
explain the parents’ procedural rights to due process.