Economy, Politics or other factors? An exploration of why riots
occurred in Cyprus in 1931 using Probit estimation
By Alexander Apostolides, European University Cyprus (a.apostolides@euc.ac.cy)1
The crown colony of Cyprus was considered so peaceful by the British that it only had 121
soldiers stationed on an island the size of Lebanon: thus the severe riots that occurred in late
1931 came as a complete surprise. Since then the causes of the riots have been disputed: the
disgraced governor blamed the economic conditions at the time for being the catalyst for the
explosion of violence, while most Greek-Cypriot historians have argued that the riots were
purely the pent up expression of the desire for union with Greece. It is clear that the initial
spark was political, yet the prolonged riots could have taken place for many reasons,
including the economic effects of the great depression and local grievances.
There have been several attempts to explain why violence occurs including Besley & Persson
(2008), but the novelty of this approach lies in the use of microlevel data of a single riot. The
paper uses a new dataset that combines geographic information systems (GIS) mapping with
a novel dataset for the conditions of Cyprus in 1931, built up through primary and secondary
sources to map all the incidences of disturbances during the rioting. Our estimates suggest
more needs to be done to be table to clearly ascertain why, riots took place, as the key
variables are still not collected in a village level.
Despite that there are still worthwhile conclusions to be made: cities are areas where riots
begin, and the distance from the capital where the first riot occurred seemed to play a factor
in how the riots spread. Areas with a high proportion of Turkish Cypriots in the population
are not so susceptible to riots, suggesting that political factors were very important. Despite
that the economic situation as proxied by the type of agricultural production play a factor too.
Areas with high Turkish Cypriot consternation clearly suggest that there is an economic
undertone to the riots, however we suggest that the negative relationship of Turkish Cypriots
population to riot occurrences suggests that nationalism was also an issue. Finally the
estimated results are checked for robustness to provide some insights on how the riots should
be seen in light of this new research.
1
The author would like to thank Stephen Broadberry, Bishnupriya Gupta and the audience in the 2012 Asian
Economic History Conference that led to the idea. The paper was created after discussion with Ruixue Jia in the
said conference and I thank her.
Introduction: What causes riots and peasant revolts?
What causes riots? This is a question that has been looked by a wide range of social scientists
and economists. Preconditions to revolutions and riots have been proposed as far back as Karl
Marx, who considered that history is defined by a series of inevitable revolutions once the
rapid change of a structure of society outpaced the existing governmental structure. A
historical approach was suggested by Brinton (1938) who suggested that there are
preconditions that are common throughout most revolutionary incidents, including discontent
from all classes of a society, the lack of government support by a sufficiently large group of
the population and a state that is close to bankruptcy. The determinants of riots and
revolutions have come back in the public interest through the recent Arab spring, with
commentators trying to pinpoint commonalities between the causes of the riots in different
countries (Rodenbeck, 2013).
Theoretical models on the incidence of violent revolt or civil war have been developed in
economics (Grossman 1991). The link between an economic crisis and subsequent
insurrections has been present in the work of social scientists and historians, and has
prominent place in the attempts by economists to explain conflicts (Miguel, Satyanath, &
Sergenti 2004), including economic incentives but also social factors. Yet there are issues in
how can one use empirics to test the validity of the theory, when conflict and political
violence are eminently exceptional events. As revolutions and riots are rare events, they are
difficulties in empirically testing theories that model riots and disturbances.
Quantitative research has tested several theories of political violence by combining violent
events across time and/or space, often spanning different continents and several centuries.
Yet this can be less than satisfactory if we accept “that attempts at revolution everywhere
should not be mere imitations of previously successful upheavals but should, instead, be
tailored to fit specific circumstances” (Blackey 1974; 191). Blackey’s suggestion presents a
challenge to empirically testing causes of riots, civil wars and revolutions. If all revolutions
have specific circumstances, then we might have serious statistical problems in testing
economic theories on riots and disturbances: Some explanatory variables might important for
some riots but less important to others, causing a variable to be considered as being less
important than it really was. It could also be that there are variables that could explain the
incidence of a disturbance but they are missing entirely from the databases that are available.
There are ways to deal with such issues, but these methods require a substantial data or might
involve categorising revolutions. As a result a researcher could be accused of cherry picking
data or of expanding the dataset to include events that are very dissimilar in nature.
However a different approach is to build detailed level information for each riot, civil war
and revolution. A riot or a revolution is simply an aggregation of many events of disturbances
across time: thus information on the series of events can be used to make detailed datasets
that might test the predictive power of variables. This approach to riots can combine the
empirical and theoretical work of economics with the work of historians who catalogue how
riots take place. This approach might give better understanding to the dynamics of riots and
revolutions, but it cannot estimate the importance of events that affected the whole population,
such as tax increases. Thus a localised approach build up for each revolution and riot can
highlight as well as hide causes of disturbances.
Our research tried to build from the evidence of detailed data for one incident of riots: the
Cypriot riot of 1931. In our case the research is focused on incidences of public disturbance
that occurred in a two month period starting from the 21st of October 1931 in Cyprus.
Cyprus was at that time a crown colony of the British Empire. The interwar period between
the First and the Second World War show an unusual large number of disturbances in the
British Empire, as the global economic instability of the period was combined with the
growing nationalistic movements in the colonies. The integration of the colonies within the
global economy prior to the establishment of Empire wide duties meant that colonial subjects
invested in producing material used in a globalised scale were gravely affected during this
period (Brown 1989). Significant riots and protests took place in India, Burma and British
West Africa in the 1930s were issues of the collapse of primary product prices, the increase
of taxation and a rural credit crunch led to violent confrontation (Rothermund, 1996)
«Τα Οκτωβριανά»: The October 1931 riots and their significance
Cyprus became a British protectorate of Britain in 1878. Under the Cyprus Convention the
island remained nominally under Ottoman suzerainty but all power was transferred to the
British High Commissioner (Hill 1952). The change did not lead to a rapid modernisation of
the outdated administration system: despite some improvement of the judicial system and the
introduction of a limited constitution; the emphasis of the British administration was in
maintaining the status quo and not in transforming the Ottoman system (Georghallides, 1979).
The subsequent occupation of Egypt removed the strategic purpose from the occupation of
Cyprus, leaving “a lingering quality of being bereft, verging on pointlessness, which British
rule there could never shake off” (Holland and Markides, 2008: 165). The island was annexed
in 1914 with the start of hostilities towards the Ottoman Empire; resolution of its status as a
crown colony only took place in 1925.
This inaction was partly caused by the fiscal constraints of the colonial administration.
Britain was supposed to provide an annual payment of £92,799 sterling to the Sultan in lieu
of the lost tax revenue from Cyprus. The British administration raised most of the ‘tribute’
from taxation in Cyprus2. Yet the amount was in excess of the fiscal surplus of the colony,
providing a large disincentive for change: any fiscal surplus was whisked off to the British
Treasury as payment for the so called “Tribute” (Georghallides, 1985).After insistent protests
the ‘tribute’ was partially reduced by a permanent grant-in-aid of £50,000 in 1907; yet
£42,799 of the ‘tribute’ remained a burden to government expenditure until 1927, and still a
payment of £10,000 for imperial defence was expected from 1928 onwards.
The colony had a limited constitution which was revised but essentially remained unchanged
when Cyprus became a crown colony in 1925. The Cypriot constitution, given in 1882, was
advanced for the time: yet the lack of substantial modernisation with the declaration of the
island as a crown colony made it look outdates when compared to the neighbouring crown
colony, Malta. It was based on clear “divide and rule principles”: the colonial government
had to appease either the majority Greek-Cypriot or the minority Turkish-Cypriot community
in order to pass legislation and fiscal appropriation bills (i.e. the budget). As a result the
legislative council heightened communal tensions that were already present on the island. For
the Cypriots the constitution was ineffective as all power and influence remained with the
colonial government: the legislative assembly could not create or even modify laws, as it
could only pass or reject laws proposed by the Colonial executive. The executive could also
circumvent the council by arranging for a law to be passed as an order-in-council by the
British monarch3.
2
But the Ottoman government did not receive one penny as the British Treasury used the money to pay interest
to the shareholders of the defaulted 1855 Ottoman loan, which it had guaranteed
3
The franchise for the legislative council was unusually wide, with the right to vote given to all men over 21
years old who paid their property tax which was set at low levels.
This Legislative council constituted twelve elected members: six appointees of the High
Commissioner, 3 elected Muslim representatives and 9 non Muslim representatives (based on
the proportion of the 1881 census). The Greek and Turkish Cypriots elected exclusively by
their own communities. Although the numbers were subsequently increased to twenty four
with the declaration of Cyprus as a crown colony, the proportions, and thus the divisive
nature of the council, remained unchanged. In the case of a tie, the governor, who was also
the president of the legislative council, cast the deciding vote. Thus the government could
overrule the wishes of the Greek-Cypriot majority as long as it could ensure that the TurkishCypriot minority voted in line with the colonial officials.
The constitution provided the Cypriots with a council that could only be effective if the
communities were united in their opposition to the government, and even then they could
only force colonial government to listen, but not to comply, with their opinion. Prior to the
First World War the colonial government effectively overruled the council, since the elected
Turkish-Cypriot councillors consistently voted with the government. This was in part due to
the fear of the fate of the community in the event that the Greek-Cypriots achieved Enosis (as
union with Greece was known). The government ensured the loyalty of the Turkish-Cypriots
councillors through the use of substantial government patronage that was bestowed on them4
(Holland and Markides, 2008).
The immediate cause of the riots is related to the action of Legislative Council (henceforth
LC) members. The Governor of Cyprus of the time, Sir Ronald Storrs, has ensured that
Cyprus was not liable for the Cyprus Tribute back in 1926; yet he intentionally failed to
inform the LC a provision to the British Treasury agreeing to stop billing the Cyprus
government to the tune of £92,799 only if the colony reneged the rights to the amounts
accumulated up to that time.
By the middle of 1931, as Table 1 indicates, the Cyprus economy was suffering a severe
recession. The recession combined the dramatic decline in agricultural and mining products
due to the great depression with the worst drought in Cyprus since records began
4
For example, Ifran Bay was a member of the executive and the legislative council, as well as the Turkish
delegate of the Evcaf which administered Muslim religious property (and effectively a government appointee).
Thus his ability to exert substantial patronage over the Turkish-Cypriot community depended on maintaining the
favour of the colonial administration.
(Apostolides, 2010). The government deficit as a proportion to GDP was a modest but
unprecedented -1.4%. Yet as the Cypriot economy was not able to accumulate substantial
reserves due to the fiscal drain of the “Tribute” to the British treasury, the small reserve of
£70,000 that the colony maintained was wiped out by the start of 1931.
The government attempted to maintain wages at the same level in order to retain the services
of British personnel: yet this was against the wishes of both communities in the council, who
wished to see more high ranking Cypriots, which would be a natural consequence of a
reduction in the wages of British colonial officials in Cyprus. How this affects Cyprus is
mentioned in more detail elsewhere (Apostolides, 2012). Suffice to say here that the LC
rejected laws to increase taxation as well as the government appropriation bill through an
unprecedented and relatively consistent co-operation of a Turkish Cypriot representative and
of the Greek Cypriot community, therefore overruling the government.
The fact that the government was not able to pass the government budget or the additional
taxation it requested (11 rises in the span of Ronald Storrs’s governorship, lasting under six
years) did not lead to the government acquiescing to the demands of the LC; it chose to
ignore the LC by passing laws and government budgets through orders-in-council. The
resulting snubbing of the LC, combined with the worsening economic situation (see table 2)
made the conditions explosive
Table 1A: Cypriot GDP, Population, Per capita GDP, Government Revenue and Expenditure in constant 1938 Cyprus pounds5
Year
GDP
Population
Per
capita
GDP
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
£3,732,544
£4,001,854
£4,125,691
£4,029,952
£4,342,975
£4,169,484
£4,678,897
£4,574,781
£5,189,706
310,715
314,253
317,830
321,449
325,109
328,810
332,554
336,340
340,169
£12.01
£12.73
£12.98
£12.54
£13.36
£12.68
£14.07
£13.60
£15.26
Government
Revenue
Government
Expenditure
Budget Deficit
/ Surplus
Year
GDP
£418,112
£471,461
£424,504
£435,785
£489,381
£444,797
£455,657
£507,504
£637,223
£415,599
£393,196
£435,959
£393,591
£453,850
£463,148
£427,200
£483,490
£602,063
£2,513
£78,265
£-11,455
£42,194
£35,531
£-18,351
£28,456
£24,014
£35,160
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
4,911,844
4,605,234
4,213,399
4,232,438
4,755,859
5,318,422
5,237,377
6,226,713
6,544,460
Population
Per
capita
GDP
Government
Revenue
Government
Expenditure
Budget
Deficit/
Surplus
344,042
347,959
353,982
360,109
366,342
372,683
379,134
385,697
392,373
£14.28
£13.23
£11.90
£11.75
£12.98
£14.27
£13.81
£16.14
£16.68
£677,372
£727,766
£761,123
£748,102
£776,723
£899,557
£824,552
£956,656
£1,023,230
£747,559
£742,164
£748,050
£698,357
£722,396
£853,725
£760,560
£835,170
£908,024
£-70,187
£-14,397
£13,073
£49,745
£54,327
£45,832
£63,992
£121,487
£115,206
Table 1B: Growth rate of Cypriot GDP, Per capita GDP, Government Revenue and Expenditure
Per
Per
capita
Government Government
capita
Government Government
GDP
GDP
Revenue
Expenditure
GDP
GDP
Revenue
Expenditure
Year
Year
7.2%
6.0%
12.8%
-5.4%
-6.2%
-7.3%
7.4%
-0.7%
1921-1922
1930-1931
3.1%
1.9%
-10.0%
10.9%
-8.5%
-10.1%
4.6%
0.8%
1922-1923
1931-1932
-2.3%
-3.4%
2.7%
-9.7%
0.5%
-1.3%
-1.7%
-6.6%
1923-1924
1932-1933
7.8%
6.6%
12.3%
15.3%
12.4%
10.5%
3.8%
3.4%
1924-1925
1933-1934
-4.0%
-5.1%
-9.1%
2.0%
11.8%
9.9%
15.8%
18.2%
1925-1926
1934-1935
12.2%
11.0%
2.4%
-7.8%
-1.5%
-3.2%
-8.3%
-10.9%
1926-1927
1935-1936
-2.2%
-3.3%
11.4%
13.2%
18.9%
16.9%
16.0%
9.8%
1927-1928
1936-1937
13.4%
12.2%
25.6%
24.5%
5.1%
3.3%
7.0%
8.7%
1928-1929
1937-1938
-5.4%
-6.4%
6.3%
24.2%
1929-1930
1926-1931
2.0%
0.9%
10.3%
9.9%
Note: Deflated using the CPI provided in appendix H of Apostolides, A. (2010) Source: Cyprus, Statistical (Blue) Books, (1921-1938) “Government Revenue and Expenditure”
5
Apostolides, A. (2010) “Economic Growth or Continuing Stagnation? Estimating the GDP of Cyprus and Malta, 1921-1938”, London School of Economics Theses,
Table 2: Real GDP decline in Cyprus compared to other countries in constant prices (Index; 1929=100)
Western
Europe (30
Countries)
Germany
Greece
USA
UK
Cyprus
Malta
1929
1930
1931
1932
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
98
98
96
90
99
95
99
92
90
91
82
93
89
101
89
83
98
71
94
81
104
Source: Apostolides 2010; Maddison 2010
In fact the economic situation of Cyprus was affecting the majority rural population (78% of
the population according to the 1931 census). Cypriot communities (majority Greek/Christian
and minority Turkish/Moslem) were overwhelmingly resident in rural areas and working in
the primary sector6. They were also scattered geographically in a mosaic of communities;
thus the effect of the combined depression and drought affected both communities relatively
similarly.
The depression of Cyprus might have affected the different minorities in a similar way, but it
does not affect all geographical areas equally. Agricultural production in Cyprus is very
structured due to environmental conditions. The presence or not of height and water
delineated what the villagers could or could not produce. As table 3 shows different types of
agricultural production: crops dependent on rainfall such as grain, carobs and olives were
much more seriously affected that those areas where aquifers were based on irrigation.
Table 3: Real value added of agricultural production in Cyprus (Index; 1929=100)
1929
1930
1931
1932
Ag., For & Fish
100
99
88
80
Annual Crops
100
90
70
48
Perennial Crops
Animal
Production
100
114
105
86
100
99
102
100
Farm Ancillary
100
100
82
117
Source: Apostolides 2010
6
Also it is true that Turkish Cypriots did have modest overrepresentation relative to their population in urban
centres
The downturn in agricultural production led a credit crunch in the informal credit system.
Cyprus farmers were burdened with debt they could not repay, which was similar situation as
in other East Mediterranean states; the combined drought and depression rapidly increased
the amount of non-performing loans, as indicated by the increase in forced sales of
mortgaged rural property. Despite the rapid growth of the cooperative saving banks prior to
the great depression, the faulty structure of the sector ensured that the cooperatives could not
provide relief, leading to a serious retrenchment of the available rural credit markets
(Apostolides, Vrachimis, Vostis, 2013)
By late 1931 the situation was worsening both politically and economically volatile. The
government reserve was exhausted and the government refused to even discuss the demand
by the LC to dramatically cut the wages of British officials to level desired by the Cypriots.
Instead it passed substantial increases in duties and excise, increasing taxation both in luxury
and in staple consumption goods (the government monopoly on salt was particularly hated).
The British Colonial office considered that the increases were not enough to ensure the island
would not need to be bailed out by a “grant-in-aid” by the British government and it was
delaying the confirmation of the Order-in-Council that would pass the government budget
and tax increases. This severely weakened the bargaining hand of the Governor, who could
not pass any legislation by the LC unless the grievances were acted upon, but he could not
count on the Colonial office accepting that there would not be additional taxation demands in
1932.
To add to the volatile situation the secret deal of the Governor with the British treasury when
the “Tribute” was abolished was made public on the 8th of July 1931. In response to a
question in the British Parliament, the Chancellor confirmed that the Governor of Cyprus
waived the right of the surplus accumulated by the “Tribute”, an amount that was up to 50%
of Cypriot GDP. This led to the Greek Cypriot members of the LC, under pressure from more
nationalistic elements in the community, to try and form a communal response against the
upcoming vote for the budget for 1932. Yet the response would have to go beyond rejection
of the government demands in the LC as the body was effectively sidelined thorough direct
rule from London through the King’s “orders-in-council”.
The demands for tax strike or even more bold actions were resisted throughout September by
one of the major forces of the Greek Cypriot community and the leading LC member, The
metropolitan bishop of Larnaca, Nicodemos Mylonas.
Yet on the 17th of October, Nicodemos Mylonas surprised all by resigning his seat on the LC;
his proclamation called for passive resistance against the British, with the sole aim to achieve
Cyprus union with Greece. On the 19th N.K. Lanitis also resigned his seat at the LC after a
meeting of the Greek Cypriot community leaders in the 18th ended with no decision on the
future course of action. By the 21st a march calling for Union with Greece in the capital,
Nicosia, led to the Governor’s palace being burned down and the first dead among the
Cypriot rioters. News of the casualties spread and soon they were disturbances across the
island.
The riots occurred in cities, but also across the rural area. The following map indicates just
how extensive the riots and disturbances were: in fact the primary sources collected by this
study indicate that the police commissioner intentionally underplayed the extent of the riot
(and of casualties) by suggesting that acts of disturbances were filed under other criminal
offenses (such as arson or theft).
Image 1: Map of Cyprus with the reported disturbances during October 1931
Note: the colour determines the amount of disturbances in that location: Once disturbance –Green, Two – Blue, Three – Purple, Five – Red.
The disturbances were quelled by the 2nd of November by the rapid re-enforcement of the
British Garrison by sea and by air7. The governor suspended the constitution and declared
that the Greek Cypriot community was to blame and placed a punitive tax (The Reparation
Impost Law) to the community of £34,315.
Why is the 1931 riot important in Cyprus historiography?
The 1931 riot is important not just for the dynamic repercussions in the relationship of GreekCypriots and the British. Its causes have been disputed. The main disputes are whether the
riots were driven or spontaneous, and whether they were largely due to economic or political
issues.
The official report of the riots thought the riots as being fanned by the Greek Cypriot political
elite8. The official colonial office position as expressed in parliament was that the Cypriot
church launched the disturbances for political and the merchants who were going to be
affected by the increase in duties supported it to avoid the tax increases. In fact the report
constantly argues that the disturbance was driven by members of the establishment egging
different areas on by travelling to villages from Nicosia after the initial riot and the burning of
the Governor’s palace took place. On the other hand the Cypriot historians who looked at the
riots in detail (Georghallides, 1985, Papapoliviou et al, 2004, Stylianos 1984) insist the riots
were a spontaneous outbreak of grievances.
The causes of the riots are also in dispute the colonial government insisted that they were
entirely due to the economic distress of the population, caused by the global trade conditions.
Greek-Cypriot historians argue that the riots were motivated by nationalistic sentiment, since
their immediate cause were protests for union with Greece. Thus there is a debate on whether
the violence in October 1931 was motivated by economic frustration or nationalistic
sentiment.
7
The provision of reinforcements by air from Egypt is perhaps the first such air action in the world and shows
how seriously the situation was considered to have been by the Colonial Office at the time
8
For a description of the events in 1931: Command 4045, “Disturbances in Cyprus in October 1931” British
Parliamentary Papers. Reports from Commissioners, Inspectors and Others: vol.VI session 03/11/1931 to
17/11/1931 pp.504–544
The paper is an attempt to shed light on both issues by the use of quantitative techniques. It
will attempt to answer the following question:
Can we predict which villages rioted in 1931 based on economic and social
characteristics?
Data and Methodology
A new dataset of all incidences of disturbances was created. Primary sources were used. The
report of disturbances noted extensive incidences, yet curiously the report suggests over 200
villages took part in act of defiance to the regime. However the reported incidences are much
less in number, suggesting that many acts of defiance we not added to the official list of
disturbances as sent to the British Parliament.
Papapoliviou et al, (2004) had an appendix of primary sources collected from the police
report of the year that were collected though extensive research in the Cyprus Archives. They
indicate a much more extensive incidence of disturbances and they have been integrated into
the database along with the official report. In addition Stylianou (1984) used extensive first
hand information that was cross checked with Greek and Cypriot archival resources to
increase the number of disturbances that were represented.
To add to the above dataset the previously unpublished diaries of convicted ringleaders
(Galatoupoulos, 2011, Sofokleous 2003) have been used to both cross check and improve the
list of disturbances that took place in Cyprus.
What is defined as a disturbance? A disturbance could be an attempt to burn down
government building (in Drousia) from a mass demonstration (in Lefkara) to stealing of
weapons from police stations (in Dhikomo). We found 151 incidences in disturbances during
that brief one month period. These were placed on a map according to where the incident was
recorded using ARCgis: there was enough information to accurately place 143 of the
incidences in the communities on the map reproduced here. This is still short from the
comment in the official report of 200 villages (out of roughly 663) rising up.
It is fortunate that the same year but before the disturbances (in April) there was a island wide
census. The Cypriot censuses are considered particularly reliable (Veropoulou, 1997) and
thus provide with accurate village by village information. The census includes information on
population (Moslem and Greek), the arable land and the number of Vine-yards, Vegetable
Gardens, Carob trees, Olive trees and fruit trees.
In addition the colonial blue book provides information on all the villages that established a
cooperative credit society, the year of establishment the number of members, the size of the
initial capital and whether it receive funds from the recently established (and by 1931
moribund) government Agricultural bank.
The biggest innovation is using maps to establish the land use of the village administration.
Using a cadastral survey of the 1960, we could map the land use and match it to the village.
Two weaknesses remain with this approach however:
1) There is a difference in the amount of land under irrigation in 1960 from 1931. A
rough rough map of 1927 can be used to correct this, as well as the recorded area
under irrigation reported in the 1961 and 1931 census. They are not very sever, but
they are present. However the underlying map is not digitised, meaning alterations
cannot take place. We have recently acquired the land use map in digital ARCgis
form of 2000 and we are working on replacing and then correcting the map of 2000 to
bring it back to 1931 conditions.
2) As the underlying map is not digitised we cannot yet establish coefficient of land us
of a village that takes into account the whole are under municipal boundaries. Thus
land use is for now determined as the land use as represented by the actual village
settlement, rather than the village boundaries. This means that for villages were we
could not determine a single land use pattern on its settlement point were excluded,
dropping our sample from 651 to 550.
This is the major weakness of the above attempt and it is being overcome by the use of a
digital map.
Image 2: Disturbances in 1931 with Land Use map of 1960.
We would have liked to have other village based data. The parliamentary report accuses the
middle class of churchmen, lawyers and teachers of leading the riots. The census gives
account of the number of lawyers and teachers, but the final report gives the evidence in a
district and not village level data. It is hoped that the original census returns will be found in
the archive, yet the chances of them surviving are slim. As the tax increase the government
was proposing was affecting items of staple consumption, data on village consumption would
be ideal. Consumption data were also collected in a census of rural living conditions that was
taken in 1927; yet again the final report does not report detailed consumption data.
Riots are a discrete dependent variable. In this case although it is not binary (i.e. 0 or 1) a
binary model is used. This is because all cities rioted (and they did so more than once)
meaning it loses explanatory power and drops out of the regression, and hence that leaves
only 16 villages where there was more than one disturbance. Thus the dependent variable was
normalised to 0 – no riots, and 1 – riots.
The regression analysis presented here is the first step in the process of analyzing the existing
database.
A logit regression is attempted where the depended variable (did a riot occur in October 1931)
is explained by the independent variables: Distance from Nicosia (in Km), the percentage of
Greek Cyprus to the population, the size of the village as represented by the population and
the agricultural land use pattern of the village settlement.
The results are shown below:
Despite some disappointment the above has some encouraging and interesting signs. It
clearly shows that the existing land use determination of the village settlement is problematic;
if the variable is going to have any meaningful predictive power the land use of the village
region needs to be accounted for.
Yet at the same time it shows positives. It confirms that the more homogenous the villages of
Greek-Cypriots Greek Cypriot villages were much more susceptible to disturbances, making
the political a stronger predictor than economic factors. It is surprising that Co-operatives
seem to have been established in areas of distress, and the distance from the source of the
initial riot is weaker than what the historical literature would suggest.
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