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Joint statement with the findings and recommendations of the report
At approximately 1 am on 7 December 2013, a leach tank at Ranger uranium mine failed, resulting
in a spill of approximately 1,400 cubic meters of acidic slurry. In response to the incident:

The Northern Territory (NT) Department of Mines and Energy (DME) instructed Energy
Resources of Australia (ERA) to cease operations and commenced an investigation pursuant to
the Mining Management Act;

NT Worksafe commenced an investigation pursuant to the Work Health and Safety (National
Uniform Legislation) Act 2011;

the Commonwealth Minister for Industry informed ERA that Ranger would not resume
processing operations until they could demonstrate the integrity of the processing plant to the
satisfaction of regulatory authorities; and

The Supervising Scientist Division (SSD) of the Australian Government Department of the
Environment conducted independent monitoring to determine if the incident impacted the
surrounding environment.
On 13 December 2013, Commonwealth Minister for Industry and the Northern Territory Minister
for Mines and Energy released terms of reference for a joint investigation and review into the
incident. The terms of reference outlined the regulatory response to the incident, including the need
to:
i.
identify the immediate cause of the incident;
ii.
examine the integrity of broader processing operations;
iii.
identify any gaps in operating procedures or maintenance practices;
iv.
undertake a comprehensive examination of corporate governance arrangements; and
v.
provide recommendations to the Commonwealth Minister for Industry and the Northern
Territory Minister for Mines and Energy.
The NT is leading the investigation into the cause of the tank failure. Independent experts, Noetic
Risk Solutions Pty Limited and HRL Technology Pty Limited, were engaged to report to ministers
on the integrity of processing operations, gaps in operating procedures or maintenance practices,
and examine corporate governance. The independent experts are also assisting the NT in its
investigations.
A taskforce, led by NT DME and consisting of NT WorkSafe, SSD, the Department of Industry, the
Gundjeihmi Aboriginal Corporation, and the Northern Land Council was established to provide a
coordinated and consistent approach to managing the regulatory response to the incident.
The independent experts undertook a rigorous assessment of the operations of ERA, which included
examining key documents and plans, physical testing of materials, onsite inspections and interviews
with key stakeholders. The investigations resulted in two key reports; a Restart Capability Report,
and the Ranger Leach Tank Incident Final Report which focusses on governance and the regulatory
environment applicable to the Ranger mine. Each of these reports was peer reviewed by R4Risk Pty
Ltd.
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The Restart Capability Report examined ERA’s plan for restarting the Ranger processing plant and
their capability to do so safely. On the basis of the report, on 5 June 2014, the Commonwealth and
Northern Territory ministers agreed to a graduated restart of the operations at Ranger. ERA was
required to produce a detailed plan for the improvement of process safety management and
governance at Ranger, the ‘Process Safety Improvement Action Plan’. This plan was submitted to
the independent experts and subsequently considered by the taskforce.
The independent expert’s final report provided an assessment of ERA’s corporate government
arrangements. This report found that at the time of the tank failure, the management of process
safety and its corporate governance did not meet expected standards.
The final report also included an assessment of ERA’s restart of the processing plant. The final
report also considered the regulatory framework applicable to Ranger and the roles and
responsibilities of regulators. Findings and recommendations of the final report can be found below.
Recommendations two, five and seven require further action from ERA through the implementation
and continuous improvement of their ‘Process Safety Improvement Action Plan’. These
recommendations have been accepted by the Commonwealth Minister for Industry and the Northern
Territory Minister for Mines and Energy and will be enforced through the Mining Management Act
(NT).
The remaining four recommendations require action from the regulators. Each of these
recommendations were accepted by ministers, with the exception of recommendation three, which
was noted. Regulators are undertaking the following specific actions:

a suitably qualified expert will be engaged to assist in monitoring the implementation of ERA’s
‘Process Safety Improvement Action Plan’ on a quarterly basis for the next two years, including
to review Return to Service documentation on a sampling basis;

relevant process safety capabilities will be improved in NT DME and the Department of
Industry; and

the Department of Industry, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, will consider the need
for a review of the regulatory arrangements as they apply to the Ranger uranium mine.
Several investigations running parallel to that of the independent experts are at varying stages of
completion. Investigations by NT DME and NT Worksafe are ongoing. On 28 August 2014, the
Supervising Scientist released a final report following its investigation, concluding that there have
been no offsite environmental impacts resulting from the incident.
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Key Findings
i.
Any future failures must be investigated with a view to understanding the damage
mechanisms that are operating. This will enable appropriate and timely
preventative and monitoring strategies to be identified and implemented.
ii.
ERA’s proposed approach to monitoring the integrity of leach tanks is technically
sound, but may not be sustainable. Should an alternative monitoring solution be
found, it will need review.
iii.
The restart plan is going well and ERA should be allowed to continue
implementation until completion.
iv.
The lessons learnt from the restart should be incorporated into ERA’s procedures.
v.
The ERA Plan is adequate and meets the requirement as set out in [the Restart
Capability Report]. It will require Board review by no later than the end of July
2014.
Recommendations
i.
It is recommended that Return to Service documentation be reviewed on a
sampling basis as part of the ongoing monitoring program.
ii.
ERA develop documented processes that ensures that responses to leaks and other
losses of containment are thoroughly dealt with.
iii.
Review the regulatory framework to ensure a more comprehensive and clear
regulatory environment.
iv.
The skills of regulators are developed to enable more effective regulation of
process safety.
v.
The successful implementation of the cultural change element of the Action Plan
is essential and must be a high priority for ERA.
vi.
The cultural change element of the Action Plan is a priority area of focus for
regulatory or monitoring oversight.
vii.
The ERA Action Plan is monitored quarterly for two years from July 2014 to
ensure it is effectively implemented.
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