Some Conceptual Tools for Understanding and
Addressing Catastrophic Challenges
As Well As Other Lesser Emergencies
By Paula D. Gordon
(Copyright by Author, June 2009)
Three Complementary Ways of Looking at Emergencies
Three complementary ways of looking at emergencies are highlighted
here. These three tools can be helpful in emergency management and
homeland security. They are

a Typology of Emergencies,

an All Hazards Emergency Management Cycle, and

an All Hazards Impact Scale.
These tools can serve as a framework for understanding emergencies
and their impacts. The tools can be helpful to emergency management
planners, policy makers, and practitioners in developing and implementing
action plans that address the widest possible range of emergencies and all
phases of the emergency management cycle.
The tools may help those
who have not previously comprehended the differences between
catastrophes and lesser emergencies deepen their understanding concerning
those differences and the implications of those differences for everything
from preparedness, mitigation, response, recovery, and continuity of
operations to emergency management planning and training and education
in general. The tools can help in broadening perspectives. They can help all
involved envision possible scenarios that could unfold and help provide
insight into how possible scenarios might best be addressed. They can help
provide insight into ways in which undesirable scenarios can be ameliorated
or forestalled in the first place. They can be helpful in suggesting ways in
which desirable scenarios might be fostered and realized.
1) A Typology of Emergencies
Table 1, the Typology of Emergencies was initially developed by
the author in the early 1980s while serving for two years as a full time
consultant with the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The Typology
was initially developed as a way of illustrating for decision makers the need
to exercise realistic expectations when considering worst case scenarios.
The Typology was developed in response to a perceived need to expand the
thinking of persons in roles of responsibility to assess possible worst
scenarios in far more realistic ways than had been the case in the past.
Table 1:
The Typology of Emergencies briefly characterizes emergencies of
differing levels of severity through and including worst case catastrophes.
The Typology can be especially helpful in highlighting a major problem that
many of those engaged in emergency management have had: Most
emergency management planning address only the lower portion of the table
and efforts to address the levels above the mid-point in the table have
tended to be unrealistic and inadequate at best. Most planning, indeed most
preparedness efforts, do not address scenarios in which all of the major
elements of the critical infrastructure are in a state of failure. Most efforts
do not address situations in which the major elements of the critical
infrastructure are in a state of failure for days, weeks, or months or longer
as was the case in Hurricane Katrina. The result of focusing on emergencies
that fall within the first parts of the Typology is that those in emergency
management are largely blindsided when a true catastrophe such as
Hurricane Katrina has occurs. To this day many do not seem to comprehend
what sets Hurricane Katrina apart. One result is that instead of recognizing
the difficulties and sometimes impossibilities of responding “effectively” in
the immediate aftermath of a true catastrophe, blame is meted out to key
players who were all equally hindered in their efforts to respond.
2) An All Hazards Emergency Management Cycle
The second conceptual tool is way of depicting the emergency
management cycle. This particular graphic representation is adapted from a
Counter Terrorism Strategic Model developed by Todd Stewart, Ph.D.
Table 2, an All Hazards Emergency Management Cycle, provides a way
of looking at an all hazards emergency management cycle, a cycle that can
be applied to emergencies of any of a universe of possible origins,
emergencies that can impact the lives of hundreds, thousands, or millions of
individuals.
Table 2: An All Hazards Emergency Management Cycle
It is imperative to ground emergency management efforts in an
understanding of the significance of this cycle in that all parts of the cycle
can be seen as being interrelated. Efforts directed at any portion of the
cycle are bound to have an impact on the other parts of the cycle.
From
time to time, there are those in the policy making arena who show little or
no understanding of the significance of the interrelated character of this
cycle. This can have dire consequences in that government efforts in
emergency management may be structured in ways that are destined to
create problems rather than to help address challenges as effectively as
possible.
3. An All Hazards Impact Scale
Table 3, an All Hazards Impact Scale, constitutes the third conceptual
tool. This All Hazards Impact Scale is a conceptual tool of potential use by
educators, researchers, policymakers, and practitioners.
(An earlier version
of this scale was called the “Homeland Security Impact Scale.” See
“Improving Homeland Security and Critical Infrastructure Protection and
Continuity” at http://gordonhomeland.com.
Either name is fitting if
“homeland security” is seen here as encompassing the full range of
emergencies, through and including catastrophes of natural origin.)
The All Hazards Impact Scale has been adapted from the Y2K Impact
Scale, a survey instrument developed in 1998 by WDCY2K, a networking
organization composed of members with interests in Y2K-related challenges.
The membership came from all parts of the public sector and private sectors,
including government, business, non-profit organizations, and academia.
(For additional background on WDCY2K, see Bruce F. Webster, The
Homeland Security Survival Guide, Prentice Hall, Saddle River, NJ,
1999.)
Table 3:
All Hazards Impact Scale
0 -- No real impact on national security, economic security, or personal security
1 -- Local impact in areas directly affected
2 -- Significant impact in some areas that were not directly affected
3 -- Significant market adjustment (20% + drop); some business and industries
destabilized; some bankruptcies, including increasing number of personal bankruptcies and
bankruptcies of small businesses, and waning of consumer confidence;
4 -- Economic slowdown spreads; rise in unemployment and underemployment;
accompanied by possible isolated *disruptive incidents and acts, increase in hunger and
homelessness
5 -- Cascading impacts including mild recession; isolated supply problems*; isolated
infrastructure problems*; accompanied by possible increase in *disruptive incidents and
acts, continuing societal impacts
6 -- Moderate to strong recession or increased market volatility; regional supply problems*;
regional infrastructure problems*; accompanied by possible increase in disruptive incidents
and acts, worsening societal impacts
7 -- Spreading supply problems* and infrastructure problems*; accompanied by possible
increase in disruptive incidents and acts, worsening societal impacts, and major challenges
posed to elected and non-elected public officials
8 -- Depression; increased supply problems*; elements of infrastructure crippled;
accompanied by likely increase in disruptive incidents and acts; worsening societal impacts;
and national and global markets severely impacted
9 -- Widespread supply problems*; infrastructure verging on collapse with both national
and global consequences; worsening economic and societal impacts, accompanied by likely
widespread disruptions
10 -- Possible unraveling of the social fabric, nationally and globally, jeopardizing the ability
of governments to govern and keep the peace
_____________________________________________________________
* "Supply problems" and "infrastructure problems" may include food shortages; availability
of potable water; degradation of water purity, water distribution and/or waste management;
fuel/heating oil shortages, disruptions in utilities (power, gas, telecommunications),
disruption in the financial sector, disruptions in transportation (airlines, trains, trucking,
ports, ships); pharmaceutical shortages; disruption of health care services or emergency
medical services; disruption of fire and public safety services; disruptions or inadequacies,
or overwhelming of public works operations and services.
"Disruptions" and "incidents" can include demonstrations, work stoppages, strikes,
organized or spontaneous vandalism, looting, and riots. Also included are sabotage and
terrorist acts and attacks. (These notations have been adapted in part from notations used
in the Y2K Impact Scale survey instrument in 1998 by WDCY2K. Bruce F. Webster, The
Homeland Security Survival Guide, Prentice Hall, Saddle River, NJ, 1999. This scale is
an adaptation of the WDCY2K Scale.)
The All Hazards Impact Scale can provide a common frame of
reference for recognizing, identifying, analyzing, and discussing, key factors
that can be considered by those roles of responsibility for formulating and
implementing policy. It can be used to help get policy makers, planners,
analysts, and practitioners “in the same book,” if not “on the same page”
when it comes to understanding, assessing, and dealing with specific events,
challenges, and possibilities.
Summation
The Typology of Emergencies, the All Hazards Emergency Management
Cycle, and the All Hazards Impact Scale are three complementary ways of
looking at emergencies. They can be helpful tools in emergency
management and homeland security. They can help individuals develop
multi-dimensional perspectives concerning emergencies of differing levels of
severity and impacts. They may be helpful in providing a framework that
contributes to the deepening understanding concerning the differences
between catastrophes and lesser emergencies and the different plans that
need to be in place and the different actions that need to be taken. This is
most importantly the case when it comes to catastrophic events that involve
significant failure of the major elements of the critical infrastructure.
These tools can be helpful in deepening understanding of scenarios
that have unfolded. The tools can be helpful in spurring imagination
concerning possible scenarios that could unfold. The tools can aid those in
positions of responsibility act in ways that are far more proactive and
realistic than in the past, particularly as regards catastrophic and other
unprecedented events.
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Dr. Paula D. Gordon is an educator, consultant, analyst, and writer. She has also served in a variety of capacities in
the Federal government, including staff officer, policy analyst, and special projects director for a wide range of
Federal agencies and Departments. She has an extensive background in several domestic policy arenas including
drug abuse prevention, emergency management, and homeland security. Her websites at
http://GordonDrugAbusePrevention.com and http://gordonhomeland.com include her articles, reports,
publications, and presentations on drug abuse prevention and on emergency management and homeland security
respectively. Her doctoral dissertation, Public Administration in the Public Interest (posted at
http://www.jhu.edu/pgordon) focuses on complex societal problem solving and governmental change.
E-mail: pgordon@erols.com.
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