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Religious Language
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Your A2 Topic Has Two Aspects:
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Verification and Falsification. Some
philosophers (particularly Logical
Positivists) argue that religious language
is meaningless because it cannot be
verified or falsified (shown to be true or
false).
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ourselves, or (b) subject the hypothesis
to any new or further forms of testing.
Perhaps a lot of what we take for
knowledge defies strict verification.
Symbol and Analogy. Some
philosophers argue that there may be
meaning in religious language because it
is symbolic (Paul Tillich) or because we
can draw analogies between God and
other things/properties (Thomas
Aquinas).
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Some key figures …
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What’s the Problem?
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Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism
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A major philosophical distinction in
language is made between language
which expresses knowledge and
language which does not.
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Cognitive Language expresses facts and
knowledge (e.g. Dr. Williams teaches at
Wellington College).
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Non-Cognitive Language expresses
things which we could never know:
feelings, values, and (perhaps)
metaphysical claims (e.g. Dr. Williams is
worth listening too: teachers are a noble
breed).
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Critics of religion might emphasise the
Non-Cognitive nature of much religious
language.
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First Problem: Verification and
Falsification, the Logical Positivists
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Formalising the argument: A.J. Ayer
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A Problem in Verification
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However, the idea of a Verification
Principle entails a number of serious
problems. How much can we really
verify? For example: did King Harold die
at the battle of Hastings? We can look at
some historical records which say he
did, but we cannot (a) observe it
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Some Criticisms of Verification
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John Hick has criticised Ayer, suggesting
that talk of God might be verifiable in
principle. Convincing evidence is not
apparent now, but it could be in the
future; the whole idea of final
judgement implies that God will be seen
and known.
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Richard Swinburne argues that there are
propositions which no-one knows how
to verify but still are not meaningless.
He gives the example of toys which
come out of their cupboard at night and
dance around, then returning without a
trace. No observation could ever
establish this as truth, but it’s not
meaningless.
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The Verification Principle might
contradict itself. The claim that a
statement is only meaningful if it can be
verified analytically or synthetically
cannot itself be verified analytically or
synthetically. Is the Verification Principle
meaningless?
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Falsification: Anthony Flew
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This is the inverse of verification; Flew
claimed that any positive claim we make
also assumes that we deny its negation.
If I say that College work is fun, I am also
saying that College work is not, not fun.
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Flew argued that language is only
meaningful if we can conceive of some
evidence which might count against it.
It’s only meaningful to say that College
work is fun because students might be
able to show contradictory information:
boring research projects, or a limited
syllabus.
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The problem with ‘God talk’ is that it
often implies that it could never by
falsified: “I know that God loves me in a
special and mysterious way which noone may question or disprove”. If God is
just a mystery, then we are not using
language in a constructive, meaningful
way.
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Responding to Falsification
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The philosopher R.M. Hare took up the
idea of falsification and used it to
describe certain beliefs which he called
‘bliks’. A blik is a non-rational belief
which could never be falsified
(disproved). For example, let us say that
a student is convinced that his
philosophy teacher is trying to kill him
but, as his friends point out, there’s no
evidence at all that this is the case. The
student may say that this teacher is so
clever that he would never leave any
evidence of any kind. Bliks are not
necessarily untrue (some are sane and
some insane), but they are groundless.
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3) Evaluation of Verification – your views,
criticisms of Verification: Hick,
Swinburne, self-contradictory?
4) Falsification – Flew, Hare and the bliks.
5) Evaluation of Falsification – Hick,
Mitchell and the freedom fighter.
6) Conclusion – consider and answer: is
religious language meaningless? Is it
non-cognitive? Does language even
have to be verifiable to be meaningful?
How might this impact on religion?
Clear answers and strong
argument throughout!
John Hick responds by arguing that
there are reasons behind religious
beliefs: experiences, Scripture, etc. He
also objects that there is no way to
distinguish between sane or insane
bliks, and the judgement that religion is
insane could only ever be arbitrary.
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Basil Mitchell’s Objection to
Falsification
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Finally, Basil Mitchell objects to the idea
that religious claims are groundless
‘bliks’. He argues that religious claims
are grounded in some facts and that the
faithful do allow that evidence may
stand against what they believe. They
recognise, for example, the problem of
evil. However, they do not allow that
belief can or should be verified in a
simple manner.
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Mitchell draws a parable of a man
claiming to be the leader of a resistance
movement – it seems that he supports
the fight but sometimes seems to help
the enemy. One could choose to trust
him despite the contrary evidence. So
with God: one could trust in God while
recognising the contrary evidence: that
he allows evil and suffering, or disbelief.
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Suggested Essay Structure - Paragraphs
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Second Issue: Analogy and Symbol
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The other area or problem on which you
tend to get exam questions is analogy
and/or symbol. These could be asked
separately or together, or as part of a
general question on religious language.
So, it’s important to learn it all!
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Essentially, we are now looking at
attempts to say that religious language
can be used meaningfully, only not in a
direct or simplistically descriptive sense.
Philosophers like Aquinas and Tillich try
to show how our language might relate
to God.
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Aquinas: Why Analogy?
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Thomas Aquinas was concerned by the
problem of explaining God in human
language; God is supposedly perfect and
infinite, so he might defy description.
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Aquinas stated that we could not speak
of God ‘univocally’ (with our language
being applied to him with the same
meaning), but nor could we speak of
him ‘equivocally’ (with our language
being applied with a different meaning).
This left Aquinas needing to find a way
of using language as an indirect
description of God.
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For this he turned to ‘analogy’. An
analogy is an attempt to explain the
meaning of something by comparison
with an example more familiar to us.
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Analogy of Attribution
1) Introduction – basic problem,
background, cognitive and non-cognitive
language.
2) Verification – Logical positivists, Ayer
and the VP, and the weak VP.
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There are three forms of analogy
described by Aquinas: attribution,
proper proportion, and improper
proportion. The first of these
(attribution) is dead easy.
Aquinas thought that we could gain
understanding of God by considering his
role as creator. Simply, if God made the
world then we could expect the world to
reflect God in some way. So, we would
be justified in drawing analogies
between the world and God.
Aquinas also explains this by the
example of a bull and its urine. The
health of the animal is present in its
urine; we can tell that the bull is healthy
by studying this. However, the health of
the bull is only complete in the bull
itself. So, what the urine tells us is
indirect and incomplete. So too with
God: what the world tells us of his
goodness is meaningful, but it is also
limited.
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That gives us the order of reference –
God’s goodness is foremost, because he
is the source of this quality. The world
has goodness only in a secondary
respect.
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Analogy of Proper Proportion
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Here, John Hick takes on and develops
Aquinas’ views. The basic idea is that
humans possess God’s qualities because
we are created in his image (Genesis 2).
Yet, because God is perfect, we have his
qualities in a lesser proportion.
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qualities for the sake of a loose
comparison.
Hick explains this by giving the example
of faithfulness. Humans can be faithful
to each other, in speech and behaviour,
and so on. Dogs too can be faithful, but
there is a great difference between this
quality in a person and in an animal. Yet,
there has to be a reasonable similarity,
or we would not recognise dogs as
faithful. So, there is “a dim and
imperfect likeness” in the dog, as there
is between us and God.
An analogy which is just a metaphor and
does not really deal with proportionate
qualities would be one of improper
proportion. For instance, ‘God is a rock’.
This ignores essential differences in
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Criticisms of Analogy
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We could criticise Aquinas’ claims about
proportionate analogy, since we may
dispute whether humans really were
created “in the image and likeness of
God”. This is challenged by Darwin’s
theory of evolution and rejected by
atheist Richard Dawkins.
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We might wonder whether the evil in
our world is also an analogy to God –
this might make a perfectly good God
impossible. However, a theodicy (such
as Augustine’s) could resolve this
problem.
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We could also criticise analogy from the
standpoint of verification, since the
object we are drawing an analogy to
(God) cannot be verified. However, for
this we can refer back to criticisms of
verification.
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Richard Swinburne criticises Aquinas for
producing an unnecessary theory. He
claims that we can speak of God and
humans as ‘good’ univocally, it is just
that God and humans possess goodness
in different ways. It is still the same
essential quality, even though God is
perfect and humans are not.
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Religious Language as Symbolic
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Theologian Paul Tillich took a different
approach in attempting to show that
religious language can be meaningful.
He focused on the manner in which
symbols may effect humans.
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Tillich’s first main point is that symbols
are not signs. Both of these point to
something beyond themselves, but only
symbols ‘participate’ in what they point
to. For instance, a road sign just points
to a fact about a road, whereas a
symbolic flag participates in the power
of the king or the nation.
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Tillich goes on to number four key
features of symbols: (a) They point to
something beyond themselves, (b) They
participate in that to which they point,
(c) They open up levels of reality which
otherwise are closed to us, and (d) They
open up dimensions of the soul which
correspond to those aspects of reality.
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To explain (c) and (d), Tillich compared
this symbolic language to a great work
of art …
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Criticisms of Tillich and Symbol
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A number of criticisms could be levelled
at what Tillich has put forward. Firstly,
John Hick has argued that the idea of
‘participating’ in a symbol is unclear.
Take the flag example; in what sense
does this really do something? Is there
really a big difference from signs here?
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William Alston has objected that
symbolism means that “there is no point
trying to determine whether the
statement is true or false”. Since Tillich’s
symbols are not literally true, Alston
feels that they could have no
meaningful impact on us. They could not
send us to heaven or hell, for example.
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He then went on to say that problems in
philosophy may occur through
misunderstanding that words can be
used in different language games.
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For Wittgenstein, meaning is all about
observing convention – just like in a
game. There’s a right way and a wrong
way to do things.
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So with religion – there might be
conventional or unconventional ways to
talk about God.
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Language Games and Religion
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The theory of language games could be
important because of the connection it
makes with the ‘coherence theory of
truth’. This is the view that statements
are true if they fit with other statements
and beliefs which are internally
consistent.
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One could argue that the ‘game’ of
religious language cannot be criticised
because internally it is coherent and
intelligible. Religious views fit with other
religious views. Perhaps religion is just a
‘language game’, and it will all make
sense if we just participate.
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Wittgenstein and Language Games
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Finally, another area you might be asked
to discuss is that of ‘Language Games’.
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Much later in his career, years after he
had influenced the Logical Positivists,
Ludwig Wittgenstein changed his views
on how language works.
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The danger of this is that it could be too
relativistic, allowing that any claims are
equally valid. It also doesn’t explain how
we could challenge truth claims.
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In his Philosophical Investigations
(published after his death), Wittgenstein
focussed on the uses language can be
put to. Famously, he wrote: “Don’t’ ask
me for the meaning, ask for the use.”
So, he was less concerned with the truth
or falsity of language (contrast the
Logical Positivists).
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Also, it’s not quite clear whether
Wittgenstein thought of religion as a
‘language game’. He had a certain
respect for religion, but wrote little
about it himself.
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Some points to think about:
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Does language work in a game? Can
you give examples?
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Is what Wittgenstein says at all
comparable to Aquinas or Tillich?
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Is religion another ‘language game’?
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Is Wittgenstein’s later view right: is the
use of language more fundamental
than meaning?
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For religious language, he thought that
function might be more important than
meaning.
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Language Games
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Wittgenstein argued that language
works through a series of ‘language
games’. That is, meaning only comes out
of context; we have to know what
‘game’ that our terms are participating
in.
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