Course title: Normativity
Instructor: Simon Rippon
Number of credits: 4
Semester: Winter, 2012-13
Time and location: Tu, Th 9:00-10:40, Room 411
Course status: Doctoral elective
Description
This course investigates issues connected to the most central underlying concept of
moral and political philosophy: normativity. Some of the questions we will
investigate are: What gives us reasons or requirements to do things? What kinds of
reasons do we have? How do moral reasons and requirements relate to other kinds of
reasons and requirements? Readings will be drawn from the contemporary
philosophical literature in metaethics and practical reasoning.
Course Goals
The main objective of the course will be for students to familiarize themselves with
the concepts of normativity, reasons and requirements and their importance in
metaethics and practical reason, and to understand and investigate in the seminar
some of the philosophical problems raised in thinking aboutthem.
Learning outcomes
By the end of the course, students will be able to:
 demonstrate a clear understanding of some of the most important ways of
conceptualizing and explaining moral and non-moral normativity
 recognize key strengths and weaknesses of the various views
 analyze and charitably reconstruct philosophical arguments from readings,
and summarise them clearly and succinctly
 carefully perform their own evaluation and critique of the validity and
soundness of arguments, both orally and in writing
 identify suitable questions for further investigation, e.g. in a writing project
Weekly schedule
Week
1
Topic
Moral Voluntarism,
Moral Realism and the
Normative Problem
Readings
Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7–48,
(Lecture 1 ‘The normative question’).
2
Skepticism About
External Reasons
Bernard Williams, ‘Internal and External Reasons’, in
Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 101–
113.
Philippa Foot, ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical
Imperatives’, The Philosophical Review 81, no. 3 (July
1972): 305–316.
3
Realist Responses
Thomas M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1998), 37–77.
Derek Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 59–110 (Part 1 ‘Reasons’; ch. 3
‘Subjective Theories’ and ch. 4 ‘Further Arguments’).
4
A Kantian Approach to
Instrumental Reason
Christine M. Korsgaard, ‘The Normativity of
Instrumental Reason’, in Ethics and Practical Reason,
ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1997), 215–54.
5
The Wide-Scope
John Broome, ‘Normative Requirements’, Ratio 12, no.
Approach to Instrumental 4 (December 1999): 398–419.
Reason
R. J. Wallace, ‘Normativity, Commitment, and
Instrumental Reason’, Philosophers’ Imprint 1, no. 3
(2001): 1–26.
6
Debates about the WideScope Approach
Nicholas Southwood, ‘Vindicating the Normativity of
Rationality’, Ethics 119, no. 1 (October 1, 2008): 9–30.
Joseph Raz, ‘The Myth of Instrumental Rationality’,
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1, no. 1
(2005).
7
Internalism Again
Mark Schroeder, ‘Instrumental Mythology’, Journal of
Ethics and Social Philosophy 1, no. 1 (April 2005).
Sharon Street, ‘In Defense of Future Tuesday
Indifference: Ideally Coherent Eccentrics and the
Contingency of What Matters’, Philosophical Issues 19,
no. 1 (October 1, 2009): 273–298.
2
8
The Authority of
Attitudes of Endorsement
Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 49–89,
(Lecture 2 ‘Reflective endorsement’).
Christine M. Korsgaard, ‘The General Point of View:
Love and Moral Approval in Hume’s Ethics’, Hume
Studies 25, no. 1–2 (1999): 3–41.
9
Sensibility Theory
David Wiggins, ‘A Sensible Subjectivism?’, in Needs,
Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value, 3rd
ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 185–214.
10
Neo-Aristotelian
Naturalism
Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 192–266.
11
Kantian Constructivism
Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 90–166,
Lectures 3 ‘The authority of reflection’ and 4 ‘The
origin of value and the scope of obligation’.
12
Humean Constructivism
Sharon Street, ‘Constructivism About Reasons’, in
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau,
vol. 3 (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 207–245.
Requirements
Regular attendance, carefully completing the assigned readings before class, and
active participation in seminar discussions will be expected.
In addition, there will be the following assignments:
1) An in-class presentation. Students will give a short (15-20 minute)
presentation to introduce a selected topic. The presentation should include a
brief overview of some of the main arguments and some questions and
potential criticisms for discussion. Students may wish to prepare a handout or
slides to assist their presentation to the class, but will not be required to do so.
2) A 2,000 word mid-term paper
3) A 4,000 word (maximum) final paper (topic must be approved by the
instructor).
Assessment
20% presentation; 20% mid-term paper; 60% final paper
3