Hannibal Barca
Biographical Report and Source Analysis
Hannibal Barca is one of the greatest military minds to have ever walked the planet. He gained fame
during the Second Punic War (218-202), when he caught the Romans off guard by crossing the Alps.
Background
Hannibal Barca, the son of Hamilcar Barca was born in the year 247 BC. Hannibal was the eldest son
of Hamilcar, along with Hannibal; Hamilcar had several daughters and two other sons, Hasdrubal and
Mago.
At the time of his birth, Carthage, the birth place of Hannibal was on the verge of losing a long and
very important war. The city had been the Mediterranean's most prosperous seaport and possessed
wealthy provinces, but it was to suffer severe losses from the Romans in the First Punic War.
Source A is a map of the Western Mediterranean
around the 3rd Century. The map outlines the territory
controlled by both Carthage and Rome. It is evident,
that by this time Rome appears to have become a rival
to Carthage in three fundamental aspects: culturally,
militarily and commercially. `
The Social Structure of Carthage at this time was
similar but not identical to that of Rome’s. When the
Monarchy was abolished in 500 B.C. Carthage took on a new form of government, It was ruled by a
small senate, which was comprised of mainly nobles and the elite of society. It was this senate which
elected two ‘suffetes’ annually. At the time the most important family in Carthage was Barca family
and subsequently historians refer to this period as the “Barcid Dynasty”. The Barca Family were one
of the more important familes in the third Century.
At the time of Hannibal’s birth, his father was just appointed to be head of the Carthaginian forces in
the first Punic War. This war was to go on for approximately twenty years, and thus changed the
dynamics of the western Mediterranean. The war revealed Carthage’s major weakness, the use of
Mercenary forces; it was because of this that as soon as a war was no longer profitable it was
inevitably abandoned.
After the defeat of Carthage Hamilcar set about trying to restore the fortunes of his family and his
nation. 1With that in mind and supported by Gades, Hamilcar began the subjugation of the tribes of
the Iberian Peninsula. Carthage at the time was in such a poor state that its navy was unable to
transport his army to Iberia (Hispania); instead, Hamilcar had to march it towards the Pillars of
Hercules and transport it across the Strait of Gibraltar (present-day Morocco/Spain). It was in this
way that Carthage was compensated for the loss of territory. Hamilcar took Hannibal on this journey
to Iberia in 237.
Youth
“2On his accepting with delight, and, like a boy, even begging to do it besides, his father took him by
the hand, led him up to the altar, and bade him lay his hand on the victim and swear never to be the
friend of the Romans.”
Hannibal swore an oath promising to forever make Rome an enemy. It was during these years that
Hannibal was maturing and learning a lot from his father and brother-in-law.
Hamilcar died in 229 BC and it was Hannibal’s father- in-law which took over, Hasdrubal the fair.
3
The new governor further improved the Carthaginian position by diplomatic means, among which
was intermarriage between Carthaginians and Iberians. Hannibal married a native princess. It is likely
that the young man visited Carthage in these years.
Hasdrubal pursued a policy of consolidation of Carthage's Iberian interests, even signing a treaty
with Rome whereby Carthage would not expand north of the Ebro River, so long as Rome did not
expand south of it.
It was during these years that Hannibal was maturing and learning a lot from his father and brotherin-law. Hannibal had become the sort of man capable of leading the Carthaginian charge. By this
time he had already gained the respect of many in the Carthaginian army.
The Career of Hannibal
“4No sooner had he arrived...the old soldiers fancied they saw Hamilcar in his youth given back to
them; the same bright look; the same fire in his eye, the same trick of countenance and features.
Never was one and the same spirit more skilful to meet opposition, to obey, or to command...”
1
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hannibal (18/4/10)
Polyb_3.11'5-7;
3
http://www.livius.org/ha-hd/hannibal/hannibal.html (18/4/10)
4
The History of Rome: Vol III, by Livy
2
The election of Hannibal saw a return to the aggressive tactics of his later father; he soon began to
attack the natives and subsequently captured, Salamanca in 220. 5After he assumed command,
Hannibal spent two years consolidating his holdings and completing the conquest of Spain south of
the Ebro. However, Rome, fearing the growing strength of Hannibal in Iberia, created an alliance
with the city of Saguntum which lay at a considerable distance south of the Ebro River and claimed
the city as its region. Hannibal saw this as a breach of the treaty signed with Hasdrubal and so he laid
siege to the city, which fell after eight months.
Hannibal understood that he had the full respect of the Carthaginian army and took advantage of
this. He began to prepare for an invasion of Rome in the year 218 B.C. Hannibal used his entire
political prowess to align his allies to his cause. He convinced them that the Romans had broken the
peace treaty created by Hasdrubal. He also convinced the prospective allies of Rome to turn away
because they broke this treaty. Polybius indicates that Hannibal left his brother Hasdrubal with
15,000 men, 21 war elephants and approximately 50 warships in Spain before beginning his march
against Rome.
The Journey to Italy/Crossing the Alps
Hannibal took his army from Spain, marched upwards through the Pyrenees into France, and he
then headed south again through the alps - he did not take the obvious passes, as these would have
been watched by the Romans, and apparently made use of local goat paths, which were known to
the hill tribesmen that were friendly to the Carthaginians. The route to the Pyrenees saw Hannibal’s
army attacked by many fierce tribesmen and it was only “after many severe engagements and with
great loss” that Hannibal reached the Pyrenees. Hannibal had some luck soon after this; the Romans
took note of his path and planned to attack Africa and Spain. These plans were abandoned however
due to a Gallic uprising, who may have been motivated by Hannibal’s march.
Hannibal now marched across the southern plains of the Gaul, negotiating with or defeating local
tribes. Hannibal’s only significant resistance came when he tried to cross the Rhone River. He
defeated these tribes-people by sending a detachment upriver and outflanking them.
It was at this point the Romans understood the Intent of Hannibal. Publius Cornelius Scipio with two
full strength legions arrived at the Carthaginian camp two days after they had moved on. The
Romans knew that they had not travelled south and thus understood Hannibal’s intent to travel
north and enter Italy through the alps. Hannibal meanwhile was advancing further through the
Rhone. He met a number of local tribes who were far more receptive to his cause; they lent their
5
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hannibal (18/4/10)
services in terms of direction and supplies. Hannibal finally reached the foot of the alps with 50,000
men and 9,000 cavalry.
6
A mercenary group called the Carpetani became disgruntled and threatened mutiny. Hannibal
realized he needed to defuse the situation properly. Otherwise, his other men may also begin to
revolt. He gathered the army and told them that he sensed that some troops were losing heart for
the campaign. He allowed those troops to return home and reinforce the garrisons there. He solved
the problems without violence and bloodshed. Hannibal’s vast knowledge of military tactics also
kept his men alive. Most of the time, Hannibal tried to stay away from elevated areas to decrease
the chance of ambush. Whenever they set up camp for the night, they made sure they were not in
an area where they could be easily taken by surprise.
The figure given by Livy for the duration of Hannibal’s journey is 15 days. Hannibal finally led his
army in to the plains of the Po, in North West Italy. Despite some warped figures Livy and Polybius
suggest that Hannibal left the Alps with 20,000 men, 6,000 cavalry and 32 elephants7.
Hannibal in Rome
The battle of Trebbia River was the first engagement between Hannibal and the Romans and the
first real test of Hannibal’s army. Hannibal brilliantly anticipated Sempronius' impetuousness and set
up a brilliant ambush. Before the fight began Hannibal sent a force of 2,000, 1,000 each of infantry
and cavalry, under the command of his brother Mago to conceal themselves in the riverbeds. As
dawn broke the Numidian Cavalry harassed the Romans angering Sempronius and stirring him to
action. The main Roman army approached the Trebbia, pushing the Numidians back across,
completely unaware of the trap set for them.
Hannibal waited with his army arranged as a screen Hannibal waited with his army arranged as a
screen with 10,000 cavalry and elephants, flanking the infantry of 30,000. Sempronius faced him
with upwards of 40,000 men. The Roman light infantry (velites) met the enemy first and were badly
beaten, though they would be largely responsible for eliminating the remainder of Hannibal's few
elephants. Numidian cavalry crushed the Roman cavalry on the flanks and things were bad for
Sempronius from the start.
6
https://courses.washington.edu/hypertxt/cgi-bin/students.washington.edu/henfu/Hannibal%20Essay.pdf
(23/5/10)
7
Hannibal’s army did swell with the recutment of local tribes.
When the main armies met, the situation for Rome improve somewhat. The superior Numidian
Cavalry however put pressure on the flanks. After which Mago ambushed at a critical moment and
the Romans were all but finished. Demoralized by the bitter cold of December in northern Italy, the
Romans were routed, cut down as they fled. In the end, nearly half of Sempronius' force was lost,
about 15 to 20,000 men. Hannibal's losses were far less. His elephants were gone, but of his regular
army only the newly recruited Gaul’s suffered at all
The Battle of Trebbia River demonstrated several things. Hannibal used his superior leadership in
understanding the psychology of his opponent. It also demonstrated a key element of the education
he had gained in Spain; the ability to consider and then adapt to an environment.
Hannibal’s victory had implications throughout Rome.
They appointed a new command for the consul,
Flaminius. Flaminius was brash and eager to meet the
Carthaginian force and exact revenge for previous
Roman losses. Hannibal, always the tactician, was well
aware of the Roman commander's strategy and laid in
wait. Hannibal began to out-manoeuvre the roman
forces he looked for another spot to unleash his next
trap. Livy paints a particularly harsh picture as to the
conditions of the Apennines, whilst supporting
Source B a graphic representation of Trebbia (Hannibal Blue, Rome
Red.
Polybius’ account of Hannibal losing an eye to disease He scouted the area fervently and found the
perfect spot at Lake Trasimene in April of 217 BC.
Polybius wrote that Hannibal calculated that he could draw out Flaminius into battle and that "8no
sooner had he left the neighbourhood of Faesulae, and, advancing a short way beyond the Roman
camp, made a raid upon the neighbouring country, then
Flaminius became excited, and enraged at the idea that
he was despised by the enemy: and as the devastation of
the country went on, and he saw from the smoke that
rose in every direction that the work of destruction was
proceeding, he could not patiently endure the sight."
8
Polybius, The Histories, 3.82
Hannibal’s strategy was to set up an ambush which would force the Romans into open terrain cut off
by the lake and the hilly grounds which were to surround them. A Carthaginian decoy baited the
Romans into this area while the rest of the main army occupied the hilly areas surrounding the
northern lake shores. On the eve of the battle, Hannibal
Souce C Graphic Depiction of the battle of Lake Trasimene
exhibited his brilliance yet again, he ordered his men to
light fires on the hills of Tuoro, at a considerable distance, to give the impression that his army was
much farther away. Foolishly Flaminius fell for the ploy and walked long, foggy and narrow valley
directly into the open land designed for the Carthaginian trap.
At dawn the next morning “when the Carthaginian saw his object achieved and had his enemy shut
in between the lake and the hills with his forces surrounding them, he gave the signal for all to make
a simultaneous attack, and they charged straight down upon the point nearest to them9” Cavalry
and infantry charged down the hill into the unsuspecting Roman lines and caught them completely
unawares and outside of their normal formations. 10In the end, the Roman army of 25,000 lost as
many as 15,000 including Flaminius himself. 4,000 cavalry reinforcements, sent late under Gaius
Centenius, were also intercepted and finished off in the complete Carthaginian rout. The ancients
claimed that the blood was so thick in the Lake, that the name of a small stream feeding it was
renamed Sanguineto, the Blood River. Livy Indicates also that “so intent were they on the battle,
that not a single man on the field was aware of the earthquake which levelled large portions of many
towns in Italy, altered the course of swift streams, brought the sea up into the rivers, and occasioned
enormous landslips amongst the mountains11”
The news of this loss quickly spread back to Rome and depression and fear was rife. Hannibal had
just inflicted the greatest loss on Rome and their manpower resources were being quickly depleted.
Livy indicates that, after the obliteration of the remaining Consul’s scouting force, the Romans ‘’did
what had never been done until that day, and created a dictator by popular election’’. Fabius
Maximus was elected to counteract Hannibal’s methods. Maximus, proved a brilliant choice, as his
strategy of survival vs. direct combat would prove its worth, despite the unpopularity. His tactics of
delay and harassment did just enough to keep the Roman allies of central Italy from switching sides
to Hannibal12. The Generals around Hannibal boosted by their succession pressured Hannibal into a
9
Livy's History of Rome: Book 22
http://www.unrv.com/empire/war-in-italy.php
11
Livy's History of Rome: Book 22
12
Fabius ordered all those people living in the path of Hannibal’s army to flee, destroying their buildings and
crops as they went.
10
direct siege on Rome itself to end the war. Hannibal however, instead of moving directly on an open
path to Rome, Hannibal turned south towards what he hoped would be better success among the
people to join his cause.
Hannibal was out-manoeuvred by Fabian, promised rewards and support to allies dissuading them to
defect to Hannibal’s cause. At the same time Hannibal was harassed by a series of Guerrilla teams
organised by Fabius. These tactics were to become known as the “Fabian Tactics.”
Fabius Maximus despite his seemingly effective strategy and the success of maintaining political and
economic stability quickly began to lose support. The people of Rome in keeping with their rich
tradition preferred victory on the battlefield, not a war of attrition, the "Delayer" as Maximus was
known, became a hated target and his dictatorship didn't last long.
Hannibal in 217 B.C crossed the Appienes and began scouring the south of Italy. He invaded
Picenum, Apulia and Campania, where he adopted a tactic of divide and conquer which seemingly
was successful. This success sparked a change in the leadership of Rome Fabius Maximus was
replaced by Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus.
In the spring of 216 BC, Hannibal broke his winter camp and seized the large army supply depot at
Cannae on the Aufidus River in Apulia. Hannibal understood that the two consuls were from
opposing “parties”. From this he hoped to create a division of opinion. While the ancient sources
vary, Varro and Paulus led upwards of 70 to 80,000 men after Hannibal. Despite previous
devastating losses, Roman tradition held that force could only be countered by force, and the large
rebuilt Roman army would meet Hannibal at Cannae in August, 216 BC.13
The ensuing battle was to be the largest waged yet, the Roman force consisted of around 75,000
infantry and 6,000 cavalry, whilst Hannibal commanded 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry.
Hannibal, despite his numerical inferiority had such an overwhelming strategic edge, that he was
eager to meet the new Roman challenge. Theoretically, the Roman tactic of crushing Hannibal
between two large armies should have spelled his doom, but Hannibal's brilliance allowed him to
turn the tables once the engagement got under way.14 Cannae is often regarded as Hannibal’s
greatest tactical work, and the following information demonstrates why.
13
14
http://www.unrv.com/empire/war-in-italy.php
http://www.unrv.com/empire/battle-of-cannae.php
It was on the Apulian plain, near Cannae and near the mouth of the Aufidus River that the two
Armies were to come face to face. The cavalry on the flanks was to meet first. There the vastly
superior Numidian cavalry quickly overpowered the roman cavalry and routed them.
As Hasdrubal was dominating the Roman cavalry, the mass of infantry marched to each other and
meet in the middle of the field. The huge numerical advantage the Romans held paid dividends, as
they pushed deep into the middle of the Carthaginians. They did their upmost and held firm as
Hasdrubal’s cavalry pushed around to the rear of the enemy. Meanwhile Carthaginian infantry held
firm on the immediate flanks.
Just as the Romans were on the verge of a crushing victory, Hannibal’s strategy came to the fore; the
flanks were brought to stand and pinned down the Romans. Hasdrubal’s cavalry ensured that the
Roman army was completely encircled. Hannibal brought his archers and slingers and the result in
the confined space was devastating. Hannibal, recalling his absolute hate for the Romans made sure
it was a total slaughter threatening his own men
with the lash if they weren’t zealous enough.
The result of the battle was as Livy writes "it is
said that 45,500 foot soldiers and 2,700
horsemen were slain in almost equal proportion
of citizens and allies15" Livy goes onto report that
3,000 Roman and allied infantry and 1,500 Roman
and allied cavalry were taken prisoner by the
Carthaginians.
The aftermath of Cannae saw a return to the non-confrontational strategies of Fabius. 16The Romans
deprived Hannibal of a large-scale battle and instead, assaulted his weakening army with multiple
smaller armies in an attempt to both weary him and create unrest in his troops. Hannibal began to
become starved of resources and manpower, which he so desperately needed to make any further
in roads.
In 212 B.C. Hannibal gained control of Tarentum, he failed however to gain the control of the
harbour. This was a tell-tale sign that the tide was finally turning against him. The Year 209 B.C. was
15
Livy. The History of Rome, 22.49.15.
Ayrault Dodge, Theodore (1995). Hannibal: A History of the Art of War among the Carthagonians
and Romans Down to the Battle of Pydna, 168 BC. Da Capo Press.
16
a great turning point. Rome recaptured the port of Tarentum and Carthage’s sphere of influence was
shrinking fast. In Hispania, his brother Hasdrubal still commanded the defence of Carthaginian
interests. The Spanish situation however was deteriorating quickly and Hannibal was unsuccessful in
holding together his alliances in southern Italy. As the situation in Spain seemed all but gone
Hasdrubal marched along the path which his brother had led him some ten years earlier. Having
arrived in the north of Italy in 208 B.C. Hasdrubal set out to join Hannibal and bolster the failing
army. Isolated along the eastern Italian coast, the Roman's jumped at the chance to crush Hasdrubal
before he could reinforce Hannibal, Hasdrubal was defeated at the river Metaurus before he could
contact his brother (207). Hannibal's hope of reinforcement had evaporated. The Battle of Metaurus
was arguably the most pivotal of the whole war. The head of Hasdrubal was catapulted into the
Carthaginian camp and Hannibal is reported to have said “I see there the fate of Carthage’’.
Meanwhile the Romans tried to take control of Spain. The capturing of Spain proved far more
difficult they expected. After some initial success their generals were killed. However, a young
commander, Publius Cornelius Scipio, took the Carthaginian capital of Iberia, Cartagena, by surprise
and brought the Spanish war to a good end in 206. After a short while, Scipio was sent to Sicily and
across the Mediterranean.
In 203 B.C. Hannibal was recalled by the war party to Carthage. 17After leaving a record of his
expedition engraved in Punic and Greek upon bronzen tablets in the temple of Juno at Crotona, he
sailed back to Africa. Publius Cornelius Scipio debarked for Sicily in 205 BC with an army of
volunteers, to meet up with forces18 assigned to him there. In 20419 BC Scipio crossed the sea and
landed in North Africa with a veteran army of as many as 35,000 men. Arriving in Africa Hannibal set
about training a new army. Scipio all the while went about destroying Carthaginian towns and cities,
increasing the anxiety of those in the city of Carthage who came to the realisation that soon they
would be short of resources and food.
In the Year 202 B.C. the last great battle was to be waged. Hannibal learned that Scipio was
devastating the area around Zama and left his base in Hadrumetum to confront him. Carthage was
heavily dependent on the fertile grain production of the area and had no choice but meet the threat,
despite Hannibal's recently recruited and poorly trained army. 20At the outset of the battle, Hannibal
17
Livy, The War with Hannibal, 28.46
18
The Survivors of Cannae
The delay was due to much debate in the senate about the next course of action.
19
20
Scipio Africanus in the second Punic war, By Howard Hayes Scullard, CUP Publisher Archive, 1930
unleashed his elephants21 and skirmishers against the Roman troops in order to break the cohesion
of their lines and exploit the breaches that could be opened. Scipo then ordered his men to create
noise so as to disturb the elephants22. Some of the elephants did an about-face whilst others simply
fled the battlefield. To capitalise upon this Masinissa led his Numidian cavalry and charged at the
Carthaginian left flank. After this Scipio ordered his troops back into their regular formation.
Hannibal’s Carthaginian cavalry was chased from the field, leaving Hannibal only with Infantry.
Hannibal seeing that his first line had been broken recalled the second line and charged with it. As a
stale-mate was imminent, Scipio recalled his cavalry and the Carthaginian army were finally crushed.
Hannibal accepted defeat and subsequently fled to the city and instructed them to sue for peace.
The government agreed and Scipio outlined a number of requirements of the peace treaty including,
a cap placed on the Carthaginian navy, and more importantly and iron- clad agreement not to make
war with anyone in Africa or beyond.
Aftermath and the period after the War
By the time the peace treaty with Rome was ratified, Hannibal had already established himself as
Chief Magistrate of Carthage, despite his plans to take a back seat. Prior to Hannibal taking it, the
seat had become relatively insignificant; however with the election of Hannibal the position regained
its power. Hannibal during this period of chief magistrate, set about to restore Carthage’s previous
trade routes as well as reform the previous abuses. Hannibal effectively brought about reform to the
extent that the heavy tribute imposed by Rome could be paid by installments without additional and
extraordinary taxation.
Hannibal’s reforms were so successful that Rome had become alarmed by Carthage’s prosperity that
they demanded the Surrender of Hannibal. Hannibal still held serious contempt for Rome and so to
avoid being captured by his sworn enemy fled to Ephesus and the court of Antiochus III. Here he was
granted a small naval command. Hannibal however lost a battle to Rome’s allies Rhodes at Magnesia
in 189 B.C. Hannibal fearing that he was soon to be turned over to the Romans fled and sought
refuge with Prusias I of Bithynia.
In the Year 183 B.C. Rome and his past adventures finally caught up with him, Prusias agreed to give
him up, but Hannibal was determined not to fall into his enemies' hands. At Libyssa on the eastern
shore of the Sea of Marmara, he took poison, which, it was said, he had long carried about with him
in a ring.23
21
22
23
The elephants were used because a lack of cavalry
Possibly Advised by the Numidians/ The elephants were also only half trained
Cornelius Nepos, Hannibal 12.5; Juvenal, Satires X.164
"Let us relieve the Romans from the anxiety they have so long experienced, since they think it tries
their patience too much to wait for an old man's death".
The Legacy of Hannibal
Hannibal’s impact has been felt right throughout history. In the short term Hannibal taught the
Romans the meaning of fear. Naughty children were threatened with the phrase "Hannibal ante
portas" (“Hannibal before the Gates!”). Despite the trivial nature of this point, it demonstrates the
psychological impact that Hannibal had on the Romans.
The grudging admiration the Romans have for Hannibal is evident in the writings of Livy.24 Romans
even built statues of the Carthaginian in the very streets of Rome to advertise their defeat of such a
worthy adversary.
Most of the sources about Hannibal are given from the Romans, and from this historians have
deducted that they consider him Rome’s greatest enemy. It is from these sources that the thought of
Hannibal being cruel is created. Both Livy and Cicero paint Hannibal as being a very cruel general.
However another picture is painted, when a victory of Hannibal brought about the death of Roman
consuls he vainly searched for the body of Gaius Flaminius on the shores of Lake Trasimene, held
ceremonial rituals in recognition of Lucius Aemilius Paullus, and sent Marcellus' ashes back to his
family in Rome.
Aside from his immediate impact, Hannibal had a significant effect on military history. Hannibal is
still studied today in military academies for his brilliance. With specific reference to Cannae, many
military college’s study Hannibal’s tactics and leadership. Aside from his military genius Hannibal’s
leadership also has had an enduring effect. His leadership qualities have been examined throughout
history.
Source Analysis
Aside from a variety of sources gained from the internet, this report has focused mainly on written
sources, specifically from Livy and Polybius. These historians’ accounts remain fairly uniform
however some differences are evident. The reason for these differences is due largely to the motive
and perspective of both these historians. Polybius was a Greek historian/writer living in Rome. Livy
on the other hand has been described as a Roman nationalist; he lived 200 years after Hannibal.
24
Holland, Rome and her Enemies 8
The two Historians have certain themes running through their histories. Livy understands Hannibal
as a cannibal, cruel and ultimately power hungry individual. Polybius conversely, is far more
detached and thus historical. Polybius runs with the theme that Hannibal maneuvered Carthage into
war with Rome and that the war was Hannibal’s personal Vendetta. Polybius also has great
admiration for Hannibal’s leadership qualities.
Livy wants to portray Hannibal was a war criminal and to demonize him. Livy writes of Hannibal upon
seeing blood “Oh what a lovely sight!” Livy being largely jingoistic has a knack of glorying Rome and
thus automatically painting Hannibal in a bad light. Polybius describes Hannibal as a true leader
working hard and fighting from the front thus sharing the dangers and leading from the front.
Thus it is evident that the motives and perspective of both these ancient historians have in effect
shaped their histories. It is from these conflicting histories that we gain a dual understanding of
Hannibal, a dual understanding which has travelled throughout the ages.
The modern historians or tacticians sited are on the whole far more balanced. Theodore Ayrault
Dodge (May 28, 1842 – 1909) was an American officer and military historian. (See footnote No. 16)
and thus analyses Hannibal from a purely tactical point of view. Dodge also considers Hannibal’s
leadership abilities. Howard Hayes Scullard (February 9, 1903 – March 31, 1983) was a British
historian specializing in ancient history; he has studied the 2nd Punic war from the perspective of
Scipio.