Conflict of Laws
4/2/14
Notes by Tish Hawkins
Review from Last Class
Hughes v. Fetter – what can we get from this case? That there exists a policy against discrimination
against sister states in providing a forum. (Discrimination does not include legitimate means for denying
forum, such as forum non conveniens, procedural statute of limitations, and the public policy exception.)
Tennessee Coal – deals with the reverse of Hughes v. Fetter: when can a state forbid a sister state from
entertaining a cause of action?
Privileges and Immunities
1) P and I: state cannot withhold from non-residents something important (something bearing
on the vitality of the nation as a single entity), unless there is a substantial reason for
discrimination and the means chosen (namely, state citizenship) bears a substantial relation to
achieving that end.
a) Piper case: N.H. says that only N.H. domiciliaries can be members of its bar. Being a
member of the bar is “something important,” and while there was a substantial reason
for limiting bar membership to N.H. citizens (encouraging pro bono work and ensuring
attorneys having a working knowledge of state rules), the means did not bear a
substantial relation to achieving that end.
2) There has been concern among many that interests analysis gives certain benefits to in-state
domiciliaries and residents in violation of the P & I Clause.
a) (from slideshow) CT has guest statute, New York does not. NY guest and host get
into accident in CT. Guest sues host in CT court, which – using interest analysis – does
not apply guest statute. Is the P&I Clause violated, because CT provides a protection to
CT defendants that it does not provide to NY defendants?
1) No, because CT is not really discriminating against New Yorkers; rather, it is
simply deferring to NY and allowing NY to define the benefits afforded its own
citizens. Such a move is actually in the spirit of the P&I Clause, b/c it fosters
friendly relations between states (i.e., it allows NY to fulfill its own regulatory
purposes). There is a substantial reason for the discrimination (deferring to NY’s
regulatory interests), and the means chosen are the only ones that would allow
this. [False conflict]
2) (From slideshow) Working off the same factual framework as #1 above,
what if NY guest sues CT host in CT state ct for accident in CT? CT resolves
true conflict by applying NY law. Any P&I violation? No: even though
CT has true interest, it is allowing NY to fulfill its own regulatory purposes. Ct
resolves true conflict by applying CT guest statute. Any P&I violation? No –
because treating new Yorkers and CT’ers the same in this case. [True conflict]
3) (From slideshow) Now, what if CT guest sues NY host for accident in CT?
Unprovided for case. Is the P&I Clause violated, because CT provides a
protection to CT defendants that it does not to NY defendants? Kramer would
say we have a P&I problem here, b/c CT is not simply allowing NY to fulfill its
regulatory purposes: NY has no interest. It does appear here that CT is
discriminating, and that there is a P&I problem here. Kramer – CT court would
be obligated to provide CT law to the NY defendant. (This would be in keeping
with Currie’s solution to unprovided for cases, but it is contrary to some
solutions for unprovided for cases that have been adduced.) [Unprovided for
case]
Preclusion and Res Judicata
1) Summary of domestic preclusion law:
a) States create bodies of (common law) preclusion law that apply domestically:
claim preclusion and issue preclusion.
b) Note that state laws on preclusion vary, particularly with respect to issue
preclusion. This is significant when we discuss the interstate preclusive effect of
judgments.
2) What does the FF&C Clause say about this? The basic rule is that the FF&C Clause is quite
restrictive: a sister state must give a judgment the same preclusive effect that the other state
would. In other words, a state is constitutionally obligated to apply the preclusion law of a
sister state, regardless of how much interest the forum state has in applying its own law of
preclusion.
a) Fauntleroy: the MO court obviously made a mistake: perhaps a mistake of law with
regard to MS law. Miss S. Ct: public policy against gambling contracts; surely not
obligated by FF&C to give effect to MO judgment. Even if true that MS court must give
MO same preclusive effect that MO would, it could refuse to take jurisdiction, citing its
public policy against taking jurisdiction of these cases. (In other words, if okay to refuse
jurisdiction on the contract, why not ok to refuse jurisdiction on a suit on the
judgment?) What does the SCOTUS say about the jurisdictional claim? It kind of punts:
says that the statute is not jurisdictional. But what if it had been about jurisdiction? It
doesn’t really matter: say the statute is about jurisdiction – this is not a suit on the K,
it’s a suit to enforce only a debt (K no longer the issue). This makes it very difficult for
MS to refuse jurisdiction (not against public policy to enforce debts). However, one of
the easiest ways for a state to wiggle out of its FF&C obligations is to simply refuse
jurisdiction. (We will deal with this later.) In the end, an easy case: MS is obligated to
give the same preclusive effect as MO would. Even though MO made a mistake, MS
still obligated to give FF&C to its judgment. Also, even if MO had violated
the FF&C Clause (i.e., had there been a prior MS judgment on the merits), Fauntleroy
would have still turned out the same! Bottom line: no public policy exception or
“sister stake mistake” exception to FF&C.
b) Yarborough: question is whether SC court is obligated to give GA decree FF&C. One
question was whether the GA decree was final and thus preclusive: Court determines it
was final and therefore preclusive. GA had a rule that allowed for lump sum payments
to extinguish future maintenance obligations. Assume DP Clause had been violated in
GA proceedings (child not represented) – what then? If unconstitutional under
procedural DP – would this be an exception to FF&C? Yes, because GA court would not
be bound by an unconstitutional judgment: another way to view this is to say that an
unconstitutional judgment bears no preclusive effect – thus, SC would be giving
unconstitutional GA judgment the same preclusive effect it would have in GA: i.e., none.
But Court states no procedural DP problem here. Court – no public policy, state
interest exception to FF&C.
1) Stone – strong dissent. Discusses what might be a genuine exception to
FF&C. Stone goes through examples where he claims there are exceptions to
the iron rule of FF&C:
A) A state cannot treat as preclusive a sister state’s
adjudication that one of its citizens is insane. Stone is wrong here: this
does not constitute a true exception to FF&C; rather, this is a DP issue.
DP requires that a judgment on sanity NEVER be a treated as a final
determination, because people may be restored to sanity.
B) Judgments regarding real property: situs state not obligated to give
preclusive effect to the judgments of sister states that purport to act in
rem on the situs state’s property. Stone is right here, this is a true
exception to FF&C. This is the best example Stone adduces.
C) Interstate injunctions – it is true that if one state issues an injunction
against another state, the sister state does not have to respect this.
(Stone is also right here.) Such actions would constitute intrusion into
sister state litigation.
Final thoughts: Is it forbidden under FF&C to give a judgment greater preclusive effect than it has in
the forum state? Note, this isn’t required under FF&C, but is it permitted?
From slideshow: GA has mutuality requirement for issue preclusion; Alabama does not. P sues D in GA
state court. D is found negligent. P2 sued D in Alabama state court concerning same accident. May P2
issue preclude D from re-litigating his negligence? No, there is a DP problem here.
Why is it true that a forum has a lot of room to work in choice of law, while the FF&C provides so little
freedom as to judgments? The interest that the rendering state has in preclusion is so great that it
overrides virtually any of the forum state’s interests. Also, the parties have very high expectations that
the judgment will have the same preclusive effect as that of original forum state.