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Politics DA
IRAN SANCTIONS
POLITICS DA
Disadvantage Politics .............................................................................................................2
1NC - Politics DA ................................................................................................................................... 3
2NC................................................................................................................................................7
2NC Link – Climate Resiliency ............................................................................................................... 8
2NC – Uniqueness Iran Sanctions ....................................................................................................... 10
2NC Uniqueness – Iran Sanctions and PC key .................................................................................... 11
UQ – A2 UQ overwhelms .................................................................................................................... 12
2NC – Link Uniqueness ....................................................................................................................... 13
2NC – Link – Generic Spending ........................................................................................................... 14
2NC AT: Political Capital Not Key ........................................................................................................ 15
2NC Impact - ME War = Extinction ..................................................................................................... 16
2NC Impact Uniqueness - Negotiations Work/No Sanctions ............................................................. 17
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Politics DA
Disadvantage Politics
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Politics DA
1NC - Politics DA
Uniqueness - Iran sanctions are back on the table – Obama and democratic resistance
are key to stop sanctions.
Free Beacon June 3, 2014 (http://freebeacon.com/national-security/congress-aipac-seeking-to-resurrectiran-sanctions-bill/ Congress, AIPAC Seeking to Resurrect Iran Sanctions Bill BY: Adam Kredo)
The nation’s leading pro-Israel lobbying group is considering backing new efforts in Congress to pass tighter
sanctions on Iran, according to Senate insiders familiar with the issue.¶ The American Israel Public Affairs
Committee (AIPAC) could put its weight behind an effort to resurrect currently stalled legislation to tighten
economic sanctions on Tehran, a move meant to pressure the Obama administration to take a tougher stand
in the nuclear talks with Iran.¶ The sanctions measure originally sponsored by Sens. Mark Kirk (R., Ill.) and Bob
Menendez (D., N.J.) stalled earlier this year with 59 co-sponsors after the Obama administration launched a full
court press to kill the legislation.¶ AIPAC, which had initially supported the bill, backed off its lobbying bid
after Democrats and White House officials expressed opposition to the bill and argued that more time is
needed to negotiate with Iran.¶ Now, with the six-month interim nuclear accord set to expire on July 20,
AIPAC and its congressional allies are said to be preparing to breathe new life into the legislation, which just
recently garnered its 60th cosponsor, a key procedural threshold.¶ Asked to comment on the potential lobbying
blitz, an AIPAC source told the Washington Free Beacon that “no decisions have been made” on the issue.
Link Ocean policy causes partisan battles and drains PC for other priorities
Stauffer, 12 (Pete, the Ocean Program Manager at the Surfrider Foundation, “Why I Support the National
Ocean Policy (And You Should Too),” May 7, http://www.surfrider.org/coastal-blog/entry/why-i-support-thenational-ocean-policy-and-so-should-you,)
Yet, despite these promising developments, the future of the National Ocean Policy is in jeopardy, plagued by a lack
of support and funding from congress. Just last month, yet another measure was introduced in the House to restrict
funding and implementation of the policy – this despite the fact that the policy is being advanced with existing
agency resources! Furthermore, several Republican leaders including Rep. Doc Hastings (WA), Chairman of the House
Natural Resources Committee, have seized on the NOP as a partisan issue, labeling marine spatial planning as
“burdensome” and accusing the administration of regulatory overreach (I won’t elaborate on Hastings’ proposals to vastly
expand offshore drilling or the donations he receives from oil & gas companies).
But the partisanship and political attacks in Washington D.C. are obscuring an important truth - the principles of the
National Ocean Policy are taking hold in states and regions across the country despite the lack of support from the federal
government. From the Pacific Northwest to New England, the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Islands, regions are making real
advances in ocean mapping, habitat restoration, renewable energy siting, and other key areas . In my home
state of Oregon, a process to create a marine spatial plan for wave energy development has brought together community
leaders, fishermen, surfers, environmentalists, and developers as part of an effective public collaboration. The expected
outcome: a plan that will both protect the environment and existing ocean uses, while also advancing renewable energy
opportunities.
Of course, such success stories do not resonate well in Washington D.C., where controversy is the rule of the day and
political parties instinctively oppose each other’s proposals. Adding to the problem, many supporters in congress
have been passive, spending their political capital on other priorities and cautioning ocean advocates against
making the NOP a target in annual budget discussions. The result is that our National Ocean Policy is neglected and
under-supported by congress, while our oceans and those that depend upon them bear the consequences.
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Politics DA
Internal Link PC’s key to the ongoing fight with the Senate---loss of capital reverses
Obama’s current ability to prevent a vote---failure collapses regional and global U.S.
credibility and power
Flynt Leverett 1-20, professor at Pennsylvania State University’s School of International Affairs
and is a Visiting Scholar at Peking University’s School of International Studies, and Hillary Mann Leverett, Senior
Professorial Lecturer at the American University in Washington, DC and a Visiting Scholar at Peking University in
Beijing, 1/20/14, “Iran, Syria and the Tragicomedy of U.S. Foreign Policy,” http://goingtotehran.com/iran-syriaand-the-tragicomedy-of-u-s-foreign-policy
Regarding President Obama’s ongoing struggle with the Senate over Iran policy, Hillary cautions against
premature claims of “victory” for the Obama administration’s efforts to avert new sanctions legislation while
the Joint Plan of Action is being implemented. She points out that “the foes of the Iran nuclear deal, of any kind
of peace and conflict resolution in the Middle East writ large, are still very strong and formidable. For example,
the annual AIPAC policy conference—a gathering here in Washington of over 10,000 people from all over the
country, where they come to lobby congressmen and senators, especially on the Iran issue—that will be taking
place in very early March. There’s still a lot that can be pushed and played here.”
To be sure, President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry “have put a lot of political capital on the line.”
No other administration has so openly staked out its opposition to a piece of legislation or policy initiative
favored by AIPAC and backed by a bipartisan majority on Capitol Hill since the 1980s, when the Reagan
administration successfully defended its decision to sell AWACs planes to Saudi Arabia. But, Hillary notes, if the
pro-Israel lobby is able to secure a vote on the new sanctions bill, and to sustain the promised veto of said bill
by President Obama, “that would be such a dramatic blow to President Obama, and not just on his foreign
policy agenda, but it would be devastating to his domestic agenda.” So Obama “has a tremendous amount to
lose, and by no means is the fight anywhere near over.”
Of course, to say that Obama has put a lot of political capital on the line over the sanctions issue begs the
question of whether he is really prepared to spend the far larger amounts of capital that will be required to
close a final nuclear deal with Tehran. As Hillary points out, if Obama were “really trying to lead this country on
a much more constructive, positive trajectory after failed wars and invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan and Libya—
Libya entirely on President Obama’s watch—[he] would be doing a lot more, rather than just giving these
lukewarm talks, basically trying to continue to kiss up to major pro-Israel constituencies, and then trying to bring
in some of political favors” on Capitol Hill.
Compare Obama’s handling of Iran and other Middle East challenges to President Nixon’s orchestration of the
American opening to China—including Nixon’s willingness to “break the crockery” of the pro-Taiwan lobby—and
the inadequacy of Obama’s approach become glaringly apparent. And that, Hillary underscores, is why we
wrote our book, Going to Tehran—because “we think it’s absolutely essential for President Obama to do what
Nixon did and go to Tehran, as Nixon went to China,” for “the Middle East is the make-or-break point for the
United States, not just in our foreign affairs but in our global economic power and what we’re able to do here
at home. If we can’t get what we’re doing in the Middle East on a much better, more positive trajectory, not
only will we see the loss of our power, credibility, and prestige in the Middle East, but we will see it globally.”
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Impact- New sanctions ensure war
Kearn 1/19—David W. Kearn, Assistant Professor, St. John’s University [“The Folly of New Iran Sanctions”
01/19/2014, Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-w-kearn/the-folly-of-new-iransan_b_4619522.html]
While the momentum seems to have stalled, the movement
in the United States Senate this week to pass a bill raising new sanctions on
Iran threatened to undermine the negotiations for a long-term, comprehensive solution to the nuclear issue, just as the
interim agreement negotiated in Geneva is planned to go into effect. What was particularly unusual was the bipartisan nature of the
support for a bill. Led by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez (D-NJ), as many as sixteen Democratic Senators had
cosponsored the bill, moving it close to a 60-vote "filibuster proof" margin, which (after likely passage in the House) would
force a veto by President Obama.
The timing of the legislation is curious because of the delicate nature of the negotiations and the ongoing diplomacy between the
United States and its partners and Iran. Hardliners on all sides are skeptical of any deals, but unlike past negotiations, the stakes this time seem
much higher. Well-meaning intentions aside, any legislation that precipitates an Iranian walkout and a collapse of the
negotiations will likely be viewed by friends and adversaries alike as a major failure by the U nited States. However,
unlike past instances, the probability of war has significantly increased.
This is no longer a debate about the relative merits of allowing Iran to acquire a functional nuclear weapon capability or the capacity to rapidly construct and deploy several
bombs (often called a "breakout" capacity). Various experts have considered the probability of Tehran achieving a nuclear weapon and assessed the implications for regional and
global security. More optimistic observers conclude that Iran could be contained by the United States and its allies, and deterred from ever using its weapons. As evidence, they
cite the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Stalin's Soviet Union, Mao's China, India and Pakistan, two nations locked in an intense historical rivalry, and North Korea. Despite the
limited proliferation of nuclear weapons -- nowhere near that predicted in the 1960s -- nuclear weapons have not been used. If indeed Iran has designs for a nuclear weapon,
these experts argue it most likely to deter outside actors like the United States or Israel from removing the regime.
More pessimistic observers disagree and take much less comfort in the history of proliferation. The
historical record, including the evidence of
risky crisis-initiation behavior between the two Superpowers paints a less sanguine picture. More importantly,
looking at the modern Middle East, an Iranian bomb would potentially transform regional security dynamics.
Given the region's geography and its particular vulnerability to nuclear attack, Israel (an undeclared nuclear power) would
be on high-alert for any Iranian move. Other actors like Saudi Arabia may seek to acquire their own nuclear
deterrent, leading to further proliferation within a region which is already flush with radical terrorist
organizations operating across various troubled states. It seems implausible that Tehran's leaders could ever believe that the delivery of a
nuclear weapon on Israeli soil by Hezbollah, rather than missile would somehow go unattributed or unpunished, but the introduction of an Iranian nuclear weapons program
into a region that is already so tumultuous conjures particularly grim scenarios.
Nonetheless, this
debate has effectively been made moot by official U.S. and Israeli policies. The clear commitment
of the Obama administration to thwart Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon has been in place for some time.
Containment is not an option, and military force will ostensibly be used to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon
from becoming operational. Despite this commitment, the Israeli government has consistently expressed its willingness to act alone to stop an Iranian bomb
even without U.S. support. While hardliners in Tel Aviv and Washington may not agree, these are both credible threats
that the regime in Tehran must take seriously. Thus, the situation confronting Iran and the world is either the
peaceful negotiated solution to the nuclear question, or the high likelihood of another destructive, costly war
in a region already torn apart by conflict.
The current sanctions bill in the Senate is not about providing President Obama and Secretary Kerry with greater leverage in the negotiations. The
Iranian
delegation has made clear that it views any such sanctions as an indication of bad faith that will wreck the
process and undo any progress made to this point. With the interim agreement set to go into effect next
week, this is clearly not the time for the Senate to usurp the authority of the commander-in-chief and his chief
diplomat. Taking their respective rationales at face value, the Democratic members of the Senate supporting the sanctions legislation may have good intentions to provide
a stronger "bad cop" to Secretary Kerry's "good cop" in Geneva. This is short-sighted. New sanctions will not only play into the narrative of
hard-liners in Iran who don't want agreement, it will also isolate the United States from its negotiating partners
and likely cripple the cohesive united front that has seemingly emerged throughout the talks. In doing so, it is most likely to fulfill the wishes of hardliners in Israel and the
United States that simply don't want an agreement and refuse to take any "yes" for an answer. However, with
a failure of negotiations, military
conflict is much more likely.
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And - That escalates to World War III
Reuveny 10 - Professor of political economy @ Indiana University [Dr. Rafael Reuveny (PhD in Economics and
Political Science from the University of Indiana), “Guest Opinion: Unilateral strike on Iran could trigger world
depression,” McClatchy Newspaper, Aug 9, 2010, pg.
http://www.indiana.edu/~spea/news/speaking_out/reuveny_on_unilateral_strike_Iran.shtml]
BLOOMINGTON, Ind. -- A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences,
including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash. For an Israeli campaign to
succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would
not dare to respond in full force. Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s
nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground. All of these widely
spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians, but also
the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well. By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control
systems and nuclear facilities, developed early-warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and
upgraded and enlarged its armed forces. Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike — or
even numerous strikes — could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond. A regional war
Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a
coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might
compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional
war. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President
Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more
determined and better-equipped opponents. Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles,
armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat. In
the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its
alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973. An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy
most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash
global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea
and Indian Ocean. Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the
war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely
stop selling oil to the United States and Europe. The world economy would head into a tailspin; international
acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring
the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which
essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony.
Replaying Nixon’s nightmare Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as
Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973.
President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish
scenario.¶ Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows
that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s
response would likely be muted.¶ If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest
and send weapons but would probably not risk using force.¶ While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be
risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for
an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.
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2NC
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2NC Link – Climate Resiliency
Climate resiliency is politically controversial – deep anti-urban bais and Republicans
don’t believe in warming
Graham 6 – Their author—professor of human geography at Durham University
(Stephen, Cities Under
Siege: Katrina and the Politics of Metropolitan America, http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Graham/)
The first is the further entrenchment of a deeply anti-urban political and media culture within the mainstream of
US society during Bush’s tenure. Whilst anti-urbanism in US politics has a long history, the whole
neoconservative project that underpins the Bush administration is based on its entrenchment to unprecedented
levels. Almost every action of the Bush government has been overwhelmingly concerned with meeting the
aspirations and needs – as well as addressing and manipulating the fears – of the largely affluent, suburban,
exurban and rural Republicans who are the mainstay of Bush’s support. Bush has been spurred on by the deep
distaste of many of his Christian Fundamentalist followers for US central Metropolitan Areas – which are widely
demonised as sites of decay, ghettoisation, promiscuity, moral pollution and unerring welfare dependency.
Bush has also followed his father and Ronald Reagan in taking forward an ideological program to cut-down the
perceived ‘Big Government’ policies associated with large-scale public works, welfare programs, and the delivery
of mainstream public services. As a result, the Bush administration has done much to dismantle policy programs
that they deem to be geared towards US central cities and the people who live there. Neil Smith, anthropologist
at CUNY in New York, has labelled such a strategy a ‘revanchist’ urban politics.
Commentators like Mike Davis have even argued that this has amounted to little less than an all-out Republican
‘war on the cities’. Such a strategy has involved a wide variety of interrelated policies. There have been drastic
reductions in Federal support for welfare, education and housing programs geared towards poor urban
communities. Large-scale tax cuts have been handed out to wealthy exurban elites. Meanwhile, and ironically, a
massive expansion of state activity is occurring in the military, corrections, counter-terrorism and ‘homeland
security’ spheres. The costs here have spiralled with the growing crises surrounding the invasion, occupation and
reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq, eating into ‘civil’ urban programs further.
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Katrina and Sandy prove that people don’t care about climate resiliency – the plan
would be controversial
Giroux 12 – 1ac author (Henry, Hurricane Sandy in the Age of Disposability and Neoliberal Terror, truthout.org/opinion/item/13025-hurricane-sandy-in-the-age-of-disposability#XXXVI)
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, shocking images of dead bodies floating in the flood waters of New
Orleans appeared on national TV against a sound track of desperate cries for help by thousands of poor, black,
brown, elderly and sick people. These disturbing pictures revealed a vulnerable and destitute segment of the
nation's citizenry that conservatives not only refused to see as such, but had spent the better part of three
decades demonizing. But the haunting images of the abandoned, desperate and vulnerable would not go away
and for a moment imposed themselves on the collective conscience of Americans, demanding answers to
questions that were never asked about the existence of those populations excluded from the American dream
and abandoned to their own limited resources in the midst of a major natural disaster. But that moment soon
passed as the United States faced another disaster: The country plunged into an economic turmoil ushered in
by finance capital and the apostles of Wall Street in 2008.1 Consequently, an additional instance of widespread
hardship and suffering soon bore down on lower-middle and working-class people who would lose their jobs,
homes, health care and their dignity.
Hurricane Sandy not only failed to arouse a heightened sense of moral outrage and call for justice, it has
quickly, if not seamlessly, been woven into a narrative that denied those larger economic and political forces,
mechanisms and technologies by which certain populations when exposed to a natural catastrophe are
rendered human waste. One reason for this case of historical amnesia and ethical indifference may lie in the
emerging vicissitudes of an era eager to accommodate rather than challenge global warming, an era in which
freakish weather events have become such commonplace occurrences that they encourage the denial of
planetary destruction. These days Americans are quickly fatigued by natural catastrophe. Major natural disasters
and their consequences are now relegated to the airborne vocabulary of either fate or the unyielding
circumstance of personal tragedy, conveniently allowing an ethically cleansed American public to ignore the
sordid violence and suffering they produce for those populations caught in the grip of poverty, deprivation and
hardship. It gets worse. Catastrophes have not only been normalized, they have been reduced to the spectacle
of titillating TV. Rather than analyzed within broader social categories such as power, politics, poverty, race and
class, the violence produced by natural disasters is now highly individualized, limited to human interest stories
about loss and individual suffering. Questions concerning how the violence of Hurricane Sandy impacted
differently those groups marginalized by race, age, sickness and class, particularly among poor minorities,
were either downplayed or ignored.
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2NC – Uniqueness Iran Sanctions
Iran sanctions are back on the agenda and could pass without Reid’s approval.
Free Beacon June 3, 2014 (http://freebeacon.com/national-security/congress-aipac-seeking-to-resurrect-iransanctions-bill/ Congress, AIPAC Seeking to Resurrect Iran Sanctions Bill BY: Adam Kredo)
However, as negotiations aimed at inking a final deal with Iran languish, the Obama administration is likely to
exercise an option to extend the interim accord for another six months.
Frustration within the pro-Israel community over the administration’s failure to adequately pressure Tehran
is said to be spurring AIPAC and pro-Israel allies on the Hill to consider rebooting the sanctions bill, according
to Senate insiders who spoke to the Free Beacon.
“Everything Mark Kirk and Bob Menendez said would happen is coming to pass,” said one Senate insider
familiar with AIPAC’s thinking. “The Senate gave the president a free six months, and now we are in a weaker
position than we were six months ago.”
“It makes a lot of sense for senators to say, ‘We let the administration try it their way for six months—now it’s
time to do it the way we wanted to in the first place—force the Iranians to negotiate with the threat of future
sanctions if they don’t dismantle their nuclear weapons capabilities.’”
AIPAC came under fierce criticism earlier this year after it rescinded support for the sanctions bill, effectively
helping the Obama administration kill the legislation.
But with little progress being made in the negotiations between Iran and the West, some feel that new
sanctions could provide a needed jolt to negotiators on both sides.
Passage of the bill could also help burnish AIPAC’s lobbying bona fides, which have been called into question in
recent months.
“A lot of people think AIPAC has lost its mojo because of how Menendez-Kirk stalled out,” said the Senate
insider. “This might be their opportunity to prove the critics wrong.”
The political dynamics surrounding sanctions has shifted in recent weeks.
The bill, which has been on the Senate’s calendar since December, currently has 60 cosponsors, making it
much easier for Senate Republicans to advance the legislation without approval from Majority Leader Harry
Reid (D., Nev.), who has stood in the way of these efforts in the past.
Renewed attention on the bill also would put Senate Democrats in a tough position by forcing them to vote
on a bill opposed by the White House just months before critical mid-term elections.
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2NC Uniqueness – Iran Sanctions and PC key
Iran sanctions will be back on the agenda: empirically, only Obama’s political capital
can stop it.
Jewish Political News and Updates June 2, 2014 (Congress & AIPAC Looking to Revive Iran Sanctions Bill by Jacob
Kornbluh http://jpupdates.com/2014/06/03/congress-aipac-looking-to-revive-iran-sanctions-bill/)
Sources within the Senate have disclosed that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) may be
willing to support new Congressional efforts to pass stronger sanctions against Iran, The Free Beacon reported
on Tuesday.
The economic constraints against the rogue Iranian regime are meant to convince it to abandon its quest for
nuclear power.
Originally sponsored by Sens. Mark Kirk (R., Ill.) and Bob Menendez (D., N.J.), the sanctions bill became stalled
earlier this year when the Obama administration actively campaigned against it. Despite its initial support of
the bill, AIPAC terminated its lobbying efforts in response to the White House and Democratic opposition, and
their argument that more time was required to effectively negotiate with Iran.
At present, however, with the six-month interim nuclear agreement set to expire on July 20, AIPAC and its
allies in Congress are reportedly ready to renew their advocacy of the legislation, which recently obtained its
60th co-sponsor, an important procedural threshold. At the same time, though, the Obama administration is
likely to exercise an option to extend the interim accord for an additional six months.
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UQ – A2 UQ overwhelms
GOP will continue to push for a vote – Obama’s strength is key prevent democratic
splintering
Rebecca Shimoni Stoil 2/6/2014 “Republicans said set to push Iran bill to a vote”, The Times of Israel”,
http://www.timesofisrael.com/republicans-said-set-to-push-iran-bill-to-a-vote/
WASHINGTON — After
days in which political insiders here tried to write the obituary for the Senate bill that would
impose additional sanctions on a recalcitrant Iran, Republican senators were poised Thursday to renew their
push on the legislation. In a letter, Senate Republicans called on Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) to allow
the bill, which has driven a wedge between some Democrats and the administration, to come to a vote.¶ The
Daily Beast reported that Republican senators were planning on utilizing procedural tools on Thursday to pressure
Reid into allowing the bipartisan Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act to be voted upon. The Obama administration has
been adamant in its opposition to the legislation, which was initiated in December by Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ).¶
The bill currently has 59 co-sponsors, hovering just below a veto-proof majority in the upper house. While 13
Democrats support the bill, a number have chosen to sit on the fence in a struggle that pits the administration
against powerful lobbying groups such as AIPAC.¶ Although the bill is on the Senate calendar, Reid has refused thus far to
schedule a vote on the legislation, which has driven a wedge among Democrats who hold a thin majority in
the upper house. In their letter, Senate Republicans called on Reid to bring the bill to a vote – not just because of the significance of the legislation
itself, but as a matter of democratic principle.¶ “You have already taken unprecedented steps to take away the rights of the minority in the Senate,” the
senators wrote to Reid. “Please do not take further steps to take away the rights of a bipartisan majority as well.”¶ In the letter, the senators also noted
that “the American people – Democrats and Republicans alike – overwhelmingly support this legislation.”¶ Senators can use the floor to publicly call out
Reid and the Democratic leadership for refusing to allow a vote, or can tack the bill on as an amendment to other pieces of legislation deemed important
by the Senate leadership. They can also refuse to support legislation if the bill is not brought to a vote.¶ In last week’s State of the Union address,
President Barack Obama warned that “if this Congress sends me a new sanctions bill now that threatens to derail these talks, I will veto it.”¶ Supporters
say the bill reinforces rather than undermines presidential authority by allowing the president to waive future sanctions either by certifying Iranian
compliance with the interim agreement with Iran reached in Geneva late last year, or in the event that a final agreement is reached. At the same time, it
sets basic terms for a deal, mandating that a final arrangement must dismantle Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.¶ The bill’s reported demise came following
repeated lobbying efforts both by the administration as well as by a coalition of lobbying groups including J Street, Americans for Peace Now, the National
Iranian American Council, the American Security Project and the Atlantic Council, coordinated under the leadership of the Ploughshares Fund.¶ Under
pressure from the administration, at least four Democratic co-sponsors of the bill, including Chris Coons (D-DE), Kirsten Gillibrand
(D-NY), Joe Manchin (D-WV), and Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) all have indicated that they are willing to put the bill on ice – at least
for the time being.¶ In an interview with MSNBC last month, Manchin said that he “did not sign it with the intention that it would ever be voted
upon or used upon while we were negotiating.”¶ Saying that it would be good to “give peace a chance,” Manchin said he co-sponsored the bill “because I
wanted to make sure the president had a hammer if he needed it and showed them how determined we were to do it and use it if we had to.Ӧ
Republicans will attempt to force Democrats to stake a position on record, creating a catch-22 situation for the Democratic
legislators who will have to vote against a bill they co-sponsored or go against a Democratic administration.¶ Iran on January 20 stopped enriching
uranium to 20 percent and started neutralizing its existing stockpile of that grade — just steps away from weapons material — in order to fulfill
commitments reached under an interim deal in Geneva. The US and the European Union also lifted some sanctions in response to the Iranian moves.¶
The interim Geneva accord will last for six months as Iran and the six-nation group — the five permanent members of the
UN Security Council plus Germany — negotiate a final deal. Those talks are to start February 18 in Vienna.
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2NC – Link Uniqueness
The budget is currently uncontroversial- the link is unique to the plan.
New York Times May 29, 2014 (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/30/us/politics/from-2-lawmakers-amodest-proposal-to-pass-spending-bills-on-time.html Lawmakers’ Modest Proposal: To Pass Spending Bills on
Time By CARL HULSE)
At the same time, this year provides the best opportunity for success in recent memory. The overall spending
of $1.014 trillion — the top line number in Congressional budget speak — was set as part of a two-year budget
package late last year, giving the committees plenty of time to prepare and act. Deficits have receded
somewhat as an issue, sapping some of the political tension from the spending debate. And there is pent-up
demand in Congress to influence the actions of federal agencies through the setting of spending priorities.
What is more, Ms. Mikulski has brought new energy to the Senate Appropriations Committee, the once
formidable panel that has floundered in recent years. She has won respect from Republicans and Democrats
for her determination to get the Senate back on track when it comes to spending legislation.
“If anyone can get it done, that fiery person can get it done,” said Senator Harry Reid, the Nevada Democrat and
majority leader, and a former member of the Appropriations Committee.
The House and Senate have agreed on a coordinated plan to test the climate with their least contentious
measures. The House has already passed two bills — the bill covering military construction and veterans issues
passed with just a single dissenting vote, and the measure paying for legislative operations also passed easily.
The House opened debate Wednesday evening on a $51.2 billion measure funding commerce, justice and
science programs, and is moving ahead with other bills as well.
House officials say the process has been smooth so far with “less tomfoolery” on the part of both parties than
in recent years.
The Senate began its process last week with committee approval of its military and veterans measure and
agriculture spending bills, though the panel had a partisan spat over the way the overall budget funds were
allocated among the various bills.
Ms. Mikulski is aiming to push all of the bills out of her committee by July — an aggressive timetable — and Mr.
Reid has set aside two weeks of Senate floor time in both June and July to consider appropriations legislation,
with the amount of future debate to be determined by how well things go with the initial bills.
While the Senate committee appears willing to work cooperatively, matters could change quickly when the
spending bills reach the floor. Senate Democrats and Republicans have been in a tense fight over the right to
offer amendments to bills and a huge spending measure offers a fat target for politically charged proposals.
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2NC – Link – Generic Spending
New spending creates massive fights in Congress and spillover to fights over other
bills.
Columbus Dispatch June 3, 2014 (A broken Congress | The Senate: GOP filibusters; Dems ‘fill the tree’ J. SCOTT
APPLEWHITE | ASSOCIATED PRESS)
Some observers say that House Speaker John Boehner’s
elimination of earmarks also removed an incentive for
disparate lawmakers to work together on spending bills that benefit their regions.
WASHINGTON — If there’s a crystal-clear illustration of how the U.S. House of Representatives is broken, it might be in how its members spend taxpayers’
money.
It’s not that those we send to Washington spend too much — that’s a conversation for another story — it’s how they spend it.
The House is supposed to pass 12 spending bills — on everything from highways to education programs — iron out the differences with the Senate and
then send them to the president for final approval by Oct. 1 of every year.
That’s the School House Rock version. But what the House, where all the spending bills originate, has adapted since 1994 could be more accurately
described as the Punk Rock version — something close to anarchy — loud, messy and chaotic.
For the past 20 years, the House and Senate have been unable to pass all of the spending bills individually on time by Oct. 1. Instead, they have had to
either pass patchwork bills or extensions of previous spending bills to keep the government operating. Last fall, even that didn’t happen. The government
shut down for 21/2 weeks.
Critics say the
breakdown in the spending process reflects larger dysfunction in the House. Where lawmakers
were once bound to their districts and regional priorities, they’re now increasingly bound to their parties,
including the parties’ most-extreme factions.
“They can’t get tax reform done, they can’t get immigration reform done, but this is actually the one thing they know every year that they’re going to have
to do,” said Steve Ellis of Taxpayers for Common Sense, a taxpayer watchdog. “And so it’s inexcusable they don’t get it done.”
The House spending committee was once a place where, love or hate the results, things functioned, parties worked together and deals were
hatched.
But now, it’s bogged down — or has been held hostage — by the fights occurring outside the committee.
“I now consider the House to be a fact-free zone,” said Thomas Mann of the Brookings Institution. “All you get is political spin, and it’s just very sad for a
great legislative body. There is no deliberation.”
That the spending process rarely works is well-documented: Even before 1994, Congress rarely passed all of its spending bills on time. But those close to
the process say it has deteriorated even further in recent years. Where Congress was once able to pass at least a few spending bills lumped together, it
increasingly has opted to pass extensions of the previous year’s spending bills. In fiscal 2012, for example, Congress passed five separate continuing
resolutions. In fiscal 2011, it passed eight.
By passing such extensions, critics say, Congress is ceding its authority to determine how federal money is spent. Instead of serving as a steward of
taxpayer dollars, critics say, they’ve thrown up their hands, slashing funding indiscriminately or just relying on older spending measures — the equivalent
of submitting the same term paper time after time.
The elimination of earmarks three years ago by House Speaker John Boehner — money targeted at specific projects in congressional districts — also has
had an unexpected effect. While earmarks were wildly criticized as “pork,” they also served a few purposes.
First, they gave Congress an additional opportunity to have a say over spending. By giving that up, says former U.S. Rep. David L. Hobson, R-Springfield,
who served on the Appropriations Committee, Congress has allowed the president to take the reins on spending.
A Broken Congress | The Senate: GOP filibusters; Dems ‘fill the tree’
“The government isn’t performing its functions as well today as when the power of the purse was dispersed between the House, the Senate and the
president,” he said. “Today, the power of the purse is all the president.”
It also stripped Boehner, a Republican from West Chester, of what had traditionally been a tool used by speakers to control unruly members. For his part,
Boehner has vowed that won’t change.
It also might have helped foster polarization. Earmarks were once a glue that could bring otherwise disparate lawmakers together in an effort to push
regional priorities. But even lawmakers who once banded together around regional issues aren’t as inclined to do that anymore, said Rep. Tim Ryan, DNiles, a member of the House Appropriations Committee. He said it has become a little harder to get all 16 members of the Ohio congressional delegation
to even sign onto letters supporting Ohio projects.
Rep. Pat Tiberi, R-Genoa Township, said the spending process has become more difficult in part because the majority has become narrower. Since 1994,
the House majority, Republican or Democrat, has only been larger than 50 twice — in 2008 and 2010.
He said that a combination
of factors — the emergence of the tea party and an emphasis on cutting spending, the
abuse of earmarks and the subsequent ban on them, and smaller majorities — has made it increasingly
difficult to pass spending bills.
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2NC AT: Political Capital Not Key
Political capital is key and zero sum---best scholarship proves
Matthew N. Beckmann and Vimal Kumar 11, Profs Department of Political Science, @ University of
California Irvine "How Presidents Push, When Presidents Win" Journal of Theoretical Politics 2011 23: 3 SAGE
Before developing presidents’ lobbying options for building winning coalitions on Capitol Hill, it is instructive to consider cases
where the president has no political capital and no viable lobbying options. In such circumstances of imposed
passivity (beyond offering a proposal), a president’s fate is clear: his proposals are subject to pivotal voters’ preferences. So
if a president lacking political capital proposes to change some far-off status quo, that is, one on the opposite side
of the median or otherwise pivotal voter, a (Condorcet) winner always exists, and it coincides with the pivot’s
predisposition (Brady and Volden, 1998; Krehbiel, 1998) (see also Black (1948) and Downs (1957)). Considering that there
tends to be substantial ideological distance between presidents and pivotal voters, positive presidential
influence without lobbying, then, is not much influence at all.
As with all lobbyists, presidents looking to push legislation must do so indirectly by pushing the lawmakers whom
they need to pass it. Or, as Richard Nesustadt artfully explained:
The essence of a President’s persuasive task, with congressmen and everybody else, is to induce them to
believe that what he wants of them is what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them
to do in their interest, not his…Persuasion deals in the coin of self-interest with men who have some freedom to reject what
they find counterfeit. (Neustadt, 1990: 40)
Fortunately for contemporary presidents, today’s White House affords its occupants an unrivaled supply of
persuasive carrots and sticks. Beyond the office’s unique visibility and prestige, among both citizens and their representatives
in Congress, presidents may also sway lawmakers by using their discretion in budgeting and/or rulemaking, unique
fundraising and campaigning capacity, control over executive and judicial nominations, veto power, or numerous other options under
the chief executive’s control. Plainly, when it comes to the arm-twisting, brow-beating, and horse-trading that so
often characterizes legislative battles, modern presidents are uniquely well equipped for the fight. In the
following we employ the omnibus concept of ‘presidential political capital’ to capture this conception of presidents’ positive power as
persuasive bargaining.
Specifi- cally, we define presidents’ political capital as the class of tactics White House officials employ to
induce changes in lawmakers’ behavior.
Importantly, this conception of presidents’ positive power as persuasive bargaining not only meshes with previous
scholarship on lobbying (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Wright (1994), Groseclose and Snyder (1996), Krehbiel (1998: ch. 7), and
Snyder (1991)), but also presidential practice. For example, Goodwin recounts how President Lyndon Johnson routinely
allocated ‘rewards’ to ‘cooperative’ members:
The rewards themselves (and the withholding of rewards) . . . might be something as unobtrusive as receiving an invitation to join
the President in a walk around the White House grounds, knowing that pictures of the event would be sent to hometown newspapers
. . . [or something as pointed as] public works projects, military bases, educational research grants, poverty projects, appointments of
local men to national commissions, the granting of pardons, and more. (Goodwin, 1991: 237) Of course, presidential political
capital is a scarce commodity with a floating value. Even a favorabl[e]y situated president enjoys only a
finite supply of political capital ; he can only promise or pressure so much. What is more, this capital ebbs and
flows as realities and/or perceptions change. So, similarly to Edwards (1989), we believe presidents’ bargaining
resources cannot fundamentally alter legislators’ predispositions, but rather operate ‘at the margins’ of US
lawmaking, however important those margins may be (see also Bond and Fleisher (1990), Peterson (1990), Kingdon
(1989), Jones (1994), and Rudalevige (2002)). Indeed, our aim is to explicate those margins and show how presidents may
systematically influence them.
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2NC Impact - ME War = Extinction
Middle East war results in Extinction
Fraser, former PM of Australia, 7/4/’11
(Malcom, “Dealing with nuclear terror means plants and weapons,” Taipei Times)
Recent history is peppered with a litany of false alerts and near misses, each unforeseen, each a combination
of technical and human failure. The growing potential for a nuclear disaster by cyber attack adds to the
existential danger.
We now know that just 100 relatively “small” Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons, less than one-thousandth of the
global nuclear arsenal, could lift millions of tonnes of dark smoke high into the atmosphere. There, it would
abruptly cool and darken the planet, slashing rainfall and food production in successive years — and thus
causing worldwide starvation on a scale never before witnessed.
This could result from the arsenals of any of the 10 currently nuclear-armed states, with the exception of North Korea.
Intent, miscalculation, technical failure, cyber attack, or accident could cause the nuclear escalation of a
conflict between India and Pakistan, in the Middle East (embroiling Israel’s nuclear weapons), or on the Korean
Peninsula. Such outcomes are at least as plausible or likely — if not more so — than a massive earthquake and
tsunami causing widespread damage to four Japanese nuclear reactors and their adjacent spent-fuel ponds.
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2NC Impact Uniqueness - Negotiations Work/No Sanctions
Negotiations likely to succeed and be durable
Colin Kahl, 1/7/14, Still Not Time to Attack Iran, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140633/colin-h-kahl/stillnot-time-to-attack-iran
In my article “Not Time to Attack Iran” (March/April 2012), I made the case for pursuing a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear
challenge, arguing that, because of the risks and costs associated with military action, “force is, and should remain, a last resort, not a
first choice.” Key developments in 2013 -- namely, the election of Hassan Rouhani, a moderate, as Iran’s new president and the signing of
an interim nuclear deal by Iran and the United States and its negotiating partners -- reinforce this conclusion. Whatever hawks such as
Reuel Marc Gerecht or Matthew Kroenig might argue, it is still not time to attack Iran. Indeed, the prospects for reaching a
comprehensive agreement to resolve the nuclear impasse peacefully, while far from guaranteed, have never
been brighter. A LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL After decades of isolation, the Iranian regime may finally be
willing to place meaningful limits on its nuclear program in exchange for relief from punishing economic sanctions.
In Iran’s June 2013 presidential election, Rouhani handily defeated a slate of conservative opponents, including the hard-line
nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, who had campaigned on continuing Iran’s strategy of “nuclear resistance.” Rouhani, in contrast,
pledged to reach a nuclear accommodation with the West and free Iran from the economic burden imposed by sanctions.
Rouhani, also a former nuclear negotiator, believes he has the support of the Iranian people and a green light from
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to reach a comprehensive nuclear accord with the United States and the other members of
the P5+1 (Britain, China, France, Germany, and Russia). The first step on the road to a comprehensive deal came in November 2013
with an interim agreement in Geneva, in which Tehran agreed to freeze and modestly roll back its nuclear program in exchange for
a pause in new international sanctions and a suspension of some existing penalties. The deal represents the most meaningful
move toward a denuclearized Iran in more than a decade. It neutralizes Iran’s stockpile of 20 percent uranium
and therefore modestly lengthens Iran’s “breakout” timeline -- the time required to enrich uranium to weapons grade -- by
one or two months. A new inspections regime also means any breakout attempt would be detected soon enough for
the international community to react, and expanded International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure
will make it more difficult for Iran to divert critical technology and materials to new secret sites. The terms also preclude
the new plutonium reactor at Arak from becoming operational, halting the risk that Iran could soon use plutonium to build a
bomb. For all its good points, the interim agreement does not by itself resolve the Iranian nuclear challenge. Rather, the
accord is designed to create at least a six-month diplomatic window (the initial period of the agreement), or longer if the agreement is
extended, to negotiate a final, comprehensive solution. At the very least, U.S. officials have suggested that the ultimate deal must
permanently cap Iran’s enrichment at five percent; substantially reduce Iran’s low-enriched uranium stockpile; place significant limits on
the number of Iranian centrifuges and enrichment facilities; dismantle Arak or convert it to a proliferation-resistant light-water reactor;
allow much more intrusive inspections of both declared and undeclared facilities; and account for the “past military dimensions” of Iran’s
nuclear research. In exchange, Iran would receive comprehensive relief from multilateral and national nuclear- and proliferation-related
sanctions. GOING FOR BROKE Some analysts argue that U.S. negotiators should use the leverage created by crippling economic sanctions
and Iran’s apparent willingness to negotiate to insist on a total dismantling of Iran’s fuel-cycle activities. The maximalist approach is
reflected in Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s stated requirements for a final deal: no uranium enrichment at any level, no
stockpile of enriched uranium, no centrifuges or centrifuge facilities, and no Arak heavy-water reactor or plutonium reprocessing
facilities. Attempting to keep Iran as far away from nuclear weapons as possible seems prudent and reasonable. It is imperative that any
final deal prohibits Iran from possessing facilities that would allow it to produce weapons-grade plutonium, for example. But in reality,
the quest for an optimal deal that requires a permanent end to Iranian enrichment at any level would likely doom
diplomacy, making the far worse outcomes of unconstrained nuclearization or a military showdown over
Tehran's nuclear program much more probable. Regardless of pressure from the United States, its allies, and the wider
international community, the Iranian regime is unlikely to agree to end all enrichment permanently. Khamenei, the
ultimate decider on the nuclear file, has invested far too much political capital and money (more than $100 billion
over the years) in mastering enrichment technology and defending Iran's nuclear rights (defined as domestic
enrichment). The nuclear program and “resistance to arrogant powers” are firmly imbedded in the regime’s ideological raison d’être.
So, even in the face of withering economic sanctions, Khamenei and hard-liners within the Revolutionary Guard are unlikely to sustain
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support for further negotiations -- let alone acquiesce to a final nuclear deal -- if the end result reflects a total surrender for the regime.
As Alireza Nader, an Iran analyst at the RAND Corporation, observes, “[S]anctions are a danger to their rule, but weakness in the face of
pressure might be no less a threat.” Nor are Rouhani and his negotiating team likely to agree to halt enrichment or
advocate for such a policy, since doing so would be political suicide. In 2003, during Rouhani’s previous role as Iran's chief nuclear
negotiator, he convinced Khamenei to accept a temporary suspension of enrichment. But further talks with the international community
stalled in early 2005 over a failure to agree on Iran’s asserted right to enrichment, and Tehran ended its suspension shortly thereafter.
Rouhani is unlikely to let that happen again.
PLAYING CHICKEN Given the certainty that Iran will reject maximalist demands from the United States, the United States should only
make such demands if it is willing to go to the brink of the abyss with Iran, escalating economic and military threats to the point at which
the regime’s survival is acutely and imminently in danger. Yet pursuing such a high-risk strategy is unlikely to succeed, and the
consequences of failure would be profound. First, it is unclear whether any escalation of sanctions could bring the regime to its knees in
time to prevent Iran from achieving a breakout capability. Iran’s apparent willingness to negotiate under pressure is not, in and of itself,
evidence that more pressure will produce total surrender. Iran’s economy is in dire straits, but the country does not appear to be facing
imminent economic collapse. Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard also seem to believe that the Islamic Republic weathered far worse
during the Iran-Iraq War, an eight-year conflict that killed hundreds of thousands of Iranians and produced over half a trillion dollars in
economic losses before Iran agreed to a cease-fire. Even if Washington goes forward with additional sanctions, economic conditions are
not likely to produce enough existential angst among Iranian leaders, generate mass unrest, or otherwise implode the regime before Iran
achieves a nuclear breakout capability. And even if they did lead to regime change, it still might not prove sufficient to force a nuclear
surrender. After all, the imprisoned leaders of the Green Movement and Iranian secularists opposed to the Islamic Republic, as well as a
significant majority of the Iranian people, also support Iran’s declared right to enrichment. Second, and somewhat paradoxically, ramping
up sanctions to force regime capitulation now could end up weakening international pressure on Iran. For better or worse, Rouhani has
already succeeded in shifting international perceptions of Iran. If the United States, rather than Iran, comes across as intransigent, it will
become much more difficult to maintain the international coalition currently isolating Tehran, particularly on the parts of China, Russia,
and numerous other European and Asian nations. Some fence sitters in Europe and Asia will start to flirt with Iran again, leaving the
United States in the untenable position of choosing between imposing extraterritorial sanctions on banks and companies in China, India,
Japan, South Korea, Turkey, and elsewhere, or acquiescing to the erosion of the international sanctions architecture. Third, issuing more
explicit military threats (through public warning by U.S. President Barack Obama or congressional passage of a resolution authorizing the
use of military force, for example) is also unlikely to achieve a maximalist diplomatic outcome. There is little doubt that maintaining a
credible military option affects the Iranian regime’s calculations, raising the potential costs associated with nuclearization. And if
diplomacy fails, the United States should reserve the option of using force as a last resort. But threats to strike Iranian nuclear sites
surgically, no matter how credible, would not create a sufficient threat to the survival of the regime to compel it to dismantle its nuclear
program completely. Finally, attempting to generate an existential crisis for the Islamic Republic could backfire by increasing the regime’s
incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. If the United States escalates economic or military pressure at the very moment when Iran has
finally begun to negotiate in earnest, Khamenei will likely conclude that the real and irrevocable goal of U.S. policy is regime change.
Solidifying this perception would enhance, rather than lessen, Tehran’s motivation to develop a nuclear deterrent. In short, playing
chicken with Iran will not work and is likely to result in a dangerous crash. Gambling everything by insisting on an optimal deal could
result in no deal at all, leaving Iran freer and potentially more motivated to build atomic arms and making a military confrontation more
likely. STILL TIME FOR DIPLOMACY During a December 2013 forum hosted by the Brookings Institution, Obama said, “It is in America’s
national security interests . . . to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. . . . But what I’ve consistently said is, even as I don’t take
any options off the table, what we do have to test is the possibility that we can resolve this issue diplomatically.” When asked by a former
Israeli general in the audience what he would do if diplomacy with Iran breaks down, Obama said, “The options that I’ve made clear I can
avail myself of, including a military option, is one that we would consider and prepare for.”
Given the dangers associated with a nuclear-armed Iran, Obama is right to keep the military option alive. But he is also right to strongly
prefer a diplomatic outcome. Leadership changes in Tehran and the diplomatic momentum created by the Geneva
interim accord mean that there is a real chance that the Iranian nuclear crisis -- a challenge that has haunted the
international community for decades -- could finally be resolved peacefully. No one can say for sure how high the odds of
success are. But given the enormous dangers associated with both an Iranian bomb and the bombing of Iran, it is
imperative to give diplomacy every chance to succeed.
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