Bergson’s “Introduction to Metaphysics” from The Creative Mind
Our So-Called Thesis: We don’t have a traditional version of what is usually called a thesis concerning
Bergson’s ideas because, (we argue), if we are going to play by Bergson’s rules for metaphysics, then we
can only do that through a series of “flexible, mobile, almost fluid representations” (198) that “through
the convergence of their action . . . direct the consciousness [of each student] to the precise point where
there is a certain intuition to seize on” (195).
A traditional thesis feels far too rigid and full of simple concepts to deal with Bergson’s ideas on his own
terms. So, during our presentation, we tried to provide more “flexible, mobile, almost fluid
representations” (198) of Bergson’s ideas, in order to do our best to allow intuition to work. We also
picked a method that has duration (i.e., playing Thinkblot® by Matel, Inc. is a process with movement
through actual time) and tried to use “many different images” that are “as dissimilar as possible” (195) to
enable intuition to (potentially) take place.
What do you see?
Below we have several questions concerning Bergson’s explanation of metaphysics. You don’t need to
answer all of them, but choose a couple, so we can explore what he has written from many different
angles to gain a clearer understanding of what metaphysics really is, according to Bergson.
Bergson argues that starting from simple concepts, instead of from intuition, inhibits philosophers
from comprehending an object completely. But one way to judge between simple concepts and the
types of examples Bergson uses is to see whether they are “inflexible and ready-made” or “flexible,
mobile, almost fluid representations” (Bergson, 198).
Two of Bergson’s examples are the Jigsaw Puzzle Poem (202) and Map of Paris Sketches (200–01).
Why does Bergson use puzzles and games for his examples?
How do these examples illustrate the real problems from starting with simple concepts?
Consider this image. What is it really of?
Does anything in nature look like this entire inkblot? Or is it a unique shape, a single unified design?
Now consider this next image. How do the “wolf” and the “walking uphill” silhouettes relate?
Could a person ever prove that the image on the left isn’t really the one showing a person walking uphill?
According to Bergson, this is what philosophies starting from concepts are like: “simple concepts . . .
have the disadvantage of dividing the concrete unity of the object into so many symbolic expressions”
(197–98). Isn’t that what this game specifically invites us to do with the concrete unity of the inkblot?
“The simple concepts . . . also divide philosophy into distinct schools, each of which reserves its place,
chooses its chips, and begins with the others a game that will never end” (Bergson, 197–98).
Consider these instructions from the Thinkblot® game we played in class.
What similarities do you find between Bergson’s criticism of the schools of philosophy and the strategies
encouraged in the Thinkblot® game?
According to Bergson, how do philosophical conflicts begin?
“We shall take any one of these concepts and with it try to rejoin the others. But the junction will be
brought about in a different way. According to whether we start, for example, from unity or from
multiplicity, we shall form a different conception of the multiple unity of duration” (Bergson, 197).
How do the categories below relate to how Bergson says “different conceptions” are formed (197)?
Is Bergson right? Have we been studying all this semester only an endless “game of ideas” (198)?
How does playing a game or assembling a puzzle illustrate the differences between starting from concepts
in a “game of ideas” or starting from intuition in a metaphysics that “is a serious occupation of the mind,”
in Bergson’s view (198)?
So, what’s wrong with having schools of philosophy, to Bergson, especially in metaphysic?
Like Dr. Seemore in the images above, philosophers argue over who can discern more and better things
than the rest, but their theories are limited and shaped by the simple concepts they choose to begin with.
Consider another Thinkblot® example:
Do simple concepts alone have any real meaning?
“Everything will depend on the weight we assign to this or that concept, and this weight will always be
arbitrary, since the concept, extracted from the object, has no weight, being nothing more than the shadow
of a body” (Bergson, 197).
How have these “Bonus Images” in the game been “extracted from the object,” making them “nothing
more than the shadow of a body” (197)?
What about Bergson’s own examples?
“Now the image has at least the advantage of keeping us in the concrete. No image will replace the
intuition of duration, but many diverse images, taken from quite different orders of things, will be able,
through the convergence of their action, to direct consciousness to the precise point where there is a
certain intuition to seize on” (Bergson, 195).
How does Bergson’s exaltation of the image and intuition over concepts and analysis affect his
aesthetic principles? Why would novelty be an important aspect for art in Bergson’s view?
What is the purpose of Bergson’s example of the cone image?
How is human perception, that “one reality which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by
simple analysis” (Bergson, 191), like the images Bergson uses to describe it?
Like the Color Spectrum (193)? Or the Spool of Thread? (192) Or the Stretched Out Elastic?
(runemadsen.com, nextgenlite.com)
(superiorthreads.com)
(easyquestion.net)
How does Bergson’s vision for metaphysics differ from how other philosophers describe it?
Metaphysics “is strictly itself only when it goes beyond the concept, or at least when it frees itself of the
inflexible and ready-made concepts and creates others very different from those we usually handle, I
mean flexible, mobile, almost fluid representations, always ready to mould themselves on the fleeting
forms of intuition” (Bergson, 198).
Do you agree with Bergson’s point that “either metaphysics is only this game of ideas, or else, if it is
a serious occupation of the mind, it must transcend concepts to arrive at intuition” (198)?
Why or why not?