Intervention Summary
Title: Support to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) 2011-2015
What support will the UK provide?
This business case provisionally allocates up to £10 million of voluntary core support to
OHCHR over the period of 2011 to 2015. For financial years (FYs) 2011/12 and 2012/13
voluntary core funding will be paid at £2.5m each year. In FY 2013/14 a mid-point review will
be undertaken to assess progress against key reforms in areas identified as weak by the
MAR. The outcome of the mid-point review will determine whether DFID should maintain
voluntary core funding at £2.5 million per year, or increase, decrease or earmark funding for
specific programmes. In the meantime, indicative funding levels for FYs 2013/14 and 2014/15
remain at £2.5 million per year.
In 2011 the Department for International Development (DFID) completed the Multilateral Aid
Review (MAR) that assessed the effectiveness of 43 multilateral agencies that receive funding
from the UK, including the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The
MAR found that OHCHR was playing a critical role in meeting international and UK
development objectives but also that a number of organisational reforms needed to take place
to further strengthen the organisation.
Overall the review found that OHCHR offered
“adequate” value for money for DFID funds. The Secretary of State agreed that DFID’s annual
voluntary core funding to OHCHR should remain static for a period of 2 years at £2.5 million
per year.
Why is UK support required?
Multilateral organisations are an essential part of the international system for humanitarian and
development aid. They have a global presence and the legitimacy to work even in politically
sensitive contexts where national governments are not welcome. This is particularly the case
for OHCHR, which provides globally recognised leadership on human rights within the UN
system. OHCHR has been uniquely mandated by the international community "to promote
and protect the enjoyment and full realisation, by all people of all rights established in the
Charter of the United Nations and in international human rights laws and treaties."
The OHCHR mandate includes:





Preventing human rights violations
Securing respect for all human rights
Promoting international cooperation to protect human rights
Coordinating related activities throughout the United Nations
Strengthening and streamlining the United Nations system in the field of human rights
To this end OHCHR works in three main spheres: human rights standard-setting, monitoring
and implementation. OHCHR also acts as the Secretariat of the Human Rights Council, its
special procedures and the committees established under a number of UN human rights
treaties. It has a critical role to play in encouraging States' engagement with UN human rights
mechanisms, and in monitoring progress and failures in relation to international human rights
standards. The Office also leads efforts to integrate a human rights approach within all work
carried out by United Nations agencies.
It is the comprehensiveness of OHCHR’s mandate that provides the Office with a comparative
advantage over other agencies and departments that focus on specific areas of rights, or on
specific beneficiaries. It has a particularly critical role in peacekeeping and peace-building
work. For example OHCHR is the lead entity for the UN in the area of transitional justice. But
OHCHR’s work is also important in ensuring the integration of human rights into MDGs work. It
contributes to the creation of stable environments and respect for the rule of law. Both are
important for sustainable development.
DFID is providing support to OHCHR because:





The UK government is committed to human rights as a cornerstone of its foreign and
development policy, and OHCHR is the unique institutional home for human rights
within the UN system and worldwide. The Foreign Secretary has stated the importance
of placing strong institutions and the rule of law at the heart of future human rights work.
Strong institutions and upholding the rule of law sit at the heart of OHCHR’s mandate.
The work of OHCHR has been seen as helping to deliver on the MDGs as well as
reinforcing links between security, development and human rights as set out in a
number of international agreements.
Working with OHCHR has helped deliver DFID’s priorities in areas such as access to
justice.
Human rights protection contributes to the building of peaceful states and societies
and to addressing the underlying causes of conflict and fragility, such as failures in
human rights protection.
OHCHR has a global remit and works extensively in DFID priority countries.
OHCHR is also important to the work of other UK government departments, including the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (the lead UK government department for human rights),
the Ministry of Justice and the Home Office. It drives international standard setting in human
rights which supports broader UK government policy, covering subjects from counter-terrorism
to the treatment of migrants.
The UK will maintain voluntary core funding to OHCHR as its activities have a direct link to the
UK Government’s policy objectives on human rights issues, particularly in the context of
working in fragile states and countries emerging from conflict and ensuring human rights is at
the heart of the UN and States’ work to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.
What are the expected results?
DFID expects to see OHCHR successfully deliver on the priority objectives set out in its
present and forthcoming Strategic Management Plans (SMPs)1, and in particular:


An increase in the number of countries where adequate legislation and policies are in
place to ensure access of discriminated groups to justice and selected basic services
(OHCHR is present in 20 countries working on this issue).
An increase in the number of countries of engagement where the UN Common
Country Programme/UNDAF has satisfactorily integrated international human rights
standards and principles into its operations.
We also expect to further address the reform priorities identified through the MAR These
include:




OHCHR improves its results framework by ensuring that key elements such as,
baselines, targets, outputs etc are included and that a results based management
culture is mainstreamed at all levels of the organisation. This would clarify OHCHR’s
contributions to humanitarian and development results.
Stronger monitoring and evaluation functions and evidence that evaluations are acted
upon. This, together with strengthened results based management needs to lead to
improved portfolio management at the project level. For example OHCHR should show
that poorly performing projects and programmes are being curtailed, and savings are
being recycled into better performing parts of OHCHR’s portfolio.
OHCHR also needs to strengthen its impact through leveraging additional effort from
other larger organisations. As such we would like to see increased OHCHR
effectiveness in mainstreaming human rights work across the UN.
OHCHR further strengthens its role and impact in fragile states and countries emerging
from conflict, particularly in areas of UK priority, including support to peace building
and peacekeeping work and in tackling violence against women and girls.
OHCHR’s present SMP covers the period 2010-11.As of 2012, the name of this document
will be “OHCHR Management Plan-Working for results” (OMP) An update to be published by
the end of 2011 will cover 2012-13, and thereafter there will be OMPs covering a four year
period.
1
Business Case for: Support to the Office of the High Commissioner
of Human Rights (OHCHR) 2011-2015
Strategic Case
A. Context and need for DFID intervention
Summary
The MAR found that OHCHR has a critical role in peace and security as the only UN
multilateral organisation focussed exclusively on the promotion and protection of human
rights. This justifies continued support. There are however a number of organisational
reforms that need to be addressed in the short term. The UK Government will work closely
with OHCHR to ensure that important reforms are taken forward, leading to improved
delivery on the ground.
Background
Multilateral organisations are an essential part of the international system for humanitarian
and development aid. They have a global presence and the legitimacy to work even in
politically sensitive contexts where national governments are not welcome. They provide
specialist technical expertise, and deliver aid on a large scale. They offer a wide-range of
aid instruments to meet the needs of all countries. They have legitimacy to lead and coordinate development and humanitarian assistance. They broker international agreements
and monitor adherence to them. They develop and share knowledge about what works, and
why.
The promotion and protection of human rights is one of the fundamental goals and purposes
of the United Nations. Within the UN system, OHCHR is the only UN entity that exclusively
focuses on human rights. The High Commissioner, Navanethem Pillay, is the principal
human rights official in the UN.
OHCHR is part of the UN Secretariat and is not an agency, fund or programme. It is
uniquely mandated by the international community “to promote and protect the enjoyment
and full realisation, by all people of all rights established in the Charter of the United
Nations and in international human rights laws and treaties.”
The OHCHR mandate includes:





Preventing human rights violations,
Securing respect for all human rights,
Promoting international cooperation to protect human rights,
Coordinating related activities throughout the United Nations, and
Strengthening and streamlining the United Nations system in the field of human rights.
To this end it works in three broad areas: human rights standard-setting, monitoring, and
implementation. OHCHR also acts as the secretariat of the Human Rights Council, its
special procedures, and the committees established under a number of UN human rights
treaties. It has a critical role to play in encouraging States’ engagement with UN human
rights mechanisms, and in monitoring progress and failures in relation to international human
rights standards. The Office also leads efforts to integrate a human rights approach within
all work carried out by United Nations agencies.
OHCHR plays a supportive role in the delivery of the MDGs and in poverty reduction.
Specifically, OHCHR provides technical assistance to governments and other stakeholders
on human rights aspects of poverty reduction strategies, ensures that human rights are
incorporated into UN country teams’ programming principles, promotes implementation of
international human rights instruments and develops specific projects to involve and
empower vulnerable groups. OHCHR works for the advancement of civil and political rights
as well as providing technical assistance to governments, national human rights institutions
and civil society on poverty reduction strategies and on protecting economic, social, cultural
rights. It is an important partner in enabling the UK to deliver on its human rights objectives
where it has limited resources or is constrained by politics. Its relevance to DFID’s priorities
is likely to grow given the increasing focus on fragile states in the UK’s development
programme. The Arab spring has raised the profile of OHCHR, further demonstrating its
importance to the international community.
OHCHR is managed by the High Commissioner (Navanethem Pillay) and her senior
management team. OHCHR is part of the UN Secretariat and has an unusual chain of
accountability, one that the UK has consistently defended given its unique role. It has no
governing board. Its mandate is set by the UN General Assembly and more broadly by the
UN Charter. Under the terms of her mandate, the High Commissioner is subject to the
authority of the UN Secretary-General.
OHCHR has a global mandate with a headquarters in Geneva, a presence in New York and
a network of regional and country offices, and a presence in the vast majority of UN peace
missions across the globe. At the end of 2010 OHCHR employed 1,005 staff and was
present in a total of 54 field offices. OHCHR’s scale in comparison to other UN
organisations is small, and although human rights is the third pillar of the UN, its share of
funds from the UN regular budget does not fully reflect the importance of this issue since
only 2.8% of funds are allocated to OHCHR.
OHCHR is important to the achievement of UK human rights objectives for a number of
government departments. It drives international standard setting in human rights which
directly impacts on UK departments including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Ministry of Justice and the Home Office, covering subjects from counter-terrorism to the
treatment of migrants.
Multilateral Aid Review Findings
The Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) was commissioned by the DFID Secretary of State in
2010 to assess the value for money and impact provided by multilateral agencies that
receive funding from the UK. The MAR found that OHCHR is critical in meeting both
international and key UK Government objectives, but that OHCHR’s performance needs to
improve in a number of areas. Overall OHCHR was judged to offer adequate value for
money for DFID aid funds.
OHCHR’s strengths are:

Its critical role in fragile states supporting human rights monitoring and wider peace

building objectives.
Its good record of working in partnerships with others including civil society groups
and those directly affected by conflict and violence.
Areas where OHCHR’s performance needs to improve are:




Better results based management - OHCHR improves its results framework by
ensuring that key elements such as, baselines, targets, outputs etc are included and
that a results based management culture is mainstreamed at all levels of the
organisation.
This would clarify OHCHR’s contributions to humanitarian and
development results.
Improved evaluation systems – OHCHR needs to strengthen its evaluation systems
and ensure that evaluation recommendations are acted upon leading to
improvements in programme quality and impact.
Better project portfolio management – As a consequence of strengthened results
based management and evaluation functions OHCHR needs to ensure that poorly
performing projects and programmes are curtailed, and savings are then recycled into
better performing parts of OHCHR’s portfolio.
Delivery of results in areas of comparative advantage - OHCHR’s comparative
advantage in fragile states and countries emerging from conflict, particularly in areas
of UK priority, including support to peace building and peacekeeping work and in
tackling violence against women and girls is strengthened.
We expect that, OHCHR will be better placed to address the above priorities after the new
Strategic Management Plan is published at the end of 2011. Recent reforms and
improvements in delivery and strategic management have shown OHCHR to be a reforming
organisation, so prospects for further improvements are good.
Since 2002, voluntary contributions have almost tripled, rising from $40 million in 2002 to a
projected figure of more than $115 million in 2009. Over the same period, the proportion of
voluntary unearmarked funding has risen steadily from seven percent to a projected figure of
57 percent.
Table 1: Income (millions of US$)*
Voluntary
“unearmarked”
income
Voluntary
“earmarked”
income
Total
2007
40.9
2008
64.6
2009
66.1
2010
59.3
54.8
55.2
52
50
95.7
119.8
118.1
109.3
*Above totals include all income to OHCHR including income for the humanitarian trust funds
which OHCHR administers.
Table 2: Top 7 donors in 2010 (voluntary contributions, millions of US$)
DFID provided voluntary core funding to OHCHR of £2.5 million in both 2009/10 and
2010/11. The UK’s voluntary contributions in 2010/11 totalled $5,429,354 (£3,438,573) 73%
of which was voluntary core. This made the UK the eighth largest contributor of voluntary
contributions to OHCHR in 2010. OHCHR heavily depends on voluntary contributions for a
large part of its funding, with 40% being provided from the UN regular budget and 60% from
voluntary contributions.
The table below details the top seven donors to OHCHR. The UK is the eighth largest donor
to OHCHR.
1
USA
2
Norway
3
Netherlands
4
Sweden
5
Spain
6
European
Commission
7
Germany
$19.3
$11.3
$10.2
$8.4
$6.8
$6.7
$6.3
B. Impact and Outcome
DFID is providing support to OHCHR because:





The UK government is committed to human rights as a cornerstone of its foreign and
development policy, and OHCHR is the unique institutional home for human rights
within the UN system and worldwide. The Foreign Secretary has stated the
importance of placing strong institutions and the rule of law at the heart of future
human rights work. Strong institutions and upholding the rule of law sit at the heart of
OHCHR’s mandate.
The work of OHCHR has been seen as helping to deliver on the MDGs as well as
reinforcing links between security, development and human rights as set out in a
number of international agreements.
Working with OHCHR has helped deliver DFID’s priorities in areas such as access to
justice.
Human rights protection contributes to the building of peaceful states and societies
and to addressing the underlying causes of conflict and fragility, such as failures in
human rights protection.
OHCHR has a global remit and works extensively in DFID priority countries.
Theory of Change
Unlike voluntary non-core (known in OHCHR as “earmarked”) funding, voluntary core
(“unearmarked”) funding is not tied to a specific project or programme. It supports all of the
work of the organisation. The underpinning theory of change is as follows.
Whilst OHCHR is already playing an important role it could be more effective. To deliver
better results on human rights across the board OHCHR needs to improve its organisational
effectiveness, through making the necessary reforms identified in the MAR. We recognise
that UN reform can be slow and difficult but this will only succeed through strong
engagement with key stakeholders. OHCHR will need strong leadership to ensure it can
reform in the right direction.
The UK government will be clear with OHCHR on the reforms we need to see and use our
funding and influence to encourage performance improvements against these
organisational-wide reforms. The UK will support OHCHR on this reform agenda through
our strong technical focus on results and improved value for money. Whilst careful to
respect the independence of OHCHR’s mandate, we will work with other key donors to
support OHCHR management reforms.
As a result of stronger engagement and strengthened support leading to reforms being
achieved OHCHR’s overall efficiency and effectiveness in-country is expected to improve.
This will allow it to deliver better results in the areas of its mandate which are important to
the UK (promoting and protecting human rights with particular focus on fragile states and
countries emerging from conflict, including support to peace building and peacekeeping work
(e.g. effective follow-up to Security Council Resolution 1325) and in tacking violence against
women and girls. While much of DFID’s voluntary core funding supports programme
delivery, OHCHR’s results monitoring and reporting needs to be further strengthened so that
we are able to clearly identify the results it delivers on the ground.
Expected Results
DFID expects to see OHCHR successfully deliver on the priority objectives set out in its
present and forthcoming OHCHR Management Plans (OMPs)2, and in particular:


An increase in the number of countries where adequate legislation and policies are in
place to ensure access of discriminated groups to justice and selected basic services
(OHCHR is present in 20 countries working on this issue).
An increase in the number of countries of engagement where the UN Common
Country Programme/UNDAF has satisfactorily integrated international human rights
standards and principles into its operations.
We also expect to further address the reform priorities identified through the MAR These
include:




OHCHR improves its results framework by ensuring that key elements such as,
baselines, targets, outputs etc are included and that a results based management
culture is mainstreamed at all levels of the organisation. This would clarify OHCHR’s
contributions to humanitarian and development results.
Stronger monitoring and evaluation functions and evidence that evaluations are
acted upon. This, together with strengthened results based management needs to
lead to improved portfolio management at the project level. For example OHCHR
should show that poorly performing projects and programmes are being curtailed,
and savings are being recycled into better performing parts of OHCHR’s portfolio.
OHCHR strengthens its impact through leveraging additional effort from other larger
organisations. As such we would like to see increased OHCHR effectiveness in
mainstreaming human rights work across the UN.
OHCHR further strengthens its role and impact in fragile states and countries
emerging from conflict, particularly in areas of UK priority, including support to peace
OHCHR’s present SMP covers the period 2010-11. An update to be published by the end of
2011 will cover 2012-13, and thereafter there will be OMPs covering a four year period.
2
building and peacekeeping work and in tackling violence against women and girls.
The above steps will help to ensure that DFID can show the UK public where their money is
being spent, how effectively it is being used and what results it delivers. It will help to
ensure that OHCHR is able to prioritise effectively and deliver against its mandate.
Consequences of Decreasing or Not Funding
DFID provided 6.7% of OHCHR’s voluntary core resources in 2010. Significantly reducing or
stopping DFID’s voluntary core funding would result in OHCHR reducing the number of
programmes it was able to carry out internationally and on the ground, particularly given that
OHCHR’s network of field presences are funded by voluntary contributions. This would
affect the achievement of UK development objectives, particularly where OHCHR has a
critical role.
If DFID stopped providing or significantly reduced its voluntary core funding OHCHR would
have fewer resources to allocate flexibly to fund the wide-ranging organisational reform
agenda that the High Commissioner has set out. It would also potentially lessen UK
Government influence with OHCHR, particularly on areas which speak to MAR reforms. On
the other hand if DFID and other donors sharply reduced voluntary core funding this could
create a strong momentum for change. DFID should assess the progress on the reform
agenda in two years’ time and then adjust its voluntary core funding levels accordingly.
Appraisal Case
A. Determining Critical Success Criteria (CSC)
Each CSC is weighted 1 to 5, where 1 is least important and 5 most important based on the relative
importance of each criteria to the success of the intervention.
CSC
for
Results/Reform
1
OHCHR continues to play a critical global leadership and
2
3
4
country level delivery role
OHCHR continues to improve business practices where
clear results chains are developed, with RBM
mainstreamed at all levels of the organisation.
Stronger monitoring and evaluation functions and
evidence that evaluations are acted upon.
OHCHR makes effective use of its comparative
advantage in fragile states and countries emerging from
conflict, particularly in areas of UK priority,
5
5
4
4
B. Feasible options
The MAR has identified the key areas in which OHCHR is operationally and organisationally
weak. Our reform agenda is defined by the MAR. There are other areas that OHCHR needs
to reform but the selected areas have been prioritised as those which are weakest and which
we judge would result in the greatest improvements in OHCHR’s organisational
effectiveness and delivery on the ground.
The theory of change underpinning this intervention has been outlined in Part B of the
Strategic Case. In order to make progress on reforms DFID needs to use our funding to
drive forward reforms and increase our influence in the organisation. To achieve we
considered two financing options. There are also different approaches to how we can
influence the organisation. These are also discussed below.
Option 1: Voluntary core funding
This type of funding is allocated to an institution (such as OHCHR) but is not tied to a
particular theme or project. It can be spent against any activity that relates to OHCHR’s
mandate.
Option 2: Voluntary non-core funding
This type of funding can be allocated against specific projects in country (for example a
Human Rights project in Colombia) or by a particular theme (for example access to justice
and basic services). Once allocated it can not be spent on other issues beyond the scope of
the original project or theme.
Environmental Considerations
OHCHR’s performance under the Climate Change and Environmental Sustainability criterion
in the MAR was not judged. OHCHR’s engagement in country largely takes the form of
Human Rights advisers and experts providing technical advice and guidance to government,
civil society and other groups rather than through specific programmes. This means specific
policies on low carbon and sustainable development are often not relevant or applicable to
OHCHR.
Environmental and Climate safeguards are not relevant and practical when looking at the
context of the interventions OHCHR makes within a country which are often in a post conflict
of humanitarian crisis situation. That said, there will be a number of cases where human
rights issues are directly related to conflict over access to natural resources (water, forests,
etc), or where climate stress/ natural resource scarcity are considered drivers of conflict. In
those cases, OHCHR professional staff should be encouraged to consider the links to wider
policies on sustainability or natural resource governance, and where possible to seek
opportunities to link up to other parts of the UN system doing relevant work, e.g. on water
resource management, drivers of deforestation, etc
OHCHR’s new Environment Plan will enable the Office to better track the impact of its
activities.
Engagement / Influencing
DFID will work with OHCHR to improve its results based management and ultimately its
delivery of priority Human Rights programmes in country. In order to do this OHCHR needs
to strengthen its management systems and ensure that the staff in-country have the
necessary skills to be able to operate its systems. This will encourage better monitoring and
reporting of results as well as better follow up on evaluation findings ensuring value for
money. To support this DFID will work with specific country offices to seek feedback,
understand delivery problems at country level and track OHCHR’s progress towards
improved delivery. These issues can then be addressed bilaterally with OHCHR.
DFID officials will strategically push for reforms and improvements through the appropriate
channels. Officials will work directly with other like-minded donor countries to build alliances
around our reform priorities. We will also look for opportunities to engage with OHCHR staff
as and when the opportunity arises. UNCD’s Results Adviser will provide support to OHCHR
to assist it in understanding and refining its results management, monitoring and reporting.
C. Appraisal of options
Option 1: Voluntary core funding
The benefits of this option 1 are
 DFID will continue to have legitimacy and leverage with the agency and other member
states on key reforms.
 The provision of voluntary core support will allow OHCHR to maintain a significant
international presence and operate in countries were DFID cannot work, but still have
a high need for a focus on human rights issues.
 The provision of core funding allows OHCHR greater freedom to make strategic
decisions about resource allocation in line with priorities set out in its strategic plan.
 OHCHR can use DFID’s funding to implement MAR reforms which will make them
more efficient and effective.
The costs of option 1 are:
 In the absence of a robust results framework voluntary core funding does not have a
direct link to country level results and so DFID’s funding can not be directly attributed
to progress against specific development results.
 DFID will need to maintain a sufficient policy engagement with OHCHR to ensure
these funds are well spent.
 Cutting DFID’s voluntary core support could weaken the financial viability of OHCHR
as it needs a certain level of voluntary core funding in order to have the autonomy and
flexibility to allocate resources as required. Reducing or stopping our voluntary core
contribution to OHCHR could slow progress on human rights issues in fragile states
and countries emerging from conflict, thereby having a negative effect on achieving
UK development objectives in these priority countries.
Option 2 - Voluntary non-core funding
An alternative would be to earmark our funding i.e. only provide funding to be used for a
specific programme. There is currently only a small amount of DFID funding (approximately
£500,000 per year) which is allocated for a specific purpose.
The benefits of this option 2 are
 DFID can target specific programmes or themes which are important to UK
development objectives and more robustly measure results.
 It would potentially allow DFID to reduce its central engagement with OHCHR.
The costs of option 2 are:
 DFID would lose influence with OHCHR on priority issues relating to human rights and
have reduced leverage over key reforms that we need to see.
 As voluntary non-core funding is restrictive it would only allow OHCHR to operate
where donors provide adequate support. This would mean that OHCHR would not be
able to use these resources for programmes elsewhere where needs are still unmet
and this would reduce the effectiveness of OHCHR in reaching all of those most in
need.
D. Comparison of options
The same weighting is used as for CSC above. The score ranges from 1-5, where 1 is low
contribution and 5 is high contribution, based on the relative contribution to the success of the
intervention.
Analysis of options against Critical Success Criteria
Option 1
Option 2
CSC
1
2
3
4
Totals
Weight
(1-5)
5
5
4
4
18
Score
(1-5)
5
5
5
5
20
Weighted
Score
25
25
20
20
90
Score
2
3
3
1
9
Weighted
Score
10
15
12
4
41
Add
more
necessary
columns
as
Conclusion
Voluntary non-core funding is a useful tool when there is a particular project or theme being
funded. However, as described above, earmarked funds only have limited coverage and
cannot cover all of an agency’s mandated areas of work in all countries where there is a
need.
The MAR found that OHCHR needs to make changes at an organisational level. A provision
of voluntary core funding is the best way to support these efforts. Voluntary core funding
also enables DFID to legitimately promote organisational reforms. Without voluntary core
funding it is also arguable that the impact of DFID’s voluntary non-core funding is also
reduced.
In order to ensure that we continue to have influence over the organisation and make
progress on reform priorities we will engage more directly with the agency on issues such as
strengthening results reporting and monitoring and evaluation. We will also encourage
OHCHR to work within areas of comparative advantage. We will also look for opportunities
to push our reform issues through direct contact with the organisation at all levels. We will
build stronger relations with other member states who consider that reform is necessary to
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of OHCHR and we will look for a stronger
relationship with the agency on these issues.
The provision of voluntary core funding allows DFID to pursue these objectives. However, if
the mid-point review indicates that no progress is being made on our top reform
requirements, then DFID will consider changing our approach to funding to continue to
ensure maximum value for money for the UK taxpayer. In the meantime the provision of
voluntary non-core funds can continue at the DFID country level where there is a clear
business case for this.
E. Measures to be used or developed to assess value for money
DFID will use the same broad criteria to assess the value for money of its voluntary core
contribution to OHCHR in two years’ time that were used under the MAR. In FY 2013/14 a
further review will be undertaken to assess progress against key reforms areas identified as
weak by the MAR, which included weak results based management and a weak evaluation
function with poor follow up on evaluation findings. The implication of this is that OHCHR
does not have the systems in place to maximise the performance of its programmes. As a
result of the outcome of the mid-point review, DFID will decide if the best value for money
can be achieved by continuing voluntary core funding at £2.5 million per year, increasing this
amount, decreasing it and/ or earmarking for specific programmes. In the meantime,
indicative funding levels for FY 2013/14 and FY 2014/15 have been made at £2.5 million per
year.
Although there are a range of measures which OHCHR can take to maximise value for
money, its flexibility on cost control is limited as i) UNDP disburses all OHCHR funds in the
field, and ii) as part of the UN Secretariat some of its administrative systems are centrally
controlled. However there is evidence that OHCHR does apply best value for money
principles when channelling money to external parties. There is evidence that OHCHR’s
senior management take account of return and cost effectiveness. They established two
bodies chaired by senior management to oversee compliance: the Programme and Budget
Review Board (PBRB) and the Financial Monitoring Committee. Following a revision of the
planning process work-flow, the Financial Monitoring Committee has been merged with the
PBRB. The PBRB reviews OHCHR’s financial situation on a monthly basis. The PBRB has
rejected projects that do not consider value for money.
The UN Board of Auditors has asked OHCHR to participate in a forthcoming value for money
exercise. OHCHR has confirmed participation but is waiting on further information. We will
ensure that we follow this process.
Commercial Case
A. Value for money through Procurement
The MAR found no material weakness in OHCHR’s approach to procurement. The nature of
OHCHR work means that there is not much procurement. In 2010, OHCHR spent US$4.9
million on procurement. In some instances UNDP procures goods and services on behalf of
OHCHR in the field. OHCHR reflect this in its financial accounting as a payment to UNDP.
OHCHR applies best value for money as the general principle for procurement. It uses the
system available to the UN Secretariat in order to procure goods and services, meaning that
it is also bound by strict UN Secretariat rules to ensure the cheapest option is selected that
meets the specification.
Financial Case
A. How much it will cost
Voluntary core funding will be £2.5m per year for each of FY 2011/12 and 2012/13. In 2013
DFID will review progress against the MAR reform priorities and Ministers will take a decision
as to whether funding should remain the same, increase, decrease or be voluntary non-core.
Pending that review a further £2.5 million has been provisionally set aside for each of FY
2013/14 and 2014/15.
B. How it will be funded: capital/programme/admin
The funding will be paid from DFID’s programme budget.
C. How funds will be paid out
The £2.5 million allocation for FY 2011/12 and 2012/13 will be released in one payment.
For FY 2011/12 and 2012/13 DFID will make one £2.5 million payment October. By
September 2013 the mid-point review will have been completed. DFID expects to release
funding for FY 2013/14 by October. For FY 2014/15 payments will be made in October.
The timing of payments will be set out in a Memorandum of Understanding between DFID
and OHCHR.
D. How expenditure will be monitored, reported, and accounted for
OHCHR is part of the UN Secretariat and in line with its unique role does not have separate
governance arrangements.
OHCHR’s expenditure is monitored through the UK’s
engagement at key meetings and bilaterally with OHCHR, as required, including at bespoke
annual donor consultations. These functions are carried out by both officials in the UK and
also at the UK’s Mission to the UN in Geneva.
OHCHR provides an annual report of activities including financial statements showing an
extensive breakdown of income and expenditure. Its budget is agreed biennially by the 5th
Committee of the General Assembly. All Member States are given an opportunity to
comment on the budget. The next budget negotiations are due to take place in autumn
2011. OHCHR is only part of the Secretariat bidding for an increase in budget (current level
of funding from UN Regular Budget is 2.8%). DFID’s voluntary core financial contribution is
accounted for through a biennial set of certified accounts. The Board of Auditors is
responsible for the biennial report which is attached to the main Secretariat accounts
published as a General Assembly document in the autumn following the end of the financial
period. This report provides an opinion on the financial integrity of the organisation. The
next report is expected to be published in autumn 2012.
Member states are provided with a Programme Performance Report on a biennial basis from
the Policy and Oversight Coordination Services of the Office of the Under-Secretary
General’s Department of Management. Donors can raise issues at donor consultation
meetings.
Management Case
A. Oversight
Governance arrangements
OHCHR is a small division of the UN Secretariat and therefore has no separate governing
board. Its mandate is set by the UN General Assembly and more broadly by the UN Charter.
Under the terms of her mandate the High Commissioner is subject to the authority of the UN
Secretary-General. OHCHR is also mandated to undertake certain activities by both the
HRC and General Assembly resolutions. The UK, as a Member State, mandates some work
through resolutions agreed in those fora.
As a division of the UN Secretariat, OHCHR’s broad plans are agreed every biennium by the
General Assembly. During these negotiations, the UK plays an active role, particularly to
defend the OHCHR’s independence. Others use this opportunity to try and dictate the sort
of programmes and issues in which the Office should focus on – whilst we defend the right of
the High Commissioner to determine her own priorities and programme of work. A number
of States recently called, particularly during the Human Rights Council Review, to increase
Human Rights Council (HRC) oversight of OHCHR’s work. However, the Review concluded
no major changes in this regard.
Oversight in OHCHR
Internal audit services are provided by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services.
Oversight services such as inspections are also provided by the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU)
which is mandated to conduct evaluations and inspections on a system-wide basis.
Formal processes are in place that allow for a good degree of transparency in OHCHR
activities. The OHCHR has the same level of oversight as other parts of the UN Secretariat.
Its budget and its strategic framework area agreed biennially by the General Assembly as
part of the Secretary General’s entire budget and strategic framework of UN activities.
Donor engagement is good. Details of financial spend both by programme and field
presences are published in the annual report. At the level of operations, the very nature of
OHCHR’s work, and the extremely political context in which it operates, means that
constraints are very considerable in terms of the detail OHCHR is able to disclose.
The UN Board of Auditors is responsible for certifying OHCHR’s financial statements. This
external audit process occurs on a biennial basis. The UK’s National Audit Office is currently
the member of the Board of Auditors. This audit covers both compliance and value for
money issues.
OHCHR is due to be examined by UN Board of Auditors in the spring of 2012. The Board of
Auditors biennial report is attached to the main Secretariat accounts and will be published as
a General Assembly document in autumn 2012.
B. Management
DFID and FCO staff exercise due diligence in oversight of OHCHR’s activities. Key
documents and reports are scrutinised to ensure that funds are spent efficiently and
effectively to maximise the impact of OHCHR’s work.
DFID has adequate staff resources to provide proportionate management and oversight of
UK taxpayers’ funds. The team responsible for relations and oversight with OHCHR will be
led by an A2 Team Leader in DFID’s United Nations and Commonwealth Department
(UNCD). The team leader is also responsible for three other agencies: UNDP, UNICEF and
UN Women. The A2 Accountability Adviser will be the direct agency lead and will give a
proportion of her time to this. All programme management, including project reviews and
payments will be the responsibility of a dedicated B2 Programme Officer. All programme
management activities will be carried out in accordance with the DFID oversight
requirements.
The UK Mission to the UN (UKMIS) in Geneva is the focal point for engagement with
OHCHR. UKMIS will take the lead on issues where discussions are sensitive and a face-toface meeting is required to ensure appropriate oversight. The UK Mission to the UN
(UKMIS) in New York can also play a role where the discussions relate to wider UN issues of
peace and security, or development.
UNCD’s A2 results adviser will provide policy advice on the appropriateness and
effectiveness of OHCHR’s results systems. Governance advice may also be provided if
needed.
DFID’s Internal Audit Department will provide advice on key financial papers. Procurement
department will also provide advice and guidance on procurement issues as necessary.
Technical inputs will be provided by a Governance Adviser in Policy Division. The
Governance Adviser dedicates approximately 10 – 20% of time to human rights. This will
include support provided on issues relating to OHCHR.
UNCD will also use contacts with a range of DFID and other member state country offices to
improve the feedback on OHCHR’s performance in country.
We will continue to work closely with the Human Rights sections at the UK Mission in
Geneva and New York as well as with key Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
colleagues in London. As the FCO is responsible for Human Rights within Her Majesty’s
Government then they will provide a vital steer on the international and political perspectives.
C. Conditionality
The level of funding for the outer 2 years will be dependent on progress being made against
the reform agenda which was set out in the MAR. If there is little or no progress further
consideration will be required as to whether funding should be decreased or voluntary noncore against specific projects/programmes.
D. Monitoring and Evaluation
As part of this business case DFID has developed a logical framework (log-frame) which will
be used to measure OHCHR’s progress annually. The baseline for reforms in the log-frame
will be the results of the MAR. The log-frame shows the high-level goals which have been
set and contain indicators (what we will measure), milestones (how the end result will be
reached) and targets, (what should be achieved by the end date). The information in the logframe will be reviewed annually to check if progress is being made.
The progress will be assessed through information provided by OHCHR in a range of
different reports. We will also seek opinions from the DFID country offices who work directly
with OHCHR in-country. This will allow a systematic monitoring of performance at country
level. Their views will be incorporated in the reviews.
OHCHR plans to publish an update to its strategic management plan covering 2012 to 2013
by the end of this calendar year. This will include new details of targets (which are not
currently available). A new four year OMP will then be produced for the period 2014-17.
DFID will revise the log frame after each of these new OMPs has been produced, with a view
to maximising our use of OHCHR’s own indicators. It should be noted that monitoring of
OHCHR’s performance is at present difficult because, as noted in the MAR, OHCHR’s
results based management systems are weak. Progress is being made (such as the recent
introduction of reporting at results rather than activity level, and the establishment of a new
IT platform for monitoring). DFID will continue to press for improvement and will update the
log frame as advances are made.
Technical level outputs are also included in the logframe and reporting against the targets as
set out in the strategic plan must result in OHCHR being able to demonstrate its contribution
to development outcomes which are critical to UK objectives.
The first annual review will assess OHCHR’s progress against key reforms and if there have
been no major events which would knock the reforms off track. At the mid-point a more
holistic review will be undertaken that will result in OHCHR’s funding levels being reviewed.
E. Risk Assessment
The nature and political sensitivity of OHCHR’s work often constrain and limited the scope
for reform in the area of human rights. It can only operate in countries at the invitation of the
recipient government. To mitigate this risk it is imperative that the UK works closely with
OHCHR Senior Management and likeminded donors to agree sufficiently broad parameters
for reform.
Risk
Probability
Reforms stall due Medium
to
wider
inefficiencies in UN
Secretariat
operations
on
which
OHCHR
depends.
Impact
Mitigating actions
Medium Push from UK for greater
efficiency in the wider UN reform
context, e.g. in Fifth Committee,
ACABQ,
Geneva
Group
discussions.
OHCHR’s Strategic Medium
Management Plan
moves away from
areas of strength
and UK interest,
esp. fragile states
and
gender
objectives.
UK Posts and DFID Medium
country offices do
not
prioritise
stronger
OHCHR
operations.
Increased
work Medium
mandated by the
Human
Rights
Council leads to
OHCHR reducing
country-work
of
value to HMG
High
Use a range of contacts with
High Commissioner (inc UKMis
Geneva, Ministers, HRC etc) to
raise the UK’s key human rights
priorities
and
have
these
reflected in OHCHR’s work.
Medium Focus on small number of
country offices where more
effective OHCHR operations are
important.
High
Encourage OHCHR to prioritise
effectively to ensure other
important areas of its work are
not overlooked.
F. Results and Benefits Management
The logical framework sets out the goal, impact, outcomes and outputs for this business
case. The logical framework is based on the reform priorities identified through the MAR and
if these are delivered this should lead to better, more efficient performance by the agency at
the country level. Milestones have been included where possible to assess if progress is on
track.
OHCHR plans to publish an update to its management plan by the end of 2011. We will
revisit the log-frame after this in seeking to ensure that we use OHCHR’s own targets and
baselines as far as possible. We are also likely to undertake major changes after the mid
point review in 2013 and will seek to introduce more targets that relate to OHCHR’s incountry delivery and MAR reform areas. In the interim:
 Overachievement would constitute OHCHR being judged as a satisfactory performer
against the MAR reform areas (results, evaluation and working in areas of
comparative advantage) and no slippage in all other areas by the mid-point review in
2013.
 Underachievement would constitute OHCHR being judged to have made no, or
negative, progress against the MAR reform areas (results, evaluation and working in
areas of comparative advantage) by the mid-point review in 2013.
DFID will increase our engagement with DFID country offices and other non-focus countries
to gather more feedback on OHCHR’s performance in-country.
The log-frame is annexed.