Paper presented at the ESA 8th Conference,
3rd-6th September, 2007
Glasgow Caledonian & Strathclyde University
Understanding Class in Contemporary Societies
Abstract:
In this paper, I argue that claims about the death of class and the coming of the classless society are
premature. Such claims are seldom genuinely empirical, and the theoretical argument often refers to
a simple and therefore easily dismissible concept of class. By rejecting the concept of class
altogether, sociological theory runs the risk of loosing the capacity for analysing stratification and
vertical differentiation of power and freedom, which in late modernity seem to be a of continuing
importance. Hence, I argue that although class analysis faces a number of serious challenges, it is
possible to reinvent class analysis. The sociology of Pierre Bourdieu in many ways introduces an
appropriate paradigm, and the paper therefore critically discusses Bourdieu’s concept of class. Since
the “Bourdieuan” class concept is primarily epistemological, i.e. a research strategy more than a
theory, empirical examples from a recent study of class and politics in Denmark will be provided.
Here emphasis will be placed upon the ways in which the Bourdieuan class concept can help
overcome some of the problems of previous class concepts.
By Gitte Sommer Harrits, Ph D, Post.doc.
Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark
e-mail: gitte@ps.au.dk
NB: Please note change of affiliation compared to conference programme
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Understanding class and the effects of class
As noted by Erik Olin Wright, the field of class analysis can be seen as an “independent variable
specialty” (Wright, 1997: 1). This means that class analysis typically focuses on the effects of a
single independent variable, much like the field of e.g. endocrinology, where the various effects of
the hormone system are explored. Doing class analysis, we are interested in finding out, whether or
not class has an effect on different areas of life. We do not intend to fully explain these social
phenomena, and we do not claim that class can be seen as the only variable of importance. Perhaps
we include other variables or mechanisms interacting with class, but the main purpose is to discover
– or to rule out – the effects of class.
However, class analysis is also interested in uncovering (aspects of) the social order. Put
simply, the traditional Marxist as well as Weberian concepts of class are deeply intertwined with the
sociological understanding of society, or at least with the structural levels of society. For Marx,
classes were constituted by the social division of labour and the social relations of ownership and
control in a society, whereas for Weber classes were an aspect of the distribution of resources of
value on a market as well as an aspect of the distribution of power in a society. Thus, the traditional
conceptions of class had a descriptive as well as an explanatory component.
Further, class analysis has typically puzzled with the relations between structure and agency,
or with the relations between the objective and subjective forms of class. Hence, the question of
how to understand structural effects or constraints on individual action, and how to understand the
relations between structures of class and processes of class formation has been discussed within the
different approaches to class analysis. So, although Wright is right in suggesting that class analysis
is an “independent variable specialty”, one should not ignore the aspects of class analysis that are
deeply rooted in some of the most basic questions of sociology, namely the question of what society
looks like, and the question of how society and individual action are related.
Today, class analysis seems to be gasping for breath. On the one hand, defenders of class
analysis seem to be reluctant to take up discussions of social order and action, focusing in stead on
the modelling of empirical effects. In light of decades of abstract and often fruitless theoretical
debates within some traditions of class analysis, this refuge of empirical data analysis and
“muddling through with somewhat less certain concepts” (Wright, 1997: xxix) may be
understandable. However, it is also unfortunate, since the lack of understanding of the concept (and
phenomenon) of class hinders the understanding of its effects. Put differently, it may be interesting
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to measure the effects of class on different aspects of political behaviour, but if we do not
understand, what we have measured, perhaps the results are of somewhat less use.
On the other hand, a consensus seems to be forming, that class analysis is outdated, and
therefore not worth exploring, neither theoretically nor empirically. Thus, different sociologists
have claimed the death of class, pointing out that in late modernity either class structures are gone,
or they do no longer have any effects. However, by rejecting the concept of class altogether,
sociological theory runs the risk of loosing the capacity for analysing stratification, distributions of
power and conflict, which even in late modernity seems to be important dimensions.
In the following, I take up the theoretical discussion of how we can understand class in our
contemporary societies, i.e. how we can insist on understanding class in its sociological context of
social order and individual action as well as group formation. First, I briefly discuss (some of) the
claims of the coming of a classless society and some of the problems of traditional class concepts.
Second I discuss the main lines of the Bourdieuian class concept, along with an empirical example
of class analysis. Finally I conclude by discussing the merits and continuing problems of a
Bourdieuian class analysis.
The death of class?
Under this intentionally provocative heading, Jan Pakulski and Malcolm Waters (1996a) have
argued that the whole tradition of class analysis is “passé”. Their argument touches upon several
aspects; however the main argument is that today the concept of class no longer captures the
important dimensions of conflict, stratification and inequality. Here, I discuss their argument in
somewhat detail, since it presents (and summarizes) the arguments presented by many critics of
class analysis (e.g. Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, Beck 1992, Pahl 1989)
The point of departure for Pakulski and Waters is a class concept fairly close to the Marxist
tradition. Thus class is defined as referring to “a specific social location and causality, a specific
pattern of groupness, and a specific form of identification”, and it is underlined that class is
“primarily about economic-productive location and determination” (Pakulski & Waters, 1996a: 2).
From this point of departure, it is argued that class theory and the broader and more
multidimensional tradition of class analysis faces a number of theoretical problems. These are 1) the
problem of economism, i.e. the claim that the economic structures of society are fundamental to the
structure of society and the structuring of actions; 2) the problem of groupness, i.e. the claim that
classes are distinct from each other and hence constitute real groups and not just theoretical
3
categories; 3) the problem of identity (and causality), claiming that classes do have effects beyond
the area of economics, determining cultural and individual identities; and 4) the problem of
collective action and transformative capacities, i.e. the claim that classes can be seen as instigating
social change (Pakulski & Waters, 1996a: 8-15).
With the outline of these four theoretical problems, the main structure of Pakulski and
Waters’ empirical argument is also presented. Thus, in the remaining parts of the book, different
kinds of empirical evidence are put forward, showing how class analysis is not only theoretically
problematic but also empirically wrong. Thus, for instance, it is argued that economic structures are
not empirically fundamental to patterns of inequality or formations of groups and identity. Further,
it is argued that economic structures have changed dramatically (due to e.g. state intervention and
new forms of production and organization), with the result that the basic Marxist conception of the
distribution of ownership and control is simply not in line with reality. Also, Pakulski and Waters
discusses the empirical bearings of the claim of groupness and identity, drawing on the great
amount of research that shows how class can be seen as only one element (and typically an element
of declining importance) in these processes.
I do not wish to argue with this. Pakulski and Waters do point toward important theoretical
problems within the traditional Marxist conception of class, and these problems may even be
present in other traditions as well. The problem is, though, that taking this point of departure, they
limit their critique towards a class concept that is on the one hand very simple, i.e. only including
production structures, and on the other hand very demanding, i.e. claiming a causal model including
both group formation, identity and transformative capacities. And in light of this concept, the
empirical evidence is fairly straightforward.
As an alternative to class analysis, Pakulski and Waters present a “status-conventional
theory”, arguing also empirically that societies are changing from a phase of class societies towards
a “culturalist or status-conventionalist phase” (Pakulski & Waters, 1996a: 152-158). This change
(theoretically as well as empirically) involves several claims: First it is argued, that stratification is
primarily cultural, i.e. organized around differences of lifestyles, aesthetics, consumption etc.
Second, it is argued that differences of “statuses” are fragmented, presenting a complex and
overlapping web of shifting positions and identities, which furthermore must be seen as fluid and
constantly negotiated and changing. Finally it is argued that statuses are increasingly created within
autonomous areas of society, meaning that the formation of identities and conflicts increasingly
follows distinct and different logics within e.g. religion, culture and politics. These argument are
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consistent with developments within sociology, pointing towards functional differentiation (e.g.
Luhman, 1997), as well as reflexivity and fluidity as basic aspects of late modernity (e.g.Giddens,
1991).
However, suggesting this status-oriented approach to the study of inequality and conflict
clearly departs from the basic intentions of class analysis, i.e. the problem of the social order, and
instead introduces the concept of identity formation as the key aspect. Of course the analysis of
formations of identity and statuses in late modernity is interesting and important. However, it
misses the basic aspects of structurally founded distributions and conflicts of power and resources.
Further, the change of approach and focus is not supported by the critique of the class concept, and
it is not supported by the empirical evidence put forward by Pakulski and Waters. Thus, it may be
that traditional class concepts do not have much success in explaining the formation of groups and
identity. But this does not necessarily mean that there are no structural patterns to be found within
these cultural processes, or that structural inequalities have withered away.
The only argument presented for not trying to reformulate class analysis is that this would
amount to stretching the theoretical concept too far. Pakulski and Waters (1996a: 150-151) argue
ironically, that the reaction to critique from traditional class analysis is one of three: Either,
researchers just keep on claiming that classes exist, despite evidence to the contrary. Or researcher
keep moving the target, arguing that classes do exist, although they may not be exactly classes, or
may not be exactly founded within economic structures, or may not be that important etc. Or,
researcher lower their level of explanatory ambition, defining class almost solely as occupational
categories, thereby loosing the theoretical value of doing class analysis.
However, even though this is an amusing argument, it is not sound. On the contrary, it
points to the basis of the whole argumentation, namely the theoretical choice (or assumption) that
classes are “primarily about economic-productive location and determination”. This rules out the
possibility of conceptualizing class as having to do with different structurally founded resources,
and it constructs an artificial theoretical choice between either economic and structural class
analysis or multidimensional and symbolic or cultural analysis of status and identity. But, as I will
argue in the remaining parts of this paper, this is a false choice, and it is indeed possible to present a
multidimensional but structurally founded concept of class.
5
Defending class analysis
Before we turn to the discussion of the Bourdieuian class concept, some of the other defenders of
class analysis will be briefly discussed, focusing on the above mentioned problems suggested by
Pakulski and Waters. These defenders are Erik Olin Wright (a neo-Marxist approach), John
Goldthorpe (a neo-Weberian approach, although he does not himself use this category) and David
Grusky (a neo-Durkheimian approach). (See also Wright, 2005, for the further discussion of
different approaches).
The most comprehensive discussion and attempt to renew the neo-Marxist tradition is
presented by Wright (e.g. Wright 1985; Wright, Becker, Brenner et al. 1989; Wright 1997, Wright,
2005). For Wright, the main problem has been to formulate an adequate conception of the middle
class, and hence a class schema relevant for the analysis of modern class relations. Wright argues
for the continuing foundation of class analysis upon the Marxian concept of modes of production
(Wright, 1985, 1997), but also that in concrete societies, different social relations may exist, making
the social relations of class more complex. Further, Wright insists on the concept of exploitation as
central to the understanding of class relations (Wright, 1997: 10). This means that social relations of
economic ownership, control and conflict are the basic element of class.
On the basis of this understanding, different class locations or categories can be discerned,
allowing for empirical analysis. In the concrete analyses, Wright has presented a rather complex
scheme of class locations, taking into consideration social relations of education and organization as
well as of production and ownership (see e.g. Wright, 1997). Finally, Wright also insists on the
analysis of individual and collective behaviour connected to class, assuming that the link between
structure and agency (or between macro and micro-levels of analysis) is facilitated by the
constitution of material interest (Wright, 1997, 2005).
No doubt, Wright’s suggestions for class analysis are consistent, but in light of the above
criticism it still contains some basic problems. First, Wright insists on defining class exclusively in
relation to economic structures. Thus, although he includes educational and organizational assets,
these are seen as relevant only in so far as they are important on the labour market. Further, the
sociological understanding of the social order (or late modernity), and hence the theoretical
argument for including precisely educational and organizational assets, is rather weak, and there
seems to be no concrete attempt to consider other structurally founded assets as relevant for class
relations. Further, Wright maintains a concept of material interest, linked to concepts such as class
formation and class agency, resulting in the empirical focus of the effects of class being a specific
6
political consciousness (socialism) for specific groups (workers). In light of the empirical
developments of the political agendas and political cleavages in the western societies this seems
unfounded. Indeed, Wright also presents interesting empirical analyses of class effects. However –
as also suggested by Pakulski (2005) and Crompton (1998) – the stringent theoretical
conceptualization fades somewhat into the background here, resulting in the class concept being
very similar to a concept of occupational groups.
Exactly this centrality of occupational groups is common for both Goldthorpe and Grusky’s
analysis of class, although in different ways. Goldthorpe (e.g. 1996, 2000 & 2002) continues the
Weberian tradition by focusing on market capacities and the effects on life chances, although he
supplements this with elements of Rational Action Theory, especially the concept of asymmetry of
information between employers (principal) and employees (agents) (e.g. Goldthorpe, 2000: 209210). In this way, Goldthorpe presents a class structure founded upon market relations, specifying
class locations of specific “economic security, stability and prospects” (Goldthorpe, 2000: 13).
Thus, compared to Wright, Goldthorpe explicitly rejects the Marxist concepts of e.g. exploitation
and class formation, but maintains the explicit focus upon economic structures. Further, his class
schemes are not that different from Wright’s.
Seen in relation to the criticism by Pakulski and Waters, Goldthorpe may escape the most
serious problems. However, the problem of not including the possibility of multidimensional
structural resources or aspects of culture prevails. Further, the sociological ambition of explaining
the social order is rather weak, and the strongest element of the approach is thus exactly the
occupational categories.
For Grusky, this is the central point of departure. Hence, Grusky (see e.g. Grusky &
Sørensen, 1998, Grusky & Weeden, 2001, 2002, Grusky and Galescu, 2005) criticises other class
concepts for being nominal and therefore not suited to understand the formation of identities and
conflicts in contemporary societies. Instead Grusky suggest the foundation of class analyses upon
concrete and disaggregated categories of occupation, exploring the building of group identity,
interest and relations (of conflict or cooperation) with other groups. Although I agree with the point
of disaggregation, moving class analysis in the direction suggested by Grusky also means loosing
the constituting elements of class analysis, namely the understanding of the social order and the
relationship between social structures and individual action. Thus I now turn to the discussion of
whether there exists a viable theoretical alternative to the drift from class analysis to the analysis of
7
occupational categories, as is seen at both Wright, Goldthorpe and Grusky, although with different
emphasis.
An alternative conception of class
Discussing the concept of class suggested by Bourdieu, it first must be underlined, that Bourdieu is
not really positioning himself in the area of class analysis. Or more precisely, although the concept
of class is central to Bourdieu, it is not the single purpose of his approach. As was seen with the
traditional class concepts of Marx and Weber, the concept of class is suggested in connection to a
range of sociological concepts and along with an explicit understanding of the social order in late
modernity as well as of the relationship between structure and agency. So, one can see Bourdieu as
presenting a new approach to class analysis alongside the approaches of the Neo-Marxists, NeoWeberians and Neo-Durkheimians (see also Wright, 2005). Discussing the Bourdieuian concept of
class, then, means discussing this entire approach or research strategy, including several important
concepts such as social space, capital and habitus. Further, since the Bourdieuian approach is
exactly this, an approach or research strategy, and not really a theory, I include in the discussion an
empirical example implementing this research strategy (see appendix below for a discussion of data
and methods).
Social Space and the generalisation of the concept of capital
Although the Bourdieuian approach contains an explicit understanding of the social order, the
concept of society seldomly occurs in Bourdieu’s writings. In stead he writes about the social space
as a relational configuration of objective positions constituted by the most important forms of
capital (Bourdieu 1984: 99-168). Capital is – broadly speaking – a concept of power, and hence it
denotes the basic structures of social relations. More precisely capital is “accumulated labour”, but
it comes in different forms (material, embodied, symbolic) and types (cultural, economic, social
etc.) (Bourdieu 1986: 241-242). The defining element is, that capital can be accumulated and stored,
and Bourdieu demonstrates how this is the case in many different areas of life (i.e. in many fields).
Thus, one of the basic claims of the Bourdieuan approach is that we need to understand the concept
of capital and the mechanisms connected hereto as a general social mechanism and not as
something specific to the economic field or the relations of production.
In the western democracies of late modernity, the most important forms of capital are money
and knowledge, i.e. economic and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1998: 6). To be precise, the most
8
important and most autonomously differentiated social fields are the economic field, the cultural
field and the scientific field. What is not often pointed out, though, when discussing the writings of
Bourdieu is, that this is an empirical claim. As such, it reveals the specific sociological
understanding of the development of modern society.
Bourdieu opposes Marxist theory, underlining how it is not only the economic field that –
qua the division of labour – takes on an objective character vis-à-vis the individual. This can be said
about a lot of different fields, especially the cultural fields of art and science. Here written language,
the printing press and the standardisation and certification of competence and credentials – just to
mention a few characteristics – secures the storing and circulation of cultural capital in a manner
similar to the economic capital. Consequently, cultural capital becomes an alternative form of
structurally based power, competing for a dominating position in social space.
However, Bourdieu also opposes theories of functional differentiation, arguing that not all
fields have the same powerful position as the economic and cultural field. More important than the
number fields, though, is the argument that functional differentiation is counterbalanced by the
foundation of individual action in the body and the individual habitus created in the life of the
individual and the (shifting) social surroundings of the position(s) in social space. Hence, the
different fields and different forms of capital are not autonomously isolated from the social history
of the individual. Also, it is important to note that the theory of Bourdieu is a theory of practice, and
not a theory of communication (Bourdieu 1987a). Individuals carry with them a history,
consequently resulting in the production of homologous – and not autonomous – fields. And the
fields most powerful in the creation of individual and class habitus, and most effectively influencing
the functioning and structure of other fields are – today – the fields of economy and culture.
Returning to the concept of social space, the main point is that this is a strong analytical tool
focusing on the relational configuration of objective class positions. Constructing social space, then
means analytically identifying the most important forms of capital and the social positions created
by these fundamental social relations. Hence, as Bourdieu suggests, the
principle of classification thus put into play is genuinely explanatory. It is not
content with describing the set of classified realities, but rather, like the good
taxonomies of natural sciences, it fixes on determinant properties which, unlike the
apparent differences of bad classifications, allow for the prediction of the other
properties and which distinguish and bring together agents who are as similar to each
9
other as possible and as different as possible from members of other classes, whether
adjacent or remote (Bourdieu 1998: 10). (Se også Bourdieu 1984: 114)
According to Bourdieu, social space will typically be structured along three dimensions i) the
volume of capital, ii) the composition of capital and iii) the historical development of these two
dimensions. Here, I shall focus on the two first dimensions only. Again, the claim that social space
is differentiated in this way is empirical and based on a number of sociological analyses of modern
France. However, the claim has been empirically confirmed in analysis of other countries (e.g.
Norway, Rosenlund 2000), and as can be seen in figure 1 below, it is also empirically supported by
the Danish case.
Figure 1 about here
Returning now to the concept of class, this is inherent within the concept of social space and the
analytical strategy for constructing social space. Hence, constructing the social space also means
constructing – “on paper” (Bourdieu 1987b), i.e. in theory – the social classes and class fractions.
The concept of class in its simple definition means exactly positions close to each other in social
space. The main point in the concept of class is, then, that similar objective social conditions create
a class habitus, producing similar positionings, i.e. similar practices in different fields (Bourdieu
1984: 167-225).
Although Bourdieu may be seen as following most closely in the footsteps of the Weberian
tradition of class analysis, it should be noticed how the concept of social space and class is founded
upon the concept of capital, denoting – much like the Marxist concept of capital – a social relation
of ownership and control over resources, although these resources, as mentioned, can be of many
forms and types. Hence, seen in relation to the critique by Pakulski and Waters, Bourdieu maintains
a structural level of capital (and power) but reformulates it into a multidimensional and empirically
sensitive concept.
As we shall see below, on two other important areas of critique, Bourdieu also presents a
theoretical advancement. These areas are the claim of functional differentiation and autonomy of
different areas of social life, and the problem of the relationship between structure and agency (i.e.
the theory of action).
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Homology or autonomy? Taking functional differentiation serious
Alongside the concept of social space, Bourdieu’s concept of the social field presents an analytical
tool focusing on the relational constitution of society. A field is a relational configuration of specific
resources (capital) and practices united in the struggle for accumulation and definition the specific
form of capital. Hence, the field is a social universe, where “external determinants can have an
effect only through transformations in the structure of the field itself” (Johnson, 1993: 14; also
Bourdieu, 2005). Thus, there are many different fields, e.g. the religious field, the cultural field, the
field of sports, the economic field and the field of education. Integrating the different positions and
agents of the field is the game of power in relation to the specific forms of capital in the field, as
well as the (silent) presuppositions of the field and rules of the game (doxa), and the illusio, i.e.
subjective feel for the game (Bourdieu 1990: 66).
As can be seen, the concept of fields is much similar to the idea of functional differentiation
and the existence of different autonomous systems. However, as was also suggested above,
Bourdieu is not supporting the thesis of functional differentiation. In stead, functional
differentiation and stratification are seen as simultaneous and complementary structuring principles
in modern societies. Hence, the question of autonomy or heteronomy, i.e. the question of whether
the structures of class have effects on the structures and actions (the relations of power, the conduct
of practices, the formation of identity, group formations etc.) within a specific field, is an empirical
question. Some fields will tend to be heteronomous, showing a structure homological to the class
structure of social space, and some fields will be structured autonomously by their own principles.
But often it will be a matter of degree. Thus, analysing concrete fields, one needs to take into
consideration the effects on practice of class differentiation as well as the more or less autonomous
principles of the field in question.
Speaking of the different fields as functionally differentiated and autonomous configurations
of positions more precisely is speaking of the different production fields (Broady, 1991: 270). But
these production fields contain a very limited configuration of positions and agents. Supplementing
the concept of production fields, then, the concept of spaces of consumption captures the
configurations of positions and practices not explicitly involved in the struggle for accumulation
and definition of capital, but positioning themselves with regard hereto. Otherwise, the same
principles apply, i.e. that one needs to take into consideration the possible effects of the class
structure (homology) as well as the possible effect of the principles of the field (autonomy).
11
This distinction between production fields and spaces of consumption was central in the
empirical example discussed here. In my research project on class and politics, the main research
question concerned the possible effects of class position (i.e. different combinations of cultural and
economic capital) on political participation. Clearly, the analysis could not concentrate on the
agents in the “political field”, that is agents involved in the struggle for accumulation and definition
of political capital, the production of political programmes and solutions, or the battle of control
over the state. In stead, focus was put on the understandings of and relations to this production field
as it was present among the citizens and the “political audience” of a society, i.e. in the political
space of consumption.
Whereas it must be expected that the political production field has a high degree of
autonomy, i.e. that the relational configurations of the game and the history of the field means more
for politicians than does the class habitus, this is not the case for the space of consumption. As the
game of politics and the political illusio is not very strong here, class position must be expected to
co-determine political participation (i.e. political habitus and practices). However, citizens are
orientated towards the political production field, and hence the principles of the production field
(e.g. the definitions of political capital or the political illusio) remain an active force in the
production of practice. To sum up, it was expected that political practice is a result of the social
history of individuals as well as the social history of the political field.
The study in general confirmed this expectation. In figure 2 and 3 the configuration of
political consumption capital (i.e. the ability to follow and understand politics and act politically)
and political practices are displayed. As can be seen, political consumption space (i.e. the two
independent but strongly homologous configurations of capital and practices) clearly has two
dimensions. With regard to the space of political capital, the first two dimensions summarises 67%
of total variance (λ1=0,32 and λ2=0,19), and with regard to the space of political practices, the first
two dimensions summarises 92% of total variance (λ1=0,27 and λ2=0,14).
The first dimension differentiates between on the one hand – in the left-hand side of the
chart – a group feeling competent and “empowered” vis-à-vis the political production field, and
showing a high amount of political engagement and activity; and on the other hand – in the righthand side of the chart – a group that is distanced, dis-empowered and passive. Consequently, one
can say that the most important dimension of the political space of consumption is total amount of
political capital (i.e. the ability to understand and act in relation to the political system) and total
amount of participation. Further, as can be seen from the positions of class fractions, there is a
12
homology between the political space of consumption and social space. Hence, the first dimension
of total amount of political capital parallels the first dimension of social space, i.e. total amount of
capital.
Although the second dimension is weaker in terms of explained variance, it evidently
differentiates between two specific types of political capital and practices. In the upper part of the
right side of the chart, the feeling of confidence with regard to being heard and the ease with which
one feels able to contact a politician dominate. This stands in opposition to (in the lower part of the
right side of the chart) a high degree of knowledge about politics and ease in following political
topics. Equivalently, political practice characterised by action (typically in traditional political
activities) stands in opposition to a political practice dominated by political interest and
participation in political discussions. In the left side of the chart – i.e. in the dominated,
disempowered and passive positions of the political space of consumption – a generally alienated
group (in the upper part) opposes a group (in the lower part) critical of their possibilities of being
heard and recognized by the political system. This second dimension is also homologous to the
second dimension of social space, i.e. to capital composition. Thus, economic class fractions are
positioned in the upper part of the chart, whereas cultural class fractions are positioned in the lower
part of the chart.
Figure 2 and 3 about here
However, one should also notice the reconfiguration or refraction of positions in the political space
of consumption, compared to social space. First, the positions of the class fractions are not as
dispersed as the positions of political capital or political practice. This indicates that although the
political space of consumption is homologous to social space it also shows a relative autonomy.
Further, especially in the configuration of political practices, a group of very active positions (in the
upper right hand corner of the chart) seems not to be described very well in terms of social class
positions. And finally, the cultural fraction of the middle class is placed in a “high” position on the
first dimension close to the cultural upper class, whereas the economic fraction of the middle class
is placed close to the passive and dominated positions of the lower classes. This indicates a
reconfiguring effect of the political field and points to the fact that cultural capital has a higher
“value” in the political consumption space than economic capital.
13
In relation to more traditional studies of political participation, this analyses shows how the
question of social structure and political behaviour should not be posed as a dualism. It is not so that
the politics in late modern societies is constituted as totally autonomous from the social
differentiations of power and classes, nor is it so that politics only mirrors the class structure.
Consequently the analysis of late modernity must take into consideration the functional
differentiation as well as prevailing class differences.
Seen in relation to Pakulski and Waters, this suggests that the claim of autonomous areas of
identity and group formation replacing the claim of class dominating all areas of life, again poses a
false dilemma. Here, the Bourdieuan approach presents an analytical strategy for evaluating this
question empirically, as well as beginning to theorize which fields should be expected to be
autonomous and which fields should be expected to be heteronomous.
Habitus and the theory of action
The final element of the Bourdieuan class approach to be discussed here is the question of how to
understand the structural effects of class on individual action, identity, group formation etc. Here,
the concept of habitus is central, since this concept condensates the theory of action implicit in the
writings of Bourdieu (see Weininger 2002 for an excellent discussion). Habitus refers to different
schemes, e.g. cognitive schemes, aesthetic and normative schemes, orientating perception and
preferences as well as actions of the individual, and produced by the structured social surroundings
of the individual (e.g. Bourdieu 1990: 53). Hence, the practices of different fields and spaces of
consumption are homologues to the structures of social space because of the different forms of
(class) habitus produced by different social positions. Bourdieu summarizes this mechanism by the
heuristic formula “[(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice” (Bourdieu, 1984: 101).
But habitus is not a static mechanism. In the concrete practices of everyday life, habitus
guides the actions of the individual also by orientating itself towards the spaces of possible
positionings presented to it. In other words, the production of practices is never carried out in a
vacuum, but is always a choice between already existing practices in a field or a space of
consumption (Bourdieu, 1984: 208-225). Therefore, the effects of class habitus is not a
determination of specific actions (and even less so of a specific consciousness), but rather a
“colouring” and constraining of practices, much like a handwriting, as Bourdieu points out.
As pointed out by Weininger (2002: 73) there is something “intrinsically verstehend” about
the explanatory project of the concept of habitus. Habitus is not the additive accumulation of social
14
experiences but rather the creation of an integrative principle (the handwriting) that structures the
production of practices and representations. Empirically, Bourdieu poses the hypothesis that the
upper class (in the western societies, i.e. the societies dominated by cultural and economic capital)
will be characterized by a habitus of ease, abstraction and reflection, being able to pursue activities
(e.g. art) for the sake of the activity itself. In contrast, the popular classes will tend to be dominated
by a “taste of necessity”, looking for a purpose of any activity (the food must taste well and be
nutritious, the picture must be nice and the theatre must present plays with a good story or morale).
Third, the middle classes will tend to be striving for acceptance and positions higher in the social
space, although their origin and taste will always disclose their lack of real “good taste” (see esp.
Bourdieu, 1984).
Because of the character of habitus, the empirical analysis of the effects of class upon
practice must try to capture the semantic unity of practices across different fields, identifying (class)
habitus as an integrative principle. This can be done by analyzing the structures of practices and
positionings, and the possible homology towards the structure of the social space. However, a
qualitative analysis exploring the principles and reasons of actions, along with for example identity
and perceptions of the world, is also well suited for exploring the more detailed workings of
different forms of habitus.
In the empirical example given here, of the research project on class and politics, I
conducted eighteen semi-structured interviews, touching upon exactly these issues of perceptions,
reasons and identity. Furthermore, in designing the interview-guide I was guided by the rather
vague Bourdieuian hypotheses mentioned above (see appendix for details on design and method).
The interviews showed how differences in political habitus and practice are indeed connected to
class positions in social space. It is not possible here to go into details regarding the results of the
qualitative study; however a brief summary will also do for the present purpose.
The interviewees belonging to the upper class all possessed the ability to distance
themselves from and reflectively observe politics as a “game of power” with specific aims and
rules. They also typically had a very abstract conception of politics, and they emphasized the
procedural aspects of the political process when judging politics and political agents. For example,
they accepted political opponents as legitimate members of a political discussion. Further, the
interviewees of the upper class were characterized by the presence of a genuinely political logic in
their political arguments and reasons put forward for their choice of party. And they presented a
high degree of knowledge about politics (at the local, national and international level), even though
15
some of them described themselves as not particularly active in politics. Thus the fundamental
relationship to politics present among the interviewees from the upper class was extremely powerful
precisely because it was implicit. The upper class simply saw themselves as natural and legitimate
political agents, and they followed politics and positioned themselves with ease in the political
space of consumption.
Further, this fundamental relationship – this taste for politics –was presented as driven by
political interest and engagement, i.e. as driven by choice, and accordingly, political passivity was
presented as a choice that could easily be reversed. Hence, presented as a choice, political taste was
constituted as neutral with regard to the social position of the upper class, and it was portrayed as a
possibility for every citizen “Many people could do it. It is definitely not some elite-thing”, as one
of the interviewees said.
Besides these common characteristics, the upper class was also clearly divided in class
fractions. In addition to the conception of politics as a game of power, the cultural upper class put
forward a concept of politics as the struggle for ‘a better world’. Also, they presented very high
demands to the political process, focusing on politics as a rational and reasonable exchange of
arguments informed by the facts of the matter. This came out in hard and sarcastic judgements of
politicians, who in the perception of the cultural upper class had no clue as to what they were doing.
Opposed to this view, the economic fraction of the upper class presented a conception of politics as
the technical solution to problems, and the political process was ideally seen as characterized by
effectiveness and the production of results. Implicitly, the private sector was put forward as the
appropriate model for politics, and consequently, there was little tolerance with regard to processes
resulting in “endless discussions” and no decisions. Also, political leadership was defined as the key
to ‘good politics’.
Among the middle class interviewees, there also was a clear distinction between the cultural
fraction and the economic fraction. However, the cultural fraction of the middle class actually was
rather difficult to discern from the cultural fraction of the upper class, whereas the economic
fraction looked much more like the fractions of the lower class. Notice how this pattern replicates
the structural pattern found in the correspondence analysis of political practices.
Thus, the cultural middle class also presented a conception of politics as based on
knowledge and reasonable arguments. Further, their political practice was dominated by
‘alternative’ activities focused, for example, on the concrete improvement of the conditions for
homosexuals or the betterment of lives of children from lower class families. Also, I found here a
16
very clear conception of the legitimacy of the state and the effort to widen the scope for political
decisions (e.g. state intervention in family life). This strongly opposes the view found in the
economic upper class, where politics was considered to be legitimate only with regard to a specific
and limited number of areas. Most importantly, though, the cultural middle class also considered
themselves legitimate political agents, and they implicitly orientated and positioned themselves with
ease in the political space of consumption.
The political taste of interviewees coming from the economic middle class and the middle
class with a balanced capital composition was very different. Here, politics was sees as something
more or less difficult to understand, and more or less superfluous: “They just sit there and talk and
talk, and they don’t say anything”, as one woman put it. Also, the concept of politics was much
more concrete and not at all focused on the procedural level. Asked about when politics is
functioning in a satisfying manner, the typical answers put forward were examples of concrete
legislation, institutions of the welfare state or even the building of a bridge. Consequently, the
acceptance of political opponents as legitimate agents, or the understanding of political principles or
arguments was rather vague here.
Very clearly, these interviewees saw themselves as outsiders vis-à-vis politics, and they did
not put forward the same naturalness and ‘feeling at home’ as was seen in the upper classes as well
as the cultural middle class. They did not follow politics in very many details, and typically, they
could not point to many political questions as important. Simply, they lacked the political illusio
typical of the upper classes. The position as outsiders, or as a passive and rather inattentive audience
of politics, also implied that genuinely political arguments were almost absent. In stead, the
presence of moral arguments about general values, humanitarian ideals, and arguments considering
the style of politicians dominated the judgement of political agents. For example, one woman
justified her political preferences with the argument: “I think she’s really good at presenting her
views”. This quote presents a logic different from the political logic in the upper classes. Actually,
in the interviews with upper class people, often this type of arguments drawing on personal, moral
and emotional elements was seen as ‘polluting’ the pure logic of politics.
As a result of their political taste, the economic middle classes rarely engaged in any
political activities. Some even did not discuss politics. However, even though the interviewees were
politically passive, the potential for political action was – at some level – intact, and the political
resources were not as low as they might seem based on “first impressions”. Thus, almost every
interviewee from the middle class did engage in social activities (e.g. being a football trainer or
17
making social arrangements in the neighbourhood), and the self image put forward underlined, that
if it “really mattered”, i.e. if something really important came up, they would engage themselves in
political action. “I think, if something was really wrong or unjust, then I think I would begin to get
involved.” Notice how this self-image parallels the conception in the upper classes of political
action being a choice.
In the lower class, the lack of political taste combined with a very weak political illusio was
even more evident. However, differences were present also in this group, although they were not
connected to class fractions but rather to differences in other types of resources. The most apparent
difference in the lower class (in the qualitative interviews of this study) was between, on the one
hand, a group totally excluded from the political space of consumption and, on the other hand, a
group who presented a specific, yet practical, conception of politics and a high amount of political
action.
This last group of interviewees in the lower classes was characterized by a long lasting
membership in a workers union, and their political practice and understanding of politics was
clearly connected to the concrete organization of the union. Hence, the political institutions of the
union (e.g. the steering committee and general meeting) and the practical involvement in union
politics had created a political illusio that – over time –had been converted into political capital.
However, although they showed a high degree of activity, the political habitus of this group is not
comparable to the political habitus of the upper classes. The conception of politics was very
concrete, and there was no reflective distance or clear conception of procedures of political
processes. And even though this group clearly saw themselves as legitimate political agents, this
conception was connected to the collective organization, and it seemed to quickly fade away when
then interviewees were no longer associated with the union.
Opposed to this group of political active lower class interviewees, the other interviewees in
the lower classes seemed excluded from the political space of consumption. Typically, these
interviewees did not have any language with which they could understand or talk about politics, and
thus the questions on politics during the interview were answered in very general terms. As was
seen in the economic fraction of the middle class, a moral and emotional logic dominated those
political arguments that were given, and typically efforts to make specific political argument were
presented with too much effort or with mistakes, revealing the not feeling at home in politics:
Further, the feeling of powerlessness vis-à-vis the political system was evident in this group,
however, the interviewees themselves did not perceive it as powerlessness. The question of political
18
action did simply not come to their minds, and hence, the lack of political resources and an effective
political language often remained hidden. Also, interviewees when confronted with the possibility
of political action defended themselves by stating, that politics was too boring or “not for somebody
like me”. Consequently, also in this group the general picture of political action being a matter of
choice was implicitly supported.
In sum, the qualitative interviews revealed interesting differences in political habitus, which
were clearly connected to the class positions as well as the specific combination of resources (i.e.
the combination of economic and cultural capital). Further, the qualitative interviews supported the
conception of habitus as an integrative principle, connected to cognitive as well as normative,
aesthetic and practical aspects. However, the qualitative interviews also showed some interesting
results diverging from the theoretical expectations. First it was shown how the political habitus of
the cultural middle class was almost identical to the habitus of the cultural upper class, and secondly
it was shown that practical political resources facilitated by the membership of a union can have
effects on the practices within the political consumption space. Both these results support the
conception presented above of autonomy and homology being a matter of degree and empirical
variation.
Concluding discussion: Merits and continuing problems of the Bourdieuian class approach
The purpose of this paper has been to show how the critique of the traditional class concepts put
forward by e.g. Pakulski and Waters does not necessitate the abolishment of a structurally founded
class concept. Although Pakulski and Waters may be right in several of their theoretical points,
there is no need to draw the conclusion that structures of inequality and conflict must be analysed
using a concept of cultural and symbolic statuses.
The class concept suggested by Bourdieu, and indeed the Bourdieuan approach, has the
advantage of preserving the analysis of structures of power (i.e. of capital). At the same time, the
Bourdieuan approach acknowledges that power may have several forms and be of several types, and
that it must be seen as an empirical question which of these forms of power is dominant within a
concrete society at a specific point in time. Further, the Bourdieuan approach takes into account that
the effects of class may not be dominant within all areas of life, since the autonomous internal
structuring and functioning of specific fields may be stronger than class effects. Also, this question
of autonomy or homology must be seen as empirical. Finally it has been shown, how the theory of
action can avoid deterministic fallacies, and instead conceptualise the effects of class structures as
19
constraining or “colouring”, or as presenting an integrative principle of habitus which at the same
time always orientates itself towards the concrete context of action.
One further theoretical point should be made, though. Until now, I have presented the
concept of capital as rather static structures of power. However, one of the most important point
within Bourdieu’s studies regarding the concept of capital is that it is dynamic. Hence, as Bourdieu
puts it, the structures of power which becomes evident in an analytical perspective are the “balancesheet”, or a snapshot of the ongoing and ever changing struggles of power. Thus, capital, although it
is a concept pointing towards the structural dimensions of a society, is created in the struggles for
accumulation and recognition of capital. Since capital is a social relation, i.e. accumulated power
which can be used for later purposes, it is of vital importance that capital is recognized as valuable,
otherwise it losses it value. This is not as odd as it sounds. Economic capital also works in this way,
since for example the value of gold, of a house of a house or of some commodity is relative to
demand.
Thus, symbolic struggles of identity and recognition (i.e. statuses in the vocabulary of
Pakulski and Waters) can have the effects of lowering the value of specific forms of capital, or of
introducing new forms of capital. However, this does not mean that we should abolish a structural
conception of capital or power, only that we in our analyses must be empirically sensitive to the
dynamic aspects of capital.
This being said, of course there are several remaining problems and aspects of the
Bourdieuan approach to class that needs to be further developed. First of all, it needs to be
recognized that we are indeed dealing with an approach or an analytical perspective, and not really
a theory. Hence, theoretical propositions must be suggested and made empirically researchable.
This includes the question of the forms and types of capital dominant in society as well as the
questions of autonomy and homology with regard to different fields. Also the workings of the
habitus, both the precise psychological mechanisms as well as the question of how the habitus of
different classes can be characterized, should be explored.
Further, questions of group formation, i.e. the effects of classes as being more than effects of
habitus on individual behaviour and identity, have seldom been addressed from a Bourdieuian
perspective. And as pointed out by several authors the need for a theoretical as well as empirical
understanding of gender and ethnicity and the interaction (or intersection) with class, is clearly
evident.
20
Despite of these problems, though, the Bourdieuan approach can be seen as a promising
research strategy, if one wishes to avoid the crude alternative of traditional class concepts or the
leaving behind of a class concept altogether.
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Appendix: Data and method for the empirical example
The empirical example given in this paper is the brief summary of a research project on class and
politics in Denmark, conducted by the author in 2001-2005 (see Harrits, 2005, or contact the author
for further details).
The quantitative analysis of correspondence analysis was conducted on the basis of
secondary survey data, collected in connection to the research project “Democracy from Below” by
Jørgen Goul Andersen and others (N=2032) (see www.socsci.aau.dk/demos/below.pdf for
questionnaire in Danish). The survey is a combination of a representative sample (N=1385) and an
oversampling of respondents from three different areas (N=197, 202 and 248). The interviews were
face-to-face interviews, conducted in 1998, and the response rate is 65%. This might seem
somewhat low; however judged on a number of variables the sample is fairly representative for the
Danish population. Thus, there is no systematic bias in the people rejecting to participate.
The survey contains a range of items on political participation, political interest, political
efficacy and democratic values along with different social background variables and items
measuring political attitudes. For the purpose of the correspondence analysis, a total of 6 items
indicating economic and cultural capital were selected. Further, 23 items indicating political capital
(internal and external political efficacy and general political estrangement) were selected, together
with 21 items indicating different political practices (political participation, political interest and
political discussion).
The method of correspondence analysis (see also Blasius 2001; Greenacre, 1993) is a data
reduction technique much similar to principal components analysis, but at the same time providing
the analyst with graphical charts showing the structure of data, at the level of main dimensions, as
well as the distribution of the variables and categories of variables (modalities). Hence, looking at
the graphical charts, similarities and differences between modalities will be visible as geometric
distances in the chart. Modalities that are similar, i.e. typically present among the same individuals,
will be shown close together in the same part of the chart, whereas modalities that are different (or,
one could say, negatively correlated) will be shown with a large distance. Thus, the chart presents a
23
nuanced graphical description of the relational configuration and main dimensions of a dataset.
Further, supplementing the visual analysis, a numerical output provides the opportunity of closer
inspection (and confirmation) of the strength of the relationships in the data.
The number of substantive dimensions present in the data is determined in the empirical
analysis, and is a matter of analytical judgement based on different indicators. In the present study,
3 dimensions were statistically present, however in all of the three analyses (of the social space, the
space of political capital and the space of political practices), one dimensions was an artificial, i.e.
non-substantive, dimension created as a result of the form of the items. Therefore, only two
dimensions are taken into consideration in the analysis.
The qualitative data was gathered by the author in direct connection to the project. As
mentioned, the interviews were semi-structured, with themes such as the conception of politics, the
practical experiences of politics and the social background and lifestyles of the interviewees. 18
people were selected on the basis of results of the quantitative analysis, meaning that they were
selected theoretically as representing a “typical person” in one of the nine class fractions. Also some
variation in gender and age was aimed for.
The interviews were transcribed, indicating pauses and other aspect of spoken language, and
were then analysed using QCA. The interviews were coded, first using a rather open form of
coding, and secondly coding more systematically for the patterns showing in the interviews as well
as for some of the theoretical expectations. Also matrix displays were used to summarize and
compare the results.
24