Jonathan Glass email@jon.glass

• Originally from Roanoke, VA.
• Awesome Wife and Two Kids
• Hopeless tinkerer, maker, and security professional.
• MCSA,MCSE,S+,CEH,CNDA,CISSP,GCIH,GAWN

The Live Response Script presented here was prepared for this presentation to frame the discussion. Feel free to use it. While it is functional on this demo vm, I make no guarantees that it will work every time in every environment. Use at your own risk.

I do not claim to be an expert. This presentation is meant to be a discussion of possible techniques. If you know a better way to do something, shout it out. I would love to hear it.

• Motivation
• How Live Response Data Collection Works
– Drop script and tools on target
– Run tools in correct order to collect artifacts
– Securely send back to analysts.
– General Guidelines for Live Response
• An Overview of Artifacts to Collect
– What to Grab
– How to Grab It
– What to Do with It
• Forensic Timelines
– How to create
– Tips on Faster/Better Analysis and Summarization

• Building your own script is a great way to understand forensic artifacts/tools.
• Adds context and verification of COTS tools
• Gives analyst the ability to compare memory artifacts vs. live output vs. artifacts from the physical drive
– Malware/rootkits may attempt to mask processes and falsify output of commands. Hard to falsify numerous sources of redunant info
– Everything means something

• Memory Analysis is ideal for understanding the current state of the machine but…
– Full Memory Dumps are Huge
• Not uncommon to see 8GB or 16GB of RAM in a workstation. Takes time to dump, compress, and encrypt memory dumps to be sent over a network.
• Solid State Drives are becoming the standard, even though they have far less capacity than HDDs. There might not be enough free space on the workstation to dump memory.

• Communication should be encrypted to and from target machine.
• Tread Lightly – The smaller footprint you create on a remote machine, the less likely you are going to cause a business interruption.
– Keep LR Packages small with only the tools you need.
– Be concise. Do not generate any more files than what is absolutely necessary.
• Get In, Grab Stuff, and Get Out – Avoid processing artifacts on the target machine.
• Don’t connect to a Target machine directly from your workstation.

• Protect Privileged Domain Accounts during Live
Response
– Don’t use any kind of “Interactive Logon”
• Interactive Logons store password hashes as cached credentials and in memory while you are logged on.
• This includes “Run As” from the command line.
– Use Temporary Admin Credentials
• Reset account passwords after acquisition or everyday.
– Limit the exposure of a compromised LR Account.

• Batch Programming, Visual Basic Scripting, and
PowerShell are great native options to create Live
Response Scripts
– Stick to native solutions unless you are going to compile your Python, Ruby, Perl or whatever into a executable…every time you make a change.
– Windows has a ton of built-in utilities for pulling a lot of forensically relevant information. Leverage those.

Analyst Target
5. Runs Script
Forensic Server

• PsExec is a light-weight telnet-replacement that lets you execute processes on other systems, complete with full interactivity for console applications, without having to manually install client software.
• http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553.aspx
• New with Ver 2.1 – March 7, 2014
– enables you to execute programs on remote systems without preinstalling an agent
– encrypts *all* communication between local and remote systems.
– including the transmission of command information such as the user name and password under which the remote program executes.

• 7-Zip is a open source file archiver with a high compression ratio. GUI and command line options. GNU LGPL license.
• 7za.exe is the command line version
– Can use AES256 GPG Encryption
– High Compression is great for memory dumps and other large files.

PsExec v2.1 + 7zip = Encrypted Communication
• Great way to transfer a collection package to a machine, run apps with as System, and collect data back to the analyst through a “secure” channel.

LiveResponse.bat
CollectionScript.bat
7za.exe
127.0.0.1
TargetMachine.zip
TargetMachine
Processes Collected Data

What/Why To Collect
How To Collect It
What To Do With It

• Artifact to Grab
– Significance
– Location on Target
– Tools to Grab and/or Parse
– Batch File Example

• Significance
– The majority of the files needed for analysis are locked, open, or protected.
• Location
– Everywhere
• Method To Grab /Parse
– VSS
• Shadowcopy
– http://www.runtime.org/shadow-copy.htm
• *HoboCopy
– http://hobocopy.cvs.sourceforge.net/viewvc/hobocopy/hobocopy/
– Low Level Disk Reading
• *RawCopy
– https://code.google.com/p/mft2csv/
• NTFSCopy
– https://www.tzworks.net/prototype_page.php?proto_id=9
• FGET – HBGARY(old)
– http://opensecurityresearch.com/files/FGET.zip

• Compiled AutoIt Script
• Console application that copy files off NTFS volumes by using low level disk reading method.
• Will let you copy files that usually are not accessible because the system has locked them.
For instance the registry hives like SYSTEM and
SAM. Or files inside the "SYSTEM VOLUME
INFORMATION". Or any file on the volume.
• Works best with the MFT record number.

Example:
FOR /F "tokens =* " %%G IN (' dir /b /a C:\Users\') DO (
IF EXIST "C:\Users\ %%G \NTUSER.DAT" (
MD C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\ %%G \
C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\rawcopy %ARC% .exe
"C:\Users\ %%G \NTUSER.DAT"
"C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\ %%G \“ ))

• Significance
– Running processes and services, open network connections, ARP cache, web history, running malware/Trojans, unpacked/decrypted versions of protected programs, system information (e.g. time lapsed since last reboot) ,information about logged in users, decryption keys for encrypted volumes mounted at the time of the capture, and much more.
• Location on Target
– \\.\PhysicalMemory
• Method to Grab and Parse
– Grab
• WinDD
– http://sourceforge.net/projects/windd/
• Dumpit
– http://www.moonsols.com/wp-content/plugins/download-monitor/download.php?id=7
• *DD for Windows
– http://gnuwin32.sourceforge.net/packages/coreutils.htm
• Memoryze
– https://www.mandiant.com/resources/download/memoryze
– Parse
• *Volatility https://code.google.com/p/volatility/
• Redline https://www.mandiant.com/resources/download/redline

REM **************BEGIN MEMORY DUMP************* echo Checking if there is enough free disk space to dump
Memory
FOR /F "tokens =* " %%G IN ('cscript /nologo
C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\MemCheck.vbs') DO (
SET MEMGO = %%G
IF %MEMGO:~0,4% == GOOD ( echo Dumping Memory start /wait cmd /c
"C:\Windows\Temp\lrscript\LRTools\MemoryDD.bat output = C:\Windows\Temp\lrscript\CollectedData" ) ELSE
(echo " NOT ENOUGH FREESPACE FOR MEMORY Dump"))
REM Wait 30 seconds to give time for the memory dump to complete
PING -n 31 127.0.0.1
> nul
REM **************END MEMORY DUMP*************

• Significance
– Critical to almost all investigations
– Trivial to determine while online
– Very hard to piece together offline
• Locations on Target
– Memory, Physical Disk, Removable Media
• Method to Grab and/or Parse
– List
• WMIC.exe Process List Full
• *Volatility - pslist,pstree,psscan,dlllist,handles
– Grab
• ProcDump
– http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/dd996900
• *Volatility – procexedump

• wmic process list full >
C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\processes\
ProcessList.txt
• C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\pslist.exe
-t >
C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\processes\
ProcessTree.txt
• C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\handle.exe
-asu >
C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\processes\
Handles.txt

• Significance
– The single most important file in a NTFS file system.
– Contains record of the logical/physical size/location for all files on a NTFS volume.
– Contains metadata including: Created Date, Entry Modified Date, Accessed Date and Last Written Date.
– Contains security permissions for each file.
• Location on Target
– Logical: ROOT:\$MFT
– Physical: Location found the MBR(first 512 bytes of on Volume)
• Method to Grab and Parse
– Need to be running with system level privs to gain direct access to $MFT
– Use *RunAsSystem https://code.google.com/p/mft2csv/ or
– PsExec http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb897553
– Grab:
• *RawCopy https://code.google.com/p/mft2csv/
• *MFTDumper.py https://github.com/Kvetch/Kludge-Collector/blob/master/collector/mftfinder.py
– Parse:
• *AnalyzeMFT
– https://github.com/dkovar/analyzeMFT
• *ntfswalk
– https://code.google.com/p/mft2csv/

REM **************BEGIN MFT DUMP************* echo Running fls-live.exe to grab MFT data from all NTFS drives connected to the system.
FOR /F "tokens =* " %%A IN ('cscript /nologo
C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\ListOfLocalDrives.vbs') DO (
SET "BAM = %%A " start /wait cmd /c "C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\fls-live.exe
%%A \ >> C:\Windows\Temp\lrscript\collecteddata\TimelineFiles\flsbodyfile.txt" mkdir C:\Windows\Temp\lrscript\collecteddata\MFT\ %BAM:~0,1% \ start /wait cmd /c
"C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\rawcopy %ARC% .exe %BAM:~0,1% :0
C:\Windows\Temp\lrscript\collecteddata\MFT\ %BAM:~0,1% \
)
REM **************END MFT DUMP*************

• Significance:
– Hierarchical “database” that contains system configuration information, and tracks a great deal of system and user activity. Much of that activity has some form of time stamp associated with it.
• Location on Target
– System
• C:\Windows\system32\config
• C:\Windows\system32\config\RegBack
– User
• C:\Users\user\NTUSER.DAT
• C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\USRCLASS.DAT
• Method to Grab and Parse
– Grab
• locked file utilities
– Parse
• RegRipper
• Volatility
– hivescan,hivelist,printkey,hivedump,hashdump,lsadump,userassist
• Python
– https://github.com/williballenthin/python-registry

• Significance:
– Hierarchical “database” that contains system configuration information, and tracks a great deal of system and user activity. Much of that activity has some form of time stamp associated with it.
• Location on Target
– System
• C:\Windows\system32\config
• C:\Windows\system32\config\RegBack
– User
• C:\Users\user\NTUSER.DAT
• C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\USRCLASS.DAT
• Method to Grab and Parse
– Grab
• Locked file utilities
• Export using Reg
– Parse
• RegRipper
• Volatility
– hivescan,hivelist,printkey,hivedump,hashdump,lsadump,userassist
• Python
– https://github.com/williballenthin/python-registry

FOR /F "tokens =* " %%G IN (' dir /b /a C:\Users\') DO (
IF EXIST "C:\Users\ %%G \NTUSER.DAT" (
MD C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\ %%G \
C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\rawcopy %ARC% .exe
"C:\Users\ %%G \NTUSER.DAT"
"C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\ %%G \" )) for %%i in ( SAM SECURITY SOFTWARE SYSTEM DEFAULT COMPONENTS BCD-
TEMPLATE) do (C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\rawcopy %ARC% .exe
C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\ %%i
C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\ ) c:\windows\system32\reg.exe
export HKLM C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\hklm.reg
c:\windows\system32\reg.exe
export HKCU C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\hkcu.reg
c:\windows\system32\reg.exe
export HKCR C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\hkcr.reg
c:\windows\system32\reg.exe
export HKU C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\hku.reg
c:\windows\system32\reg.exe
export HKCC C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\Registry\hkcc.reg

• Significance
– The cache INDEX.DAT file is a database of cache entries. It holds information relating to individual cached items so that the browser can check whether the resource needs to be updated (eTag) and information relating to the location of the cached item.
• Location on Target
– C:\Users\user\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies\index.dat
– C:\Users\user\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Cookies\Low\index.dat
– C:\Users\user\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History\History.IE5\index.dat
– C:\Users\user\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History\History.IE5\Low\index.dat
– C:\Users\user\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History\History.IE5\index.dat\MSHistXXXXXXX
XXXX\index.dat
– C:\Users\user\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History\History.IE5\Low\index.dat\MSHistXXX
XXXXXXXX\index.dat
– C:\Users\user\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet
Files\Content.IE5\index.dat
– C:\Users\user\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet
Files\Low\Content.IE5index.dat
– C:\Users\user\Roaming\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\UserData\index.dat
– C:\Users\user\Roaming\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\UserData\Low\index.dat

• Grab
– Assume they are locked.
• Parse
– Perl http://search.cpan.org/~ishigaki/Win32-UrlCache-
0.06/lib/Win32/UrlCache.pm
– id https://tzworks.net/prototype_page.php?proto_id=6

echo Grabbing Browser History Files
Set
FilesToGrab = index.dat, * .dat,urlclassifier3.sqlite,index.sqlite,addons.sql
ite,chromeappsstore.sqlite,content-prefs.sqlite,cookies.sqlite, downloads.sqlite,extensions.sqlite,permissions.sqlite,places.sqlite,searc h.sqlite,signons.sqlite,webappsstore.sqlite
for %%X in ("%FilesToGrab:,=" " %") do ( for /f "tokens =* " %%a in (' dir /s /a /b c:\ %%X ') do ( for /f "tokens =* " %%b in ('cscript /nologo
C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\recursionPath.vbs " %%a "') do ( mkdir "C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\WebHistory %%b "
C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\rawcopy %ARC% .exe
" %%a "
"C:\windows\temp\lrscript\collecteddata\WebHistory %%b "
)
)
)

• Significance
– The change journal is a component of NTFS that will, when enabled, record changes made to files and folders. The change journal records time of the change, affected file/directory, change type (eg. delete, rename, size extend, etc)
• Location on Target
– [root]\$Extend\$UsnJrnl:$J
– $J is an alternate data stream
• Method to Grab and Parse
– Grab
• Locked File
– Parse
• Windows Journal Parser
– https://github.com/jschicht/LogFileParser

FOR /F "tokens =* " %%A IN ('cscript /nologo
C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\ListOfLocalDrives.vbs')
DO ( FOR /F "tokens =* " %%B IN
('C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\ifind.exe -n
/$Extend/$UsnJrnl:$J \\.\ %%A :') DO (
C:\windows\temp\lrscript\lrtools\rawcopy %ARC% .exe
%%A : %%B
C:\Windows\Temp\lrscript\collecteddata\MFT\ ) )

• Significance
– Application, System, and Security
• Location on Target
– C:\Windows\system32\config
• Method to Grab and Parse
– Grab
• Locked File
– Parse
• GrokEVT is a set of forensics scripts designed to make sense of EVT logs for investigations. Along with RegLookup, it is able to combine registry information and event log templates to place EVT data in context.
• python-etvx
– http://www.williballenthin.com/evtx/
• LogParser
– http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/scriptcenter/dd919274.aspx
• Windows Event Log Parser (evtwalk)
– https://tzworks.net/prototype_page.php?proto_id=25

• Significance
– Current TCP and UDP connections are extremely important to document while the machine is running.
– Very hard to piece together after the fact without external logs.
• Location on Target
• Memory

• Method to Grab and Parse
– Grab
• “netstat -anto & wmic process get
ProcessID,Name,CommandLine >netcon.txt”
– a Displays all connections and listening ports.
– n Displays addresses and port numbers in numerical form.
– t Displays the current connection offload state.
– o Displays the owning process ID associated with each connection.
• Volatility
– connections, connscan, sockets, netscan

• Significance
– Designed to boost the startup process of frequently launched applications
– Name of the executable, Unicode itemizations of the DLLs that the executable requires to function, Timestamp of when the application was last launched, a count of the times that the executable has ran.
• Location on Target
– %SystemRoot%\Prefetch\*.pf
• Method to Grab and Parse
– Grab
• Just copy them.
– Parse
• Windows Prefetch Parser (pf)https://tzworks.net/prototype_page.php?proto_id=1

• Significance
– Created Date, Last Written Date, Last Accessed Date, Full
Path, Command Line, occasionally the MAC address
• Location on Target
– %APPDATA%\ Microsoft\ Windows\ Recent\
– %APPDATA%\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\
– Desktop, etc...
• Method to Grab and Parse
– Windows LNK Parsing Utility (lp) https://tzworks.net/prototype_page.php?proto_id=11
• “dir /s /b C:\users\*.lnk | LP -pipe -csv >> results.csv”
– LNK Parser - https://code.google.com/p/lnk-parser/

• Significance
– Entry vector for bad stuff
– Exfil vector
• Location on Target
– HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR
– HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USB
– C:\Windows\inf\setupapi.dev.log
– NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersi on\Explorer\MountPoints2
• Method to Grab and Parse
• Grab C:\Windows\inf\setupapi.dev.log and Registry Files

• Significance
– Many cases routinely require examination of Recycle Bin
• Malware often operate from the Recycle Bin
• People delete stuff.
– $I files
• Bytes 0-7: $I File header "01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00".
• Bytes 8-15: Original file size – stored in hex, in little-endian.
• Bytes 16-23: Deleted date/time stamp – represented in number of seconds since Midnight, January 1, 1601.
• Bytes 24-543: Original file path/name.
• Location on Target
– c:\$Recycle.Bin\%SID%
– %SID% is the SID of the user who deleted the file
• Method to Grab and Parse
– recbin.pl - Harlan Carvey
• https://winforensicaanalysis.googlecode.com/files/wfa3e.zip

• Significance
– Logs give timestamps of last virus subscription update, last scan, virus/quarantine activity
– Quarantined files are potentially malicious samples that have been rendered inert.
• Location on Target
– Application Logs
– Vendor Specific
• Method to Grab and Parse
– Vendor Specific

Add anything that you might find useful.

• DEMO!

• Grab any relevant log that has a timestamp
• Make sure they all are on the same time zone
(local vs. UTC) and format (YYYY/MM/DD hh:mm:ss)
• Put them all in the one big file
• Sort

• Linux or OSX command line
If you absolutely must use Windows for timeline analysis…
• GnuWin
– GnuWin provides ports of tools with a GNU or similar open source license , to modern MS-
Windows (Microsoft Windows 2000 / XP / 2003 /
Vista / 2008 / 7)
– http://gnuwin32.sourceforge.net/packages.html

• Grep - searches one or more input files for lines containing a match to a specified pattern.
– http://gnuwin32.sourceforge.net/packages/grep.htm
• CoreUtils - collection of basic file, shell and text manipulation utilities
– http://gnuwin32.sourceforge.net/packages/coreutils.h
tm
• Includes a ton of really useful timeline analysis commands like cat,cut,fold,head,join,nl,sort,tac,uniq,wc and a few others.
• Many of these tools are also included in the
Kludge source files

• The %PATH% variable should be updated on regular and elevated accounts if you are going to use either for timeline analysis.
• Always append your Tools folder to the END of your PATH.
Do not prepend to the beginning.

Determine the processes that were launched during a specific hour that do not have “Windows” in the file path: c:\Incidents\DEMO\TLN> grep "2014-03-14\ 20" timeline.csv | grep "Microsoft-Windows-Security-
Auditing/4688" | cut -d, -f1,10 | sort | uniq | grep -vi
Windows
2014-03-14 20:05:01,C:\Tools\grep.exe
2014-03-14 20:05:13,C:\Tools\grep.exe
2014-03-14 20:06:36,C:\Tools\grep.exe
2014-03-14 20:31:39,C:\Tools\grep.exe
2014-03-14 20:39:02,C:\Tools\grep.exe

This example shows the event codes for the when the Event
Logging Service Starts (6005) and Stops (6006): c:\DEMO\TLN> grep -iE "EventLog/600[5,6]" timeline.csv
2014-03-14 19:48:11,EVTX,TARGETMACHINE,,EventLog/6005;4;
2014-03-14 19:46:03,EVTX,TARGETMACHINE,,EventLog/6006;4;
2014-03-14 17:40:10,EVTX,TARGETMACHINE,,EventLog/6005;4;
2014-03-14 17:38:01,EVTX,TARGETMACHINE,,EventLog/6006;4;
2014-03-14 14:33:18,EVTX,TARGETMACHINE,,EventLog/6005;4;
2014-03-14 13:10:44,EVTX,TARGETMACHINE,,EventLog/6006;4;
2014-03-14 10:49:40,EVTX,TARGETMACHINE,,EventLog/6005;4;
2014-03-13 21:26:30,EVTX,TARGETMACHINE,,EventLog/6006;4;
2014-03-13 13:24:32,EVTX,TARGETMACHINE,,EventLog/6005;4;

c:\DEMO\TLN>grep -E “,URL,|Content.IE5” timeline.csv | cut -d: -f1,2 | sort| uniq|cut -d" " -f1 |sort |uniq -c
136 2014-03-11
98 2014-03-12
53 2014-03-13
31 2014-03-14
This will give you a count of the unique minutes that web history or temporary internet files were created and a rough estimate of how long a user was actively browsing.
Great for when proxy logs are not available.

Determine the logon times and user names for anyone that interactively logged on to the system:
C:\DEMO>grep 2014-03-11 timeline.csv | grep "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing/4624"| cut -d, -f1,10,13 | grep -E ",2$|,11$" |sort | uniq
2014-03-11 12:10:09,DAVESTRUM,11
2014-03-11 12:50:46,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11
2014-03-11 12:59:56,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11
2014-03-11 14:20:45,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11
2014-03-11 14:21:24,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11
2014-03-11 15:16:01,DAVESTRUM,11
2014-03-11 20:39:38,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11
2014-03-11 20:42:22,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11
2014-03-11 20:47:07,DAVESTRUM,2
2014-03-11 20:47:08,DAVESTRUM,2
BUT THIS STILL DOESN’T READ ALL THAT WELL

LABEL, SEPARATE, and COMBINE YOUR FINDINGS
C:\DEMO> grep 2014-03-11 timeline.csv | grep "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing/4624" | cut -d, -f1,10,13 | grep -E ",2$|,11$" | sort | uniq > logontimes.txt & FOR /F "delims=" %i IN
('type logontimes.txt') DO @echo %i LOGON >> FINDINGS.TXT
C:\DEMO> grep 2014-03-11 timeline.csv | grep "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing/4647" | cut -d, -f1,6 | sort | uniq > logofftimes.txt & FOR /F "delims=" %i IN ('type logofftimes.txt') DO
@echo %i LOGOFF >> FINDINGS.TXT
C:\DEMO> type FINDINGS.TXT | sort
2014-03-11 12:10:09,DAVESTRUM,11 LOGON
2014-03-11 12:50:46,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11 LOGON
2014-03-11 12:59:56,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11 LOGON
2014-03-11 14:20:45,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11 LOGON
2014-03-11 14:21:24,DAVESTRUMADMIN,11 LOGON
2014-03-11 15:06:43,DAVESTRUM LOGOFF

• https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/incident/orionincident-response-live-cd-33368
• https://blogs.sans.org/computer-forensics/files/2012/06/SANS-
Digital-Forensics-and-Incident-Response-Poster-2012.pdf
• https://code.google.com/p/mft2csv/downloads/list
• https://tzworks.net/download_links.php
• http://journeyintoir.blogspot.com/2013/09/tools-to-grab-lockedfiles.html
• http://www.emich.edu/ia/pdf/research/Live%20Memory%20Acqui sition%20for%20Windows%20Operating%20Systems,%20Naja%20
Davis.pdf
• https://code.google.com/p/volatility/wiki/CommandReference
• http://www.dfinews.com/articles/2010/12/decoding-prefetch-filesforensic-purposes-part-1

• http://securityscaper.com/Protecting%20Privil eged%20Domain%20Accounts%20during%20L ive%20Response%20-%20June%202011.pdf