Question 2: John Lewis Gaddis, in The Landscape of History, described the concepts of continuity and contingency. How does he define these
terms and what usefulness do they have for historians, academics in other fields, and military practitioners? Consider a reading from one of the
SAMS courses that reflects the presence of continuities and contingencies (whether or not the author explicitly referred to them as such) and
discuss how your understanding of those terms helped you as you read and interpreted the text. For example, place a historical campaign or war
you read about in context by using the concepts of continuity and contingency as Gaddis described them.
Intended
Deliberate
Emergent
Realized
Mintzberg page 24
P 30-31: continuities are patterns that extend across time, phenomena that recur with sufficient regularity to make
themselves apparent to us
Contingencies phenomena that do not form patterns, these may include the actions individuals take for reasons
known only to themselves (ie. Hitler or Lee Harvey Oswald) “Black Swan”
-Contingencies can be limited using scenario planning (Schwartz) helping to limit the unpredictable and bring it
closer to the predictable
-Gaddis ideas of contingencies and continuities is similar to Mintzberg’s ideas of deliberate and emergent strategies
-EOA tie in 1973 Arab Israeli war, Israeli based doctrine on superior armor and air force, and assumed that Egypt
would be unable to attack without a superior air force based on their experience in the 48, 58, 67 wars
(continuities); Egyptians determined to use man portable anti-tank and ADA systems to shift the balance, the
Israelis also falsely assumed their intelligence network would give them 48 hours advanced warning (contingencies)
-Cohen and Gooch “Military Misfortunes”: Anticipate, learn and adapt; in 73 the Israelis failed to anticipate changes
in the technology and nature of war, but were able to learn and adapt rapidly to be victorious
3a. (TOA) Choose one of the applicatory readings from TOA (Kalyvas, Herbst, Mintzberg, Dolman), and
argue whether the author developed a theory or not, and regardless, how the reading illustrated the utility
of theories, models, and frameworks to the practitioner seeking to understand a particular problem or
Buss
develop a strategy or plan to deal with it.
Kalyvas – The Logic of Violence in Civil War
• Theory – Yes
• Paradigm - control gets collab;
indiscriminant violence counter-productive
• Causal process - examines indiscrim vs.
selective violence
• Abstract (Y) – mult. examples; Meaning (Y)
– scopes & defines; Logical (Y) – all civil
wars; Empirical (Y) – case studies vs
hypothesized predictions
• Utility – Examines problem on multiple
levels (macro, meso, micro); suggests how
we should selectively use violence to
evidence control and gain collaboration
among population.
Herbst – States & Power in Africa
• Continuities (central control)
vs. contingencies (colonies/UN)
•
•
THEORY=YES
Causal Process
Costs of
extend Pwr
1
Abstract (Y) – can extend
causal mech over time of
Consolidate
2, 3
Nature of
Africa; Meaning (Y) – IR
Power over
Boundaries
theories; Logical (Y) –
Distance
compare AF to EU;
Nature of
Empirical (Y) – pop/road
2, 3 1= Pre-colonial
State Sys
2=Colonial
density, maps, historical
3=Independent
analysis
Utility – Explains why gov’t of w/ sparsely populated areas
& minimal external threats centralize control geographically;
Control land vs control population; think infl of urbanization
Theory of Theory
Kuhn – The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
•
Paradigm shifts = revolutions (incommensurability)
•
Normal science vs. extraord. science
•
Norm science -> crisis -> paradigm shift
Reynolds – A Primer in Theory Construction
•
Theory provides sense of understanding (Causal Process); a formal
description of idea (paradigm)
•
Characteristics of Sci Knowledge– Abstract, Intersubjectivity
(Meaining & Logical), Empirical Relevance
•
Ideas – Kuhn paradigm, paradigm, paradigm variation
•
Develop Sci Knowledge – Composite Approach (Explore>Describe->Explain)
Gaddis – Landscape of History
•
Historical application/analysis valuable
•
Meeting of continuities & contingencies
•
Tools - selectivity, shifting scale, simultaneity, infinite
divisibility
•
Interdependence of mult. Variable sensitive to init
cond.
CvC – On War [140-42]
•
Task of theory = study the nature of ends & means
•
Tactics easier than strategy
•
Theory ≠ doctrine; = guide to analyze military history
04 - Compare/Contrast Jomini & CvC
•
•
•
•
•
Carl Von Clausewitz
1780-1831
Son of Prussian 1LT
Served throughout the Napoleonic
Wars (Losing to France a lot)
Kreigsakademie graduate, later director
of Berlin War Academy
Influenced by German Romantic
Movement (Kant, Hegel)
–
–
•
•
•
•
Improvement of knowledge
Question accepted concepts
On War proposes a theory of war in
dialogue with the reality of war
Paradoxical Trinity (Passion, Reason,
Chance & Probability) most often found
in secondary trinity (People,
Government, General & his army)
Best Generals posses genius (coup
d’oeil and determination)
Study of history does not supplant
experience but makes achievement of
experience easier (fingerspitzengeful)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini
1779-1869
Son of middle class Swiss
Rose through ranks to become Corps
Chief of Staff under Napoleon
Wrote frequently during and after
Napoleonic wars
The Summary of the Art of War
represents mature thinking on the
subject of war and its many facets
Influenced by Bulow and Lloyd
Presents a rational way to explain
war
Underlying principle of war at all
levels is Mass
Strategic level- Mass against an
enemy in a theater and then
maneuver to encounter his army
Tactical- Mass at the decisive point (
the place or object that once
captured or destroyed results in the
defeat of the enemy)
04 - Compare/Contrast Jomini & CvC
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Carl Von Clausewitz
Sampled history to illustrate support
for his theories
Advocated the use of case studies to
learn principles of warfare
Viewed Jomini disparagingly- too
formulaic
CvCs description of the Center of
Gravity not out of line with Jomini’s
decisive point
Center of gravity featured
prominently in US Army and Joint
doctrine (probably more at the
strategic level- less so at the tactical)
War as an extension of politics lends
itself to the discussion of endstates
and termination criteria
Understanding chance and friction
assist commanders and staffs plan for
uncertainties and contingenciesbuilding flexibility into plans
Link to Linn Echos of Battle Heros
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini
Used examples from the campaigns
of Napoleon- structured as successes
Regarded Clausewitz as too abstract
Description of decisive point is very
similar to Center of Gravity
Jomini’s principles of mass,
maneuver, lines of operation, and
objective survive in US Army doctrine
Discusses combined arms warfare
and battlefield operating systems in
ways that apply even to day
Example- Rational for number of
artillery pieces per number of
infantry is almost dead on with the
number of tubes in a BCT to day.
While CvC dismisses logistics- Jomini
discusses at length
US Military often looks for Jominian
solutions to tactical problems
Link to Linn Echos of Battle Guardians
1700
1800 1820 1860
Linn “Echo of Battle”
Hero /Manager/Guardian
4 Distinct Regimes
(Steam/Combustion)
1880 1890 1915 1930
Computer
1940 1945 1950
1960
(Un Tenable in Practice)Starry/Depuy
Active DefenseThe Big 5, FM 100-05 Air Land Battle-
Mil Revolutions (Knox and Murray)
French /Industrial revolution
WWI/WWII Combined Arms
1973 Arab Israeli War-
Bousquet “The Scientific Way of War”
Engine
Clock (Mechanistic)
WWII Arsenal of
Democracy
/Emerge as Super,
(Nuclear) power
New Look/ Measured
Response/ Brinkmanship/
Containment/NATOKorean War
(Containment) Attrition Vietnam-
Guardian /Hero
WWI/Wilsonian
Democracy
/League of
Nations
Return to
Isolationism an
shell of a
military
(Task Force Smith/NATO-Coalition Warfare)KoreaBrodie/Kissenger/Schelling Limited War/Nuclear Deterrence
Dispersion = Survival on the Nuclear Battle Field/ PENTOMIC
DivReturn of the BN, Reorganization Division-ROAD
US Imperialism
Spanish American War
Roosevelt Corollary/
Regional (Hemisphere)
Hegemony Banana War
International/Boxer
Rebellion
WWII(Combined Arms) Regimental Combat Team (RCT)
Atomic BombEisenhower New Look- Cold War-
Hero/Guardian
(Annihilation )WWICombined Arms-Return Mobility- InterwarRussians (“Udar”Svenchen,Isserson,Tukhachevsky)
French (De Gaulle Vs Petain Maginot Line Vs Arty destroys/
INF Clears
German (Guderian, Von Seeckt)
English (Liddell hart/Fuller)
US (Motor/Mechanization)Mac Arthur, Patton, Van Voorhis,
Chaffee, Mitchell )
US Policy
States or Nation
Question of a
Standing Army
Manifest
Destiny/Western
expansion/Mexican
War / Civil War
Spanish American War-
Century, Nation State
D.H Mahan /A.T MahanCorbettUS Civil War(Rail Road Generalship)
Frontier Out Post WarfareScharnhorstMoltkeFranco Prussian War-
1776
NapoleonGrand Arme Levee en masse/Battalion Carre
Clausewitz/Jomini
Theorists
17th
EnlightenmentUS RevolutionVon Steuben
Fortifications / VaubanFrederic k the GreatDiscipline/Positional Warfare) Classical Texts :Vegitius
Events/Prevalent Doctrine
Sovereignty
AmRev/1812An
American continent
Free of European
interference
/Federalist Papers
Monroe Doctrine
Deterrence/Limited
War ( Vietnam)
Rebuild the Force/
Forward Defense/ Air
Land Battle/ TF Eagle
Engagement/
Global Stability/Deter
Defeat
Nuclear Weapons
Manager /Hero/Guardian
Network/Chaopletic
1970 1986
7. Using a historical example and the doctrinal principles of mission command, explain how a commander and his staff developed and conducted a successful
campaign.
•
•
ADP 6-0, Mission Command – the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the
commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.
6 Mission Command principles: Build cohesive teams through mutual trust, Create shared understanding, Provide clear commander’s intent, Exercise
disciplined initiative, Use mission orders, Accept prudent risk
Mid-Atlantic Campaign, American Revolution
02 July 1776 – Howe brothers garrison Staten Island
22-25 August 1776 – Howe turns Putnam’s left flank; Battle
of Brooklyn Heights
29-30 August 1776 – Americans evacuate Long Island
12 September 1776 – Americans abandon NY
15 September 1776 – Kip’s Bay
16 September 1776 – Harlem Heights
16-20 November 1776 – Forts Washington and Lee
Nov-Dec 1776 – American retreat through NJ
26 December 1776 – Battle of Trenton
2 January 1777 – Washington moves behind Cornwallis
3 January 1777 – Battle of Princeton; Washington defeats
Cornwallis’ reinforcements at Princeton and captures
supplies. He withdraws to Morristown before Cornwallis
can attack from Trenton.
After defeats on Long
Island and Manhattan,
Washington’s Continental
Army retreated to PA/NJ
for the winter. To maintain
the revolution, Washington
knew he must keep a
continental “army-inbeing.” To that end, he
executed the principles of
mission command to
maintain the “army-inbeing” and regain the
initiative from the British.
Kotter’s 8 Step Change
Model and the Mission
Command Principles both
produce highly flexible
organizations where the sum
of the parts is greater than
the whole.
Mission Command Principles
1. Build Cohesive Teams through Mutual Trust
- Principles of the American Revolution
- Shared experiences
2. Create Shared Understanding
- Importance of Army in Being
- Importance of initiative
- Impact of low morale
3. Provide Clear Commander’s Intent
- 3 DOS, Ready to March
- Wet powder/bayonet story
4. Exercise Disciplined Initiative
- Raid on Trenton
- Maneuver away from Cornwallis
- Defeat reinforcements at Princeton
- Avoiding Decisive Battle
5. Use Mission Orders
- Ewing raids into NJ
- Cadawalader conducts diversionary attack to
prevent reinforcements
- Ewing seizes bridge to encircle Trenton
- Washington assaults
6. Accept Prudent Risk
- Cross Delaware
- Attack under cover of storm
- Continued assault after Ewing and
Cadawalader failed to cross
- Left camp fires burning to evade Cornwallis
8. What are the challenges of command at the operational level? How do they differ from tactical command? Give examples from the course.
JP 1-02 strategic level of war — The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or
coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. Activities at this level establish
national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power;
develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans.
JP 1-02 operational level of war — The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic
objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the
strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.
JP 1-02 tactical level of war — The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical
units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to
achieve combat objectives.
Janine Davidson – Politicians want options.
Operational
2
1
Challenge #1 – Transition of ambiguous strategic guidance into tactical actions.
- Example: Afghanistan surge under Obama; Military presented different COAs for
one options; not numerous options; constantly changing end state; lack of specified
end state.
- Davidson – Politicians want options; Don’t want solutions to reduce options
Strategic
Time constraints
Commander’s
intuition/experience
Tactical
Janine Davidson – Politicians
want options.
Dorner – Complexity of
problems.
# of variables
# of linkages
4
Operational
Time available for
planning
3
TTPs and Battle Drills
Creates a well defined
problem for planning
TLPs to execute tactical
mission tasks
Enables the linkage of
strategic objectives
with tactical actions
ADM Reduces Ambiguity
Coup d’oeil
Ambiguity
Minimal time available
for planning
Political Level
MDMP provides COAs
Tractable
Intractable
Challenge #2 – Sequencing of tactical actions through time, space, and purpose
- Example: Vicksburg 1863; Grant managing campaign vs Sherman, McPherson,
McClerndon, and Porter
- Gaddis – Scope and Scale; Tactical commanders control singular events;
Operational commanders control multiple events.
Challenge #3 – Flexible interpretation of operational level
- Example: 1806 – Napoleon is the operational artist; OIF/OEF – BN level
commanders are operational artists
- ADRP 1-02/3-0 does not define levels of war
- JP 1-02 defines levels of war but does not identify echelon
Risk of Quadrant 2 – Injection of cognitive biases by commander into process
Risk of Quadrant 3 – Never engaging the clutch
Q11 (EOA) Discuss the tension between strategy, operations, and tactics. Provide at least one
example from the course.
Achim Hesse
Concept
Politics/Policy
Pursuit of interdependent
outcomes in the context of
participant's beliefs about the
importance and nature of just
relationship, procedures, and
outcomes (Lamborn)
Means
Detail
Strategy
Tactics
Ends
Campaigns, Operations
OpArt: The pursuit of strategic objectives
, in whole or in part, by the arrangement
of tactical actions in time, space, and
purpose.
Ways
(potential)
tension
- “Tension” not defined in doctrine. Proposals: cognitive tension between abstract and detail
(Naveh, 9,13); strategy and tactics are theoretical opposed, but never alone (Dolman, 14)
- All course of AMSP reflect tensions: no common theory about the relation of the levels of
policy/war (TOA), variety of examples (EOA, SCOA), necessity to constantly reframe to
mitigate tension (DOA)
Selected historical/current examples (every EOA,SCOA example is about tension!):
• Korea ‘50: imprecise ends and ways given by UN (crossing the 38th parallel)
• Vietnam ’69: Mismatch of strategy (Vietnamization) and end state (end the war vs. win the
war)
• Afghanistan: Missing strategy in ‘01, COIN vs. CT ways and means, post 2014 strategy?
Q12: Moltke has stated that no plan survives first contact
with the enemy. Agree or disagree and provide examples.
First important step: define “plan.” Are we talking overall operational approach (no details),
a hasty course of action (some details), or a deliberate COA (many details)? The plan is more
likely to survive first contact the fewer details it involves.
Amount of Detail…
Agree (plan won’t survive)
- Complexity of war (CvC, Senge, etc.)
- Interdependence of system elements
- Whole more than sum of parts
- System involves humans (Dolman, 123)
- Emergent problems and opportunities
- Continuities make for meaningful plans, but contingencies will always
appear (Gaddis) (contingencies are probably another way of getting
at the emergence above).
- Initial understanding of a system will always be limited, so plan must
change with increased understanding after contact.
- Impossible for the plan to survive contact, but also undesirable, since
sticking to a plan may cause one to miss opportunities or fail to learn,
adapt, and anticipate (Cohen/Gooch).
- Examples where original plan did not survive:
- T.E. Lawrence: had to develop radically different approach
than initial idea to mass Arabs against Turks in a European
way of war.
- Franco-Prussian War 1870-71: Moltke constantly modified
plan to take advantage of emerging possibilities (trapping
Bazaine at Metz, then encirclement at Sedan) and adapt to
new challenges (declaration of Third Republic after Napoleon
III surrendered, guerrilla attacks along LOCs)
Disagree (plan will survive)
- LTG Knutson (guest speaker): “a plan that can’t survive first
contact is a pretty poor plan.”
- One result of ADM is the commander’s intent, which might be
considered the overarching “plan.” Assuming a decent
understanding of the OE and the actors because of ADM, the
cdr’s intent will survive for a while.
- Eventually, reframing will need to occur. ADRP 5-0 (2-11):
- Assessment reveals lack of progress
- Key assumptions prove invalid
- Unanticipated success or failure
- Major event causes catastrophic change in OE
- Periodic review shows a problem
- Change in mission or end state from higher
- Pushback: is cdr’s intent really a plan? It might be simply a vision
or an end state, which always endure better than plans.
- Examples where overarching plan seemed to endure:
- GEN Scott’s campaign in Mexico
- Philippines 1898-1901
- (But again – did the plan endure, or only the end state?)
Even if the plan does not survive first contact, planning is still worth it. GEN Eisenhower: “the plan is nothing, but planning is everything.”
# 13. What is the relationship between Strategy and Operational Art?
- What factors should be considered in examining the strategic context for Op’ Art?
1) DEFINE: According to FM 1-02 and ADP 5-0/JP 5-0
Strategy: The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in and
synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, or muli-national objectives.
Op’ Art: The organization and employment of Military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means.
(A cognitive approach by CDRs and Staffs to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations.)
~ strategy is more of the art (the what) a vision with a known end-state; whereas op’ art is the how
to achieve that vision that incorporates the science of war, its tactics, constraints and limitations.
2) Use ADM to illustrate the relationship:
OP ENV
MEANS OP Approach
What we
WAYS
physically
have to
deal with
Desired E.S.
ENDS
How we will get
there
To achieve
this goal
4) Factors to Consider:
Historical Context (1967; US/Soviet interest)
Lamborn’s 5 (PLTLR)
Thucydides (F,H,I)
OP Environment includes: Terrain, WX, Actors
and Motivations
3) EXPL: 1973 War (Egypt Perspective)
Strategy: Defeat a superior IDF/IAF to gain regional
and world wide recognition IOT gain leverage in
Middle East Peace Process.
OP ENV
-Egypt
Modernized Army
- Soviet
Assistance
- Superior IDF/IAF
Desired E.S.
OP Approach
-Counter Israel capability
- Penetrate Def
- Exploit & Hold Terrain
- Element of Surprise
- Form Alliances
-Achieve political
victory w/o tactical
surrender
5) Successful Strategies: Include plans that are
Flexible; with planners and leaders that are able to
Learn, Adapt, Anticipate (Cohen/Gooch) ; Iterative
Assessments and Reframing as needed.
Strategy, Operational Art, Tactics, ADM and Mission
Command
Tactics
Art / Science
20 / 80
Operations
Art / Science
50 / 50
Detailed
Direct
Science
Conceptual
OP ART
MDMP
Control
Strategy
Art / Science
80 / 20
Describe
Yin Yang
Senge - Balance
ADM
Visualize
CMD
Understand
Art
(This is not directed toward any specific question, however it aims to tie, questions 13 and 18 together. )
16- Using a Historical Example, examine the relationship between the application of
military force and the use of diplomacy
•
Cuban Missile Crisis- October 1962
1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion
–
–
–
•
Khrushchev and Castro agree to place Soviet Missiles in Cuba as
–
–
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
US supported attempt to overthrow Castro- Failure
Lack of US Air Support
Invasion members cut off and decimated
Deterrent to future invasion
Response to US missiles in Turkey
US identifies site prep with U2 flights
Soviet missiles in Cuba are a direct threat to US
USSR influence in Cuba violation of Monroe Doctrine
US places forces on high alert- USSR does not
US commits to “quarantine” of Cuba. A blockade in name only as a blockade is
an act of war
Land forces begin mobilization for invasion, 5 MEB moves from Pacific to
Caribbean
U2 shot down by soviet missile over Cuba
Kennedy and the Executive Committee (EXCOMM) plan immediate response to
the introduction of offensive weapons to Cuba
Diplomatically Adlai Stevenson brings issue to the UN (Soviet veto means no
action from the security council)
Backchannel communications US Brazil Cuba “US will not invade if the
Soviets remove missiles
Backchannel discussions with Soviets through USSR Ambassador- developing a
win set that can gain approval from both sides ratifies (Two-party game)
Khrushchev shows two sides in communications (internal-Politburo and
external-Kennedy audience) Tommy Thompson knew Khrushchev personally
and encourages Kennedy to listen to what Khrushchev needs to in order to
save face
Kennedy brokers deal through UN Secretary General, USSR removes missiles
and US agrees to never invade Cuba. Secretly US agrees to remove missiles
from Turkey and Italy.
• Utility of Deterrence
• Presence of missiles
eclipsed shortly after by
new technology
(Submarine launched
ICBMs)
• Win sets and Time
Horizons
• Two party game
• Diplomacy and Military
action in synchronization
(SCOA) #17: Explain how economics and economic
theory can influence military operations.
•
•
Economics: study of the efficient and effective distribution of scarce resources
Economic principles
–
–
–
•
Free Market economic theories argue that:
–
–
•
People are rational
People seek to maximize (satisfy) utility
The best decisions are made at the margins
The market (Adam Smith’s invisible hand) is the best means to determine the true worth of goods.
Nations, enterprises should engage in activities where they have a comparative advantage (David Ricardo originator of the idea
of “comparative advantage”). (U.S. nanotechnology v. Vietnamese catfish farming).
Not all governments at all times have subscribed to classical free market economic theories
–
–
–
18th century governments believed in “mercantilism” economic theory based on a state satisfying all its economic need internally
not by trade.
Nations pursued colonies to acquire resources. Examples British/French competition for West Indies and Indian Sub-Continent
Naval blockade is a traditional means of trying to defeat an enemy by interrupting trade.
•
•
•
–
–
–
–
–
•
Examples: British Blockade of Germany during WWI
Union Blockade of CSA during the American Civil War
Confederacy attempted to leverage its perceived monopoly on cotton by embargoing exports to Europe to encourage European
nations to recognize the CSA.
Race for Africa in 1880s.
Nazi Germany believed in autarkic self sufficiency. Can make an economic argument for attack east. Need to acquire sufficient
land/resources to allow Germany to be self-sufficient.
Soviet Union believed in Marxist economics. All wars were capitalist wars. Capitalist nations fought each other for access of
markets. Imperialism was the final stage of capitalism because capitalists had expropriated all the surplus wealth in the home
nation and had to colonize foreign territories for resources and to find new wealth to expropriate. Eventually capitalist
economies would collapse due to their internal contradictions and Marxism would triumph.
Strong argument that U.S. commitments in the Middle East are driven by the need to maintain free flow of relatively inexpensive
oil. Carter Doctrine, Desert Storm/Desert Shield.
OPEC Decision to embargo oil during the 1973 Yom Kippur War is an example of Arab nations seeking to exploit their control of
much of the world’s oil supply for military gain.
Ability to borrow money/engage in deficit spending critical to fighting wars
–
–
–
First U.S. income tax passed during the American Civil War. Also first use of fiat money in the U.S. “Greenbacks”
Stability of US financial markets/economy critical to US strategic strength.
Financial crisis was a threat to the U.S. strategically
# 18. Using History, Theory, and Doctrine explain the relationship between conceptual and
detailed planning.
1) DEFINE: According to ADP 5-0, FM 1-02, and JP 5-0.
2) EXPL: FP War 1870
ADM
D.E – Unify Germany
O.E. – FR Army, Nap III,
Terrain, FR vs DE Infra’, Alliances
O.A. – 1 Front vs 3 Fronts
(Deciding which approach best
gets from the current env’ to
the desired end-state.
MDMP – Once O.A. is
decided MDMP details the best
COAs to achieve the End-state.
1. Receipt Mission
2. MA
3. CO Dev
4. COA Analysis
5. COA Comparison
6. COA Approval
7. Orders Production
Reframing happens throughout
ADM and is ongoing within
MDMPs via staff estimates)
Conceptual Planning: Best described via the Army definition of design – “A method for
applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize and describe complex
and ill structured problems, and develop approaches to solve them. Strategic and
High Operational Level. An iterative and dynamic process. Reflects on going learning,
adaptation. Asking: Is the mission scoped properly?
Detailed Planning: best example is MDMP as a means to attack and solve an already
identified problem to reach a decision or course of action. In MDMP receipt of
mission is treated as a known end-state, the problem is defined.
• Operational Art is the link between the two: Developing a plan that organizes and
employs military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means.
• Together, Detailed and conceptual planning provides a holistic approach to planning,
they are mutually supporting.
3) Concepts to
Reference:
- G: Mapping the Mess
- Cohen/Gooch: LAA
- Lynn: Discourse of War
- Gaddis: Contingencies
- Schwartz: Futures
- Dolman: Strategy
•Defining an acceptable operational
approaches is based on the means
and ability of those means to
address the problem and achieve
the ends.
•MDMP is the detailed planning of
the operational artist's approach
toward organizing and employing
military forces along specific
LOO/LOEs to the achieve the ends,
weighing heavily on the knowledge
of the science.
Strategy, Operational Art, Tactics, ADM and Mission
Command
Tactics
Art / Science
20 / 80
Operations
Art / Science
50 / 50
Detailed
Direct
Science
Conceptual
OP ART
MDMP
Control
Strategy
Art / Science
80 / 20
Describe
Yin Yang
Senge - Balance
ADM
Visualize
CMD
Understand
Art
(This is not directed toward any specific question, however it aims to tie, questions 13 and 18 together. )
Question 19, Using theory, history, and doctrine explain
the relationship between design and operational art.
ADRP 5-0, page 2-3
JP 5-0, page III-2
History
Theory (Explain)
Doctrine
• operational art is the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose (ADRP 3-0,
page 4-1)
• Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches to
solving them (ADRP 5-0, page 2-4)
• Applying operational art requires a shared understanding of an operational environment with the problem analyzed through the Army design methodology
(ADRP 3-0, page 4-2)
• CvC (Bk 2, chp 5, page 156): historical inquiry, first discovery and interpretation of facts; second, tracing the effects back to their cause; third , investigation
and evaluation of means employed
• JP 3-0, page 2-4 Operational design extends operational art’s vision with a creative process that helps commanders and planners answer the ends–ways–
means–risk questions.
• operational art and operational design strengthen the relationship between strategy and tactics.
Operational Art Design
tactics
operations
campaigns
strategy
21. (DOA) Explain the difference between complex and complicated systems. Using theory, a historical
campaign(s), and personal experience give examples of both, and explain the implications for how to
Buss
ensure relevant action when performing simple, complicated, and complex tasks.
Chaos Theory
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Non-linear
Open systems
Driven by positive feedback
High sensitivity to initial conditions
Emergent self-organization
Limited long-term predictability, but allows for
predictability in short-term
Discovered by natural scientist in 1970s, enabled by
computers for calculations/simulations
See Bousquet & Beyerchen
Theorist – CvC
• Interaction btw animate obj, positive feedback tends
to absolute war
• Friction = non-linear, small events-big impact
• Chance - unpredictable
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Complexity Science
Focused on interconnectivity of elements w/in
system, & btwn system & its environment
“Edge of chaos” – balance btwn forces of order &
disorder, btwn fixed rigid structures & chaotic motion
Complex Adaptive System (CAS) – retains
systematic structure, but also most flexible and
creative. Suited for dealing w/ contingency &
unpredictability. Uses feedback from enviro &
system interaction w/ envrio to develop
schemata/model for how to act.
See Bousquet & Osinga
Theorist – Boyd
• OODA Loop like CAS
• Orientation phase analyzes enviro & how we affect
enviro
• Embraces uncertainty & adjusts to it
Historical Campaign – WWII, Burma Campaign, Field Marshall Slim
Initial defeat chaotic – sensitive to initial conditions (force available), open system (side campaign in WW),
driven by + feedback (JPN offensive), emergent self-org (tactical losses drove retreat), short-term predictable
Burma Corps = CAS – Slim analyzed environment & his cmd’s interaction with it, developed mental model,
provided vision to bring order to chaos
Relevant Action
Simple tasks – battle drills developed through habit, 2d nature
Complicated tasks – analyze to determine structure, hierarchical organizations ok (Bar Yam)
Complex tasks – need hybrid organization (Bar Yam); systems thinking to see interrelationships & change
(Senge), map the mess (Gharajedaghi)
Q22: Discuss the function and utility of narrative in design as well as its relationship to
discourse. Focus on defining what narrative and discourse are, what comprises them, how you
'do' them, how they function, and how they inform design.
Narrative: “a story constructed to give meaning to things and events” (ADRP 5-0). More than rhetoric, a
narrative is grounded in people’s experience, interests, values, possibly giving belonging or purpose (Freedman,
Transformation of Strategic Affairs, 23).
Discourse: debate; open sharing of competing or complementary ideas, often in written form (Linn – TOA;
Abbott – DOA)
Relationship: people use narratives to participate in discourse (Abbott – DOA)
Narrative’s function and utility in design:
- Helps to understand the actors in the OE (ADRP 5-0).
- Summary of an actor’s worldview, circumstances, meaning, motivations.
- Heart and mind, and when they might disagree (Freedman – SCOA).
- Better anticipate behavior, given the understanding above.
- Narratives help influence others (soft power and hard power; Nye – SCOA).
- Soft power: a well-constructed narrative can help attract others’ cooperation.
- Hard power: narratives can help identify what coercion methods will work and what ripple
effects will be.
Discourse’s function and utility in design:
- Fosters exchange of open ideas, especially between commander and staff/subordinates.
- Collaboration and dialogue (ADRP 5-0)
- Complex problems require open testing of ideas (Red teams)
- Discourse helps create shared understanding (ADRP 6-0, Msn Command, 1-2)
23.(DOA) Define adaptive work and describe
how one leads this type of effort.
Adaptive work is able to adjust (someone or something) to different conditions, a new
environment, or capitalize on emerging opportunities while being able to fit, change, or
modify to suit a new or different purpose.
Planning is a way of adapting
the organization to its
surroundings in two ways: by
designing actions in advance
of the need to act and by
supporting the exercise of
initiative during execution.
Cohen & Gooch
•Learning
•Adaptive
•Anticipate
Because of the unpredictability of
war, a good plan should be flexible,
allowing us to adapt quickly to a
broad variety of circumstances. This
obviates the need to develop explicit
courses of action for an unlimited
number of possible contingencies.
The level of flexibility in a plan should
be in direct proportion to the level of
uncertainty and fluidity in the
situation.
ADP 6-0, Mission Command – the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using
mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile
and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.
6 Mission Command principles: Build cohesive teams through mutual trust, Create shared
understanding, Provide clear commander’s intent, Exercise disciplined initiative, Use mission
orders, Accept prudent risk
(DOA) #25: Using a military historical case, explain how an
organization or individual achieved their design goals.
•
•
•
•
ADM: Define the current state; Define the desired endstate; Define the problem; develop an
operational approach(es)
ADRP 5.0 definition: “methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand,
visualize and describe problems and approaches to solving them”
Means to begin understanding and developing potential solutions to “ill structured” problems
Curtis LeMay use of B-29
–
•
German Army 1917 Infiltration tactics
–
•
•
•
•
•
Designed for high altitude, precision bombing in formation with HE ordnance from China. Used by LeMay for
low altitude area bombing with incendiary bombs . Bombers did not fly in formation. Attacks launched from
the Marianas.
How to launch successful offensive on the WWI Western Front despite trenches, massive artillery,
poor comms etc. German answer, short suppression barrages, specially trained infantry units
bypassed resistance, light automatic weapons for added firepower in the assault. Tactical success in
spring 1918. Strategic failure.
Grant 1863 take Vicksburg from the south
Grant 1864 fight a distributed campaign to destroy Confederacy. Single “decisive” battles not
sufficient
Nathanael Greene Southern Campaign 1780-81 undermine British control of NC, SC without
winning battles
Ridgeway 1950 stabilize front, restore 8th Army’s morale, employ limited offensives, seek
comparative advantage to facilitate negotiations
Petreaus 2007 Reframe from previous campaign plan. Secure Iraqi population from Baghdad out to
allow political solution to insurgency.
–
Exploit Sunni awakening as an additional opportunity
CONCLUSION: Successful military leaders throughout time have used methods that resemble ‘Design’ to
achieve their goals. ADM is an effort to reintroduce flexibility into planning that MDMP lacked.
Question 27: What is the Utility of scenario for anticipating future conflicts. What did you
learn about operational art from this process?
The WHAT: Scenario planning provides options and possibilities at the higher operational/ strategic level from which to determine what is or may become a
problem. Scenario planning serves as a starting point from which to begin addressing the current operational environment and the possible desired endstate
environment. Scenario planning also allows the exploration of the possible second and third order effects caused by the operational approach (Heisenberg
Principle)
Theorists:
The WHY: Lawrence Wilkinson: “How to Build Scenarios, Planning for long fuse, big bang problems in an era of uncertainty .”
The purpose of scenario planning is not to pinpoint future events but to highlight large-scale forces that
push the future in different directions (long fuse, big bang problems). Whatever you decide to do will
play out with a big bang—often a life or death difference to an organization—but it can take years to
learn whether your decision was wise or not. (Dolman, no victory in strategy, goal is continued
position of advantage) Worse yet, “long fuse, big bang” questions don’t lend themselves to traditional
analysis; it’s simply impossible to research away the uncertainties on which the success of a key
decision will hang. Scenario planning derives from the observation that, given the impossibility of
knowing precisely how the future will play out, a good decision or strategy to adopt is one that plays
out well across several possible futures. To find that “robust” strategy, scenarios are created in plural,
such that each scenario diverges markedly from the others. These sets of scenarios are, essentially,
specially constructed stories about the future, each one modeling a distinct, plausible world in which
we might someday have to live and work.
The HOW:
Peter, Schwartz : “The art of the long view”
1.ID Focal issue or Decision (work inside out)
2. Key Forces in local environment(Key factors influencing success
3. Driving Forces (STEP OR PMESI- PT)
4. Rank by importance for success or degree of uncertainty If we can simplify our entire
list of related uncertainties into two orthogonal axes, then we can define a matrix
(two axes crossing) that allows us to define four very different, but plausible,
quadrants of uncertainty. Each of these far corners is, in essence,
a logical future that we can explore.
5.Select scenario logic
6. Flesh out scenario
•Implications of the scenario, what does it mean?
•Leading Signposts Indicators (indicate likelihood of scenario occurring)
The Application: Gold Stone “A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability”
Purpose: Created a model to forecast the onset of political instability in Africa.
accurately and with a two-year lead time.
Model for instability variables—infant mortality, conflict
in neighboring states, political/economic
regime type The onset of political instability is rare but important
and our goal has been to develop a model capable of
forecasting its occurrence accurately and with a two-year
29 - (FOA) What trends will influence the future operating environment? How will
these trends affect operations in the next 5–10 years?
Technology
•
Cyber/Space: increasing reliance and prevalence of use which
increases risk to infrastructure (JOE 2010). Colin Gray “The
greater the dependency on a capability, the higher the payoff
to an enemy who can lessen its utility, in effect turning our
strength into a weakness.”
•
Increase in A2AD capes: Iran, China, Russia - (Sustaining U.S.
Global Leadership: Pri for 21st Century Defense Jan 2012)
Resource scarcity (The JOE, USJFCOM 2010)
•
Pop growth – expect global pop growth of 60 million per
year. Birth rates increase in developed areas compounded by
migration to developed areas (JOE, 2010)
•
Energy – to meet growing demands - global energy
production need to increase 1.3% per year. Petrol expected
to be basis of energy thru 2030.
•
Food – expect global supply adequate but local shortages –
Joint force assist in distro (JOE)
•
Water – Pop growth & pollution increasing risk of water
scarcity esp in Africa; Tensions increase over water use –
control of water in rivers which cross state lines
Violent extremists – (Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Pri for 21st
Century Defense Jan ‘12)
Nuclear proliferation / WMD is here to stay (Colin Gray
•
We can try to slow, arrest, reverse Nuclear proliferation but
we CAN’T stop it – to do so falsely assumes others will allow
themselves to be beaten conventionally rather than escalate
with nukes
•
Iran/nK efforts to gain nuclear capes/ WMD
Economic – “Resource constrained era” - Sequestration, US debt
and globally connected economies (sustaining US global ldrship,
2012)
Poss future MIL:
Technology
• US emphasis on C3I as advantage (Gen Odierno) = challenge to others
to counter our strengths and turn them into a weakness (Colin Gray) = US
Strength at risk
• CYBER – how to integrate into “PLT lvl” & avoid CYBER Fratricide
• Tim Thomas – CH and RU coordination in CYBER to counter US
• A2AD – limit/prevent US from FOM in global commons; cheap /
availability of weapons tech increases A2AD range
Resource scarcity
• US MIL can expect to be used to aid distro and provide security ISO
USAID/NGO/UN efforts.
• Energy – growing number of countries needing to transport energy
requires defense of global commons(USN, USAF, FID…)
• Food: secure / distro and increase partnering with USAID in 6-9 month
famine forecasting & deployments
• Water – Dip efforts on water use where it impacts multi-states; US
provide MIL Observers in UN treaty monitoring (PKO) (UNTSO ex)
• Pop – Ted Talk – Global POP will cap at 10Billion
Global trends show increasing wealth and decreasing birthrates
challenging JOE pop growth; countries w/ high mortality have high
birthrates and pop growth. Birthrates have stabilized and will fill age age
gaps upto 10 Billion mark (TED Hans Rosling)
Violent extremists
• Future = mix of regular &irregular wars - the challenge is to try to
confine military ops to situations where one enjoys major
asymmetrical advantages (Colin Gray)
• Presence of VEO will drive US MIL use and complicate force
employment in other situations
• VEO seek ungoverned spaces
Nuclear proliferation / WMD is here to stay
• Can not stop proliferation must change narrative
• nK – Wildcard = emboldened S. Korea
• Iran – wild card = Israel, AMB Oren talk
• SY – regional instability/access to chemical weapons
Economic:
• Taleb – Globalization has created interconnected FRAGILITY in
economy (discuss REALIST vs Liberalist views on globalized economy)
BPC
Limited BOG commitments
Post war (Post hero, Lynn)
Limited$ 
Use of special
31 – (EX) Explain the commander’s role in the Army’s Military Decision Making
Process. How does the commander employ Mission Command to ensure the staff
meets his intent and higher headquarters’ mission requirements?
DOCTRINE: CRD’s role in MDMP
• ADP 3-0 Commanders use the operations
process (planning, preparing, executing, and
assessing Military ops) to drive the
conceptual (ADM) and detailed planning
(MDMP) necessary to understand, visualize,
and describe their unique operational
environment; make and articulate
decisions; and direct, lead, and assess
military operations.
ADP 5-0: Commanders role in MDMP:
–Encourage active collaboration among all
orgs affected by operations to build shared
understanding,
–Participate in COA dev & decision-making,
–Resolve conflict before publish plan/order.
ADP 5-0: Commander’s Role in MDMP
–Commanders Focus Planning by providing:
–Commander’s intent,
–Planning guidance,
–Discipline to the process IOT meet
requirements of time, simplicity, detail,
desired outcomes, is relevant and suitable
for subordinates, & legal
ADRP 5-0 Commander’s Role in MDMP
(adds)
–During MDMP, CDRs focus activities on
understanding, visualizing, & describing
–Initiate MDMP
–CDR = most important participant in
MDMP.
–CDR uses experience, knowledge,
judgment to guide staff planning efforts.
–In addition to formal meetings-> optimal
planning results when CDR informally &
frequently meets w/staff during MDMP.
•
•
•
•
•
•
Commander Tasks:
•Drive Ops process thru
activities of understand,
visualize, describe, direct, lead,
& assess
•Develop teams both within
their org and with unified action
partners
•Inform & influence audiences,
inside and outside their org
Build cohesive teams thru mutual trust
Create Shared Understanding
Provide clear commander’s intent
Exercise disciplined initiative
Use mission orders
Accept prudent risk
Mission Command rests on a CDR’s
ability to thrive in the conceptual
while maintaining the ability to
communicate in the detail:
- Understand & Visualize require
conceptual ability
- Decide, Direct require details
from staff
SCOA: Emile Simpson on “Strategic
Dialogue”: focused on the strategy
but applies to the CDR using MSN
CMD
- Plans should result fm a “dialogue
b/t desire & possibility”
- CDRs need to inform their
understanding/visualization by staff
provided details
DOA: Swain, Richard. “CDR’s
Business: Learning to Practice Op
Design” ’09 (concerns design, it
applies to MSN CMD)
- Discourse learning technique
where ideas fm multiple
perspectives are offered/tested in
argument, challenging fact w/ facttriangulating meaning. -- Shared
understanding, which may be
achieved not only by discourse but
also by dialogue, a clear substantive
directive, or explanatory
memoranda, is a requirement for
decentralized operations
-TOA: CVC Pg 88-98 importance of
statesmen and MIL CDRs to establish
the “kind of war on which they are
embarking” ->this transitions down
to the CDR to use MSN CMD to
inform his staff
Question 33: M&W, Explain the moral dilemmas posed by civilians on the battlefield
Main Theorist Michael Walzer, “Just and Unjust Wars “ / St Thomas Aquinas , St Augustine- Jus In Bello, Church Doctrine
Theory
The Principles of Jus In Bello or justice in war, emerged from Roman Catholic theologians around 1250 A.D to govern the rules of just conduct in which war is
prosecuted.
-Civilians on the battlefield are covered by the Jus In Bello principles of proportionality and discrimination. That is to say determining who is and who is not a
legitimate target and what degree of force is morally appropriate to use against them . Also fitting are the principles of responsibility, in that actors in war are held
legally accountable for their conduct either collectively or as individuals, and military necessity, being the acceptance of certain levels of collateral damage
depending on the significance of the military target being engaged.
(Walzer) Just war theory prohibits acts include bombing civilian residential areas that include no military targets and committing acts of terrorism or reprisal against
civilians. An attack cannot be launched on a military objective in the knowledge that the incidental civilian injuries would be clearly excessive in relation to the
anticipated military advantage. An attack or action must be intended to help in the military defeat of the enemy, it must be an attack on a military objective, and the
harm caused to civilians or civilian property must be proportional and not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. This
principle is meant to limit excessive and unnecessary death and destruction.
As the scope and lethality of war increases , issues arise over the legitimacy of targeting civilians. Civilians lose their “Innocent/ Protected status for the following
reasons as witnessed in modern war:
Identification- When they take up arms (Non Uniformed Insurgents) Example 2003: Iraq, The Fedayeen Saddam, non uniformed paramilitary fighters.
Militarization (Civilian who works in military industry) WWII German aircraft factory employees
Responsibility ( A Civilian required for the operation of a weapon system) Dr Oppenheimer during the Manhattan project..
Giulio Douhet, “Air Power” Advocate of the intentional targeting of civilians through air attacks to include poison gas and the targeting of first responders to these
attacks IOT maximize destruction and terror. Douhet claimed this was a just course of action in that the affected population would pressure the government to sue
for peace, preventing a longer war in which many more innocents would perish.
Historical examples of targeting civilians
WWII-Grayling A.C. “Among the Dead Cities” addresses the intentional targeting of civilians in German and Japanese industrial centers as a means to hastening the
end of the second world war. Explores Strategic bombing campaign especially the fire bombings of Dresden, Hamburg, and various cities in Japan. He Concludes
the bombing was immoral despite the decision to bomb being tied to legal intent of attacking enemy war production. Despite Japan’s industry being co located
with the population which equals a legitimate target the inaccurate “area” bombardment particularly with fire bombs according to Grayling remains an unjust act.
Atomic/Nuclear weapons – President Truman dropping the Atomic bombs on Japan to end the war and prevent the invasion of Japan. Mutually Assured Destruction:
Bernard Brodie/Thomas Schelling (Deterrence), The willingness to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet population in order to prevent attack
Current- Drone strikes/ Air strikes with collateral damage/no “on the ground “ control-assessment, War on terror CIA/DOD
Applicable DoctrineUCMJ, Rule of Law, ROE (Hostile intent, covers identification) Positive ID
End state: The dilemma for the commander becomes “just because you physically can do something, morally should you.” Moral relativism in decision making
(Sometimes right, sometimes wrong) relative to the specific instance.
34. (M&W) Make a moral argument for or against the use of unmanned (armed)
aerial systems in war. Use theory and history to frame your discussion.
Moral criteria for war: Walzer, Orend, etc.
•
Jus ad bellum (Go to War)
–
–
–
–
–
–
•
Proper Authority – minimally legitimate sovereign
Last Resort – all diplomatic means exhausted.
Just Cause – Self defense or other defense.
Proper Motives – the just cause is not a cover for
profit or revenge
Reasonable chance of Success Proportionality – Universal costs < Universal benefits
•
An M16, like a drone, is neither moral or immoral.
Yet when used in violation of the principles of Jus in
Bello, they can be part of an immoral act.
–
•
Discrimination – combatant vs non-combatant
Proportionality – action proportional to the objective.
Military Necessity – Militarily relevant target
DDE (Doctrine of Double Effect)
–
-
Legitimate act of war
Acceptable effect
Intent is good, no intent for bad, active intent to
minimizw bad by accepting cost to oneself
Jus post bellum (Lasting peace)
–
–
–
–
–
Proportionality – peace measured and reasonable
Rights Vindication – Human Rights reestablished
Discrimination – punishment for leaders, and war
criminals, not civilians.
Compensation – proportionate and discriminate.
Rehabilitation – reform institutions depending on
depravity
•
Comparative low cost, and low risk to friendly human
life may increase the likelihood of the use of force by
groups with armed drones
Jus In Bello
–
–
–
•
My Lai
Jus Post Bellum
Jus in bello (Just actions in war)
–
–
–
–
•
Argument: Drones are neither moral or immoral. They
are tools. Morality is injected into the discussion in the
way drones are used.
Much less collateral damage compared to ICBM’s or
cruise missiles
Only as good as supporting intelligence
-Post hoc analysis does not meet criteria of
discrimination.
Justitiam Focos (Just use of drones)
–
–
Doctrine of Double Effect
Raid on Bin Laden Compound
•
•
•
Discrimination was so important, U.S. risked the
lives of SOF to ensure we killed him.
If the U.S. is willing to risk Soldier’s lives to increase
discrimination of particular combatants, then the
same standard must be upheld to also discriminate
between combatant and non-combatant.
Currently, the U.S. in many cases is not using drones
within the just war standard. We would not accept
post hoc analysis inside the United States nor by an
adversary.
35. (M&W) Explain how you, a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies,
evaluate the moral constraints and moral implications of operational actions in war.
Moral criteria for war: Walzer, Orend, etc.
•
Jus ad bellum (Go to War)
–
–
–
–
–
–
•
Proper Authority – minimally legitimate sovereign
Last Resort – all diplomatic means exhausted.
Just Cause – Self defense or other defense.
Proper Motives – the just cause is not a cover for
profit or revenge
Reasonable chance of Success Proportionality – Universal costs < Universal benefits
Jus in bello (Just actions in war)
–
–
–
–
Discrimination – combatant vs noncombatant
Proportionality – action proportional to
the objective.
Military Necessity – Militarily relevant
target
DDE (Doctrine of Double Effect)
-
•
Legitimate act of war
Acceptable effect
Intent is good, no intent for bad, active
intent to minimizw bad by accepting cost to
oneself
Jus post bellum (Lasting peace)
–
–
–
–
–
Proportionality – peace measured and reasonable
Rights Vindication – Human Rights reestablished
Discrimination – punishment for leaders, and war
criminals, not civilians.
Compensation – proportionate and discriminate.
Rehabilitation – reform institutions depending on
depravity
Argument: The role of the SAMS planner, commander, or
staff officer is to continually think through and be
cognizant of the 2d and 3d order of effects regarding Jus
in bello.
•
•
•
•
Escalation: CVC page 87 highlights the concerns for
war’s tendency to move towards absolute. The
actions of one protagonist give validation and
instigation of the actions of others.
Political Objective: Doleman argues that there is no
strategic ‘end state’ but rather the goal is to achieve
a position of continuing relative advantage. CvC on
page 89 states that war is a political instrument or a
continuation of politics by other means.
If the goal of warfare is to achieve a position of
advantage through political actions via other
means, the character of actions conducted within
war color the position of advantage to be achieved
post conflict.
Given the stated goals of the U.S. in the National
Security Strategy values the actions taken in war
must continually represent and support our view of
post war world.
–
–
–
Strengthen the Power of Our Example
Promote Democracy and Human Rights Abroad
Promote Dignity by Meeting Basic Needs
“Two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner
light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.” Karl Von Clausewitz