Reasons for inst'l effectiveness and
lack of effectiveness
 Influence and compliance arise because:
 Managerial view: Sanctions and enforcement often
aren’t needed, even for “deep” cooperation
 Enforcement position 1: States only agree to “shallow”
cooperation, so sanctions aren’t needed
 Enforcement position 2: States will only accept “deep”
cooperation in combination with strong sanctions
 Lack of influence and noncompliance because:
 Intention or Tallberg’s “preference-driven violations”
 Incapacity or Tallberg’s “capacity-driven violations”
 Inadvertence
Syria: IOs MAKE a difference
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Chemical Weapons Treaty in 1992, 165 countries signed Creates pressure on others to respond as they
said they would, with inspectors (Alex Bryans)
Strengthens a general norm: “international organizations can have an impact on how a country acts
according to rules shared amongst most of the world” (Alex Bryans)
“Syria has submitted its report of chemical weapons through an international organization” (Zack
Gripenstraw)
“There is a strong norm, supported by the Geneva Protocol (1925), prohibiting chemical weapons in
warfare. Obama stated once the chemical attacks were confirmed that the U.S is responsible to hold
Syria responsible” (Zack Gripenstraw)
“U.S. opinion regarding the case against Syria was strengthened as a result of the U.N. report on the
matter” (Greg Mina)
“Syria sent the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) a declaration
outlining its weapons program” (Greg Mina)
“countries that were divided on the actions that needed to be taken in response to Syria’s chemical
weapons usage have come together to adopt a resolution” (Jessica Neafie)
“team of inspectors sent into Syria: if the International Organization did not exist, and without the
norm that chemical weapons are extremely dangerous and bad to use in warfare, there would be
almost no push to solve the issue” (Emily Gaudin)
“accepted norm provided the impetus for a breakthrough” (Sam Sun)
“Even though they could go ahead and do whatever they pleased, based on their military strength,
they do not” (Joe Sawtelle)
“Through the U.N., Russia’s disagreement becomes very public to the rest of the world and as
international support for action gains momentum Russia was forced to seek a solution” (Will Smith)
“OPCW serves to distance itself from the revolution and civil war violence and merely extract the
dangerous weapons being used against Syrian civilians” (Chris Torgeson)
“U.N. officials explain how they have to negotiate dozens of government and opposition checkpoints
before aid is allowed into Syria” (Javiera Wood)
Syria: IOs do NOT make a difference
 “Obama stated that the U.S. would do whatever it needed to in
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order to protect its individual interests. Power matters in this
case” (Alexandra Moreno)
“largely we have seen states attempting to act unilaterally and in
their interests” (Evan Horne)
“article shows the concerns Russia has and why it is in their best
short term interest to work with the Assad government in Syria”
(Neal Killion)
“chemical weapons situation would not have even happened if
Syria had any care for the international community” (James
Hadid)
“certain states have no qualms with unilateral action” (Alex
Murphy)
“actions of both great powers, Russia on one side and the United
States on the other, are significantly shaped by their national
interests in Middle East” (Sam Sun)
“US has made it clear that it intends to work alone” (Inessa
Wurscher)
Syria: Tweeners
 “The majority of the solutions being put forth now have
happened outside of international organizations like the
United Nations, yet they are using the international
organizations to provide inspectors and the experts to
dismantle the chemical weapons” (Neal Killion)
 “After attacks on civilians in Damascus, there was the
immediate possibility that the United States and its allies
would respond with cooperative and/or unilateral military
action” but then this was delayed in response to UN
discussions (Alex Murphy)
 “has been used as a secondary tool to both justify unilateral
action by some states and pressure others into pursuing
collective actions” (Shawna Meechan)
 “While the US has agreed to go along with Russia’s plan
publically, the US is still continuing its original plan as
well” (Inessa Wurscher)
Brown Weiss and Jacobson
Determinants of Institutional
Influence
 Problem structure:
 Characteristics of activity
 Institutional features:
 Characteristics of institution
 Broader international context
 Country variables
 Characteristics of the country
 Overall model linking these
Brown Weiss / Jacobson
Characteristics of Activity
 Number of actors involved in activity
 Effect of economic incentives
 Role of multinational corporations in activity
 Concentration of activity in major countries
Brown Weiss / Jacobson
Characteristics of Institution
 Perceived equity of obligations
 Precision of obligations
 Provisions for obtaining scientific advice
 Reporting requirements
 Provisions for other forms of monitoring
 Secretariat
 Incentives
 Sanctions
Brown Weiss / Jacobson
The International Context
 Major international conferences
 Worldwide media/public opinion
 International NGOs
 Number of parties as members
 Other international organizations
 International financial institutions
Brown Weiss / Jacobson
Characteristics of the Country
Brown Weiss / Jacobson
Overall Determinants of
Effectiveness
Duffield: NATO Force Levels
 Basic question: “what determines NATO force levels?”
 From 1960 through 1990, not very much variation – so
how can he say NATO made a difference?
 How can this chart show NATO influenced behavior?
NATO Force Levels
120%
% of 1965 Levels
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
1955
1960
1965
Divisions
1970
1975
Brigades
1980
1985
Troops
1990
NATO Force Levels
120%
% of 1965 Levels
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
1955
1960
1965
Divisions
1970
1975
Brigades
1980
1985
Troops
Source: Duffield, John S. 1992. International Regimes and Alliance Behavior: Explaining NATO
Conventional Force Levels. International Organization 46 (4): 823.
1990
HOW institutions have influence
according to Duffield
 Benefits of contributing
 Direct: your troops increase security of your country
 Indirect : by providing troops, it may lead other countries to provide
troops too, since they now know that you are going to
 Reputational effects: may benefit state in other issue areas with
other states
 Internal forces within states may prompt action:
 Strengthening substate actors who support status quo by making
changes to it harder: agencies committed to value of regime
 Decisions are made that are hard to remake
 Agencies adopt habits in response to regime rules
 Compliance may become valued in itself, even if doesn't make sense
Duffield: NATO Force Levels
 Basic question: “what determines NATO force levels?”
 From 1960 through 1990, not very much variation – so
how can he say NATO made a difference?
 Basic answer: threat is changing, NATO should be
responding, but it doesn’t when we expect it to
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US foregoes reductions in 1956; UK foregoes in 1957
Negotiations in 1966-67: smaller than expected reductions
Senate pushes for reductions but Exec Branch resistance
Senate 1984 efforts don’t pass
 Force levels should “have varied somewhat more than
actually was the case”
EU Infringement Cases
(Tallberg 2002, 618)
 Formal infringement proceedings preceded by informal consultations that “weed out
cases … of inadvertent violations” early on. That leaves remainder, as below, that then
also tend to settle “out of court.”
Tallberg’s explanation
 Primary causes of rule violations: BOTH “incentives for
defection” AND “legislative and administrative capacity
limitations”
 Institutional feature and process:
 Best strategy is a responsive/discriminating one: “Enforcement
and management mechanisms are most effective when
combined”
 States violate for different reasons and so effectiveness of
response depends on responding to the real reasons they violated
 Threat of legal suit with potential financial penalties leads states
to respond
Tallberg on information systems
 "To detect violations, the Commission monitors member state
conformity with EU rules, following a two-track approach. On
the one hand, it actively and systematically collects and assesses
information on state compliance through in-house monitoring.
On the other hand, the Commission operates an informal
procedure through which it records and examines complaints
lodged by citizens, firms, nongovernmental organizations, and
national administrations. The complaint procedure offers a form
of monitoring that is more resource-efficient than systematic inhouse inquiries, provides access to information otherwise
unobtainable, and points to areas of EU legislation that may be
particularly ambiguous and in need of clarification."
 Police patrols by ECJ and fire alarms by public and individuals
Tallberg on response strategies
 Management strategies
 “Economic funds that ease and encourage adjustment to EU
policy”
 “Learning exchanges” between executives that helps train those
not complying so that they can comply
 EU interprets rules to clarify where ambiguity is cause of
violation