Multi-Stakeholder Governance
initiatives: Addressing the challenges
of ASM sector in Ghana
Natalia Yakovleva*, Diego Vazquez-Brust
*Winchester Business School, University of Winchester, UK
Centre for Business, Responsibility, Accountability,
Sustainability and Society (BRASS), Cardiff University, UK
Annual Meeting of the American Association of Geographers,
12-16 April 2011, Seattle, Washington, USA
What is Governance?
Collective and consensual actions to address
and regulate welfare conflicts that go beyond
the capacity of Governments to solve.
Governance requires:
Balance of economic, social and environmental concerns
 Minimum framework of principles, rules and laws necessary to
tackle identified problems
 Multi-sector approach: states, markets, citizens and organizations,
both inter- and non-governmental .
 Articulation of collective global interests
 Consensus on the definition of rights and obligations
 Acceptance and Mediation of differences: Deliberative Democracy.
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Figure 2: the IAD framework ( adapted from Ostrom, 2005)
Constitutional Choice
Collective Choice
Operational Level
Institutional design for governance solutions
(Paavola, 2007; Hall & Soskice, 2001)
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Governance functions
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Exclusion of unauthorised users
Regulation of authorised resource uses
Distribution of benefits and risks
Provision and Recovery of Costs
Monitoring and Enforcement
Conflict resolution
Enablement of Deliberation
Institutional rules
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Rules of exclusion
Entitlement rules
Monitoring rules determine
Decision-making rules
Protection rules
Functional tiers:
• Operational
• Institutional
• Constitutional
Governance solutions:
• Community-based
• State-based
• Co-management
• Multi-level
Interviews with the range of stakeholders of
ASM sector in Ghana (2005 and 2008)
Range of stakeholders
2005
2008
Government departments
5
6
Small-scale miners and
buyers
4
0
NGOs
3
2*
Large-scale mining
companies and industry
associations
4
2
Total
16
10
* includes NGO and university
Challenges
Transition from Community Based ( tribal law) to State-Based
Governance Solution (Mining Code and Small Mining
Regulation)
 Customary governance: unified property regime ( surface and
mineral rights). State-Based: Separated Property regime
(surface and mineral rights).
 Design and implementation of to State-Based Governance
Functions
 Conflict:
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Multiple land (farming, fishing, mining) use with traditional ASM vs.
Exclusive land Use ( only mining) with current LSM.
Lack of institutions providing employment/unemployment protection
for surplus of industry specific labour ( Hall & Soskice, 2001)
Lack of institutions providing deliberation spaces. ( Hall & Soskice,
2001)
Initiatives for ASM sector in Ghana
 Small-Scale Mining Project (World Bank, GTZ)
1989 :
Provide institutions and rules to implement
transition of governance regime (Constitutional)
 Mining Sector Development and Environment
Project (World Bank) 1995-2001:
Land use, allocation of land to ASM
(Collective/Operational)
 Prestea Action Plan (World Bank) 2005:
Enforcement of rights of authorised ( state-based)
users, protection of excluded (customary users)
(Operational)
Initiatives
 Alternative Livelihood Project 2005,
Protection of excluded land-users/ surplus of
mining labour, providing pathways for alternative
development based of skills. ( Institutional)
 Abatement of Mercury Pollution Programme
(UNIDO) 1998-2001
Provision of technical supply to reduce ASM health
and environmental risks ( Operational)
Outcomes
 Small-Scale Mining Project (World Bank, GTZ)
1989 :
Acceptance at Constitutional level but failed at
operational level.
 Mining Sector Development and Environment
Project (World Bank) 1995-2001:
Excessive focus on policy but little effect on
operations.
 Prestea Action Plan (World Bank) 2005:
Failed to protect ( reallocate) customary users.
Outcomes
 Alternative Livelihood Project 2005,
Failed to provide viable and widely accepted
alternatives.
 Abatement of Mercury Pollution Programme
(UNIDO) 1998-2001
Failed to provide widely accepted alternatives
Factors for success/failures of governance
solutions
 Design failure:
 Constitutional:
State-based governance is not an
appropriate solution for Ghana. Co-management,
multilevel governance is required when local
knowledge and cooperation is a condition for
success.
 Institutional: No initiatives to promote
institutions/skills that enable deliberation .
 Assumes that ‘unregistered’ can be excluded from
governance solutions and these would still be viable
 Operational: Lack of assessment what works on the
ground
Factors (continued)
 Implementation failure
Top-Down approach fails to interpret acceptance
factors at operational levels (limited consultation with
end users)
 Suspicion of ‘quality of expertise’
 Limited transparency
 Focus on general advice rather than specific
solutions
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Conclusions
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Future programmes should focus on working on
improving deliberation to create co-management
solutions (including customary stakeholders – informal
supply chain, chiefs, galamsey, etc) to address
following governance problems:
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Exclusion of small-scale miners from access to mineral resources.
Entitlement: No availability of land for ASM.
Distribution of benefits: ASM cannot prospect but LSM can.
Provision of financial and technical support to ASM
No proper system in place to monitor unauthorised users
Enforcement: Implementation of viable alternatives to use of force
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Policy Implication
 Land Regime: Double System of Alternate users
for mineral concessions where small scale
miners operate on a surface for a short period of
time in controlled conditions, followed by large
scale operations
 Implementation: Negotiated Agreement as
alternative to legislative reform