SATLOC – state of the art
Satellite based operation and management of local low traffic lines
George Barbu – Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer
The essential
questions for
signaling:
Where is my
train?
Which speed?
Which time?
ETCS principle: balise-referenced position
EGNOS and the future GALILEO are civil systems, operated by civilians and
under civil political control. They are designed specifically for civil use and
satisfy requirements that emerged from consultations with many different user
groups. Railways have included their requirements in the HLD - MRD
Results after tests in the railway environment
• Accuracy: 4-6 m; <1m with augmentation; 2-5
cm with RTK or LRK techniques
• Coverage: total is possible with sensors, but
accuracy degrades on long dark zones
• Integrity: 2,5.10^-7, but in railways this maybe
not always sufficient for the highest integrity
applications
• Perror<10^-9 is possible with additional sensors
(e.g. Route Map)
Aim and objectives
• Aim: proof of evidence that GNSS based absolute train
location and speed determination is compliant with
requirements for signaling and with train control functions
(ETCS)
• Objectives:
– Live demonstration on LTL of train control, full speed supervision,
traffic control and traffic management based on GNSS – concrete
technical solution based on industry supply
– Proof of feasibility of using carrier independent communication (use
of public networks @ marginal cost)
– Full specifications of Concept, ORS, FRS, ARS, SRS and
methodology for validation and certification
– Reference methodology for performance and safety (until SIL4)
assessment of GNSS based absolute positioning
– Economic evaluation, proof of concept export on any railway line
– Migration strategy to ETCS: GNSS-based train end localization (train
integrity) level 3 with full interoperability with ERTMS Regional
High innovation – close loop control
Accreditation of innovatation change of mentality
PVT(n+1)
Train and TCC control reciprocally
-Train sends each 5 s PVT
-TCC real time emulates the train run
under the MA data
-Train OBC executes the MA
-If MA execution fails, TCC sends EB
High operational safety is enabled
by this reciprocal control when both
OBC and TCC are qualified at
minimum SIL 2
Route map data
Expected (x;y)
at n+1
PVT (n)
Nonassessed
Continue
Assessed
warning
Exceed α
Route map static
line profile
Train
PVT (n)
assessed
Wait α cycles
Train data
Calculate dynamic speed profile
and SBIP, then EBIP
Advantage: low cost on highest operational safety
7
Matches
(ἐ) xy(n+1)
continue
Warning then EB
order
Active MAL XY
Matches
calculated
data
SATLOC reference architecture
Brake &
traction
TIU
KERNEL
RFID position
check
DMI
GNSS
odometry
Route
map
onboard
RADIO INTERFACE
(EURORADIO)
EDOR Data:
VPN over UMTS (3G..)
Voice CAB radio 3G…
RFID
Tags
Route
map
Euroradio
Traffic controller
interface
Simplified
interlocking / LC
TCC-RBC TCC-RBC
RBC + traffic control center
Trackside
Results @ date
• All specifications are concluded – available
on the UIC SATLOC extranet and on the
EC/GSA project site
• Technical design of the pilot line is ended
• Three equipment sets are completely
provided
• Software products are validated
• Two running trains are fully equipped
10
Results @ date
• Test specifications are elaborated and agreed with the user and the
CFR Safety Authority and Notified Body – full flexibility for safe
adapted use is available
• TCC (RBC) center in Zarnesti is operational
• The train – TCC mobile data and voice connections are operational:
-
-
Via VPN-Secured link for data transmission in GPRS 3G / 4G coverage is also
available (full IP, VPN based on the SEC-IP-VPN protocols in the VODAFONE
Network – second provider OTENET is prepared for full availability)
- Voice over other channels (normal 3G/4G) in a different VPN for secure
availability of transmission
• Real scale tests with running trains have successfully ended
• Validation, certification and commissioning are ongoing
11
12
13
14
TCC operational equipment
15
Route map – place of virtual balises –
equipment with spring switches – example
stations Rasnov and Cristian
16
17
Successful introduction of the new technology
in the railway safety needs accreditation of
new mode of thinking, demonstration of
operational safety, innovation, convincing
demonstration of concept and lifting of
technical and mentality barriers.
You are welcome to SEE that it works
18