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SYN# Phase 3 DEL
Phase 3
Operational Orientation
MISSION ANALYSIS BRIEFING
Syndicate
Student Template
3
ADMIN INSTRUCTIONS (1 of 2)
•
This template is in line with the processes outlining Phase 3 as presented in
Chapter 4 but does not strictly adhere Appendix 1 to Annex H of the COPD V1.0
dated 17 Dec 10.
•
As annotated in Appendix 1, the template is illustrative only – actual briefing
requirements are determined by the Commander.
•
This template is intended to assist you with preparation of the mission analysis
briefing, but you are not expected to adhere to it rigidly. Feel free to:
– Add slides where you feel important items of analysis have been omitted
– Delete slides about which you have no significant analysis to brief
– Modify slides to facilitate your own presentation style
•
Remember to make adjustments to agenda slides as necessary to support
modifications.
•
Be cognizant of the size/length of the brief – presenting more material is not
necessarily conducive to a clearer operational picture
4
ADMIN INSTRUCTIONS (2 of 2)
• Items in GREEN text are administrative notes or instructions
which should be deleted prior to the presentation of the
briefing.
Refers to information in the notes page below.
Delete prior to presentation.
• Items in BLACK represent information from the Zoran Sea
scenario that has been input for your benefit and header
information
• BLUE RED has been used for the classification in the
header/footer and to highlight key points within your analysis
• Slides in light blue background require student inputs. You
may reset to white for backbrief.
5
Logistic Input into
Mission Analysis
6
Purpose
• To provide the Resource Director/JOPG
LOG Rep an overview of the logistics input
into the Mission/Operational Analysis of
the JOPG.
Agenda
• Key Factors
• Critical Logistics
Requirements
• Assumptions
• Limitations
• Center of Gravity Inputs
• Risks
• Effects/Actions
• CCIRs
• Initial Force Estimate
• Estimate of Required
Logistic Capabilities
• C2
• Deployment Timeline
• Proposed Planning
Guidance
• Conclusion
Key Factors and Deduction
Time/Space/Force/Information
Factor
Deduction
Predeployment Different deployment in
& deployment to respect of time & place.
SAG, PER &
AUR.
Between STRATLIFT &
SROM to AUR security of
extensive LOC need.
Conclusion
SPACE
Provision of small SA (s) in PER
FORCE
M&T capabilities +++
TIME
CCIR
Planning through all options
Break or block of LOC
in a complex environment.
RFI
...
CC
Force multiplyers
CR
FP for RSOM ++ (Kama Sea LOC)
CV
LOC in Kama Sea threat by mines
Key Factors and Deduction
Time/Space/Force/Information
Factor
Deduction
Conclusion
Forward stage
will be limited to
SAG & Kama
Sea.
1 APOD and 2 SPOD in
PER
SPACE
LLOC to cover the onwards movement
FORCE
M&T capabilities +++
TIME
....
CCIR
Break or block of LLOC
RFI
APOD/SPOD capabilities
CC
High readiness and availability of M&T
CR
Freedom of movement in PER, AUR
CV
APOD/SPOD capabilities
LLOC blocked or stalled
Only 1 APOD in AUR
LLOC plan to carry troops
and materiel flow
Key Factors and Deduction
Time/Space/Force/Information
Factor
Deduction
Conclusion
Sustain pos for
6 months until
FOF
deployment
Provisions (contracts,
employment, etc) for 6
months support for 6
months
SPACE
Excessive storage in SAG
FORCE
M&T ++
TIME
…
CCIR
...
RFI
HNS capabilities/capacities
CC
...
CR
M&T availability
CV
...
Ensure LOC operable for 6
months
Key Factors and Deduction
Time/Space/Force/Information
Factor
Deduction
Conclusion
LOG minimum
footprint
Increase HNS
SPACE
LLOC to cover the onwards movement
FORCE
NSPA involvement in the Predeployment
TIME
Phase I early stage
CCIR
…
RFI
HNS capabilities
CC
...
CR
Freedom of movement in PER, AUR
CV
PER, AUR HNS capabilities in Class I
12
AUR collapse
Contract heavy spt
Bi/Multi lateral NSE
cooperation
Key Factors and Deduction
Time/Space/Force/Information
Factor
Deduction
Conclusion
AUR
The implications, issues or
considerations, derived from fact(s)
that have operational significance.
What is the significance of the
factor?
The outcome or result
reached that requires
action in planning or
further analysis.
What can or should be
done? Fit each into a
category below
FS
Timeline
Action
CCIR
RFI
CC
CR
CV
13
Critical Logistics Requirements
14
Logistics Planning Assumptions
• List any assumptions that you have made during
your analysis of key factors
• Remember that assumptions must be:
– Logical
– Realistic
– Necessary - Planning can not continue unless an
assumption is made
– Valid – if assumption turns out to be false, framework
of problem would have to be readdressed.
15
LIMITATIONS
CONSTRAINTS (Must Do)
RESTRAINTS (Can’t Do)
Identify Constraints and Restraints from SSA, MRO, SPD
and list those with Operational and Logistics impacts
16
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Centre of Gravity Analysis
Assessed Aim and desired Outcome: What is the actor’s main goal and what conditions
does he seek to achieve by his actions?
Centre of Gravity: What is the primary
Critical Capabilities: What are the primary
element of power upon which an actor
depends to accomplish his operational
objectives (to be targeted in an opponent and
protect in a friend)?
means that enables the COG to gain and
maintain dominant influence over an opponent
or situation?
Critical Vulnerabilities: What are the
Critical requirements: What are those key
weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key
system elements and essential conditions,
characteristics, capabilities, relationships,
specific resources or influences through which
the COG may be influenced or neutralised?
system elements and essential conditions,
characteristics, capabilities and influences
required to generate and sustain the COG’s
critical capabilities, such as specific assets,
physical resources, or relationships with other
actors?
Conclusions: Which weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and
essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationships, specific resources or influences
could be exploited to change the capabilities and behaviour of the actor and improve conditions
in the operational environment?
17
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Alliance Centre of Gravity Analysis
Assessed Aim and desired Outcome: deter VUL, assist AUR in disrupting BLA and in reestablishing internal security, set conditions for NEO, provide FoM for UN HA.
Centre of Gravity:
Critical Capabilities:
CJTF
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
ability to deter VUL
ability to train AUR/PER
ability to disrupt BLA (ourselves)
ability to create a SASE
ability to sustain ourselves
ability to coordinate with external partners
Critical Vulnerabilities:
Critical requirements:
Extensive LOCs
- Limited APOD/SPOD capability
- Weather cond in winter
- Degradation of Humanitarian situation
-
-
1-6: C2
- 1-5: FOA
- 1-5 : strategic deployment secured (within JOA)
- RSOM-I in place
- 5: sustainment
- 6: robust liaison & training capacity
Conclusions:CJTF effectiveness depends on early activation/availability of Strategic
assets, sourcing of force package and intelligence data. Furthermore, protection of
APOD/SPOD is critical.
18
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
UN Centre of Gravity Analysis
Assessed Aim and desired Outcome: Security for UN refugees camps and maintain
flow of HA.
Centre of Gravity:
Critical Capabilities:
UNMA Humanitarian Mission
Critical Vulnerabilities:
2 a 1 Force Protection not adequate
2 b 1 LOC not secured
2 c 1 APOD not available
1 Act with legitimacy
2 Intervene in critical area
Critical requirements:
1 a UN SC Resolutions
2 a Force protection (UNSECFORA)
2 b Freedom of movement
2 c Access to APOD/SPOD
Conclusions: Intervene with force protection, secure LOC and reopen Capella
Airport.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
AURIGA Centre of Gravity Analysis
Assessed Aim and desired Outcome: preserve its territorial integrity and stability
Centre of Gravity:
Security forces
Critical Vulnerabilities:
1 a 1 Moral
3 a 1 Lack of Training
3 b 1 Credibility
3 b 2 Cohesion
Critical Capabilities:
1 Mantain control of its territory
2 Cooperate with PER Security Forces
3 Defeat BLA
4 Protect DPREs
5 Control of critical infrastructures
Critical requirements:
1 a FoM
1 b High mobility/terrain Equipment
3 a COIN TTPs
3 b Effective C2
4 a Logistics
Conclusions: Keep working on AUR specific training, strengthening logistic
capacity, establishing FoM, supporting them in fighting BLA and in keeping the
territorial integrity.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
PERSEUS Centre of Gravity Analysis
Assessed Aim and desired Outcome: Maintain the control of the territory and
sustain AUR in containing BLA
Centre of Gravity:
Critical Capabilities:
1 Defeat BLA
2 Support Auriga
3 Maintain its territorial integrity
4 Protect energy infrastructures
5 Maintain population support
Security Forces
Critical Vulnerabilities:
1 a 1 Air Defence Force weakness
1 a 2 Limited numbers of modern weapons
systems
2 b 1 Low military readiness
2 b 2 Lack of Training
5 a 1 Control of HA and of DPREs flow
Critical requirements:
1 a COIN TTPs
2 a Logistics
2 b Capable Fighting Force
4 a Access to SPOE/SPOD
5 a International ties
Conclusions: Increase Security Forces capabilities IOT defeat BLA and obtain a
better control of the territory.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Batari National Movement
Centre of Gravity Analysis
Assessed Aim and desired Outcome: to create an ethnically pure BATARI state.
Centre of Gravity:
BLA Fighters
Critical Vulnerabilities:
2 a 1 FOM in Kandar Valley
2 a 2 Differencies in council
3 1 Support/recruitment people
4 a 1 Financial resources (VUL/ Crime
Organization)
4 a 2 VUL supply lines
a Cellphone network
Critical Capabilities:
1 Capability to attack refugees camp.
2 Control of etnhic batari area
3 Expel non BATARI people
4 Destabilise AURIGA
5 Acting as insurgency
Critical requirements:
1 a Weapons
1 b FOM
2 a Support of tribal council
4 a VUL support/logistic/training/ safe
heavens
5 a C2 (1c)
a Communications (all)
Conclusions: Prevent destabilization actions in AUR performed by BLA, cutting VUL
support. The operation will focus on limiting FOM mainly in the Kandar valley and
decreasing C2 capabilities. Conduct INFO operations IOT exploit council differences
and gain population support to limit the effects of hostile propaganda.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
VUL
Centre of Gravity Analysis
Assessed Aim and desired Outcome: Political, economic and military dominance of the
Zoran Sea region in order to achieve regional hegemony.
Centre of Gravity:
Critical Capabilities:
VUL Intervention Forces
1 Deny/delay NATO’s access to the region
2 Deter/ threaten Alliance forces/ Partners
3 Directly intervene into AUR/PER
4 Support the BLA (use as proxy org.)
Critical Vulnerabilities:
Critical requirements:
3 a 1 Limited avenues of approach to AUR/PER
3 b 1 Logistics and sustainment of long term operations
3 b 2 Simultaneous ops (AUR/PER) (3c)
3 b 3 LOCs and links (phys/influence) with BLA (4a)
3 c 1 Joint C2 structure and not capable for efficient joint
operations
a Energy exports (In case of VUL’s intervention embargo
should be applied- UNSCR)
1&2 Submarines, mines, SOF, Air force
2 a TBMs, WMD (Counter WMD, TBMs capabilities required)
2 b Aggressive Government (Deterrence required, PsyOps )
3 a Armoured land forces
3 b Operational sustainment (logistics, reinforcement)
3 c Effective C2
4 a Training, bases and equipments for the BLA
4 b Effective supply chain (LLOCs)
a Dependence on energy/drugs exports
Conclusions: Prevent VUL from hampering our deployment to the Kama Sea (particularly with their
maritime component) in coordination with SAG. TBMD may be vital should VUL launch a TBM attack.
Cutting the support (physical links and influence) to BLA will prevent VUL’s proxy to act effectively. Should
VUL armed forces attack, operations should focus on limited logistics capacity and joint C2 to degrade ability
to conduct/continue operations. Furthermore, military reactions should include the interdiction of their LOCs
to prevent resupplies thereby further reducing their sustainment.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Operational Risks
Operational Risk Assessment: Risk Name
Source
Consequence for
Severity
- Actions of the
opponent(s).
- Actions of friendly
forces.
- Operational
environmental
factors.
- Overall mission
- Line of
operation
- Decisive Points
- Desired effect.
Extremely high - could result failure to accomplish
mission.
High - could result in failure to accomplish one or
more objectives.
Moderate - could result in failure to meet criteria
for success or exceed time, space,
forces/actors limits
Low - minimal impact on mission accomplishment
Probability
- High
- Moderate
- Low
(Select 1 &
Delete rest)
Select one &
Delete rest for presentation)
•
•
•
•
•
Risk Management
Can we neutralise the source?
Can we reduce our vulnerability to the source of the risk?
Can we limit the consequence and/or severity of the occurrence?
Can we reduce the probability of occurrence?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Conclusion
Unacceptable - risk management cannot reduce risk to an acceptable level!
Conditionally acceptable - risk can be reduced to an acceptable level by taking actions to:
Modify force disposition/posture/composition.
Adjust current operations.
Prepare branch plan or sequel.
Acceptable, no risk management actions required
24
Logistics Input into Operational
Design
• Review the following 4 slides from the
JOPG
• Review and evaluate the DC/Effects
– Has the JOPG gotten this right? If not…what
are your inputs?
• What are the Key actions logisticians will
have to take to support the effects and
DCs?tional Design? Keep them broad and
focus on the most important actions.
For Reference Only
Objectives
•
•
•
•
•
•
MSO 1. Prevention of further escalation and widening of the Zoran Sea conflict;
MSO 2. Uninterrupted international access to the region and its resources;
MSO 3. Support Aurigan efforts to achieve and maintain a safe and secure
environment.
MSO 4. Enable safe delivery of humanitarian aid and access to DPRE camps.
MSO 5. Deter Vulpecula.
MSO 6. Isolate BLA Insurgency
•
•
•
•
•
OO 1. Contribute to the deterrence of Vulpecula
OO 2. Assist Auriga in defeating any external aggression
OO 3. Assist Auriga to re-establish internal security
OO 4. Provide for the freedom of movement for UN humanitarian activities
OO 5. Enable freedom of access to the region and its energy resources
•
•
•
BPT 1. Set the conditions for NEO
BPT 2. Conduct interdiction operations in support of a potential embargo
BPT 3. Support PER to maintain / re-establish territorial integrity
Initial
Deployment
D
e
t
e
r
&
D
e
f
e
a
t
C
O
I
N
Early Deployment
G-Day
D + 30
OE:
1
AUR
CoG
Deployment & Shaping
OE:
5
OE:
2,3,4
SASE
Handover
OE:
6
D + 120
VUL
CoG
MSO1
OO1
9
8
B
P
16
17
11
10
OO2
18
BPT3
MSO5
MSO3
ALLIANCE
CoG
OE:
11,12
OE:
9,10
1
2
BLA
CoG
4
3
OE
17
OE:
15,16
5
6
7
OE:
13,14
OE:8
OO3
MSO6
OO4
MSO2
OO5
MSO4
OE:
18
UN
CoG
OE:
21
OE:
20
OE:19
F
o
M
12
13
14
15
PER
CoG
BPT1
BPT2
For Reference Only
Internation
al peace
and
security in
the Zoran
Sea region
is restored
with full
implement
ation of all
UNSC
resolutions,
and the
sovereignty
and
territorial
integrity of
Alliance
partners is
preserved.
Decisive Conditions – By LoO
Deter & Defeat
COIN
8
VUL deterred
1
SLOCs secured
9
AUR SF trained
2
CIA open & operational
10
Terrorist activity mitigated
3
GoA stabilized
11
AUR SF capable of independent ops
4
BLA fractured
5
BLA isolated
6
SASE established in AUR
7
GoA – Bataris dialogue established
Freedom of Movement
12
VUL naval forces contained
13
LLOCs secured
14
HA delivered without interruption
15
Critical nodes secured
Branch plan
16
VUL offensive operations ceased
17
AUR territorial integrity re-established
18
PER territorial integrity re-established
For Reference Only
Effects to be Achieved : For Reference Only
Nr
Effect
LOO
1
LOO
2
LOO
3
1
VUL SF returned to peace locations
X
2
AUR police trained
X
3
AUR border control trained
X
4
AUR army trained
X
5
Terrorist attacks decreased
X
6
AUR army conduct ops without assistance
X
8
VUL threats on SLOCs neutralized
X
X
9
BLA attacks on CIA ceased
X
X
10
Civ/Mil traffic restored
X
11
Public support increased
X
12
Public services provided
X
13
Hardliners & Moderates separated
X
14
Tribal council spt to BLA decreased
X
15
Tribal council spt to BLA stopped
X
16
FoM for BLA denied
X
17
BLA attacks in Kandar Valley decreased
X
18
Comms between GoA and tribal council established
X
19
LOCs attacks reduced
20
Attacks on HA actors decreased
X
21
Attacks on pipelines decreased
X
X
X
X
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Commanders' Critical Information
Requirements
CCIR NATO - UN
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
READINESS NATO JF
ACHIVEMENT OF FULL OPS CAPABILITY (NRF + FOLLOW ON FORCES )
REQUIREMENT OF ACTIVATION OR USAGE OF OPERATIONAL RESERVE
LOSS OF CRITICAL ASSETS/CAPABILITIES (tbd)
SPOD AND APOD UNDER ATTACK
ATTACK ON NATO SECURITY FORCES/FACILITIES
KIDNAPPING OF NATO SECURITY FORCES PERSONNEL AND VIPs
ATTACK ON UN ASSETS/FACILITIES OR REFUGEE CAMPS
CCIR AURIGA AND PERSEUS
GOA COLLAPSE;
2.CIA UNAVAILABLE;
3.ATTACK SPOD IN PERSEUS;
4.ATTACKS ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES;
5.GOA/GOP SECURITY FORCES NOT ABLE TO CONTRAST BLA;
6.HUMANITARIAN CRISIS DETERIORED;
7.AURIGA/PERSEUS ATTACKED.
1.
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Commander’s Critical Information
Requirements
31
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Agenda: Initial Force Estimate

Estimate of Required Capabilities

Preliminary C2 Arrangements
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
MLOPC INITIAL FORCE ESTIMATE. The following preliminary estimate of force levels is provided
as a basis for planning and are available in the IRF or RFP. All others units need to be force
generated.
Initial Force Estimate
NRF
Joint C2
FOLLOW-ON
DJSE
JF HQ
LAND FORCES
1 Infantry BDE
2 Mech Bns
3 Light Bns
4-5 BDES
2 ENGR BDE
1 CIMIC GP
HELO TRANS
HELO ATTACK
MARITIME FORCES
NTF
1 MPA Detachment
1 MCM TG
1 AGI
3 AOR
1 AFS
NETF(-)
AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE
1 MCM TG
5 AOR
3 AFS
AIR FORCES
1 AEW Squadron
1 AIR/GRND SURV DET
1 TRX (AAR) SQN
2 ADX SQN
1 FBA SQN (-)
3 FBX/ADX SQN
1 TMD BN
1 EW Squadron (SEAD)
1 CSAR Detachment
1 ESJ SQN
1 AAR Squadron
3 AIRBASE SPT
2 APOD OPS GP
1 Tactical Air Lift Squadron
2 UAV Platoons
1 ESM Detachment
2 AAEW Squadron
2 AIR/GRND SURV DET
3 TRX/TRO/TRI (AAR) SQN
3 ADX/ADR SQN
3 FBX/FBA SQN
6 SAM M/H BN
2 TMD BN
SHARED EARLY WARNING
2 CSAR Detachments
1 ESJ/ETS SQN
4 AAR Squadron
3 AIR
BASE SPT
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
4 SPEC OPS TASK GPS
6 SPEC OPS TASK GPS
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS FORCES
PSYOPS COY
PSYOPS TF
JOINT LOGISTICS SUPPORT GROUP (JLSG)
Logistics Base Bn
RSOM Bn
SPOD/APOD Operating Coys
Ground Trans Bn
Role 3 Hosp
NATIONAL SURVEILLANCE ASSETS / SPACE SUPPORT TEAMS
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
For Reference Only
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Initial Force Estimate JLSG
JLSG
JLSG HQ
JLSG HQ
JLSG HQ Sp Unit
JLSG HQ FP Coy
LOG BASE
RSOM
GROUND
TRANSPORTATION
RSOM HQ
Ground
Transport. HQ
Supply Bn HQ
Ammo Storage Supply
Coy
POL Supply Coy
Cargo Transfer
Unit
Field Warehousing Coy
MOVCON Center
Supply and Field
Service Coy (mx)
Water Purification Unit
MOVCON Teams
Medical Log Coy
Role 3 Medical Facility
Gen Support Eng Coy
POL Facility Const Unit
Staging Area
Support Unit
Convoy Support
Centers
SPOD
Sea Port Ops Coy
Cargo Truck Coy
POL Truck Coy
APOD
Water Truck Coy
AirPort Ops Coy
Heavy Equipment
Transport Coy
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Force Protection Unit
For Reference Only
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Logistics Required Capabilities


Identify and highlight any significant
differences between required operational
capabilities based on the mission analysis
and the force capability requirements
provided in the Strategic Planning
Directive/Initial Force Estimate.
Provide assessment on the forces required.
What gaps in capabilities have you identified
between what is available and what actionseffects logisticians will have to create?
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Preliminary C2 Arrangements

Portray your initial concept for the organization of
the Joint Force.

Determine TOO/JOA requirements.

Determine required C2 functions and locations.

Determine critical liaison and coordination
requirements.

Include NSEs in C2 arrangements

Include Role Specialist Nation & Lead Nation
designations
NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Deployment Timeline
37
Agenda: Proposed Planning
Guidance
• Tentative Missions for Subordinate
Commands
• Requests for SHAPE
38
Tentative Mission for Component (JLSG)
• Draft mission statement for the JLSG. Be sure
to include the following: Who, What, When,
Where, & Why…plus the assigned objectives.
See Page 11 of SPD for an example from the
COM JFC Naples mission statement.
39
Requests for SHAPE
• Develop requests, requirements and issues
that require action at the strategic level such
as:
– Requests for additional Crisis Response Measures
(CRMs).
– ROE requests.
– Requests for Information
– Pre-conditions for success.
– Force requirements.
40
CONCLUSION
• Provide any additional conclusions that
are essential for the JFC to fully
comprehend the operational problem to be
solved or the specific operational
conditions that must be achieved.
41