Seminar:
‘Aandeelhouderschap op de schop’
Theoretisch Kader Aandeelhoudersbetrokkenheid –
Trends en Ontwikkelingen
Daniëlle Melis MBA MSc
11 februari 2014
Leadership • Entrepreneurship • Stewardship
[email protected] +31 (0)346-291 291 www.nyenrode.nl
De driehoek van Corporate Governance
Aandeelhouders/
Algemene Vergadering van
Aandeelhouders
Stewardship
Raad van
Bestuur
Raad van
Commissarissen
Corporate governance zien als een
complex systeem in beweging…
‘…Complexity of relationships seems to be one of the
main reasons why corporate scandals still occur’
Mallin, Christine, et al. Corporate governance and complexity
theory. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010.
…vraagt om een multidisciplinaire
benadering van een nieuw vakgebied
De ‘homo teleopathicus’ en de onderzoeksagenda
voor ‘behavioral corporate governance’
Artikel in Goed Bestuur & Toezicht 4, 2013
Startpunt voor deze beschouwing
Nyenrode onderzoeken
tbv Monitoring
Commissie
2010, 2011, 2012 en
Eindrapport 2013
Een speelveld in beweging…
Bron: ‘Overzicht Corporate Governance in Nederland 2003-2013’, eindrapportage Nyenrode (2013) ten behoeve van de Monitoring Commissie Corporate Governance Code
… ook internationaal
Bron: ‘Overzicht Corporate Governance in Nederland 2003-2013’, eindrapportage Nyenrode (2013) ten behoeve van de Monitoring Commissie Corporate Governance Code
De laatste jaren:‘appèl’ aan de aandeelhouder…
Lord Myners (2009), UK City Minister
‘…has attacked shareholders for acting like "absentee
landlords" and urged them to get more involved with
companies they own’
Michael Barnier (2010), EU Commissioner of internal market:
‘…We need to reconsider the role and responsibilities of
shareholders’.
Green Paper on the EU corporate governance framework
(2011):
‘...The corporate governance framework is built on the
assumption that shareholders engage with companies and
hold the management to account for its performance.’
… De internationale ‘call for stewardship’
Bron: ‘Overzicht Corporate Governance in Nederland 2003-2013’, eindrapportage Nyenrode (2013) ten behoeve van de Monitoring Commissie Corporate Governance Code
Maar wat veronderstelt dit ‘appèl’?
Shareholders as Owners: Legal Reality Or Urban Legend?
April 15, 2010 by Lynn A. Stout:
-
-
-
‘…no human being can own a corporation. In effect, corporations,
like human beings, own themselves. As a legal matter, shareholders
who purchase shares of stock in a corporation own nothing more
than that—shares of stock’.
‘… At law, a principal has a right to control her agent. But
shareholders can’t exercise direct control over corporate directors.
Moreover, case law describes corporate directors not as “agents” but
as fiduciaries with a wide range of discretion, who owe duties not
just to shareholders but also to the firm as a whole
‘…It is [thus] wildly misleading to describe shareholders as the sole
residual claimants in companies that aren’t actually in bankruptcy’
Is het ‘appèl’ aan aandeelhouders ‘a big bet’?
‘….Policymakers who championed the transfer of enhanced powers to
investors went well beyond available knowledge in crafting such a
response to the financial crisis. This is perhaps understandable in
light of the severity of the 2008 market seizures and the political
pressures that arose in their wake. But there is no mistaking that the
approach represents, in effect, a big bet that investor institutions can
and will exercise rights responsibly, and that such behavior will make
markets more sustainable, less prone to error, and more in sync with
the interests of capital providers.’ (Ben W. Heineman, Jr. and
Stephen Davis, October 2011)
Het dilemma: ‘regulation – moral behavior’
‘…The more we can rely on good governance at the level of
the board of directors and effective shareholder engagement,
the less we will have to depend on regulation.
To put that the other way around, if we conclude that
governance and stewardship are deficient, that vacuum will
have to be filled by regulation'. (Myners, 2010)
Justice Tempered by Mercy - Statue Cumberland Law School
Regulation is noodzakelijk?
Martin Luther King Jr. on December 18, 1963:
‘…You can’t legislate morals. But we must go on to say that
while it may be true that morality cannot be legislated,
behavior can be regulated.
It may be true that the law cannot change the heart, but it can
restrain the heartless.’
… echter vereist zorgvuldigheid?
Adam Smith (1776) posed serious accusations at the address of
policymakers and regulators (in relation to managers proposing
new laws or regulations) by stating:
‘The interest of the dealers, however, in any particular branch of
trade or manufactures, is always in some respects different from,
and even opposite to, that of the public …. The proposal of any
new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order,
ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought
never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully
examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most
suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men, whose
interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who
generally have an interest to deceive and even to oppress.’ (p.
116)
…. het gaat om het gedrag (‘behavior’)
‘…Responsibility for stewardship is shared.
The primary responsibility rests with the board of the company…
[Institutional] investors in the company … holding the board to account
for the fulfillment of its responsibilities.’ (Stewardship Code, 2010)
‘…[in doing so] stewardship is more than just voting. Activities include
monitoring and engaging with companies on matters such as
strategy, performance, risk, capital structure, and corporate
governance, including culture and remuneration. Engagement is
purposeful dialogue with companies on these matters as well as on
issues that are the immediate subject of votes at general meetings.’
(Stewardship Code, 2010)
… institutional investors have not always
behaved ‘as desired’ (OECD, 2012, p.9)
‘…[institutional investors] are heterogeneous in terms of their
investment style, strategy, time horizon, concentration, size
and investor base. More importantly, recent research […]
emphasizes their own widely different corporate governance
arrangements which leads to differing principal/agent issues and
to a distinctive structure of incentives and constraints faced
by each’ (p. 21).
The OECD study lastly acknowledges the ‘increasing
complexity in the investor chain’ (p. 21) and ‘multiple
intermediaries in the ownership chain’ (p. 21), referring to the
‘increasing separation of ultimate beneficiaries from ownership
rights, and from the investee company’ (p. 21).
Kortom, zijn de veronderstellingen ten
aanzien van aandeelhouderschap juist?
Stout (2012): ‘…shareholder primacy…an ideology, not a legal
requirement or a practical necessity of modern business life.’
Handy (2002): ‘…Should the market no longer be king? Success
no longer be measured in terms of shareholder value? And profit
no longer suffice as an end in itself?
Greenspan (2008): ‘..I made a mistake in presuming that the
self-interest of organizations is such that they were best capable
of protecting shareholders and equity in the firms.
Barton (2010): ‘…a shift is needed from ‘quarterly capitalism’ to
‘long term capitalism’
Een vraag die om ander onderzoek vraagt…..
Columbus
Mijn bijdrage aan dit vraagstuk
Promotie-onderzoek D. Melis (verwacht 2014):
‘The Institutional Investor Stewardship Myth; a theoretical, legal
and empirical analysis of prescribed institutional investor
stewardship in a Dutch context’
Hoofdvraag:
Is institutional investor stewardship in respect of Dutch listed
companies as prescribed by the Dutch Corporate Governance
Code realistic?
Een tipje van de sluier…….
#1: Een breder theoretisch perspectief
The agency theory is most often referred to in the development
of corporate governance, providing a theoretical framework ‘in
which it most naturally seems to rest’ (Mallin (2009), p. 18).
Hansmann and Kraakman (2004) state that ‘…first, it [coporate
law] establishes the structure of the corporate form as well as
ancillary housekeeping rules necessary to support this structure,
and second, it attempts to control conflicts of interest among
corporate constituencies, including those between corporate
‘insiders,’ such as controlling shareholders and top managers,
and ‘outsiders,’ such as minority shareholders or creditors.
These conflicts all have the character of what economists refer to
as ‘agency problems’ or ‘principal-agent’ problems.’
#1: Een breder theoretisch perspectief
Daily, Dalton and Cannella Jr. (2003) acknowledge that even
though the agency theory dominates the corporate governance
debate, ‘a multitheoretic approach to corporate governance is
essential for recognizing the many mechanisms and structures
that might reasonably enhance organizational functioning’ (p.
372).
#2 Een breder juridisch perspectief
‘…Overarching principles, internationally accepted
but non-binding, attempt to guide investors in their
stewardship role, encouraging institutional investors to take up
their stewardship responsibilities towards investee companies.’
‘… institutional investors are likely to take their stewardship
responsibility only to the extent that it fits the institutional
investors’ primary fiduciary responsibility, i.e., the responsibility
of enhancing value for their beneficiaries, and to the extent that
differences between legal frameworks facilitate investors should
they choose to undertake such responsibility.’
#3 Een gedifferentieerd empirisch perspectief
‘Institutional investors are heterogeneous and – in their behavior
as shareholder in respect of investee companies - driven by
different investor specific, issuer specific and market specific
characteristics’
‘Institutional investor stewardship’ in
Nederland – enkele feiten
in ‘form’
>
compliance percentages ten aanzien van best practice provision IV.4.4,
IV.4.5 en IV.4.6 van de Nederlandse Corporate Governance Code zijn
hoog
in ‘substance’
> ‘Actual behavior’ in de geest van best practice provision
IV.4.4, IV.4.5 en IV.4.6 van de Nederlandse Corporate
Governance Code dwingt tot nuancering
*) 2010 figures available, but not shown, 2012 not researched
Institutional Investors’ Stewardship in ‘form’*
*) 2010 figures available, but not shown
Institutional Investors’ Stewardship in
‘substance’
Twee onderzoeken:
- Exploratief onderzoek naar stemgedrag van institutionele
beleggers (2011 perspectief van de beleggers; 2012
perspectief van de beursvennootschappen)
-
Exploratief nderzoek naar de dialoog tussen institutionele
beleggers en beursvennootschappen rondom de AVA 2012
The Dutch landscape
Zelfevaluatie institutionele beleggers
30
Zelfevaluatie door beursvennootschappen
Stewardship in ‘substance’ kan beter
Baroness Hogg, Chairman of the FRC (2012):
‘….there are some signs of a change in [stewardship]behaviour
by shareholders and investors [worldwide], …but this is all still
by no means the norm, and we cannot afford to stop here.’
IMA survey for FRC 2012 ‘Adherence to the Stewardship Code’
Based on recent Nyenrode research (2012) Jos Streppel,
Chairman of the Dutch Monitoring Committee Corporate
Governance (2012):
‘…the dialogue seems to develop and improve…. but the role
of shareholders needs to be seen into the right perspective
[referring to foreign institutional investors].’
Fourth Report of the Dutch Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance Code, december
2012
Stewardship in ‘substance’ kan beter
Stewardship in ‘substance’ kan beter
Stewardship in ‘substance’ vraagt om
multidisciplinair onderzoek
Thank you!
For questions :
[email protected]
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