Social Value Orientation and
Cooperation in Social Dilemmas:
A Meta-Analysis
Daniel Balliet
Singapore Management University
Craig Parks and Jeff Joireman
Washington State University
Social Value Orientation (SVO)
• The weights people assign to self and
other outcomes in interdependent
contexts.
– Prosocials (altruists and cooperators)
– Proselfs (individualists and competitors)
Purpose of Meta-Analysis
• Central tendency
• Variation
• Moderators
– Iterated vs. one-shot
– Give-some vs. take-some
– Paid vs. non-paid participants
– Group size
Iterations vs. One-Shot Dilemmas
• Partner strategy may reduce SVOcooperation relationship in iterated
dilemmas.
– Behavioral Assimilation: Prosocials conform to
a proself’s defection during iterated social
dilemmas (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Kuhlman
& Marshello, 1975)
Give-Some vs. Take-Some
• Two reasons to expect SVO may be more
predictive of cooperation in G-S than T-S.
– Prospect Theory: Losses (G-S) more
important than gains (T-S). Therefore,
defection and Cooperation more attractive for
proselfs and prosocials, respectively (De Dreu
& McCusker, 1997)
– Equality norm more salient in take-some
dilemmas (Van Dijk & Wilke, 1995), and SVO
less predictive when equality norm is salient
(de Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006).
Paid vs. Non-Paid Dilemmas
• Two reasons to expect SVO may be more
predictive of cooperation in non-paid
dilemmas.
– Payment may prime a business frame.
• This may change prosocials ‘communal’ construal
of the dilemma to a ‘business’ construal, thereby
reducing their level of cooperation.
– Payment may reduce expectations of other’s
cooperation.
Group Size
• All SVO measures include decisions while
interacting in a dyad.
• Does this limit SVO’s ability to predict
behavior in groups of 3 or more?
Methods and Analyses
• Criteria for Selection
– Adults
– Measure SVO (Ring or TDM)
– DV is strict social dilemma
• Analyses
– Correlation as effect size
– Prosocial vs. Proself
– Mixed-Effects models
Results: Main Effect
• Prosocial vs. Proselfs
– Q(81) = 248, p <.001
– (n = 82) r = .30, 95% CI, LL = .26, UL = .33
– Orwin’s fail safe N = 510
• Individualists vs. Competitors
– Q(18) = 33.9, p = .013
– (n = 19) r = .27, 95% CI, LL = .19, UL = .34
– Orwin’s Fail Safe N = 110
Results: Moderators
• Iterated vs. One-Shot
– Q (1) = .157, p = .692
– One-Shot: r = .31, 95% CI, LL = .26, UL = .35
– Iterated: r = .29, 95% CI, LL = .24, UL = .34
• Give-Some vs. Take-Some
– Q (1) = 5.26, p = .022
– Give: r = .29, 95% CI, LL = .25, UL = .34
– Take: r = .22, 95% CI, LL = .17, UL = .27
Results: Moderators
• Paid vs. Non-Paid Participants
– Q(2) = 20.6, p < .001
– Not Paid: r = .39, 95% CI, LL = .33, UL = .45
– Lottery: r = .36, 95% CI, LL = .23, UL = .47
– Paid: r = .23, 95% CI, LL = .20, UL = .26
• Group Size
– Slope = -.007, Q(1) = 4.75, p = .03
Future Directions
• Payment X SVO Implications
– Is an implicit measure of SVO needed?
• Research needed on SVO in the context of
iterated social dilemmas.
– Forgiveness
• Why is SVO more predictive of G-S games?
• SVO in strong vs. weak situations.
– Do paid/take-some dilemmas have more
uniform expectations, construal, and incentives
for appropriate behavior?
Questions?
Balliet, D., Parks, C., & Joireman, J. (2009). Social value
orientation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A metaanalysis. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations,
12, 533-547.