EASA Verification
Milen Dentchev
ANS Standardisation Section Manager
Received data
Answers
Justifications / comments
Evidence / references
ANSP evidence should be available at
NSA level and will only be requested if
needed
EoSM and JC verification data flow
08/04/2015
EASA/PRB Workshop
3
EASA verification methodology
Three methods of Safety KPI verification:
1)
Light verification through desktop audits based on available
documentation (e.g. written evidences provided to EASA,
information published on the Internet or available in ECTL) +
clarification on the phone (interviews)
2)
Thorough verification during Standardisation inspections
using Checklists and based on Findings and UNCs
3)
Trustful verification through desktop audits based on
reports on closure of Corrective actions (further verified
during follow-up inspections)
08/04/2015
EASA/PRB Workshop
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Light verification
NSA verification first, followed by
ANSP verification
Light verification of NSA quest.
Sampling 3 to 5 answers from each
questionnaire
If OK, then move to the next one
If not, then thorough check
Thorough verification for some NSAs
randomly
Use external information as far as
practical
Phone call / email if necessary
Light verification of ANSP quest.
Verify the main ANSP for each State
Sampling 3 to 5 answers from each
questionnaire
If OK, then move to the next one
If not, then thorough check
Verify at least one additional ANSP with the
same method as above.
Thorough verification for some ANSPs
randomly
Use external information as far as practical
Phone call / email to NSA if necessary
EASA thorough verification
Verification during Standardisation
inspections using Checklists
Structure of ANS checklist CA/NSA:
LEG/REG
ORG
Initial Oversight
Ongoing Oversight
PEL
RSC
MOR
Structure of ANS checklist Undertakings:
ANSP (ATS/CNS/AIS/MET/TOs)
08/04/2015
EASA/PRB Workshop
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EASA thorough verification
Several steps are foreseen:
Step 1 – mapping ANS checklists with EoSM
questions
Step 2 – adding reference to ANS Checklists
Step 3 – on site auditing
Step 4 – If finding is raised, checking
answers in EoSM
08/04/2015
EASA/PRB Workshop
9
EASA thorough verification
1st step – mapping ANS checklist with EoSM
questions
Examples of matching PQs with EoSM Q:
MO1.1: Implement the EU safety legislative and regulatory
framework, including where necessary, by aligning the
national framework.
Q1-3 There are national secondary regulations that address
requirements stemming from primary legislation, international
obligations and they are in line with the EU Regulatory Framework in
relation to ATM/ANS.
Question # 20 of LEG Checklist
Has the State developed and promulgated ANS regulations to enable
the implementation of the provisions related to ICAO Annexes?
08/04/2015
EASA/PRB Workshop
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EASA thorough verification
Examples of matching PQs with EoSM Q :
MO2.1: Establish controls which govern how service
providers’ safety management systems (SMS) will
identify hazards and manage safety risks
Q2.1 The competent authority has established oversight procedures
which aim to monitor compliance with the SMS requirements by the
service providers in particular the requirements for hazards
identification and risk assessment and mitigation.
Question # 100 of On-going Oversight Checklist
Does the process address the implementation of safety objectives,
safety requirements and other safety-related conditions identified in
risk assessment and mitigation procedures required by safety
regulatory requirements applicable to air navigation services, ATFM
and ASM?
08/04/2015
EASA/PRB Workshop
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EASA thorough verification
2nd step – adding reference to ANS
Checklists
100
#
ICAO
Ref.
GM
Doc
9734
Part A
3.7 &
3.8
EU
Ref.
Area
Safety
Oversight
Regulatio
n
EU) No
1034/201 Verification of
1
compliance
Art. 6 § 1
d) ii)
EoSM
Q2.1
Questions
Does the process address the
implementation of safety
objectives, safety requirements
and other safety-related
conditions identified in risk
assessment and mitigation
procedures required by safety
regulatory requirements
applicable to air navigation
services, ATFM and ASM?
Statu
s
Example of evidence
(guidance to auditors)
Implementation
Yes
No
The implementation of
safety-related conditions
identified to allow the
proposed operation of a new
system has to be verified:
normally as a part of the
monitoring or safety
regulatory auditing
conducted to verify
continuous compliance. In
addition, the safety review
of changes has to be capable
of identifying what will have
to be monitored by the ongoing oversight.
Satisfactory
Not satisfactory
Not applicable
Comments
CE
7
Adding reference
to checklist
08/04/2015
EASA/PRB Workshop
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EASA thorough verification
Next step – on site audit
If answer is not satisfactory, then auditor will check the
answer in EoSM Questionnaire
Component 2 Safety risk management
Element 2.1 Safety requirements for the air navigation service provider’s SMS
MO2.1: Establish controls which govern how service providers’ safety management systems (SMS) will identify hazards and
manage safety risks
Q2.1
The competent authority has established oversight procedures which aim to monitor compliance with the
SMS requirements by the service providers in particular the requirements for hazards identification and risk
assessment and mitigation.
A
Initiating
The competent authority oversees the service provider’s risk assessment process on ad hoc
basis.
B
Planning/ Initial
Implementation
All of Initiating plus:
A formal procedure for continuous oversight of the risk assessment processes of the service
provider has been prepared but it has not been approved neither implemented.
Implementing
All of Planning/ Initial Implementation plus:
A formal procedure for continuous oversight of the risk assessment processes of the service
provider has been implemented. The service provider procedure for hazard identification and
risk assessment and mitigation has been approved by the competent authority.
D
Managing & Measuring
All of Implementing plus:
The procedure for overseeing the service provider’s risk assessment processes is
systematically applied.
E
All of Managing & Measuring plus:
Continuous Improvement The procedure for overseeing the service provider’s risk assessment processes is constantly
reviewing for continuous improvement and for introducing riskoversight approach.
C
08/04/2015
EASA/PRB Workshop
In this case
correction
would be
required
13
EASA trustful verification
The same as light verification, but
taking into account
Corrective Actions
Status of their closure
Verification process: output
The overall computed scores as
provided by the NSA will not change,
but the process will verify them.
Verification results
Light / trustful verification
EASA may ask States for additional evidence to
support the score provided
EASA will inform PRB of the verification results
when completed
Thorough verification
Based on evidence EASA asks the State to
change the computed scores and reflects it in
the EASA standardisation inspection report.
EASA will inform PRB of the request to the State,
after the FCC meeting.