The Politics of Labour Importation
in Hong Kong and Macau:
Identity, State and Democracy
Alex H. Choi, University of Macau
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 Both HK and MO started their importation
programs in the late 1980s.
 But their programs display very different
characteristics in terms of size, regulation,
and most importantly, with very different
political consequences
 This paper is an attempt to look into these
phenomena and offer some tentative
explanations.
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Migrant Workers in HK
 The Supplementary Labour Scheme allows
employers to import unskilled labour if there
is no suitable local workers available.




Labour Dept Job match program
Labour Advisory Committee endorsement
Median wage
Admitted 1,101 persons in 2007
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 The current SLS replaced the General Labour
Importation Scheme (GLIS) in 1996. The
GLIS allowed a maximum quota of 25,000.
On top of it, there was a special quota for
migrant construction workers for the then
airport project. GLIS has caused a lot of
labour unrest and political upheavals. It was
terminated in 1996. Since then migrant
workers as an issue has never caused major
political crisis in HK politics.
4
 Apart from SLS, there are 245,531 foreign
domestic workers working in HK in 2007,
representing 6.7% of the working population.
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Migrant Workers in Macau
 Officially, MO started to import migrant labour
in 1988.
 In 2008, there is a total of 82,175 migrant
workers representing 25.2% of the working
population here.
 Migrant workers are present in almost every
sector of the economy. The exceptions are
card dealing, civil service, and bus driving.
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 The regulation regime is very liberal with no
import quota, no occupational restriction, no
minimum wage, and no ceiling.
 Migrant workers has become a hot political
issue in MO. All the major recent
demonstrations targeted migrant workers to
be one of the key grievances.
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Theoretical Framework
 Why regimes import unskilled migrant workers?
 Why some of them afford to allow the issue of
migrant workers to remain a hot political issue, and
for so long?
 Current discussions on the importation of labour are
always contextualized in a developed country
background.
 There is also a shift from economic (esp. pull-push
theory) to political factors in those discussions.
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

Benefits are concentrated, costs are diffused
(migrants took up low pay, low skill jobs), so
importation is allowed to continue.
Liberal political regime: illegal workers can
become legal workers through acquiring local
connections, legal workers become migrants,
migrants fight for family reunion. The court
becomes a main battleground for all these
issues, and always sides with the migrants.
Migration becomes self-perpetuating
phenomenon.
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 These factors are not very applicable in the
Third World: no liberal political regime, and
costs are concentrated on unskilled local
workers.
 I will propose a threefold framework to
explain the importation of migrant workers in
the less developed countries. This framework
is adapted from Bartram (2005)*,
(* David Bartram. 2005. International Labor Migration: Foreign Workers
and Public Policy. Houndmills: Palgrave.)
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1) Identity: Many Third World countries are
former colonies still very much in the
process of building a national identity. If the
construction of this concept of ‘us’ has
achieved a measure of success, the closure
of the state is likely. The entry of ‘others’ has
to be strictly regulated. Those allowed in are
often given a truncated or non- citizenship.
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2) State: State holds the ultimate authority on
controlling who can get into the country. The
importation of workers usually involves short
term gains and long term pains. Only an
autonomous state can resist employers’
pressure on labour import, and force them
onto a path of capital reinvestment and
productivity upgrade.
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3) Democracy: The presence of an autonomous
and organized labour sector strong enough to
counter-balance the employers’ political
influence is an important factor in shaping the
policy-making process. It is even more so if
the political system is open and democratic
such that the rights of the workers are better
protected, and their voices are heard.
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HK: the Crisis Resolved
1) Identity: The Vietnam boat people crisis and
the influx of refugees from mainland China at
the end of the 1970s not only led to a ‘crisis of
people’ but also threatened the fledging
sense of Hong Kong identity. The touch-base
policy, long used as a measure to regulate
labour supply, was terminated in 1980.
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2) State Autonomy: Because illegal immigrants
as a source of labour power was found to be
not socially and politically acceptable, the
business resorted to migrant workers when
they faced a so-called labour shortage in the
mid-1980s. The colonial state initially
resisted, but succumbed to the pressure in
May 1989 by approving the import.
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3) Democracy: The pro-Beijing FTU and the
independent CTU joined hand, albeit
reluctantly, into a united front against migrant
import, at a time when HK workers were
facing serious unemployment due to
industrial relocation.
 The critical turning point, however, was the
June 4 massacre, that prompted Chris Patten
to introduce a democracy program in HK.
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
The democratized 1995 Legislative Council
election returned an unprecedented number of
candidates with labour sympathies. They
threatened to pass a motion in Legco to
terminate the GLIS. To prevent a huge
embarrassment, the government replaced the
GLIS with a greatly diminished SLS. The SLS
has a labour import quota of merely 2000.
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MO: the Unending Saga
1)
Identity: Similar with HK, MO faced a huge influx of
refugees from China in the late 1970s. Macau
government closed its border in 1979, but large
number of illegal immigrants still found their way in.
The practice of granting amnesties encouraged
more to come. IIs provided industries with cheap
labour. They were found to be a problem only after
the 3.29 incident in 1990 (massive demonstration by
IIs clamoring for legal status). The border was
closed more tightly since then.
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2) State: the colonial state was weak, corrupted and did
not have a strong will to govern. Its continuous
existence was contingent on the consent of Beijing.
Since the 123 incident in 1966, Beijing has groomed
up an ubiquitous and powerful network of social
organizations headed by the Macau Chamber of
Commerce (MCC).
In 1988, the colonial government approved labour
import in response to MCC’s demand. Actually,
labour had already been imported before the demand
was made.
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3) Democracy: The labour sector in MO was
monopolized by the MO FTU (MFTU). MFTU
was an important component of the proBeijing network. The approval of the labour
import brought immediate role conflict to
MFTU. MFTU resolved this conflict by voicing
out constrained opposition while avoiding
radical actions for fear of jeopardizing political
stability. Opposition pressure simply was not
strong enough to reverse the policy.
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
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The colonial state placated the MFTU by
enhancing social welfare (e.g. setting up the
Social Security Fund in 1989), and periodic
suspension of labour import (e.g. 1995-1996
high unemployment period).
There was no democratic opening in MO after
June 4. The pro-Beijing business network
dominated the colonial regime. The labour
sector manipulated by a pro-status quo MFTU.
All these led to the displacement of labour
discontents to the peripheries of political
power.
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 New conditions after the 1999 transition:
1) The pro-Beijing business network is in direct
control of the post-colonial state.
2) Casino-led economic growth fueled an
escalation of labour import which has caused
a lot of social problems.
3) New labour group emerged to challenge the
monopoly of the MFTU on labour issues
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4) The government softens labour discontents
through the distribution of welfare and goodies
(e.g., cash payment).
5) The welfare policy and the new prosperity
help to consolidate a MO identity.
6) The issue is whether this identity can be
developed into a democratic force leading to
correcting the power imbalance between
labour and capital in the political system
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A brief Conclusion
 In HK, the democratic opening in mid-1990s
closed off the option of labour import except
foreign domestic helpers.
 In MO, the labour import issue helps to create
a local identity. This identity can result in a
demand for democratic opening. Before this
democratic opening emerges, the politics of
labour import will continue as usual.
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