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Religion, democratisation and the
Arab Spring
Jeffrey Haynes,
London Metropolitan
University, UK
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Two years on: the Arab Spring and
democratisation
• The democratic direction of the Arab Spring in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is neither
clear cut or unidirectional.
• In Egypt and Tunisia, Islamists achieved power via
the ballot box
• In Libya, secular actors claim to be in charge,
although Islamists are also influential
• Overall, it appears that the relationship that
Islamists have with democracy in the MENA varies
from country to country, informed by both internal
(cultural, political, historical) and external factors.
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Religion and democratisation after
World War II
• The question of how religious actors affect
democratisation is a long-term controversial issue.
• After World War II, scholars of comparative politics
stressed the importance of political culture in
explaining success or failure of democratisation in
various countries influenced by US policy, including
West Germany, Italy and Japan.
• Religious traditions – for example, Roman
Catholicism in Italy and Christian Democracy in
West Germany – were said to be important in the
(re)making of those countries’ political cultures
following the traumatising effects of totalitarian
regimes.
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Religion and the ‘third wave’
• During the ‘third wave of democracy’ (mid1970s–mid-1990s), much attention was paid to
the role of religion in democratisation.
• For example, in Poland, Polish pope, John Paul
II, played key role in undermining existing
communist government and, along with civil
society, pivotal in helping establish democratic
rule.
• During 1980s and 1990s, widespread religious
deprivatisation affected much of the world.
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Specific claims about religion and
democratisation
• Huntington: some religions more amenable to
democracy than others.
• Linz/Stepan: religion not that important to democratic
outcomes in E. Europe after communism.
• Halliday: Islam not key factor in MENA to explain lack of
democracy: barriers primarily social and political, not
religious, factors.
• In MENA, long histories of authoritarian rule and weak
civil societies and, although some or all of those features
might be legitimised by the state in terms of ‘Islamic
doctrine’, nothing specifically ‘Islamic’ about them.
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Three propositions about religion and
democracy
• Religious traditions: core elements more or less
conducive to democratisation and democracy;
• Religious traditions are always multi-vocal. Yet, at
any given moment voices in the ascendancy more or
less receptive to/encouraging of democratisation;
• Religious actors rarely if ever determine
democratisation outcomes. On the other hand, they
are regularly of significance in various ways for
democratisation, with a range of outcomes. This
may especially be the case in countries that have
long traditions of secularisation, e.g., Turkey.
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The Arab Spring=New wave of
democracy?
• Not since end of communism in E. Europe 20 years ago is role
of religion in democratisation so prominent as in Arab Spring.
• Yet, a simple question – ‘What is to be the political outcome of
the Arab Spring for the Arab/Muslim countries of the MENA,
a region largely untouched by the third wave of democracy? –
is not likely to elicit a clear answer.
• Another question: ‘What is the role of religion in these
events?’, is also not conducive to a simple or short satisfactory
response.
• It seems clear, however, that so far religion is not pivotal actor
in relation to democratisation in MENA.
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Religion and the Arab Spring
• In Egypt and Tunisia, where Islamists achieved power
via the ballot box, it did not imply clear or simple
transition to Islamic state (eg Iran or Saudi Arabia) or
even an ‘Islam-influenced’ government (eg Turkey).
• In both Egypt and Tunisia, several ‘kinds’ of Islamists,
illustrating that ‘Islam’ does not provide a singular
blueprint for how to rule once power achieved.
• Whether authentically democratic regimes become
ensconced or not in Egypt and Tunisia, etc, would appear
to have little to do with the fact that both are strongly
Muslim countries.
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Democratisation depends on various
factors
• Material considerations seems much more important for
stability, security and regime longevity than the extent of
its ‘religious-ness’.
• Key questions: To what extent can new governments
deal with pressing challenges from fast-growing
populations who want more jobs and improved welfare?
• To people who want beneficial changes NOW the
religious complexion of a government is much less
important than its broad-based abilities.
• Evidence for this comes from Turkey, where an Islaminfluenced government has, since 2002, presided over
sustained economic growth, with beneficial ramifications
in terms of jobs, welfare, security – and votes.
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Internal and external factors &
democratisation
• INTERNAL: Strength and cohesion of civil society,
political society (including political parties),
religious and ethnic make up of country, economic
situation and plausibility of broad-based reforms.
• EXTERNAL: Foreign policies of interested parties,
e.g., USA, EU, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, muddy
the waters.
• MENA most likely outcome: Slide into entrenched
and long-term political instability, with some state
failure and much state fragility with serious results
for regional and international instability.
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Conclusion
• Relationship between religion and democratisation in
MENA in context of Arab Spring is complex, linked to
both internal and external factors, and varies from
country to country.
• Is third wave of democracy, especially in E. Europe, a
useful comparison to Arab Spring?
• Religious actors may be pivotal in relation to
democratisation outcomes, as in Poland in late 1980s.
• Overall, religious actors tend to have a rather ambivalent
relationship with democratisation.
• They are not necessarily recognised as legitimate
political actors after revolution, eg, in post-communist
Poland where secular political actors quickly became
prominent.