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Finland's winter war and
Estonian neutrality
Evald Laasi
a
a
Tallinn
Published online: 01 Mar 2007.
To cite this article: Evald Laasi (1993) Finland's winter war and Estonian neutrality,
Journal of Baltic Studies, 24:3, 269-282, DOI: 10.1080/01629779300000161
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01629779300000161
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F I N L A N D ' S W I N T E R W A R AND E S T O N I A N N E U T R A L I T Y
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Evald Laasi, Tallinn
The Hitler-Stalin Pact gave the Soviet dictator a free hand to deal with the
Baltic states as he wished. As soon thereafter as Hitler had committed his
military forces in Poland, Stalin made demands on the governments of Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland that the Soviet Union be allowed to station troops
at strategic bases. Estonia assented to a mutual assistance pact (28 September
1939), hoping thereby to maintain a degree of independence. Once additional
confidential agreements were reached in early October with a Soviet military
delegation, specifying the placement of Soviet army and navy units in bases,
every highly-placed Estonian military and civilian official must have known that
the country's continued independence was henceforth questionable. These seven
accords went considerably beyond the stipulations of the mutual assistance pact
which had specified Soviet bases only on the islands of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa
and in Paldiski on the mainland, even beyond the confidential accord dictated
that same day allowing the Soviet navy to station ships in the harbor of Tallinn)
They yielded to the Soviet military large areas from Haapsalu to Lihula in the
northwest, Klooga-Laulasmaa 25 km west of TaUinn, and air bases in Kuusiku
and Kehtna (50 km south of Tallinn).2
The Soviet Bases in Estonia
The text of the seven accords of the Pact of Mutual Assistance has never
been published and their details are fairly little known.
Accord No. 1 Section 1 gave the Soviet navy access to harbors and the
broader maritime anchorages in K6iguste, Kuressaare, Tagalaht and Ktidema in
Saaremaa and Kardla in Hiiumaa. The Soviets would be permitted to build
hydrotechnical installations, wharves, bridges, living quarters, service and
maintenance buildings, workshops, radio stations, roads and railroads there; they
could also dredge and establish installations to provide for navy security. Section
3 went even further. It gave the Soviet navy the right to establish observation
and communication posts, searchlights and coastal defense batteries of any
caliber not only in the aforementioned areas but also on four peninsulas in
Saaremaa (SOlve, Harilaiu, Nina and Pammana) and another four in Hiiumaa
(SOru, K0pu, Tahknna and S~re), thereby establishing a ftrm Soviet grip on the
JBS, Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (Fall 1993)
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Evald Laasi
entire coast of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa. Until these bases were completed, Section
9 in the same accord authorized the Soviets to make use of the mainland harbor
of Rohukiila that faces Hiiumaa, with the right to build workshops and
storehouses.3 The lack of installations on the islands became a justification for
a Soviet presence at Rohuktlla (despite the lack of installations there, too).
Accord No. 2. In Sections 11 and 12, the Estonians were to assist in the
construction of the Paldiski naval base by supplying eleclricity and helping to
find materials, transport and labor.4
Accord No. 3 was the most dangerous to Estonia's sovereignty in that it
gave the Soviet navy a "temporary" foothold in Tallinn. The New Merchant
Harbor and the Karavani Harbor with the surrounding wharves were handed over
to the Soviet navy (Section 1). The Soviets also received an anchoring spot in
the roadstead west of the main course (Section 2),5 which enabled them to
monitor continuously the entire sea traffic of Tallinn. The artillery of large Soviet
ships at the roadstead could threaten the entire city, while the Estonian coastal
fortifications could reach the Soviet anchoring spots with only a few smallcaliber pieces. ~ The accord obliged the Estonians to supply all these Soviet ships
with steam, electricity and drinking water, take them in for repairs in Tallinn
shipyards, and provide Estonian tugboats and icebreakers.7
Accord No. 5 gave the Soviet authorities unlimited access to carry out
hydrographic measurements in Estonian territorial waters, and ordered the
Estonians to give to the Soviet Baltic Fleet command all existing hydrographic
materials and maps for the designated areas of Soviet bases and their approaches,
as well as data needed for harbor construction,s
Accord No. 6 stipulated the procedure for visits to Estonian harbors by
foreign navy and merchant ships: "In the Estonian harbors Soviet naval bases,
Paldiski, Saaremaa and Hiiumaa roadsteads the Soviet navy has the right to
forbid visits by foreign warships or merchant ships for longer durations or
permanently. "9 It is notable that this restriction on Estonian sovereignty used the
term "permanently," while the mutual assistance pact was to last for only ten
years.
Accord No. 7 established in Estonia a press, radio, film and photo
censorship regarding information on the Soviet bases. 1°
Since the Estonian and international publics were not informed of these
October 1939 accords, the implications of the accords became apparent only after
the Red Army entered the base areas on 18 October. The Estonian authorities
tried to maintain a silence about the Soviet activities. Yet the Estonian State
Archive contains hundreds of reports detailing arrogant behavior, even violence,
practiced by the Soviet armed forces toward Estonian civilians and military
personnel, as illustrated by the following examples.
One week after Soviet forces had arrived in Haapsalu, the assistant prefect
of the Laa'ne County reported that on 29 october 1939 Soviet sentries prevented
him from entering the Aafrika harbor area and because the Red Army was
drilling in the garden of the medieval castle, promenades were no longer allowed.
On 25 october three Soviet soldiers stopped a man and a woman on the road to
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Finland's Winter War and Estonian Neutrality
271
a mill near Padise (10 km south of PaMiski), put pistols against the farmer's
head, and searched his bags of grain. On 22 November the police officer of
Klooga complained to the Paldiski police commissioner that the inhabitants of
Kersalu village were incensed about the arbitrary confiscation of sheds and
rooms by the Soviet military, who, moreover, were not constructing toilets for
themselves; the wood around summer cottages, as well as the surroundings of
Klooga manor, were strewn with human excrement, n
A calculated insult to uniformed Estonian personnel occurred in Paldiski
on 26 November 1939. At 1 AM a Soviet sentry prevented four Estonian
officials from using the sidewalk, because it "bothered him," and ordered them
to use the road. On 15 January 1940 the Soviet military suddenly cordoned off
the Paldiski harbor with barbed wire, blocking further entry by local inhabitants
who had their motor boats and nets in the harbor. The local police report noted
that local fishermen were deprived of their livelihood. 12
On 24 February 1940 two Soviet navy officers in civilian clothes, Ivan
Abramov and Aleksandr Polkov, tried to leave the "Grand" restaurant in TaUinn
without paying and cursed out the Estonian police: "I'U just spit once, and you
and your Estonia no longer exist. We'll shoot you like dogs. Who do you think
you are: we came to protect you, and if we so wish you no longer exist. ''13 This
type of "protection" was to become the theme song of drunken Russian colonists
during the next 50 years.
While the hundreds of such incidents on record could be blamed on
undisciplined individuals, the pattern was similar at the command level. On 1
November 1939 four Soviet destroyers left the Tallinn roadstead without
notifying the Estonian authorities and moved at least 50 km east, hugging the
coastline and continuously violating Estonian territorial waters in an area with no
Soviet bases) 4 The Estonian coastal artillery at Aegna could have fired warning
shots at the intruders but did not. Upon a written Estonian request for
explanation, the Soviet commander of the Tallinn base agreed to call the ships
back.
A most blatant violation of Estonian sovereignty occurred on the first day
of the Soviet attack on Finland (30 November 1939), when the Soviet destroyer
"Groziashtshi" seized the Finnish merchant steamer "Auvo" in Estonian territorial
waters, 2 miles off the coast, less than an hour after the ship had left Tallinn.
"Auvo" (192 gross register tons) was heading to VesterOse, Sweden, with a cargo
of scrap iron. Explaining the incident to the commander of the Estonian navy,
the vice-commander of the Soviet Baltic fleet said the Finnish coastal
fortifications had started hostilities by fn'ing on Soviet ships, and hence he had
seized the ship. "In order to avoid misunderstandings," the Soviet commander
asked the Estonians to block Estonian merchant ships from going to Finland) s
The action took place under the nose of the powerful Estonian coastal battery at
Aegna, but the latter did nothing to protect a third party's vessel against piracy
in Estonian territorial waters.
From the very beginning, Soviet warships in TaUinn frequently ignored
the accords of October 1939 about transmitting recognition signals to the
Estonian coastal fortifications when entering or exiting. On 15 December 1939
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EvaM Laasi
the Estonian Navy commander reported two such incidents within two days:
Trawler T210 passed Aegna without reacting to interpellation and searchlights;
a Soviet destroyer entered the roadstead and agreed to identify itself only after
half an hour of requests. He added, "There have been plenty of similar
instances."16
At the same time the actions of the Estonian military in their own country
were restricted appreciably. While the Soviets flew over Estonia without
informing the Estonian military, Soviet forces had to have prior notification
about Estonian military flights. Thus the Estonian second vice-minister for
defense sent on 22 January 1940 a Russian-language letter to the commander of
the Soviet 65th Corps, informing him three days in advance that the Estonian
Hawker Hart type planes would carry out practice flights, on 25 and 26 January,
in the area ranging from the Narva-Sonda railroad in the north to the shore of
Lake Peipsi in the south, and from the Narva River in the east to the MustveeSonda railroad in the west.17This notification involved an area where no Soviet
troops were stationed at the time.
Estonian Government and Military Attitudes
Prior to the Winter War
The Pact of Mutual Assistance and the accords of October 1939 had put
Estonia in a delicate situation. Estonia had been forced to yield to the USSR
extensive privileges on its territory, including the use of its economic resources,
which opened the door to their potential application in the Soviet war against
Finland---a people who were both neighbors and kinfolk of the Estonians. All
that Estonia had succeeded in deleting from the mutual assistance pact was
Estonia's obligation to help the USSR in case of war with "any aggressor." Stalin
agreed to restrict this obligation to aggression by a great power) 8 But obviously
the USSR was more interested in the use of Estonian territory by the Red Army
than in requiring direct Estonian military participation in the war against Finland.
By the time the Winter War began Estonia was incapacitated to the point where
it no longer could afford to refuse anything demanded by its big partner in the
mutual assistance pact.
Still, what the Soviets demanded and what the Estonian authorities agreed
to were not the same. Understandably, Estonia could not refuse anything
stipulated in the pact and the accords. It could not even refuse demands going
beyond the accords, since the Soviet Union effectively had occupied Estonia. But
the Estonian authorities may actually have given the USSR more than the latter
demanded before and during the Winter War. This was true in particular of the
Estonian military commanders, as Estonia's State Controller Karl Soonp~t noted
in his diary, commenting on a Cabinet meeting of 11 October 1939:
In general, it appears that our military men are more
accommodating to the Russians than the, civilian officials; they
want to cede more, worried that otherwise the Russians would not
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273
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have enough space. [Minister of justice] Assor told me in private
that friendship has become so great that [minister of defense,
Lieutenant General Nikolai] Reek has drunk the pledge of
brotherhood with the Russians and, thereafter, demonstratively said
"thou" to them at every occasion.19
At the 13 October Cabinet meeting foreign minister Ants Piip raised the
issue of new economic agreements with the USSR, given that the entrance of
Soviet troops put immediate economic burdens on Estonia: use of railroads,
highways repairs, electricity and water bills, etc. Should not the USSR pay for
them? Commander-in-chief Johan Laidoner was opposed, explaining that "It's not
in our interest to press the Russians on this matter." The cabinet decided to do
nothing .20
At the 19 October Cabinet meeting minister of agriculture Artur Tupits
felt the military was overly compliant to the Russians, while Tupits himself was
convinced Estonia could not survive in such confusion. Reek was upset and said
he would resign, if such reproaches stood. At the next day's meeting it was noted
that Estonia had yielded to the Soviets more territory than agreed to in the pact.
The Estonian military presented the argument that otherwise the 25,000 Soviet
troops agreed to in the pact could not fit into their bases. Defense minister Reek
also tried to persuade his civilian colleagues that once Soviet ships were allowed
to be stationed in the Tallinn harbor, it was natural to let Soviet sailors stroll in
the city during their leisure hours: "You cannot restrict them to their ships." At
the 23 October meeting Reek even justified the Soviet demand for placing their
antiaircraft batteries in Kopli, a harbor promontory a few kilometers from
downtown Tallinn, but he yielded in the face of civilian opposition.2t
Thus, the Estonian military commanders worried about the lack of housing
for excessive Soviet troops in Estonia but not about the housing of Estonian
civilians evicted from their homes to make room for Soviet bases. As for
uniformed foreign military strolling in the streets of the capital city on a regular
basis, the symbolic implications for national independence seemed to have been
completely missed by General Reek. Prefect Kml Ruus and county secretary A.
Ruusa~ of Harju County, in a letter sent to the minister of interior on 11
December 1939, claimed that the Estonian military commanders seemed rather
eager to please the new masters:
Soviet military men have broken into locked rooms left (by
previous agreement) for use by the original owners. They have
arbitrarily seized such rooms, throwing out the owners" property.
They have imprisoned our citizens, holding them overnight,
arguing that our citizens are forbidden to use certain roads. In the
areas taken over by the [Soviet] air force, they have closed some
roads and established new ones, without our own military having
presented proposals to the county adminislration, as required by
law.
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It has become apparent that our military representatives in contact
with the Soviet Russian forces have not sufficiently kept in mind
the lawful interests of our citizens and have done nothing to avoid
improprieties. Our military even offer the Soviet military
authorities more than the latter demand... Our military authorities
have even gone as far as to demand that the county administration
destroy bedbugs in the rooms used by the Soviet army...
Furthermore, our military authorities have unlawfully demanded
evacuation of our citizens from their permanent residences. 22
The excessive compliance by the Estonian military command was stressed
by Finnish linguistics professor Lauri Kettunen, who visited Estonia in early
January 1940 on behalf of the Finnish government. Among the leading figures
in Estonia he met were the commander-in-chief General Johan Laidoner, Prime
Minister Jfi_riOluots, the foreign ministry protocol chief Elmar Kirotar, the head
of the Lutheran church Bishop Johan K0pp, and the opposition leader Jaan
T0nisson. He also met with journalists and student leaders. Karl Ast, press
attach6 of the Estonian embassy in Stockholm, met Professor Kettunen after the
latter's return to Finland and informed the Estonian Foreign Ministry on 12
January 1940 about Kettunen's observations. KeUunen felt that a leadership crisis
in Estonia was more dangerous than the crisis in the public mood. From the
viewpoint of this Finn (during the Winter War, of course), the Estonian military
leadership's behavior was questionable:
Could it be that a number of Estonian senior officers have become
overly comfortable in their positions and have adopted a mercenary
stand, hoping that even under Soviet control they can preserve their
rank and commission? Russian imperial practices in the past
facilitate their sliding onto that slope. 23
The only higher military commander Kettunen is known to have met
during that trip was Laidoner. Since the meeting was private, no record remains.
It is unlikely that this talk left Kettunen with a negative impression. More likely,
he received it from talks with junior officers who undoubtedly knew about their
seniors' politics. They must have known about the higher command's directives
regarding the Winter War, such as the one to assist Soviet aircraft damaged
while bombing Finland. Some junior officers may have seen this as dishonorable.
Professor Kettunen hinted that.
The agreements imposed on Estonia in September-October 1939 enabled
the USSR to gain a measure of control over Estonia's territory and population.
They also determined the conditions underlying the behavior of the Estonian
government and military leadership during the Winter War. If the Estonian
leaders could not, or would not, protect their own citizens from the arbitrariness
of the Soviet military, then no genuine neutrality could be expected from them
in the Russo-Finnish war.
Finland's Winter War and Estonian Neutrality
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"There Is No War"
In the early morning of 30 November 1939 the Red Army crossed the
Finnish border and began a military action against Finland that lasted 105 days.
An empire of 170 million subjects attacked a nation of 3.5 million who could not
expect much help while most European nations were fighting in the Second
World War. In particular, help was blocked by the Soviet Union's ally, Nazi
Germany. It was clear who was the aggressor, and the USSR found it impossible
to convince world opinion that little Finland was a serpent trying to slip into the
Soviet garden.2. But the USSR tried hard. One stratagem was to deny the
existence of a war. Another was to say that the USSR had excellent relations
with the "democratic government" of Finland; however, Stalin had only recently
made plans to manufacture such a government.
On the second day of Soviet aggression (1 December 1939) the Soviet
news agency TASS announced that a "Finnish democratic people's government"
had been formed in Terijoki, a Finnish border town occupied by the Soviet army.
The "government" was headed by Komintern activist Otto Ville Kuusinen. TASS
badly butchered the names of the other Finnish exile communists who
supposedly signed the declaration. When the League of Nations demanded that
USSR explain its aggression (9 December 1939), the latter denied any war
existed. The USSR supposedly had concluded a mutual assistance and friendship
pact with a Finnish people's government which had asked for Soviet military
help so as to liquidate a possible hotbed of war created by Finland's former
governmentY Apart from the USSR itself, no other state gave recognition to
this figment of Soviet imagination nor even paid the least attention to it except
for the Estonian government, headed by President Konstantin PAts and
commander-in-chief Laidoner. On the sixth day of the Winter War (5 December
1939) Estonian foreign minister Ants Piip sent a letter to the Estonian
ambassador in Helsinki, Aleksander Warma, presenting Estonia's position
regarding the conflict. He used terms which suggested a potential for Estonia
violating the norms of neutrality:
As far as our attitude toward the Finnish-Russian events [sic] is
concerned, it has remained unchanged. Just as before, we do not
consider it a formal war but count it as repressaalium [reprisal
measures] . . . . Molotov has told the same to [League of Nations
Secretary General] Avenol.26
The legal argument for Estonia's "There is no war" attitude boiled down to the
fact that Stalin had never issued a formal decla~ation of war when he attacked
Finland. Such a narrow interpretation of the Winter War aligned Estonia fully
with the USSR. Hip's letter further tried to prove that the raids against Finland
by Estonian-based Soviet forces did not violate Estonia's neutrality:
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Evald Laasi
Further, we have analyzed the juridical status of our [sic] bases and
their agreement with our [sic] neutrality. The norms and precedents
of international law say that "leaseholders" have the right to
execute on the leased territories those acts of sovereignty, for the
purpose of which the land was leased. Accordingly, fortifications
were built on territories rented from China in Port Arthur [by
tsmist Russia], Weihaiwei [by Britain], etc., and these fortifications
were used in military actions both for aggression and for the
defense of these bases without violating China's neutrality. I have
no information to what extent bases in our country have been used
in such direction, but the aforementioned considerations go to show
that even in an affn-mative case our neutrality would not be
violated. I tell you this so that you could explicate our
understanding of the matter, in case of need-qhe more so, since
no war in a juridical sense exists in our neighborhood.27
Thus Ants Piip put Estonia on par with the semi-colonized China of 1900, a
plaything in the hands of the great powers of the day. The wars he mentioned
took place largely on China's own territory, but they did not violate China's
"neutrality," according to Piip. One can guess at how such explanations would
have impressed the Finns, if the Estonian ambassador had indeed uttered them.
However, the most damning evidence of the extent to which the government was
complying with Soviet wishes came in a postscript to Piip's letter:
Regarding the recognition of the Kuusinen government, no one has
approached us. But if that should happen, then we would under the
present circumstances give this positive consideration only with
regard to the territories under the control of the Kuusinen
government in eastern Finland. 2s
In other words, Estonia's government was so compliant that it considered
recognizing the puppet government even before the USSR had time to utter such
a wish. Indeed, it seems that such a demand was never made, because the heroic
Finnish resistance restricted the Kuusinen "government's" realm to a tiny border
strip where no Finnish population remained.
Piip's refusal to recognize Kuusinen outside his actual area of control (a
tiny note of defiance in the din of war) did not amount to much. At the time Piip
wrote his letter (5 December 1939) the degree to which the Finns would succeed
in blunting Soviet offensives was not yet clear, and there was reason to expect
that the Red Army would advance rapidly, soon giving the puppet government
"control" of Viipuri and then of all Finland. It turned out otherwise. The Red
Army's frontal attempt to break through the Finnish main defense line failed on
the day Piip's letter probably arrived (6 December 1939). By 14 December the
Finns annihilated an entire Soviet division north of Lake Ladoga. These Finnish
Finland's Winter War and Estonian Neutrality
277
successes eliminated any opportunity for the Estonian government to "positively
consider" recognizing Kuusinen in territories under his control.
The Finnish government evidently heard about Estonia's willingness to
recognize the puppet regime, since the Estonian foreign ministry very soon (8
December 1939) received the following telegram from ambassador Warma:
"[Finnish Foreign Minister Vaino] Tanner told me that recognition of the
Kuusinen government would mean the breaking of relations with Finland. "29
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Bombing of Finland from Estonia
Estonian-based Soviet air raids against Finnish population centers and the
blockade of Finland by the Red Navy based in Paldiski and Tallian manifestly
violated Estonia's neutrality. One must appreciate the understanding the Finnish
government showed toward Estonia's inability to protest. The Finns (realizing the
futility of any protest) did not officially raise the issue of bombing raids with the
Estonian government. Since Estonia was not put on the spot, its government had
the opportunity to keep quiet, but they did not. Here too, the Estonian
government may have given the USSR more than the latter cared to ask for.
Reporting on his talks with Finnish Foreign Minister Tanner on 17
January 1940, Ambassador Warma recorded that Tanner believed ordinary Finns
were more irritated by those raids originating in Estonia than those coming from
the Soviet Union. Instead of refraining from responding to an off-the-record
statement, Warma asserted to Tanner that he had no information on the number
of Soviet aircraft in Estonia or about their possible participation in raids on
Finland. "The Russians have told us that the aircraft stationed in Estonia only
carry out training flights over the Gulf of Finland," Warma said.3° At the time
the Estonian foreign ministry obligated Warma to plead such ignorance, northern
Estonia was the scene of numerous emergency landings by Russian planes, all
presumably hit during training flights over the open sea.
On 25 December 1939 the Finnish embassy in Tallinn transmitted to the
Estonian foreign ministry the following verbal note:
On behalf of its Government the Finnish embassy has the honor to
announce the following. Soviet warships have been stationed more
or less permanently in Tallinn, a city that had not been yielded as
a military base. Although the USSR is not formally at war [given
a lack of declaration of war], it cannot be accorded during the
hostilities greater rights than allowed by the rules of neutrality.
Therefore Estonia's practices amount to a violation of neutrality.
In the light of the above, the Finnish Government voices protest
and reserves the right to undertake necessary countermeasures in
Estonian territorial waters.31
It should be noted that Finland did not protest about the warlike use of publicly
ceded bases such as Paldiski, but only against the use of Tallinn (a case outside
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the scope of Ph'p's aforementioned "Chinese defense"). The very next day (26
December 1939) the Estonian government rejected the protest:
Neither Finland nor the USSR are warring parties, so that Estonia
has no grounds for applying norms of neutrality to either country.
Consequently, Estonia could not possibly have violated those
norms when allowing Soviet warships to stay temporarily in the
harbor of Tallinn, which is not a Soviet navy base. On these
grounds the Government of the Republic of Estonia firmly rejects
your protest and cannot recognize the right Finland wants to
reserve itself on the basis of that protest? 2
A handwritten note scribbled over the text of the document characterizes
the compliant behavior of the Piits regime: "After its contents were made known
to the President of the Republic, this verbal note was handed to the Finnish
ambassador on 26 December 1939, l:40pm. [Soviet ambassador] Nikitin was
informed of the transmittal by phoney Was it really necessary to inform the
Soviet ambassador hurriedly about an Estonian-Finnish matter?
As for the contents of the Estonian counter-note, its truthfulness was
debatable. The argument about Finland and the USSR not being at war is too
ludicrous to be discussed. But how "temporary" was the stay of Soviet warships
in the harbor of Tallinn, given that they had constantly been there from 12
October 1939 on? ''~ The aforementioned confidential Accord No.3 shows
clearly that the harbor and the wider roadstead had been yielded to the Soviet
navy for two years, together with repair and resupply facilities and entire parts
of the harbor complete with buildings. If this was not a "base," what is? The
Soviet navy itself called Tallinn their "base". Admiral Issakov did so on 3
October 1939 when talking with the Estonian military delegation--and the latter
did not object.35 Thus, the verbal note's claim that the Soviet presence was a
temporary stay amounted to the obfuscation of facts.
The Soviet naval behavior confirmed their words about Tallinn being their
base. On 2 February 1940, Soviet warships anchored in the Miini Harbor of
Tallinn opened fire on an Estonian aircraft which dared approach. The city itself
was in the winter of 1939/40 full of Soviel officers and sailors moving
individually or in columns of up to 80 men being taken to the city baths. (As a
results of these visits, parasites spread in the baths and infected local people. 36)
As mentioned earlier, Professor Kettunen met the Estonian Prime Minister
Uluots in the latter's home on 5 January 1940, for informal contacts on behalf
of the Finnish government. Off the record, Uluots expressed regret over the
Russian use of Tallinn as their base but felt protests were useless, since the
accords gave the Russians such a right. Uluots did not deny that Russian aircraft
used their bases in Estonia to bomb Finland, "but for heaven's sake, don't bomb
Tallinn. ''37 Thus, the Prime Minister himself, who undoubtedly was aware of
Estonia's counter-note of 26 December, acknowledged that Tallinn was a Soviet
Finland's Winter War and Estonian Neutrality
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naval base in the war against Finland. With this, Uluots also acknowledged
Estonia's violation of its announced neutrality.
In sum, the Estonian government's foreign policy during the Winter War
had every appearance of being anti-Finnish--and was seen as such in Finland.
Finnish reaction to the Estonian counter-note of December came during Warma's
conversation with Tanner on 28 De~cember 1939. Warma reports Tanner as
saying:
We presented a protest against the stationing of Russian ships in
Tallinn. The purely formal reply by Minister Piip was
disappointing in that it recognized and affirmed only the Soviet
position regarding the Russo-Finnish conflict... We did not raise
the issue of your yielding those footholds foreseen in the EstonianSoviet agreement. 38 But when the mother ship of Russian
submarines is stationed in the Tallinn roadstead and resupplies the
subs operating against us in the Gulf of Bothnia, then we deem it
necessary to protest against it, because we must reserve ourselves
some freedom of action, just in case39
On 29 December 1939 the Finnish embassy in Tallinn sent the Estonian
foreign ministry a new note, saying that Estonia must observe the rules of
neutrality regarding the USSR, since the latter was engaged in hostilities against
Finland. Finland pointed out that Estonia applied the rules of neutrality toward
Poland in September 1939, although Germany and Poland were not formally
warring parties, either. The note concluded: "As a member state of the League
of Nations, Estonia should heed the League's plenary assembly resolution;
Estonia should support Finland and avoid supporting the Soviet Union. "4°
In a 4 January 1940 counter-note, the Estonian government had the gall
to maintain that the Soviet warships which were allowed temporary visits to
Tallinn did not enjoy any privileges beyond those accorded to the warships of
other foreign states. Therefore, there were no grounds for the Finnish belief that
the USSR was using Tallinn as a support base for military action.4~ Ever since
the seizure of the "Auvo" by Tallinn-based Soviet warships on the first day of
war, this had been a lie.
By such diplomacy the Uluots government wrecked its relations with
Finland without deflecting Stalin from his course toward the total destruction of
Estonian independence.
Conclusions
Violations of neutrality by Estonian authorities during the Winter War
consisted of the following:
1. Allowing Soviet ships and aircraft based in Paldiski to attack Finland.
Under the existing circumstances Estonia could not block these raids, but the
Estonian government could have abstained from claims that they did not know
how many Soviet aircraft were stationed in Estonia and from making statements
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Evald Laasi
such as: "According to the Russians only training flights were undertaken by
them." Such claims merely made Estonia appear ridiculous in the eyes of the
Finnish government.
2. Allowing Soviet warships to use harbor and roadstead of Tallinn for
activities against Finland. This too, Estonia could not prevent, but the
government could have abstained from claims that no such use occurred.
3. Orders by Estonian military authorities to allow Soviet aircraft damaged
over Finland to land at Estonian military airfields and to receive technical
assistance. This was avoidable, and therefore such orders represented a serious
moral and practical breach of neutrality.
4. The refusal by Estonian authorities to call the Finnish-Soviet hostilities
a war. This provided direct diplomatic support of the USSR, which was making
the same claim at the League of Nations. This diplomatic support was avoidable.
5. The Estonian government's readiness to recognize the Kuusinen puppet
government. This was avoidable; yet the Estonian government was prepared to
take this step even before the USSR made such a demand.
In sum, the Estonian government's policy during the Winter War was
markedly unfriendly toward Finland. In other words, Estonia's neutrality had a
pro-Soviet slant.
Lastly, the key officials reponsible for Estonia's policies failed completely
to ameliorate their nation's situation. The subsequent fate of the Estonian
decision-makers mentioned in this article was as follows: Elmar Kirotar and
Johan Ktpp fled to Sweden in 1944 and died there several decades later; General
Johan Laidoner died on 13 March 1952 in a Soviet special prison in Vladmir,
Russia; Ants Piip died in 1942 in the Solikamsk prison camp in Russia;
Lieutenant General Nikolai Reek was shot by the Soviets on 8 May 1942 in the
Solikamsk prison camp; no information is available on Karl Ruus and A. Ruusa;
Karl Soonpad fell in battle between the German-organized local defense
organization Omakaitse (of which he was a member) and Soviet paralroopers on
15 June 1944 near Elva (Tartu county); Jaan Ttnisson vanished in a Soviet
prison camp (date and place of death unknown); Artur Tupits died in a Soviet
prison camp (date and place unknown); Jiiri Uluots fled to Sweden in 1944 and
died there in 1945; Aleksander Warma passed away in Sweden several decades
after the end of the war.
Finland's Winter War and Estonian Neutrality
281
ENDNOTES
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Evald Laasi was until 1991 senior researcher at the History Institute of the
Estonian Academy of Science. He passed away in January of 1993. This article
was translated by Rein Taagepera.
1. ESA 957-17-9:140-141. (Read: Estonian State Archive, folio 957, label 17,
preservation unit 9, pages 140-141.)
2. ESA 957-17-9: 129-132.
3. ESA 957-17-9: 136-137.
4. ESA 957-17-9: 139.
5. ESA 957-17-9: 140.
6. ESA 527-1-1628: 125.
7. ESA 957-17-9: 140.
8. ESA 957-17-9: 143.
9. Ibid.
10. ESA 957-17-9: 146.
11. ESA 1-7-157: 20, 26, 149.
12. ESA 1-7-157:151 and 546.
13. ESA 1-7-157: 795-796.
14. ESA 527-1-1628: 68.
15. ESA 527-1-1628: 70.
16. ESA 527-1-1628: 78.
17. ESA 526-1-84: 190.
18. Molotovi-Ribbentropi paktist baaside lepinguni. Dokumente ja materjale
[From the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact to the agreement on the bases:
Documents and materials] (Tallinn 1989), 168-169 and 172.
19. "Teenides isamaad. Riigik6ntrolor Karl Soonp~i p~ievik 1939-1940" [In the
service of the country: The diary of State Controller K. S., 1939-1940].
Akadeemia No. 8, 1990, 1665. (The explanations in square brackets are
added by the author.)
20. Op. cit., 1667
21. OP. cit., 1675-1676.
22. ESA 1-7-157: 965.
23. ESA 957-14-704:357 and 359. See also Magnus Ilmj~rv, "Kui Soome Eestile
ei m~lnud. Eesti Soome v~ilispoliitikas 1937-1939" [When Finland did
not think about Estonia: Estonia in Finnish foreign relations 1937-1939],
Vikerkaar No. 2, 1990, 65-69.
24. After the total Soviet occupation of Estonia, this image featured in a book,
Tallame puruks valgesoome mao [We shall crush the White Finnish
serpent] (Tallinn, 1941), 3.
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Evald Laasi
25. Osmo Jussila, Terijoen hallitus 1939-1940 [The government of Terijoki],
(Porvoo and Helsinki: Jura, 1985), 20-22; Juho Paasikivi, Toimintani
Moskovassa ja Suomessa 1939-1941. !: Talvisota [My activities in
Moscow and Finland 1939-1941, I: Winter War] (Porvoo and Helsinki,
1959), 125-126.
26. ESA 957-14-704: 19.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. ESA 957-14-704: 20.
30. ESA 957-14-704: 61-62.
31. ESA 957-14-713: 34.
32. ESA 957-14-713: 30.
33. Ibid.
34. ESA 978-1-871: 175-214.
35. ESA 957-17-9: 57.
36. ESA 1-7-157:479 and 507.
37. "Laud Kettuneni luurematk Eestisse" [L.K.'s reconnaissance trip to Estonia],
Vikerkaar No. 2, 1990, 67-68.
38. This means the public pact of September 1939. The Finns could not know
about the confidential accords by which Tallinn was yielded to the Soviet
navy.
39. ESA 957-14-704: 36.
40. ESA 957-14-713:27. In September 1939 the Polish submarine "Orzer' sought
refuge in TaUinn after Poland was defeated by Germany and the USSR;
Estonia treated it as a ship belonging to a waning state.
41. ESA 957-14-713: 36.