SCRIPT FOR CRIM LAW II VIDEO ASSIGNMENT
Good day everyone. I am Ricalyn Nullaga and today, I will discuss Article 32 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Article 32 provides the effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary
special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage.
This provision states that the perpetual or temporary special disqualification for
the exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or
during the term of the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of
the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected
to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public
office during the period of his disqualification.
Let us first explain the right of suffrage. The right of suffrage means the right to
vote, and to be voted upon. To further explain, it is someone’s right to elect
someone for a public office or position, or the right to run for such public office
or position.
Thus, a person suffering from a perpetual or temporary special disqualification
for the exercise of the right of suffrage produces two effects. First, the
deprivation of the right to vote or to be elected to any public office. Second,
a person cannot hold any public office during the period of disqualification.
The duration of the disqualification is according to the nature of the penalty.
Perpetual disqualification is effective during the lifetime of the person
convicted even after the service of sentence. Meanwhile, temporary special
disqualification lasts during the term of the sentence and is removed after the
service of sentence.
It will be further discussed later in Article 36 but it is important to mention now
that a pardon shall not restore the right of suffrage except when it is expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon.
The said disqualification of the right of suffrage stated in Article 32 is withholding
the privilege to the right and not a denial of the said right. The manifest purpose
of the restrictions upon the right of suffrage is to preserve the purity of elections.
In the case People vs. Corral, G.R. No. 423000, Amadeo Corral was charged
with illegally voting in the general elections held on June 5, 1934. He was
convicted on the grounds that he had voted while under a legal
disqualification. It was established that Corral had been sentenced to eight
years and one day of presidio mayor by final judgement in 1910, and he had
not been granted a plenary pardon. The disqualification was based on section
432 of the Revised Administrative Code, which stated that anyone who had
been sentenced to suffer not less than eighteen months of imprisonment since
August 13, 1898, and had not been granted a plenary pardon, was disqualified
from voting. His counsel contends that he voted in 1928 so, his offense had
already prescribed, and he could no longer be prosecuted for illegal voting at
the general election held on June 5, 1934.
The question in this case is whether Corral was disqualified from voting in the
general elections due to his previous criminal conviction.
The Court affirmed the judgement of conviction against Corral, and he was
found guilty of illegally voting. Suffrage is a function of government thus, the
right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a
privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes that are most likely to
exercise it for the public good. Consequently, the right of the State to deprive
persons of the right of suffrage by reason of their having been convicted of
crime, is beyond question. The presumption is that one rendered infamous by
conviction of felony, or those base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit
to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold office.
The Court also held that considering the disqualification imposed on Corral as
having been removed at the expiration of his sentence, is an erroneous
understanding of the disqualification since it views the disqualification as a
punishment. The Court held that the disqualification shall be viewed as
protection of the purity of election instead of a punishment.
In another case, G.R. No. L-28613, the case of Lacuna vs. Abes, Benjamin Abes
was convicted of a crime and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six to
eight years of prision mayor, along with the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right
of suffrage.
Abes was released from confinement on April 7, 1959, after partially serving his
sentence, due to a conditional pardon granted by the President of the
Philippines. Abes applied for registration as a voter with the approach of the
1967 elections but was denied by the Election Registration Board, but he still
filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor and was proclaimed
the winner in the elections. Ambrocio Lacuna who came second to Abes
challenged the latter’s eligibility to hold position.
The issue in this case is whether or not Abes, who was previously disqualified
from holding public office and exercising the right to vote due to his conviction,
is eligible to assume the position of mayor despite his disqualifications.
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court, declaring the
eligibility of Abes to hold the position of mayor. The court ruled that the plenary
pardon granted to Abes by the President of the Philippines removed his
disqualifications and restored his civil and political rights. Previous cases have
held that an absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but also
removes all disabilities resulting from conviction. Therefore, the plenary pardon
granted to Abes removed his disqualification, and his election and assumption
of office must be sustained.
So, that is it for Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code. I hope your learned
something from the discussion. See you next time. Bye.