To what extent was the fear of spread of communism a significant factor in the British stance
towards territorial changes at Versailles? 1
To what extent was the fear of spread of communism a significant factor in the British stance
towards territorial changes at Versailles?
Word Count: 2200
To what extent was the fear of spread of communism a significant factor in the British stance
towards territorial changes at Versailles? 2
Table of Contents:
1. Section A: Identification and Evaluation of Sources……………………………….... 3 - 4
2. Section B: Investigation…………………………………………………………….. 5 - 10
3. Section C: Reflection………………………………………………………………. 11 - 12
4. Bibliography……………………………………………………………………….. 13 - 15
To what extent was the fear of spread of communism a significant factor in the British stance
towards territorial changes at Versailles? 3
1. Section A: Identification and Evaluation of Sources
This investigation assesses the question: “To what extent was the fear of spread of
communism a significant factor in the British stance towards territorial changes at
Versailles?” Territorial changes include those in Europe, German African colonies, and China.
The source The Truths About The Peace Treaties Vol-1 (January 1st, 1938) by David
Lloyd George is relevant as it offers Britain’s Prime Minister’s (1916–22) testimony regarding
the British stance at Versailles which is the investigation’s focus. A value of its origin is that it
was written by a politician actively involved in the peace-making process in Versailles, thus
providing exclusive first-hand insights. A limitation of origin is that it was written 19 years after
Versailles so it is possible that Lloyd George’s hindsight could have distorted information. A
value of content is that it details discussions between Allied leaders through releasing
previously-secret documents, such as the “Outline of Peace Terms”. The limitation of content is
that it only provides the perspective of one politician at Versailles, hence has to be
cross-referenced with other primary sources. The value of purpose is that it was made to inform
the general public about Versailles’s negotiations from a perspective different to the evidence
thitherto. However, a limitation of purpose is that despite claiming to “narrate simply… the story
of peace-making,”1 Lloyd George was on the fringe of British politics by 1938 which could have
led to omissions or undue emphasis on certain aspects of the Versailles negotiations to clear his
final image.
A source, Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace (1966) by John M. Thompson, is
relevant as it offers the perspective that the fear of, specifically Russian, communism spreading
1
Lloyd George, David. The Truth About The Peace Treaties Vol-1. (1938). p. 5
To what extent was the fear of spread of communism a significant factor in the British stance
towards territorial changes at Versailles? 4
was not prevalent at Versailles, arguing that “it would be difficult to prove that Bolshevism
affected [its] general structure.”2 A value of origin is that it was written at a time when
Thomspon got to interview Ambassador William C. Bullitt and thus obtain an eyewitness
account. A limitation of origin is that it was published 47 years later but 55 years ago, hence not
close enough to provide first-hand witnessing but too distant to incorporate contemporary
historiography. A value of the content is that it utilizes two sets of public records, the American
delegation and the Russian Political Conference’s, which allows multiple perspectives to be
evaluated. However, a limitation of content is that it was written before the British government
abandoned its fifty-year rule for releasing classified documents, hence, it lacks primary source
evidence regarding the British stance. The value of purpose is that Thompson is one of the first
historians to thoroughly consider the menace of Bolshevism spreading so brings a new
perspective. A limitation of purpose is that being one of the firsts, Thompson’s historiography of
Versailles is unsupported by other historians thus restricted to evidence and arguments he
provides.
2
Thompson, John M. Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace. (1966). p. 395.
To what extent was the fear of spread of communism a significant factor in the British stance
towards territorial changes at Versailles? 5
2. Section B: Investigation
In January 1919, David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau, and Woodrow Wilson
began the Paris Peace Settlements that resulted in multiple treaties between the victors and losers
of WWI. The political climate of the Russian Revolution and German Spartacists under which
the Treaty of Versailles was written posed challenges.3 Some historians argue the fear of the
spread of communism from Germany played a large role in the British stance towards territorial
changes as shown by European adjustments.4 However, German African colonies appear to not
be considerably influenced by the menace of communism expanding but rather imperialism.5
Still, some trace the threat of communism proliferating, specifically from Russia, as notable to
the British by analyzing Chinese concessions.6 This investigation will thus assess the extent to
which the fear of the spread of communism was a significant factor in the British stance towards
territorial changes at Versailles.
The most controversial territorial change in Western Europe was the Rhineland under
French control.7 Ripsman argues Lloyd George opposed Clemenceau’s proposal because he
feared it “could lead to a Bolshevik revolution in Germany” since Germans under French rule
would harbor resentment towards traditional capitalist systems.8 Ripsman points to Lloyd
George’s Fontainebleau Memorandum as evidence,9 which Schuker adds “conjured up the
specter of “spartacism from the Urals to the Rhine” if the Allies failed to offer an equitable
3
Sharp, Alan. “The Paris Peace Conference and its Consequences.” International Encyclopedia of the First World
War. (2018). doi: 10.15463/ie1418.10149.
4
Mayer, Arno J. Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles,
1918-1919. (1967). p. 9.
5
Boemeke, Manfred F., Feldman, Gerald D., and Glaser, Elisabeth. The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after
75 Years. (1998). p. 494.
6
Dillon, Dr. E.J. The Inside Story of The Peace Conference. (1920). p. 468.
7
Ibid. p. 23.
8
Ripsman, Norrin M. "The Politics of Deception Forging Peace Treaties in the Face of Domestic Opposition."
International Journal 60, no. 1. (2004). p. 202.
9
Ibid.
To what extent was the fear of spread of communism a significant factor in the British stance
towards territorial changes at Versailles? 6
peace.”10 Clemenceau’s interpreter corroborates this, stating Britain opposed “creating new
Alsace-Lorraines.”11 On the other hand, Thompson argues Lloyd George was more preoccupied
with monitoring France’s power than preventing communism.12 Thompson sees communism’s
menace in the Fontainebleau Memorandum, the document written by Lloyd George in March
1919 outlining British concerns of peace settlements, “as a way of trying to secure amelioration
of terms” to counteract French hegemony caused by a weakened Germany.13 While Britain and
France did have an implicit historic rivalry, Thompson only considers the Memorandum and fails
to account that many records explicitly emphasize British prioritization of a weakened Germany
over a strengthened France; one example is Baker’s compilation of Woodrow Wilson’s
unpublished and personal material which states “Mr. Lloyd George fears that too severe
territorial conditions will be playing the game of Bolshevism in Germany” without ever
mentioning French hegemony.14 Mantoux adds Lloyd George stated “the English worker [didn’t]
want to crush the German people with excessive demand.”15 These credible, contemporary
sources demonstrate the British stance towards Western Europe was rooted in the fear that too
weak a Germany would translate into economic struggles for Britain which threatened
revolution. Consequently, the Rhineland was demilitarized and left under German jurisdiction.16
Although French strength may have been alarming, the more significant and explicit threat to
Britain that shaped its stance towards territorial adjustments of the Rhineland wasn’t a
10
Boemeke, Manfred F., Feldman, Gerald D., and Glaser, Elisabeth. The Treaty of Versailles: A
Reassessment after 75 Years. (1998). p. 301. Citing David Lloyd George.
11
Mantoux, Paul. The Deliberations of the Council of Four (March 24-June 28, 1919). (1991). p. 66.
12
Thompson, John M. Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace. (1966). p. 10.
13
Ibid. p. 387.
14
Baker, Ray Stannard. Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement. (1922). p. 250.
15
Mantoux, Paul. The Deliberations of the Council of Four (March 24-June 28, 1919). (1991). p. 35.
16
Marks, Sally. "Mistakes and Myths: The Allies, Germany, and the Versailles Treaty, 1918–1921." The Journal of
Modern History 85, no. 3. (2013). p. 647.
To what extent was the fear of spread of communism a significant factor in the British stance
towards territorial changes at Versailles? 7
hegemonic France but a weak, potentially communist Germany that acted as a contagion of
revolution.
East Europe’s situation was even more delicate; a threatening Russo-German
collaboration intensified feelings of insecurity.17 Clemenceau’s solution was to strengthen Poland
against communism, but Lloyd George believed this strategy would turn Germany communist
since Poland’s power would come at the expense of Germany’s who was already experiencing
hardships.18 In 1914, Upper Silesia provided Germany with 23 and 80 percent of coal and zinc,
respectively,19 and Lloyd George saw granting these advantageous resources to Poland as “a
deadly wound” that would harm Germany’s economy, triggering revolution.20 A poor German
economy would ripple and tempt revolution in Britain too because British trade would also be
harmed. Consequently, Poland gained only some regions of Upper Silesia.21 Andelman argues
the number of Germans under Polish rule was also worrying,22 which Steiner adds Germany
would find “most intolerable.”23 Trachtenberg verifies that Lloyd George declared “Germans
must not be placed under Polish rule”, because resentment could spurr a German revolution.24 On
the other hand, Cooper argues “nationalism, not Bolshevism, was at the heart of troubles in
Eastern Europe” claiming “it would be misleading to say that British delegates… [had] the threat
of Bolshevism foremost on their minds.”25 Yet even if nationalism superseded communism,
Lloyd George was struggling with the Irish independence movement that had been explicitly
17
Henig, Ruth. Versailles and After 1919-1933. (1995). p. 37.
Steiner, Zara. The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919-1933. (2005). p. 51.
19
Henig, Ruth. Versailles and After 1919-1933. (1995). p. 25.
20
Huddleston, Sisely. Peace-Making at Paris. (1919). p. 151-152.
21
Henig, Ruth. Versailles and After 1919-1933. (1995). p. 37.
22
Andelman, David A. A Shattered Peace: Versailles 1919 and the Price We Pay Today. (2008). p. 159.
23
Steiner, Zara. The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919-1933. (2005). p. 51.
24
Trachtenberg, Marc. "Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference." The Journal of Modern History 51, no. 1. (1979).
p. 37. Citing Woodrow Wilson’s memorandum.
25
Cooper, Susan L. “The Paris Peace Conference Without the Bolshevik Threat.” (1975). p. 35.
18
To what extent was the fear of spread of communism a significant factor in the British stance
towards territorial changes at Versailles? 8
supported by the Bolsheviks,26 and showed revolutionary attitudes.27 Hence, he understood that
nationalism presented potential Bolshevism, and given its propagating nature, Bolshevism in
Europe was feared to mean revolution in Britain.28 Lloyd George’s initiative for a plebiscite thus
exemplifies British efforts to prevent “an explosion of Bolshevism.”29 The plebiscite both
challenged the Bolshevik accusation that Allies were motivated by “cynical imperialism”, and
sought to counteract the interest in Bolshevism which supported self-determination.30 The latter
was increasingly important as Briain faced the Irish separatists; Lloyd George restricted both
exterior causes for communism in Britain (a strong, resource-rich Poland which weakened
Germany and harmed British trade) and interior pressures (Irish revolutionary attitudes) through
territorial compromises and plebiscites, respectively. Therefore, although East European
territorial adjustments included nationalism, the British stance reflected a stronger fear for the
spread of communism caused by a weak German (and British) economy, and resentment of
foreign rule.
Turning to Germany’s African colonies, self-determination differed.31 Henig argues
self-determination was not given to the League of Nations’ mandates because it was profitable
for Britain given it would acquire some of Togoland and the Cameroons, as well as all of
German East Africa under what Lloyd George called “virtually a codification of existing British
practice”.32 On the other hand, Buzinkai claims that instead of not providing self-determination
to African colonies on the basis of economic benefits, Lloyd George utilized the League as a
26
Throntveit, Trygve. "The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National Self-Determination."
Diplomatic History 35, no. 3. (2011). p. 357.
27
Laffan, Michael. The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn Fein Party. (1999). p. 312.
28
Henig, Ruth. Versailles and After 1919-1933. (1995). p. 25.
29
Mantoux, Paul. The Deliberations of the Council of Four (March 24-June 28, 1919). (1991). p. 35.
30
Throntveit, Trygve. "The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National Self-Determination."
Diplomatic History 35, no. 3. (2011). p. 357.
31
Throntveit, Trygve. "The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National Self-Determination."
Diplomatic History 35, no. 3. (2011). p. 357.
32
Henig, Ruth. Versailles and After 1919-1933. (1995). p. 17.
To what extent was the fear of spread of communism a significant factor in the British stance
towards territorial changes at Versailles? 9
“political guardian, a defensive bulwark against the spread of Bolshevism.”33 While this may be
true in regards to Europe, Keylor argues there was no immediate communist threat to Africa and
that instead, there was “never any intention of preparing the… mandates in Africa for
independence.”34 Britain could continue profiting from imperialism while remaining protected
under the “cloak of moral respectability represented by the mandate[s]”.35 Moreover, Britain and
France had secretly agreed on preliminary divisions of German colonies during WWI,36 but prior
to any serious communist movements in Russia or Germany, hence emphasizing the
insignificance of communism’s menace. Consequently, while the League may have partially
served against communism, territorial changes in Germany’s colonies demonstrate economic
advantages Britain would reap in Africa outweighed any distant threat of communism in Europe.
However, British perspective on Chinese territorial changes was influenced by the fear of
spread of communism. Though its expression was not self-determination as in Europe but rather
imperialism, transferring Germany’s concession of the Shantung peninsula to Japan allowed for
the spread of communism to be kept in check. Not only did China have “a highly unstable
system”37 thereby vulnerable to communism exemplified by the Russian Revolution,38 but
Britain’s ally, Japan, saw that it “could not exist without China” and China could not exist as a
communist state.39 Nevertheless, Elleman points out that in February 1917, Japan signed a secret
agreement with Britain in which “London promised to support Tokyo’s claim to the Shandong
concession… in return for Japan’s supporting British claims to all of Germany’s South Pacific
33
Buzinkai, Donald I. "The Bolsheviks, the League of Nations and the Paris Peace Conference, 1919." Soviet Studies
19, no. 2. (1967). p. 258.
34
Boemeke, Manfred F., Feldman, Gerald D., and Glaser, Elisabeth. The Treaty of Versailles: A
Reassessment after 75 Years. (1998). p. 494.
35
Ibid.
36
MacMillan, Margaret. Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World. (2003). p. 105
37
Fairbank, John K., Twitchett, Denis. The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12: Republican China, 1912-1949,
Part 1. (1983). p. 297.
38
MacMillan, Margaret. Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World. (2003). p. 341.
39
Ibid. p. 329. Citing Viscount Kikujiro Ishii’s diary.
To what extent was the fear of spread of communism a significant factor in the British stance
towards territorial changes at Versailles? 10
islands.”40 While this is true, and actually agreements date back to 1915,41 Dillon demonstrates
that accords only mattered when they benefited the Allies.42 Dillon highlights that the 1916
Treaty of Bucharest, which gave Romania the whole Banat in exchange for their belligerence,
was abrogated because it did not benefit Allies’ plans,
43
and so, even if there were agreements
prior to the threat of communism spreading, China’s political instability and the Bolshevik’s
proximity further solidified the British stance.
Ultimately, although changes in Germany’s African colonies were not shaped by
communism’s menace, territorial adjustments in Europe and China demonstrate the fear of the
spread of communism significantly influenced British stance at Versailles. Britain faced the
trouble of a communist Germany caused by placing citizens under foreign rule, and hindering
Germany’s economy. Opportunities for self-determination in the Rhineland and Poland, and
German maintenance of the Rhineland and most of Upper Silesia provided solutions since they
directly opposed Bolshevik accusations, and prevented resentment towards traditional systems
which alleviated internal and external threats for revolution within Britain. However, the
mandate system and division of Germany’s African colonies show an inconsequential
consideration of the spread of communism compared to imperialism’s economic benefits.
Nonetheless, China’s adjustments demonstrate the fear of communism’s proliferation
significantly affected Britain’s continued support for Japanese control of Shantung so as to keep
communism from expanding into a vulnerable China. Conclusively, while the fear of spread of
communism did not influence Britain’s stance towards all territorial changes at Versailles, most
were significantly determined by the threat of communism.
40
Elleman, Bruce A. Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question. (2002). p. 89.
MacMillan, Margaret. Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World. (2003). p. 329
42
Dillon, Dr. E.J. The Inside Story of The Peace Conference. (1920). p. 468.
43
Ibid.
41
To what extent was the fear of spread of communism a significant factor in the British stance
towards territorial changes at Versailles? 11
3. Section C: Reflection
This investigation helped me understand challenges that historians studying the Versailles
settlement might face. Firstly, historians struggle gaining accurate knowledge from primary
sources given volatile records by peace-makers. Although primary sources bring historians closer
to the past, they must rely on inferences to suggest reasons behind actions since primary sources
may have ulterior motives difficult to decipher. In my investigation, this challenge presented
itself through the frequent “this or else communism” peroration by peace-makers who seeked to
persuade other leaders with the threat of communism spreading to implement their plans, though
leaders may not have actually believed in the proliferation of communism as a consequence to
specific affairs.
My investigation also prompted me to consider the prevalent challenge for historians to
balance benefiting from hindsight and not falling victim to it. Historians can avail from
evaluating events from a retrospective viewpoint that can better make judgements about events’
significance. Still, post facto analysis of historical events can be tainted by bias which can
influence historians’ arguments, ultimately distorting knowledge from its objectivity. Finding
this balance was exemplified in my investigation through citing various historians to minimize
bias while maintaining the benefit of hindsight; the book The Treaty of Versailles: A
Reassessment after 75 Years was a noteworthy tool for this.
Another challenge to historians that my investigation presented me with was the problem
of interpretation. Historians handpick evidence that fits their argument, and this, culminated with
fact selection from the extensive information regarding Versailles, means historians are
susceptible to misrepresent facts so as to advance their interpretation of history. Arno Mayer’s
exclusion of Chinese concessions at Versailles and Bruce Elleman’s tendency to consider larger
To what extent was the fear of spread of communism a significant factor in the British stance
towards territorial changes at Versailles? 12
causes to deduce a system around the idea of sovereignty made this challenge explicit to me;
thus, new angles had to be considered, as Margaret MacMillan did when suggesting a synthesis
of perspectives, something which I endeavoured to explore further in my investigation.
To what extent was the fear of spread of communism a significant factor in the British stance
towards territorial changes at Versailles? 13
4. Bibliography
Andelman, David A. A Shattered Peace: Versailles 1919 and the Price We Pay Today. Hoboken,
New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2008.
https://archive.org/details/shatteredpeaceve0000ande
Baker, Ray Stannard. Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement. New York: Doubleday, Page &
Co., 1922.
Boemeke, Manfred F., Feldman, Gerald D., and Glaser, Elisabeth. The Treaty of Versailles: A
Reassessment after 75 Years. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Buzinkai, Donald I. "The Bolsheviks, the League of Nations and the Paris Peace Conference,
1919." Soviet Studies 19, no. 2. pp. 257-63. Taylor & Francis, 1967.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/149400.
Cooper, Susan Leslie. The Paris Peace Conference Without the Bolshevik Threat. Master's
Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1975.
https://open.library.ubc.ca/cIRcle/collections/ubctheses/831/items/1.0087832
Dillon, Dr. E.J. The Inside Story of The Peace Conference. New York: Harper & Brothers
Publishers, 1920.
https://archive.org/details/Dillon_E.J._The_Inside_Story_Of_The_Peace_Conference/pag
e/n3/mode/2up
Dockrill, Michael and Fisher, John. The Paris Peace Conference, 1919: Peace without Victory?
London: Palgrave Publishers Ltd, 2001.
Elleman, Bruce A. Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question. New York:
M.E Sharpe, 2002.
Fairbank, John K., Twitchett, Denis. The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12: Republican
To what extent was the fear of spread of communism a significant factor in the British stance
towards territorial changes at Versailles? 14
China, 1912-1949, Part 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Henig, Ruth. Versailles and After 1919-1933. London: Routledge Lancaster Pamphlets, 1995.
Huddleston, Sisely. Peace-Making at Paris. London: T. Fisher Unwin Ltd., 1919.
https://archive.org/details/cu31924027876063/mode/2up
Laffan, Michael. The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn Fein Party, 1916-1923. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Lloyd George, David. The Truth About The Peace Treaties Vol-1. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd,
1938. https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.523824
MacMillan, Margaret. Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World. New York: Random
House Trade Paperbacks, 2003.
Mantoux, Paul. The Deliberations of the Council of Four (March 24 - June 28, 1919). New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991.
https://archive.org/details/deliberationsofc0001pari
Marks, Sally. "Mistakes and Myths: The Allies, Germany, and the Versailles Treaty, 1918–1921."
The Journal of Modern History 85, no. 3. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
2013. doi:10.1086/670825.
Mayer, Arno J. Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at
Versailles, 1918-1919. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Inc, 1967.
Neilson, Keith. Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Ripsman, Norrin M. "The Politics of Deception Forging Peace Treaties in the Face of Domestic
Opposition." International Journal 60, no. 1. London: Sage Publications, Ltd., 2004.
doi:10.2307/40204027.
To what extent was the fear of spread of communism a significant factor in the British stance
towards territorial changes at Versailles? 15
Sharp, Alan. “The Paris Peace Conference and its Consequences.” International Encyclopedia of
the First World War. 2018. doi: 10.15463/ie1418.10149.
Steiner, Zara. The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919-1933. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005.
Thompson, John M. Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace. Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1966.
Throntveit, Trygve. "The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National
Self-Determination." Diplomatic History 35, no. 3. pp 445-81. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24916429.
Trachtenberg, Marc. "Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference." The Journal of Modern History
51, no. 1. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1877867.