Dualism vs Physicalism Phil 1 What makes you you? Under what conditions do you continue to exist? What changes can you undergo and still survive? What kind of thing are we? Can we survive our death? Is this a contradiction in terms? Can you continue to exist after the death of your body? What does it take for a single person to exist over time? • Last week’s lectures and today’s lecture both had someone you recognize as David King. What does it take for the person from last weeks lecture to be the same person as you are seeing now? core questions of personal identity • What is a person? • What does it take for a person to exist/persist over time? In order to know whether we could survive our death, we have to get clear on what we are and what it takes for us to continue to exist over time. The questions of personal identity • What is a person? • What does it take for a person to exist/persist over time? • This lecture is making progress on the first of these two questions. Note: on the word soul • When we use the word soul, it will refer to something immaterial. Note: on the word soul • When we use the word soul, it will refer to something immaterial. • The word soul can be used by people who do not believe in anything immaterial. Note: on the word soul • When we use the word soul, it will refer to something immaterial. • The word soul can be used by people who do not believe in anything immaterial. • The word soul sometimes is used as a synonym for self. But, if it is to be used as a theory of personal identity, it will have to be used to mean something more. Dualism • There are both immaterial objects (souls) and material objects (bodies) Idealism • There are only immaterial objects (minds/souls), but no physical objects (bodies) Physicalism (monism) • There are only physical things (bodies) If physicalism is right, we are just physical objects, like tables, chairs, cell phones, etc. What separates a live person from a dead one? A non-functioning body is no more mysterious than non-functioning electronics. P-functioning • Kagan uses p-functioning do describe the operations of physical bodies that we associate with personhood. P-functioning • Kagan uses p-functioning do describe the operations of physical bodies that we associate with personhood. • The difference between a live and dead person is that one of these bodies is still functioning. Physicalism (monism) • There are only physical things (bodies) • Does this mean minds don’t exist? • Of course not! • Minds exist in the way that smiles do. Physicalism (monism) • There are only physical things (bodies) • Does this mean minds don’t exist? • Of course not! • Minds exist in the way that smiles do. • The things we associate with the mind are functions of the brain. Why not just call the mind a soul? Whether we survive our death depends on what we are. • Dualism: leaves open the possibility that people do in fact survive their death. • Physicalism: people do not in fact survive their death Must physicalists deny the possibility of surviving death? • No! • However, whether or not it is possible for us to survive our deaths (if physicalism is true) will depend on what is required for identity to persist over time. • It may well be that with future technological advancement, surviving death is possible, on a physicalist account. Must physicalists deny the possibility of surviving death? • No! • However, whether or not it is possible for us to survive our deaths (if physicalism is true) will depend on what is required for identity to persist over time. • It may well be that with future technological advancement, surviving death is possible, on a physicalist account. • But Physicalists are committed to saying that no human has yet survived their death. Dualism • The soul and the body interact • The soul causes states and actions in the body • The body and its interaction with the physical world cause states and activities within the soul Does the soul have a location? Is the person both soul and body, or just soul? Does the soul survive the destruction of the body? Do we have any reason to think souls exist? How do we normally establish the existence of things? Can you tell you have a soul through introspection? Why souls? • Inference to the best explanation? Positing the existence of atoms Note: inference to the best explanation is not a valid argument form! Explaining Illness Germ theory vs. demon theory What is to be explained? • Who gets sick? • How do they get sick? • Why do they get sick? What makes an explanation better than another? • Adequacy • Prediction • Fit with other good theories Why souls? • Inference to the best explanation? • Note: inference to the BEST explanation =/= inference to an explanation What would make souls a good explanation? • A feature that the physicalist cannot explain that the dualist can, with the use of souls. Positing the existence of an entity type • Feature F cannot be explained by the entities we all agree exist. • The best explanation for F is that entity E exists. • Conclusion: We have good reason to think entity E exists. F: animation • Proposed F: a live body is animated, but a dead body is not animated • We could explain this by positing souls as the difference in animation between a live and dead body • Conclusion: we have good reason to think souls exist. Physicalist response • We don’t need souls to explain this. The body is no longer functioning. This is no different than a broken stereo. It doesn’t work any more because it stopped functioning, not because there is an immaterial element that has left. • There’s nothing mysterious from the physicalist perspective about objects breaking and having different properties as a result of not functioning. F: purposeful action • Proposed F: a live body acts purposefully • We could explain this by positing souls as the element which brings purposeful action into the body. • Conclusion: we have good reason to think souls exist. Physicalist Response • There is a command module within the body (the brain). This is no different than a heat seeking mistle or self-driving car. The command module explains the purposeful activity, without the need to appeal to an immaterial entity. F: reasoning about what to do • Proposed F: humans, unlike other matter, reason about what to do and act on their beliefs and desires • We could explain this by positing souls as the element which is capable of doing this. • Conclusion: we have good reason to think souls exist. Physicalist Response • Cutting edge computer technology seems to be able to do this stuff. We can explain how the computer does this in strictly physical terms, so even if we don’t know all of the details about how humans do this, we’ve been given no reason to think an immaterial entity is needed. Physicalist Response • Cutting edge computer technology seems to be able to do this stuff. We can explain how the computer does this in strictly physical terms, so even if we don’t know all of the details about how humans do this, we’ve been given no reason to think an immaterial entity is needed. • What is more, we are making a lot of progress in figuring out how humans do such things by assuming a physicalist perspective. F: Creativity • Proposed F: humans are creative and no machine is creative • We could explain this by positing souls to explain this creative component of the person • Conclusion: we have good reason to think souls exist. Physicalist response • Computers are creative! • They come up with things that their creators never could have come up with. This includes math proofs, chess moves, symphonies, stories, and paintings. F: qualia • Proposed F: humans have a qualitative aspect to their experience that other physical objects don’t and can’t have • We could explain this by positing souls as entities that function differently than objects in the physical world. • Conclusion: we have good reason to think souls exist. Physicalist Response • Admittedly, we can’t explain this. But neither can you. Positing an entity that you say could explain it, without saying how it could explain it doesn’t give you a better explanation than the physicalist. • Conclusion: at best, this is a tie. Kagan: • We haven’t been given much of a reason to think souls exist. What about these things? • Near death experiences • Seances • Free will Some takeaways about souls • They are immaterial • We don’t have positive arguments for their existence • We don’t have conclusive arguments against their existence • It is not clear what they are supposed to be or how they are supposed to work. Why is dualism so tempting? “…our dualism is a natural by-product of our possession of two distinct cognitive systems—one for dealing with material objects, the other for social entities. These systems have incommensurable outputs, and dualism emerges as an evolutionary accident. Dualism comes naturally to children. When asked, in implicit and explicit ways, preschool children will say that they believe the brain is only responsible for some aspects of mental life, typically those involving deliberative mental work, such as solving math problems. But the brain is not essential for activities such as pretending to be a kangaroo, loving one’s brother, or brushing your teeth (e.g., Gottfried, et al. 1999; Johnson 1990; Lillard 1996). This is done by people, not their brains.” -Paul Bloom, “Religious Belief as an Evolutionary Accident” Some takeaways about dualism and physicalism • Physicalism is the view presumed by the sciences. • Dualism is the view presumed by common sense. • Dualism leaves open the possibility that people do in fact survive their deaths and still exist. • Physicalism says that people do not survive, but does not rule out the possibility of survival of death, if there are sufficient technological advancements. Kagan we are skipping • Kagan ch 4 – The Cartesian argument for the soul • Kagan ch 5 – Plato’s argument for the immortality of the soul Kagan is giving us the view, if physicalism is true. (You can consider it all a hypothetical, if that helps.)
