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Hook Stock and Sec. 355 Did a Distribution Occur

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Hook Stock and Sec. 355: Did a
Distribution Occur?
By Andrew Cordonnier, CPA, and Brian Angstadt, CPA, Washington D.C.
February 1, 2014
Corporations & Shareholders
On Oct. 11, the IRS issued a letter ruling addressing the tax effects of a proposed Sec.
368(a)(1)(D)/Sec. 355 spinoff, which included a distribution on “hook stock.” In Letter Ruling
201341004, the IRS ruled that the distributing corporation’s failure to distribute all of the
controlled stock was not in pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal purposes the
avoidance of federal income tax, as set forth in Sec. 355(a)(1)(D)(ii). By invoking this
exception to the requirement that the distributing corporation must distribute “all of the stock
and securities in the controlled corporation,” the IRS implicitly held that a distribution on
hook stock should not be respected.
Hook Stock in General
Regs. Sec. 1.7874-1 defines hook stock for purposes of calculating tax on the inversion
gain of expatriated entities. More broadly, the term hook stock is used to describe stock of a
corporation that is held by an entity in which the corporation, indirectly or directly, holds an
interest. The most common example of hook stock is stock of a parent corporation held by
the parent corporation’s subsidiary.
Hook stock arises from various types of transactions. For example, an acquiring corporation
(most likely a publicly traded one) may purchase a target entity that already holds an
interest in the acquiring corporation. An affiliated group may enter into an inversion
transaction whereby the old parent continues to hold stock in the new parent. It could also
arise when a subsidiary purchases the stock of the parent corporation from a third-party or
from the parent.
Because hook stock is commonly parent corporation stock held within a consolidated group,
it is often confused with treasury stock. Unlike treasury stock, hook stock provides its owner
with the various indicia of stock ownership—voting rights, dividend rights, and liquidation
rights (see Himmel, 338 F.2d 815 (1964)), although some states may not allow hook stock
to vote. When a corporation makes a pro rata distribution, the distributing corporation
makes a distribution to the hook stock shareholders, whereas it would not make a
distribution on the treasury stock.
Letter Ruling 201341004
In Letter Ruling 201341004 (the facts and steps have been simplified for purposes of this
item), a wholly owned subsidiary (Subsidiary) of a parent corporation (Parent) established a
grantor trust under Sec. 671 (at the end of the ruling, the grantor trust is referred to as a
“rabbi trust”). The grantor trust held assets on Subsidiary’s behalf to satisfy obligations
under three unfunded deferred compensation plans. Among the assets the grantor trust
held was stock in the parent corporation (i.e., hook stock).
Parent proposed a series of transactions whereby it would spin off one of its business lines
to its shareholders. First, Subsidiary formed a new corporation, Controlled, and contributed
certain business assets to Controlled in exchange for Controlled’s outstanding stock. Next,
Subsidiary distributed Controlled’s stock to Parent. After entering into certain financing
transactions, Parent distributed all of Controlled’s stock pro rata to its shareholders.
Because Subsidiary held Parent’s stock in trust, Subsidiary received Controlled’s stock
(likely less than 20% of the outstanding stock) as part of the spinoff.
In its ruling, the IRS held that Parent would recognize no gain or loss on the distribution of
Controlled stock to its shareholders. Further, the IRS concluded that the Controlled stock
received by Subsidiary was not “in pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal
purposes the avoidance of U.S. federal income tax within the meaning of section
355(a)(1)(D)(ii).”
The Distribution Requirement of Sec. 355
Sec. 355 permits a distributing corporation to distribute the stock of controlled corporations
to its shareholders if certain requirements are met. In general, the requirements are: (1) The
distributing corporation must have control immediately before the distribution; (2) the
distribution is not principally used as a device for the distribution of earnings and profits; (3)
the distributing corporation and controlled corporation are engaged in an active trade or
business immediately after the distribution (with exceptions); and (4) the distributing
corporation distributes “all of the stock and securities in the controlled corporation held by it
immediately before the distribution” (Sec. 355(a)(1)(D)(i)).
Sec. 355(a)(1)(D)(ii) offers an exception to the “all of the stock and securities” rule. A
distributing corporation can still receive tax-free treatment under Sec. 355 if (1) the
distributing corporation distributes an amount of stock in the controlled corporation
constituting control within the meaning of Sec. 368(c); and (2) the distributing corporation
establishes to the IRS’s satisfaction that retaining any controlled stock was not in pursuance
of a plan having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of federal income tax.
History of Rulings on Sec. 355(a)(1)(D)(ii)
Prior to Letter Ruling 201341004, the IRS issued a number of letter rulings analyzing
“principal purpose” under Sec. 355(a)(1)(D)(ii). Generally, these rulings involved cases
where the parent corporation did not formally distribute “all of the stock and securities in the
controlled corporation.” Some of the reasons cited for retaining stock in the spun-off
corporation were maintaining the distributing corporation’s value (Letter Ruling 7905084);
raising future capital (Letter Rulings 8405017 and 199909027); maintaining the distributing
corporation’s borrowing capacity, financial flexibility, or high credit (Letter Rulings 8520096,
8908075, and 200137011); relieving capital allocation issues (Letter Rulings 200944026
and 201330007); and reducing potential liabilities from foreign claims (Letter Ruling
8927078).
The IRS has also issued Sec. 355(a)(1)(D)(ii) rulings when the distributing corporation
essentially made a distribution of some controlled stock to itself (see Letter Rulings
9752024, 199941017, 200534006, 200611003, 200702033, 200802009, and 201032017).
In these rulings, the stock was held in grantor trusts. Though not explicitly stated in the
rulings, the parent corporations appeared to directly own the grantor trusts. Because grantor
trusts are generally disregarded for federal tax purposes, the IRS, it seems, disregarded the
parent corporation’s distribution to itself and thus analyzed the “principal purpose” of the
retention under Sec. 355(a)(1)(D)(ii).
Implication of Letter Ruling 201341004: Hook Stock Was Not Respected
The facts of Letter Ruling 201341004 are distinguishable from the above letter rulings
because (1) the taxpayer did in fact distribute all its ownership in Controlled and (2) the
hook stock shareholder was a subsidiary of the parent corporation, not the parent
corporation itself. If the IRS would have respected the form of the distribution and treated
the hook stock shareholder as an actual shareholder, it would seem that an analysis of
“principal purpose” under Sec. 355(a)(1)(D)(ii) would be unnecessary.
The IRS may have invoked Sec. 355(a)(1)(D)(ii) in its ruling under one or more theories,
including that (1) the taxpayer did not substantively meet the “all of the stock or securities”
test because the consolidated group received controlled stock in the distribution; and/or (2)
hook stock shareholders are not respected as shareholders for this purpose.
In any case, it is noteworthy here that the IRS simply did not respect the separate existence
of the hook stock and/or hook stock shareholder. The authors are not aware of any other
circumstances where the existence of hook stock was completely ignored.
Respecting the Existence of Hook Stock and Hook Stock Problems
Many practitioners have disagreed about whether the consolidated return regulations
should adopt a single-entity or separate-company approach to intercompany transactions.
The regulations have, generally, favored a separate-company approach. As such, hook
stock shareholders are often respected as shareholders of the parent corporation. Because
of possible abuses with this approach, a number of rules limit the potential advantages of
hook stock. (The discussions in this section assume that the hook stock is held by a direct
or indirect subsidiary of the parent corporation and that the parent corporation and
subsidiary are members of a consolidated group.)
Distributions of hook stock: Generally, under Regs. Sec. 1.1502-13(f)(2), intercompany
distributions between consolidated members are eliminated. This exclusion, however,
applies only if the recipient shareholder incurs a negative basis adjustment in the stock of
the entity making the distribution under Regs. Sec. 1.1502-32. Because a hook stock
shareholder would not incur a negative adjustment on distributions of parent corporation
stock, the hook stock shareholder may not eliminate the dividend, and must instead
generally recognize dividend income on the intercompany distributions (assuming the
parent corporation has earnings and profits). It appears that the hook stock shareholder
may take a dividend-received deduction (DRD) on the dividend income received from a
parent corporation for federal income tax purposes. However, it is uncertain whether the
hook stock shareholder should obtain a 100% DRD or an 80% DRD (a discussion of this
issue is beyond the scope of this item). Further, some states do not allow a DRD, thus
creating the possibility of full income recognition in those states.
Because of concerns over dividend leakage, as described above, a parent corporation
might decide not to pay a dividend on hook stock even though it pays dividends to its other
shareholders. Such a decision could lead to unintended consequences. For example, if the
hook stock is of the same class as the parent corporation’s other shareholders, the IRS
could assert that there is a deemed dividend on the hook stock, thus giving rise to the
dividend leakage issues discussed above.
Moreover, to account for the fact that no dividend was actually paid on hook stock, it could
be asserted that the hook stock shareholder is then deemed to distribute the deemed
dividend up the chain and back to the parent corporation—to account for the actual end
result. The subsequent distributions up the chain would then cause an unfortunate negative
basis adjustment in the stock of the hook stock shareholder. On the other hand, the failure
to make distributions on the hook stock could result in the IRS asserting that the hook stock
has been canceled, thus causing any inherent gain in the hook stock to be triggered (see
below).
Gains but not loss on hook stock: Under Regs. Sec. 1.1502-13(f)(6)(i)(A), all losses
recognized on hook stock are permanently disallowed. Consequently, the sale of hook stock
outside the consolidated group at a loss would result in a permanent disallowance of the
loss. If the stock were sold outside of the consolidated group at a gain, however, the
consolidated group would fully take into account the gain.
If the hook stock were sold from one member of the consolidated group to another member,
it appears that any loss on the sale would be disallowed and the basis of the stock would be
stepped down to fair market value—notwithstanding that the transaction otherwise qualifies
as an intercompany transaction. Instead of selling the hook stock, the parent corporation
could try to sell the stock of the subsidiary holding built-in loss hook stock. Regs. Sec.
1.1502-13(f)(6)(i)(B), however, requires a hook stock shareholder that leaves a consolidated
group to recognize an immediate reduction in the basis of the hook stock. Again, any loss
associated with the write-down is a permanently disallowed loss and will reduce the parent
corporation’s basis in the subsidiary immediately before disposition. As such, the parent
corporation would not receive any benefit from selling the subsidiary that holds the built-in
loss hook stock.
How to eliminate built-in gain hook stock: As described above, a sale of the hook stock
would generate gain but not loss. A cancellation of the hook stock is treated as a distribution
of the hook stock to the parent corporation. The deemed distribution of the stock creates a
recognized gain under Sec. 311(b), and the gain is immediately triggered under Regs. Sec.
1.1502-13 because the subject of the intercompany transaction—the built-in gain hook
stock—is eliminated (i.e., it leaves the consolidated group). Accordingly, care should be
taken, for example, to ensure that the group’s legal department does not simply cancel hook
stock as a cleanup measure. Consequently, there are few alternatives to eliminating built-in
gain hook stock without triggering the built-in gain.
The most widely used method for eliminating built-in gain hook stock without triggering the
gain is to liquidate the subsidiary holding the hook stock into the parent corporation in a taxfree liquidation under Sec. 332 (or a tax-free upstream merger of the subsidiary). A tax-free
downstream merger of the parent corporation into the subsidiary would also eliminate the
hook stock without triggering the gain, but few consolidated groups are willing to eliminate
the parent corporation (see Letter Ruling 200731025, in which a taxpayer used an
intergroup Sec. 355 split-off to remove hook stock, and Letter Ruling 201007045, in which a
taxpayer used a busted (i.e., taxable) Sec. 351 exchange with a Sec. 338(h)(10) election
(presumably, the purchase price compensated for the hook stock gain)).
Conclusion
Given the discussion above regarding the various rules related to hook stock, it appears
there is a significant history of the IRS and Treasury respecting the existence of hook stock
and the ownership of hook stock by a separate party. Accordingly, Letter Ruling 201341004
represents a departure from this history as the IRS seems to disregard the existence of the
hook stock and/or the existence of the hook stock shareholder as a separate shareholder.
The IRS did not state its rationale for disregarding the existence of the hook stock, and a
letter ruling may not be used or cited as precedent (Regs. Sec. 301.6110-7(b)). Further,
given the history of rulemaking that respects the existence of hook stock, it would be
unwise, based on a single letter ruling, to ignore the existence of hook stock when analyzing
the impact of a transaction involving hook stock. Taxpayers would be well-advised to seek a
letter ruling when considering a transaction involving hook stock that is not otherwise set
forth in regulations or elsewhere. In any case, the analysis in Letter Ruling 201341004
opens up a new way of thinking about hook stock—which is simply to disregard its
existence.
EditorNotes
Greg Fairbanks is a tax senior manager with Grant Thornton LLP in Washington, D.C.
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