Journal of Dharma Studies
https://doi.org/10.1007/s42240-019-00058-7
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Defining Dharma Yuddha: a Taxonomical Approach
to Decolonizing Studies on Hindu War Ethics
Arunjana Das 1
# Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019
Abstract
Extant scholarship on Hindu war ethics uses the term dharma yuddha as a synonym of
the term, just war, as conceptualized within Christian theo-ethical frameworks developed primarily in the Western academy. Dharma in the term dharma yuddha is
presented as equivalent to the term just in just war, and an antonym of adharma or
kuta, i.e., unjust. I track the documentary origins of the term dharma yuddha by
surveying the usage of this and similar terms in ancient Hindu sources, including the
Mahabharata, the Arthashastra, and selected Dharmasastras. I find that the usage of the
term dharma yuddha in primary Hindu sources is markedly different from how it is
used in contemporary scholarship: the texts mention a range of types of war that are
closely related to, but not the same as, the concept of dharma yuddha; this taxonomical
richness and complexity is not captured by a binary analytical framework of just versus
unjust. In addition, the relationship between dharma and war remains under-explored
and merits a more nuanced study than a one-to-one comparison with Christian just war
ethics. I, hence, offer a taxonomical model for dharma yuddha, which places it as part
of the yuddha family; the model presents attributes of dharma yuddha that are
necessary and/or sufficient and which bear conceptual similarities with attributes of
other members in the yuddha family. The model presents these attributes in a hierarchical fashion as is reflected in the texts surveyed. The paper makes two types of
contributions: firstly, theoretically, it fills a lacuna in the scholarship on Hindu war
ethics by presenting a taxonomical and constructive framework to study war that draws
from a systematic survey of wars as presented in the Hindu canon; secondly, methodologically, it seeks to decolonize studies on Hindu ethics by studying the texts on their
own terms, as opposed to seeing them through the eyes of Christian and, primarily,
Western, analytical categories of war.
Keywords Just war . Hindu war ethics . Righteous war . Decolonization . Taxonomy
* Arunjana Das
ad1562@georgetown.edu; Arunjana.das@gmail.com
1
Department of Theology and Religious Studies, Georgetown University, Washington DC USA
Journal of Dharma Studies
Introduction: Why Theorization sans Comparison?
Numerous studies in sociology and political science suggest ways that religion and
religious arguments have been used to justify political positions and policies. Some of
these policies include decisions related to going to war, conduct of war, and its
aftermath. Just war theories remain as the most significant theories used by the modern
nation state to justify going to war or using force for political means. In the Western
world, these theories have taken form from the writings of Augustine, Aquinas, and
other Christian thinkers. In the non-Western world, however, there is a rich corpus of
materials that deal with questions regarding war and peace. Ancient Hindu sources on
ethics, morality, and law have engaged with such questions and have a great deal of
promise and potential in enriching the current corpus of constructive ethics on war and
peace.
Given the plethora of literature on war and peace in Christian ethical thinking, part
of the extant scholarship on Hindu ethics has undertaken a comparative and
constructive project that engages this thinking in theorizing on Hindu ethical
frameworks on war and peace. Such a comparative approach is laudable in its
attempt to engage other theological traditions, and it is a worthy pursuit in its own
right. In light of the extant religious diversity and availability of an abundance of
theological texts, Clooney (2010) emphasizes the need for interreligious learning by
arguing, “Because diversity is an objective feature of the world around us, we need to
keep looking outward, learning to be as intellectually engaged as possible in studying it
in the small and manageable ways that are possible for us” (7, 8).1 As Yearley (1990),
however, argues comparing two traditions can have its “own flourishing and stunted
forms” (2). One of its stunted forms involves likely methodological pitfalls that one
might encounter where one area of comparison is more developed than the other in
contemporary scholarship. Such a pitfall comprises seeing the other through one’s own
analytical lenses, and explicitly or implicitly imposing one’s analytical tradition on the
other instead of seeing the tradition on its own merit, strengths, and weaknesses.
An example of the above is the comparison between just war concepts prevalent in
Christian thinking with those apparently present in Hindu ethics. Contemporary
scholars have used the term dharma yuddha as a Hindu equivalent of just war citing
its usage in the Mahabharata and other parts of the Hindu canon, and embarking on a
constructive enterprise that, firstly, engages in a one-to-one comparison with Christian
just war thinking, and secondly, based on such a comparison, conceptualizes precepts
of what constitutes a dharma yuddha. Doctrines on war and peace within Hinduism and
Christianity are certainly similar in their approach to questions regarding when and
what kind of war is permissible; concepts of jus ad bellum2 and jus in bello3 prevalent
in Christian just war thinking, however, do not neatly travel across to concepts related
to justice, righteousness, and fairness when it comes to Hindu thinking on war. More
broadly, although there are common themes in the Western conception of justice and
1
Similar to Francis Clooney, I am writing this paper as a Christian and, unlike Clooney, a former Hindu
writing on Hinduism. Clooney 2010. Comparative theology: Deep learning across religious borders. John
Wiley & Sons.
2
Rules for going to war.
3
Rules of conduct during war.
Journal of Dharma Studies
the Sanskritic conceptions of dharma, they also differ in ways that are significant and
not always reflected in the extant scholarship.
Yearley (1990) says, “When I asked myself, or others asked me, what was really at
stake in my work, I began to realize just how important it is to develop the virtues and
skills that can enable us to compare different visions of the world” (p. 2). Before
comparing and contrasting religious ethics on war and peace, there is, hence, a
prerequisite in the form of understanding the visions of the world presented by the
individual traditions that are the subject of comparison. This paper is, hence, an attempt
to, first and foremost, understand the Hindu vision of what constitutes ethics on war.
This project is also important in its own right in terms of contributing to answering one
of the most enduring questions of the world: How is war to be eliminated, and peace to
be made? This question is important not just to persons identifying with faith traditions,
but also to those who do not explicitly or implicitly subscribe to any faith traditions.
With the above goal in mind, in this paper, I conduct a survey of the various kinds of
war that are mentioned in part of the Hindu canon that engages with questions on war
and peace. The following texts serve as my primary source documents: the
Mahabharata, Arthashastra4, and the following Dharmasastras: Manu-smriti, Vishnusmriti, Yajnavalkya-smriti, Angiras-smriti, Narada-smriti, and Brihaspati-smriti. I situate dharma yuddha among the various types of wars mentioned in the canon and
explore the conceptual similarities and dissimilarities between these types. Based on the
analysis of the findings from the survey, I propose a constructive conceptualization of
dharma yuddha as a taxonomy of necessary and/or sufficient attributes that constitute
the yuddha family tree. In terms of methodology, I search for the words yuddha, and its
synonyms, vigraha, ahava, and sangrama in my primary sources.
In light of the conceptual discombobulation and ambiguity present in the contemporary literature on dharma yuddha, this paper traces the origins of the term back to the
primary texts in the Hindu canon. It conducts a survey of different war types in selected
texts from the canon and presents a conceptualization of dharma yuddha building on
the conceptual clarity and insights provided by the survey. Instead of presenting a static
definition, the paper proposes a taxonomic definition that acknowledges the degree to
which various conceptual similarities serve as family resemblances in the yuddha
family in the canon. This taxonomic definition comprises a hierarchy of attributes
based on necessary and sufficient conditions that are gleaned from the context in which
yuddha and its synonyms along with the different war types are used.
The paper contributes to the project of decolonization in the following ways: firstly,
theoretically, it proposes a definition for the term dharma yuddha that takes into
account the multiplicity of typologies of war found in the Hindu canon, thereby
advancing the extant literature on Hindu ethics on war and peace. Secondly, methodologically, the paper avoids using analytical categories originating in Christian theological thinking, such as just and unjust wars, in coming up with its theoretical
framework; instead, the paper builds up on a survey of war as presented in the Hindu
canon and uses the original Sanskrit terms for the war types mentioned in the canon. It,
hence, avoids drawing a direct equivalent between the Sanskritic conceptualization of
dharma and the Western notion of justice. Thirdly, by seeing dharma in its own cultural
4
The earliest known treatise written in the subcontinent on statecraft and grand strategy dating back to 300
BCE.
Journal of Dharma Studies
context, it snatches the term out of the ivory cage of a Western construction, and lets it
fly free in its multicolored conceptual plume.
Usage of Dharma Yuddha in Contemporary Literature and Hindu
Primary Texts
Contemporary scholarship on the conceptualization and articulation of dharma yuddha
as an equivalent of just war comprises one or more of the following three intellectual
pivots: citing the usage of dharma yuddha in the canon and contrasting the concept
with that of kuta yuddha as presented in the Arthashastra, drawing an equivalence
between justice and dharma, and constructing a theory on dharma yuddha based on
related concepts from the Mahabharata and the Dharmasastras drawing from terms
prevalent in Christian just war thinking. Contemporary scholars have presented kuta
yuddha as the opposite of a just war and used the term adharma yuddha interchangeably with it. In the following sections, I discuss each of these intellectual pivots, and
compare and contrast this usage with how the terms are used in the original texts.
Roy (2007) defines dharma yuddha as a “righteous war that is waged in accordance
with certain clear-cut rules... A righteous ruler is supposed to wage dharmayuddha in
accordance with high moral principles. The laws and customs governing
dharmayuddha aim to curtail the lethal effects of warfare and emphasize humanitarian
principles. Laws cover such issues as the protection of prisoners of war, avoiding harm
to non-combatants, not using the latest weapons, avoidance of nocturnal attacks, etc.
The focus is on the fighting of clear-cut battles with the hereditary class of warriors,
where the objective is not total annihilation of the enemy. Dharmayuddha involves the
use of moderate amounts of force in proportion to the amount of punishment to be
delivered to the enemy” (p. 242).5 In proposing this definition, Roy (2007) cites from a
range of sources and concepts: Emperor Asoka’s pacifist concept of dhammavijaya
(conquest by the spiritual force of non-violence), the Laws of Manu (or Manu-smriti)6,
and Kamandikiya’s Nitisara. It is to be noted, however, that the definition proposed by
Roy is a constructive one since the texts he cites do not actually explain the term
dharma yuddha, although they do articulate ethical principles related to going to war
and conduct during war.
Subedi (2003) defines the “Hindu concept of just war” thusly, “a war fought in
accordance with the laws of war to uphold dharma and justice, rather than a war waged
to spread the Hindu religion or to contain the spread of another religion” (p. 348).
Subedi, hence, clarifies that dharma yuddha is not to be spoken of in the same vein as
jihad since this kind of war is not against people of other faiths or nations; it is a war
fought to uphold dharma.
These scholars have articulated wars within Hindu ethics to be just only if they
follow certain rules, and when these rules get violated, the wars are articulated as
unjust, or adharma or kuta. Roy (2007) states, “In Hindu philosophy, there exists a
continuous tension between dharmayuddha and kutayuddha. These two terms might
5
Roy, K. 2007. Just and unjust war in Hindu philosophy. Journal of Military Ethics 6, 3, 232–245
One of the Dharmasastras composed at the beginning of the Common Era. The authorship of this text is
attributed to the sage, Manu.
6
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roughly be translated as just and unjust war, respectively... Dharma stands for right
conduct in order to maintain cosmic harmony, while kuta means bad or evil” (pp. 232,
233).7 Drawing from Kautilya, the author of the Arthashastra and a well-known ancient
thinker of the Hindu canon, Roy (2007) defines kuta yuddha thusly: “waging war
through duplicity, treachery, and trickery.” Similarly, Subedi defines kuta yuddha as,
“Wars fought with deceptive means, crafty methods, under charms and spells of Maya
and Indrajal, and using lethal and deadly weapons” (p. 356).8 In making a contrast to
dharma yuddha, kuta yuddha as used by Kautilya in the Arthashastra is, hence, often
cited. Roy (2007) states further, “In Kautilya’s theory, kutayuddha is situated at one end
of a spectrum that has dharmayuddha at its opposite end.” Subedi (2003) states that
there has been a social sanction at various times against prestigious and well-known
monarchs from civilized societies engaging in adharma yuddha; only asuras, or
demons, are thought to engage in adharma yuddha.
Both Roy and Subedi conflate justice, or rather just, with dharma. In addition, some
of the related terms, such as prakasa yuddha, or open war, are also conflated with that
of righteous war and just war. Quoting Kangle (2000), Roy (2007) states: “Kautilya
took pains to define dharmayuddha as prakasa yuddha (open or regular warfare). By
this was meant a frontal clash between opposing armies at a place and time decided in
advance by the two sides. This sort of warfare was considered to be righteous.”
There are certainly common themes in the Western conception of justice and the
Sanskritic conceptions of dharma; they, however, also differ in significant ways that the
above scholars and others making the above linkage have not considered.9
The Enlightenment views of justice are some of the earliest conceptions of justice in the
Western academy. Winthrop (1978) summarizes the Aristotlean view thusly: “distributive
justice provides the principle underlying the distribution of goods and honors in a political
community; it is the principle embodied in a regime. The general principle, that equal
persons must have equal shares and unequals, unequal shares, can be stated with the
certitude, clarity, and precision of a mathematical formula. Distributive justice is a proportion. Corrective justice provides the principle applied in courts of law when contracts must
be rectified. Here persons are not to be taken into account, but the gain reaped from inflicting
loss on a partner in contract is to be equalized by a judge who, again with impressive
mathematical rigor, imposes a fitting loss on the one who has gained unjustly” (p. 1204).
Contemporary scholars have approached the question of justice in a number of
ways, most of which Barry (1991) condenses into the following two broad categories:
justice as impartiality and justice as mutual advantage.10 Justice as impartiality which
requires an individual to extricate themselves from their contingently given positions
and consider perspectives outside of their own position is a Kantian notion—John
Rawls and Robert Nozick being more contemporary champions of the notion.11 For
7
Roy, 2007.
Ibid.
9
An in-depth discussion on the differences in the ideas of justice and dharma is beyond the scope of this paper
but can potentially serve as part of a future research agenda.
10
Barry, Brian. Theories of justice: a treatise on social justice. Vol. 16. Univ of California Press, 1991. Others
have provided more approaches to the question of justice. For a discussion of these approaches, see Lebacqz,
Karen. Six theories of justice: perspectives from philosophical and theological ethics. Augsburg Books, 1986.
11
See Political Theory (Nov., 1977) for a comprehensive bibliography of literature building up on John
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice.
8
Journal of Dharma Studies
Rawls, however, as Barry (1991) argues, impartiality is a condition associated with the
situation of an individual as opposed to the individual themselves. Summarizing the
justice as mutual advantage view, Barry states that justice “represents terms of rational
cooperation for mutual cooperation under the circumstances of justice” attributing the
idea to both Hume and Rawls (p. 16). Both the above approaches to justice have been
around for a long time and have been manifestly built upon and applied in the extant
literature.12 Theories on legal rhetoric, jurisprudence, and social justice13 are derivatives of the idea of justice as impartiality. Other, what I would call “second order”
theories of justice, for example, theories of environmental justice, combine the notion
of justice as impartiality with that of mutual advantage, and explicate the economic,
social, political, and moral dimensions of this order of justice.14
Dharma, on the other hand, lacks a precise Western equivalent, though not
for the lack of trying. Edgerton (1942) defines dharma as: “propriety, socially
approved conduct, in relation to one’s fellow men or to other living beings
(animals, or superhuman powers). Law, social usage, morality, and most of
what we ordinarily mean by religion, all fall under this head” (p. 151). Other
definitions of dharma either comprise various permutations of the above definition or tend to equate dharma to the Western understanding of ethics and
ethical conduct.15 Irawati Karve talks about the naturalistic and normative
aspects of dharma. The naturalistic aspect entails the necessary attribute or
the innate quality of an entity or being whereas the normative aspect comprises
one’s social and/or moral duty or responsibility. Whereas ideas of distributive
and corrective justice, and impartiality and mutual advantage are encompassed
within some of the aspects of dharma, it becomes quickly clear that dharma
and justice are two different categories with some similarities. Comparativists,
hence, need to see dharma as its own category, and understand the normative
and naturalistic aspects and the group of concepts that dharma encompasses.
Scholarship in the last few decades had already realized the need to not push
dharma into any of the pre-existing Western conceptual boxes. Creel (1972),
for example, asks us to be circumspect, and states, “premature identification
with Western concepts tends to blind one to the particular multifaceted structure
of meanings in the Hindu dharma” (p. 2). Reflecting upon dharma and the
Western understanding of ethics, Creel stated most profoundly in 1972: “the
lesson to be learned seems to be that one must be continually on guard against
taking categories of one culture and imposing them upon another. It would
12
For further discussion of Enlightenment thinkers and their approaches to the question of justice, see
Winthrop, Delba. “Aristotle and theories of justice.” American Political Science Review 72, no. 4 (1978):
1201–1216 and Cooper, John M. “Two theories of justice.” In Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association, vol. 74, no. 2, pp. 3–27. American Philosophical Association, 2000. See also, for
example, Kolm, Serge-Christophe. Modern theories of justice. MIT Press, 2002 and Roemer, John E. Theories
of distributive justice. Harvard University Press, 1998.
13
See, for example, Capeheart, Loretta, and Dragan Milovanovic. Social justice: theories, issues, and
movements. Rutgers University Press, 2007 and Miller, David. “Recent theories of social justice.” British
Journal of Political Science 21, no. 3 (1991): 371–391.
14
See, for example, Liu, Feng. Environmental justice analysis: theories, methods, and practice. CRC Press,
2000.
15
For a discussion on the definitions of dharma, see Holdrege, Barbara A. “Dharma.” In The Hindu world, pp.
225–260. Routledge, 2004.
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appear to be less fruitful to explore dharma as ‘an ethical category’ than to
examine the concept in its own cultural context. Perhaps then comparative
work, which will be fruitful, may begin. This is simply to say that we do
not have some universal framework as to what constitutes ethics, from which
lofty pinnacle we may then look down upon Indian and Western and Chinese
manifestations. There is a great danger that the interpreter will take some
parochial view of ethics-not in this case as moral teachings but as the form
of a discipline of inquiry-and treat this as if it were universal. Doubtless we are
never free of the tendency, but we are least free when we ignore the problems
and most free when we bring some self-consciousness and cultural perspective
to our work. Then, after attending as faithfully as we can to what dharma has
meant, our understanding of dharma may serve to alter our understanding of
ethical categories” (p. 168).
The above understanding has perhaps not percolated to comparative scholarship on
Hindu and Christian ethics on questions related to war and peace. In this context when
scholars conflate justice with dharma, they are not, however, making a mere semantic
choice; they are making a choice that carries conceptual luggage, for the term, just, in
Christian ethical thinking on war involves very specific precepts. This conflation has,
hence, opened the door to making a direct comparison of Hindu ethics with the
Christian just war thinking on jus ad bellum and jus in bello.16
In Christian ethical thinking, in order for a war to be called just, it needs to fulfill the
requirements of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Jus ad bellum prescribes rules for going
to war, which include legitimation from a just authority, fought for a just cause, having
a just or right intention, and used as a last resort. Whereas Augustine saw God as a
legitimate authority seeing God’s divine directive as sufficient for going to war,
Aquinas saw this legitimacy invested in a prince or a monarch. More contemporary
thinking on legitimate authority considers entities, such as heads of nation states and
international organizations, serving as legitimate authority as well, especially in light of
new challenges in the form of intra-state conflict.17 A just cause can comprise selfdefense, pursuit of the common good, or establishing a “right” order in society.18 In
16
Most Christian norms related to just war can be divided into two categories: rules regarding going to war,
also known as jus ad bellum, and rules prescribing norms for conduct during war, also known as jus in bello.
17
As derived from the writings of Augustine and Aquinas. Other scholars have questioned ideas of
sovereignty in a post-Cold War world. See Augustine, St. 1887 Contra Faustum Manichaeum, tr. Richard
Stathert, pp. 151–365 in Philip Schaff (ed.) The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. IV. Buffalo: Christian
Literature; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Q. 40. On War. available at http://www.newadvent.
org/summa/3040.htm and Hehir, J. Bryan. “Just war theory in a post-Cold War world.” The Journal of
Religious Ethics (1992): pp. 237–257.
18
Augustine had, what John Langan argues, a punitive conception of war, i.e., he saw war as the means not
for self-defense, but to set a wrong right. Augustine, in fact, was categorical in arguing that war for selfdefense is not a just war. Augustine differentiated between a “right” or “just” peace and an “unjust” peace.
Peace if it is unjust needed to be changed through the use of force. From a Thomistic perspective, however,
self-defense is a just cause as long as the means used are proportional to what is needed for self-defense. For
Aquinas, defending and preserving the self is natural; the onus is on the natural law of what is just. Selfdefense/self-preservation is aligned with the natural law, and, hence, serves as a just cause for war. Within
Thomistic conceptions, seeking the common good is a just cause for war; such a common good could be
protecting a state from outside aggressors, or protecting victims of oppression in foreign lands from an
aggressive government. Thomistic ideas find resonance in several contemporary debates on just cause. See
Langan, John. “The elements of St. Augustine’s just war theory.” The Journal of Religious Ethics (1984): pp.
19–38.
Journal of Dharma Studies
terms of right intentions, the intended effect should be aligned with moral action.19
Lastly, war should be the last resort after all other means, i.e., diplomatic, economic,
and others, have been explored and found to be wanting. 20
Jus in bello prescribes rules for conduct of war, which includes proportionality of
force used, and discrimination between combatants and non-combatants. For a war to
be just, the amount of force used should be proportionate to what is required in order to
subdue the adversary. 21 Lastly, the tactics used in war should make a differentiation
between combatants and non-combatants.22
As contemporary scholars have pointed out, all the precepts that constitute jus ad
bellum and jus in bello are already present in some shape or form in the Hindu corpus
of ethical writings. Where this scholarship treads slippery ground is when these
preformed categories of rules of warfare are used to look at how principles of warfare
are conceptualized in the Hindu canon. This is on account of the following three
reasons: firstly, as my survey of the Hindu canon demonstrates, there is many a type
of war betwixt the righteous and the non-righteous that a binary conception cannot
capture. Secondly, the conception of just and unjust as it relates to war does not have
the same connotations in the Hindu canon as it does in Western, Christian paradigms; a
19
For Augustine, the objective of conducting a just war is the creation of just peace where inner attitudes of
citizens are aligned with what God intended and ordained. Aquinas talked about intended and unintended
effects, also known as the principle of double effect. Killing someone in self-defense has two effects: selfpreservation and killing the aggressor. As long as the intended effect is aligned with moral actions, it is a
lawful act. It is, hence, lawful to kill in self-defense since the intention is self-preservation, which is a natural
(and, hence, moral) action. Responsibility of the warring actor to ensure that the action has behind it intentions
to produce good consequences and not bad, and the good must be more than the bad side effects. See Aquinas,
Thomas, Richard J. Regan, and William P. Baumgarth. On law, morality, and politics. Hackett Publishing,
2003.
20
Most historical and contemporary just war theorists, with a few modern exceptions, are in agreement that
war should be the last resort after all peaceful means have been exhausted. O’Brien (1981), for example,
argues: “Every reasonable peaceful alternative should be exhausted” (p. 33). Similar to O’Brien, Orend (2000)
says: “A state may resort to war only if it has exhausted all plausible, peaceful alternatives to resolving the
conflict in question, in particular through diplomatic negotiation” (49). See O’Brien, William Vincent. “The
conduct of just and limited war.” (1981), and Orend, Brian. “Jus post bellum.” Journal of Social Philosophy
31, no. 1 (2000): pp. 117–137.
21
Aquinas argues that although it is lawful to kill in self-defense since the intention is self-preservation, which
is a natural (and, hence, moral) action, it is, unlawful to use force that is much greater than what is required to
defend oneself, and thereby, kill someone when a lesser force would have sufficed for self-preservation. In
contemporary thinking on just war, proportionality features as a fundamental principle governing the conduct
of war. It arises from the principled notion, as advanced by Aquinas and others after him, that belligerents
should not have unlimited liberty in terms of choosing the means and size of damage that they can inflict on
the adversary. Modern developments in international law governing use of force across international borders
are guided by this principle. See Aquinas, Thomas, Richard J. Regan, and William P. Baumgarth. On law,
morality, and politics. Hackett Publishing, 2003, and Gardam, Judith Gail. “Proportionality and force in
international law.” American Journal of International Law 87, no. 3 (1993): pp. 391–413.
22
Questions about non-combatant immunity have a genesis in discussions on Aquinas’ principle of double
effect applied to war. Ramsey (1976) argues that most Protestant and secular discussions around just war and
killing of non-combatants revolve around justification of direct killing of non-combatants in war; “we only
have to know that there are non-combatants, not exactly who or where they are, in order to know that warfare
should be forces and counter-forces warfare, and attack be limited to legitimate military targets” (p. 68).
Whereas a war conducted with the objective of defending victims of aggression can be justified, an objective
such as securing freedom for the oppressed cannot. He argues for aggression, in such cases, to be defined in
terms of the rival nation’s first resort of arms and/or a challenge by a rival nation to one’s laws and order of
peace and justice (p. 90). Only aggression defined in such terms could warrant resort to an armed response.
See Ramsey, Paul. “War and the Christian conscience: how shall modern war be conducted justly?” (1976).
Journal of Dharma Studies
simple translation of just as dharma defenestrates the nuanced relationship that dharma
has to war in the Hindu conception and binds it in the straitjacket of a pre-formed,
Western terminological and analytical system. Thirdly and related to the last point,
dharma, in the entirety of its cosmic significance, bears an intimate relationship to
principles of warfare in the Hindu canon.
In this context, paying short shrift to the differences in the notions of dharma and
justice by engaging in a terminological shortcut without acknowledging or addressing
the conceptual consequences can lead to not only analytical frameworks that have no
real empirical foundation in the canon, but also a loss of the opportunity to explore the
theoretical richness that the canon offers. Ignoring this promise of theoretical enrichment goes against the dharma of the scholar, if you will.
The Yuddha Family Tree: a Taxonomical Approach to Conceptualizing
Dharma Yuddha
Theoretical Framework
The universe of war types mentioned in the Hindu canon are as follows: dharma
yuddha, suyuddha, arya yuddha, prakasa yuddha, kuta yuddha, and mantra yuddha.
Each war type bears a kind of conceptual relationship to at least one other war type; this
relationship is, at times, either synonymic or antonymic. The synonyms vigraha,
sangrama, and ahava are also used for the word yuddha.
In the quest to understand how the canon presents the concept of dharma yuddha in
the midst of this taxonomical richness and complexity, the following pitfalls are
encountered: firstly, there is a lack of consistency in terms of the conceptual clarity
that the canon offers for each of the war types. Whereas a term such as arya yuddha is
used in a fashion that makes its meaning and significance relatively clear, for terms
such as dharma yuddha and suyuddha, that is not the case. Secondly, one war type may
share an attribute that is common to a few others in some shape or form, but this
attribute may not be shared by all the war types. Thirdly, the attributes themselves may
share a complex relationship with one another that is assumed in the text but not
explicitly stated. For example, the concept of fairness has several attributes of its own
as used in the canon that may not be explicitly stated but are assumed. This concept
may also be assumed to have some sort of a resemblance to concepts such as
legitimacy, honor, valor, and duty of a warrior, i.e., raja dharma.
In light of the above, I propose that instead of seeking to arrive at an objective and static
definition of dharma yuddha, it is more accurate to see it as a war type that is a
combination of attributes that it shares, to some degree, to other war types. It is, hence,
useful to think about yuddha as a family tree of war types, wherein dharma yuddha and
other war types are members. Each of the war type shares conceptual attributes, i.e.,
family resemblances in Wittgensteinian terms, to one or more war types. This model of
the yuddha tree, however, departs from the Wittgensteinian idea of family resemblances in
proposing an “attributal hierarchy” for its members. This is key in proposing a conceptualization of dharma yuddha: the conceptual attributes do not have equal weight; some
are given more and explicit contextual coverage, and are presented as necessary attributes,
whereas others are either implicit, or given less contextual coverage. These latter attributes
Journal of Dharma Studies
may not be necessary, sufficient, or are sufficient only in combination with other
attributes. A careful study of the various contexts within which the terms are employed
is, hence, warranted, and teasing out the conceptual attributes presented in the context is
key to arriving at a conceptual rubric for these terms. I, hence, offer a taxonomical model
for dharma yuddha, which places it as part of the yuddha tree, and present conceptual
similarities among members in a hierarchical fashion as part of, what I call, a ladder of
attributal hierarchy. It is to be noted, however, that this hierarchy can be inferred from the
texts based on their explicit mention and contextual coverage only in case of some of the
conceptual attributes and war types, not all.23
War Types in the Hindu Canon: a Survey24
(a) Suyuddha: The term is mentioned more than twenty-seven times in the
Mahabharata, and once in the Arthashastra. In most translations, suyuddha is
translated as a fair fight, fighting fair, or righteous war. None of the major
translations used the term just war for suyuddha, whereas the term righteous
war is used for both dharma yuddha and suyuddha. This is an example of where
looking at the context of usage is fruitful instead of simply relying on how the
term is being translated.
In the primary sources, the term is used in the following contexts: fairness in fighting,
increasing happiness, winning fame and merit, being righteous, heroic, and sinless,
entering heaven, and protecting people.
At the end of studies well-learned, battles well-fought, acts well-done, austerities
well-observed, happiness increases.25
Suyuddha is translated here as battles well-fought. In other instances, it is translated as a
good fight or a fair fight.26 Although the corresponding text does not explain what is
meant by a good fight, a fair fight, or a battle well-fought, other sources in the canon,
for example, Manu-smriti provide certain postulates of fairness in battle. These postulates extend to how war is started, how it is conducted, and its aftermath.
Engaging in a suyuddha is also associated with going to heaven; one who dies
fighting in a suyuddha is said to enter heaven.
The Pandavas have now disposed their forces in counter array agreeably to what
is laid down in the scriptures. Ye sinless ones, fight fairly, desirous of entering the
highest heaven.27
23
A broader and deeper study of the canon could potentially lead to the construction of such a hierarchy, but
that is outside the scope of this paper.
24
Many thanks to Dr. Brahmachari Sharan, professor in Georgetown University, who not only kindly agreed
to guide me on this paper, but also helped me look up Sanskrit terms in the primary texts available online.
25
Mahabharata n.d.-e, Book 5, Section 36, verse 2
26
Suyuddha is mentioned in the following verses in the Mahabharata: 1.128.4; 1.128.18; 3.13.103; 3.171.12;
5.36.52; 5.132.26; 5.165.25; 6.22.2; 7.5.6; 7.16.25; 7.29.33; 7.164. 13; 7.165.13; 8.26.69; 8.55.5; 8.57.44;
8.68.43; 9.4.25; 9.4.33; 9.4.45; 9.11.43 12.25.24; 12.59.46; 12.100.11; 12.138. 12; 13. 120.9* (0603-1);
13.134.57* (15-981); 14.92.13).
27
Mahabharata n.d.-g, Book 6, Section 2, verse 2
Journal of Dharma Studies
The Arthashastra, Manu-smriti, and Vishnu-smriti also mention suyuddha in the
context of being heroic as a warrior and going to heaven.28
Heroic warriors who lay down their lives in righteous wars will in a moment
reach even beyond the worlds attained by Brahmanas desirous of heaven through
a multitude of sacrifices, through ascetic toil, and through numerous gifts to
worthy recipients.29
In addition, the Mahabharata mentions suyuddha in terms of being sinless and
protecting people.
That high-souled one, O Karna, achieving great glory and slaying large numbers
of my enemies protected us by fair fight for ten days.30
(b) Arya yuddha: The Mahabharat mentions arya yuddha nine times and in two
related contexts: wars fought by aryas, kshatriyas or warriors, and wars
that are noble or righteous.31 In its articulation in the canon, this bears a
conceptual resemblance to dharma yuddha in the sense that this is a war
fought by the warrior class, whose dharma is to engage in a righteous war.
The text associates the following conceptual attributes to this war type:
raja dharma and righteousness as a feature of the war itself.
The concept of heroism and valor is also implicitly present in the contextual vicinity of
mentions of arya yuddha. The Mahabharata, for example, says:
Thou have been told the reason why those heroes (Nara and Narayana)32
are invincible and have never been vanquished in battle, and why also, O
king, the sons of Pandu are incapable of being slain in battle, by
anybody.33
Another such instance is when Karna, one of the brave commanders and warriors,
when challenged to battle says:
I tell thee that I am incapable of being frightened by thee in battle with
thy words. If all the gods themselves with Vasava with fight with me, I
would still not feel any fear, what need be said then of my fears from
Pritha and Kesava?34
28
Manu-smriti mentions suyuddha in the following verses: 7.176; 7.190; 7.198; 7.199; 12.46. Vishnu-smriti
mentions it in 3.16. Yama and Angirasa do not mention yuddha or any of its synonyms.
29
Arthasastra, Book 10, Section 3, verse 30
30
Mahabharata n.d.-b, Book 7, Section 5, verse 6
31
Aryayuddha or aryam yuddham is mentioned in the following verses in the Mahabharata: 6.68.31; 6.82.30;
7.21.2; 7.77.13; 7.86.11; 7.100.18; 7.164.9; 8.43.46; 12.272.24.
32
Incarnations of Lord Vishnu
33
Mahabharata n.d.-c, Book 6, Section 68, verse 31
34
Mahabharata n.d.-d, Book 8, Section 43, verse 46
Journal of Dharma Studies
In the above and other instances when arya yuddha is used, there is, hence, an
accompaniment of valor and heroism, mostly implicit, that serves as a conceptual
attribute of those who engage in this war type.
(c) Prakasa yuddha: The Arthashastra mentions prakasa yuddha in terms of a war
that is open. Prakasa is the Sanskrit term for light, or in the open. The defining
attribute of such a war is, hence, openness, which the Arthashastra conceptualizes in the context as a war where the time and place are known. The
Arthashastra also associates such a war with righteousness.
War at a preannounced time and place is however the most righteous.35
In calling prakas yuddha righteous, the Arthashastra presents righteousness in an
antonymic relationship to two other war types: kuta yuddha and mantra yuddha.
(d) Kuta yuddha: Translated as treacherous fights or covert war, the Arthashastra
presents kuta yuddha as the opposite of a righteous war and conducted through
treacherous means. The Arthashastra, however, adopts a strategic and realpolitik view in providing a list of tactics oriented toward victory by all means as
opposed to victory through only righteous means.
When he has the stronger military force, when secret instigations to sedition have
been carried out, when precautionary measures have been taken with regard to the
season, and when operations are carried out on terrain suitable for himself, he
should undertake open military operations; in the opposite case, covert military
operations.36
The chapter, On War, in the Arthashastra provides similar guerilla tactics verging on
secret, covert, and treacherous fights for the warrior and king. Although 10.3.26 claims
that prakasa yuddha is the most righteous, the Arthashastra does not explicitly claim or
mention that engaging in kuta yuddha is against raja dharma; one can, however, infer
from how raja dharma is conceptualized in the canon that engaging in kuta yuddha is
against raja dharma.
The text, hence, associates the following conceptual attributes to this war type:
synonymic relationship with treachery and deceit, and an antonymic relationship with
righteousness as a feature of the war itself and raja dharma (inferred relationship).
(e) Mantra yuddha: This war type can be seen as a sub-set of kuta yuddha. It refers
specifically to a battle of intrigue, or a war of wits. It is mentioned in the
Arthashastra in the context of what a warrior or king is to do if the adversary
does not agree to a peace pact. The warrior is encouraged to exhort the
adversary to be righteous and exhibit exemplary qualities that are becoming
of a warrior in order to constrain the adversary and trick them into leaving their
allies and acceding to a peace treaty or alliance. In effect, the text encourages
the warrior to employ righteousness as a tool of deception.
35
36
Arthashastra n.d.-c, Book 10, Section 3, verse 26
Arthashastra n.d.-d, Book 10, Section 3, verse 1
Journal of Dharma Studies
Under the topic of War of Wits, the text says:
Pay attention to what is righteous and profitable, for those who urge you to do
things that are reckless, unrighteous, and detrimental to profit are enemies in the
guise of allies.37
(f) Dharma yuddha: The term is mentioned three times in the Mahabharata, including
once in the Bhagavad Gita. It is also mentioned once in Brihaspati smriti. In most
translations, dharma yuddha is translated as righteous war instead of just war. In
the Mahabharata, it is used in the context of a war to uphold dharma, and a war
that is to be waged by a kshatriya, a warrior or a king.
In Brishaspati Smriti, it is used in the context of a prohibition against killing a learned
Brahmin from among one’s adversary in the Kali Yuga. Similar to other instances of
mentions of dharma yuddha, Brihaspati does not explain what is meant by a dharma
yuddha.38
Further, having regard to your own duty, thou shouldst not waver, for there is
nothing higher for a Kshatriya than righteous war. (Bhagavad Gita II. 31.)39
The Mahabharata further associates dharma yuddha with fighting fairly.
Alas, having summoned thee to a fair fight, Bhimasena, putting forth his might,
fractured thy thighs.40
The following conceptual attributes are, hence, used in the context of a dharma yuddha:
raja dharma, upholding of dharma as justice and righteousness, fairness, and righteousness as an attribute of the war itself, and going to heaven when fighting bravely
and dying in a dharma yuddha. The concept of heroism and valor is implicit in the
concept of raja dharma and can be inferred from it.
Conceptualizing Dharma Yuddha: a Ladder of Attributal Hierarchy Based
on Necessary and Sufficient Attributes
From the survey above, the following conceptual attributes of the yuddha tree can be
teased out: dharma as duty, i.e., raja dharma, dharma as righteousness and justice,
going to heaven, fairness, openness, heroism and valor, and deception, treachery. These
conceptual attributes are present, in some degree, in the articulation of at least one of
the members of the Yuddha tree in the canon.
The two attributes of highest contextual coverage in defining dharma yuddha are
dharma as duty and dharma as righteousness and justice. I call them first-order
attributes, i.e., attributes that are necessary for a war to be qualified as a dharma
37
Arthashastra n.d.-d, Book 12, Section 2, verse 2
Brihaspati Smriti (n.d). Book 1, Section 23, verse 4
39
Bhagavad Gita n.d.-e, Chapter 2, verse 31
40
Mahabharata n.d.-a., Book 10, Section 9, verse 23
38
Journal of Dharma Studies
yuddha. Other attributes which are provided less contextual coverage but are implicitly
stated in the context of a dharma yuddha are as follows: fairness, openness, and
heroism and valor. I call them second-order attributes, i.e., attributes that may be
necessary but not sufficient, or are sufficient in combination with other attributes for
a war to be qualified as a dharma yuddha.
First-Order Attributes: Necessary Attributes Based on Explicit Contextual Coverage, i.e.,
Dharma as Duty and Righteousness
The Gita begins by describing the battlefield as a dharma kshetra, or the field of
righteousness. Dharma as duty and righteousness are given equal weightage in the
canon as the term relates to war. In talking about dharma, translated as duty, the canon
talks about kshatriya dharma, raja dharma, or the duty of a warrior.41
As the Pandavas and their cousins, Kauravas, are about to engage in war, Arjuna
grows despondent while pondering over the indiscriminate loss in lives that the war he
was about to fight would bring, and more importantly, a number of lives that are at
stake on account of the war, including those of his own cousins, the Kauravas, elders,
such as Bhisma, and other loved ones. He sees it as highly immoral to wage war against
one’s own near and dear ones, even though they have done evil, and says:
Alas, what a great sin are we resolved to commit! ... Why should we not have the
wisdom to turn away from this sin?... Only sin shall we incur by killing these
evildoers?42
In his despondency, he finds even the killing of evildoers to be sinful. He, hence,
asks Lord Krishna:
Being bewildered about righteousness, I ask Thee. Tell me for certain wherein
lies the good?
On hearing this, Krishna replies that as a warrior, it is his righteous duty to fight the war.
He should be detached from the fruits of his action and dedicate himself to his duty
since as a warrior it is sinful for him to not execute his duty and give in to despondency
as result of his attachments to the material reality.
Krishna says,
“For those who deserve no grief thou hast grieved, and words of wisdom thou
speakest. For the living and for the dead the wise grieve not. Never did I not exist,
nor thou, nor those rulers of men; and no one of us will ever thereafter cease to
exist. Just as in this body the embodied (Self) passes into childhood and youth
and old age, so does He pass into another body. There the wise man is not
distressed. These bodies of the embodied (Self) who is eternal, indestructible and
unknowable, are said to have an end. Whoever looks upon Him as the slayer, and
41
Each of these terms is an inherently complex term with theological, philosophical, social, and political
import, which given the scope of the current paper, I cannot do justice to.
42
Bhagavad Gita n.d.-c, Chapter I, verse 45, 39, 36
Journal of Dharma Studies
whoever looks upon Him as the slain, both these know not aright. He slays not,
nor is He slain”43
The Gita itself does not clearly specify what comprises a righteous war, but available
commentaries on the Gita have theorized that protection of innocent people and pursuit of
justice could serve as likely goals or attributes of a righteous war. Ramanuja, for example,
says:
Even considering svadharmam, your own duty, the duty of a Ksatriya, viz battle
— considering even that — you ought not to waver, to deviate from the natural
duty of the Ksatriya, i.e. from what is natural to yourself. And since that battle is
not devoid of righteousness but is supremely righteous — it being conducive to
virtue and meant for protection of subjects through conquest of the earth –
therefore, there is nothing else better for a ksatriya than that righteous battle.44
It is very clear from the Gita that it is only monarchs or those from the warrior class
who can engage in war. It is indeed their dharma to declare a righteous war, when
necessary, and fight it.45
Thus, the Gita exhorts the warrior to engage in his duty to fight a righteous war for the
sake of the duty itself. The war is righteous because it is against evildoers and in the pursuit
of justice. When fighting such a war, the warrior has to practice renunciation in terms of their
attachment to the outcomes of their actions. This inner attitude is key to participate and
execute the dharma of a kshatriya. In relation to the warrior’s duty, the Gita also talks about
Yoga, or discipline, karma, or action; and tyaaga, or renunciation and detachment to the
fruits of one’s action. The Gita lays a great deal of emphasis on maintaining this inner
attitude of renunciation and detachment to the fruits of one’s action.
Krishna says:
“Treat alike pleasure and pain, gain and loss, victory and defeat and then get
ready for the battle. Thus, you shall not incur sin.”46 “He who is not selfconceited, whose mind is not attached, even though he slays these worlds, he
neither slays nor is he bound.”47
Second-Order Attributes: Necessary but Not Sufficient Attributes with Lesser
but Implicit Contextual Coverage, i.e., Fairness, Openness, Heroism and Valor,
and Going to Heaven
Emphasizing the importance of fairness and openness in war, Manu-smriti underscores that
fighting should occur only among equals; a more powerful entity is prohibited from
declaring war on a less powerful one. Manu is also against any surprise attacks or use of
43
Bhagavad Gita n.d.-d, Chapter 2, verses 12–19
Commentary by Sri Ramanuja of Sri Sampradaya on Gita II. 31. Available at https://www.bhagavad-gita.
us/bhagavad-gita-2-31/.
45
Ibid.
46
Bhagavad Gita n.d.-a, Chapter 2, verse 38
47
Bhagavad Gita n.d.-b, Chapter 18, verses 17
44
Journal of Dharma Studies
Table 1 Conceptualization of dharma yuddha as a hierarchy of conceptual attributes
Conceptual attributes of dharma yuddha
1st order
Dharma as duty
2nd order
Fairness
Dharma as righteousness
Openness
Heroism and valor
Going to heaven
weapons by one side that are more powerful than weapons used by the adversary. There are
also strict rules on who can fight whom on the battlefield and who can be attacked and how;
a warrior is to spare those who surrender or those who are helpless. In addition, there is also a
call for the land, artifacts, people, and property in occupied land to be respected. They are not
to be harmed, and they are to be allowed to continue their beliefs, traditions, and practices.
This is an important aspect of fair play in terms of what happens in the aftermath of a war.48
There is also a strict protocol for initiating war. In the Gita, war is declared by sounding of
conch shells, following which the commanders from both the Pandavas and Kauravas side
advance toward each other to fight on the battlefield. Kautilya, the advocate of kuta yuddha,
however, argues for violating such protocol and using treacherous or guerilla tactics to get
the best of the adversary.49
Implicit in the concept of raja dharma are also the concepts of heroism and valor in
battle. A warrior is generally expected to follow rules of comportment that conform to
what is expected of a righteous king. Part of this heroism in battle is to fight fairly, and
to not turn one’s back in battle.50 Fighting according to the arya codes and displaying
heroism in battle will lead them to enter heaven; else, they will incur demerit, which
will manifest as rebirth.
Table 1 below presents a visual illustration of the proposed conceptualization of
dharma yuddha.
Conclusion
In light of the conceptual discombobulation and ambiguity present in the contemporary
literature on dharma yuddha, this paper traces the origins of the term back to the primary
texts in the Hindu canon. It conducts a survey of different war types in selected texts from the
canon and presents a conceptualization of dharma yuddha building on the conceptual clarity
and insights provided by the survey. Instead of presenting a static definition, the paper
proposes a taxonomic definition that acknowledges the degree to which various conceptual
similarities serve as family resemblances in the yuddha family in the canon. This taxonomic
definition comprises a hierarchy of attributes based on necessary and sufficient conditions
that are gleaned from the context in which yuddha and its synonyms along with the different
war types are used. This paper also serves as an attempt to decolonize the scholarship on
Hindu ethics by avoiding the use of analytical categories envisaged within a Christian
theological framework. A future research agenda could comprise further clarification of the
conceptual attributes, and a conceptual mapping of all war types in the yuddha family.
48
The Laws of Manu (1991) translated, annotated, and introduced by W. Doniger with B. K. Smith (New
Delhi: Penguin).
49
Arthashastra n.d.-a, Book 10.
50
Manu-smriti n.d., 7.88–89
Journal of Dharma Studies
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of Interest
The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
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