Statutory Construction
The art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning
and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its
application to a given case, where that intention is rendered
doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given
case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
What is a Law?
A law is a rule of conduct, just and obligatory, laid down by
legitimate authority for common observance and benefit.
What is a Statute?
A statute is an act of the legislature, as an organized body,
expressed in form and passed according to the procedure
required to constitute it as part of the law of the land.
Construction
Art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law, where that intention is
rendered doubtful by reasons of ambiguity in its language or
the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the
law.
Construction is the drawing of conclusions with respect to
subjects that are beyond the direct expression of the text.
Interpretation
interpretation is the process of discovering the true meaning of
the language used and is limited to exploring the written text.
Presidential Veto
The president may refuse to sign a bill, sending the bill back to
the house where it originated along with his objections.
Congress can override the veto via a 2/3 vote with both houses
voting separately, after which the bill becomes law.
Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the
Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that
it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.
Under the doctrine, once a bill passes a legislative body and is
signed into law, the courts assume that all rules of procedure
in the enactment process were properly followed.
Effectivity of a Law
General rule: Statutes continue to be in force until changed or
repealed by the legislature.
Article 2 of the Civil Code. Laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication.
TAÑADA V. TUVERA: Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
"ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever,
not even a constructive one. The publication of all presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law (Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638).
Enactment of a Statute
Article VI, Section 26(2) of the 1987 Constitution:
No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof
in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
I. WHEN CONSTRUCTION BECOMES NECESSARY
Duty of the courts to construe and interpret the law requisites
1.
2.
There must be an actual case or controversy; and
Thsere is ambiguity in the law involved in the controversy.
Condition sine qua non: Before the court may use its power to
construe, there must be ambiguity in the language of the statute. For
where there is no ambiguity, there is no room for construction, only
for application.
Ambiguity exists if reasonable persons can find different meanings
in a statute. A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible to two or more
possible meanings.
If the law is clear and unequivocal, the court has no other alternative
but to apply the law and not interpret it. Construction comes only after
there has been a showing of ambiguity, hence, the application is
impossible.
Limitations on power to construe
1. Courts may not, under the guise of interpretation, enlarge the
scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided
nor intended by lawmakers;
2. Neither should courts construe statutes that are perfectly vague
for it is repugnant to the Constitution (see test of Constitutionality);
3. Courts do not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. For any shortcoming of a statute is for the
legislative alone to correct by appropriate enactment.
Stare Decisis Doctrine
The doctrine of stare decisis is a principle of adherence to precedents
for reasons of stability in the law. The doctrine requires lowers courts
to follow the rules established in the prevailing decisions of the
Supreme Court. Once a case has been decided one way, any other
case involving the same point at issue should be decided in the same
manner.
BANAWA V. MIRANO, G.R. NO. 24750, 1980:
W/N the construction of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court
can be applied to Mirano, an extrajudicial adopted child.
The court ruled that Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court
cannot be applied because it specifically provides for the case of a
judicially adopted child. It is not applicable to Mario Mirano, an
extrajudicial adoption. It is an elementary rule of construction that
when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must
be taken to mean exactly what it says.
DEL MAR V. PAGCOR, 346 SCRA 485, 2000:
FACTS: The respondents asserted Sec. 10 of PD No. 1869
which included the line “the rights, privileges and authority to
operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other
recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools, i.e.
basketball, football, lotteries, etc”. They claimed that jai-alai
franchises are impliedly included because it is a sport or game
played for bets.
ISSUE: Whether or not the franchise granted to the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) includes the
right to manage and operate jai-alai.
RULING: NO. To be sure, the term "jai-alai" was never used
and is nowhere to be found in the law. The conclusion that
it is included in the franchise granted to PAGCOR cannot be
based on a mere cursory perusal of and a blind reliance on the
ordinary and plain meaning of the statutory terms used such as
"gaming pools" and "lotteries."
PEOPLE V. MAPA, G.R. NO. 22301, 20 SCRA 1164, 1967:
FACTS: That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his
custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22,
without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition,
without first having secured the necessary license or permit
therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law. In
his defense, he said that he is a secret agent of the
Governor of Batangas and that he is exempt from the
requirement of securing a license of a firearm. He also
showed a certification given by Governor Leviste that he was
appointed as such.
ISSUE: Whether or not an agent of the governor is exempt from
the requirement of securing a license of firearm.
RULING: NO. The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is
made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task
is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to
apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after
it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them.” The conviction of the accused must
stand. It cannot be set aside.
JOYA V. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568, 1993:
FACTS: Petitioners filed for Preliminary Injunction and/or
Restraining Order seek to enjoin the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) from proceeding with the
auction sale of eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings and
seventy-one (71) cartons antique silverware seized from
Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged
to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos,
his relatives and cronies.
from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date —
11 January 1991 — which is long past, the issues raised in the
petition have become moot and academic.
LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO CONSTRUE
CASCO PHIL. CHEMICAL CO., INC. V. GIMENEZ, G.R. NO. 17931,
27 SCRA 131:
What the courts may correct to reflect the real and apparent intention
of the legislature are only those which are clearly clerical errors or
obvious mistakes, omissions, and misprints. They may not, in the
guise of construction, correct what they think is due to oversight as
shown by an examination of extraneous circumstances, where the
statute is clear and to correct it would be to change the meaning of
the law, or specific provision will be abrogated. To do so is to rewrite
the law and invade the domain of the legislature; it is judicial
legislation in the guise of interpretation.
FACTS: CASCO filed for refund for the tax they paid for the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde following the resolution issued
by the Monetary Board. Petitioner contends that the bill approved in
Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the
terms "urea" and, "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress
intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as
essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue
called "urea formaldehyde", not the latter finished product.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law
from the payment of the margin fee.
RULING: NO. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product which
is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioner contends that
the bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction “and”
between the terms “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential
elements in the manufacture of “urea formaldehyde” and not the
latter. But this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and the intent
of the House of Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been
any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was passed the
only remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by
judicial decree.
ENDENCIA V. DAVID, 93 PHIL. 696, 1953
FACTS:
Following the ruling in Perfecto v. Meer that a tax on SC justices and
other officials of the judiciary is a diminution of their salary, contrary
to the Constitution, Congress enacted a law including subjecting
them to income tax and declaring that it is not a diminution of their
salary.
RULING: Congress cannot overrule, in a legislative action, a
construction of a constitutional provision made by the court. In
declaring that “subjecting courts officials to income tax is not a
diminution of their salary”, they are invading the province of the
court to interpret the law.
PEOPLE V. JABINAL, G.R. NO. 30061, 1974:
ISSUE: Whether the instant petition complies with the legal
requisites for this Court to exercise its power of judicial review
over this case.
RULING: NO. For a court to exercise its power of adjudication,
there must be an actual case of controversy — one which
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be
moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case
becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become
The interpretation of a statute or a constitutional provision by the
courts is not so sacrosanct as to be beyond modification or
nullification. The Supreme Court itself may, in an appropriate case,
change or overrule its previous construction.
Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that “Judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system … .” The settled rule supported by numerous authorities
is a restatement of legal maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet”
stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this
petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials
— the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court
has the force of law.
The question raised in People v. Jabinal is whether a person
appointed secret agent by a provincial governor and found in
possession of an unlicensed firearm at a time when the
Macarandang doctrine was still in force can be prosecuted and
convicted of illegal possession of firearms. The trial court,
relying on the Mapa ruling, convicted him of such crime. On
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment
of conviction, saying: "The doctrine laid down in xxx
Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the
law of the land, at the time appellant was found in
possession of the firearms in question and when he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was
overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not
apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the
construction and application of criminal laws, where it is
necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably
foreseen for the guidance of society.
VERA V. AVELINO, 77 PHIL. 192, 1946
PEOPLE V. GARCIA, 85 PHIL. 657, 1950:
INCHONG VS. HERNANDEZ
Courts are not authorized to insert into a law what they think
should be in it or supply what they think the legislature would
have supplied it if its attention had been called to the omission.
FACTS: Driven by aspirations for economic independence and
national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An
Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the
Act, among others, are:(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens
of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade. He assails the
constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien residents
the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law.
FACTS: Eugenio Garcial was found guilty of the crime of
robbery. He was 17 years of age at the time of the commission
of the crime. The lower court, ignoring defendant's minority,
sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of from 4 years, 2
months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8 years of prision
mayor. Then, Republic Act No. 47 (Oct 3, 1946), which
amended article 80 of the Revised Penal Code by reducing
from 18 to 16 the age below which accused have to "be
committed to the custody or care of a public or private,
benevolent or charitable institution," instead of being convicted
and sentenced to prison, has given rise to the controversy. The
Solicitor General believes that the amendment by implication
has also amended paragraph 2 of article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides that when the offender is over 15
yo and under 18 years of age, "the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period.
ISSUE: Whether Eugenio, being 17 years of age at the time of
the commission of the crime, was entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of article 68, paragraph 2, of the
Revised Penal Code.
RULING: NO. At least there is no clear intention on the part of
the Congress to amend article 68. Indeed the rational
presumption is that if there had been such an intention the
lawmakers should have said so expressly, instead of leaving
the change to inference. Criminal and penal statutes must be
strictly construed, that is, they cannot be enlarged or extended
by intendment, implication, or by any equitable considerations.
It is right to say that we are not authorized to insert into a
law what we think should be in it or to supply what we think
the legislature would have supplied if its attention had
been called to the omission. This is especially true in penal
legislation which, as we have repeatedly stressed in our
decision, has to be construed strictly. But there is not even
room for construction in this case.
FACTS: The petitioners filed a case with the SC, praying for an order
annulling the Pendatun Resolution and compelling respondents to
permit them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial
prerogatives.
RULING: The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the
concept of separation of powers, holding that the case was not a
“contest”, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the legislature to
determine who shall be admitted to its membership. Following the
powers assigned by the Constitution, the question raised was
political in nature and therefore not under the juridical review of
the courts.
NOTA BENE: A political question refers to "those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government.
RULING: The wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its
objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact, it
seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any
case, such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with
whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the
Government may not interfere.
NOTA BENE: It is within the prerogative of the Legislative
Department to enact a law along with its intention and purpose. If the
law is not unconstitutional and there is no ambiguity in the language
used, the courts must not interpret it but apply the law.
ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 148560
FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Estrada was prosecuted An Act Defining
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder. The focal point of the case is
the alleged "vagueness" of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly,
this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of
this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the
mentioned law.
ISSUE: WON the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague or
ambiguous.
RULING: NO. The Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards
and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to
determine the nature of his violation; As long as the law affords some
comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject
to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity
will be sustained.
II. THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
NITAFAN V COMMISSIONER, G.R. NO. 78780, 23 JULY 1987
A. Supremacy of the Constitution
B. Rules on the Interpretation of the Constitution
FACTS: Judges Nitafan, Polo and Savellano from RTC Manila filed a
petition to prohibit enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and
the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any
deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. They agrue that
"any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as
judicial officers constitute a decrease or diminution of their salaries,
contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution mandating that: “The salary of the Chief Justice and of
the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower
courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be decreased. (Emphasis supplied)."
FRANCISCO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ISSUE: WON the petitioner judges are exempt for income taxes?
FACTS: A second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B.
Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr
RULING: NO. it is plain that the Constitution authorizes
Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of
Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that
which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it
would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval.
It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an
exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the
Constitutional Commission.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS, 267 SCRA 408:
Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for private
purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether the 2nd impeachment complaint is barred
under Art. 11, Sec. 3(5) of the 1987 Constitution?
RULING: YES. The court ruled that the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. is barred
under Art. 11, Sec. 3(5) of the 1987 Constitution which states
that: “No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year”.
The court laid down well-settled principles in constitutional
construction.
1.
Verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed.
2.
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima.
The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers.
3.
Third, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is
to be interpreted as a whole. The Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another.
VERBA LEGIS
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION V
NLRC
ISSUE: Whether or not Salazar can be reinstated to her former
position and entitled to back wages.
RULING: YES. The wording of Article 279 of Labor Code is
clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is 'unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement . . . and
to his full backwages . . . " Under the principles of statutory
construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation (Verba legis).
An employee may not be dismissed on mere presumptions and
suppositions. Petitioner’s allegation that since Salazar and
Saldivar lived together, an employee should not get dismissed
on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative inferences.
RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA
PEOPLE V. PURISIMA, G.R. NO. 42050, 86 SCRA 542, 1978
FACTS: Several pieces of information were filed before the courts of
the responded judges (Judge Purisima et. al.) charging the accused
of illegal possession of deadly weapons in violation of P.D. 9. The
respondent courts stand that PD No. 9 should be read in the context
of Proc.1081 which seeks to maintain law and order in the country as
well as the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless
violence. Judge Purisima, in particular, reasoned that the information
must allege that the purpose of possession of the weapon was
intended for the purposes of abetting the conditions of criminality,
organized lawlessness, public disorder. The petitioners said that the
purpose of subversion is not necessary in this regard because the
prohibited act is basically a malum prohibitum or is an action or
conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PD No. 9 should be read in the context of
Proc.1081.
RULING: YES. The result or effects of the presidential decree must
be within its reason or intent. In the paragraph immediately following
the last "Whereas" clause, the presidential decree states: “NOW,
THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of
an the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in order to attain the desired
result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders
Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that…” From the above it
is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the
desired result of Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and
7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and therefore have
no relevance to PD 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed weapons. It
follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed
weapon with a motivation connected with or related to the aforequoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the
intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.
UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS: President Cory Aquino issued Executive Order No.
284 which allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs
counter to Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: WON the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies
or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions
made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par.
(2), Article I-XB?
RULING: NO. It is a well-established rule in Constitutional
construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be
separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that
all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be
brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the
great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution
and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any
reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together. In other words, the court must harmonize them, if
practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will
render every word operative, rather than one which may make
the words idle and nugatory.
III. AIDS IN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
A.
INTRINSIC AIDS
Intrinsic means internal or within. Intrinsic aids, therefore, are
those aids within the statute. Intrinsic aids are resorted to only
if there is ambiguity. In resorting to intrinsic aids, one must go
back to the parts of the statute the title, the preamble, the
context or body, punctuation, and language used.
Title - It may indicate the legislative intent to extend or restrict
the scope of the law. Carries more weight because of the
constitutional requirement of one bill-one subject expressed in
the title.
Preamble - Part written immediately after the title. It contains
the “Whereas clauses”. Although not an essential part of the
statute, it is important if there is ambiguity in the meaning
since it states the purpose, reason, or justification for the
enactment of the law.
Context of the whole text - The best source to ascertain
legislative intent is the statute itself- words, phrases,
sentences, sections, clauses, and provisions. Taken as a
whole and in relation to another; not from an isolated part or
particular provision.
Punctuation Marks- The comma and the semi-colon are both
used for the same purpose, namely, to divide sentences and
parts of sentences, the only difference being that the semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than the
comma. They are not used to introduce a new idea. A period
is a mark used .to indicate the end of a sentence.
- Aids of low degree and can never control against the intelligible
meaning of the written words. Argument based upon these alone is
not persuasive.
Reason: Punctuation marks are neither a part of the statute nor the
English language.
When used: If it gives the statute a meaning which is reasonable and
in accord with the will of the legislature.
Language - The original language when a statute is officially
promulgated will prevail. Revised Penal Code is Spanish; Judiciary
Act is English.
General rule: The English text shall control.
PREAMBLE
PEOPLE V. GARCIA, 85 PHIL. 663, 1950
FACTS: Eugenio Garcial was found guilty of the crime of robbery. He
was 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. The
lower court, ignoring defendant's minority, sentenced him to an
indeterminate penalty of from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision
correccional to 8 years of prision mayor. Then, Republic Act No. 47
(Oct 3, 1946), which amended article 80 of the Revised Penal Code
by reducing from 18 to 16 the age below which accused have to "be
committed to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or
charitable institution," instead of being convicted and sentenced to
prison, has given rise to the controversy. The Solicitor General
believes that the amendment by implication has also amended
paragraph 2 of article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides
that when the offender is over 15 yo and under 18 years of age, "the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but
always in the proper period.
ISSUE: Whether Eugenio, being 17 years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime, was entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of article 68, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING: NO. The preamble or explanatory note to Republic Act No.
47 cannot be used as basis for giving it an meaning not apparent on
its face. A preamble or explanatory not is resorted to only for
clarification in cases of doubt. There is no ambiguity in Republic Act
No. 47.
NOTA BENE: If there is no ambiguity, do not resort in construing the
law using the preamble of the statute.
PEOPLE V. PURISIMA, G.R. NO. 42050, 86 SCRA 542, 1978
FACTS: The respondent courts stand that PD No. 9 should be read
in the context of Proc.1081 which seeks to maintain law and order in
the country as well as the prevention and suppression of all forms of
lawless violence. The Solicitor General however contends that a
preamble of a statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is
not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers,
or cure inherent defects in the statute.
ISSUE: Whether or not the preamble of a statute usually introduced
by the word "whereas", is NOT an essential part of an act and cannot
enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute.
RULING: NO. We disagree with these contentions. Because of the
problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it
becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree
and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas"
clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify
therein. In the paragraph immediately following the last
"Whereas" clause, the presidential decree states: “NOW,
THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-inChief of an the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in order to
attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081
and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree
that..” From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D.
9 are those related to the desired result of Proclamation 1081
and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and
7 refer to firearms and therefore have no relevance to PD 9(3)
which refers to blunt or bladed weapons.
It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed
weapon with a motivation connected with or related to the
afore-quoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within
the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.
NOTA BENE: The preamble of a statute may be referred to
determine what acts fall within the purview of a penal statute.
PUNCTUATIONS
MORENO V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 168550, 2006
FACTS: Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify
Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that
the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention. The Comelec en banc granted her petition
and disqualified Moreno. Comelec en banc assails Sec. 40(a)
of the Local Government Code which provides: Sec. 40.
Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position. “Those sentenced by
final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence
are disqualified from running for any elective local
position.” Since Moreno was released from probation on
December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this
date and end two (2) years thence. The grant of probation to
Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but
did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective
local office. On his petition, In this petition, Moreno argues that
the disqualification under the Local Government Code applies
only to those who have served their sentence and not to
probationers because the latter do not serve the adjudged
sentence.
ISSUE: WON Moreno’s probation grant him the right to run in
public office?
RULING: YES. The Comelec could have correctly resolved this
case by simply applying the law to the letter. Sec. 40(a) of the
Local Government Code unequivocally disqualifies only those
who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense
punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more, within
two (2) years after serving sentence. This is as good a time
as any to clarify that those who have not served their sentence
by reason of the grant of probation which, we reiterate, should
not be equated with service of sentence, should not likewise
be disqualified from running for a local elective office because
the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the
Local Government Code does not even begin to run.
NOTA BENE: Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does
not apply to probationers because while on probation, serving
of sentence is suspended. The comma (,) placed in the clause
of Sec. 40(a) which states that “… comma (,) within two (2)
years after serving sentence.” clearly states that the
sentence should be served before the provision could apply.
FLORENTINO V. PNB, G.R. NO. L-8782, APRIL 28, 1956
FACTS: The petitioners are indebted to the respondent bank in the
amount of P6, 800 plus interest, the same having been incurred on
January 2, 1953, which is due on January 2, 1954. The said loan is
secured by a mortgage of real properties. The petitioner Marcelino B.
Florentino is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment No. 1721 in the
amount of P22, 896.33 by virtue of Republic Act No. 897. Mariano
offered to pay their loan with the respondent bank with their backpay
certificate, but the respondent bank refused to accept the petitioner's
offer to pay the said indebtedness with the latter's backpay certificate.
Mariano filed with the Court of First Instance of La Union a petition
for mandamus against respondent and appellee, Philippine National
Bank, to compel it to accept the backpay certificate.
The legal provision involved is section 2 of Republic Act No. 879,
which provides: … the applicant may need for the payment of (1)
obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this amendatory
Act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the Government
or to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or the corporations
owned or control by the Government, or to any citizen of the
Philippines, or to any association or corporation organized under the
laws of the Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same for
such settlement.
The question raised is whether the clause "who may be willing to
accept the same for settlement" refers to all antecedents "the
Government, any of its branches or instrumentalities, the
corporations owned or controlled by the Government, etc.," or only
the last antecedent "any citizen of the Philippines, or any association
or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines. The
contention of the respondent-appellee, Philippine National Bank is
that said qualifying clause refers to all the antecedents, whereas the
appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last antecedent.
RULING: Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last
antecedent; that is, "any citizen of the Philippines or any association
or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines." It should
be noted that there is a comma before the words "or to any
citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase from the preceding
ones.
NOTA BENE: A comma is used to divide sentences or parts of
sentences.
In the instant case, PNB is contending that the clause “who may be
willing to accept the same for such settlement" refers to all
antecedents but the court rule that it only applies to the last
precedent. Hence, PNB does not have the discretion not to accept
the backpay certificate because they are government bank
compelled to accept the certificate and the clause “who may be willing
to accept the same for such settlement" only applies to any citizen of
the Philippines, or any association or corporation organized under the
laws of the Philippines.
B.
EXTRINSIC AIDS
1.
CONTEMPORANEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES
Contemporaneous constructions or also called practical
constructions are the constructions placed upon the statutes at the
time of, or after, their enactment by the executive, legislative or
judicial authorities.
ESTRADA V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, G.R. NO. 146738
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
FACTS: After his fall from power, the petitioner’s legal
problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed
against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
conducting any further proceedings in any criminal complaint
that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner
as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also
filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for judgment “confirming
petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her
oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an
acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”
The origin and history of the statute. Refers to all its antecedents
from its inception until its enactment into law. Covers the period
and steps done from the time the bill us introduced until it is finally
passed by the legislature.
a. Presidents message to legislature
b. Explanatory note
c. Legislative debates, views and deliberations
d. Reports of commissions
e. Prior laws from which statute is based
f. Amendment of the statute
g. Adopted statutes
h. Conditions at the time of enactment
i. History of the times
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable
to Act as President.
SANLAKAS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. NO. 159085
RULING: Both houses of Congress have recognized
respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that
recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada
is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
petitioner’s claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that
he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is
a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to
govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de
jure President made by a co-equal branch of government
cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
FACTS: On July 27, 2003, some 300 junior officers and enlisted men
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines stormed into the Oakwood
Premiere apartments in Makati City. Bewailing the corruption in the
AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of
President Gloria Arroyo, Secretary of Defense Angelo Reyes, and
PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane. In the wake of the Oakwood
occupation, the President issued later in the day Proclamation No.
427 ("Declaring a State of Rebellion") and General Order No. 4
("Directing the AFP and the PNP to Suppress the Rebellion"), both
declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling out the Armed Forces
to suppress the rebellion.
The Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:
"x x x The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko
na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape,
bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any more
of this – it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the
bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I just want to clear my name,
then I will go." Again, this is high-grade evidence that the
petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he
said "x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na"
are words of resignation.
Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), contend that Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of
a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY V. ATIENZA, JR., G.R. NO.
156052, FEBRUARY 13, 2008
ISSUE: WON Ordinance
Ordinance 8027
8119
impliedly
repealed
RULING: NO. While it is true that both ordinances relate to the
same subject matter, that is classification of the land use of the
area where Pandacan oil deposit is located, if there is no intent
to repeal the earlier enactment, every effort at reasonable
construction must be made to reconcile the ordinances so that
both can be given effect. The conflict between the two
ordinances is more apparent than real. The two ordinances can
be reconciled. Ordinance No. 8027 is applicable to the area
particularly described therein whereas Ordinance No. 8119 is
applicable to the entire City of Manila. Implied repeals are not
favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the
legislators is manifest.
There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the
provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are
irreconcilably contradictory, the latter act, to the extent of the
conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The
second is: if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier
one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to
repeal the earlier law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution
grants the President the power to declare a state of rebellion.
RULING: YES. Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commanderin-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. The
provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
"sequence" of "graduated power[s]." From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare
martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution
requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual
invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of
such power.
In the course of time, the U.S. President's power to call out armed
forces and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without
prior legislative approval, in case of invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion came to be recognized and accepted. The United States
introduced the expanded presidential powers in the Philippines
through the Philippine Bill of 1902. The lesson to be learned from the
U.S. constitutional history is that the Commander-in-Chief powers are
broad enough as it is and become more so when taken together with
the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of office.
Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the
occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats which
undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of the
State.
CONSTRUCTION BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Rules and regulations issued by executive or administrative
officer pursuant to law have the force and effect of laws. The
administrative agency has the power to interpret its own
rules; this will become part of the rules.
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation
where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With
the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26
thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through
judicial precedent.
SAN LUIS V. SAN LUIS, G.R. NO. 133743
ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD V. CA, G.R. NO. 113079
FACTS: During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later,
He married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States
of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute
Divorce.
FACTS: The ERB rendered a Decision allowing Shell to establish the
service station in Benigno Aquino, Jr. Avenue, Parañaque, Metro
Manila. - Aggrieved, private respondent PDSC elevated its cause to
the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the decision of the
ERB. Dissatisfied, both Shell and ERB elevated the matter to the
Supreme Court. ERB contended that the evidence presented by
applicant Shell regarding vehicle volume and fuel demand supports
the construction of the proposed outlet and will not lead to ruinous
competition. For its part, Shell avered that the respondent appellate
court should not have passed judgment on purely economic and
policy issues regarding the petroleum business which are within the
realm of the Energy Regulatory Board which has a recognized
expertise in oil economics.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad
San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos at Wilshire Boulevard,
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Thereafter,
the respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate.
On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo
by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the
respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because
she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the
time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
ISSUE: Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration. YES.
RULING: YES. In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido
III, the historical background and legislative intent behind
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to
wit: On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original
Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code.
A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended,
it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied) x x x x Legislative Intent.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the
1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines,
and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis added)
ISSUE: Whether it was proper for the CA to review the decision of
the ERB
RULING: NO It is improper. The power to determine whether the
building of a gasoline retail outlet in a trading area would benefit
public interest and the oil industry lies with the ERB not the appellate
courts. The interpretation of an administrative government
agency like the ERB, which is tasked to implement a statute, is
accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction
of the courts because when an administrative agency renders an
opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a preexisting law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory
for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Thus,
an action by an administrative agency may be set aside by the judicial
department if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the
letter and spirit of the law.
In the case at bar, the Court found no cogent reason to depart from
the general rule because the findings of the ERB conform to, rather
than conflict with, the governing statutes and controlling case law on
the matter. Petitioner ERB is in a better position to resolve
petitioner Shell's application, being primarily the agency
possessing the necessary expertise on the matter.