Communication Theory ISSN 1050–3293 ORIGINAL ARTICLE Drew B. Margolin Department of Communication, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14850, USA This article derives a theory of informative fictions (TIF). Common forms of misinformation— fake news, rumors, and conspiracy theories—while dysfunctional for communicating property information—information about the state and operation of things—can actually be valuable for communicating character information—information about the motivations of social agents. It is argued that narratives containing “false facts” can effectively portray a speaker’s theory of another individual’s character. Thus, such narratives are useful for gathering information about leaders and other important individuals who are evaluated in the community. After deriving the theory, TIF is used to derive propositions predicting the empirical conditions under which misinformation will be accepted, tolerated or promoted. The implications of the theory for addressing the normative problem of misinformation are also discussed. Keywords: Misinformation, False News, Rumors, Theory of Mind, Narrative, Embodied Cognition doi:10.1093/ct/qtaa002 Misinformation—including fake news, rumors, and conspiracy theories—has been studied and theorized by social scientists for over a century (Garrett, 2011; Guess, Nagler, & Tucker, 2019; Knapp, 1944; Sherover, 1915; Uscinski, 2017). This body of research indicates that misinformation is often “preferred” to true information. For example, false rumors are readily created (Knapp, 1944), false news is often shared more than true news (Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018), and individuals retain false beliefs even after being corrected (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Thorson, 2016). Despite these tendencies, misinformation is not always preferred. Rather, it appears to be a contingent form of dysfunction. For example, individuals are often aware that misinformation is actually false (Bullock, Gerber, Hill, & Huber, 2015) and will abandon it when corrected by Corresponding author: Drew B. Margolin; e-mail: dm658@cornell.edu 714 Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736 © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of International Communication Association. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023 The Theory of Informative Fictions: A Character-Based Approach to False News and other Misinformation D. B. Margolin Informative Fictions Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736 715 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023 friends or provided with related stories (Bode & Vraga, 2015; Margolin, Hannak, & Weber, 2018). This raises the question: what are the boundary conditions for the preference for misinformation? Why is it tolerated, accepted, and promoted in some situations, or by certain individuals, and not others? While current theories identify many causes of misinformation acceptance: the presence of particular emotions (Allport & Postman, 1947; Weeks, 2015), the use of particular thinking styles (Pennycook & Rand, 2019; Schwarz, Newman, & Leach, 2016), prior biases (Flynn, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2017; Lewandowsky et al., 2012), and individual predispositions (Bessi et al., 2015; Garrett & Weeks, 2017; Grinberg, Joseph, Friedland, Swire-Thompson, & Lazer, 2019; Guess et al., 2019), these theories approach misinformation as an anomaly to be explained, rather than as a derivable outcome of a general communication theoretic problem. As such, they tend to provide useful proximate explanations for the prevalence of misinformation, but are limited in their ability to articulate conditions that would alter this prevalence. One approach to understanding misinformation’s contingent preference is that, in certain circumstances, its function may outweigh its destructive impact. For example, if there were more than one kind of valuable information, such that individuals would always face a communication trade-off in having to decide which was more important to convey, then “misinformation”—inaccurate information of one form—would be an expected outcome of situations where communicating the other form was prioritized. The preference for this kind of misinformation would then be predictable from the conditions that heighten the value or necessity of this other kind of information. This article proposes one such theory, the theory of informative fictions (TIF). TIF argues that individuals gather and communicate two valuable yet distinct kinds of information: property information, which describes events, states, and mechanisms that pertain to “objects,” that is, entities that they perceive lack agency, and character information, which describes the motivations and perspectives of “agents,” that is, entities individuals perceive to be capable of making choices. TIF argues that different communicative forms more effectively facilitate the communication of each kind of information. Property information is more effectively communicated through propositions and arguments; character information is more effectively communicated through stories. Because of this distinction, individuals can use inaccurate property misinformation (e.g., describe fictitious events) to more effectively narrate stories that communicate accurate character information. Thus, in conditions where individuals prioritize character information they may construct or tolerate narratives that rely on false claims. TIF does not justify the use of misinformation, as the spread and acceptance of inaccurate property information remains dangerous irrespective of the benefits these narratives may provide. Nor does TIF purport to explain all incidences of misinformation. Rather, TIF provides a theoretical framework that synthesizes many findings about misinformation while pointing to additional, testable predictions (Rosenbaum, 2017). Informative Fictions D. B. Margolin Theoretical foundation—assumptions, definitions, and outline Assumptions Key concepts and definitions The TIF begins with a distinction between two kinds of entities: objects and agents. Toulmin describes the distinction as follows: There is one kind of knowledge that we typically arrive at on the basis of our reciprocal dealings with our fellow human agents ( . . . ) and there is another kind of knowledge that we typically arrive at on the basis of our dealings with “insensate” physical objects, with which our relations go only one way. (Toulmin, 1982, p. 241) As Toulmin suggests, when individuals perceive they are in a relationship with an entity, they think about it differently (Burgoon & Hale, 1984). Individuals act on objects and agents, but agents also act back on individuals. Agents have a mind of their own that includes goals, motivations, and the ability to strategically and creatively plan actions, including the manipulation of other agents, to achieve those goals (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Reiss, 2004). TIF does not insist that individuals make sharp, distinct classifications of objects vs. agents. Rather, it suggests that the extent to which they perceive an entity has agency—the ability to make choices based on motivations and plans—influences the decisions they make and the information they seek in reference to it. To the extent to which an individual believes they are interacting with an object, they will be described as facing execution decisions for which they seek property information (“What is this thing? How does it behave?”). Examples of execution decisions include deciding what to eat, what to wear based on the weather, how to repair a machine. To the extent to which an individual believes they are interacting with an agent, they will be described as facing relational decisions for which they seek character information (“Who is this agent? How do they behave?”). Examples include deciding whether to trust another individual to fulfill an exchange, commit to a friendship, rely on another for information, or empower a political leader. Accurately gathering both kinds of information and appropriately making both kinds of decisions is essential as individuals must successfully interact with both 716 Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023 TIF rests on two premises that are not justified within the theory itself. The first is that the communication is functional, meaning that individuals try to gather the kind of information that would be beneficial to improving decisions. The assumption is not that individuals are perfect maximizers, only that they possess a sufficiently functional inclination to gather and communicate information they believe is valuable. The theory also assumes that individuals both seek information relevant to their own decisions and communicate information they believe will help others make effective decisions. This communication can be self-interested, such as sharing information to influence political decisions that impact the individual, or altruistic, such as advising a friend (Kümpel, Karnowski, & Keyling, 2015; Yuan, Fulk, & Monge, 2007). D. B. Margolin Informative Fictions Theory of informative fictions The thesis of TIF is that message construction inherently creates a competition between property information and character information. I will demonstrate that this competition is logically possible and functionally likely through the following argument: (a) to be functionally effective, character information is gathered and processed differently from property information, (b) character information is communicated differently from property information, and (c) because of these differences, inaccurate property claims can be used to enhance the communication of accurate character portrayals. The gathering and processing of character information This section will demonstrate that the kind of information needed to make effective relational decisions (character information) differs from the kind needed to make Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736 717 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023 the physical and social worlds (Campbell, 1965; Tetlock, 2002). The assessment of any particular object or agent is subjective, however, meaning what is an execution decision for some can be a relational decision for others (Garrett & Weeks, 2017). For example, some see the economy as an autonomous system (an object), while others view it as orchestrated by agents (Leiser, Duani, & Wagner-Egger, 2017). Some see decisions about climate change to be purely executional—"what to do about physical properties (rising temperature) of the world?” Others appear to see them as relational—"do I trust the motives of the agents who seek the power to address climate change?” (Feine, 2012; Jones, 2010). These subjective differences result from a number of differences, including life experience, culture, as well as social systems that delineate specialization and delegation of expertise (Yuan et al., 2007) and responsibility (Fox & Shotts, 2009). Real world decisions also often contain a mixture of both aspects. When the American public was asked its opinion on whether to invade Iraq in 2003, the decision had executional aspects, such as: “would the invasion neutralize Iraq’s military capability?”; “would many American soldiers die?”; as well as relational aspects, such as “would President Bush use his authority judiciously?”; “would Saddam Hussein become more (or less) aggressive if war were declared?” Similarly, the U.K.’s 2016 Brexit referendum included executional aspects: “will new trade arrangements increase the price of goods?”; and relational aspects: “what kind of policies will EU leaders choose to impose on Britain in the future?” To maintain clarity, this article will refer to assertions of property information as claims. The statement “Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)” is a claim. Verified claims will be called facts. Assertions about of character information will be called portrayals. The statement “Saddam Hussein wants WMDs” is a portrayal. A summary of these terms, as well as definitions and examples of related concepts from the main argument, are provided in Table 1. Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736 Information required Entity type Definition: Information about the choice-making tendencies of agents Assumption: Behavior is Governed by Mind, Body Dynamics Definition: Information about events, states, and behavior of objects Assumption: Behavior is Law-Like Continued Character Information Property Information Definition: Entity perceived to possess strategic, creative intelligence Definition: Entity perceived to lack strategic, creative intelligence Theoretical Importance: Must account for possibility of manipulation Examples: Trusting an information source about a tool/technology/treatment Hiring a colleague/employee Electing a representative Theoretical Importance: Does not account for possibility of manipulation Examples: Use of physical tools/technology Use of medical treatment Setting a department policy Setting a tax or tariff Agent Explanation: Whether to trust and expose oneself to decisions of social agents Explanation: How to interact with objects Object Relational decisions Decision Type Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023 718 Execution decisions Table 1 Theory of Informative Fictions: Summary of Concepts Informative Fictions D. B. Margolin Means of Communication: Evoking Justification: Through transportation, identification and empathy, narratives enable evocation of character’s mind and body state in the mind and body of listener for evaluation Means of Communication: Encoding Justification: Rigid and precise rules of language and inference mimic law-like mechanisms that govern objects, enabling inferences from individual observations statements to general theories Definition: Statements that entail implications via logical Definition: Presentations of characters and events that combinations of rules for: (a) applying terms, (b) connecting describe: (a) characters’ choices, (b) characters’ motives terms and perspectives when facing these events and making these choices Narratives/Stories Operational Definition: Accurate (Inaccurate) Portrayals Operational Definition: True (False) Claims Propositions/Arguments Relational decisions Execution decisions Decision Type Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023 Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736 Functional messaging Table 1 Continued D. B. Margolin Informative Fictions 719 Informative Fictions D. B. Margolin 720 Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023 effective execution decisions (property information), or, in other words, that it is neither typical nor functional for individuals to build knowledge of agents using the typical and functional methods used to build knowledge of objects. Recall that objects are defined as entities perceived to lack the ability to make choices. Thus if the behavior of an object is to be predicted, it must have stable (if not yet known) properties that make its behavior consistent across time and space within definable conditions (Popper, 2003). In formal science, this assumption is articulated as search for “laws” (Popper, 2003). Consistent with this assumption, inferences to the properties of objects are based on rigid rules. Observations should be encoded in defined vocabulary that enable logical connections to constructs and principles (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Though scientists and others gathering property information do not always follow it, this process describes an ideal (Kuhn, 1996). For gathering information about agents, however, this ideal does not apply. First, by definition, agents are believed to be capable of choices. Motives of agents can be conditional on the agent’s (unobservable) internal state (Reiss, 2004). Agents can also reach goals through strategic planning, creating instrumental motives to induce particular conclusions (Ellison, Heino, & Gibbs, 2006; Reiss, 2004). Thus, assuming that an agent will follow discoverable rules leaves an individual vulnerable to exploitation, as the agent can produce patterns that logically compel inferences that support their advantage (Corter & Gluck, 1992). For example, a politician could create a fact pattern that shows that they have always supported a specific constituency, inductively compelling that constituency’s loyalty only to exploit it later (Fiske & Durante, 2014). Thus, the best practices for gathering property information can lead individuals astray when gathering character information. Consistent with this claim, research shows that individuals typically deviate from scientific inference strategies when assessing other agents. First, they use inputs that are not classifiable into well-defined constructs that enable logical connections. Instead, they rely substantially on paralinguistic cues and other forms of relational signals that are difficult to describe in well-defined terms (Burgoon & Hale, 1984; Pfau, 2002). Individuals believe paralinguistic cues such as body language, facial expression, and tone of voice reflect intentions (Grèzes & Dezecache, 2014; Lewkowicz, Delevoye-Turrell, Bailly, Andry, & Gaussier, 2013). Paralinguistic signals are also difficult to advantageously curate because they are hard to control (Walther, Van Der Heide, Hamel, & Shulman, 2009). Second, there is evidence that the cognitive process through which these inferences take place is imaginative rather than logical. Cognitive theorists argue that individuals predict the behavior of agents using a theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), meaning they “impute mental states to [themselves] and others” (Premack & Woodruff, 1978, p. 515). Individuals build theories of (agents) minds using imagination and perspective taking, particularly through simulations (Hurley, 2008). According to this research, “people employ imagination, mental pretense, or perspective taking (‘putting oneself in the other person’s shoes’) to determine others’ mental states” (Shanton & Goldman, 2010, p. 1). D. B. Margolin Informative Fictions Communicating character information This section will demonstrate that the most effective forms for communicating character information are distinct from the most effective forms for communicating property information. Specifically, it will demonstrate that while property information is functionally communicated through logical arguments, character information is functionally communicated through evocative narratives. As described above, property information is the basis for predicting the behavior of entities believed to be behave according to discoverable rules or “laws.” Thus, when an individual (a speaker) wishes to communicate their predictions to another (an audience) they can most effectively do so by demonstrating the rule-based relationship between observations and mechanisms. This process is facilitated by encoding observations and higher order principles into propositions using welldefined vocabulary that can be connected via logic (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Popper, 2003). For example, the economic implications of Brexit can be predicted from economic theory, but such predictions are contingent on defining what “Brexit” means in legal and policy terms. Logical arguments are not as well suited to communicating character information, however. First, the speaker’s imagination of the target agent’s character may have been built from a variety of inputs, such as paralinguistic cues or empathic reactions that cannot be accurately encoded into defined vocabulary. For example, Cramer (2016) reports on rural Wisconsites comparing their impressions of Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton during the 2008 presidential primary. One individual says “he’s [Obama] more down to earth ( . . . ) Hillary is up here, she’s a multimillionaire.” Another interviewee concurs “She’s got that air around her. That aura. That ‘I’m better than you are.’ She doesn’t seem genuine.” (Cramer, 2016, p. 183). These terms (“air around,” “aura”) convey information, but are difficult to define and confirm. Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736 721 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023 This imaginative process conjectures the future behavior of others through simulations that include vivid images or acutely felt mental or bodily states but which do not require logical deduction (Gilbert & Wilson, 2009). For example, sensing that an agent is irritated could lead to the inference that they will become impatient with social interaction. This inference can be built from gathering paralinguistic cues, imagining the agent’s state of mind, and then imagining one’s own response in that state of mind. This state of mind does not need to be categorized so that a logical principle (“irritation → impatience”) can be called on. This flexibility permits imagination to gather information through empathy (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989), making it possible to draw conclusions from observing agents’ reactions to unique situations (Gilbert & Wilson, 2009). Taken together, these arguments indicate that requiring individuals to understand agents using property inference rules would be neither easy, as it not typical, nor functional, as it requires restricting inputs for the sake of a process (logical inference) that is not well suited to the task. Informative Fictions D. B. Margolin 722 Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023 For example, what facts could arbitrate a test as to whether there is an “air around” Clinton? More broadly, even if such claims could be proven, deriving predictions from them follows more easily from imagining what Clinton is thinking than from logical deductions derived from the category. The individual makes a leap here, from “I’m better” to “not genuine,” an inference that is difficult to arrive at logically. However, the former statement (“I’m better”) may portray Clinton as having motives that, in the context of seeking power, suggest the latter (“not genuine”) (Fiske & Durante, 2014; Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011). If a speaker wishes to communicate their predictive model of the agent’s behavior, they must communicate their imagination of who the agent is, that is, their theory of the agent’s mind. Communicating this imagination is not dependent on sharing rules for applying vocabulary, but rather on conveying images, perspectives, emotions and other aspects that contribute to each individual’s simulation of the agent’s character. Thus, for a speaker to communicate the ability to predict an agent’s behavior, they must find a way to “evoke” their theory of the agent’s mind in the imagination of the audience (Mar, Oatley, Djikic, & Mullin, 2011). How can this evocation—imbuing the audience’s imagination with the speaker’s theory—be achieved? One way is via impersonation. In impersonation, the speaker performs paralinguistic cues and situational reactions that induce the audience into the appropriate imaginative state, essentially proclaiming “I imagine/simulate the agent like this,” a technique common in satire of important personages (Baumgartner, Morris, & Walth, 2012). However, these direct evocations depend on speakers and audiences having visual and/or auditory access to one another placing limitations on scale. Another effective and more scale-able method of communicating theories of mind is narrated stories. The usefulness of narratives for communicating character information is documented in disparate literatures (Boyd, 2018; Fisher, 1984; Smith et al., 2017). Across cultures, storytelling is a preferred genre for communicating gossip (Baumeister, Zhang, & Vohs, 2004; Dunbar, 2004; Kniffin & Wilson, 2005). That is, when individuals wish to convey information to construct the reputation of other human agents, they tell stories about them. There is also evidence that attending to stories improves the ability to make character inferences, as those who read literary fiction have enhanced abilities for imagining the minds of others (Bal & Veltkamp, 2013; Oatley, 2016). What gives stories an advantage in communicating character information? First, narratives stimulate the audience’s imagination, creating vivid images and senses of situations, thus directly engaging the relevant process for predicting agent behavior (Mar et al., 2011; Oatley, 2012, 2016) Second, while there is no single, dominant definition of narrative, the concept is generally agreed to encompass an event (or series of events) that require choices by characters (Fisher, 1984; Mar et al., 2011). Thus, narratives target the critical component of character information (choices). D. B. Margolin Informative Fictions Accuracy of character information vs. accuracy of property information If character information is more effectively communicated through evocative stories, there is a possibility that the most evocative stories, in terms of their ability to reproduce the sense of character imagined by the speaker in the mind of the audience, are not the most factual stories, in terms of their reference to real events and properties of the world. For example, during the Brexit campaign a highly shared story was entitled “Major leak from Brussels reveals NHS will be KILLED OFF if Britain remains in the EU” (Chadwick, Vaccari, & Loughlin, 2018). As a prediction about the future of the NHS, this claim may have limited predictive value. As a story that evokes a model of the EU’s motives regarding Britain, however, it is precise and vivid. Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736 723 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023 Audiences’ processing of stories also focuses on the perspectives and motives of these characters. Audiences identify with characters, sharing their perspective (Cohen, 1998; Murphy, Frank, Chatterjee, & Baezconde-Garbanati, 2013). They are often also “transported” into the action where it is experienced as partly real (Mar et al., 2011; Shapiro & Kim, 2012), increasing their ability to take the perspective of the characters, experiencing the action as though it were happening to them. Finally, narratives can convey precise information without requiring precise vocabulary (Fisher, 1984). For example, as Mar et al. describe “Having already evoked sadness in a reader, a writer need only describe a character looking off in the distance for the reader to infer a sense of forlornness” (p. 828). The speaker and audience do not need to share a precise vocabulary (e.g., the word “forlorn,” which may itself be insufficient) from which to build logical inferences. Rather, they must share the appropriate images and feelings to conduct similar simulations. For these reasons, a narrative should be better than a proposition or argument at conveying a speaker’s model for predicting an agent’s behavior. Whereas an argument must convert all of the paralinguistic information and imagined senses of the speaker into a defined vocabulary ready for logical connection, the narrative can directly evoke, in the mind and body of the audience, the motives and perspectives necessary to predict the agent’s behavior. For example, Lepore (2018) recounts a campaign biography’s telling of how Abraham Lincoln used to “walk for miles” to the Illinois legislature (p. 288). This story evokes a rich, predictive sense of his character, in many way foreshadowing Lincoln’s leadership during the Civil War. This character could be described in propositional terms: “Lincoln is humble, has endurance, is committed to democracy.” However, these broad characterizations do not seem to capture the unique qualities that predict Lincoln’s conduct. As these arguments and examples illustrate, there is a trade-off between communicating for logical deduction and communicating for imaginative simulation. Whereas the former demands arguments comprised of defined terms with logical connections, the latter demands evocative images and scenarios that portray motivations and perspectives related to choices (Shapiro & Chock, 2003) and transport the audience into the situation (Mar et al., 2011). Informative Fictions D. B. Margolin 724 Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023 It evokes the image of the European Commission as a ruthless entity that “wants” or “seeks” to undo British government programs. Can the latter be true even though the former is false? To reiterate, within TIF the goal is prediction of future behavior (of objects, of agents). For property inferences, false claims undermine predictive accuracy. This is because inference via logical deduction assumes that the true properties of the world are all consistent with one another (Popper, 2003). Lincoln himself denied the story cited above, that he used to walk to the legislature, writing in the margin of the biography “no harm, if true; but, in fact, not true. L.” (Lepore, 2018, p. 288). Thus, historians who took the claims in this story to be true could be misled about the historical properties of mid-19th -century Illinois or Lincoln’s early life (e.g., how far he lived from the legislature). When an agent’s behavior is predicted from imagination, however, there is no need for logical consistency with the true properties of the outside world. Fisher (1984) argues that a story need not be true but simply be realistic, that is, have narrative fidelity, meaning that it evokes an imagined world the audience recognizes is consistent with their own experience. The story about Lincoln is a claim about his mind, only, and what is relevant is only that it could plausibly be true. Even contradictory stories can be reconciled with plausible states of mind, as individuals can have conflicted motivations (Reiss, 2004). If an audience is interested in predicting Lincoln’s behavior as an agent, the accuracy of the story depends on whether it evokes a theory of Lincoln’s mind that leads their imagination to accurately predict his behavior, not whether the property claims in the story are true. This does not mean that all stories are accurate portrayals of character, or that facts are irrelevant to judging character. The point is only that the claims in the story can be false without distorting the accuracy of the character portrayal. The fiction that Lincoln walked to the legislature can be true in predicting his behavior—who Lincoln is—even if it is false in fact—what he actually did. Consistent with this, studies of narrative show that individuals can learn from stories they know not to be true. Individuals can learn to make more precise and accurate assessments of real people and relational decisions from reading fictional literature (Bal & Veltkamp, 2013; Carroll, 2018; Oatley, 2012, 2016). For example, Jasinski (1993) shows how the fictional film The Big Chill reveals truths about the social world. It is difficult to identify stories about real agents where the truth value of both character portrayals and property claims can be assessed. Character portrayals do not afford logical deductions and so are not testable in a formal sense (Popper, 2003). Nonetheless, Kapferer’s (1989) study of the “leaflet of Villejuif ” provides a useful, detailed example where both character and property information have been substantially corroborated. The leaflet was a document that claimed to show the results of secret tests of major corporate food products, conducted at the Hospital of Villejuif (in France), which revealed that these products are carcinogenic. This story was fake. No such tests were run, and the results were fictional. However, the portrayal D. B. Margolin Informative Fictions Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736 725 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023 of the food companies’ character, as evoked by the story, as places that conduct and hide the results of “secret” tests, was basically accurate. In particular, Kapferer shows that many of the companies did not wish to dispute the memo’s veracity in public for fear that it would call attention to other ways their products were unhealthy, “the Coca-Cola Corporation decided to stay mute for fear of seeing a more important question being raised: the case of sugar” (Kapferer, 1989, p. 479). This tendency of food producers to manipulate publicly available information about properties of the world has subsequently been documented by Oreskes and Conway (2011). The story of the memo thus accurately portrays the industry’s perspective and motives—it would rather the public be misinformed than learn the truth about the unhealthiness of its products—through a narrative that includes false claims. As this example illustrates, the character information provided by the leaflet can be corroborated. However, the relevant facts are not necessarily those used to communicate this information. The facts that logically support this character inference were missing from the story for two reasons. First, the facts were hard to find, requiring substantial investigation (Oreskes & Conway, 2011). Second, the facts are hard to vividly imagine without technical expertise (Fisher, 1984). They involve subtle decisions in specialized contexts, such the incentives given to scientists. The leaflet of Villejuif story portrays these decisions in a context that is more evocative (secret results) and leads to clear character inferences (intention to manipulate for private gain). Stories about U.S. government malfeasance during the Vietnam War provide another illustration. After the Vietnam War, there was speculation that the U.S. government abandoned prisoners of war (POWs) as part of a secret deal with the Vietnamese government, a portrayal communicated in popular entertainment such as the Rambo films (Sweeney, 1999). These stories mislead with respect to property inferences—there is no evidence U.S. POWs in Vietnam (United States Senate, 1993). Yet the character of the U.S. government portrayed by these stories—as making secret deals and callous, disloyal choices—is substantially corroborated by evidence such as provided by the Pentagon Papers (Kahin, 1975; Sweeney, 1999). In other words, both the fictional POW stories and the true Pentagon Papers story portray substantially the same character, only with different events. The Pentagon Papers are true in properties, but hard to imagine, while the POW stories are false in properties, but highly evocative, and thus superior in communicating this character information. Mundane examples can also illustrate the point. A faculty department might express a strong consensus to endorse a norm or idea. This consensus might be more evocatively described as “the faculty took a vote” even if no vote was literally taken. Discrete events indicating that a spouse forgets special occasions might be assembled into more dramatic, composite story about a singular, embarrassing failure and so forth. In each case, the audience walks away with an accurate sense of the agent, if not of the real events, that occurred. Informative Fictions D. B. Margolin Of course, not all character portrayals are accurate. The accuracy of the character portrayal is based on the accuracy of the speaker’s theory of the character’s mind, as well as their intent. Trusting portrayals offered by speakers who are poor judges of character, or whose goal is to mislead or persuade to achieve a goal, will lead audiences to make poor predictions as to the target agent’s behavior. Assessing these factors involves assessing the speaker, not the events in the story per se, however. The relevant warrant for the audience accepting the portrayal is in the speaker’s own character, the theory of mind the audience holds for that speaker (Walther et al., 2009). The warrant is not logical—e.g., “you should trust/not trust this agent because they did XYZ”—but rather relational—e.g., “you should trust/not trust this agent because I imagine they would do XYZ” (Burgoon & Hale, 1984; Hovland & Weiss, 1951) and so does not necessarily follow from the accuracy of the facts in the story. In addition, these arguments do not downplay the costs of telling a false story, but only demonstrate that there can be a counter-balancing benefit that requires assessing a trade-off. Ideally, the vivid, evocative claims needed to convey character portrayals would be supplied by available facts, allowing individuals to communicate accurate character information with no loss of or distortion in property information. Under conditions when this is not the case, however, the preceding arguments suggest that functionally motivated speakers will have to choose. Summary This section has illustrated the rationale of the TIF. A summary of this rationale is presented in Figure 1. 726 Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023 Figure 1 Theoretical model of theory of informative fictions D. B. Margolin Informative Fictions Testable predictions of the theory of informative fictions Importance of character information Perhaps the simplest indicator of what is valued in a message is the topic of the message itself. All else being equal, messages about agents should carry more character information, and thus signal the importance of this information, at least in the mind of the speaker. Thus, when messages focus on agents audiences may be more tolerant of them containing misleading property information. For example, a false statistic should be more acceptable in a story portraying the motivations of a politician rather than the predicted outcomes of a policy. Proposition 1: The greater quantity of character information a message conveys, such as through the description of choices, motives, and perspectives of an agent, the more individuals will tolerate/accept/promote false claims within it. Similarly, the value of the character information obtained depends substantially on the vulnerability the individual faces when relating to the agent. This vulnerability can be decomposed into two parts. First, there is the importance of the agent— Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736 727 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023 The primary claim of TIF is that narratives constructed from false claims can be of functional value because they can evoke, and thus communicate, accurate character information. How can this argument be tested? TIF makes many predictions that are consistent with existing theories of misinformation. First, prevailing theories emphasize the impact of existing beliefs and worldviews on the acceptance of misinformation (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). TIF makes similar predictions. Both Fisher’s (1984) idea of narrative fidelity as well as the tenets of simulation theory suggest that individuals will reject narrative/simulations that they cannot reconcile with their existing imagination of the world. Second, TIF predicts that messages with misinformation will be accepted if they evoke strong, vivid and arousing imaginations, a finding consistent with observations of misinformation (Horne & Adali, 2017; Vosoughi et al., 2018). Work on the theory of rumors (Allport & Postman, 1947) suggests that rumors are embraced when there is substantial anxiety and/or a loss of confidence in authority. This finding also follows from TIF, which suggests these contexts create a demand for character information in order to re-assess leadership or to shift attention to interpersonal relationships as formal institutions break down (Weick, 1995). TIF is thus consistent with these existing approaches. An advantage of TIF, however, is that it also makes additional predictions about the conditions under which false claims will be accepted, tolerated or promoted. Specifically, TIF implies that the acceptance, tolerance, and promotion of false claims will vary with two broad conditions: (a) conditions in which character information is more valuable than property information, and (b) conditions in which character assessments diverge from available facts. These conditions can be used to derive specific, empirically testable propositions that do not follow from other theories explaining misinformation. Informative Fictions D. B. Margolin their power. Individuals should be more willing to accept/tolerate/promote misinformation about important people or institutions than about unimportant people or institutions. Targeted individuals might have formal power, or be in influential social positions within a local context, such as having a central position in a social network (Monge & Contractor, 2003). A second condition is the decision-type. If individuals believe they are making execution decisions—that is, in relation to entities they perceive to be objects—then they should apply logical, propositional reasoning and should reject false claims (Pennycook & Rand, 2019). By contrast, when individuals believe they are making relational decisions—that is, in relation to entities they perceive are choice-making agents—they should value character information. Perceptions of whether a decision is one of execution or relational are subjective and depend substantially on the decision-maker’s social role and position. Much human decision-making is situated in a specialized social environment in which individuals are delegated responsibility for expertise and decision-making (Fox & Shotts, 2009; Yuan et al., 2007). For those treated as experts or assigned to make execution decisions, accurate property information is paramount. However, for those who rely on others, accurate character information is more important. This rationale can be extended to consider the influence that individuals believe they have over decision-makers. The more an individual believes they have a voice in influencing a decision-maker, the more they should perceive they are making execution decisions and thus seek property information. For those who have less direct influence, character information is more relevant, because their decisions end with empowering others to make decisions on their behalf. For example, Cramer (2016) documents how citizens of rural Wisconsin perceive most policy proposals as really being decisions about whether to entrust more resources to state employees in “Madison” (where the state capitol is). That is, they perceive their political decisions as more relational—who do we entrust with power— than executional—what should the government do? Thus, depending on an individual’s social role relative to a decision or their sense of influence over the decision, the relevant information may be property or character: Proposition 3: The more individuals perceive communication to be in relation to a relationship decision, as opposed to an execution decision, the more they will tolerate/promote false claims. Divergence between available fact and character The preceding propositions focus on the information that individuals prefer or “demand.” The following propositions hold constant this demand for information and emphasize the “supply” of materials, specifically facts, available for communication. 728 Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023 Proposition 2: The more important the agent targeted by a message the more individuals will tolerate/accept/promote false claims. D. B. Margolin Informative Fictions Proposition 4: The greater the cost of searching for/acquiring facts relative to important agents, the greater the use of false claims in narratives about those agents. Communities can also differ in the extent to which they normatively insist that decisions be based on facts and logic (Bessi et al., 2015; Margolin et al., 2018). When individuals wish to communicate character information, norms demanding that communication be logical and factual could encourage individuals to invent facts to portray relevant characters. Importantly, while such norms can be useful in precluding the communication of false property information, they do not necessarily improve accuracy of character portrayals. For example, Cramer accepted the portrayal of Hillary Clinton in ambiguous terms: “up here,” “that air around her.” If she had required these individuals to justify these impressions, using facts and logic, they might not be able to do so. This inability would not bear on the accuracy of their imagination of Clinton’s character. Nonetheless, to communicate this impression, they might feel motivated to invent a story that portrayed it in an evocative manner. Thus, demands that individuals factually justify their impressions of agents can press them to invent facts: Proposition 5: The greater the expectation that decisions about agents be based on fact and logic, the greater the use of false claims in narratives about those agents. These propositions are summarized in Figure 2. Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736 729 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023 False claims are damaging because they mislead execution decisions. Thus, from a functional point of view, all else equal, individuals should prefer to convey character information with true stories based on facts. However, the availability of such facts is a variable within an individual’s information environment. Some communities have individuals (e.g., professional journalists) with the dedicated function of identifying relevant facts while others lack such access (Kim & Ball-Rokeach, 2006). In communities with easy access to a rich set of facts about a target agent, it may be easy to find true stories that portray how they imagine the agent’s character. In communities with less access, however, such searches may be difficult or cost-prohibitive. Individuals whose access to facts is more limited must either search longer and harder for facts, construct narratives using fictions, or refrain from communicating character information. This means that the extent to which individuals must search to find facts that, when presented in narratives, evoke the character impressions they wish to portray is important in determining whether they will invent “facts” to convey character information. Conspiracy theories, defined as concrete, secretive plans by elites to abuse their power (Uscinski, 2017), can be viewed as an example of this phenomenon. Within TIF, conspiracy theories would not assert conjectures of fact, but rather convey character information—a suspicious portrayal of elite motives—in contexts where elite behavior is not transparent and thus facts are hard to come by (Fiske & Durante, 2014; Uscinski, 2017): Informative Fictions D. B. Margolin Discussion This article presents a communication-centered theory for predicting the tolerance and promotion of misinformation. The theory models the communication of misinformation—false property claims—as the result of a decision to prioritize the communication of another kind of information—character portrayals. The TIF does not purport to explain all instances or preferences for misinformation, and is consistent with many existing theories, however, it also provides an additional set of specific empirical predictions. It thus consistent with available evidence while having more elaborate empirical content, a criterion of a good theory (Popper, 2003; Rosenbaum, 2017). Having presented the theory, it is now useful to briefly articulate how it might be used to advance the normative goal of reducing the spread of misinformation. Practical implications As stated at the outset, though TIF argues that the acceptance of misinformation can have functional motivations, the theory is not a defense of misinformation. The damage done via the spread of property misinformation can be substantial. Moreover, TIF makes no claim that character information is necessarily accurate. In fact, intentional misinformation campaigns appear to be motivated by attempts to influence relational decisions (such as voting), and so can be expected to mislead about character. The practical contribution of TIF is in emphasizing that the portrayal of character is central to many misinformation messages. Most plainly, this means that correcting 730 Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023 Figure 2 Propositions D. B. Margolin Informative Fictions Conclusion Misinformation is a complex phenomenon unlikely to be explicable through a single theory. This article contributes to the theoretical conversation by focusing on the uniqueness of character information—the ways in which individuals conceive of and share what they know about one another. Future work may support the specific claims of this approach. More broadly, it is hoped that these arguments stimulate further investigation into the different kinds of information, and the challenges in communicating them, that may foster the spread of misinformation. Acknowledgments This research was supported in part by a grant from the Cornell Institute for Social Sciences. The author thanks Dr. Sahara Byrne for her helpful feedback on this manuscript. Communication Theory 31 (2021) 714–736 731 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ct/article/31/4/714/5857697 by Aarhus University Library user on 07 March 2023 misinformation by simply providing facts, that is, more property information, is unlikely to be successful (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). More broadly this recognition suggests two alternative strategies for correction. First, TIF suggests that misinformation be countered with relevant character information. For example, many individuals have lost confidence not only in specific facts, but in institutions that produce facts, such as journalists, scientists, and governments (Cramer, 2016; Fiske & Durante, 2014; Iyengar & Massey, 2018; Tsetsura & Kruckeberg, 2017). TIF suggests this loss of confidence is directly related to the way that (these mistrusting) individuals imagine the motivations of the agents that inhabit these institutions. Addressing the problem thus requires addressing these imaginations. Unlike claims, imaginations cannot be proven “right” or “wrong.” However, inviting individuals into the motivations and perspectives of these characters can alter their views. This could be done directly, by the relevant agents making themselves available via dialogues that enable the observation of paralinguistic cues, or, more scale-ably, through the presentation of narratives that 1) highlight the beneficent motives of these agents; and 2) resonate with audiences’ life experience. Second, TIF suggests there may be times when it is beneficial to de-couple character portrayals from false property claims thereby allowing individuals to communicate their imagination of agents without relying on property misinformation. 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