CENTRAL-LOCAL DYNAMICS AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
IN THE PHILIPPINES,
2001 TO 2016
SOL DOROTEA ROSALES IGLESIAS
(MA International Affairs, The Fletcher School, Tufts University
M Soc Sci Political Science, National University of Singapore
BA Public Administration, University of the Philippines)
A THESIS SUBMITTED
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE
2018
Supervisor:
Associate Professor Douglas Kammen
Examiners:
Associate Professor Yoshinori Nishizaki
Associate Professor Dominique Caouette, University of Montreal
Professor Mark R. Thompson, City University of Hong Kong
DECLARATION
I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and it has been written by
me in its entirety. I have duly acknowledged all the sources of information
which have been used in the thesis.
This thesis has also not been submitted for any degree in any university
previously.
Sol Dorotea Rosales Iglesias
6 November, 2018
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I owe much to the people who lent a hand so that I could conduct my
research at various institutions. My biggest debt is to Arpee Santiago,
Executive Director of the Ateneo Human Rights Center, Ateneo de Manila
University, for opening doors particularly at the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) and the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) on human rights of
the government peace process with the Communist Party of the PhilippinesNew People’s Army-National Democratic Front.
I am grateful to the following individuals for their assistance at the
CHR. I thank Executive Director Marc Cebreros for agreeing to extend access
to me and for kindly offering office space while I was there. At the
Investigation and Case Monitoring Division, I am grateful to its chief, Diana
de Leon, and Florante Enciso for hosting me. I am also grateful to Banuar
Falcon for prolonging my access to records over long hours each day. I would
have been unable to complete my data collection while in Manila otherwise.
Finally, I am most indebted to Diana Figueras. She was the one who helped
me navigate the maze of CHR databases, records and case documents. I would
not have been able to work so efficiently without her kind assistance. I am
grateful to Paulynn Sicam who very kindly facilitated approval of my access
to the JMC records. I thank Editha Wayas for her invaluable help with the
JMC documents and database. I thank Father Amado Picardal of the Catholic
Bishops Conference of the Philippines and the Coalition Against Summary
Executions. I am indebted to DJ Acierto at Karapatan, Lomel Bautista at the
Ibon Foundation, Cristina Guevarra at Hustisya/Selda/Desaparacidos,
Sunshine Serrano at Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, Luis Teodoro at
the Council for Media Freedom and Responsibility, and Carol Mercado at the
Asia Foundation in Manila. I am so grateful to Renato Reyes, Bayan
Secretary-General, for allowing me to interview him and for the documents he
entrusted to me. I thank Tarlac City counselor Emily Ladera-Facunla for
kindly allowing me to interview her, and my sister Anna Iglesias for the
introduction. I thank Karen Tañada at the Gaston Z. Ortigas Institute for Peace
for the insights she shared. I am grateful to Prof. Herman Kraft at the
University of the Philippines for his enriching analysis of political violence.
I am thankful to the organizers of the Southeast Asia Research Group
(SEAREG) for selecting me as a 2017 fellow. I gained valuable insight in the
process of presenting my findings at the SEAREG workshop in Ho Chi Minh
City in December 2017. Each opportunity I had to present preliminary
findings helped me clarify my writing. For this, I am grateful to co-panelists
and audiences of the Project Southeast Asia Symposium at Oxford University
in April, 2016 and in Jakarta in March 2018. I am also thankful to fellow
panelists at the Association for Asian Studies conferences in Kyoto in June,
2016 and Toronto in March, 2017. Particular thanks go to Adrian Morel at the
Asia Foundation, Rafendi Djamin of the Indonesian Human Rights Resource
Center, Ima Abdulrahim at the Habibie Center, Moe Thuzar at the Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Sriprapha Petcharamesree at Mahidol
University, Alex Afrianto at the Rajeratnam School of International Studies
and Ehito Kimura at the University of Hawaii Manoa. I thank Malcolm Cook
iii
for inviting me to speak about the political implications of the declaration of
martial law in Mindanao at an ISEAS seminar in August 2017.
I owe much thanks to Marianne Teo at the NUS Graduate Studies
writing clinic for her editing advice and encouragement. I am grateful to my
colleague at the World Bank, Chi Fung Fan, for his support at a critical period
before my final submission.
I thank my fellow PhD students at NUS who listened patiently and
advised wisely: Simon Rowedder, Annisa Beta, Vila Somiah, Grace
Concepcion. In Manila, I owe a debt to my friends Cherry Joy Veniles and
Gisela Ordenes for answering my many random questions over the past threeand-a-half years as well as for sharing contacts and documents to help my
research along.
I am grateful to members of my dissertation committee, Oona Paredes
and Jamie Davidson, for their invaluable feedback. I thank Itty Abraham for
encouraging me to extend my research to other Southeast Asian cases and all
the thoughtful conversations that often led me to new insights about my work.
I cannot adequately express in words how much I owe to my
dissertation adviser Douglas Kammen. He shepherded me through a difficult
decision to abandon my original research proposal on East Timor and study
political violence in the Philippines instead. I could always count on him when
I needed to think ideas through. His enthusiasm for my research kept me going
forward. He chided me for enjoying “being a student” too much, in the
beginning. I will never forget when he observed that I had finally transitioned
into “being a researcher”.
I am grateful for the constant support of my sisters, Gay, May and
Anna, and my closest friends, Natalia, Anjeli, Sohni, Ira and Rahiman.
I thank my partner PJ for motivating me to write 300, 500, 1500, 2500
words a day at different stages, for our writing retreats together, and for his
help with copying JMC documents in Manila. I am also grateful to him for
articulating the support of all our critters at home: Grouchy, Plato, Tala, Inuka
and Lisa.
I thank my son Gabriel for being the best study buddy. We shared an
extremely stressful last few months in 2017—him with his Primary School
Leaving Examination and me writing against the clock, in time to submit the
following January. We took turns, taking up the slack for each other at home.
During the crunch time before my deadlines, he did his chores without the
customary foot-dragging, asked very little of me and left me an occasional
note of encouragement on my desk. His hard work, determination and
perseverance inspire me.
I dedicate this dissertation to my father, Gabriel Urquiola Iglesias, who
sparked the ambition in me to become Dr. Iglesias just like him, and to my
mother, Solina Rosales Iglesias, for getting me here.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.............................................................................. iii
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................... vii
LIST OF MAPS .............................................................................................. viii
GLOSSARY ..................................................................................................... ix
Chapter 1. Explaining Political Violence in the Philippines After Marcos ....... 1
Introduction ................................................................................................... 1
Violence in Democracies ............................................................................... 2
State Weakness .............................................................................................. 5
The Philippines: Weak State, Flawed Democracy ........................................ 9
Violent Repression without Authoritarian Reversal .................................... 15
Strategic and Particularistic Interests, Central and Local Capacities .......... 20
From the Periphery, to the Center ............................................................... 25
Dissertation Structure .................................................................................. 30
Chapter 2. Northern Luzon’s Bloody Contests ............................................... 34
A Game of Gods and Monsters ................................................................... 37
Local Elite Pact in Ilocos Sur ...................................................................... 46
Queen Takes King off Abra Chessboard ..................................................... 52
Insurgency in the North ............................................................................... 58
State Weakness and Violent Politics? ......................................................... 72
Chapter 3. The Communist Threat in Eastern Visayas ................................... 75
“The Butcher” in Eastern Visayas ............................................................... 79
Counter-insurgency Continues .................................................................... 85
The Fight Ends in Northern Samar .............................................................. 91
Electoral Violence ....................................................................................... 99
Draining the Sea to Catch the Fish ............................................................ 106
Chapter 4. Patronage and Punishment in Central Luzon ............................... 108
A Strong but Brittle Alliance: Hacienda Luisita ....................................... 111
The Butcher Arrives, Violence Shifts in Meaning .................................... 119
Violence De-escalates................................................................................ 134
The Red Vigilante Group .......................................................................... 137
“Seasonal” Electoral Violence................................................................... 140
A Weak State’s Show of Strength ............................................................. 146
Chapter 5. Safe City, Murder Capital in Southern Mindanao ....................... 148
Petty Despotism and Central Support ........................................................ 151
Duterte Outlasts Rift with Center .............................................................. 164
Next Stop, Malacañang.............................................................................. 170
Tagum City Death Squad, A Pale Imitation .............................................. 174
The Military and Investment Defense ....................................................... 179
The Violent South ...................................................................................... 189
Chapter 6. The Extra-Judicial Killing of Philippine Democracy?................. 191
Central-Local Dynamics of Political Violence .......................................... 191
Shock Therapy: Duterte’s War on Drugs .................................................. 202
War on Drugs, War on Democracy ........................................................... 213
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................... 215
v
Appendices .................................................................................................... 253
Appendix 1. Private Armies and Guerrilla Fronts ..................................... 253
Appendix 2. Political Violence by Region and Pattern ............................. 254
Appendix 3. Political Violence by Type of Incident ................................. 255
Appendix 4. Political Violence by Target ................................................. 256
Appendix 5. Political Violence by Known or Suspected Aggressor ......... 257
Appendix 6. Political Violence in Northern Luzon ................................... 258
Appendix 7. Political Violence in Eastern Visayas ................................... 259
Appendix 8. Political Violence in Central Luzon...................................... 260
Appendix 9. Political Violence in Southern Mindanao ............................. 261
Appendix 10. Fatalities in “War on Drugs” .............................................. 262
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Political Violence from 2001 to 2016, by Region
Figure 2. Political Violence from 2001 to 2016, Number of Affected
Individuals per 100,000 Voters in each Region
Figure 3. Pattern of Election-related Violence in Northern Luzon
Figure 4. Pattern of Insurgency-related Violence in Northern Luzon
Figure 5. Pattern of Insurgency-related Violence in Northern Luzon, by
Administrative Region
Figure 6. Pattern of Insurgency-related Violence in Eastern Visayas
Figure 7. Pattern of Election-related Violence in Eastern Visayas
Figure 8. Pattern of Insurgency-related Violence in Central Luzon
Figure 9. Pattern of Election-related Violence in Central Luzon
Figure 10. Pattern of Wealth Control Violence in Central Luzon
Figure 11. Pattern of Social Control Violence in Central Luzon
Figure 12. Patterns of Political Violence in Southern Mindanao
Figure 13. Pattern of Social Control Violence in Southern Mindanao
Figure 14. Estimated Davao Death Squad Killings
vii
LIST OF MAPS
Map 1. Northern Luzon Regions and their Provinces
Map 2. Eastern Visayas Provinces
Map 3. Central Luzon Provinces
Map 4. Southern Mindanao Provinces
viii
GLOSSARY
ACT
AFP
AMGL
AMTG
Anakpawis
Azucarera
Bantay
Barangay
Bayan Muna
CAFGU
CAR
CHR
COMELEC
CPLA
CPP
DDS
DENR
DILG
DOJ
DPWH
Hacienda
Jueteng
LDP
Kagawad
Karapatan
KMP
Lakas-Kampi-CMD
Lumad
Malacañang
NBI
NDF
NGO
NPA
OBL
Party-list
PDEA
PDP-Laban
PhP
Alliance of Concerned Teachers
Armed Forces of the Philippines
Alyansa ng Magbubukid sa Gitnang Luzon (Alliance of
Central Luzon Farmers)
Aguman da reng Maglalautang Talapagobra keng Gabun
(Association of Farmers and Land Workers)
“Laborer”, party-list political party
Sugar mill
“Watch”, party-list political party
village
“Nation First”, party-list political party
Citizens’ Armed Forces Geographical Unit
Cordillera Autonomous Region
Commission on Human Rights
Commission on Elections
Cordillera People’s Liberation Army
Communist Party of the Philippines
Davao Death Squad
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Department of the Interior and Local Government
Department of Justice
Department of Public Works and Highways
plantation, estate
illegal gambling game
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (Fight of Democratic
Filipinos), political party
Councilor, member of local legislature
Human right, also the name of a human rights nongovernment organization
Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (Philippine Peasants’
Movement)
Lakas (Power)-Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (Partner of
the Free Filipino)-Christian Muslim Democrats, political
party
indigenous, also refers to indigenous people
Office of the President of the Philippines (colloquial)
National Bureau of Investigation
National Democratic Front
Non-government organization
New People’s Army, armed wing of the CPP
Operation Plan Bantay Laya (Freedom Watch)
System of representation of disadvantaged sectors in the
lower house of Congress with a set list of nominees, also
refers to the political parties themselves
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (Philippine
Democratic Party-Power of the Nation)
Philippine pesos
ix
PISTON
PNP
RHB
RPA-ABB
RVG
SDO
SPARU
Tanod
UDS
ULWU
Pinagkaisang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide
(United Drivers and Operators Nationwide)
Philippine National Police
Rebolusyonaryong Hukbo ng Bayan (National Revolutionary
Forces)
Revolutionary Proleteriat Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade
Red Vigilante Group
Stocks Distribution Option
NPA Special Partisan Unit, assassins also referred to as
“sparrows”
Watchman
Underground Death Squad (Tagum City)
United Luisita Worker’s Union
x
Chapter 1. Explaining Political Violence in the Philippines After Marcos
Introduction
On May 25, 2017, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte declared Martial Law
in Mindanao, the southernmost of the country’s three main island groups, in response
to a terrorist attack in Marawi City. Six months later, the president received
Congressional approval to extend military rule until the end of 2018. He had earlier
placed the country under a state of national emergency on September 4, 2016, which
has yet not been lifted as of this writing. This is not creeping authoritarianism: the
safeguards against the return of autocracy are being dismantled systematically and
quickly. Since the collapse of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986, three decades of
Philippine democracy may be coming to a close.
From the day that Duterte took office in 2016, an estimated 7,000 to 13,000
people have died in a politically motivated, state-sponsored mass killing.1 While the
president himself evokes the specter of Marcos’s strongman rule, this violence is
something new. Philippine politics is notoriously bloody but the magnitude of state
violence in such a short period of time is unprecedented. In comparison, under the
Marcos dictatorship from 1972 to 1986 there were an estimated 2,427 extrajudicial
killings and 10,000 insurgency fatalities.2
While the Marcos dictatorship is a natural reference point, the instructive
comparison for understanding the on-going political violence is the presidency of
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Until Duterte’s presidency, Arroyo’s long tenure produced
the greatest amount of political violence coupled with the most political repression
1
I discuss the basis of the low and high estimates in the concluding chapter.
Estimate of extrajudicial killings from 1975 to 1985. Richard Kessler, Rebellion and
Repression in the Philippines (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 137. Combat deaths
estimated from data available on Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "UCDP Conflict
Encyclopedia," Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research 2014,
www.ucdp.uu.se/database.
2
1
since 1986. My research seeks to understand political violence in the Philippines
during that time. The Arroyo government was the most violent presidency in the postMarcos period until 2016 yet the relevant literature is scant and thus sheds little light
on the current state-sponsored violence. Yet the killings under President Duterte were
made possible only in the post-Marcos, democratic period.
This dissertation asks why political violence occurs in a democracy. I argue
that the strategic interests of the state and the particularistic interests of political actors
in society create a motive for the use of violence. However, interests alone cannot
result in action: political actors located at the center and periphery must have the
capacity to act alone, together or against each other. Specific patterns of political
violence—including why violence is used, when it starts, and why it ends—are
contingent upon these central-local dynamics.
Violence in Democracies
Coercion is the essential means of accumulating and maintaining power in
autocracies.3 Democracies, in contrast, are expected to have developed less coercive
ways of managing contention, opposition and protest.4 Democracy is premised on
consent. A stable democracy habituates state and non-state actors to the resolution of
political conflict through constitutionally legitimate processes, political parties and
elections. 5 Davenport argues that the comparative literature has found consistent
3
Francisco Herreros, "The Full Weight of the State: The Logic of Random State-Sanctioned
Violence," Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 6 (2006): 671. See also Ronald Francisco, "The
Dictator's Dilemma," in Repression and Mobilization, ed. Hank Johnston and Caroline
Mueller Christian Davenport (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2004), 59. George
Lopez, "National Security Ideology as an Impetus to State Violence and State Terror," in
Government Violence and Repression, ed. Michael Stohl and George Lopez (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1986), 74.
4
Ted Robert Gurr, "War, Revolution and the Growth of the Coercive State," Comparative
Political Studies 21, no. 45 (1988): 54.
5
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
2
evidence that democratic political institutions inhibit violence “across time, space,
measurements and methodological techniques.”6 Why then might political violence
persist in democracies with a recent history of authoritarian rule? There are three key
explanations for this puzzle in the literature: the failure of democratic consolidation,
the persistence of authoritarian legacies, and state weakness.
States undergoing democratization commit higher levels of violence than
either consolidated democracies or stable authoritarian regimes.7 In unconsolidated
democracies, elections may be held regularly even if the use of coercion and other
forms of manipulation may be pervasive. These “imperfect” democracies have
“somewhat higher levels of freedom” than authoritarian regimes, but may deploy state
violence with little constraint. 8 Moreover, elections blur the line between centralized,
state-sponsored violence against opponents—the focus of state repression studies—
and particularistic, decentralized political violence against candidates and their
supporters. Migdal, for instance, notes that it can be difficult to distinguish between
non-state and state power centers because of the frequent alliances between officials
and societal leaders.9 Elections may also exacerbate violence in places with a history
of armed conflict or communal tensions. 10 Ultimately, the argument of flawed
University Press, 1996), 44. Steve Poe and C. Neal Tate, "Repression of Human Rights to
Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis," The American Political Science Revew
88, no. 4 (1994): 855-56. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., "Thinking inside the Box: A Closer
Look at Democracy and Human Rights," International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 3 (2005):
442.
6
Christian Davenport, "State Repression and Political Order," Annual Review of Political
Science 10, no. 1 (2007): 11.
7
Helen Fein, "More Murder in the Middle: Life Integrity Violations and Democracy in the
World," Human Rights Quarterly 17, no. 1 (1995): 184.
8
Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1999), 9-16.
9
Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1988), 223.
10
See for example, Jacqueline Klopp, "Ethnic Clashes and Winning Elections: The Case of
Kenya's Electoral Despotism," Canadian Journal of African Studies 35, no. 3 (2001); Kristine
Höglund, "Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies: Concepts, Causes, and
Consequences," Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 3 (2009): 413-14.
3
democracy is limited by its circular reasoning: violent repression occurs in
democracies because they are not fully democratic.
Instead of assessing the institutional deficiencies of “failed” democratization
against an idealized type, other scholars have focused on continuities from
authoritarian rule as an explanation for violence in and by democracies.11 Specialized
state agencies of coercion and violence, as well as rules, patterns and practices of an
authoritarian past may remain durable in the democratic present.12 The military’s role
may be preserved or expanded into such areas as drug interdiction, counterinsurgency and crime fighting. 13 These “everyday forms of state coercion” that
constitute “routine politicking, intelligence work, and military operations” do not
overtly challenge civilian rule but may result in violence.14
Such studies highlight the importance of the quotidian dimension of security
forces in the public sphere. However, an authoritarian past may not fully clarify why
violence might resurge then recede in a democratic polity. Meitzner, for instance,
argues that Thailand had phases of military marginalization between 1992 and 2006
that defied the path dependency argument.15 In the Philippines itself after the Marcos
dictatorship, the civilian government exercised firm control over the Armed Forces of
11
David Pion-Berlin, "Authoritarian Legacies and Their Impact on Latin America," Latin
American Politics and Society 47, no. 2 (2005): 160-61.
12
Katherine Hite and Paola Cesarini, "Introducing the Concept of Authoritarian Legacies," in
Authoritarian Legacies and Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe, ed. Katherine
Hite and Paola Cesarini (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 2004), 4.
Christian Davenport, "The Promise of Democratic Pacification: An Empirical Assessment,"
International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 3 (2004): 542.
13
For instance, as a consequence of their subordination to political parties, the militaries in
Colombia and Mexico continue to maintain a presence in the local state and contribute to
growing violence in urban centers and the regions. Anthony Pereira and Diane Davis, "New
Patterns of Militarized Violence and Coercion in the Americas," Latin American Politics and
Society 27, no. 2 (2000): 7.
14
Anthony Pereira cited in Jorge Zaverucha, "Fragile Democracy and the Militarization of
Public Safety in Brazil," Latin American Perspectives 27, no. 3 (2000): 8-10.
15
Marcus Meitzner, "Conflict and Leadership: The Resurgent Political Role of the Military in
Southeast Asia," in The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia: Conflict and
Leadership, ed. Marcus Mietzner (London: Routledge, 2011), 13.
4
the Philippines (AFP) for most of the 1990s and early 2000s prior to a period of weak
oversight in the mid-2000s that cannot be explained by historical legacies.16 Nor does
an authoritarian past readily account for violence generated by elections. Moreover, if
similar kinds of violence might persist regardless of regime type, then does the
explanation lie with the state rather than the regime?
State Weakness
The ability to monopolize the legitimate use of force to the exclusion of other
forces in society is integral to the modern state. Weber defines the modern state as a
political entity with monopoly over the legitimate use of violence and with a
bureaucratic apparatus based on rational-legal authority. 17 He placed particular
emphasis on the monopoly over the principle means of coercion in society as crucial
element of “stateness”.18 Indeed, “Weberian minded comparativists” began labeling
modern national states as “stronger” or “weaker”, according to how well they
approximated the ideal type of centralized and fully rational bureaucracy.19
A key critique of the Weberian perspective is that it depoliticizes the
bureaucracy. In contrast, Anderson observes that the nature of the capitalist state, “in
any final contest”, is to defend the dominant position of capitalist class power.20
Poulantzas argues that the capitalist state is characterized, on one hand, by its relative
16
Aries Arugay, "The Military in Philippine Politics: Still Politicized and Increasingly
Autonomous," in The Political Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia: Conflict and
Leadership, ed. Marcus Mietzner (London: Routledge, 2011), 98-99. See also Eva-Lotta
Hedman, "The Philippines: Not So Military, Not So Civil," in Coercion and Governance: The
Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. Mutiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2001).
17
Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 3-5.
18
Migdal, 18.
19
"Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Bringing the
State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Reuschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 351.
20
Perry Anderson, "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," New Left Review I, no. 100 (1976):
76.
5
autonomy to class interests in that it can exact economic sacrifices from the ruling
elite in the name of national interest—while never truly posing a threat to their
political dominance. Thus, nowhere in the state’s institutions is the relationship
between the dominant and dominated classes clearly defined: “everything takes place
as if the class struggle did not exist”.21
However, Skocpol criticizes the society-centered assumptions in Marxist
writings on the state as failing to recognize that states are not inherently shaped by
classes or class struggles, nor do they function solely to preserve and expand modes
of production. States reinforce the personal authority of state officials but policies
may be demonstrably autonomous from social demands.22 It is essential to move
beyond an uncomplicated Weberian bureaucratic rationality and expose how the state
serves dominant classes in society. However, it is equally important to recognize that
the state is not fully subordinate to societal elites. The concept of state autonomy from
society thus provides an important key to how the literature on states has modeled
state-society relations.
Mann characterizes state autonomy as flowing from the ability of a state to
establish centralized power and project itself across a defined territory. 23 State
autonomy is taken to mean the capacity to intervene in society, on one hand, and the
lack thereof is inferred from society’s ability to interfere with the state. This
conception requires drawing a conceptual line between state and society. Migdal
separates the notion of state from society, observing that the “strong men” of society
may weaken the state by forcing it to seek accommodation with them, or by capturing
21
Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: NLB, 1973), 188.
Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in
Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 14-15.
23
Michael Mann, States, War and Capital (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1988), 30.
22
6
parts of the state entirely.24 The distinction between state and society is useful for
heuristic purposes. Nonetheless, Evans contributes the insight that states may possess
an autonomy embedded in society such that state leaders are sufficiently influenced
by social groups for the state to be developmental rather than predatory—yet
autonomous enough to avoid capture by social forces.25
The extent to which states shape society, or social forces constrain the state,
has been the crux of state strength versus state weakness in the literature. The tenacity
of competing, well-organized social groups implies a weaker state that is less
autonomous from society.26 Migdal argues that states are weak if they are unable to
establish their predominance over networks of local strongmen and other powerful
influences outside the central state, whereas certain social structures with highly
centralized institutions make strong states.27 Weak states with charismatic leaders
may manage social fragmentation by using personal appeal to compensate for the lack
of a coherent political center.28 On the other hand, society may doggedly undermine
attempts at state centralization so as to effectively subvert the state’s aims.29 The
paradox of the weak state is that small social groups may have the ability to confound
even a large army with no lack of instruments for enforcement.30 The binary of state
strength versus weakness thus turns on an axis of state centralization versus social
fragmentation.
24
Migdal, 182.
Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
26
Skocpol, 7.
27
Migdal.
28
Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue, eds., State Power and Social Forces:
Domination and Transformation in the Third World (New York: Cambridge Unviersity Press,
1994), 105.
29
Catherine Boone, "Politically Allocated Land Rights and the Geograpy of Electoral
Violence: The Case of Kenya in the 1990s," Comparative Political Studies 44, no. 10 (2011):
308-9.
30
Migdal, 178.
25
7
Surprisingly, these influential works on state weakness do little to address the
importance of the use of state violence, or the restraint from its use. Weber argued
that while violence is neither the normal nor sole means of the state to govern, the
bond between the state and violence was a particularly intimate one—as Kalyvas
observes. Much of Michel Foucault’s work is based on this insight, in line with
Hannah Arendt’s axiom of the inverse relation between the state and violence.31 In
short, theorization about the modern state and violence is founded on the absence of
the latter.
Yet in the literature about weak states, violence is an important concern. The
forms vary and may include state terror, state-sponsored dirty wars, electoral violence
as well as crime. In Africa, the deployment of violence by state and non-state actors is
a key constraint to state capacity. Jackson and Rosberg argue that states are “not
empirically states” by the Weberian definition, especially due to the lack of monopoly
over legitimate violence.32 Chabal and Daloz maintain that the state’s exercise of
illegitimate violence against its citizens likewise contributes to state weakness
considering that everyday violence in Africa is typically only either private crime or
state violence. Local politicians are patrons in a clientelistic relationship moreover,
and these patrons are licensees of violent state repression.33 Like the Philippines, the
dimension of state capacity that pertains to violence is highly salient. In a way, we
find the opposite problem: the weakness of the Philippine state—particularly in terms
of its inability to control and regulate the use of violence—has become virtually
axiomatic. Why state weakness and defective democracy in the Philippines form a
31
Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006), 218.
32
Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and
the Juridical in Statehood," World Politics 35, no. 1 (1982): 10-12.
33
Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument
(Bloomington, Indiana: The International African Institute, Indiana University Press and
James Currey Oxford, 1999), 78-80.
8
common explanation for political violence requires more careful examination,
however.
The Philippines: Weak State, Flawed Democracy
The failure of democratic consolidation and state weakness are common
explanations for political violence in scholarship on the Philippines. The underlying
argument is that self-interested elites prey upon a weak Philippine state. The key to
controlling state resources at different levels is in winning elections. Thus, the quality
of democracy may be constrained as elites seek to dominate elections, through
varying modes of persuasion and coercion, and thereby deprive voters of meaningful
choice. The biggest rewards are control of resources, policy levers, lucrative state
contracts and other rents at the national level. Hutchcroft, for instance, emphasizes the
rent-seeking
behavior
of
oligarchs
who
have
plundered
the
Philippine
“neopatrimonial” state for particularistic advantage.34
However, central contestation for political power has historically depended on
relationships that link national elites with local ones. How elites are structured and
why reciprocity works is a matter of perspective. In the post-war period, political
relations
structured
by
personal
reciprocity
persisted
amid
greater
party
professionalization. One model of these relations is a set of patron-client relationships
between wealthy provincial “leaders” and local “followers”, with votes flowing
upwards while patronage flows downwards and outwards.35 Lande’s study of the premartial law period in the Philippines argues that political factions were organized
34
Paul Hutchcroft, Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the Philppines (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1998), 8-15.
35
See James Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," The
American Political Science Revew 66, no. 1 (1972): 92. Also Allen Hicken, "Clientelism,"
Annual Review of Political Science 14 (2011): 290-92.
9
around personal affiliations rather than the party system. 36 In contrast, due to
economic changes and the professionalization of politics in the post-war period,
Machado argues that the role of political factions around landed families had eroded
and specialized party machines began to emerge.37 Provinces were important sites of
political power, particularly in a political environment that prioritized elections over
the development of a centralized bureaucracy.38
In 1972, just one year before his second and final term in office would have
ended, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law. Anderson observes that
Marcos became the “supreme cacique” by reversing the traditional flow of power
toward the center, rather than outwards to the local political bosses or caciques at the
periphery.39 Marcos exploited the state and enhanced it as an instrument for plunder
while politicizing the military for social control and counter-insurgency.
40
Dictatorship thus disrupted the arrangements of power linking Manila to the provinces
that had been organized around regular elections since the early twentieth century.
Moreover, the degree to which Marcos centralized the state apparatus, underpinned by
military and police violence, was unprecedented.
Initially, scholars portrayed the ouster of dictatorship in the Philippines as a
process of redemocratization, part of a third wave of democracy sweeping throughout
36
Carl Lande, Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 78. See also his "Political Clientelism,
Developmentalism and Postcolonial Theory," Phlippine Political Science Journal 23, no. 46
(2002).
37
Kit Machado, "From Traditional Faction to Machine: Changing Patterns of Political
Leadership and Organization in the Rural Philippines," Journal of Asian Studies 33, no. 4
(1974).
38
Paul Hutchcroft and Joel Rocamora, "Strong Demands and Weak Institutions: The Origins
and Evolution of the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines," Journal of East Asian Studies 3,
no. 2 (2003): 270.
39
Cacique refers to a local political boss in Latin America; Anderson applied the concept to
analogous leaders in the Philippines.
40
Benedict Anderson, "Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams," New
Left Review I, no. 169 (1988).
10
Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa.41 However, it quickly became evident that
the end of authoritarianism also ushered in the return of oligarchic domination in
electoral politics. The empirical evidence is difficult to refute: as early as the local
elections in 1987, political clans were found to have been integrated into formal party
structures—typically reconstituting and realigning themselves according to the
“administration” party of the incumbent president. 42 These families sought to
transform their electoral offices into lasting political dynasties with a strategy of rent
seeking, typically in the capital, and political violence against opponents in the
provinces.43
Although many deeply entrenched political dynasties survived the transition
into the post-Marcos period, there were new entrants to electoral politics that aspired
to establish their own dynastic rule. Political elites, especially at the local level, were
no longer just the landed, cacique oligarchs of the post-war period. Illicit activities
and protection rackets had become important sources of wealth. Sidel stresses the
heightened importance of coercion, rather than patronage, as a means of amassing
power. Local bosses were constrained from establishing durable political dynasties in
places where the public sector dwarfs private wealth, so they tended to rely more on
crime and violence.44 Winters observes that the dictatorship also disrupted intra-elite
41
Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century
(Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1991). Also "Democracy's Third Wave," Journal of
Democracy, no. Spring (1991). On the end of the third wave, see Marc Plattner, "The End of
the Transitions Era?," Journal of Democracy 25, no. 3 (2014).
42
Eric Gutierrez, Ildefonso Torrente, and Noli Narca, All in the Family: A Study of Elites and
Power Relations in the Philippines (Diliman, Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy,
1992), 13-15. Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 276.
43
Alfred McCoy, "An Anarchy of Families: The Historiography of State and Family in the
Philippines," in An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines, ed. Alfred
McCoy (Wisconsin: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison,
1993), 20-22; 24.
44
John Sidel, Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 1999), 19, 50.
11
arrangements of oligarchic rotation, which had played an important role in
moderating the use of political violence.45
Thus, a “strong society, weak state thesis” informs much of the scholarship on
the Philippines. Kuhonta, in a review of literature on the state in Southeast Asia,
described the Philippines as being weak: it was on the “low end” in terms of state
capacity for development.46 In a comparative study of state formation in Southeast
Asia, Slater argued that the Philippines—unlike Singapore or Malaysia, which
developed strong authoritarian leviathans as a result of elite coalitions against a
communist threat—followed a pathway of fragmentation. Arrangements linking the
state and social elites remained highly factionalized and power flowed from powerful
societal actors to the state. Even under centralist, authoritarian rule, Marcos received
only tepid social support from elites and so he ruled through intimidation rather than
institutions.47 Weak elite support during Marcos’s martial law regime, resulted in
weak institutions—authoritarianism without leviathan, according to Slater.
Rather than state weakness however, Sidel argues that local bossism signifies
the Philippine state’s “strength”. Sidel claims that by Migdal’s definition, local bosses
in the Philippines had the capability of strong states to penetrate society—as a
pronounced ‘predatory’ rather than ‘developmental’ strong state, however. 48 He
describes bosses as “predatory power brokers” who control both coercive and
45
Jeffrey Winters, Oligarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 137-39; 206.
Kuhonta made a comparison with Thailand and Indonesia, adapting Hutchcroft’s
characterization of the Philippines as a neopatrimonial oligarchic state, particularly
manifested in the crony capitalism prevalent during the Marcos dictatorship. Erik Kuhonta,
"Studying States in Southeast Asia," in Southeast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region
and Qualitative Analysis, ed. Erik Kuhonta, Dan Slater, and Tuong Vu (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2008), 51.
47
Dan Slater, Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in
Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 97-104, 67.
48
Sidel, 146. See also Migdal, 4.
46
12
economic resources within their bailiwicks.49 Rather than the common portrayal of a
fragmented society imposing its will upon a weak state, Sidel sees bossism as an
“interlocking, multitiered directorate” of bosses that exploits its control over the state
apparatus for particularistic gain. In stark contrast to Migdal and others, his study
emphasizes the ability of local bosses qua state leaders to direct and penetrate society.
In reference to Evans, Sidel argues that while the Philippine state appears relatively
weak due to its failures as a developmental state, it is a muscular predatory state—
prior to, and after the Marcos dictatorship—that plunders the country’s resources
“without more regard for the welfare of the citizenry than a predator has for the
welfare of its prey.” 50
Although Sidel evokes Evans’s idea of predation, he conflates bosses’
predation on the state apparatus and predation by bosses, as state agents, on society. In
either case, Evans was ambivalent on whether predatory states could be qualified as
either “strong” or “weak”: they may be strong with despotic or infrastructural power
but weak, if strength is defined by the state’s capability of transforming the economy
and social structure.51 Sidel therefore inadvertently lends support to the insight that
strongmen qua society have captured parts of the weak state apparatus.
Abinales demonstrates the analytical value of state weakness by asking a
crucial question: how does a weak state govern? He suggests that capacity is not
determined by the state’s ability to dominate society but instead influence it,
providing both a focus for politics where institutions are hollow and a middle ground
with other centers of power.52 A weak state governs through mutual accommodation
with local strongmen. Indeed, as Hagopian found, traditional clientelism can morph
49
Ibid.,John Sidel 19.
Ibid. 146.
51
Evans, 45-47.
52
Patricio Abinales, Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the
Philippine Nation-State (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000), 181-83.
50
13
from a personal arrangement to a state-based system in which local political bosses
serve as the mediators between the state and citizens.53
In sum, the scholarship on the Philippines underscores the futility of
conceptualizing either democracy or the state in normative, idealized terms. Elections
are manipulated to the advantage of an entrenched elite. There is little that constrains
incumbents and challengers from deploying all sorts of underhanded and even
criminal strategies, including violence, in order to win elections. However, theorizing
why political violence has surged in the post-authoritarian period is focused mainly
on electoral violence and struggles over public office. This does not extend to an
explanation for a period of ruthless state violence against activists and civilians that
intensified in the mid-2000s throughout the country.
Why does political violence occur in the Philippines during the post-Marcos,
democratic period? Violence persists in Philippine politics due to a weak state’s
accommodation with society. Moreover, elites seek to win elections in order to access
policy-making, lucrative state contracts and other rents. The weakness of the
Philippine state encourages plunder rather than developmentalism. Moreover, because
the Philippine state is developmentally weak, elites use the state security apparatuses
for predation and to maintain their political power. In this, the state can manifest a
capacity for addressing threats, being selectively repressive while remaining
democratic in other respects.
53
Frances Hagopian, "Traditional Politics against State Formation in Brazil," ed. Joel Migdal,
Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue, State power and social forces: domination and
transformation in the Third World (New York: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1994). 45-47.
14
Violent Repression without Authoritarian Reversal
In 1986, hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets of Manila and
other cities, precipitating the collapse of the Marcos dictatorship. Corazon Aquino,
who was widely believed to have won a snap election against Marcos, was
subsequently installed into office as the country’s new president. A key democratic
reform, the 1987 constitution imposes a limit of a single six-year term to the president
without the possibility of re-election. National and local elections have proceeded
regularly since then. In 2001, however, a second uprising unseated the popularly
elected President Joseph Estrada after the failure of a senate impeachment process for
corruption. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, then vice-president, assumed Estrada’s office
and completed his term. Unprecedented in the post-Marcos period, she ran for a
second term in 2004 as an incumbent president and won. However, a recorded phone
call between Arroyo and Commission on Elections (COMELEC) official Virgilio
Garcillano allegedly to alter the count, was made public in June 2005.54 Opposition
politicians sought to impeach Arroyo but her allies defeated each attempt in Congress.
She remained in office until the end of her term in 2010.
Plagued by challenges to her electoral legitimacy, Arroyo’s time in office was
distinguished by political violence, coercion and repression. 55 For instance, the
Arroyo government revived a 1985 law under Marcos that imposed a strict “no
permit, no rally” rule in 2005.56 The Human Security Act of 2007, more popularly
known as the “Anti-Terrorism” law, rolled back protections from indefinite detention,
54
This became known as the “Hello, Garci” recording, for what Arroyo says to Garcillano in
greeting. Arroyo, in an apology, verified its authenticity but denied any wrongdoing. Bobby
Tuazon, ed. Fraud: Gloria M. Arroyo and the May 2004 Elections (Diliman, Quezon City:
Center for People Empowerment in Governance, 2006).
55
Nathan Quimpo, "The Philippines: Predatory Regime, Growing Authoritarian Features,"
The Pacific Review 22, no. 3 (2009): 347-8.
56
Alexander Remollino, "GMA Creating 'De Facto' Dictatorship--Ex-PCGG Commissioner,"
Bulatlat.com V, no. 34 October 2-8, 2005, http://www.bulatlat.com/news/5-34/5-34defacto.htm.
15
allowed warrantless arrests with limited judicial control as well as discouraged
legitimate acts of protest.57
State violence was higher during Arroyo’s long incumbency than that of any
other post-Marcos leader, until Duterte became president. 58 The United Nations,
NGOs and independent investigations attribute the sharp rise in extrajudicial killings
under Arroyo’s government, particularly in the years 2005 and 2006, to the military
Operation Bantay Laya (Freedom Watch, widely abbreviated as OBL) against the
communist insurgency.59 The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its
armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), were founded in the early years of the
Marcos government in 1968 and 1969, respectively. The rebellion persists today as
one of the longest running Communist insurgencies in the world. The government’s
preoccupation with counterinsurgency in the Muslim south throughout most of the
1990s created room for the NPA to grow, reinvigorating conflict in 2001.60 In 1992, at
the urging of President Fidel Ramos, Congress repealed a law that made the CPP
illegal and membership in it a crime. Leftist political parties associated with the CPP
subsequently emerged—a radical but legally legitimate Left that contested elections
and engaged in political organization.
57
"Philippines: Summary Prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, in Accordance with Paragraph 15(C) of the Annex to Human Rights Council
Resolution 5/1," (Human Rights Council Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review,
2008), 10.
58
Karapatan (Alliance for the Advancement of People's Rights), "2012 Karapatan Year-End
Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines," (Quezon City: Karapatan, 2012).
59
"2010 Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines," (Diliman,
Quezon City: Karapatan, 2011), 16. See also Al Parreño, "Report on the Philippine ExtraJudicial Killings, 2001 to 2010," (Manila: Supreme Court of the Philippines, Asia
Foundation, 2011), 13-14. Peter Sales, "State Terror in the Philippines: The Alston Report,
Human Rights and Counter-Insurgency under the Arroyo Administration," Contemporary
Politics 15, no. 3 (2009).
60
ICG, "The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks," in Asia Report
No. 202 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2011), 3-4; 8.
16
Rather than armed insurgents however, the military targeted civilians in a bid
to undermine the NPA nationally and locally.61 An estimated three out of ten victims
of alleged summary executions were officers or members of leftist party-lists like
Bayan Muna.62 Party-lists are political parties formed from marginalized sectors (e.g.
women, workers, peasants), voted upon nationally constituting 20 percent of all seats
in Congress with a maximum of three seats per party-list.63 The party-list system was
designed as a post-authoritarian electoral reform to include single-issue constituencies
of under-represented groups. In 2001, Bayan Muna unexpectedly topped the vote with
26 percent of the 5.06 million votes cast for the party-list system.64 Consequently, the
military designated groups like Bayan Muna as a communist threat. The government
surmised that the leftist groups were a front for propaganda, recruitment and fundraising for the armed insurgency.65 The NPA in turn, they reasoned, helped candidates
on the radical left get elected.
Yet leftists groups may not have been targeted because they were a security
threat but rather because they were a political one. Once represented in Congress, the
radical left was part of the bothersome opposition.66 Moreover, members of Bayan
61
Jose Melo, "Independent Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings Created
under Administrative Order No.157 (S. 2006) Report," in Stop the Killings, Abductions, and
Involuntary or Enforced Disappearances in the Philippines (Quezon City: IBON Foundation,
Inc., 2007), 202-03. A subsequent investigation conducted by the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, lent credence to these
findings.
62
Parreño, 5.
63
How many seats per party list is proportional to their vote share, and the actual
representatives follow an ordered list of up to five candidates registered in the election.
64
Felix Muga, "How Seat Allocation Formulas Disenfranchise Millions of Voters," ed.
Bobby Tuazon, 12 years of the Party List System: Marginalizing People's Representation
(Quezon City: Center for People Empowerment in Governance, 2011). 89.
65
"The Strategic and Tactical Activities of CPP-NPA-NDF in the White Areas," (Knowledge
Management Division, Office of the Presidential Adviser for Special Concerns, 2003), 74-80.
66
See Julius Mariveles, "The Pawn in the Queen's Gambit? Palparan and the CounterInsurgency Game Plan," Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism August 12, 2014,
http://pcij.org/blog/2014/08/12/the-pawn-in-the-queens-gambit.
17
Muna and other leftwing party-lists also ran for local office under traditional parties.67
Left-wing politicians were vertically involved in national politics and horizontally
situated in towns and villages throughout the country, a formidable political force for
mobilizing votes. In response, Arroyo reversed the trend towards drawing the
communists into mainstream politics. The policy was ultimately incompatible with
growing conservative fears, sparked by the left’s electoral success.68
Not all the violence was a consequence of the overlap between the military’s
anti-communist, “dirty war” and electoral politics. A number of agrarian reformrelated killings of farmers and peasant organizers were unconnected to
counterinsurgency.69 For instance, local units of the Philippine National Police (PNP),
the military and local government authorities were involved in protecting landowners
and their interests.70 Motives behind the assassinations of elected officials, judges,
lawyers and journalists were likewise a blend of the political and the personal.
Nonetheless, as long as the violence was mainly trained on the radical left and outside
Manila, the violence could be considered an aberration to democratic political values
that otherwise were ostensibly still in effect.71
Over a two-year period from 2007 to 2009, the democratic institutions
reasserted constraints on the military and government. Pressure from nongovernmental groups, the Supreme Court and the investigation of an independent
commission into the violence culminated in a visit from the United Nations expert on
67
Nathan Quimpo, Contested Democracy and the Left in the Philippines after Marcos
(Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2012), 150.
68
Amado Doronila, "GMA's Hardline Policy vs Reds Will Crush Her," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, June 19, 2006.
69
Melo, 202.
70
Jennifer Franco and Patricio Abinales, "Again, They're Killing Peasants in the Philippines Lawlessness, Murder and Impunity," Critical Asian Studies 39, no. 2 (2007): 322. See also
Parreño, 17.
71
Vincent Boudreau, "Elections, Repession and Authoritarian Survival in Post-Transition
Indonesia and the Philippines," The Pacific Review 22, no. 2 (2009).
18
extra-judicial killings Philip Alston in February 2007. On September 25, 2007, the
Supreme Court promulgated the writ of amparo as a legal remedy to extrajudicial
killing and forced disappearances. The writ could be filed in court at no cost to the
petitioner and requires a summary hearing within a week of filing. The court is
allowed to issue a temporary protection order to the petitioner. Moreover,
respondents—whether government officials or private persons—are required to
respond within 72 hours.72 Families of victims were also given the right to access
information pertaining to their cases in a writ of habeas data, common in Latin
America. Ultimately, it would not be enough for state authorities or agents to simply
deny that they have custody of the victims, as they had in the past when responding to
the writ of habeas corpus.73 Violence against activists rapidly de-escalated in 2007.
Karapatan estimated that from 185 extrajudicial killings in 2005 and 220 in 2006
nationally, the figure dropped to 94 killed in 2007.74
In response to the outcry over the violence, new legislation and administrative
measures were instituted to increase protection and remedies available to victims of
violent human rights abuses. For instance, Congress passed a law explicitly defining
torture in 2009. Under the subsequent presidency of Benigno Aquino, the level of
violence continued to decline with around 55 extrajudicial killings annually on
average, nationally, from 2010 to 2016, compared to the 127 annual average from
72
"In the Know: Writ of Amparo," Philippine Daily Inquirer July 14, 2017,
https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/913827/in-the-know-writ-of-amparo. In November 2007, the
first cases to successfully apply the writ of amparo included that of Luicito Bustamante, a
young farmer who had been picked up at a Davao City checkpoint, held and tortured by the
military on suspicion that he was a communist rebel. TJ Burgonio, "Davao Farmer Walks
Home to Freedom on Amparo," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 17, 2007.
73
Jocelyn Uy, "Puno Says SC to Use Writ of 'Amparo'," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August
18, 2007.
74
"2008 Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines," (Quezon City:
Karapatan, 2008), 11.
19
2001 to 2010 during Arroyo’s terms in office.75 He issued an administrative order in
2012 on extra-legal killings as the basis for an inter-agency committee that expedited
the resolution of certain human rights violation cases, including politically-motivated
killings of members of “cause-oriented organizations”, activists and journalists.
Congress also passed a new law on forced disappearance the same year.
Strategic and Particularistic Interests, Central and Local Capacities
Why does political violence occur in democracies? The literature suggests that
weak states with unconsolidated democracies, such as the Philippines, will be prone
to violence. The underlying argument laid out above is that self-interested elites prey
upon a weak state. The key to controlling state resources at different levels is in
winning elections. Thus, the quality of democracy may be constrained as elites seek to
dominate elections and deprive voters of meaningful choice. Incumbents and
challengers deploy a range of strategies to win, including violence.
What is insufficient in these explanations? They do well in explaining
electoral violence but are largely silent on other forms of political violence, including
that related to counter-insurgency efforts and a range of local protection rackets. As
such, they encourage an analytical bifurcation between elections and other forms of
organized coercion. To put it another way, the overlap between electoral violence and
state violence is often overlooked. For instance, counter-insurgency violence is in fact
often another facet of regime building. In many regions, counter-insurgency strategies
strongly influence the processes of setting the rules (particularly with regard to the
legal opposition), cementing political coalitions and securing local power beyond the
75
"2016 Karapatan Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines,"
(Quezon City: Karapatan, 2016), 23. See also Karapatan (Alliance for the Advancement of
People's Rights), "2010 Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines,"
16-17.
20
limited period of elections. In the post-Marcos democratic period moreover, state
violence tends to be seen as an aberration in the face of democratic norms and
institutions that continue to operate, particularly in the capital. I address such
shortcomings by examining the relationship between central and local political actors
involved in political violence. I provide evidence that political violence is not
primarily locally-driven, as conventionally thought. Central actors and national
institutions play a critical role in escalating violence or, at times, forcing deescalation. Opting to look at political violence in a broad sense, encompassing
categories that are elsewhere treated as mutually exclusive, makes this study
innovative.
I argue that interests, married with capacity, can result in political violence. In
this dissertation, I accept the main explanation in the literature that a weak state and
flawed democracy fosters the persistence of political violence in a country like the
Philippines. However, this broad explanation does not account for why some periods
were more violent than others in the post-Marcos period, particularly in the mid2000s. The corrective presented here is the recognition of the overlap and interrelationship between political violence related to elections and state violence. Why
violence is used, when it starts, and why it ends is contingent upon central-local
dynamics. Central-local dynamics refer to the interaction and resolution of strategic
and particularistic interests, enabled by the capacity of national and local political
actors to use violence unilaterally, cooperatively or as antagonists.
In the face of social fragmentation and the proliferation of powerful actors
outside the state’s control, accommodation allows an infrastructurally weak state to
govern as Abinales contends. However, I argue that a state’s strategic interest is still
to exercise hegemony over competing coercive forces such as armed political clans
21
and insurgents in society. Primacy does not preclude accommodation. Unlike
Abinales, I posit that accommodation need not be mutual and will more than likely be
asymmetrically favorable to one side. The approach toward insurgency will be more
unequivocally statist: the strategic interest is to end an insurgency through a political
or a military solution.
The conceptual opposite is the particularistic interests of political actors, who
aim to augment or deploy coercive resources—the state and their own—for
individual, personal motives. These interests can be reasoned from specific threats to
specific political actors. Such threats include direct electoral challenges and other
risks to desired electoral outcomes. Particularistic interests also form over any
endangerment of access to predation of state or illicit wealth normally secured
through political office, including policies of redistribution, exposure of corruption,
violent intimidation and harassment.76
However, competing interests are resolved and decisions to use violence,
where, when, how and against whom, are made by political actors who are centrally
and locally situated. Kalyvas contends that central and local actors “jointly produce”
political violence. Central elites seeking local advantage mobilize local actors seeking
to settle private scores.77 These microfoundations of political violence aligned with
national cleavages is only one possibility, however. I argue that other relationships
between central and local actors are possible. Rather than coinciding, competing
interests may pit central and local actors against each other. Central and local actors
might also act independently of each other. Also contrary to Kalyvas, I argue that
“local” should not be equated with the personal (nor “central” with “political”).
76
The idea of threats to particularistic interests here is similar to Winter’s conceptualization
of oligarchy as the politics of wealth defense against such threats to elite property. Winters, 7;
20-26.
77
Stathis Kalyvas, "The Ontology of Political Violence," Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 3
(2003): 476; 83-6.
22
Centrality and locality are the antipodes that denote both hierarchy as well as the
uneven dispersion of capacity—i.e. power and resources—from the center to the
periphery.
The literature on Philippine politics connects central political actors with local
ones through what Abinales calls “web-like” national elites and local strongmen or
what Sidel terms an interlocking, multi-tiered “directorate” of political bosses that are
activated, machine-like, for elections and for the flow of patronage.78 I argue that the
use of violence may also activate other, non-electoral relationships between different
central and local actors. In an irregular war such as the protracted communist
insurgency in the Philippines, centrally located political actors connect with local
ones over the contest for control of territory and population.79 Local commands of the
military may assert authority over civilian governing structures, for instance. 80
Central-local interactions may thus be independent of existing arrangements around
elections and patronage.
Political violence can be considered in a broad sense as “any form of
organized violence carried out by political actors” including government forces,
politicians’ private armed groups (often including military or police), insurgents,
among others. In a weak state with an unconsolidated democracy, violence is a form
of politics. Rather than being something anomalous, it is prosaic.81 Central-local
dynamics can therefore explain patterns of political violence. Threats to the state or to
political actors’ personal interests may motivate aggressors to aim violence against
specific targets. Interests marry with the capacity of central and local actors to carry
78
See, for instance, Gutierrez, Torrente, and Narca, 11-13.
See Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 364-65.
80
Rosalie Arcala Hall, "Politics in the Frontline: Local Civil-Military Interactions in
Communist Counterinsurgency Operations in the Philippines," Phlippine Political Science
Journal 27, no. 59 (2006): 18-22.
81
Meredith Weiss, Edward Newman, and Itty Abraham, eds., Political Violence in South and
Southeast Asia: Critical Perspectives (New York: UNU University Press, 2010), 11-12.
79
23
out violence. Specific dynamics sustain violence at a high intensity for over a
relatively long period. The onset and termination of political violence is a crucial
empirical observation from which capacity for violence can be inferred. 82 For
instance, violence that is sustained over a significant period of time may be suddenly
halted from above or below. Who does the halting, for what reasons, can tell us whose
dispensation allowed the violence to remain unchecked until it was finally restrained.
The basic relationship between democracy and political violence is that of
constraint. Constraint on the capacity of local and central actors for violence
distinguishes a democratic regime from an authoritarian one. In addition to regular
and competitive elections, there are three key limits: first, vertical accountability to
the electorate, whether directly or indirectly; second, horizontal accountability of
officeholders to one another; and, third, protection of political and civic pluralism so
that contending interests and values may be expressed.83 Constraints are not activated
automatically: political actors must invoke them. In an unconsolidated democracy,
constraints will not always be effective—and even when they are, the effects may be
temporary.
This study identifies four distinct patterns of political violence: (1) electionrelated violence, driven by particularistic interests and mobilizing local capacity for
violence that builds up and peaks at regular intervals during election seasons; (2)
insurgency-related violence, mainly strategic in aim and typically centrally-directed,
peaking at periods corresponding to national counter-insurgency campaigns or in
response to local security threats; (3) wealth control-related violence, driven by
particularistic interests in elite wealth defense and control over valuable assets; and,
82
This proposition is informed by Conley’s insight that the ending of violence does not imply
the successful attainment of its object; rather, onsets and terminations may be contingent on
political actors’ capacities for violence. Bridget Conley-Zilkic, ed. How Mass Atrocities End
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 11; 17-25.
83
Adapted from Diamond, 11-12.
24
(4) social control-related violence, mainly locally-led, with the strategic aim of
regulating society through intimidation and lethal force against alleged petty
criminals, who are painted with a broad brush as “social ills” and even as enemies of
the state.
While central-local dynamics in this framework may not predict increases or
decreases in the level of violence over a period of time, they do explain the onset of
violence, the maintenance of its intensity, escalation and de-escalation, and even its
cessation. One of my key findings is that the convergence of political actors’
particularistic interests and the state’s strategic interests to mobilize central capacity
produces violence of the greatest magnitude sustained over the longest period of time.
This finding might seem obvious taken out of context but it is counter-intuitive
considering the scholarly literature on the Philippines, which has emphasized the
putative weakness of the Philippine state. When particularistic motives and strategic
aims diverge, central actors have the means to mobilize an array of resources,
including the capacity for violence, against antagonistic local actors. In a contest
between the center and periphery, the center is likely to prevail. Moreover, in contrast
to the focus on the country’s “defective” democracy and resurgence of electoral
violence since the fall of the Marcos dictatorship, I have found that democratic
constraints inhibit violence. For instance, term limits for elected officials and
institutional checks by independent bodies like the Commission on Human Rights
have restrained political actors’ capacities for violence—albeit with temporary and
tenuous effect.
From the Periphery, to the Center
I seek to explain patterns of political violence from 2001 to 2016 in the
Philippines. A decade earlier, Philippine democracy was considered flawed but
25
reasonably consolidated.84 The political turbulence of Joseph Estrada’s ouster in 2001
and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s electoral fraud scandal suggested otherwise and
signaled possible democratic deconsolidation. Yet after violence intensified in 2005
and 2006, it declined considerably and remained low during the presidency of
Benigno Aquino. Data collection in this study ends with Aquino’s term of office on
June 30, 2016. Why did violence intensify then before sharply declining and
remaining low? That is the empirical question pursued in this research. Drawing
implications for the new scale of violence in the early period of the Duterte
government is the subject of the concluding chapter.
Most accounts by scholars, the media and activists perceived elections and
counter-insurgency as separate causes for heightened political violence. Leftists posed
a security threat to the state and a political threat to the conservative elite. However,
that explanation did not account for violence against other groups at the same time:
judges, lawyers, local politicians, and other civilians that were not affiliated with any
political organization. It was also unclear how this violence against civilians affected
military operations against armed insurgents, and vice versa. Ultimately, these
explanations failed to recognize the importance of the overlaps between electoral
politics and insurgency—as well as other distinct patterns that are neither—as key to
understanding patterns of political violence.
I collated national-level data from available sources on the presence of nonstate armed groups: private armed groups and insurgent guerrilla fronts. I concentrate
on four areas: (1) Northern Luzon, consisting of the Ilocos, Cordillera and Cagayan
Valley regions; (2) Central Luzon; (3) Eastern Visayas; and, (4) the Davao region in
Southern Mindanao. These are regions where the number of private armed groups
84
See, for instance, Mark Thompson, "Off the Endangered List: Philippine Democratization
in Comparative Perspective," Comparative Politics 28, no. 2 (1996): 197-98.
26
maintained by local politicians has an inverse relationship to the presence of
communist fronts therein (see Appendix 1). The regions in Northern Luzon had a high
number of private armed groups but few communist insurgent fronts. Eastern Visayas
had a few private armies under local politicians but a considerable number of NPA
guerilla fronts. Central Luzon was low on private armies but high on insurgent
groups. Southern Mindanao had no recorded private armies but had as many as 11
guerrilla fronts. The Northern Luzon and Central Luzon have similar voter
populations, as do Eastern Visayas and Southern Mindanao. The regions represent a
fair geographic spread across the country. Finally, the communist insurgency is the
only rebellion with a significant, active presence in these areas.
Figure 1. Political Violence from 2001 to 2016, by Region
800
Insurgencyrelated
700
600
Electionsrelated
500
400
Wealth
control-related
300
Social controlrelated
200
100
Unknown
0
Northern LuzonEastern Visayas Central Luzon
Southern
Mindanao
Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly
disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 2 for frequency distribution table
My preliminary research on available datasets revealed that organizations
tended to specialize in tracking specific types of violence. For example, the
27
Commission on Human Rights had rich documentation of rights violations like
extrajudicial killings, forced disappearance and torture, particularly complaints
against the military and police. However, it had little to no records on killings or
abductions committed during election cycles or against local politicians. Newspapers,
on the other hand, cover killings, attempted killings and violence around local
politics, but typically only the more sensational cases.85 Non-government sources tend
to have a precise focus. The NGO Karapatan reflects data on leftist activists and
community organizers. The Center for Media Rights and Freedom collects data on
journalists killed for reasons related to their profession. In order to understand
political violence comprehensively, I constructed an original database from these
sources.
I included cases of violence in the dataset if either the targets or the
perpetrators of violence were known or suspected to be political actors. These include
activists, insurgents, journalists, holders of public office or politicians, soldiers and
paramilitary members, police officers, and members of private armed groups. From
1,093 incidents of violence, 1,890 individuals were affected: most were killed (87
percent) or survived an attempt (4 percent); some were forcibly disappeared (6
percent); the rest were subjected to rape or torture (3 percent) (See Appendix 3).
Looking at Figure 1 above, Southern Mindanao experienced the highest magnitude of
violence, followed by Central Luzon. The total number of individuals affected was
lowest in Eastern Visayas, with 323 people, followed by Northern Luzon with 327,
Central Luzon with 541 and Southern Mindanao with 699. However, if we express
this count per 100,000 voting population, Southern Mindanao (26) was the most
85
For newspaper sources, I conducted a daily search of the Philippine Daily Inquirer print
and online archives, supplemented by online archives of the Philippine Star, Bulatlat,
Rappler, GMA news and regional news outlet Sun Star.
28
violent, followed by Eastern Visayas (12), Central Luzon (9) and Northern Luzon (6)
(See Figure 2). 86
Figure 2. Political Violence from 2001 to 2016,
Number of Affected Individuals per 100,000 Voters in each Region
86
Voter populations are as follows: Northern Luzon regions has 5.78 million; Central Luzon
has 6.05 million; Eastern Visayas has 2.70 million; and, Southern Mindanao has 2.66 million.
"Philippine 2016 Voters Profile by Province and City/Municipality," ed. Commission on
Elections (Philippines2016).
29
I evaluated each incident to determine whether the violence was related to
insurgency, elections or some other dynamic. Insurgency-related incidents were
typically part of a broad military campaign or operation. Election-related incidents
included violence during election cycles (filing of candidacy, campaign, polls, and
post-poll counting) or outside these periods, if the object of the violence was the
elimination of political rivals or undermining support for them. Insurgency and
elections account for most of the violence in the four regional areas, overall (73
percent) while other patterns make up 25 percent and the number of victims in
incidents that couldn’t be clearly classified—a category labeled “unknown”—
comprises 2.28 percent of the violence. 87 While insurgency-related violence and
electoral violence are prevalent in all regions, violence related to the control of wealth
(natural resources, productive assets, etc.) is significant in Central Luzon (10.7
percent). Moreover, social control-related violence is substantial in Southern
Mindanao (32.5 percent) and, to a smaller extent, in Central Luzon (14 percent). The
numbers presented here are indicative of broad patterns and should not be understood
as absolute counts.
Dissertation Structure
Why does political violence occur in democracies like the Philippines, long
after democracy should have been consolidated? Democracy is “flawed” if compared
to an ideal type, but that is a limited and circular argument. Others would argue that
violence must be a legacy of authoritarian rule yet this does not account for periods of
relatively low violence. Another explanation is that the state is weak and does not
87
Calculations based on data presented in Appendix 2.
30
have the capacity to monopolize the use of violence. Disagreeing with scholarly
consensus on the weakness of the Philippine state, Sidel argues that the Philippines is
developmentally weak but strong because local political actors are powerful—as
predators are to their prey. However, my research shows that the Philippine state has
shown some significant capacity for addressing insurgency and dislodging entrenched
local “strongmen” and political “bosses” from their bailiwicks. I argue that even if the
Philippine state is developmentally weak and unable to monopolize the use of force, it
regulates the use of political violence and thereby achieves some of its statist aims. At
the same time, the state is constrained by particularistic interests by political actors
both at the central and local level. For this reason, this dissertation explains political
violence that results from such central-local dynamics.
Four distinct patterns of political violence can be discerned. Elections create
particularistic interests to win or maintain local elected office and mobilize local
capacity for violence. Violence waxes and wanes according to election cycles every
three years. It scales up just prior to the filing of candidacy, is sustained during
campaign period, peaks during the polls, and falls shortly afterwards with episodic
violence until the next election. Intra-elite moderation of electoral violence was
typified by politicians’ games of “gods and monsters” in Northern Luzon. Deescalation is usually locally-led but political violence can be stamped out through a
centrally-led dislodgement of local strongmen. It took a falling out with the president
to extricate powerful, long entrenched dynasts—as in the cases of Abra governor
Vicente Valera and Nueva Ecija governor Thomas Joson. A strong central
government is required to dismantle private armies and the Philippine state has
demonstrated its capacity to do so, albeit selectively and according to the
particularistic interests of national elites.
31
Insurgency activates strategic interests of the state and the capacity for
violence is spread outwards, from the center, in accordance with the distribution of
security forces. Political violence can be sustained and escalated—in response mainly
to insurgency—and diffused across local municipal or provincial borders. Centrally
coordinated, violence can be de-escalated in response to institutional checks. This was
exemplified in the reassignment of General Jovito Palparan from Eastern Visayas to
Central Luzon due to his extrajudicial excesses, which eventually resulted in his
conviction over one case many years later. Violence also ends when military
objectives are achieved such as routing of armed communists from Leyte and most of
Samar island, before their final defeat in Northern Samar.
Particularistic interests, such as the control and extraction of wealth like land
and minerals, converge with statist aims, such as counter-insurgency. This motivates
central and local actors to cooperate and jointly produce violence. In the defense of
wealth, an analysis of military deployment against Hacienda Luisita strikers and
activists yields important insight. Similarly, military mobilization in the defense of
mining interests in Southern Mindanao, as well as in Northern Luzon, exemplify the
use of violence for wealth control. Such violence is episodic—escalated or deescalated according to the exigencies of the situation, in response to activism and
resistance, for instance, rather than for counter-insurgency aims. The violence is also
localized, occurring where the stakes are high—as in the agricultural lands of Central
Luzon, rather than in Eastern Visayas.
Violence against social ills (such as drugs, criminality, gambling and other
vices) presents an unusual pattern of violence. Apart from the cases covered in this
research in Davao City, Tagum City and the Red Vigilante Group in Gapan, there are
very few other well known cases: Metro Manila under the mayorship Alfredo Lim in
32
the late 1980s and 1990s and the anti-crime campaign of Mayor Tommy Osmeña in
Cebu City. Statist interests in regulating crime coincided with local capacity for
violence. Central support enabled violence to scale up and sustain intensity over
years. For instance, President Gloria Arroyo’s anti-drugs rhetoric and endorsement of
Davao City mayor Rodrigo Duterte’s methods prompted an escalation of violence in
the Southern Mindanao city and sustained the violence over a decade. When the
interests of Arroyo and Duterte diverged, democratic institutions and central control
over the military almost enabled Arroyo to dislodge Duterte. However, she failed and
Duterte survived—although barely. The cases of the Tagum Death Squad and Red
Vigilante Group show that when interests diverge and capacities are antagonistic, the
center still generally wins.
After this introductory chapter, the subsequent chapters are organized by
regional group (Northern Luzon, Eastern Visayas, Central Luzon and Southern
Mindanao), followed by a concluding chapter. Each chapter discusses the centrallocal dynamics of insurgency-related violence, election-related violence and other
forms of political violence experienced in the region, explaining the immediate causes
of onset, escalation, de-escalation, termination of violence. The final chapter
summarizes key findings and discusses the so-called national War on Drugs in the
Philippines that officially began with President Duterte’s term in July 2016.
33
Chapter 2. Northern Luzon’s Bloody Contests
In Northern Luzon, the overall level of violence from 2001 to 2016 was low
compared to the other regions in this study. Unlike other regions furthermore,
elections have been the occasion for nearly as much violence as counter-insurgency.
Of greater importance, in Northern Luzon there was a pronounced overlap between
insurgency and local politics. Most cases of political assassinations were at the town
and village level, typically proxy killings for their leaders at upper levels of the
political hierarchy.
Map 1. Northern Luzon Regions and their Provinces
The northern part of Luzon (referred to as Northern Luzon in this study)
includes the provinces of three administrative regions: Ilocos Region, composed of
34
the provinces Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union and Pangasinan; Cagayan Valley
Region, comprised of the provinces Batanes, Cagayan, Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya and
Quirino; and, the Cordillera Autonomous Region, composed of the provinces Abra,
Apayao, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga and Mountain Province (see Map 1).
This chapter explores the central-local dynamics of two main patterns of
political violence: (1) local electoral violence, including the centrally led expulsion of
a local strongman; (2) counter-insurgency and the subduing of security threats. In
each of these patterns, the interests of central political actors were the deciding factor
in managing the level of violence, for how long it was sustained and how it ended.
Figure 3. Pattern of Election-related Violence in Northern Luzon
45
40
35
Other patterns of
violence
30
25
20
Election-related
15
Election year
10
5
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
0
Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly
disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 6 for frequency distribution table
Across the Philippines, in the seven decades since independence, 55 political
families have had uninterrupted control of an elective post for between twenty and
forty years. Seven of the ten most durable politics dynasties have been located in
Northern Luzon: the Abadillas clan in Ilocos Norte, the Albanos in Isabela, the
Ortegas in La Union, the Gironellas in Ilocos Sur, the Mambas and Vargases in
35
Cagayan, and the Purisimas in Ilocos Sur.88 Incumbency and dynastic dominance
often choke off competition to the point that a powerful politician can run unopposed,
and when that happens only one vote is required for him or her to be declared the
victor.89 Nevertheless, electoral politics produced regular violence every three years,
although the scale of the violence diminished after the 2010 elections (see Figure 3
above).
Figure 4. Pattern of Insurgency-related Violence in Northern Luzon
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
Other patterns of violence
10
Insurgency-related
5
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
0
Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly
disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 6 for frequency distribution table
Insurgency-related violence in Northern Luzon, as in most of the country, was
most intense during the years 2005 and 2006. As in Central Luzon, however, leftist
activists were lethally targeted even before the scale of such violence heightened and
became prevalent nationally. Insurgency violence tended to diminish during election
years, although insurgents were involved in the assassination of a number of local
88
Karen Tiongson-Mayrina, "55 Political Families Have Unbreakable Hold on Power, One
Clan for 43 Years," GMA News Online July 5, 2013,
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/316096/news/specialreports/55-political-familieshave-unbreakable-hold-on-power-one-clan-for-43-years.
89
Jocelyn Uy, "18 Lawmakers Don't Have Challengers," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
November 5, 2013.
36
officials. More recently, the military became closely involved in the protection of
mining interests—a pattern that is more pronounced in other regions, particularly in
Southern Mindanao.
This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section explains the
dynastic politics of Northern Luzon, tracing a few of its bloody contests as well as
some backlash against dynasties as well as a tendency for intra-elite moderation in the
use of violence. One example is Governor Chavit Singson and the de-escalation of
electoral violence in Ilocos Sur province, explained in the second section. The third
section throws the contrast into high relief, comparing the central-local dynamics that
led to the dislodgement of Governor Vicente Valera and diminishing violence in
Abra. The final section explains the dynamics of insurgency violence in the region,
highlighting the central cooptation of a local insurgency faction and a shift in the
military-led violence from counter-insurgency towards resource exploitation.
A Game of Gods and Monsters
Dynastic politics dominate local elections in the Philippines, none more so
than in some parts of Northern Luzon. Throughout elections from 2001 to 2016, many
political clans in the region maintained their holds on political power. In power since
1901, the Ortega clan in La Union province made a nearly clean sweep of the 2001
local elections with 10 of its 11 candidates successfully elected. The Singsons in
Ilocos Sur, the Valeras in Abra and the Dys of Isabela likewise dominated the
elections at the time.90
Central levers. The central government regularly intervenes in local elections
by deploying additional state security forces to locales designated as violent. The
90
Inquirer Bureaus, "Marcoses, Singsons, Dys, Ortegas, Josons Winning," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, May 16, 2001.
37
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) declares an area to be an “election hotspot”
on the expectation that violence will erupt and political rivals will use intimidation.
The police and military track election-related violence 120 days before and 30 days
after election day.91 For example, police monitored the local arms build-up in view of
several violent rivalries in Ilocos Norte towns in 2001.92 Even so, Edgar Quinto, an
ally of the incumbent Currimao town mayoral candidate, Rosario Go, was gunned
down two months prior to the 2001 elections.93 The widow of the former mayor
Ernesto Go whose son Wilbur had been killed in 1999, Go accused her rival Cirilo
Quilala of masterminding the murder and went on to retain her seat.94
A major source of electoral violence in Ilocos Norte was a thriving “cottage
industry” of hired assassins in Ilocos towns. A hit could cost as much as PhP50,000
(US$ 1,000) or as little as a cigarette or bottle of gin between friends.95 Killers usually
lived in one town but operated in another. Among them were former paramilitaries
and many worked as bodyguards of local politicians. For instance, it is likely that a
judge who had handled high profile election protests in Paoay and Currimao was
killed by such guns-for-hire.96 The killing had a chilling effect on involved officials
from the Commission on Elections.97
91
Luz Rimban, "Breaking the Cycle of Election Violence," in Democracy at Gunpoint:
Election-Related Violence in the Philippines, ed. Yvonne Chua and Luz Rimban (Quezon
City: Vera Files Inc., 2011), xiii-xiv.
92
Cristina Arzadon, "Ilocos Norte Arms Buildup Revealed," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
January 8, 2001.
93
Cristina Arzadon, Kira Espino, and Edwin Fernandez, "2 Dead in Pre-Election Violence,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 27, 2001.
94
Jerry Esplanada, "Guns-for-Hire Sow Terror in Ilocos Norte Town," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, June 6, 2001.
95
"Guns-for-Hire Thrives in Ilocos Towns," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 9, 2001.
96
"Resolution 1-008-62 For: Arbitrary Deprivation of Life (Murder, of Ariston Rubio),"
(Commission on Human Rights, June 15, 2009).
97
Cristina Arzadon, "4 Gunmen Assassinate Ilocos Judge," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
November 1, 2001. See also "Judge's Slay Sends Fear to Officials of Comelec," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, November 10, 2001.
38
Additional police and military personnel were also sent to critical areas where
private armed groups were entrenched, including municipalities in Ilocos Sur, Abra,
Cagayan, Isabela, Pangasinan, Ilocos Norte and Ilocos Sur.98 Days before the polls,
Abra was placed under full Commission on Elections (COMELEC) control.99 In San
Pablo town, Isabela, the regional police director replaced the 21-member police force
for allegedly interfering in partisan politics.100 However, active duty military, police,
and paramilitary personnel often engaged in harassment, intimidation and lethal
violence during elections, moonlighting as muscle for politicians’ private armies.101
As former high ranking officials in the military and police began running for office
themselves, army deployment during elections raised fears in some places that the
troops were there to “ensure” a favorable outcome for the ex-generals.102
The 2001 Congressional and local elections prompted a quick re-alignment of
central-local alliances, severing ties with deposed president Joseph Estrada—ousted
in January—in favor of Gloria Arroyo. During the swift and turbulent transition, the
Northern Luzon races relied heavily on the support of national politicians. If they did
98
Volt Contreras, "100 Private Armies of Candidates Listed," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
March 19, 2001.
99
PDI Northern Luzon Bureau and PDI Central Luzon Desk, "Abra Placed under Control of
Comelec," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 13, 2001.
100
Estanislao Caldez, "Isabela Town Cops Fall Victims to Polls," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
May 7, 2001.
101
Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, "Executive Summary of "a Journey Towards H.O.P.E. The
Independent Commission against Private Amies Report to the President," (2010).
102
During the 2010 elections in Pangasinan, for instance, while the military justified their
presence by claiming that rebels had been sighted in the area, military activity fueled
suspicions that they were there to ensure the victory in the congressional race of former
Armed Forces chief of staff and retired general Hermogenes Esperon. Gabriel Cardinoza,
"Pangasinan Execs Ask Comelec: Remove Troops Now from Villages," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, April 9, 2010. Moreover, the 2010 election ushered a number of former police and
military officials into electoral races for local executive positions in towns and cities. Gabriel
Cardinoza and Yolanda Sotelo, "Pangasinan New Battlefield for Lawmen-Turned-Pols,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 3, 2010.
39
not have direct access to the new president, it was prudent to gain Arroyo’s good
graces and the advantages of incumbency with it.103
Ilocos Norte realignments. The Marcoses in Ilocos Norte were among the
earliest to withdraw their support for Estrada.104 It initially seemed that the erstwhile
“Solid North” voting bloc may have lived and died with former president Ferdinand
Marcos. The Fariñas clan had expanded into the political vacuum left by the Marcos
family, which President Fidel Ramos had allowed to return from exile in 1993 after
Marcos had died in 1989. The split between Marcos and Fariñas influence divided
electoral races across the Northern Luzon provinces in Ilocos Sur, La Union, Benguet
and Isabela. A local analyst described the realignments created by the Marcos
dynasty’s climb back to power in mythic terms, likening it to a game of gods and
monsters.105
From 2001, the Marcoses began to “take back” Ilocos.106 The Marcos siblings
ran unopposed for re-election to second terms – Ferdinand Marcos Jr. for governor
and Imee Marcos for congress. 107 They resurrected their father’s party Kilusang
Bagong Lipunan (KBL, Movement for a New Society) with a highly successful slate
that mixed Marcos relatives and those from old, “familiar” clans who served in office
at one point during Marcos’s 20-year rule.108 By 2007, the Fariñases were mainly
103
PDI Northern Luzon Bureau and PDI Central Luzon Desk, "Singsons, Josons Lead Local
Battles," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 2, 2001.
104
Tonette Orejas et al., "Ouster Reshapes Politics in North," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
January 22, 2001.
105
Frank Cimatu, "How Ilocano Politicians Play Gods and Monsters," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, January 17, 2001.
106
PDI Northern Luzon Bureau and PDI Central Luzon Desk, "Poll Winners: Same Names,
Same Families," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 23, 2001.
107
Cristina Arzadon, "Marcoses Take Back Ilocos Politics," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June
16, 2001.
108
Apart from the established political dynasties, 2001 also ushered in the rise to power of
political families such as the Saleses in Pagudpud, despite suspicion that Reynolan Sales was
behind the killing of his rival and former mayor Rafael Benemerito, a scion of the town’s
40
limited to Laoag City while the Marcoses consolidated their dominance in provincial
and congressional positions, including three-term governor Marcos, Jr.’s unopposed
bid for a congressional seat vacated by his sister.109 Despite Ilocos Norte being the
site of much electoral violence in the region, the Marcoses were not directly
implicated in any of the violence. Once Marcos, Jr. was provincial governor,
however, the entry of additional troops and police during the 2004 elections prompted
concern that the deployment meant to sow fear among his rivals.110
A dynasty topples in Isabela. Voters in Isabela province rejected dynastic
politics and violence in the 2004 and 2010 elections. The scaling up of electoral
violence in the province, blamed on incumbent Governor Faustino Dy, Jr.,
precipitated the shift. Several assassinations and attempted killings occurred prior to a
2003 special election, including the murder of a political operative who had been a
long-time Dy ally but switched allegiance unexpectedly. 111 In the synchronized
national and local polls the following year, the Dy clan attempted to silence
unfavorable political commentary against them. Cauayan City mayor Caesar Dy
ordered the closure of two radio stations, ostensibly for an alleged zoning infraction
months prior to the May vote.112 Governor Dy approved the issuance of shotguns to
longest standing political clan. "In Ilocos, Politics Is 'All in the Family'," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, May 30, 2001.
109
Inquirer Northern Luzon and Inquirer Central Luzon, "After a Century, Political Clan Still
Rules," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 12, 2007.
110
Cristina Arzadon et al., "More Troops Deployed to Ilocos Norte, Cavite," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, May 10, 2004.
111
Villamor Visaya, "Lone Gunman Shoots, Wounds Vice Mayor of Isabela Town,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 4, 2003. "NPAs Disown Killing of Village Chief,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 19, 2003.
112
"Mayor Orders Closure of 2 Radio Stations," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 20,
2004. "Bishop Asks Mayor to Let Radio Stations Go on Air," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
March 31, 2004.
41
over 1,000 village heads, denying that the firearms were meant to harass opposition
candidates during the campaign period.113
Much was at stake in the 2004 gubernatorial election in Isabela. Governor
Dy’s father and brother had held the office before him while several family members
occupied seats throughout the province. He faced a formidable opponent in Grace
Padaca, a popular radio commentator who nearly defeated his brother, Benjamin Dy
III, in the 2001 third district congressional race. For decades, beginning with the
family patriarch and long-time governor, Faustino Dy, Sr., the Dys dominated Isabela
politics but left the province underdeveloped. Padaca had spent 14 years in broadcast
journalism, speaking against the province’s stagnant rural economy, corruption,
illegal gambling, logging and environmental degradation.114 Defeating Faustino Dy,
Jr. in 2004, Grace Padaca took office as provincial governor and ended 32
uninterrupted years of the Dy clan’s dominance of the office.115
In the 2007 polls, the Dys suffered another blow and lost the support of the
Albano family, ending a 30-year alliance between the two most prominent political
dynasties in Isabela. The Dys fielded former governor Benjamin Dy, Jr. (another
brother of Faustino Dy, Jr.) for governor, while the Albanos endorsed the incumbent
Padaca.116 President Arroyo tried to broker a deal to limit the contest to only the
Albanos and the Dys, to the exclusion of Padaca. Failing to do so, Arroyo then
113
"1,000 Village Chairs Armed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 21, 2004.
"Grace Padaca (2008 Magsaysay Awardee for Government Service) ", Ramon
Magsaysay Awardees, http://rmaward.asia/awardees/padaca-grace/.
115
Lito Salatan, "This Early, Dy Cohorts Plotting Padaca Recall," The Philippine Star June
14, 2004, http://www.philstar.com/nation/253870/early-dy-cohorts%C2%91plotting%C2%92-padaca-recall.
116
Villamor Visaya, "Palace-Brokered Isablea Deal Collapses," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
May 11, 2007.
114
42
endorsed the candidacy of Dy over Padaca.117 Padaca won the election with a lead of
over 17,000 votes.
The conflict continued to fester after the election and Benjamin Dy, Jr.
maintained an election protest against the incumbent Padaca. Near the end of her
second term, suspected contract assassins killed Michael Valdez, who was an election
supervisor for Isabela and Cagayan provinces of the COMELEC.118 A month after the
murder, the COMELEC unseated Padaca in favor of Dy after a recount of votes
showed that Dy led Padaca by over 1,000 votes. The reversal was criticized for being
part of a larger pattern of COMELEC decisions to oust opposition politicians from
their seats at President Arroyo’s behest, including Bulacan governor Joselito Mendoza
and Pampanga governor Eddie Panlilo. 119 COMELEC officials had also been
increasingly targeted over recent years throughout Northern Luzon.120
117
Charlie Lagasca, "Arroyo Endorses Dy vs Padaca for Isabela Gov," The Philippine Star
February 22, 2007, http://www.philstar.com/nation/386149/arroyo-endorses-dy-vs-padacaisabela-gov.
118
Villamor Visaya, "Top Isabela Comelec Exec Murdered," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
November 15, 2009.
119
Gabriel Cardinoza, "Poll Exec: Rule on Padaca Ain't Syndicate Work," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, December 12, 2009.
120
Two months prior to the election, gunmen assassinated Rodolfo Ruiz, the town election
registrar of Natividad, Pangasinan; Ruiz’s house had been strafed with gunfire also in
November the year before. Yolanda Sotelo-Fuertes, "Pangasinan Poll Exec Shot Dead,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 10, 2004. In 2005, Eugenia Vinluan-Campol, a lawyer at
the Public Attorney’s Office who had won several election-related cases against Abra
officials, was assassinated in Baguio City shortly after relocating from Abra. Vincent
Cabreza, "Increased Protection for Lawyers Sought," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September
10, 2005. In Luna, Apayao, COMELEC provincial supervisor Julius Angadol was killed on
his way to work on September 7, 2006. Jolene Bolambot, Jhunnex Napallacan, and Joey
Gabieta, "Bloody Thursday: Ex-Gov, Leftist, Poll Official Shot Dead," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, September 8, 2006. Although the case ultimately did not prosper, police filed
murder charges La Union congressman Tomas Dumpit and his son, for allegedly ordering the
assassination of Commission on Elections officer, Filemon Asperin. Asperin may have
refused to fix an election to favor a Dumpit clan member. Luige del Puerto, "Solon Sued for
Murder of Poll Exec," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 5, 2006. Peter La Julian, "Prime
Suspect Claims Police Torture," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 24, 2006.
43
After breaking the Dy dynasty’s hold on Isabela province for two terms,
Padaca lost the gubernatorial seat to Benjamin Dy III in the 2010 elections. 121
Celebrated in the media as a “giant slayer”, Padaca led Isabela province’s brief detour
from dynastic dominance. From above, she had no central support for the reforms she
pursued. It is even likely that President Arroyo had targeted her and other reformist,
opposition governors that lost their seats around the same time. Dy’s allies,
entrenched in Isabela’s municipalities, stymied her efforts from below. 122 While
Padaca played the role of David to the Dy dynasy’s Goliath, it is unclear how pivotal
the support of other powerful dynasties in Isabela was to her success. Apart from the
aforementioned Albanos, the Uy dynasty—a rival of the Dy clan—had also backed
Padaca.123
Elections continued to be violent, although the violence shifted downwards to
towns and villages—often directed against campaigners rather than candidates.124
Florante Raspado had been Jones town mayor for a maximum of three terms until
2013. That year, his wife Elaine ran for mayor and he won as her vice mayor.
However, Leticia Sebastian defeated Elaine Raspado and took office. Raspado had
planned to regain the mayoral post in 2016, with Councilor Melanie Uy as his running
mate. A year before the elections, two former soldiers-turned-assassins barged into
the Jones Town municipal hall and killed Raspado and one of Uy’s security aides.125
121
Villamor Visaya and Tonette Orejas, "Grace Padaca Weeps for Isabela; among Ed Goes
Back to Priesthood," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 15, 2010.
122
Isa Lorenzo, "Isabela's Non-Dynasty Detour," Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism April 11, 2007, http://pcij.org/stories/isabelas-non-dynasty-detour/.
123
Lito Salatan, "Padaca Vows Jueteng-Free Isabela under Her Watch," The Philippine Star
July 1, 2004, http://www.philstar.com/nation/255930/padaca-vows-jueteng-free-isabelaunder-her-watch.
124
Jaymee Gamil, "Poll-Related Violence on the Rise--PNP," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April
30, 2016.
125
This could have been a second attempt against Raspado’s life. In September 2014, police
arrested three men allegedly contracted to kill Raspado and Uy. Juliane Love De Jesus,
"Jones, Isabela Vice Mayor, Security Aide Gunned Down in Municipal Hall," Philippine
44
A month before the May 2016 elections, the NPA’s Benito Tesorio Command killed
Raspado’s successor, Vice Mayor Rolando Lucas, after first detaining him and his
companions for allegedly violating the terms of the NPA’s permit to campaign by
buying votes and carrying firearms.126 Hours later, a Lucas supporter named Heinrich
Apostol was shot dead in Jones town. Apostol was San Isidro village chief and
Nationalist People’s Coaltion (NPC) candidate for town councilor.127 Days prior to
the election, three Uy supporters were killed, also in Jones Town.128
Unhappy families. Dynasty building, through keeping politics in the family,
and domination, by limiting competition from outside the family, often resulted in
bitter feuding within political families. For instance, by 2010, factionalism divided the
Marcos dynasty. Imee Marcos squared off against her nephew and incumbent Michael
Keon for the position of governor. Imee and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. had supported
Keon in 2007 but they split along national party affiliations in 2007. Keon remained
with the ruling party Lakas-Kampi-CMD while Marcos, Jr. joined the Nacionalista
Party’s slate in a successful bid for the national Senate.129
In La Union, the Ortega dynasty was so entrenched that family members had
to avoid running against each other in the 2016 elections. For example, three Ortega
brothers in major elective posts each faced term limits barring them from running for
re-election. As a result, different members of the Ortega clan began clamoring to run,
Daily Inquirer June 19, 2015, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/699554/jones-isabela-vice-mayorsecurity-aide-gunned-down-in-municipal-hall. Villamor Visaya, "Isabela Town Hall Slays: 2
Former Soldiers Held," Philippine Daily Inquirer June 21, 2015,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/699786/isabela-town-hall-slays-2-former-soldiersheld#ixzz4PsMNCYVx
126
"Isabela Vice Mayor Shot Dead by Rebels--Police," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 13,
2016.
127
Villamor Visaya and Armand Galang, "2 Bets Dead in Gun Attacks in Isabela, N. Ecija,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 17, 2016.
128
Inquirer Bureaus, "Security Beefed up in Provinces for Polls," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
May 9, 2016.
129
Cristina Arzadon, "Politics Takes a New Turn in Ilocos Norte," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
April 7, 2011.
45
even against each other.130 Brothers, nephews and other relations initially filed against
each other for seats in Congress, the mayoralty of San Fernando City and the
provincial governor’s office.131 Ultimately, San Fernando city mayor Pablo Ortega
dissuaded two of his brothers and a sister-in-law from running against him as First
District representative, and the eldest brother, Victor, ran for San Fernando mayor
with the younger Jose Maria as his running mate. 132 Pablo’s nephew, Victor
Emmanuel, persisted in running against him; another brother Mario ran for governor
against his nephew Francisco Emmanuel.
Local Elite Pact in Ilocos Sur
Although there was considerable violence in the local elections, a large part of
avoiding political violence is intra-elite moderation. Singson had a long history of
deploying violence to eliminate rivals and threats to his incumbency. Yet after
decades of brutal violence, Strongman Luis “Chavit” Crisologo Singson solidified his
dynasty’s dominance by engineering contestless elections and distributing political
offices among family members and cronies. An alliance with President Arroyo
endorsed Singson’s consolidation of political power.
Singson was born into an inconsequential offshoot of the Crisologo family, a
prominent Ilocos clan. His uncle, Floro Crisologo, was the congressional
representative of Ilocos Sur for 24 years immediately after World War II. Crisologo’s
wife, Singson’s maternal aunt, was provincial governor from 1964 to 1971. In the
1960s, Crisologo imposed a blockade that prevented tobacco producers from
transporting or selling outside the province, forcing them to sell only to the
130
Yolanda Sotelo, "Cracks in La Union's Ortega Clan Show," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
August 26, 2015.
131
Yolanda Sotelo and Anselmo Roque, "In La Union Elections, It's Ortega vs Ortega,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 5, 2015.
132
Inquirer Bureaus, "In Local Races, Same Faces, Same Families," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, October 13, 2015.
46
Crisologos’ Fortune Tobacco.133 Singson defied his uncle, and in retaliation Crisologo
attempted to expropriate Singson’s Vigan Electric Company and remit its profits to
the provincial treasurer. 134 After Crisologo was assassinated during mass at the
provincial capital’s cathedral in 1970, suspicion fell on Singson. Over the years, even
in the absence of proof or criminal conviction, the brazen assassination of Crisologo
cemented Singson’s reputation as a quintessential local strongman.135
The murder prompted a public clamor to disband politician’s private armies
and President Marcos vowed to do so in his 1972 State of the Nation Address.136
Months later, Marcos declared Martial Law and dismantled private armed groups
selectively. As for Singson, he won the 1971 provincial election and remained
governor of Ilocos Sur until the end of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986. Pushed out
for a term under the Corazon Aquino government’s purge of Marcos allies, Singson
regained the gubernatorial office for three consecutive terms from 1992 to 2001, and
was governor again from 2004 to 2007 and 2010 until 2013, when he retired from
elected office. During the gaps, his trusted vice governor Deogracias Victor Savellano
held the post.
By the 1990s, Singson was one of three main operators of an illegal numbers
game, jueteng, and the key player in Northern Luzon.137 Jueteng and similar betting
schemes are popular throughout the country with bets as low as a few pesos making it
widely accessible. The illicit business generates profits for operators as well as
133
Ellen Tordesillas, "Chavit Singson," in Hot Money, Warm Bodies: The Downfall of
President Joseph Estrada, ed. Greg Hutchinson (Manila: Anvil, 2001), 42.
134
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, "Chavit Singson: Ilocos 'Folk Hero' a Blast
from the Past," GMA News Online May 4, 2007,
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/content/40959/chavit-singson-ilocos-folk-hero-ablast-from-the-past/story/.
135
Caroline Hau, "Of Strongmen and the State," Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, no. 1
March 2002, https://kyotoreview.org/issue-1/of-strongmen-and-the-state/.
136
Filemon Tutay, "Who Me?," The Philippine Free Press Online, February 5, 1972.
137
Alfred McCoy, Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the
Rise of the Surveillance State (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 475.
47
kickbacks for local politicians and police to turn a blind eye. In the late 1990s, bribery
rates for Ilocos Sur went as high as PhP 1 million (US$ 20,000) for the regional
Philippine National Police (PNP) director, PhP 500,000 (US$ 10,000) for the
provincial police chief, and PhP 7,500 (US$ 150) to PhP 30,000 (US$ 600) for the
municipal police chief, depending on the size of the town. 138 President Joseph
Estrada’s ambition to centralize control of both illegal and legal gambling resulted in
a power struggle between Singson and the other gambling operators.139 Claiming that
he had survived an assassination attempt, on October 3, 2000, Singson publicly
exposed Estrada’s acceptance of jueteng protection bribes as well as proceeds from a
tobacco tax in Ilocos Sur. This precipitated impeachment proceedings against Estrada,
street protests, and finally a military-backed succession to then vice president Gloria
Arroyo, who was proclaimed president on January 20, 2001.
During Arroyo’s long tenure from 2001 to 2010, Singson benefited from the
pivotal role that he played in Estrada’s fall. First of all, Singson was pardoned for his
own participation in the crimes for which Estrada was eventually convicted of
plunder.140 In 2001, Singson kept to a pledge not to run in the elections. In the crucial
May 2001 elections and the reorientation of political alignments to President Arroyo,
Singson was given a free hand to choose the candidates for central support.141 He thus
successfully fielded family members (including his wife, his brother, a son and a
niece) and allies for positions at the Ilocos Sur provincial level for governor, vice
138
Peter Kreuzer, "Philippine Governance: Merging Politics and Crime," (Frankfurt: Peace
Research Institute Frankfurt, 2009), 23.
139
For an excellent account of the inter-connections between policing, jueteng and politics
that led to Estrada’s ouster, see McCoy, Policing America's Empire: The United States, the
Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State, 471-96.
140
While granted immunity from charges related to the Estrada case, Singson still faces graft
charges filed in the Office of the Ombudsman for the diversion of Ilocos Sur’s tobacco excise
tax in 2001. Reynaldo Santos and Michael Bueza, "Cast in Erap Plunder Case: Where Are
They Now?," Rappler April 24, 2014,
https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/investigative/56022-cast-erap-plunder-case.
141
Tordesillas, 45.
48
governor, provincial board (legislature) member, congress as well as Vigan city
mayor and councilor. He also reportedly reconciled with an estranged cousin to
forestall competition over the gubernatorial contest. 142
Sheltered by President Arroyo’s favor, Singson allegedly wielded violence
with impunity in the province. The widow of Ilocos Sur provincial auditor Agustin
Chan, who was ambushed by gunman in September 2001, accused Singson of
masterminding the assassination. Decrying police inaction on the case, the local group
Save Ilocos Sur Alliance claimed that their own investigation found that Chan had
been investigating Singson over the use of public funds from a tobacco excise tax.143
The group and other provincial organizations had been clamoring for corruption
investigations against the governor even before Estrada’s downfall. Some members
had kept to a “resign all” demand during the height of the anti-Estrada protests,
arguing that Singson should also face the consequences for his crimes. However, the
President Arroyo’s protection was likely to have reinforced Singson’s position as
Ilocos Sur’s political kingpin and deflated moves to hold him to account.144
Singson was also implicated in an ambush attempt made on a known dzXE
Vigan radio broadcaster and political rival, former Provincial Board member Efren
Rafanan. Rafanan, one of Singson’s former closest political allies, had helped found
Singson’s political party, Bileg, in 1998. The two fell out over the gubernatorial race
in 2001, with Singson backing the candidacy of Victor Savellano and Rafanan
defiantly running in opposition.145 Rafanan was wounded but his wife, teenage son,
142
Inquirer Bureaus, "Marcoses, Singsons, Dys, Ortegas, Josons Winning."
Frank Cimatu and Leoncio Balbin, "Chavit Tagged Brains in Killing: Ex-Gov Says
Accusation Part of Erap Plot to Extract Revege," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 10, 2003.
144
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism., “Chavit Singson: Ilocos Folk Hero”.
145
Anselmo Roque and Leoncio Balbin, "Homegrown Political Parties Test Their Mettle on
May 14," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 9, 2004.
143
49
brother and security aide were all killed when armed men fired on their vehicle.146
Rafanan claimed that he had been warned in the months prior that Singson had been
“talking to soldiers and businessmen to arrange Rafanan’s assassination” and
cautioned against further radio commentaries that would anger the powerful
provincial boss.147 Moreover, another assassination bid linked to Singson was made
on Robert Segismundo, the elder brother of the founder of Save Ilocos Sur Alliance
and Rafanan ally Nestor Segismundo.148 Apart from investigating the Agustin Chan
case, the group had initiated a string of graft cases against Singson and other Ilocos
Sur officials. Nestor Segismundo was himself shot and wounded the following
year.149
In 2007, Singson decided to run for a national senate seat on Arroyo’s slate
while supporting family members locally.150 He lost the election and, as a consolation,
Arroyo appointed him Deputy National Security Adviser. 151 When he brutally
tortured his former domestic partner Rachel Tiongson and her boyfriend in 2009, he
boasted on national television that he was able to keep them under surveillance using
official equipment and personnel.152 Unscathed by the scandal, Singson served a final
term in the governor’s office from 2010 to 2013. Meanwhile, the Singson scions
146
Leoncio Balbin, "Reward up for Arrest of Ilocos Attackers," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
April 2, 2003.
147
Christian Esguerra, "It's Chavit, Massacre Survivor Insists," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
May 14, 2003.
148
Blanche Rivera, "Killings Continue; Comelec Sees 80-85% Turnout," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, May 10, 2004.
149
Luige del Puerto and Armand Nocum, "Ilocos Sur Cop Chief Sacked over Shooting of
Newsman," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 4, 2005.
150
Inquirer Northern Luzon and Inquirer Central Luzon., “After a Century, Political Clan Still
Rules”.
151
"Arroyo Names Chavit Singson Deputy Nat'l Security Adviser," GMA News Online
September 6, 2008, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/118617/arroyo-nameschavit-singson-deputy-nat-l-security-adviser/story/.
152
Marya Salamat, "Chavit Beating: Arroyo Denouced for Looking the Other Way,"
Bulatlat.com September 10, 2009, http://bulatlat.com/main/2009/09/10/arroyo-denouncedfor-looking-the-other-way-in-chavit-mess/.
50
maintained their clan’s dominance over the positions of provincial governor and
congress.
Scant months prior to the filing of candidacy for the 2013 elections, Singson
pulled out of the race.153 Singson and son Eric held meetings with mayors and their
rivals to push for a consensus to minimize electoral competition. Consequently, in the
2013 elections, 18 towns in Ilocos Sur had candidates for mayor running
unopposed.154 This was an unprecedented number of unopposed candidatures in the
Ilocos region and among them were several Singson clan members. The governorship
itself was contested, however. Former police chief inspector and multi-awarded
mayor of Tagudin town, Roque Verzosa, ran against Ryan Singson for Ilocos Sur
governor with Singson adversary Rafanan as his running mate.155 Still, Ryan Singson
trounced Verzosa, garnering more than twice the votes of the latter.
The clan also expanded its reach into other realms of local office. While the
party list system is meant to allow representation of marginalized sectors rather than
mainstream political parties, a 2013 Supreme Court decision relaxed the rules and
paved the way for political dynasties to field candidates for these congressional seats.
In the 2016 elections, examples included the political party Abono in La Union and
Pangasinan, and Ilocos Sur’s Grace Singson of the Association for the Development
Dedicated to Agriculture and Fisheries.156
The Singson case demonstrates that a local strongman may have the
wherewithal to consolidate political domination and de-escalate the use of political
153
Leoncio Balbin, "Chavit Drops out of Ilocos Sur Race," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October
6, 2012.
154
Frank Cimatu, "Ilocos Sur Politics Still under Spell of Chavit," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
April 24, 2013.
155
Leoncio Balbin, "In Ilocos, an Unlikely Challenger vs Singson," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
October 7, 2012.
156
Tina Santos, "All in the Family: Pols Use Party-Lists for Dynasties," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, May 1, 2016.
51
violence. A period of unbroken central support during Arroyo’s long incumbency
facilitated Singson’s ability to exclude serious contenders or co-opt them. Singson
may have also applied strategies that served him as a regional and national jueteng
kingpin. The long persistence of this poor man’s betting game has relied upon its
shadowy operators to settle disputes, turf clashes and takeovers through mediation
rather than outright violence.157 Often, like Chavit Singson, jueteng leaders were also
community leaders, depended upon for patronage and other forms of economic and
social assistance. Indeed, when he was Estrada’s jueteng bagman, Singson worked
effectively with the gambling bosses of Northern Luzon, defining and allocating each
one a territory in order to manage and forestall conflict.158
Queen Takes King off Abra Chessboard
Abra province hosts the highest concentration of armed factions in Northern
Luzon, including the NPA, the NPA breakaway Cordillera People’s Liberation Army
(CPLA), and politicians’ private armies. Political contests remain bloody, despite
repeated central efforts to dismantle armed groups. Police describe the ultimate
futility of the dismantling process as a “never ending cycle” of arrest, release, rearrest and further release.159 Yet several investigations have exposed practices like
military “donations” of firearms, bullets and other supplies to politicians’ private
armed groups in the province.160 The military and the police have also been known to
support opposing factions in Abra’s ever-shifting political battlefield. The presence of
insurgent group factions manifests itself in the partisan involvement of the military, in
157
Kreuzer, 25.
McCoy, Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the
Surveillance State, 478.
159
Vincent Cabreza and Desiree Caluza, "Why Private Armies Thrive in Abra," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, May 5, 2010.
160
Artha Kira Paredes, "Where Guns Rule: Private Armies in Abra," in Primed and
Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines (Geneva: Small
Arms Survey, 2010), 224.
158
52
particular. The proliferation of political armed groups sustains a security dilemma,
making private armies an indispensable political resource.161
In the 2000s, Governor Vicente Valera was the biggest employer of private
armed groups in the province.162 Valera came from the Paredes-Valera dynasty that
had dominated local politics in Abra until the mid-1960s.163 After the end of the
Marcos regime, the central government purged local offices and appointed officers-incharge until elections. President Corazon Aquino had appointed Valera to the
governorship in this manner in 1986. Winning in the 1988 election, he served as
governor for the maximum of three successive terms until 1998. After a term in
Congress, Valera immediately pledged allegiance to President Arroyo when Joseph
Estrada was ousted, and he then successfully ran for governor in May, 2001. 164
Those polls and the run-up to the 2004 elections were marred with violence, including
the assassination of two of Abra’s mayors and around seven barangay
chairpersons.165 As observed by a Cordillera politician: “the pawns go first; the more
pawns a player has on the board, the better shielded the king is from attack”.166
However, the fault-line in Abra politics was between Governor Valera and an alliance
of the Luna and Bernos political clans.167 Valera and his followers commanded an
estimated two-thirds of the ten major private armies in Abra.168
161
"The Assassins of Abra: 'Just Like Killing Chicken'," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
September 8, 2004.
162
"Cops Says Private Armies Make Peace in Abra 'Elusive'," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
September 16, 2004.
163
Ma. Ayn Ballesta, "The Blood Politics of Abra," Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism February 14, 2007, http://pcij.org/stories/the-blood-politics-of-abra/.
164
Orejas et al., “Ouster Re-shapes Politics in the North”.
165
Frank Cimatu et al., "Mayor Shot inside Church," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 30,
2002.
166
Artha Kira Paredes, "Pawns in Abra Politics," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 9,
2004.
167
In 2002, for instance, Tineg mayor Clarence Benwaren, a Cordillera leader allied then with
the Lunas and Bernoses, may have been assassinated by his vice mayor and Valera ally,
Edwin Crisologo. PDI Northern Luzon Bureau, "Abra Mayor's Kin Pin Murder on Vice
53
Violence continued even after the 2004 elections were over, prompting the
central government to create Task Force Abra later that year, aimed at dismantling
private armed groups in the employ of local politicians. Police kept close watch of
Abra towns, particularly Lagayan, in anticipation of a possible outbreak of violence
weeks before the election.169 Governor Valera successfully ran for re-election against
Lagayan town mayor Cecilia Luna’s husband, while Valera’s wife, Ma. Zita ClaustroValera, ran for mayor of Bangued, the provinces capital and center of commerce.
Four other Valeras of different lineages of the clan ran for office in Bangued and
Lagayan.170 After the polls, an alleged Valera plot to kill Lagayan mayor Luna was
exposed. Two soldiers claimed that Governor Vicente Valera plotted with their
commanding officer, Lt. Col. Noel Mislang of the 41st Infantry Battalion and
Governor Vicente Valera to kill Mayor Luna and her family.171 In December 2004,
five days after executing sworn statements accusing Governor Valera of the
assassination orders, gunmen ambushed the two soldiers when they were in Aurora,
Isabela and one was killed. 172 The army discharged Mislang and the Department of
the Interior transferred police officers out of the region, also suspending local
executives’ supervision and control of the police.173
Mayor," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 31, 2002. The Cordillera People’s Liberation
Army is discussed further in the last section of this chapter.
168
Paredes, "Where Guns Rule: Private Armies in Abra," 216.
169
Christian Esguerra, "PNP Fears Bloody Polls," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 18, 2004.
See also Villamor Visaya and Artha Kira Paredes, "Rebs Bar Mayor from Sorties, Says Gov,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 1, 2004.
170
PDI Northern Luzon Bureau, "Central Luzon: Aquino-Cojuangco Most Durable, Unique,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 24, 2004.
171
Christian Esguerra and Artha Kira Paredes, "Army Officer Sacked for Order to Kill Abra
Mayor," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 24, 2004.
172
Norman Bordadora, "Corporal Files Murder Raps vs Abra Governor, Colonel," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, March 12, 2005.
173
Artha Kira Paredes, "Abra: Bloody Struggle for Control of Public Funds," in Democracy
at Gunpoint: Election-Related Violence in the Philippines, ed. Yvonne Chua and Luz Rimban
(Quezon City: Vera Files Inc., 2011), 227.
54
La Paz municipal mayor Marc Bernos decried Valera’s use of violence against
his political opponents as a “reign of terror”.174 Yet the Luna and Bernos factions
were also responsible for political violence in the province. La Paz Mayor Joseph Sto.
Niño Bernos and his father, Andres Bernos, vice mayor of Danglas town, were
charged with masterminding several political assassinations carried out by the
younger Bernos’s bodyguard. The victims included Joel Afos in 2002, La Paz vice
mayoral candidate Ruben Afos in 2004 and William Sagun in 2006. 175 Valera
supporters were targeted in particular.176
Matters came to a head in 2006. Marc Bernos, was himself gunned down in
January.177 Later that year, two assailants on a motorcycle shot and killed James
Bersamin, a member of the Abra provincial board.178 Police initially filed charges
against paid assassins, and dismissed the possibility that the killing was “politically
motivated. 179 However, former army sergeant Rufino Panday shot dead Abra
Congressman Luis Bersamin in December, 2006.180 Bersamin had planned to run for
governor, ending a long-standing political alliance with Governor Valera.181 Panday
174
Norman Bordadora and Artha Kira Paredes, "Abra Mayor Sues Governor, Colonel for
Murder," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 10, 2005.
175
Vincent Cabreza, "Abra Congress Bet, Father Face Murder Cases," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, January 2, 2016. In 2003, moreover, Luna’s son was charged with the killing of
police officer Jesus Trinidad of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. Jovelyn Reyes,
"Cops Hunt Son of Mayor," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 13, 2003.
176
In 2004 for example, unidentified gunmen made an attempt on the life of Marino Bicera,
consultant to Governor Vicente Valera in Bengued. Artha Kira Paredes, "Consultant Shot,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 13, 2004.
177
Luige del Puerto and Artha Kira Paredes, "Abra Town Mayor Slain by Lone Assassin,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 14, 2006.
178
Artha Kira Paredes and Frank Cimatu, "Abra Provincial Exec Shot Dead," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, November 12, 2006.
179
Artha Kira Paredes, "2 Suspects in Murder of Abra Board Exec Charged," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, November 14, 2006.
180
See Philip Tuboza and Nancy Carvajal, "Solon Shot Dead at Church," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, December 17, 2006.
181
Artha Kira Paredes, "Solon Had Planned to Run for Gov," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
December 18, 2006.
55
testified that he assassinated Bersamin at Valera’s behest.182 Although witnesses later
recanted as the case against Valera advanced, the families of the slain Bersamins,
Benwaren and Bernos believe that Valera was responsible for the killings.183
From 2001 to 2007, one estimate of Abra’s electoral violence counts 19 Abra
politicians and 13 barangay councilors murdered.184 Valera reportedly fell out with
President Arroyo and the withdrawal of critical political support sealed Valera’s
fate.185 The campaign season in 2007 was tense: Abra was once again placed under
COMELEC control in view of potential violence and the previous year’s murders.186
Valera was the incumbent but, unable to run, he fielded his wife, Bangued mayor Ma.
Zita Valera, for governor. The days surrounding the May 2007 election were fraught
with violence.187 Brenda Cardenas-Crisologo, wife of Tineg town mayor, was shot
while observing the canvassing of votes on May 17, and died a little over a month
later.188 The gunman was a poll watcher of Crisologo’s rival and brother of the late
Tineg mayor Clarence Benwaren, Lenin Benwaren. A local judge ordered the arrest
of Benwaren, Bangued mayor Ryan Luna and six other suspects for the shooting.189
Ultimately, the Valeras lost their 20-year grip on the governorship as Eustaquio
182
Dona Pazzibugan, "Abra Gov Linked to Solon's Murder," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
December 23, 2006.
183
Frank Cimatu, "Widows, Orphans of Slain Abra Politicos Unite to Fight Valeras,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 29, 2006.
184
Paredes, "Where Guns Rule: Private Armies in Abra," 216-19.
185
"The Bersamin Killing: Who Really Benefited from His Death?," ABS-CBN News
December 16, 2011, http://news.abs-cbn.com/-depth/12/15/11/abra.
186
Alcuin Papa and Nikko Dizon, "Abra Placed under Comelec Control," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, February 21, 2007.
187
An attack on mayoral candidate Esther Bernos resulted in the death of police officer
Jeoffrey Ponce in Danglas amid the May 2007 polls. Inquirer Southern Luzon et al.,
"Violence Rages on Eve of Polls; 4 More Killed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 14, 2007.
Barangay captain of Layugan village in Bucay town was killed by local councilor Jojo Sales
on election day. Alcuin Papa et al., "10 Dead on Election Day, Including 3 in Masbate,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 15, 2007.
188
Frank Cimatu, "Abra Mayor's Wife Dies One Month after Shooting," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, June 25, 2007.
189
Vincent Cabreza, "Cops Try, Fail to Arrest Abra Mayor," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May
1, 2013.
56
Bersamin, brother of the assassinated Luis Bersamin, triumphed over Vicente
Valera’s wife. Lagayan town mayor Luna retained her seat.190
About a month before the 2010 elections, tension was high throughout the
province and especially so in places like Bangued, where armed men in military
uniforms were reportedly going door to door, asking villagers who they would vote
for, taking down their names and forcing them to accept PhP 1,000 (US$ 20) to vote
for a particular candidate.191 Nonetheless, while the 2010 elections were tense and
marred by intimidation, as well as frustration with the high level of police and
military presence around the elections, electoral violence was relatively subdued.192
Six months before the 2013 polls, the government announced that 15
provinces were considered at high risk for election violence, five of which were in
Northern Luzon – including Abra.193 The national police continued a campaign to
control Abra private armed groups, claiming a reduction from 86 to 31 groups in 2012
with maintained monitoring of such towns as Lagayan, Tineg, Bangued, Baay-Licuan,
Malibcong, Bucloc and Langiden. 194 In January 2013, Abra governor Eustaquijo
Bersamin and mayors or representatives from the province’s 27 towns “surrendered”
179 guns to the PNP: muzzles were covered with masking tape and an identification
sticker signed by police officials then returned to their licensed owners, who retain the
190
Inquirer Northern Luzon, Inquirer Central Luzon, and Inquirer Southern Luzon, "Old
Fiefdoms Going as Valeras, Josons Tumble," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 20, 2007.
Valera’s ouster from power had other conseuqences. In December 2008, Nelson Parel, former
official of the defunct Cordillera Executive Board and legal adviser to former Abra governor
Vincent Valera, was killed in Bangued. His association with Valera had implicated him in the
murder of Luis Bersamin. Vincent Cabreza, "Abra Exec Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
December 31, 2008.
191
Vincent Cabreza, Artha Kira Paredes, and Nestor Burgos, "Poll Terror Tactics Rear Ugly
Head Again in Abra," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 9, 2010.
192
Vincent Cabreza, "In Time, Abra Will Change," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 12, 2010.
193
Dona Pazzibugan, "Police Launch Drive in 15 Poll 'Hot Spots'," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
November 17, 2012.
194
Desiree Caluza, "Police Claim Success vs Abra Armed Groups," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, November 25, 2012.
57
right to use them in self-protection; the police only actually retained 45 weapons for
safekeeping.195 Violence abated, however one casualty of the polls was recorded that
year.196
In 2015, Valera and two other co-conspirators were convicted of
masterminding the assassination of Luis Bersamin.197 Valera and police officer Joseph
Barreras, one of his police escorts, were also charged with the 2010 murder of Mario
Acena, a Luna clan campaigner.198 While the PNP admitted its failure in eliminating
private armies nationally, it claimed the crackdown in Abra was its one success.199
Abra’s political leaders signed a peace covenant in the lead-up to the elections the
following year.200 With Valera dislodged, violence continued as allegiances shifted
and re-shifted among his erstwhile rivals—albeit at a smaller scale.201
Insurgency in the North
In Northern Luzon, the NPA maintained four guerrilla fronts in the Cordilleras
in the early 2000s, and was active in Ilocos provinces and the Cagayan valley.202
Another front operated from neighboring Central Luzon, also straddling the border
into Cagayan Valley in Nueva Vizcaya and the Ilocos region in Eastern Pangasinan.
195
"Abra Politicians Surrender 179 Guns to PNP," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 14,
2013.
196
Vincent Cabreza, "This Business of Fixing Abra," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 15,
2013.
197
Erika Sauler, "Ex-Abra Gov Found Guilty of Killing Political Rival," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, October 1, 2015.
198
Cabreza and Caluza.
199
Marlon Ramos, "PNP Admits Failure to Dismantle Private Armies," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, January 5, 2010.
200
Kimberlie Quitasol and Gabriel Cardinoza, "Abra Political Leaders Sign Covenant for
Peaceful Elections," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 9, 2015.
201
See Paredes, "Abra: Bloody Struggle for Control of Public Funds."
202
"The Strategic and Tactical Activities of CPP-NPA-NDF in the White Areas." Diana
Rodriguez and Soliman Santos, "Introduction," in Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups
and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), 12.
58
The presence of several private armies, particularly in the Cordilleras, and the
presence of the NPA and its breakaway Cordillera faction, produced considerable
violence in three key periods: political realignment and insurgency tensions from
2001 to 2003; the peak of counter-insurgency and anti-activist killings in 2005 to
2006; and, renewed militarization and struggles over natural resource exploitation
from 2011 to 2014 (See Figure 5 below).
Figure 5. Pattern of Insurgency-related Violence in Northern Luzon,
by Administrative Region
30
25
20
Cagayan
15
Ilocos
10
Cordilleras
5
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
0
Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly
disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 6 for frequency distribution table
The interference of the NPA in the 2001 elections nationwide was particularly
palpable in Northern Luzon. In Isabela, regional police officials reported that the NPA
were collecting between PhP10,000 (US$ 200) and PhP50,000 (US$ 1,000) from
local candidates for “permits” to campaign.203 Overall however, the chief of the
military’s Northern Luzon command said that while the insurgency in the area was
declining, rebels collected around PhP300,000 (US$ 6,000) for a “permit-to-
203
Estanislao Caldez, "NPA Campaign Fees," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 21, 2001.
59
campaign” in the 2001 elections. 204 In parts of Pangasinan, Nueva Vizcaya and
Isabela, moreover, the NPA routinely extorted businesses to pay “revolutionary”
taxes.205
In Isabela, the NPA’s imposition of “permit-to-campaign” fees on candidates
before they were allowed into rebel controlled areas resulted in the disarming and
holding of Rep. Giorgini Aggabao, Mayor Virgilio Padilla of San Agustin, Mayor
Leoncio Kiat of Echague and 20 aides, in February 2004.206 NPA insurgents operating
in Isabela stopped the Benito Soliven town mayor from campaigning in areas under
their control, until she paid the “permit-to-campaign” fees—estimated at PhP150,000
(US$ 3,000) and weapons. 207 Actions like these eventually became rarer as the
military cracked down on insurgent groups in the region.
The overlap between the insurgency and local politics was also evident in
Kalinga. Peter Dangiwan, a candidate for reelection as Balbalan municipal councilor
and member of Bayan Muna, was killed days before the May 2001 election. Bayan
Muna officials in Kalinga claim that Dangiwan was silenced for his opposition to
militarization and calling for the disbandment of the CAFGU militia in the town.208
Army soldiers had arrested him in 1994 on insurgency suspicions.
Tensions arose in 2001 over the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA),
an indigenous people’s faction that broke away from the NPA in 1986.209 As a
consequence of the government’s peace agreement with the CPLA, some 1,200 CPLA
204
Tonette Orejas, "Pols Warned Not to Seek NPA Aid in 2004 Polls," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, August 4, 2003.
205
"Insurgency Seen as 'Big Business'," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 10, 2001.
206
Villamor Visaya and Delfin Mallari, "NPAs Hold, Disarm Isabela Congressman,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 26, 2004.
207
Visaya and Paredes., “Rebs Bar Mayor from Sorties, Says Gov”.
208
PDI Northern Luzon Bureau, "Foe of Militarization Gunned Down," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, May 7, 2001.
209
Artemio Dumlao, "GMA Coddling 'Terrorist' Force in Cordillera?," Bulatlat.com, no.
May 19-25, 2002, http://www.bulatlat.com/news/2-15/2-15-dumlao.html.
60
fighters were merged into the regional security forces for the Cordilleras, with about
270 into the armed forces as soldiers (including 15 as officers), 530 into the
paramilitary Citizens Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGU), and the remaining
400 as beneficiaries of government livelihood projects.210 After the 2001 election,
Tubo municipal mayor Jose Segundo was assassinated on 27 December, 2001,
possibly timed for the 33rd founding anniversary of the CPP and the second
anniversary of the assassination of former rebel priest Conrado Balweg, head of the
CPLA.211 Police claimed that Segundo had made himself an NPA target by supporting
the unification of CPLA factions as a step toward integrating their militiamen into the
Philippine military.212
In other cases, NPA members worked as mercenaries and lent their services in
the guns-for-hire market in Ilocos. In 2003, suspected NPA insurgents assassinated
Mayor Guerrero Zaragoza of Tayug, Pangasinan. 213 However, police identified
former Tayug mayor Marius Ladio, who had lost to Zaragoza in the 2001 local
elections, as responsible for the hit.214 Police suspected that NPA insurgents also
killed Dammao village chief Jaime Baliwag in Gamu town, Isabela, but over a
personal land dispute.215
Clashes between soldiers and the NPA, insurgent ambushes and military attacks
on civilians were concentrated in Ilocos Sur and neighboring Mountain Province in
210
Soliman Santos, "DDR and 'Disposition of Forces' of Philippine Rebel Groups
(Overview)," in Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the
Philippines (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), 143-46.
211
Nathan Alcantara, Yolanda Fuertes, and Tonette Orejas, "Abra Town Mayor Killed,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 28, 2001.
212
Vincent Cabreza, "Slain Mayor Had Links to CPLA, Documents Say," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, January 3, 2002. The NPA is widely believed to have been responsible for Balweg’s
assassination.
213
Dennis Santos and Anthony Allada, "Compostela Valley Mayor 3rd to Be Killed in a
Week," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 30, 2003.
214
Yolanda Sotelo-Fuertes and Tonette Orejas, "Ex-Mayor Tagged in Mayor's Slay,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 6, 2003.
215
Villamor Visaya, "Village Chief Killed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 14, 2005.
61
the Cordilleras. Abra-based soldiers killed farmer Johnny Camareg in an alleged
shoot-out with the NPA in a Mountain Province town. In a traditional peace pact
(bodong) with provincial and town leaders, the military paid PhP 115,000 (US$
2,300) and pledged a college scholarship to Camareg’s children but denied claims the
farmer had died a “wrongful death”. 216 The following year, soldiers killed four
unidentified New People’s Army (NPA) fighters who were reportedly members of the
Sonang Guerrilla Uno of the NPA’s Ilocos-Cordillera regional party committee that
was active in Northern and Southern Ilocos provinces.217 The NPA also exacted a
number of losses from military and police targets.218 Local opposition to mining firms
operating in an Ilocos Sur town at the border of Abra and Mountain Province also
heightened counter-insurgency operations in the area.219
Farther south in the Ilocos region, insurgency-related violence was thick in
Pangasinan province, and across in the Cagayan Valley region, in Nueva Vizcaya and
Isabela provinces. A spate of violence in 2002 began when soldiers killed Victor
Lazo, allegedly the military chief of the New People’s Army’s Josepino Corpuz
Command.220 The Josepino Corpuz Command reportedly operated along the borders
of the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya and, where the killing occurred, in
216
Frank Cimatu, "Army Pays for Farmer's Death," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 8,
2001.
217
Villamor Visaya and Cesar Villa, "4 NPA Rebels Killed, Army Soldier Wounded in
Clash," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 1, 2002.
218
Two soldiers were killed in Magsingal town, Ilocos Sur by suspected NPA fighters at the
end of 2001. Cristina Arzadon and Desiree Caluza, "2 Gov't Troopers Slain, 2 Injured in Reb
Ambush," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 22, 2001. The NPA raided a Mountain
Province detachment and ambushed soldiers from Nueva Ecija, Central Luzon who had been
in the area, killing eight soldiers. TJ Burgonio and Nathan Alcantara, "NPAs Slay 8 Soldiers
in Mountain Province," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 15, 2003. In September 2003, an NPA
raid on an Ilocos Sur police station left one officer dead. Leoncio Balbin, "NPAs Raid Ilocos
Sur Police Station," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 17, 2003.
219
Audrey Beltran, "Military Protecting Lepanto Mining in Ilocos Sur?," Bulatlat.com 3, no.
10 April 6-12, 2003, http://www.bulatlat.com/news/3-10/3-10-lepanto.html.
220
Tonette Orejas and Anselmo Roque, "Gov Tops List of NPA Targets," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, January 11, 2002.
62
Eastern Pangasinan. 221 Four months later in June, soldiers killed Janet Taguba and
four others, who were allegedly members of the Filomena Asuncion Front of the NPA
operating in northern and eastern Isabela.222 Human rights NGO Karapatan alleged,
however, that the rebels were killed while trying to surrender; Taguba was two
months pregnant. The military denied the accusation and maintained that the five
were killed in a firefight.223 Furthermore, the military began to use lethal violence
against activists earlier in Northern Luzon than in other parts of the country.224
However, military violence against insurgents was marked with extrajudicial
use of lethal force. In Pangasinan, police and army intelligence officers killed Pablo
Buaga, whom they claimed was a “revolutionary tax” collector for the NPA
breakaway group in Pangasinan, the Rebolusyonaryong Hukbo ng Bayan (RHB, or
National Revolutionary Forces). The CHR investigation concluded however that
based on witness testimony and forensic analysis from the CHR-conducted autopsy—
contrary to the autopsy report of the municipal health officer—that Buaga was
summarily executed.225 In Cagayan province, soldiers killed Noel Capili, in what the
military alleges to be a legitimate military operation. However, based on a CHR
221
Tonette Orejas, "2 Rebs Slain in Clash after End of Truce," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
January 10, 2002.
222
Orejas et al. A year prior, soldiers killed two alleged rebels in Umingan, Pangasinan in
armed clashes but human rights NGO Karapatan maintained that they were unarmed farmers
Remy Rueda Rivera and Adelaida Cabiao. Tonette Orejas and Yolanda Fuertes, "3
Communist Rebels Slain in New Clashes with Gov't Troops in Luzon," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, June 2, 2001.
223
Villamor Visaya and Tonette Orejas, "Rights Groups Accuse Army of Executing Rebs,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 25, 2002.
224
In March, 2002, military intelligence took Warlito Nagasao was taken from his home in
Isabela and was found dead several days later in Ifugao province in the Cordilleras. Nagasao
was a member of Bayan Muna but “suspected as an NPA organizer. "Political Killings in
Region 02 as Reported by Karapatan," (January 20, 2006).
225
"Resolution 1-003-26 For: Violation of the Right to Life without Due Process of Law
Resulting to the Murder of the Deceased Pablo N. Buaga," (Commission on Human Rights,
August 8 2005).
63
investigation of the incident, the CHR lodged a criminal case with the provincial
prosecutor, who then charged the involved soldiers with murder.226
The NPA in Northern Luzon stepped up its attacks in the first half of 2005,
raiding military installations and making off with armaments.227 In Ilocos Sur and the
Cordilleras, the military suffered multiple losses. 228 Retaliation was fierce and
civilians bore the brunt of it. For instance, in an Abra town, farmer Francisco
Tangbawan was allegedly used by government soldiers as a human shield amid an
armed encounter with NPA fighters.229 Tangabawan was killed as a result and BaayLicuan residents asked that the 41 Infantry Battalion be pulled out of Abra over such
st
violations of human rights. In Isabela province, the military claimed the lives of two
fighters from the NPA Central Front of Cagayan Valley as well as the alleged team
leader of the Northern Front and two of his fighters.230 Meanwhile, the NPA Benito
Tesorio command in Cagayan Valley launched separate ambushes on December 15,
2005, killing four unidentified soldiers.231
Meanwhile, calls for President Arroyo’s impeachment over electoral fraud the
year before intensified. As a result, there was a surge in lethal attacks against leftist
activists in 2005. Deepening militarization in the Cordilleras, especially Kalinga
province, and nearby parts of Ilocos Sur already began to affect civilians and activists
226
"Resolution II-2004-038 For: Murder (of Noel Capili)," (Commission on Human Rights,
September 28, 2004).
227
Alexander Remollino, "99 Soldiers Killed in NPA Offensives in 4 Months," Bulatlat.com
IV, no. 1 June 18, 2005, http://bulatlat.com/main/2005/06/18/99-soldiers-killed-in-npaoffensives-in-4-months/.
228
In 2005, Corporal Alvin Rambac and eight other soldiers of the 50th Infantry Battalion
were killed by suspected NPA fighters in an ambush near Cervantes town, Ilocos Sur.
Leoncio Balbin, "9 Soldiers Slain in Ambush," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 15, 2005. In
April 2005, suspected NPA fighters killed Diosdado Claveria, village chief in San Isidro,
Abra. Artha Kira Paredes, "Village Chief Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 20,
2005. Suspected NPA rebels killed solders Ricardo Gabriel, Philip Domingo and Albert
Again at the Pinukpok-Baiban boundary, Kalinga in November 2005. Dona Pazzibugan, "5
Troopers Killed in Clashes with NPA," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 30, 2005.
229
Desiree Caluza, "Abra Townsfolk Seek Pullout of Army Troops," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, September 10, 2005.
230
Villamor Visaya, "2 Rebels Slain in Clash," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 5, 2005. "3
NPA Rebels Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 18, 2005.
231
"4 Soldiers Killed in Clash," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 19, 2005.
64
the year before.232 However, a series of killings in March signified a shift in the scale
of the violence. Paramilitary forces augmented the military capacity, enabling
heightened attacks. On March 9, 2005, a gunman from the Revolutionary Proleteriat
Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPA-ABB) shot dead Romeo Sanchez in Baguio
City. The group is one of the most prominent breakaways from the NPA. After a
peace process with the government in 2000, the RPA-ABB was rumored to play a
paramilitary role for the government and continued to clash with the NPA.233 Sanchez
was the Ilocos regional coordinator for Bayan Muna. 234 The RPA-ABB claimed
responsibility for the slaying, stating that Sanchez was a traitor to peasants. The local
group Cordillera Human Rights Alliance claimed that the RPA-ABB of Ilocos served
as paramilitary forces of the 50 Infantry Battalion in Ilocos Sur.235 In Aringay town
th
of La Union in March 2005, an unidentified gunman shot and wounded Charles
Juloya. Juloya was a member of the Bayan Muna party, a former municipal councilor
and brother of a former mayor of the town.236 As the year wore on, more violence
mounted in the Cordillera and Ilocos regions.237
232
Abigail Bengwayan, "Groups Decry Atrocities in Cordillera," Bulatlat.com IV, no. 45
December 12-18, 2004, http://bulatlat.com/news/4-45/4-45-cordillera.html.
233
"Rebolusyonaryong Partido Ng Manggagawa Ng Pilipinas (Revolutionary Workers Party
of the Philippines) and Its Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPMP/RPA-ABB)," in Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups & Human Security Efforts in the
Philippines, ed. Diana Rodriguez (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of
International and Development Studies, 2010), 280.
234
Desiree Caluza, Michael Lim Ubac, and Norman Bordadora, "Another Bayan Leader
Killed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 11, 2005.
235
"CHR Memorandum Re: Study/Analysis of Reported Political Killings," (2006).
236
Desiree Caluza and Yolanda Sotelo-Fuertes, "Cordillera Cops Identify Killer of Ilocos
Bayan Muna Leader," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 29, 2005.
237
Jose Manegded, coordinator of the group Rural Missionaries of the Philippines in
Cordillera and Ilocos, was allegedly murdered by army captain Joel Castro in November
2005. Desiree Caluza, "Ilocos Cops Tag Army Exec Suspect in Militant's Slay," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, January 9, 2007. In Bangued, Abra, a sheriff of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, farmer organizer and human rights activist Albert Terredaño was also murdered that
month. "Resolution for CHR/CRC Case No. 06-39 (Re: Arbitrary Deprivation of Life of
Albert Terredaño)," (Commission on Human Rights, January 15, 2007).
65
In February 2006, military agents were suspected of killing the Bayan Muna
Vice Chair in Pangasinan, Mariano Sepnio.238 A police corporal, Jessie Caranto, was
charged with the killing of Calanan village chair Gabriel Lumbican and his father in
March 2006 as well as the ambush of Bayan Muna Kalinga chapter chair, Constancio
Claver and his family, which resulted in the death of his wife.239 A lone gunman shot
Jose Doton, Bayan Muna provincial general secretary, and his brother in San Nicolas
town. Doton was the fifth activist murdered that week alone in May, throughout the
country.240 Local police alleged that Doton was a victim of an internal purge within
the NPA, but leftist groups denied this and accused them of covering up state
involvement in the murders.241 The shooter, Joel Flores, was arrested and found guilty
of Doton’s murder.242
On May 10, 2006, Bayan Muna Cagayan Valley secretary general Elena
Mendiola was killed with her fellow Bayan Muna member and common law partner
Ricardo Balauag in Echague, Isabela. This was the second assassination attempt on
Mendiola within a 24-hour period. She had led several political protests in the locale,
demanding an increase in the purchase price for rice and corn produced by farmers.243
The following month, Rafael Bangit, a key leader of the Cordillera People’s Alliance
238
Yolanda Sotelo-Fuertes, "Bayan Member Shot," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 12,
2006. Manny Galvez, "Maybe They Killed Themselves, Says Palparan of Slain Activists,"
The Philippine Star February 9, 2016, http://www.philstar.com/nation/320745/maybe-theykilled-themselves-says-palparan-slain-activists.
239
Villamor Visaya, "Barangay Chief, Pa Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 3, 2006.
See also Jaime Laude, "Lawman Tagged in Ambush of Bayan Muna Leader," The Philippine
Star September 25, 2006, http://www.philstar.com/nation/359656/lawman-tagged-ambushbayan-muna-leader. See also "CHR Memorandum Report Re: More Killings in Kalinga,"
(2006).
240
Yolanda Sotelo-Fuertes, "2 New Slays for Task Force," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May
17, 2006.
241
Tonette Orejas et al., "Pangasinan Militants Accuse Cops of Coverup," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, May 24, 2006.
242
"Resolution 1-006-47 For: Arbitrary Deprivation of Life (Violation of Right to Life, of
Jose and Diosdado Doton)," (Commission on Human Rights, March 21, 2009).
243
Villamor Visaya, "2 More Leftists Shot Dead: Bayan Muna Members Killed in 5 Years Hit
91," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 12, 2006.
66
and member of Bayan Muna, and a bystander were shot and killed in San Isidro,
Isabela.244 Bangit believed he had been subject to extensive surveillance prior to the
attack and the CHR investigated the possibility of a “military death squad”, noting
that “there is no group with overflowing logistics and without fear of being monitored
by government agents ... suspected to be responsible in the killing of the victims
except those sanctioned by the government itself.”245 Two months later, Madonna
Castillo, who had replaced Mendiola at Bayan Muna, was also killed—allegedly by
the military death squad.246
The Commission on Human Rights investigated a spate of killings with
possible military involvement in Ilocos Sur that occurred in October and November
2006. Laureaneano Galicia, village chief of Tabloc, Candon City in Ilocos Sur,
disappeared in mid-October 2006, and it was believed that he was abducted by the
military. Prior to vanishing, he received a white envelope with a black ribbon. This
was understood to be a threat, considering that several other local officials and
activists received similar ribbons and were publicly “red tagged” as NPA supporters
by the military. Shortly after, village chief and member of the local Peasant Group
Against Exploitation, Robert Abaya, was gunned down by four unidentified persons
on motorcycles in Sta. Cruz town. 247 Brothers Demstrio and Orlando Salvador, were
also murdered in the same village but under unclear circumstances. Finally, an
244
Villamor Visaya and Desiree Caluza, "Police Say Cordillera Killing Was Well Planned,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 10, 2010.. See also "Another Militant Leader Gunned Down
in Isabela," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 9, 2010.
245
"Memorandum Re: Investigation Report on the Killing of Rafael Markus Bangit and
Gloria Casuga," (2006).
246
"Memorandum Re: Special Report on the Assassination of Madonna Castillo, a Student
Activist and Bayan Muna Local Chairperson," (2006). See also Villamor Visaya and Tonette
Orejas, "Woman Peasant Leader Fights for Life after Isabela Attack," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, July 21, 2006.Also Villamor Visaya and Desiree Caluza, "1 More Militant Leader
Added to Left Death Toll," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 22, 2006.
247
"Memorandum Re: Case of the Different Alleged HRV Committed ... Ilocos Sur,"
(Commission on Human Rights, November 26, 2006).
67
attempt was made on Billy Austin, pastor of the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines and provincial chair of the leftist party Bayan. He was shot and wounded
by unknown armed men on his way to the local Bayan office after having conducted a
human rights seminar.248
The insurgency-related violence that targeted members of the political left
diminished considerably in 2007 until the end of the Arroyo presidency in 2010.
Although the scale of the violence was much lower, similar dynamics were at play.
Insurgency and local politics commingled, particularly during the 2007 elections in
May and barangay elections in October.249 Some communist factions continued their
attempt to press into the Northern Luzon regions.250 The NPA targeted the military,
but were increasingly constrained from exacting losses as they had in previous
years.251 The military still targeted activists but the pace no longer was at the staccato
frequency as in the mid-2000s and the numbers remained low.252 In some ways, the
248
Leoncio Balbin, Desiree Calusa, and Yolanda Sotelo-Fuertes, "Ilocos Bayan Head
Survives Gun Attack," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 11, 2006.
249
The NPA’s Reynaldo Piñon Command “executed” Dibuluan village chief, Nicolas
Collado, in October 2007 in San Mariano, Isabela. Collado, who ended his final term as
barangay chair, was executed for “blood debts to the people.” Villamor Visaya, "Village
Chair Killed in Isabela," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 5, 2007. Armed men
“identified with a politician” in Barangay Alaoa-TApayen killed NPA guerilla Lilette Fatima
Raquel, allegedly a member of the Agustin Begnalen Command, in October 2007 in Tineg,
Abra. Desiree Caluza, "Up Journ Graduate-Turned-Reb Dies in Clash with Troops,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 1, 2007.
250
In 2007, police exchanged fire with alleged rebels and killed an unidentified woman and
wounded two other in Bagulin town, La Union. The violence occurred as police captured two
leaders of the Marxista-Leninistang Partido ng Pilipinas-Rebolusyonaryong Hukbo ng Bayan
(MLPP-RHB). Active in Western Pangasinan and Zambales, the MLP-RHB splintered off
from the Communist Party of the Philippines and New People’s Army and were reportedly
expanding into La Union and Benguet. Yolanda Sotelo-Fuertes, "2 Arrested Leaders of Red
Group Brought to Police Headquarters," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 17, 2007.
251
In a significant NPA operation on August 1, 2008 in Malibcong Abra, 1st Lt. Eduard Siaed and privates Aurelio Begtang and Jones Andrade of the 41st Infantry Battalion were killed
by insurgents suspected to be part of the Agustin Begnalen Command. Sia-ed had been
suspected of the 2004 extra-judicial killing of farmer Etfew Chadyaas. Leoncio Balbin and
Tonette Orejas, "At Least 2 Soldiers Slain in Abra Clash," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August
4, 2008.
252
One case, however, was the abduction and disappearance of indigenous rights activist and
founding member of the Cordillera People’s Alliance, James Balao in September 2008.
68
military presence in the region settled into a form of casual excess, including sexual
violence against women and young girls. 253 The army claimed that they had
successfully pacified the Cagayan Valley provinces La Union and Nueva Vizcaya by
2009 as well as Pangasinan in Ilocos and Apayao and Kalinga in the Cordilleras by
2010.254
However, clashes between the military and communist insurgents swelled
again, particularly from 2011 to 2014 (except during the 2013 election period), as
well as against activists.255 The relative magnitude was smaller compared to the mid2000s. Moreover, central government support for military involvement in natural
resource extraction indicated that different central-local dynamics were at play. The
military had been involved in enforcing state encroachment into upland areas,
precipitating resistance and Cordillera rebellion in particular during the Marcos
dictatorship.256 In 2008, President Arroyo directed military deployment to Mindanao
Shortly after, a Benguet court issued a Writ of Amparo and the CHR a resolution on the
forced disappearance of Balao, the CHR proceeded to search several military and police
detention centers, to no avail. "Chronology of Events on James Balao Case (CHR-CAR Case
No. 0846)," (2014). See also Vincent Cabreza, "Militants Fail to Find Activist in Military
Camps," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 6, 2008.
253
Karapatan (Alliance for the Advancement of People's Rights), "2012 Karapatan Year-End
Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines," 56.
254
Lalaine Jimenea, "Military Says Northern Luzon 'Insurgency-Free'," The Philippine Star
January 16, 2014, http://beta.philstar.com/nation/2014/01/16/1279535/military-says-northernluzon-insurgency-free.
255
For instance, in Abra province, soldiers killed eight NPA insurgents in Tineg town in 2011
and seven in Lacub town, 2014. Karapatan (Alliance for the Advancement of People's
Rights), "2015 Karapatan Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the
Philippines," (Quezon City: Karapatan, 2015), 27. In 2012, the NPA ambushed and killed
soldiers Normandy Maravilla, Norie Cahena and Wendel Clemente in Asipulo, Ifugao.255 In
2012, the military reported that 6 suspected NPA fighters were killed in a clash in Natonin,
Mountain province; while the Cordillera Peoples Democratic Front (CPDF) denied casualties
on either side, 11 soldiers of the 86th Infantry Battalion were ambushed and killed by the NPA
in Tinoc, Ifugao a few days later. Vincent Cabreza and Villamor Visaya, "11 Soldiers, 2
Others Die in Ambush," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 26, 2012.
256
"Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA)," in Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups
and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2010), 319-20.
69
to protect foreign investments in mining sites from NPA attacks, calling them
“investment defense forces”.257
Elected president in 2010, Benigno Aquino refused to honor a campaign
promise to revoke an Arroyo executive order paramilitary forces.258 Instead, President
Aquino directed the military in 2011 to mobilize civilian militias in the provision of
security for mining companies.259 The following year, Aquino issued Executive Order
No. 79 on the mining sector, which included a general provision for the police and
military to provide security at mining sites.260 Human rights groups decried this as
“marching orders” to the army and paramilitary groups to clear mining areas.261 The
mining policy also undermined local ordinances that banned mining in some
provinces, but President Aquino insisted that national policy had primacy over local
legislation.262
The expansion of mining activities in mineral rich regions like Northern
Luzon led to violence against activists and conflict within communities. Randy
Domingo and his sister-in-law Sheryl Ananayao-Puguon, were shot and killed by
unidentified gunmen riding tandem on a motorcycle at the Nueva Vizcaya-Quirino
border in 2012. Police investigators believed that Domingo was the assassination
257
"Arroyo Orders Military to Guard Mindanao Mining Areas," GMA News Online April 17,
2008, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/regions/89872/arroyo-orders-military-toguard-mindanao-mining-areas/story/.
258
Marcos Mordeno, "Dismantle Paramilitary Groups Too, Ny Based Rights Monitor Urges
Aquino," Mindanews March 31, 2012, http://www.mindanews.com/humanrights/2012/03/dismantle-paramilitary-groups-too-ny-based-rights-monitor-urges-aquino/.
259
"Philippines: Killings of Environment Advocates Unpunished," Human Rights Watch
July 18, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/18/philippines-killings-environmentadvocates-unpunished.
260
ABS-CBN News, "Pnoy's Mining EO No. 79," ABS-CBN News July 9, 2012,
http://news.abs-cbn.com/-depth/07/09/12/pnoys-mining-eo-no-79.
261
Karapatan (Alliance for the Advancement of People's Rights), "2012 Karapatan Year-End
Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines," 9.
262
Christine Avendano and Vincent Cabreza, "Aquino on New Mining EO: Governors Can
Go to Court," Philippine Daily Inquirer June 26, 2012,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/218529/aquino-on-new-mining-eo-governors-can-go-to-court.
70
target, under the alias Randy Nabayay, who may have had business dealings with the
Australian firm OceanaGold Mining.263 On the other hand, activist groups suspected
that the true object was Ananayao-Puguon, due to her membership in the group
Didipio Earthsavers’ Multipurpose Association (DESAMA) that is opposed to the
mining projects in the province.264 Some residents resisted OceanaGold’s efforts to
clear land for the mining project, leading to violent confrontations between the
company’s armed guards and protesters in the past.265 In 2014, unidentified gunmen
killed village chief Paulino Baguilat in Didipio village in Kasibu, which had been
deeply divided due to the OceanaGold project.266
The NPA often made common cause with villages that opposed mining
activities. In Cagayan province, the NPA Danilo Ben Command-West Cagayan Front
claimed to have assassinated Gonzaga town mayor Carlito Pentecostes because their
“revolutionary court” sentenced him to death for his role in the arrest of a rebel leader
and for being a proponent of black sand mining.267 Nonetheless, Pentecostes had been
controversial for his vocal support for black sand mining undertaken by Chinese
companies in the town. While the mayor argued that mining was a lucrative financial
263
Police also noted that Nabayay was involved in a series of robberies with homicide,
murder and other offenses, as well as a land dispute. Police Senior Inspector John Rigomano,
"Special Report on Shooting Incident (Randy Domingo Aka Randy Nabayyay)," (Cabarroguis
Police Station, 2012).
264
Artemio Dumlao, "Lawman Tagged in Ambush of Bayan Muna Leader," The Philippine
Star December 10, 2012, http://www.philstar.com/nation/2012/12/10/884131/anti-miningactivist-kin-killed-nueva-vizcaya. An initial CHR investigation found that Ananayao-Puguon
was not a DESAMA member, although her mother was. "Initial Investigation Report on
Killing of Randy Domingo Y Puguon A.K.A. Randy Nabayay and Sheryll Ananayao-Puguon
by Unidentified Armed Men at Purok 7, Barangay Tucod, Cabaruguis, Quirino, on December
7, 2012," (2012).
265
Melvin Gascon, "Shooting Mars Lent in Mining Village," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
March 24, 2008.
266
Baguilat was popular among the pro-mining residents but he had disgruntled villagers with
supposed inaction over the mining firm’s alleged violations—land evictions in particular.
"Vizcaya Village Chief in Mining Row Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 31, 2008.
267
Separately, the military expressed doubt that the crime scene evidence supported the
NPA’s claim of responsibility for the murder. Villamor Visaya, "NPA Admits Killing Mayor
over Black Sand Mining," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 26, 2014.
71
base for the municipality’s economic development, residents were uneasy about the
industry.268 In Ilocos Sur, local anti-mining advocates had successfully pressed for
national government intervention on the illegal mining of magnetite or black sand in
2013, but the alleged resumption of magnetite extraction backed by local politicians
prompted speculation that the NPA might act as it did in Cagayan by assassinating
Pentecostes.269
State Weakness and Violent Politics?
This chapter on Northern Luzon has demonstrated why some claims about
violence in Philippine politics need to be examined more closely for their contextual
dynamics. On the one hand, the central state contradicted its putative weakness in
toppling Abra warlord Vicente Valera in 2007 and constraining private armies in the
province. Although the scale of violence in Abra was out of proportion with the rest
of election-related violence in Northern Luzon, the use of violence and coercive
intimidation to underwrite the dominance of clans was not. In Northern Luzon, local
political factions employed violence to forestall political competition by dissuading
rivals from running in the first place. Assassinations and harassment continued during
the intervals between election years, in part because central monitoring of violence is
at its most intense only in the four months prior to, and a month after, an election. It is
during this period that the Commission on Elections might begin designating towns,
cities and provinces as sites for additional police or military presence. As the Abra
268
Marvin Gascon, "Gunmen Kill Cagayan Town Mayor," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April
22, 2014.
269
Kyle Francisco, "Blacksand Mining Still Ravages Ilocos Sur," Bulatlat May 20, 2014,
http://bulatlat.com/main/2014/05/20/blacksand-mining-still-ravages-ilocos-sur/.
72
case also demonstrates, some local political factions have either police or military
backing – their presence can swing the balance of favor in an electoral outcome.
However, the dynamics in Northern Luzon also contradict a common portrayal
of Philippine local politics as inherently violent. Political dynasties constrain
meaningful democratic competition but may also diminish violence. The Singson case
in Ilocos Sur province illustrates this dynamic. Singson was a feared local strongman
from the time of the Marcos dictatorship. Singson waited in the congressional wings
until the Corazon Aquino government was over before resuming the governorship.
His role in the Estrada impeachment entangled him in national politics, but he was
ultimately unable to transcend provincial politics and failed a run for the senate. His
political career coming to an end, he refocused his attentions from his own electability
to transforming his dissipating clout into patrimonial endowment. Singson followed
the pattern of other highly successful political dynasties in Northern Luzon who
managed to perpetuate themselves in power far longer: reduce uncertainty by
avoiding contestation. Ostensibly, he pulled this strategy off without recourse to
further violence. In the waning of his political career, a preference for intimidation
rather than annihilation could explain why targets were wounded rather than killed.
With regard to non-electoral violence, the communist insurgency initially
shaped the contours of political violence in Northern Luzon. The NPA’s ability to act
as a force in local politics diminished under the pressure of military engagement and
the co-optation of other insurgent groups into state troops. In 2005 and 2006, the
military expanded violence against activists that were involved in peasant
organization. Farmers were frequent victims of violent military excesses as well. The
army successfully hemmed the NPA into the Cordilleras and bordering areas in Ilocos
and Cagayan. However, after 2011, army and militia involvement in the violent
73
defense of natural resource extraction resulted in a new pattern of political violence
for wealth control.
First and foremost, the Northern Luzon case provides insight into
particularistic, locally led political violence. Mainly related to elections, violence
peaks and subsides according to campaign and poll schedules—every three years. A
significant observation, however, is that intra-elite moderation and long-term
domination by a few political dynasties has kept violence low overall in comparison
to the other regional cases. Although the central government may tolerate the
violence, if the violence escalates and central elites form an antagonistic attitude
towards local ones, the state may act to dismantle the private coercive forces of
entrenched local strongmen—as in the case of Governor Valera in Abra. Secondly,
the Northern Luzon case highlights the ways in which counter-insurgency operations
may escalate violence in response to security threats. The central government thus
pursues a statist aim of regulating violence in society, despite its inability to achieve a
monopoly over the use of force.
74
Chapter 3. The Communist Threat in Eastern Visayas
The NPA insurgency posed a much greater threat to the state in Eastern
Visayas than in the other regions in this study. Consequently, the military response to
the insurgent activity is what explains the most dominant pattern of political violence
in the region. Compared to Southern Mindanao or Northern Luzon, the military was
less driven by particularistic interests in natural resource extraction. Moreover, unlike
in Central Luzon, the military acted with more autonomy from local elites. Unable to
root out insurgents and sympathizers from local communities, it pursued a strategy of
indiscriminate violence against civilians. Because of the difficulties in combating
insurgent guerrilla warfare, states tend to employ large-scale violence against entire
populations—to quote a macabre counter-insurgency aphorism, “the surest way to
catch the fish is by draining the sea”.270 A similar logic underpinned violence against
civilian populations and displacement in Eastern Visayas.
The NPA insurgency and military counter-insurgency accounts for most of the
violence in attacks, ambushes and assassinations. The NPA proved to be a formidable
foe, extracting higher casualty tolls on the military in Eastern Visayas than it did in
other regions. In other words, the main driver of violence was the insurgency and the
corresponding response of state security forces to the threat. Soldiers may have also
vented their ire against villages in reprisal. It was in this region that the military began
to escalate its use of lethal force against activists. Over time, the army successfully
cut insurgents off from civilian support in Eastern Visayas, virtually routing the NPA
from what once was a communist stronghold.
270
Mao Zedong had likened guerrillas among “the masses” to fish who inhabit the sea.
Consequently, many political leaders and military commanders have made the analogy of
draining the sea to the mass killing of civilians to combat guerrilla warfare. Benjamin
Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, "'Draining the Sea': Mass Killing and
Guerrilla Warfare," International Organization 8, no. 2 (2004): 384-85.
75
Map 2. Eastern Visayas Provinces
The Eastern Visayas region consists of three island groupings: Biliran, Leyte
and Samar. Leyte island is divided into two provinces, Leyte and Southern Leyte,
while Samar island is divided into Western Samar, Eastern Samar and Northern
Samar (See Map 2 above). 271 Violence was concentrated the most on Samar island,
particularly Western Samar, and to some extent in Leyte province. Remarkably,
hardly any violence occurred in Biliran and Southern Leyte. Overall, 69 percent of the
violence in Eastern Visayas was insurgency-related (see Appendix 2); moreover,
unlike in other regions, military, paramilitary and police personnel were the most
frequent targets (30 percent).
271
Officially “Samar province”, the locale is sometimes colloquially referred to as Western
Samar. To avoid confusion with respect to the other similarly named provinces, “Western
Samar” is used in this dissertation.
76
Figure 6. Pattern of Insurgency-related Violence in Eastern Visayas
60
50
40
30
Other patterns of
violence
20
Insurgency-related
0
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
10
Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly
disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 7 for frequency distribution table
There was a steady increase of violence between NPA and the military in the
Samar provinces and Leyte until 2003 (see Figure 6 above). Insurgency-related
violence intensified in 2005 when Major General Jovito Palparan was assigned to the
region but dropped when he left. Violence heightened again in 2007 as the military
resumed its counter-insurgency campaign. The overall level of insurgency-related
violence decreased from 2008 onwards except in Northern Samar, where it was
relatively quiet until 2009 and 2010. The government estimated that seven rebel fronts
operated in Eastern Visayas in the early 2000s. The number may have dropped to as
few as four by 2010 and violence became rare afterwards.272
With regard to elections, Eastern Visayas demonstrated the same pattern as in
most of the other regions in this study. Violence peaked around election seasons,
every three years starting in 2001, except in 2010 (See Figure 7 below). As with
insurgency-related violence, Western Samar was the site of the most violence while
272
"The Strategic and Tactical Activities of CPP-NPA-NDF in the White Areas." Rodriguez
and Santos, 12.
77
the provinces of Biliran and Southern Leyte experienced next to no violence at all.
The NPA insurgency also figures prominently in elections in Eastern Visayas.
Figure 7. Pattern of Election-related Violence in Eastern Visayas
60
Other
patterns of
violence
Electionrelated
violence
50
40
30
Election Year
20
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
0
2001
10
Source: Author’s data, number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly
disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 7 for frequency distribution table
This chapter is organized into the following sections: (1) the state of
insurgency in the region from 2001 to 2004, characterized by a resurgence of the
NPA; (2) the heightening of insurgency-related violence in 2005 and the persistence
of state violence in Eastern Visayas until 2007; (3) the general decline of insurgency
related violence afterwards except in Northern Samar; and, (4) election cycles that
resulted in violence involving clans in Western Samar and Leyte and the
complications of the communist insurgency as well as the curious lack of any
violence in two provinces.
78
“The Butcher” in Eastern Visayas
In Eastern Visayas, the NPA did not split into moderate and radical
factions. 273 The communists in the region remained committed to an armed
insurgency. By early 2001, the military reported that around 250 villages were
infiltrated by the NPA.274 From 2001 to 2003, the NPA launched several attacks
against the military.275 The army suffered multiple casualties—such as in a 2001 raid
by suspected insurgents on an army detachment in a hinterland village of San Jose de
Buan town, Samar that left seven soldiers dead.276 In 2002 in Leyte, suspected NPA
insurgents killed Alex Ajenga and three other scout rangers in Mahaplag town.277 In
2003, a NPA attack on Quinapondan town in Eastern Samar was repulsed by two
policemen and prominently reported in the national media. 278 Four days later, around
200 insurgents attacked an isolated army patrol base in another Eastern Samar town
and killed 17 people: eleven militiamen, five army soldiers and one civilian. It was
one of the biggest NPA raids since the 1980s, part of a series of attacks in the
province and in other areas of the country.279
273
William Holden, "The Never Ending War in the Wounded Land: The New People's Army
on Samar," Journal of Geography and Geology 5, no. 4 (2013): 37-42.
274
Vicente Labro, "NPA Shadow Gov'ts in Samar Bared," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October
7, 2002.
275
For example, suspected insurgents ambushed and killed Staff Sergeant Orlando Vinculado
in Can-avid town, Eastern Samar in May, 2002. Lethal NPA ambushes also occurred in
Tacloban, Leyte. Vicente Labro, Cynthia Borgueta, and Anthony Allada, "NPA Ambushes
Continue in Samar, Davao Norte," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 3, 2002. Cynthia
Borgueta, "Soldier Slain, Civilian Hurt in NPA Ambush in E. Samar," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, May 2, 2002. In January 2003 in Catamaran, Northern Samar, suspected NPA
insurgents of the Rodante Urtal Command killed the operations chief of the 803rd brigade,
major Danilo Bilion. Marc Villavicencio, "NPA Owns up Killing of Army Major," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, February 25, 2003.
276
Vicente Labro, "Judge Orders Arrest of 200 Rebels Who Killed 7 Soldiers," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, March 27, 2002. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-01-36 Re: Ssgt. Luceno P.
De Guzman et. al.," (Commission on Human Rights, September 14, 2001).
277
"CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-02-59 Re: Mahayahay Mahaplag Ambush Re: Killing of
Msg Alex Ajenga et. al.," (Commission on Human Rights, February 18, 2003).
278
Cyrain Cabueñas, "2 Policemen Repel 20 NPA Attackers," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June
23, 2003.
279
"17 Killed in NPA Attack," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 27, 2003.
79
The NPA was deeply entrenched throughout the Samar island provinces,
either by acting as a parallel government, providing some forms of social services and
enforcing its dominance through coercive means and “revolutionary” justice.280 The
military thus had a very difficult task in rooting out insurgents from among the
population. 281 As a result, the military targeted civilians suspected of being NPA
members or sympathizers, or went after known family members. For example, in
Pinabacdao town in February 2002, soldiers killed civilians two men whom they
accused of being NPA, claiming it was an armed encounter but it was more likely a
summary execution.282 In another incident later that year, the daughter of National
Democratic Front (NDF) consultant Abdias Guadiana was allegedly abducted by the
army and was last seen on a bus with a military officer.283 The military also inflicted
violence upon suspected insurgents and civilians in Leyte.284
280
Holden, 41. For instance, in November 2001 in Basey town, Samar, 20 suspected NPA
insurgents seized bamboo farmer Bernardino Guiuan while he was in the midst of dispute
mediation with the barangay chairman; the NPA accused him of involvement in the death of
two people in the town. "CHR Resolution Case No.:08-2002-08 Re: Bernardino G. Guiuan,"
(Commission on Human Rights, April 4, 2002). In January 2003 in Calbiga town, Samar,
gunmen who identified themselves as NPA members killed Mario Ocasla, a rebel “returnee”
granted amnesty in 2001. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-05-38 Re: Marlo Ocasla,"
(Commission on Human Rights, October 6, 2005). In March, in Basey, Celso Tabucao was
abducted by six armed men; his wife subsequently received a letter from the NPA Jorge
Bulito Command that he was “sentenced to death” by the NPA for involvement in killing,
participating in anti-NPA intelligence, membership in a death squad, among other charges.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-03-19 Re: Celso Tabucao, Jr.," (Commission on Human
Rights, May 22, 2003).
281
Marc Villavicencio, "Army Seeks Mayors’ Help against Rebs," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
July 20, 2003.
282
"CHR Resolution Case No.:08-02-09 Re: Alberto Ocenar and Roberto Cabueños,"
(Commission on Human Rights, September 9, 2002).
283
"CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-DO-02-006 Re: Rosa Guadiana," (Commission on Human
Rights, June 15, 2003). Also Nestor Burgos, "Reb's Daughter 'Abducted' by Army,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 10, 2002. In addition to the violation of Guadiana’s
daughter’s civil rights, the abduction breaches the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity
Guarantees that protects NDF consultants as they negotiate on behalf of the armed Left.
Jodesz Gavilan, "Fast Facts: The Jasig in the Peace Talks," Rappler February 8, 2017,
https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/160828-fast-facts-jasig-peace-talks-ndf.
284
In April 2003 in Kanaga, suspected government soldiers killed Eugenio Tazan and eight
others, including four teenagers. The army claims the nine were NPA members but the CHR
investigation found evidence of torture and contradicted the military’s assertion that these
80
Violence escalated and peaked when the regional military command was led
by a general with a history of extra-legal violence against leftist activists. Major
General Jovito Palparan was assigned to Eastern Visayas in February 2005 to
command the 8th Infantry Division. Palparan had served in Oriental Mindoro province
from 2001 to 2003, where he gained the monicker berdugo, meaning butcher. He was
linked to an estimated 32 alleged summary executions there, although he had been
suspected of other violations in Central Luzon, the Cordilleras and other parts of
Southern Luzon since the 1980s.285 In 2003, Palparan had been up for promotion from
colonel to brigadier general. The promotion was delayed, but not denied, amid
protests when two Karapatan activists investigating him for human rights violations in
Mindoro were themselves abducted and found dead. In 2004, he was promoted to the
rank of major general.286
By 2005, when Palparan was assigned to Eastern Visayas, the military
estimated that there were 600 to 700 fully armed rebels on Samar island and about
200 more on Leyte.287 Palparan publicly called Bayan Muna, a left wing political
party, as a front organization for the armed insurgency.288 In February 2005, the first
target of state violence was Father Allan Caparro, a member of the Iglesia Filipina
were combat deaths. Moreover, local NGOs in Tacloban maintained that the fatalities were
not insurgents but were farmers. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-03-30 Re: Killing of Nine
(9) Persons at Sitio Mahayahay, Brgy. San Isidro, Kanaga, Leyte," (Commission on Human
Rights, December 11, 2003). Aubrey Makilan, "GMA Accused as 'Coddler of Killers in
Uniform'," Bulatlat.com 3, no. 19 June 15, 2003, http://www.bulatlat.com/news/3-19/3-19killersinuniform.html. Joey Gabieta, "5 Soldiers, 10 Suspeted Rebels Killed in Holy Week
Clashes," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 12, 2003.
285
"Terror in Mindoro: The Murders of Eden Marcellana and Eddie Gumanoy," (Quezon
City: Ecumenical Consotium for a Just Peace, 2003), 43-51. Also Alexander Remollino,
"Palparan: From Mindoro to Iraq," Bulatlat.com IV, no. 1 February 1-7, 2004,
http://www.bulatlat.com/news/4-1/4-1-palparan.html.
286
Aries Hegina, "5 Things You Need to Know About Jovito Palparan," Philippine Daily
Inquirer August 12, 2014, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/628418/5-things-you-need-to-knowabout-jovito-palparan.
287
Joey Gabieta and Jani Arnaiz, "NPA Kills 6 Soldiers in Ambush," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, April 10, 2005.
288
Joey Gabieta, "Bayan Muna Decries Tag of CPP 'Front'," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May
6, 2005.
81
Independiente (Philippine Independent Church) and known critic of Palparan. Three
unidentified gunmen who were suspected soldiers under Palparan’s command
attempted to kill him in Abuyog town, Leyte.289 Shortly afterward, Palparan declared
that he would rid Eastern Visayas of anti-government demonstrations. A month later,
in March 2005, the legal counsel for Bayan Muna Eastern Visayas and local human
rights NGO Katungod, Feledito Dacut, was murdered in Tacloban City by two
unidentified men on motorcycle, suspected to be connected to Palparan’s 8th Infantry
Division.290
In April, Palparan condemned an NPA attack in Calbiga municipality, Samar,
in which six soldiers were killed, and warned that the military would launch a massive
clearing operation in the town.291 Palparan vowed to vanquish the rebellion in six to
twelve months. Within days, the military conducted aerial attacks, bombing villages,
and set up blockades to disrupt the provision of food to insurgents and flush them
out.292 A month after the Calbiga ambush, an estimated 900 people in eight villages of
the same town fled in mortal fear after alleged military harassment.293 Counterinsurgency operations displaced another 2,500 residents of remote villages in Basey
town that July. At a press conference, Palparan remarked that he hoped that the
evacuation would “serve them a lesson…. They can make a choice as to whether they
will support the government or the outlawed group”, alluding to the NPA.294
A succession of killings by government forces in Leyte and Samar continued
289
"Another Bayan Muna Leader Killed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 16, 2005.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-05-19 Re: Murder of Atty. Feledito C. Dacut,"
(Commission on Human Rights, June 3, 2005). Norman Bordadora, "Salonga Laments Rising
Number of Lawyers Killed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 25, 2005.
291
Gabieta and Arnaiz. “NPA Kills 6 Soldiers in Ambush”
292
Joey Gabieta, "Group Says Army Bombed Samar Villages, Blocked Food Supply,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 22, 2005.
293
"'Special Operations' Force Samar Folk to Flee," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 12, 2005.
294
"Palparan Says Villagers' Flight a Big Help to Troops," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 24,
2005.
290
82
until June. Some incidents involved multiple actions on the same day in different
locations, while others were spread out over a course of several days.295 Palparan
claimed that the military was gaining ground in its campaign against insurgency in
Eastern Visayas, particularly in Samar.296 A key feature of this offensive was the
targeting of activists of leftist political parties. After being threatened and subjected to
surveillance by soldiers and paramilitary forces, Bayan Muna and Anakpawis member
Alrico Barbas was attacked at home and killed along with one of his sons.297 Other
activists were forcibly abducted and have not resurfaced since. 298 Suspected soldiers
also tortured and killed several villagers and barangay tanod accused of being NPA
insurgents.299 Prior to Palparan’s arrival, such cases were rare in this region.
295
In April 2005, spouses Bayan Muna municipal coordinator Alfredo Davis and Abanse
Pinay (Filipina Advance) chair Imelda Davis were attacked in a tandem motorcycle shooting
in Mahaplag municipality, Leyte, suspected to be part of the pattern of targeting “cause
oriented” groups; Alfredo was killed while Imelda was wounded. "CHR Resolution Case No.:
08-05-20 Re: Alfredo Davis," (Commission on Human Rights, June 28, 2005). "Bayan Muna
Supporter Shot Dead; Wife Hurt," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 17, 2005. United Church
of Christ of the Philippines and former regional coordinator of Bayan Muna and Katungod
chair Edison Lapuz was shot and killed along with Alfredo Malinao, a peasant leader, in San
Isidro town. Lapuz had allegedly been subject to surveillance and death threats, frequently
visited by a soldier named Mangohon and others prior to his death. "CHR Resolution Case
No.: 08-05-27 Re: Murder of Rev. Edison Lapuz," (Commission on Human Rights, July 19,
2005). "Church Leaders Raise Alarm over Killings," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 16,
2005.
296
Jani Arnaiz, "Palparan Dares Militants to Denounce Killings," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
July 4, 2005.
297
"CHR Resolution Case No.: CHRP VIII-05-48 Re: Alrico Barbas et. al," (Commission on
Human Rights, December 14, 2005).
298
For instance, in February 2004 in Baybay town, Bayan Muna members Rolando Portaleza
and Jaqueline Paguntalan were forcibly abducted by seven armed men. Joey Gabieta, "Wife
of Abducted Left Activist Joins Search," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 8, 2004. See
also "Army Exec Denies Abduction of Bayan Muna Members," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
March 1, 2004. "AFP Faces Case on Missing Activists," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 12,
2004.
299
In Villareal, Constancio Calubid, suspected NPA, was tortured and killed shortly after he
and Ismael Solayao, a barangay tanod, were forcibly abducted by armed men believed to be
members of the AFP; the CHR recommended that an administrative case be filed against
General Palparan with the military ombudsman. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-05-36 Re:
Constancio Calubid, Ismael Solayao," (Commission on Human Rights, September 1, 2005).
Moreover, soldiers allegedly killed peasants Noel “Tuin” Versoza and Lindon “Boranting”
Pacon in Paranas town in August 2005. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0123 and
Final Report Re: Noel Versoza Alias Twin and Boranting," (Commission on Human Rights,
March 23, 2009). Pacon was only later identified and said to have been killed in 2006. "CHR
83
During his six-month tour of duty in Eastern Visayas, Palparan alleged that
fifty to sixty percent of the Samar population sympathized with the NPA.300 He also
accused local politicians of supporting the NPA, which he claimed had infiltrated
local governments. In turn, Western Samar’s congressman, Reynaldo Uy, accused
Palparan of being responsible for warrantless arrests, illegal searches, and the
disappearance and murder of activists during House hearings on national defense.301
Ostensibly bowing to pressure from Samar’s congressmen and human rights groups,
President Arroyo instructed the military to transfer Palparan out of Eastern Visayas in
August. 302 Unlike Uy and other critics, some local politicians like Uy’s rival,
Milagros Tan, and the governors of Southern Leyte and Eastern Samar, praised
Palparan and echoed his calls to outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines once
more.303 Even after being transferred to Central Luzon in August, Palparan may have
continued to exert an influence over military ground operations even after his transfer.
On August 31, 2005, suspected military elements killed Bayan Muna regional
coordinator Norman Bocar in Borongan town.304 Palparan quickly denied having
Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0124 Re: Lindon Pacon "A.K.A. Boranting"," (Commission
on Human Rights, May 20, 2009).
300
Figueroa pointed out that Palparan's allegation of the NPA's overwhelming infiltration
explains the rationale for the general’s military operations, and so" he must kill/annihilate our
population in order to win his war". Philip Tubeza and Bernice Mendoza, "Palparan: Deaths
Small Sacrifices," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 2, 2005. Likewise, Palparan’s accusations
that Bayan Muna was a communist front offended local officials like Villareal municipal
Mayor Renato la Torre, who was also the Bayan Muna coordinator of Samar. Gabieta,
"Bayan Muna Decries Tag of CPP 'Front'."
301
See also Philip Tubeza and Norman Bordadora, "Samar Solon Says Palparan ‘Friendly’
but with ‘No Soul’," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 26, 2005.
302
Joey Gabieta, "Palparan Leaving Samar, Says Solon," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August
19, 2005.
303
"Transfer of Army General Draws Mixed Reactions," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August
22, 2005. "3 Govs Back Proposal to Outlaw CPP," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 25, 2006.
304
The CHR noted that the slaying followed the pattern of assassinations of militant leaders
such as Felididto Dacut, Rodrigo Catayong, Edison Lapuz and Jose Maria Cui. "CHR
Resolution Case No.: VIII-06-48 Re: Norman Bocar," (Commission on Human Rights,
March 26, 2007).
84
anything to do with Bocar’s death. 305 But activists have charged that Palparan
continued to direct the overt and covert operations of some of the soldiers formerly
under his command.306
Counter-insurgency Continues
Palparan’s departure from Eastern Visayas slowed the violence down
temporarily, with a lull for two months before beginning again in Leyte.
Assassinations of Bayan Muna activists and armed encounters with rebels left several
dead.307 In the midst of the conflict, nine soldiers were killed in an explosion of rebelplanted land mines in neighboring Iloilo province.308
Two days later, on November 21, 2005, soldiers opened fire on a group of
over forty people who had gathered together in a village “balik uma” (return to the
land) ceremony in Palo town, Leyte. The ceremony marked the first day of tilling
lands that they received through the government’s agrarian reform program.309 Seven
farmers were killed in the attack, locally referred to as the San Agustin massacre. The
CHR investigation rejected the military claim that the incident was part of a legitimate
305
Tonette Orejas, Cyrain Cabueñas, and Joey Gabieta, "E. Visayas Bayan Chair Gunned
Down," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 2, 2005.
306
"Terror in Mindoro: The Murders of Eden Marcellana and Eddie Gumanoy," 51.
307
On November 7, 2005, former Bayan Muna organizer and community organizer for the
ruling Codilla clan, Jose Ducalang was killed in Ormoc City by shooters riding on a
motorbike; an alleged “Ormoc Death Squad” may have claimed responsibility (there are no
other reported cases of such a group aside from this). "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-05-02
Re: Jose A. Ducalang," (Commission on Human Rights, January 4, 2006). The next day,
Maricris Opo was killed in an armed encounter between suspected NPA insurgents and
soldiers in Baybay town. Jani Arnaiz, "18-Yr-Old Woman Reb's Body Found in Leyte,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 11, 2005. In Eastern Samar, unidentified gunmen riding
tandem on motorcycle, suspected to be military elements, killed the provincial chair of Bayan
Eastern Samar Ben Bajado in Maydulong town in November. Luige del Puerto, "Another
Bayan Leader Killed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 14, 2005.
308
Joey Gabieta and Vincent Labro, "Soldiers Raid Leyte Village, Kill 7 Farmers," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, November 22, 2005.
309
Johann Arpon, "Bullets Rain over Palo Farmers," Bulatlat December 3, 2005,
http://bulatlat.com/main/2005/12/03/bullets-rain-over-palo-farmers/. The author of this
article, Johann Arpon, claimed to have been present at the attack with a DYDW radio station
reporter Jazmin Bonifacio; they had been invited to cover the balik uma ceremony.
85
counter-insurgency campaign.310 Under public scrutiny as journalists at the balik uma
ceremony released a first-hand account of the violence, the military slowed down
counter-insurgency activities in Leyte.
Although overall levels of violence were significantly lower after Palparan’s
departure, the focus of the counter-insurgency campaign shifted back to Samar.311
Violence began to scale up in Motiong town in Western Samar. In January, suspected
NPA insurgents attacked a military convoy that had been near Karanas village on a
medical mission, killing six military personnel and two civilians. This sparked an
intense military operation in the area.312 On February 16, 2006, Generoso Labong was
shot at his brother’s house.313 On March 5, Noel Labong was shot near his house and
Levi Labong reported for duty as barangay watchman but did not return home
afterwards.314 On April 5, 2006, in Motiong, suspected soldiers killed Rogelio Jabaan
Dacutanan, a village councilor. He was shot twice in the back of his head.315
310
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-06-04 Re: Renato Dizon et. al," (Commission on Human
Rights, March 20, 2006).
311
Initially, there were only a few insurgency-related violence occurred on Samar island. In
one case, engineer Dalmacio Cepeda and two other members of the Samar Electric
Cooperative were killed in Catbalogan in September 2005; the army blamed the NPA, the
NPA blamed the military, claiming that the local army detachment had been accusing the
association’s linemen of being NPA couriers and sympathizers. "CHR Resolution Case No.:
08-05-37 Re: Ryan Cabrigas, Dalmacio S. Cepeda, Jr., Benedicto Gabon," (Commission on
Human Rights, October 25, 2005). In December 2005 in San Jose de Buan, the NPA claimed
responsibility for killing barangay Cataydungan chairman Pedro Dacles; they alleged that
Dacles was military intelligence. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0170 Re: Pedro
Dacles," (Commission on Human Rights, September 15, 2009).
312
"Report Re: Fact-Finding Mission at Brgy. Calapi, Motiong, Samar on the Alleged Forced
Evacuation from Brgy. San Andres, Brgy. Karanas and Brgy. Sto Niño, Motiong, Samar,"
(Commission on Human Rights, March 21, 2006).
313
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0174 Re: Generoso Labong," (Commission on
Human Rights, October 12, 2009).
314
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-06-12 Re: Noel Labong, Levi Labong," (Commission on
Human Rights, June 9, 2006).
315
The CHR investigation noted that the case followed the pattern of extralegal assassinations
in the region "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0121 Re: Rogelio Dacutanan,"
(Commission on Human Rights, January 12, 2009). Similarly, a Catbalogan barangay
kagawad Oscar Laboc was told to report to a Corporal Rocky Tapalla, who asked him to
confirm the contents of a barangay resolution signed by Laboc and other village councilors
that stated the village would stop supporting the NPA in any form, money or in kind; Laboc
86
By mid-2006, the military estimated that there were about 1,000 active NPA
fighters based in Eastern Visayas, most of whom were concentrated on Samar
island.316 The military deployed over 600 soldiers to Western Samar and Leyte and
vowed that the renewed counter-insurgency campaign would end the insurgency
within two years.317 Over the following months, the NPA continued its attacks on
military targets while the military continued to attack villagers they suspected of
being NPA sympathizers or insurgents.318 In Villareal town, soldiers accused Eddie
Albay of being an NPA insurgent and allegedly burned his family’s farmhouse and
stole their coconuts; his wife claimed that Albay was then forcibly abducted.319
Reports from provincial newspapers and local human rights NGO Katungod (human
rights, in the local language) claimed that as many as 14 farmers were killed in
different towns in Samar from September to November 2006.320
Suspected NPA sparrow assassins killed several targets in Eastern Samar and
Western Samar.321 One such target was Augusto Daclitan, former NPA and provincial
was then released but found dead on the road home, suspected killed by the military. "CHR
Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0119 Re: Oscar Laboc," (Commission on Human Rights,
January 23, 2009).
316
Gabieta, "3 Govs Back Proposal to Outlaw CPP."
317
President Arroyo earmarked PhP 1,000,000 for the training and redeployment of 3,000
troops for this purpose. Edra Benedicto, "AFP Beefs up Anti-Red Forces in Samar, Leyte,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 26, 2006.
318
For instance, on June 30, 2006, suspected NPA sparrow assassins killed paramilitary
member Pepe Legria in Catbalogan. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0075 Re: Pepe
Legria," (Commission on Human Rights, April 9, 2008).
319
Months later, Albay remained missing. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-06-53 Re: Eddie
R. Albay," (Commission on Human Rights, April 4, 2007).
320
Among the 14 peasants allegedly killed, the CHR investigated the cases of Emilio Jabulan
(reportedly killed in September 2006 in Catbalogan City), Arturo Nablo and Rene Abina
(allegedly killed on November 15, 2006 in Hinabangan town), Noel Verzosa and Lindon
Pacon (allegedly killed on August 14, 2005 in Paranas town) but could not find substantiating
evidence. "Final Investigation Report Case No.: VIII-2008-0131 Re: Emilio Jabulan,"
(Commission on Human Rights, December 22, 2008). The CHR could not corroborate that
Nablo and Abina had lived in the village where they were reportedly from, according to
Katungod as reported in San Juanico News. "CHR Joint Resolution Case No.: VIII-20080127, VIII-2008-0128 Re: Arturo Nablo and Rene Abina," (Commission on Human Rights,
November 5, 2008).
321
“Sparrow” refers to the NPA’s Special Partisan Unit of specially trained assassins.
87
coordinator of the anti-communist group Alliance of Nationalism and Democracy
(ANAD) in January, 2007.322 Within days of Daclitan’s murder, NPA assassins killed
civilians whom they suspected of spying for the military. They killed Alfonso Sabillo
in Catbalogan and Vestado Gabiana, a barangay chairman in Motiong town.323 In Las
Navas, Northern Samar, suspected NPA sparrows killed off-duty soldier Jose Baccol,
as he was harvesting rice in the field.324 In response to these actions, the military
targeted Bayan Muna leaders and other community organizers.325 The military also
sought to discourage electoral support for leftist parties and, in one incident, sent a
chilling message to the public. On May 11, 2007, the couple Manuel Pajarito, who
had been actively campaigning for labor group Anakpawis, and Juliet Fernandez,
campaigning for women’s rights group Gabriela, were taken by the military along
with another man. They were allegedly tortured and deprived of food. Fernandez was
322
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-25 Re: Augusto Daclitan," (Commission on Human
Rights, August 16, 2007). Joey Gabieta, "Anti-Red Leader in Samar Shot Dead," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, January 21, 2007.
323
"Solon to Meet with Comelec on Spate of Killings in Samar," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
February 4, 2007. Also "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0168 Re: Arturo Gabiana,"
(Commission on Human Rights, October 7, 2009).
324
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-DO-07-59 Re: Sgt. Jose Baccol," (Commission on
Human Rights, December 28, 2007). Assassins also killed Sergeant Reynaldo Bantayan in
Can-avid town, Eastern Samar, on December 21, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII2008-0074 Re: The Killing of Sgt. Reynaldo Bantayan," (Commission on Human Rights,
April 29, 2008).
325
In January, 2007, two men on motorcycles gunned down Bayan Muna member Dominador
de Luna in Catbalogan; de Luna’s wife, Concepcion, is provincial coordinator of Bayan Muna
and provincial board member. "Solon to Meet with Comelec on Spate of Killings in Samar."
Also "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-24 Re: Dominador De Luna," (Commission on
Human Rights, November 7, 2007). In February 2007 in Hinabangan town, suspected military
gunmen killed Sixto Azilan, member of the community organization Hinabangan Alliance for
Livelihood and Development. Azilan’s involvement in community organizations in
Hinabangan and nearby towns like Catbalogan had previously prompted the army's 8th
Infantry Division, then under Palparan, to invite him for questioning. "Urban Poor Leader
Killed in Samar Town," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 4, 2007. Apart from Western
Samar, similar attacks continued throughout the region. In January 2007,Jose Maria Cui, a
professor of the University of Eastern Philippines, and leader of various groups like the local
Alliance of Concerned Teachers and member of Bayan Muna was shot in his class, on
campus in Catarman. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-DO-07-001 Re: Extra-Judicial Killing
of Jose Maria Cui," (Commission on Human Rights, March 19, 2007). "Another Activist
Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 20, 2007. See also "Army Official Scores
Left's Claim on Killings," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 22, 2007.
88
pregnant and, according to witnesses’ accounts, several soldiers raped her while she
was in detention.326 In retaliation, the NPA executed Elisabeth Fernandez whom they
accused of being a military spy and responsible for the abduction of Fernandez and
Pajarito.327
Seven months later, the military presented Fernandez and Pajarito to the
media. Despite the AFP’s earlier denials that the couple had been in their custody, the
military confirmed that they had arrested the two. The two claimed to have been
treated kindly. Fernandez had given birth a month prior to her release and denied that
soldiers had raped her.328 The CHR investigation indicates that Parajito’s parents had
been active in the search for them until September 2007, when Parajito allegedly
visited them in the company of soldiers. The CHR also could not conclude that the
two had indeed been released despite being presented to the media and raised the
possibility that they were collaborating with the military. 329 NGOs accused the
military of coercing the couple and criticized the military’s publicity stunt,
challenging the government to release them so they could speak freely.330
The military resumed violence against civilians, to deter support for the rebels
326
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-DO-07-011 Re: Manuel Pajarito, Juliet Fernandez,"
(Commission on Human Rights, February 19, 2008). See also Benjie Oliveros, "Military in
Samar Abducted, Tortured Three Organizers, One Luckily Escaped," Bulatlat.com October
20, 2007, http://bulatlat.com/main/2016/06/14/6-years-under-aquino-media-killingsunabated-press-freedom-under-siege/.
327
Miriam Desacada, "NPA Abducts Government Spy," The Philippine Star November 20,
2007, http://www.philstar.com/nation/28463/npa-abducts-government-spy. The CHR
investigation also considered as motive that her husband was a ranking NPA leader and she
was responsible for his capture by the military. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-54 Re:
Elizabeth M. Gutierrez," (Commission on Human Rights, January 2, 2008).
328
Joey Gabieta and Jerome Aning, "Missing Activist Couple Released by Military in Leyte,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 30, 2007; Miriam Desacada, "NPA Couple Released,"
The Philippine Star December 30, 2007, http://www.philstar.com:8080/headlines/35787/npacouple-released.
329
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-DO-07-011 Re: Manuel Pajarito, Juliet Fernandez."
330
Jerome Aning, "Militants Welcome Release of Couple But.." Philippine Daily Inquirer,
December 30, 2007; "Karapatan Press Release," December 29, 2007,
http://www.samarnews.com/news2007/dec/f1429.htm.
89
in Leyte, Western and Eastern Samar.331 The NPA mirrored the military’s use of
violence for deterrence, likewise targeting local officials and paramilitary fighters for
collaborating with the army. 332 For instance, in Tacloban City, Leyte in July 2007,
Charlie Solayao, vice president of a market vendors’ association linked to Bayan
Muna was allegedly killed by suspected military or police agents. 333 Days later,
suspected NPA sparrow assassins killed Rogelio Picoy, who was believed to be an
331
In Mahaplag, Leyte on July 5, 2007, two gunmen suspected to be from the military killed
Guillermo Robin; Robin may have been considered a NPA sympathizer who, with his partner,
had been caring for NPA commander Fermin Gozon’s child. "CHR Resolution Case No.:
VIII-2009-0002 Re: Guilermo Robin," (Commission on Human Rights, January 23, 2009).
On July 22 in Villaba, Leyte, Feliciano Labrador and his wife and 12-year-old son as well as
Labrador’s visitor named Jessry were killed. The military claimed it was an armed encounter
and that Labrador was a former NPA insurgent, but the military officers had reportedly been
at the house for three hours before the family was killed, suggesting otherwise. "CHR
Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-32 Re: Feliciano Labrador et. al.," (Commission on Human
Rights, August 10, 2007). An unknown gunman killed Roberto Cabaljao in Hinabangan,
Samar on August 7, 2007; Cabaljao, son of a Bayan Muna member, may have been mistaken
for his father, and killed for the latter's affiliation with Bayan Muna. "CHR Resolution Case
No.: VIII-2008-0126 Re: Roberto A. Cabaljo," (Commission on Human Rights, January 12,
2010). In September 2007 in Leyte, witnesses to the lethal shooting of four men by gunmen
on motorcycle claim that the shooters said three of the dead were known NPA insurgents; in a
separate incident, soldiers killed a man in an alleged armed encounter but he may have
already been in their custody before dying. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0087 Re:
Celestino P. Almerino," (Commission on Human Rights, May 14, 2008). "CHR Resolution
Case No.: VIII-07-44 Re: Bonifacio Dunghit," (Commission on Human Rights, February 22,
2008). Soldiers arrested a young man, Sonny Boy Dacles, in Motiong town, Samar in
November 2007. He was not seen again afterwards. Four years later, his family filed a
complaint but withdrew it shortly after the implicated commanding officer was notified.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2011-0318 Re: Sonny Boy Dacles," (Commission on
Human Rights, December 28, 2011).
332
In July 2007 in Eastern Samar, suspected NPA insurgents killed Jaime Nebril, a CAFGU
paramilitary member and former NPA, reportedly due to the NPA’s decision to “liquidate”
Nebril as a traitor for joining the CAFGU. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 2008-0102 Re: Jaime
A. Nebril," (Commission on Human Rights, June 24, 2008). On August 17, 2007, suspected
NPA insurgents killed Alipio Tagle of the paramilitary Western Samar CAFGU company,
CAA, at his home in Santa Rita town. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-47 Re: Alipio
Tagle," (Commission on Human Rights, November 5, 2007). Former barangay chairman in
Llorente, Eastern Samar Alberto Calzado was shot while gathering coconuts by alleged NPA
insurgents in December 2007. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0079 Re: Alberto
Calzado, Sr.," (Commission on Human Rights, February 14, 2008).
333
"Tagalog News: PNP Iniimbestigahan Na Ang Pagpatay Kay Solayao," Philippine
Information Agency Press Release July 19, 2007,
http://archives.pia.gov.ph/?m=12&sec=reader&rp=8&fi=p070719.htm&no=71&date=.
90
informer to government authorities.334 Picoy was the former chairman of labor group
Anakpawis in Tacloban City from 2000. He separated from the group after the 2004
presidential election and joined the Philippine Guardian Brotherhood as an alleged
police asset; Solayao had succeeded him as Anakpawis chair.335 During this period
however, insurgents were no longer able to inflict heavy casualties as they had before
Palparan’s assignment to the region.
The Fight Ends in Northern Samar
The military continued to pour additional fighters into the region: by early
2008, there were five thousand soldiers in Eastern Visayas in nine battalions.336 As
the military made headway quelling the communist insurgency in the area, the overall
level of violence decreased.337 Most of the incidents in 2008 were concentrated in
334
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-27 Re: Charlie Solayao," (Commission on Human
Rights, October 16, 2007).
335
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-28 Re: Rogelio B. Picoy," (Commission on Human
Rights, September 28, 2007). In another incident, on September 26, unidentified gunmen
ambushed a group of villagers from barangay Caranas, Motiong town as they left the 46th
Infantry Battalion Philippine Army detachment in the town. The villagers had been directed
to report to the military. Suspected insurgents killed four barangay officials including
Jonathan Dacutanan, a Samar College student and sangguniang kabataan (youth council)
chair, and wounding three others. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0122 Re: Jonathan
T. Dacutanan," (Commission on Human Rights, December 24, 2008). On the same day, the
military claimed that NPA gunmen killed Ernesto General in Motiong town. "CHR
Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0140 Re: Ernesto General," (Commission on Human Rights,
April 28, 2009).
336
Joey Gabieta, "Army to Recruit 100 Men for East Visayas," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
February 6, 2008.
337
Few incidents occurred in Leyte and Eastern Samar. For instance, in January 2008 in
Abuyog, United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) Pastor Feliciano Catambis was
killed by two suspected military agents. He may have been targeted because the UCCP was
considered to be a NPA front organization and he was moreover the second pastor of the
Northeastern Leyte Conference killed in this manner in a two year period. "CHR Resolution
Case No.: VIII-2008-81 Re: Felomino G. Catambis," (Commission on Human Rights, April
29, 2008). Also "In the Know," Philippine Daily Inquirer June 17, 2011,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/15557/in-the-know-5. Farmers Jimmy Anday, Chito and Ronald
Catubay were killed in September 2008 in Boronga, Eastern Samar by suspected soldiers,
allegedly in response to a recent directive from President Arroyo to finish off the communist
insurgency before 2010. Their bodies bore marks of torture, their hands were tied and their
stomachs sliced. "Rights Group Says Soldiers Tortured, Killed 3 Farmers," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, October 7, 2008. In a strange case, soldiers allegedly killed farmer Leopoldo
Fernando, claiming that he was a member of the NPA. Afterwards, however, Fernando’s
91
Western Samar. For instance, a series of attacks took place in Paranas town, next to
Motiong town where much of the violence had occurred in previous years. Suspected
NPA insurgents killed four unidentified soldiers in March, 2008; three days later,
suspected soldiers allegedly retaliated by forcibly taking farmer Rodrigo Babatio
whom they accused of being with the NPA.338 In June, suspected NPA insurgents
killed former barangay official Noe Pagarao.339 Nevertheless, the army was relentless
in its anti-insurgency campaign, conducting air raids in San Jose de Buan town and
making arrests of villagers on the ground.340 By the end of 2008, the army claimed
common law wife Gina Irigon witnessed the soldiers going to Fernando’s house and, with
two barangay councilors, distributed Fernando’s food and valuables throughout the group.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0111 Re: Leopoldo Fernando," (Commission on
Human Rights, July 18, 2011). A year later in August 2009 in Calbayog city, relatives of
Barangay Chairwoman of Barangy Higasaan, barangay kagawad Lolito Valentino and a 13member squad from the 46th Infantry Battalion allegedly killed Irigon’s new common-law
husband, Michael Oñate. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0446 Re: Michael Oñate,"
(Commission on Human Rights, August 19, 2011).
338
"4 Troops Slain in Samar Encounter," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 6, 2008.According
to the CHR investigation, this may have been a reaction to the prior ambush that left four
soldiers killed and others wounded. The CHR report stated that the NPA ambush occurred in
Motiong but the March 6 news report in the Philippine Daily Inquirer reported the encounter
to have occurred in neighboring Paranas town. "Final Report Re: CHR VIII-2008-0089,"
(Commission on Human Rights, March 17, 2008). Shortly afterwards, in April 2008, soldiers
allegedly killed two NPA insurgents from the Samar South Front in a chance encounter in
Basey town. "NPA Rebs Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 12, 2008.
339
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0139 Re: Noe Pagarao," (Commission on Human
Rights, November 7, 2008). Suspected insurgents ambushed members of a local group called
the Philippine Christians Maintaining Peace Organization, whom the NPA suspected of
helping the military, killing Rafael Papiona and Arnuldo Mabesa and wounding others in
Villareal town in August 2008. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0115 Re: Rafael
Papiona, Arnuldo Mabesa and Romeo Vencio," (Commission on Human Rights, March 3,
2009).
340
"Rights Group Hit Military Use of Air Raids in Samar," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
September 28, 2008. The military denied this claimed to have only bombed a deserted village
thus reasoning there were no people to arrest or detain. However, it was unclear why the
military would bother bombing an abandoned area. After weeks of intense counter-insurgency
activity, three alleged military fighter planes dropped 33 bombs in four separate blasts over
two days in September 2008 and caused civilians to flee the area—not for the first time.
Villagers fled alleged military harassment in August 2005 as well, at the tail end of Palparan’s
command in the region. Ericson Acosta, "An Overview of the Human Rights Situation in
Eastern Visayas," Bulatlat August 12, 2011, http://bulatlat.com/main/2011/08/12/anoverview-of-the-human-rights-situation-in-eastern-visayas/.
92
that they had dismantled three guerrilla fronts in Eastern Samar.341
The locus of the conflict shifted to Northern Samar, where the number of
violent incidents soon tripled. The NPA waged a retaliatory campaign, picking off
military targets and civilian collaborators.342 The army initially seemed to maintain
the upper hand, keeping the pressure on local activists and civilians suspected of
supporting the insurgents. For instance, suspected soldiers killed Bartolome Resuelo,
a physician at the Northern Samar Provincial Hospital and human rights advocate in
Pambujan town.343 In August 2009 in Lope de Vega town, barangay kagawad Jojo
Basiloy and farmer Jerwin Marino were questioned over the location of NPA
insurgents before being killed by alleged soldiers and members of Dosé Parés, an
armed paramilitary group.344 In Catubig town, a week after the Lope de Vega killings,
armed men suspected to be from the military ambushed and killed a parish priest.345 A
brother of Northern Samar’s vice governor Antonio Lucero, the priest Cecilio Lucero
may have been suspected to be a NPA sympathizer and was reportedly mentioned in a
local military order of battle. Moreover, Lucero took charge of the witnesses in the
341
Carla Gomez, "Half on NPA Fronts Dismantled, Says Army Exec," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, March 10, 2009.
342
In February 2009 in Catubig town, alleged NPA insurgents killed Caesar Vicencio,
husband of town mayor Maria Cristina L. Vicencio; she received letters from the Rodante
Ortal Command that her husband was “sentenced” to death for the murder of two NPA
members. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII- 2010-0144 Re: Caesar Y. Vicencio,"
(Commission on Human Rights, May 12, 2010). In May 2009, suspected NPA insurgents
killed soldier Douglas Jumagdao and a civilian woman with a grenade attack on a military
camp in a Catarman village. Joey Gabieta, Johana Gasga, and Julius Embile, "2 Soldiers,
Woman Slain in NPA Attack in Northern Samar," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 1, 2009.
343
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2010-0011 Re: Dr. Bartolome M. Resuello,"
(Commission on Human Rights, April 22, 2010). Even if incidents were concentrated mostly
in Northern Samar, military-led violence also continued in other parts of the region. In July
2009 in Samar, soldiers allegedly killed Romulo Mendova, accused of participating in raid
and wounding CAFGU; Mendova had earlier been made to report to the detachment
commander of 52nd Infantry Batallion and was said to have been in the military’s Order of
Battle. "CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0489 Re: Romulo Mendova," (Commission on
Human Rights, November 4, 2009).
344
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2010-0027 Re: The Alleged Killing of Jojo Basiloy and
Jerwin Marino," (Commission on Human Rights, September 27, 2010).
345
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0324 Re: The Killing of Rev. Fr. Cecilio P.
Lucero," (Commission on Human Rights, October 19, 2009).
93
Lope de Vega case.346 A soldier charged for the crime went into hiding and was
finally found and arrested in 2012.347
Two months afterwards, an another case involved a relative of a prominent
political family. In October 2009 in Rosario town, the younger brother of Raul Daza,
provincial governor of Northern Samar, was ambushed by alleged NPA. 348 The
COMELEC expressed alarm at the murders, hinting that they could have been linked
to the elections the next May.349 In late 2009, the CHR launched an investigation into
the high number of documented extra-judicial killings in the region—second only to
Davao—and there was particular concern over the murder of the Lucero case as a
possible intersection between the insurgency-related attacks on activists and electoral
politics. 350 Having defended former president Estrada in his impeachment case,
Governor Raul Daza was at the time the only high-ranking politician in the region to
have been elected without the backing of the incumbent Arroyo administration. 351
Although the level of violence in Western Samar had declined considerably
compared to previous years, most of the violence that did occur consisted of NPA
attacks—including on local politicians.352 In Leyte, for instance, the NPA also took
346
"National Fact-Finding Mission Report on the Killing of Father Cecilio Lucero," 2009,
http://www.karapatan.org/files/Lucero%20fact-finding%20mission%20report%20Oct09.pdf.
347
Orlando Dinoy, "Ex-Soldier Wanted for Priest's Slay Arrested," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
February 19, 2012.
348
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0448 Re: The Killing of Manuel A. Daza,"
(Commission on Human Rights, August 12, 2010).
349
Joey Gabieta, "Comelec Exec Alarmed over Samar Killings," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
October 6, 2009.
350
"CHR: E. Visayas Next to Davao in Murders," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 21,
2009. Nikko Dizon, "CHR to Probe Spate of Unsolved Samar Murders," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, October 16, 2009.
351
Vicente Labro, "Families Rule Eastern Visayas Politics," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
February 3, 2007.
352
In March 2010 in Matuginao, the family home of Domingo dela Cruz was strafed by
armed men, killing two; there was family history of attacks by NPA as they were suspected to
be military intelligence assets and guides in military operations. "CHR Resolution Case No.:
VIII-2010-0135 Re: Domingo De La Cruz, Junie De La Cruz and Mylene De La Cruz,"
(Commission on Human Rights, May 4, 2010). Catarman municipal police intelligence
officer Teronimo Tan was killed in September 2010 by alleged NPA sparrow assassins. Tan
94
responsibility for the killing of former mayor of Giporlos town Mateo Biong in July
2010, who had run and lost in the May election.353 The NPA claimed that they
executed him for crimes against the people, but the CHR investigation indicated that
he might have been punished for refusing to pay off the NPA.354
The military had paused in its counterinsurgency campaign as soldiers were
either redeployed to secure polling precincts and assist the police or sent to
Maguindanao province in the south.355 As a consequence, shortly after the elections,
the NPA managed to inflict severe casualties again on the military in Northern Samar,
at levels comparable to the early 2000s. In August, suspected insurgents of the Efren
Martires Command ambushed and killed police official Nicasio San Antonio and
seven other policemen in Catarman.356 In a December ambush in Catubig, 10 soldiers
and a civilian were killed in an ambushed by an alleged group of 40 armed NPA
insurgents. 357 Still, the cumulative effect of the government’s counter-insurgency
campaign bore fruit. By the end of this period, the military estimated the NPA’s
fighter numbers to have dropped to about 300 active insurgents in the region. 358
Under the government of Benigno Aquino, who assumed office on June 1,
was known to have gathered intelligence against University of Eastern Philippines
personalities, Bayan Muna, and the campus organization League of Filipino Students. He was
also an affiant in a legal case against NPA leader Salvador Nordan. "CHR Resolution Case
No.: VIII-2010-0307 Re: Geronimo E. Tan," (Commission on Human Rights, September 17,
2011).
353
Joey Gabieta, "CHR Tags Former Mayor's Slay as Extra-Judicial," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, July 20, 2010. See also "Philippines: Rebel Executions Violate International Law,"
October 27, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/27/philippines-rebel-executionsviolate-international-law.
354
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2010-0277 Re: Mateo Biong, Jr," (Commission on
Human Rights, August 17, 2010).
355
"Army Exec Vows to End Anti-Insurgency Campaign in Eastern Visayas This Year,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 14, 2010. Troops were sent to Maguindanao on account of the
Ampatuan massacre of 59 people on November 23, 2009, which led to the imposition of a
state of emergency and brief martial law in the province.
356
Rachel Arnaiz and Joey Gabieta, "N. Samar Cops Slain by NPA Buried as Heroes,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 1, 2010.
357
"Memorandum Re: CHR VIII-2011-0234," (May 3, 2011).
358
Gabieta, "Army Exec Vows to End Anti-Insurgency Campaign in Eastern Visayas This
Year."
95
2010, the AFP shifted its tactics in Eastern Visayas. Even in areas that had been
declared “cleared”, such as Leyte, the military maintained a presence. Local human
rights NGO Katungod alleged that soldiers were stoking fear among villagers by
paying frequent visits.359 Yet there was a pronounced decline in the military’s use of
lethal violence, even after serious provocations and multiple deaths among
government forces. Nonetheless, allegations of military torture, harassment, and
forced disappearance persisted.360 The military continued to direct its attention toward
deterring civilians from supporting insurgents, but began to place a greater emphasis
on intelligence gathering.
361
Activists and others suspected of being NPA
sympathizers were often the subject of arrest on trumped up charges.362 For instance,
the military arrested Ericson Acosta, a researcher working for human rights NGO
Karapatan, in February 2011 in San Jorge, Samar. Acosta was accused of being a
NPA member and arrested for possessing a grenade without authority or license.363
He was detained for almost two years until the Department of Justice reviewed his
case and dropped the charges.364
In 2011, the NPA launched several attacks but these resulted in far fewer
359
"Group Slams "Militarization" of Villages," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 17,
2011.
360
In November 2012, 10 soldiers stationed in San Jose de Buan town allegedly tortured
Yono Cabadongga, a farmer and member of the Mamanua indigenous peoples group, as he
was interrogated on NPA movements in the locale. "CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-VIII2012-0436 Re: Yono C. Cabadongga," (Commission on Human Rights, May 21, 2013). In
another case, the military allegedly coerced barangay councilor Artemio Labong and his
family to publicly pose as rebel returnees. Ina Silverio, "Family Abducted, Presented as Rebel
Returnees in Samar," Bulatlat.com March 23, 2012,
http://bulatlat.com/main/2012/03/23/family-abducted-presented-as-rebel-returnees-in-samar/.
361
Joey Gabieta, "Reservists Tapped in Anti-Red Drive," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 26,
2011.
362
Ronalyn Olea, "Military Turns Wrath on Farmers, Activists in Eastern Visayas,"
Bulatlat.com December 10, 2011, http://bulatlat.com/main/2011/12/10/military-turns-wrathon-farmers-activists-in-eastern-visayas/.
363
"Memorandum Re: Case of Erickson Acosta," (Commission on Human Rights, December
15, 2011).
364
"DOJ Drops Charges against Political Prisoner Ericson Acosta," Bulatlat.com February 1,
2013, http://bulatlat.com/main/2016/06/14/6-years-under-aquino-media-killings-unabatedpress-freedom-under-siege/.
96
casualties than the year before. Moreover, typhoons and other natural catastrophes
forced insurgents to surface for humanitarian assistance. In 2009 for instance, NPA
members sought help due to heavy floods.365 Typhoon Haiyan, one of the strongest
tropical cyclones on record, devastated the Visayas regions in 2013. Tensions rose as
military presence was increased to assist with the calamity, but also in response to
rioting and protests over the failures in the government’s relief efforts.366 The army
claimed that NPA rebels were left disorganized and unable to contact their leaders,
but were attempting to regroup by recruiting members in calamity-stricken areas.367
The military allegedly targeted aid workers as a consequence. Violence was aimed at
the Municipal Farmers’ Association (MUFAC), an NGO assisting typhoon victims in
Leyte. In the following months, soldiers established outposts and allegedly prohibited
residents from joining protest actions over delays in relief and rehabilitation. 368 In
August 2014, in Carigara, Leyte, two gunmen on motorcycle killed MUFAC member
365
James Mananghaya, "Flood Flushes out Communist Rebels," The Philippine Star October
13, 2009, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/358226/esperon-tells-melo-commission-npabehind-political-killings. Human rights group Karapatan claimed that government relief
failures in the 2012 Typhoon Pablo led to protests, military repression and the killing of
Cristina Jose, leader of the Pablo victims. Bulatlat Contributors, "Stranded Pablo Mission
Rescued, Military Blamed," The Philippine Star April 22, 2013,
http://bulatlat.com/main/2013/04/22/stranded-pablo-mission-rescued-military-blamed/.
366
Marya Salamat, "Urgent Relief and Rehab Needed in Yolanda-Stricken Areas, Not
Militarization," Bulatlat November 12, 2013, http://bulatlat.com/main/2013/11/12/urgentrelief-and-rehab-needed-in-yolanda-stricken-areas-not-militarization/.
367
Rommel Fuertes, "NPA Operation in Eastern Visayas Devasted by Yolanda," DZRH
News December 18, 2013, http://dzrhnews.com.ph/npa-operation-eastern-visayas-devastatedyolanda/. The Communist Party of the Philippines had declared a ceasefire and ordered the
NPA to desist from launching attacks in areas affected by the typhoon and later denied the
army’s assertion that they were devastated by the typhoon. Edwin Espejo, "Communist
Rebels Declare Ceasefire in Disaster Areas," Rappler November 14, 2013,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/43717-communist-rebels-declare-ceasefire-haiyan. CPP
Information Bureau, "CPP Laughs Off AFP Claim That Yolanda Disorganized NPA in the
Visayas," National Democratic Front of the Philippines International Information Office
December 18, 2013, https://www.ndfp.org/cpp-laughs-off-afp-claim-yolanda-disorganizednpa-in-the-visayas/.
368
Janess Ann Ellao, "'Ruthless Legacy': 7 Activists Killed in August," Bulatlat.com
September 3, 2014, http://bulatlat.com/main/2014/09/03/ruthless-legacy-seven-activistskilled-in-august/.
97
Jefferson Custodio.369 Skirmishes increased after the NPA ambushed and wounded
two soldiers who had delivered relief goods to Northern Samar due to typhoon Nona
in 2015.370
Counter-insurgency is a strategic aim of the state. The period from 2001 to
2004 was marked by NPA insurgency attacks that dealt multiple casualties to military
and paramilitary forces. However, the military was stymied by the difficulty in
identifying rebels and their supporters. Democratic constraints were weak and failed
to prevent the targeting of activists and civilians. During the assignment of General
Palparan to Eastern Visayas for six months in 2005, the military’s tactic shifted in
scale and lethalness. Claims that soldiers killed leftist activists and other local
community organizers are credible. The military bombed villages and restricted
people’s movements. The NPA likewise targeted civilians, albeit in smaller numbers
and more selectively. However, Palparan’s tactics alienated some local politicians and
he was consequently reassigned to Central Luzon.
After a slowdown of the military-led violence with Palparan’s departure,
conflict intensified in 2007 as the army weakened the NPA’s hold on Leyte and
Samar islands. Although the NPA made a number of strikes against military targets,
they no longer exacted the kind of casualty numbers as they had in the past. The NPA
was driven into the northern interior of Samar island. However, a series of natural
disasters battered Eastern Visayas. The 2013 “super” typhoon Haiyan fragmented an
already greatly diminished insurgent force. Violence on both sides subsided
significantly and dwindled.
369
Ibid. See also "Initial Investigation Report Re: Jefferson A. Custodio Case,"
(Commission on Human Rights, September 24, 2014).
370
Insurgents also raided a police station in March 2016 in Eastern Samar, and ambushed
soldiers with a land mine in Samar weeks before the May 2016 elections. CDN Research,
"Attacks Staged by Suspecteed NPA Rebels in the Visayas since 2015," Philippine Daily
Inquirer July 22, 2017, http://cebudailynews.inquirer.net/140558/attacks-staged-suspectednpa-rebels-visayas-since-2015.
98
Electoral Violence
Electoral violence regularly peaked around election seasons. Mandated term
limits, in effect from 1988, restrict local officials and congressional representatives
from running after three consecutive terms in office. In practice, affected politicians
barred from running in 1998 often bided their time by fielding family members or
close allies as “seat warmers” until they could run again. So in 2001, many such
politicians throughout Eastern Visayas were attempting to make a comeback while
others were entrenched politicians seeking higher office or re-election. 371 Moreover,
at least two private armies were known to operate in Samar: one under Calbayog City
mayor Reynaldo Uy and the other under Congressman Rodolfo Tuazon. 372
Western Samar was the site of the most electoral violence and 2001 was
particularly bloody. 373 In the 2004 elections, almost all of the violence was
concentrated over the Catbalogan contests in Samar.374 Samar congressman Reynaldo
Uy allegedly orchestrated the murder of Tarangan town mayor Aniceto Olaje in
371
PDI Visayas Bureau, "Old Faces in 'New Politics'," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 10,
2001.
372
Contreras., “100 Private Armies of Candidates Listed”.
373
On March 26, Robert Gulla, former bodyguard of Congressman Tuazon, was killed; on
April 19, Liberal Party leader Marcelo Niangga in Calbayog (shot and killed) and his
companion Gerry Calderon (wounded) were ambushed; and on May 2, Rose Tamidles, wife
of incumbent city councilor and Tuazon’s trusted leader Nestor Tamidles, who was also
critically wounded in the attack along with eight other wounded and four other fatalities.
Vicente Labro, "Bet's Wife, 4 Others Killed in Ambush in Calbayog City," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, May 3, 2001.
374
In Northern Samar however, suspected gunmen from a private armed group wounded a
supporter of mayoral candidate Nicolas Turog (Liberal party) in an ambush by gunmen
belonging to a rival camp. Inquirer Bureaus, "15 More Killed in Poll-Related Incidents,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 11, 2004. Politically-motivated killings occurred in Samar
during the July 2002 barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (youth council) elections
nationwide, alleged supporters of barangay chair candidate Florencio Apacible shot dead
Eutemio Patente, the incumbent candidate for re-election; Patente's brother, in apparent
retaliation, shot dead Erenio Medalla, a known Apacible supporter. Joey Gabieta, "2 Murders
Open Campaign Period," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 5, 2002.
99
February 2004.375 A third term mayor, Olaje had fielded his wife Emily in the town’s
mayoral race and was also a known supporter of former Samar Rep Rodolfo Tuazon.
Tuazon and Uy ran against each other in the congressional race.376 Uy accused
Tuazon of retaliating by shooting and wounding one of Uy’s bodyguards.377 Barely a
month after filling the vacancy left by Olaje’s death, Tarangan mayor Francisco
Montero was assassinated.378
As a result, the Commission on Elections monitored Eastern Visayas. The
police estimated that as many as ten politicians’ private armies operated in Eastern
Visayas.379 The situation was rendered more complicated with the NPA being active
during the elections, raking in at least PhP 13 million (US$ 260,000) in permit-tocampaign fees.380 For instance, weeks prior to the elections, suspected NPA members
held captive incumbent mayor Chinita Gabieta and her entire slate in Samar and
released them after they paid PhP200,000 in permit-to-campaign fees.381
In the 2007 elections, violence was again mostly concentrated in Samar as
soon as the election season opened the year before. In October 2006, unidentified
gunmen on motorcycles, allegedly under the orders of San Jorge town mayor Joseph
Grey, killed Rolando Diocton. Grey went on the run after a regional trial court issued
375
"Solon's Supporter Tagged Gunman in Mayor's Murder," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March
3, 2004.
376
"Samar Town Mayor Shot Dead in Cockfight Arena, Politics Eyed," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, March 1, 2004.
377
"Samar Solon's Guard Shot," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 2, 2004.
378
Vicente Labro, Mei Magsino, and Marlon Ramos, "Mayor Who Took over Slain
Predecessor Himself Killed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 4, 2004.
379
Joey Gabieta, "110 East Visayas Areas on Watch List," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 7,
2004.
380
Gil Cabacungan, Alcuin Papa, and Martin Marfil, "Gov't Cracks Down on Private
Armies," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 19, 2004.
381
NPA group believed to belong to the Arnulfo Ortiz Command of the CPP-NPA, which
operates on Samar island. Joey Gabieta, "Rebs Hold Mayor Hostage, Get P200,000,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 21, 2004.
100
a warrant of arrest against him, his son and three others.382 Grey’s supporters had
themselves been targeted in the past.383 In January, Samar Rep. Catalino Figueroa,
Daram town vice mayor Bartolome Figueroa, Edgar Figueroa and four unidentified
men, allegedly killed Daram mayor Benito Astorga.384 Other election-related violence
occurred throughout the following weeks. Vice mayor Francisco Langi of Motiong
town survived an attempted assassination on February 6.385
There were also quite a number of incidents that involved NPA insurgents. On
February 20, suspected NPA insurgents killed municipal councilor and member of the
municipal peace and order council Vivencio Ellantos in San Jose de Buan town,
Western Samar. He was reportedly suspected by the NPA of gathering all barangay
captains to join in intelligence and monitoring against the NPA.386 Around the same
time in Eastern Samar, alleged NPA assailants killed village councilor Ruino Silla and
his daughter Rufa Silla. There were escalating threats to Silla’s life for offenses
“against the masses”. 387
From 2007 to 2013, much of the election-related violence in the region was
related to the struggle between the Uy and Tan dynasties in Calbayog City and their
382
"Samar Mayor, Son Face Arrest for Slay," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 1, 2007.
During the 2002 Barangay elections, security personnel of Calbayog City mayor Oliceria
Catalan allegedly fired upon Wilfredo Sale, chair of barangay Mancol, San Jorge
municipality and reportedly a supporter of Catalan’s opponent Joseph Gray, killing Sale’s
sister Rosalita and wounding several others. Gray later defeated Catalan in the mayoral
elections and the latter and his bodyguards were charged with murder and frustrated murder.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: 08-DO-02-003 Re: Rosalita Sale," (Commission on Human
Rights, September 26, 2002).
384
Vicente Labro, "Remote Samar Town Mayor Murdered," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
January 26, 2007. See also Joey Gabieta, "Congressman Sued for Mayor's Murder,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 10, 2007.
385
"Police Tag Samar Election Hot Spot," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 23, 2007.
386
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-41 Re: Vivincio L. Ellantos," (Commission on
Human Rights, October 8, 2008).
387
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0080 Re: Rufino G. Silla and Rufa Joy S. Silla,"
(Commission on Human Rights, March 13, 2008).
383
101
political supporters.388 One incident involved Jovito Palparan, who had retired from
military service in 2006 and founded an anti-communist political party “Bantay – The
True Marcos Loyalist for God Country and People”. Bantay means “watch”, likely
referring to his role in the violence counter-insurgency campaign Oplan Bantay Laya
(Operation Freedom Watch) under President Arroyo. Running in the party-list
elections, Palparan accused Uy of benefiting from the pattern of killings in Calbayog
City, including a June 2009 attempt on Arturo Pasacas, a former soldier himself who
had run in 2007 under Uy’s party. It was unclear why Paplaran thought Uy would kill
his own party mate.389
In April 2011, Calbayog City Mayor Uy was assassinated.390 Prior to his
death, Uy had endorsed a recall petition against Samar governor Sharee Ann Tan and
her younger brother vice governor James Tan. The COMELEC had been about to
schedule a recall election.391 Violence continued a pattern of tit-for-tat retaliation
between the Uy and Tan dynasties, targeted at political operatives at the village
level.392 In one case, however, former barangay chief Felomino Cabarriban was killed
388
There were some exceptions. In the 2007 barangay elections, re-elected barangay chair
Marcos Anquillo and tanod Roger Reyes were killed by unknown assailants in Catarman,
Northern Samar. Inquirer Bureaus, "29 Dead but Polls Peaceful, Says PNP," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, October 31, 2007. Unidentified killers assassinated Matuginao municipal mayor
Carlos de la Cruz in July, 2009. Joey Gabieta, "Mayor of Poor Samar Town Murdered,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 18, 2009.
389
As explained earlier in this chapter, there was an animosity between Western Samar
politician Reynaldo Uy and former general Jovito Palparan. Palparan’s command in Eastern
Visayas had been cut short partly due to congressional inquiries led by Uy and other allies of
the heightened violence in 2005. Palparan was consequently reassigned to Central Luzon,
where he remained until his retirement in 2006. The CHR also noted that Pasacas’s
involvement in land disputes was the probable motive for the attempted assassination. "CHR
Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0447 Re: Arturo Pasacas," (Commission on Human Rights,
September 13, 2011).
390
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2011-0233 Re: Reynaldo S. Uy," (Commission on
Human Rights, September 27, 2010).
391
Joey Gabieta and Christine Avenado, "Noy Orders Hunt for Mayor's Killer," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, May 2, 2011.
392
In January 2013 for instance, unidentified assailants killed Lito Buracan and William
Someno in Catbalogan City; Buracan was reportedly a political organizer of Samar provincial
102
in Calbayog City to silence him over an alleged corruption relevation. A week before
he was killed, Carriban told the Philippine Daily Inquirer that a road worth PhP 11
million (US$ 220,000), funded through Congresswoman Milagros Tan’s discretionary
funds, was never built.393 Election-related violence dwindled after 2013 although a
few cases involved prominent local politicians.394
What about seeming oases of calm? Biliran and Southern Leyte provinces did
not experience any serious cases of insurgency-related violence and saw very little
electoral violence. The only incident of lethal electoral violence in Biliran
documented in this study occurred in Caibiran town, Biliran, several weeks after the
May 2001 election.395
On the face of it, the enduring primacy of the Espina political dynasty in
Biliran has obviated the use of violence. Family patriarch Gerry Espina first occupied
the Biliran congressional seat in 1998 and a second generation of Espinas began to
seek office when he reached his seventies.396 By 2007, Espina was unable to run for
re-election in Congress due to term limits but he ran and won as mayor of the capital
town Naval instead. His sons occupied Biliran’s lone congressional seat,
governor Sharee Ann Tan. Joey Gabieta, "Killings Mar Poll Peace Pact Signing," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, January 15, 2013.
393
Jennifer Allegado and Joey Gabieta, "Gunman in Ghost Project Witness' Killing Charged,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 4, 2013.
394
In Samar, prior to the May 2016 local and national elections, Joseph Grey was implicated
in electoral violence, this time in the killing of barangay chair Romulo Barcoma. Grey’s two
sons and a former soldier who had been working in the Grey family’s private security were
charged as suspects but the court case was dismissed for lack of evidence. "Evaluation Report
Case ID CHR-III-2016-0114," (Commission on Human Rights, 2016). Rommel Rutor,
"According to Cops, Eyewitness: Vice Mayor, 3 Others Linked to Killing of Village
Chairman," The Philippine Star July 1, 2016,
http://www.philstar.com/region/2016/02/18/1554263/according-cops-eyewitness-vice-mayor3-others-linked-killing-village.
395
Caesar Almen, who had just won the vice mayoral election, was allegedly killed by
suspects Antonio and Noel Azur, supporters of the town mayor Melchor Maderazo. Vicente
Labro, "Biliran Vice Mayoral Race Winner Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 16, 2001.
396
Eileen Ballesteros, "Biliran Governor Insists: "No Dynasty, but Destiny"," The Philippine
Star November 1, 2015, http://www.philstar.com/region/2015/11/01/1517195/bilirangovernor-insists-no-dynasty-destiny.
103
gubernatorial seat, and mayorship of Kawayan town.397 Moreover, the Espina political
clan had no serious opponents. 398 While the Espinas requested security details like
many politicians in the region during the 2013 election, neither was there serious
violence nor was the Espina clan dislodged despite the death of the Espina patriarch
that year.399
In Southern Leyte, there was active electoral jostling between the Lerias and
Mercado political families yet electoral violence was rare. 400 Southern Leyte
politicians eschew additional security details from the army and police during election
seasons.401 The electoral contests between the Leriases and the Mercados have had
their bitter moments, but they also cooperated to divide political spoils between them.
Rosette Lerias, from a political clan that dominated politics in the 1980s, first ran
against Roger Mercado for the lone congressional district in 1987. Mercado won by a
few hundred votes then, but defeated Lerias by a wider margin in the next election.
Avoiding confrontation, Lerias ran for governor instead in 1995 and won.402 In 2004,
although they were aligned with opposing political parties, Lerias (for governor) and
Mercado (for Congress) ran as allies and successfully defeated their rivals.403 In
397
Labro, "Families Rule Eastern Visayas Politics."
In the 2010 elections, there were some challenges to Espina dominance but to no avail.
"Political Families Revive Poll Rivalries," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 19, 2009.
399
PDI Visayas Bureau, "Polls Solidify LP Hold in Most of Visayas," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, May 25, 2013. Also Joey Gabieta, "Only 1 Province Not a 'Hot Spot' in East
Visayas," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 15, 2016.
400
In Macrohon municipality, Southern Leyte, unknown assailants killed Dennis Yulo. Prior
to the incident, he was seen tearing down posters for congressional candidate Roberto
Castañares. Inquirer Southern Luzon et al. Labro, "Families Rule Eastern Visayas Politics."
401
Joey Gabieta, "22 Visayas Bets Want Bodyguards," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 24,
2013. Although journalists had been harassed and even killed elsewhere, when gunmen fired
at the house of Southern Leyte Times publisher Tony Reyes in 2008, local journalists noted
that any assault on a media worker in the province was unprecedented. Jani Arnaiz, "Gunmen
Attack Leyte Publisher's House, Send Chilling Mesage," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December
12, 2008.
402
Eileen Ballesteros, "It Must Be Fate, Says Ex-Solon of Facing Rival for the Fourth Time,"
The Philippine Star April 16, 2001, http://www.philstar.com/nation/104010/it-must-be-fatesays-ex-solon-facing-rival-fourth-time.
403
In 1998, Mercado had been so incensed that he shot at Saludo and missed, instead hitting a
helicopter that burst into flames; Mercado was charged with frustrated murder and arson.
Saludo had the charges dropped in 2001 when he allied with Mercado against Lerias. Jani
398
104
subsequent elections, the prowess of Lerias waned while Mercado began to
successfully field his family members in local elections.404 Violence was averted by
this ecosystem of political families that contest but also cooperate, trading political
offices like they swap horses.
Similar to the Lerias and Mercado families in Southern Leyte, political
dynasties have divided the governorship and control of the capital city of Tacloban
between themselves. The Petilla and Romualdez families have been among Leyte’s
dominant political clans since the 1960s. Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez, Imelda
Marcos’s younger brother, was Leyte governor from 1967 until Marcos fell in
1986. 405 Since 1989, the Petillas maintained their stature. Leopoldo Petilla was
governor until 1995, succeeded by his wife Remedios (1995 to 2004), his son Jericho
(2004 to 2013), and another son Dominico (2013 to the present).406
As for the Romualdez family, only after Corazon Aquino’s presidency did
they slowly return to dominance in Leyte’s capital Tacloban City. Imelda Marcos held
office as congressional representative of the First District in the city from 1995 to
1998, succeeded by her nephew Alfred Romualdez from 1998 to 2001. Another of her
brothers, Alfredo Romualdez was Tacloban City mayor from 1998 to 2007 and his
son Alfred took over, also for three consecutive terms until 2016.407 Unlike Southern
Arnaiz, "Southern Leyte's Tangled Web of Politics," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 20,
2010.
404
Derek Alviola, "East Versus West: Southern Leyte Divided in 2016 Elections," Rappler
April 30, 2016, https://www.rappler.com/move-ph/131297-east-west-southern-leyte-2016elections. Election results and party affiliations in 2013 and 2016 as published online on
rappler.com.
405
Joey Gabieta, "Benjamin 'Kokoy' Romualdez Dies; 81," Philippine Daily Inquirer
February 22, 2012, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/149717/benjamin-kokoy-romualdez-dies-81.
406
Adelina Larrazabal took office briefly in 1986 before the Petilla clan began its sustained
dominance. Lalaine Jimenea, "Cari, Petilla Families in Leyte Retain Political Reign," The
Philippine Star May 17, 2016,
http://www.philstar.com:8080/region/2016/05/17/1584077/cari-petilla-families-leyte-retainpolitical-reign.
407
Alfred’s wife, Cristina Romualdez, was elected in 2016 to succeed him. Joey Gabieta,
"Cristina Gonzales-Romualdez Is New Tacloban City Mayor," Philippine Daily Inquirer
May 10, 2016, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/784830/cristina-gonzales-romualdez-is-newtacloban-city-mayor. Although the Romualdez hold was broken for two terms from 2001 to
2004 by TV news personality Ted Failon and from 2004 to 2007 by Remedios Petilla,
105
Leyte and Biliran, however, Leyte province was the site of considerable insurgencyrelated violence. The insurgency had little impact on politics in urban areas and
electoral violence was rare.408
Draining the Sea to Catch the Fish
In Eastern Visayas, the dynamics of counter-insurgency explain violence
against activists and other civilians. At the start of the period in this study, in the early
2000s, the NPA insurgency was at a post-Marcos peak in terms of arms and fighters
nationwide—and Eastern Visayas was a communist stronghold with roots in Western
Samar. The NPA waged an effective armed campaign against military, paramilitary
and police targets, as well as against civilians and those they claimed were civilian
collaborators. The military took many losses. Unable to strike the guerrilla forces
effectively, the army’s strategy was oriented toward eroding the civilian base from
which insurgents sought support or sympathy. By 2008, Leyte was almost clear of
insurgency-related violence. Western Samar was clear by 2009 except for a small
spike in 2012. The NPA was pushed to Northern Samar where they made a stand and
stepped up attacks in 2009 and 2010. Violence dropped drastically afterwards—partly
due to natural disasters that fragmented an already exhausted insurgent force.
The Eastern Visayas case thus follows a pattern of political violence resulting
from statist, strategic interests in containing an armed insurgency—by all means
available to the military, including the illegal targeting of civilians and using mass
Imelda’s nephew and Kokoy Romualdez’s son, Ferdinand Martin, kept the post of First
District congressman from 2007 to 2016.
408
In one case, two assailants killed Villaba municipal vice mayor Claudio Larrazabal, cousin
of former Commission on Elections commissioner Gregorio Larrazabal, in November 2014.
Larrazabal may have been killed to prevent him from running in the 2016 elections. "Leyte
Vice Mayor Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 18, 2014. Lalaine Jimenea,
"Vice Mayor Slay Suspect Nabbed," The Philippine Star December 23, 2014,
http://www.philstar.com/region/2014/12/23/1405735/vice-mayor-slay-suspect-nabbed.
106
violence against them. Military violence was centrally directed and coordinated across
the region. The military escalated violence in response to insurgents’ attacks, and the
level of violence dropped mainly as a result of the NPA’s defeat. All in all, the pattern
best exemplifies a centrally led crackdown on opponents. Similar examples are
discussed in Northern Luzon (counter-insurgency from 2001 until 2011) and, to a
certain extent, in Central Luzon (from 2005 to 2006), where General Palparan was
assigned after his command in Eastern Visayas. This is the subject of the next chapter.
At a smaller scale than counter-insurgency, elections produced violence each
election “season”, every three years from 2001. There were exceptions, of course:
potential candidates were sometimes eliminated as early as a year or two before an
election. Sometimes, shortly after the polls, a winning candidate was killed to prevent
them from assuming office. However, elections did not produce violence
“automatically”. As demonstrated in provinces where violence was comparatively
low, violence was averted when one group had a virtual monopoly over politics or
when competing groups managed to share power by carving up electoral offices
among themselves. In the region, electoral violence lessened considerably in scale
after 2010. The NPA also actively intervened during elections, particularly in Western
Samar. In the early 2000s, they levied “permit-to-campaign” fees, abducted and
harassed candidates and, in some cases, eliminated them permanently from the
running. The NPA’s ability to do so diminished over time, under the pressure of the
government’s military counter-insurgency campaign.
107
Chapter 4. Patronage and Punishment in Central Luzon
Central Luzon was the site of a high level of insurgency-related violence.
Unlike in Eastern Visayas, where state violence was in clearer response to the local
insurgency threat, particularistic politics had a stronger influence on the use of
violence. (See Figure 8, below) The violence against unionists, leftist politicians and
activists in Hacienda Luisita, a sugar plantation in Tarlac province that had enjoyed a
controversial exemption from land reform, exemplifies this variation. In neighboring
Nueva Ecija, a group of former communist insurgents engaged in anti-crime
vigilantism. Demonstrating a capacity for regulating social violence, the police
dismantled the group. Finally, electoral violence followed a similar pattern as in
Northern Luzon and Eastern Visayas—President Arroyo’s successful dislodgement of
Nueva Ecija strongman Governor Thomas Joson offers another example of the center
prevailing when faced with an antagonistic local leader.
Figure 8. Pattern of Insurgency-related Violence in Central Luzon
120
100
80
60
Other patterns of
violence
40
Insurgencyrelated violence
20
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
0
Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly
disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 8 for frequency distribution table
108
Central Luzon has a long history of peasant organization and unrest. Close to
Manila, the region has the third highest voting population nationwide. The densely
populated region is made up of the provincial bailiwicks of the Cojuangco-Aquinos in
Tarlac and the Macapagals in Pampanga, as well as Aurora, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan,
Bataan and Zambales. (See Map 3 below)
Map 3. Central Luzon Provinces
The presence of these dynastic families that have prominent roles in the
capital has served to lessen electoral violence in Central Luzon. Underlying their deep
and long sustained participation in national politics, the consolidation of these
dynasties. This chapter will explore the reasons why dynastic consolidation resulted
in a relatively low scale of electoral violence. Nonetheless, violence tended to
heighten prior to, or during, elections—although the scale diminished over time (See
Figure 9).
109
Figure 9. Pattern of Election-related Violence in Central Luzon
120
100
80
Other patterns
of violence
60
Electionrelated
violence
Election
Year
40
20
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
0
Source: Author’s data, number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly
disappeared, tortured or raped, see Appendix 8 for frequency distribution table
This chapter is organized into four sections. The first section explains the
dynamics that produced a pattern of political violence related to wealth control,
particularly the case of Hacienda Luisita in Tarlac. The second section covers the
general contours of insurgency-related violence throughout the region, with a focus
on General Jovito Palparan’s assignment to the regional military command in Central
Luzon in 2005 and the brutality of counter-insurgency violence during this period.
The third section deals with anti-crime vigilantism in Gapan City, a distinct category
of political violence concerned with social control. Finally, the fourth section explains
the central-local dynamics affecting electoral violence in the region, focusing on the
fall of the Joson political dynasty in Nueva Ecija.
110
A Strong but Brittle Alliance: Hacienda Luisita
Central Luzon has a long past of class conflict, having been the site of the first
major peasant insurgency in the country’s modern history. The Huk rebellion lasted
from 1946 to 1954, and at its height numbered between 11 and 15 thousand
fighters.409 The Huks had grown out of a guerrilla force that resisted both the Japanese
occupation during World War II and its landlord collaborators. After the war, the
independent Philippine government grew violently repressive against the Huks and
the leftwing political party, the Democratic Alliance (DA). Matters came to a head
when six DA candidates elected to Congress to represent Central Luzon were
prevented from taking their seats on unsubstantiated allegations that they had used
terror and other illegal means to win.410 The Huks engaged in full-scale rebellion,
peaking between 1949 and 1951.
The Secretary of National Defense, Ramon Magsaysay, made headway in the
government’s counter-insurgency efforts by using violence more selectively. Elected
president in 1953, Magsaysay instituted limited land reform and frontier resettlement
in Mindanao to alleviate agrarian discontent.411 In 1957, the Spanish corporation
Tabacalera sold the 6,400-hectare sugar plantation Hacienda Luisita and sugar mill
Central Azucarera de Tarlac after prolonged labor unrest. Magsaysay asked an ally,
Benigno Aquino, to facilitate the sale to Aquino’s in-laws, the Cojuangcos—a
powerful clan in Tarlac.412 In line with its social justice programs, the government
guaranteed loans for the Cojuangcos to make the purchase on the proviso that the
parcel of land would be distributed after ten years to the tenants and small-holders
409
Benedict Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines
(Philippine Edition) (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2014), 243.“Huk”
refers to the Hukbong Mapagpalayang Bayan (HMB).
410
Ibid.158-72.
411
Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 270-71.
412
James Putzel, Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines (London:
Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1992), 93-95.
111
who worked on the sugar plantation. This section explains the central-local dynamics
of political violence for control of Hacienda Luisita.
Figure 10. Pattern of Wealth Control Violence in Central Luzon
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
0
2001
2
Source: Author’s data, number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly
disappeared, tortured or raped, see Appendix 8 for frequency distribution table
This pattern of using political violence to control the wealth of resources like
farmlands, forests and mines is distinct from counterinsurgency and electoral
violence, although they overlap. The strategic interests of the state converge with
particularistic interests of national and local political actors to crush threats to their
dominance as well as to exploit and extract highly valuable resources. The violence is
sustained and can scale up quickly, especially if the military is involved. Yet in
contrast to counter-insurgency violence, which spreads nationally or regionally,
incidents are localized because violence concentrates in resource rich areas. From
2001 to 2016, political violence related to wealth control in Central Luzon intensified
112
in 2004 and 2005 (See Figure 10).413 From November 2004 to around June of the
following year, more than half of the killings were due to labor conflict on the
Hacienda Luisita sugar plantation in Tarlac City.
On November 16, 2004, police shot into a crowd of Hacienda Luisita workers
who were on the fourth day of a strike, killing seven and wounding over a hundred
protesters. The violence resulted from the intersection of national and local elite
interests as well as state and private aims. The struggle between the Cojuangco family
and Hacienda Luisita workers spanned four decades since Magsaysay brokered the
sale of the estate to the Cojuangcos. However, the family refused to honor the terms
of the agreement to redistribute the land, thanks to weak agrarian reform policies in
the country. During the presidency of Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, sister of
Cojuangco patriarch Jose “Peping” Cojuanco, Congress passed a comprehensive land
reform law in 1987. Under the law, Hacienda Luisita applied a Stocks Distribution
Option (SDO) to farm workers in lieu of land distribution. Peasants continued to
clamor for outright ownership.
Labor protests by workers in the Central Azucarera de Tarlac, the sugarprocessing factory, were rooted in grievances over wages and other aspects of the
SDO implementation. The retrenchment of more than 300 workers in October, 2004,
413
A small spike in violence throughout different Central Luzon provinces in 2010 were from
incidents that were mostly unrelated to one another. However, there was one thorny dispute
over the establishment of a special economic zone in Aurora province on land claimed by the
Agta indigenous people as their ancestral domain. For instance, in November 2010, an
attempt was made on the life of Bernie Rada, a commentator on Radyo Natin and vocal critic
of the project. Half a year later, Agta tribal chieftain Armando Maximino was killed amid
protests against Apeco; two days later, the homes of Agta tribal members were burned down
and Maximino was denied burial on Agta ancestral land. Tonette Orejas, "Radioman Links
Threat to Views on Apeco Aired on His Program," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 19,
2010. "CHR Probes Burning of Aurora Tribe Homes," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 3,
2011.
113
including union leaders, was the immediate spark of the protest.414 The following
month, negotiations broke down between the Hacienda Luisita, Inc. and the United
Luisita Workers Union (ULWU), as well as between the Central Azucarera de Tarlac
and the Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union. This prompted a demonstration by
5,000 workers and supporters in the demonstrations at the gates of the hacienda. At
first, the police were unable to disperse the protesters. The Department of Labor and
Employment, recognizing that the sugar industry was “imbued with public interest”,
issued orders for compulsory arbitration and assumed jurisdiction, paving the way for
military presence at the picket lines.415 On November 16, riot police fired into the
crowds, killing seven demonstrators and injuring 121 others. After a yearlong
investigation into the case, the CHR upheld the legality of the government’s actions
and deplored the aggressiveness of the protesters. However, the CHR questioned the
basis of military involvement—raising the possibility that it was a “strategic ploy to
intimidate the strikers.”416
Troops from the military’s Northern Luzon Command had been stationed in
Tarlac earlier that year—ostensibly for special operations training in the villages,
community dialogue and the protection of local facilities. After the 2004 strike and its
violent dispersal, the military claimed that the Hacienda Luisita situation presented a
threat to national security due to NPA infiltration and instigation of workers to take
up arms.417 Over the months that followed, leaders and prominent supporters of the
414
Stephanie Dychiu, "How a Worker's Strike Became the Luisita Massacre," GMA News
Online January 26, 2010,
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/182515/news/specialreports/how-a-workers-strikebecame-the-luisita-massacre.
415
"Fact Sheet in Re: Alleged Violent Dispersal of Strikers in Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City,"
(Commission on Human Rights, Republic of the Philippines, no date).
416
"CHR Resolution Case No. R III-Pi-2004 Re: Alleged Violent Dispersal of Strikers in
Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City ", (CHR, November 16, 2005).
417
Jo Martinez-Clemente, "Luisita Workers Defy DOLE," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January
16, 2005.
114
strike were assassinated one by one. Peasant leader Marcelino Beltran was killed in
Tarlac City on December 8, 2004. Beltran, who had been scheduled to testify in a
congressional inquiry into the Hacienda Luisita strike dispersal, made a dying
declaration that his killer was a soldier.418
Shortly after, in early March 2005, Tarlac City councilor Abelardo Ladera,
who had filed several resolutions in support of the hacienda workers, was shot
dead.419 Ladera was a member of the left-wing political party Bayan Muna, which
accused the military of Ladera’s assassination. 420 On the same day, Danilo
Macapagal, another prominent leader of the protest and Bayan Muna provincial
leader, was forcibly abducted from Cabanatuan City and has not been seen since.421 A
parish priest of the Philippine Independent Church, Reverend William Tadena, was
killed by two unidentified gunmen riding tandem on a motorcycle days later.422 In
June in Mayantoc, Bulacan, unidentified gunmen on motorcycles killed barangay
chair Artemio Carmen and Pedro Quinez, who was a member of the peasant group
Alyansa ng mga Magbubukid (Peasants’ Alliance) and a known supporter of the
Hacienda Luisita strike.423 The military blamed the NPA for the violence, and charges
were filed against alleged insurgents in some cases.424 Family members and fellow
418
Philip Tubeza and Leila Salaverria, "NBI Ordered to Probe Killing of Peasant Leader,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 11, 2004.
419
"Abelardo Ladera: The Hero of Luisita," Bulatlat.com March 12, 2005,
http://bulatlat.com/main/2005/03/12/abel-ladera-the-hero-of-luisita/.
420
Ronaldo Dizon, "Tarlac Councilor Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 4, 2005.
421
"Initial Report Case No CHR III-C-05-2635 Re: Danilo A. Macapagal," (Commission on
Human Rights, April 14, 2005). Dee Ayroso, "Aparición Danilo Macapagal," Bulatlat March
3, 2015, http://bulatlat.com/main/2015/03/03/aparicion-danilo-macapagal/.
422
"Initial Report Re: Killing of Fr. William Tadena and Wounding of Two Others," (March
18, 2005).. Russell Arador and Tonette Orejas, "Pro-Worker Priest Killed in Tarlac,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 14, 2005.
423
Russell Arador, "Barangay Chair Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 9, 2005.
424
Dona Pazzibugan and Blanche Rivera, "Military Blames NPA for Killings at Luisita,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 15, 2005.
115
hacienda community organizers nevertheless remained convinced that the military
was behind the violence, which was meant to dissuade further protest.425
As scandal engulfed President Arroyo in June 2005 following accusations of
massive voter fraud in the 2004 elections, former president Corazon Aquino called for
Arroyo’s resignation in early July.426 Arroyo set in motion the process to wrest
Hacienda Luisita away from the Cojuango-Aquino family. It appears that this was
done in retaliation for Corazon Aquino breaking ranks with Arroyo. In October, the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), the highest decision making body on
agrarian reform issues on which the president and other cabinet members vote, began
a review of the SDO that exempted the land from being redistributed.427 Before the
year’s end, PARC revoked the SDO and ordered that the land be parceled out to the
workers.428 This abrogated the 1989 PARC decision that allowed the exemption in the
first place. Undeterred, in April 2006, Aquino joined opposition politicians and civil
society groups in a campaign to block Arroyo’s attempts at amending the constitution
to prolong her term in office. The following month, PARC ruled against a Hacienda
Luisita appeal to reconsider the SDO revocation.429
425
Interview with Tarlac City Councilor Emily Ladera-Facunla on June 7, 2016 in Tarlac
City.
426
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, "Make Way for Your Successor, Cory
Aquino Asks Arroyo," The PCIJ Blog July 8, 2005, http://pcij.org/blog/2005/07/08/makeway-for-your-successor-cory-aquino-asks-arroyo. This was a reversal from the support she
and her family had given Arroyo in the 2004 elections. Moreover, her son Benigno
Cojuangco Aquino—a Tarlac representative at the time and future president—voted against
examining alleged evidence of Arroyo’s electoral fraud in Congress just days prior to the
public break with Arroyo. Stephanie Dychiu, "Win or Lose, Noynoy Has to Face Luisita
Deadlock," GMA News Online May 4, 2010,
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/190035/news/specialreports/win-or-lose-noynoyhas-to-face-luisita-deadlock.
427
Blanche Rivera, "Cory Family on the Verge of Losing Luisita," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
December 8, 2005.
428
"It's Final: Cory, Kin Lose Hacienda Luisita," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 21,
2005.
429
"Gov't Parceling out 1,000 Ha. To Luisita Farmers," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 5,
2006.
116
During this period, a shift also occurred in the violence related to the Hacienda
Luisita disputes. First of all, there was a lull in the violence for a number of months,
broken when Major General Palparan was assigned to Central Luzon in September
2005 (discussed in the next section). Three assassinations are likely to have been
aimed at forestalling organized action in the hacienda as a continuation of strong arm
tactics following the 2004 strike dispersal: those of Ladera, Macapagal and Tadena.430
However, the subsequent killing of Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union
president Ricardo Ramos and others with links to the Hacienda Luisita protests were
more likely to have been part of the broader counterinsurgency campaign throughout
Central Luzon.431 Although the military had already established an outpost inside the
hacienda at the height of 2004 strikes, the army’s presence assumed a new
significance as an enforcer of land distribution. 432 Militarization in the hacienda
shifted in purpose and meaning. The military’s presence no longer meant protection
of Cojuangco-Aquino landowners from peasant and labor protests. Instead, it implied
President Arroyo’s particularistic punishment of the family.
While subsequent violence in Tarlac City can be attributed to the larger
counterinsurgency campaign in Central Luzon, developments in national politics
affecting the land dispute itself and the use of political violence to influence the
outcome. Benigno Cojuangco Aquino, son of the former president and whose father
was the Marcos dictatorship’s most prominent martyr, ran for the presidency and won
in 2010. Nevertheless, the following year, the Supreme Court upheld the previous
430
"Karapatan 2005 Human Rights Report," (Quezon City: Karapatan, 2005). See also
Tonette Orejas, "500 Luisita Farm Families Told to Leave," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April
30, 2009.
431
Tonette Orejas and Vincent Cabreza, "Political Killings, Meningo, a Rape Case,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 4, 2006. Tonette Orejas, "Legacy Left by Palparan: 35
'Archived' Abuse Cases," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 6, 2016. Carmela Reyes, "AntiRed Drive Pushed in Bulacan," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 6, 2006.
432
Tonette Orejas, "Army Won't Remove Troops in Luisita," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May
21, 2006.
117
government’s decision to parcel out the land. 433 Moreover, the court set the land
price at which to compensate the Cojuangco family at 1989 rates—far lower than
what prevailing rates in 2011 could fetch.434
In 2012, the military reinstalled a troop presence in Hacienda Luisita,
bolstered by a request lodged by some village officials inside the sugar estate.435 On
the pretext of deterring the return of communist insurgents, the army was once again
an instrument of intimidation against peasant and labor unrest.436 Lethal violence
abated in the hacienda during this period nonetheless, reflecting the shift in the
struggle from the estate itself to the higher courts at the national level. The Supreme
Court rejected a final bid by the Cojuangco family to secure PhP 5 billion in
compensation for Hacienda Luisita, setting the number at PhP 196 million instead.437
The Supreme Court rulings may have set off Aquino’s retaliation against the Supreme
Court chief justice Renato Corona, an Arroyo appointee. Corona was soon impeached
by a Congress dominated by Aquino’s Liberal Party and he was removed from office
in May, 2012. 438 The Department of Agrarian reform began awarding land titles to
over 6,000 farmer beneficiaries in 2013, finally distributing the largest contiguous
estate remaining in the country at the time. 439 During President Aquino’s term,
433
Philip Tubeza, "Noy May Give up Luisita," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 13,
2009.
434
Daxim Lucas and Kristine Alave, "The Hacienda Is No More," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
November 25, 2011. "Highlights of the Hacienda Luisita Decision," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, November 25, 2011.
435
Tonette Orejas, "Military Presence in Luisita Confirmed," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
March 13, 2012.
436
Jerome Aning and Tonette Orejas, "P-Noy Kin: Luisita No Garrison State," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, March 22, 2012.
437
Inquirer Bureaus, "SC: P196m for Luisita," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 25, 2012.
438
Vincent Cabreza, "Luisita Farmers Hail Corona 'Agrarian Reform Champion'," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, April 25, 2012.
439
Jo Martinez-Clemente, "Tough Journey Ends for Luisita Farmers," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, October 2, 2013.
118
moreover, Arroyo was convicted of corruption and spent nearly four years under
arrest.440
The Butcher Arrives, Violence Shifts in Meaning
The state’s strategic aim of containing the communist insurgency coincided
with alarm over the electoral success of left-wing parties, a concern that many local
political actors shared. Bayan Muna was particularly successful in Central Luzon in
2001, making it a priority target for both counter-insurgency and anti-activist violence
as early as 2003—even prior to Operation Bantay Laya that used dirty tactics
throughout the country. The military also established a strong presence in urban
centers—a measure that had been unprecedented in the post-Marcos period. However,
the military’s use of violence elicited a backlash from some local politicians. The
violence abated to a large extent after 2007 although the military increased its
involvement in disputes over resources, mining in particular.
Counter-insurgency efforts in Central Luzon were centrally directed. In
August 2001, top military and police officials launched a joint counter-insurgency
agenda aimed at crippling the CPP in Central Luzon, which was one of the
insurgency’s biggest sources of funds. 441 The military contended that communist
forces were expanding rapidly among the region’s villages. The army estimated that
the combined forces of the communist factions in parts of Northern and Central
Luzon numbered some 1,500 to 1,600 insurgents, of which around 700 were in
440
As an informal concession, Arroyo was detained in a hospital for most of the period. When
she was president, she allowed a similar arrangement for her predecessor, Joseph Estrada.
441
At the time, only the highly industrialized Southern Tagalog generated more funds than
Central Luzon. Tonette Orejas, "PNP, AFP Sign Pact vs Reds," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
August 17, 2002.
119
Central Luzon.442 In comparison to the other regions however, the NPA was the least
violent in Central Luzon so the actual security threat may have been overplayed.443
Moreover, the NPA escalated its attacks in 2004 and 2005, but from 2006 onwards,
rebel-led violence dropped to virtually zero with only a handful of deadly attacks
made.444
After the May 2001 national and local elections, clashes and assassinations
heightened in scale. Most of the violence was concentrated in Pampanga, the
bailiwick of then president Arroyo.445 After a lull in the conflict between the NPA and
NPA breakaway, Rebolusyonaryong Hukbo ng Bayan (RHB), during the May
elections, violence flared up again with the assassination of Reynaldo Lagman, RHB
leader for Central Luzon, Santa Ana town in August.446 In December, Angeles City
police killed three men whom they accused of being insurgents from a new
communist armed group called the Maralitang Hukbong Bayan (MHB). The CHR
investigation indicated that forensics show that the victims were shot at close range,
execution style.447 In Tarlac, there were a number of cases in which the military
442
"Army Says C. Luzon Has Most Rebels," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 23, 2003. See
also "Communist Threat in C. Luzon Serious, Says PNP Director," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
December 22, 2002.
443
Drawing from the data in this study, insurgent-led attacks in Central Luzon resulted in only
61 victims (comprised of military, police, local government, other insurgent and civilian
targets) compared to 64 in Northern Luzon, 120 in Eastern Visayas and 202 in Southern
Mindanao.
444
In Central Luzon, the NPA claimed about half a dozen victims a year from 2001 to 2003.
In 2004, the number went up to 12 and in 2005, to 25. However, it dropped to four in 2006
and after that virtually zero except for 2 recorded casualties from NPA attacks in 2009 and
one in 2010. These figures come from the data collected in this study.
445
One case prior to the election involved the RHB taking responsibility for killing a man
whom they claimed was a military intelligence agent. Jun Malig, "NPA Condemns Rival
Group over Killing," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 11, 2001.
446
Tonette Orejas, "Suspected NPA Hit Men Kill Leader of Rival Communist Group,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 13, 2001.
447
"CHR Resolution Case No. III-01-2227 Re: Killing of Henry Marin and Arnold
Mendoza," (Commission on Human Rights, March 5, 2008 ). Also Ding Cervantes, "Raps
Poised vs. Angeles Fiscal, 8 Policemen over Salvaging," The Philippine Star February 8,
2002, http://www.philstar.com/nation/149878/raps-poised-vs-angeles-fiscal-8-policemen-
120
allegedly inflicted casualties among insurgents and civilians alike.448 Clashes between
army soldiers and NPA insurgents continued to cause casualties on both sides.
Violence began to intensify in Bulacan, where insurgents began to target local
government officials and rebel “returnees”. 449 The military responded with counteroffensives, resulting in the deaths of several alleged insurgents in armed encounters in
various towns. Lethal force was particularly intense in 2003, with as many as twenty
suspected rebels killed over two days in March.450
The pattern of counter-insurgency violence against political activists on the
Left emerged earlier in Central Luzon than in other regions in this study. The military
began to target activists particularly from political parties that had made
unprecedented electoral successes in the 2001 party-list elections. In September 2001
in Bulacan, military scout rangers were suspected of killing local councilor and
activist Wilfredo Mananghaya.451 In February 2003, suspected military and police
forcibly abducted Rowena Bayani and Edwin Villaluz in Maria Aurora town in
Aurora province; and five days later soldiers took Juan Orcino and Honorio Ayroso in
over-%C2%91salvaging%C2%92. See also Tonette Orejas, "Cops Kill 3 Members of New
Red Group," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 7, 2001.
448
Ronaldo Dizon, "Ex-Rebel, Dad, Brod Slain in Tarlac," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
December 20, 2001.
449
Rebel returnee Luis Reyes, alias Ka Allan, was killed in Calumpit in January 2003
seemingly as part of a pattern of NPA killings of former members in Cenral Luzon and in
Negros Occidental.Carmela Reyes, "Another Former NPA Leader Slain in Bulacan,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 25, 2003. See also TJ Burgonio, Carlito Pablo, and Alcuin
Papa, "Hit Squads on the Loose," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 25, 2003.
450
On March 28, 2003, the military reported killing an unidentified NPA fighter in Angat.
The following day, the military claimed to have killed 18 unnamed NPA fighters in Pandi
town. Carmela Reyes, Russell Arador, and Tonette Orejas, "2 Rebs Slain in Clashes,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 30, 2003. Tonette Orejas and Carmela Reyes, "18 NPA
Rebs Killed in Bulacan Clashes," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 31, 2003.
451
"CHR Resolution Case No.: III-02-2294 Re: Wilfredo Mananghaya for Homicide,"
(Commission on Human Rights, May 2, 2006).
121
San Jose City, Nueva Ecija; all of whom were affiliated with leftwing party Bayan
Muna.452
Apart from the assassinations following the violent dispersal of a workers’
protest at the Hacienda Luisita, the lethal targeting of activists escalated with the
assignment of Major-General Jovito Palparan to the region. Palparan was assigned to
Northern and Central Luzon amid allegations of his personal responsibility for
extrajudicial attacks against leftist activists and local organizers in Oriental Mindoro
and Eastern Visayas (as discussed in the previous chapter). 453 With a flair for
showmanship, upon his installation as chief of the army’s 7th Infantry Division in the
region, Palparan “declared war” on Central Luzon’s communist insurgents.454 He also
claimed that the killing of military sergeant Juanito Sobredo in San Ildefonso,
Bulacan and 2nd Lt. Rolly Aganon in Guimba, Nueva Ecija were meant as a personal
challenge to him.455 The general explicitly vowed to employ a strategy of state terror
against the rebels, declaring this to be part of the “essence of the coercive power” of
the state against “bad elements of society”.456 Meanwhile, civilians began to bear the
brunt of heightened military bombing, movement restriction and the establishment of
food blockades. 457 The military tightened its grip and fostered a climate of
repressiveness. For instance, soldiers interrogated and tortured the president and three
452
"CHR Resolution Case No.: III-02-2268 Re: Cristina R. Orcino and Zacarias A. Ayroso
for Forcible Abuction," (Commission on Human Rights, November 17, 2003). Also "Report
CHR Case No. III-02-2252 Re: Edwin C. Villaluz et. al.," (Commission on Human Rights,
May 25, 2004). See also "Army, Police Nix Abduction of Bayan Muna Members," The
Philippine Star, April 6, 2016, 2002.
453
Norman Bordadora, "Assault on Activists Alarms CHR," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April
25, 2005. See also Gabieta, "Transfer of Army General Draws Mixed Reactions."
454
Tonette Orejas, "Palparan Declares War on C. Luzon Rebs," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
September 8, 2005.
455
Palparan claimed that the NPA’s Sparrow Unit of assassins was responsible for Sobredo’s
murder. The insurgent group did not claim credit for the attack.
456
Anselmo Roque, "Palparan to Use Terror vs Guerrillas," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
September 29, 2005.
457
Palparan: Rebs suffer 'major setback', "Suspected Reb Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
October 8, 2005.
122
members of a farmers’ union in San Miguel town over graffiti slurring President
Arroyo. The farmers were warned that the military was in the area to purge “enemies
of the state” and had the power to kill them in their homes if their association had
links to the NPA.458
In addition to Palparan’s assignment, a deployment of 1,500 troops from
Mindanao to Central and Southern Luzon, a move made possible by reduced fighting
with the Moro Islamic Liberation while peace negotiations took place. 459 He
positioned his troops in key cities and towns in Pampanga and Bulacan, a counterinsurgency strategy that was highly unusual in the post-martial law years. Their stated
aim was to deny NPA insurgents staging grounds for specialized assassinations in the
urban centers of the region.
460
The military developed this strategy of urban
militarization in cities like San Fernando and Angeles in Pampanga, San Jose City in
Nueva Ecija, Tarlac City and Malolos City in Bulacan, adapting the use of “special
operations teams” (SOT) that had been confined since the mid-1990s to only “red
areas”, or guerrilla bases in remote areas.461 These SOTs sustained a military presence
in villages aimed at shrinking the areas in which insurgents could operate, pushing
them into the less populous hinterlands.462
In other regions, the military was mainly responding to the armed challenge of
a resurgent Communist insurgency. In contrast, in Central Luzon, the political threat
was more pronounced than the security risk posed by the NPA. In the military’s
view, areas that gave electoral support to the “above ground” political parties of the
458
"Investigation Report Re: Threats on the Life & Mental Torture," (Commission on Human
Rights, March 13, 2006), 333.
459
Delfin Mallari, Marlon Ramos, and Dona Pazzibugan, "3 Army Battalions Join Anti-NPA
Drive," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 20, 2006.
460
Tonette Orejas, "Troops Sent to C. Luzon Urban Areas," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June
14, 2006.
461
"Palparan Formula Seen in New Anti-Red Plan," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 1,
2007.
462
"Only 40 Villages Left in Army 'Clearing'," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 1, 2007.
123
left were one and the same with those that aided the “under-ground” armed
movement. 463 As a result, the military targeted what it considered “front”
organizations, including local chapters of political party Bayan Muna, peasants’ group
Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, labor group Anakpawis and other groups like the
Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT).
Shortly before the 2004 elections, for instance, Bayan Muna complained that
soldiers in Tarlac were using such tactics as posing as census-takers or looking for
houses to rent, asking who among the residents were members of the party-list
group—even distributing propaganda materials against Bayan Muna in Hacienda
Luisita.464 Arroyo thus reversed the trend towards legalizing the Communist Party
and drawing its members into democratic politics. This policy was ultimately
incompatible with growing fears sparked by their party-list success.
The targets of violence in Central Luzon in previous years were insurgents,
and insurgents responded by targeting local officials, the military and the police. 465
During the Palparan period however, lethal force against leftist activists escalated in
Central Luzon as it did in the rest of the country. Some of the killings occurred merely
hours apart in different provinces throughout the region, as in the murders of Bayan
Muna and urban poor group Kadamay members in Pampanga and the provincial
chairperson of Anakpawis in Bulacan. 466 Around the same time in Nueva Ecija,
463
"The Strategic and Tactical Activities of CPP-NPA-NDF in the White Areas," 80.
"Left Assails Campaign against Bayan Muna," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 3, 2004.
In Bataan province, soldiers were caught conducting surveillance on a Bayan Muna assembly.
465
Dabet Castañeda, "New Killings, Abductions Blamed on Palparan," Bulatlat December
24, 2005, http://bulatlat.com/main/2015/03/03/aparicion-danilo-macapagal/. The military
often blamed the NPA for these attacks, as in the case of Bayan member Victorina Gomez.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: III-05-2675 Re: Victorina M. Gomez," (Commission on Human
Rights, July 30, 2009). See also Carmela Reyes and Tonette Orejas, "Bayan Muna Member, 2
Others Killed in Attacks," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 18, 2005.
466
Part of a spate of leftist political party assassinations within hours of each other, Bayan
Muna members Francisco Rivera, Nemensio Maniti and Angel David in Magalang,
Pampanga on October 26. "Initial Report Re: Killings of Francisco Rivera, et. al.,"
464
124
former president of the leftist League of Filipino Students at the Central Luzon State
University, Maribel Supera, was abducted with her husband from San Jose City. Their
bodies were found hogtied and mouths taped up almost a month later. 467 Supera had
been pregnant. Murdered activists were allegedly given prior warning from the
military itself that they were in the army’s Order of Battle.468
Leaders of Bayan Muna and unionists associated with the labor unrest in
Hacienda Luisita were targeted. However, there was a distinction between the
assassinations that were directly aimed at repressing dissent in the hacienda and
azucarera disputes from those that occurred under Palparan’s watch. Activists
associated with the Hacienda Luisita protests such as Bayan Muna Tarlac chapter
(Commission on Human Rights, October 27, 2005). See also Karapatan (Alliance for the
Advancement of People's Rights), "Karapatan 2005 Human Rights Report," 2. On the same
day, provincial chairperson of Anakpawis and president of a local tricycle operators and
drivers association Federico de Leon was killed in Malolos; de Leon was an employee and
unionist in the municipal government until he was accused of being a member of the NPA.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-05-2680 Re: Killing of Federico De Leon for Violation of
Art. 3 UDHR and Art. 9 ICCPR," (Commission on Human Rights, July 17, 2007). Similarly,
suspected military agents killed leftwing Bayan Muna and urban poor group Kadamay
member Errol Sending in Angeles City on November 19. Two days later, Bayan member
Rommel Arcilla was killed in Floridablanca by unknown gunmen. Marlon Ramos, Tonette
Orejas, and Anselmo Roque, "Political Killings Escalate," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
November 22, 2005. Tonette Orejas, "Militant Leader in Angeles Slain," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, November 16, 2002. Also "Investigation Report Re: CHRP-III-C-06-2705 Errol
Sending," (Commission on Human Rights, October 16, 2008).
467
Ibid.,Marlon Ramos, Tonette Orejas, and Anselmo Roque., “Political Killings Escalate”.
468
In Guimba, Nueva Ecija, alleged military elements abducted and killed Cecilia Esteban, an
active member of Bayan Muna on October 2, 2005.Prior to her murder, soldiers of the 71st
Infantry Brigade had warned her four times that she was in their Order of Battle. TJ Burgonio,
"'One of the Worst Cases Submitted to the Melo Commission," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
September 8, 2006. On the same day, labor group Anakpawis-Central Luzon leader Armando
Javier, Jr. was killed by suspected soldiers in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. Tonette Orejas, "Kin of
Slain Activists Seek Justice," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 11, 2006. Less than two weeks
later in Bataan, soldiers under the command of General Palparan forcibly abducted Tomas
Paras, a rebel returnee, who refused army pressure on him to join the land mines team despite
threats that his name was on the army’s Order of Battle. "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
Dorina Paras Petitioner Versus Staff Sergeant Elizaldo Betty and Major General Jovito
Palparan," (2006). Anakpawis and Bayan Muna member Leodegario Punzal was killed by
two unidentified men wearing civilian clothes in Norzagaray. "CHR Resolution Case No.: IIIC-05-2679 Re: Leodegario M. Punzal for Violation of Art. 3 UDHR and Art. 6 ICCPR,"
(Commission on Human Rights, August 30, 2006).
125
secretary general Florante Collantes,469 Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union
president Ricardo Ramos, 470 labor organizer Jesse Alcantara, 471 United Luisita
Workers Union leader Tirso Cruz and Hacienda Luisita youth leader Ronald Intal,
were killed between October 2005 to April 2006 while an attempt was made on the
life of Father Mario Quince, pastor of the Philippine Independent Church. 472 Their
association with the hacienda protests made them targets but the pattern of attacks
469
In October in Camiling town, suspected military agents under the command of MajorGeneral Jovito Palparan gunned down Bayan Muna Tarlac chapter secretary-general Florante
Collantes, who was also a close supporter of Central Azucarera picketers. Russell Arador,
"Bayan Muna Tarlac Leader Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 16, 2005. See
also "Re-Investigation Report CHRP-III-05-2693 Re: Florante Collantes," (Commission on
Human Rights, May 30, 2008). However, despite a warrant issued for the arrest of Pfc.
Roderick de la Cruz, relatives of Collantes claimed that he roamed free within Hacienda
Luisita. Tonette Orejas, "Suspect Roams Freely, Victim's Kin Say," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, October 30, 2005.
470
A few days later after Collantes’s murder, however, two army sergeants allegedly
assassinated the president of the Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union Ricardo Ramos;
on the afternoon of the killing. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-Lo-05-2676 Re: Ricardo S.
Ramos," (Commission on Human Rights, June 21, 2009). See also "2 Army Sergeants
Tagged in Luisita Slay," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 29, 2005.
471
In December 2005, unidentified gunmen riding tandem on a motorcycle fatally shot Jessie
Alcantara, former president of the Tricycle Drivers’ Association in Bulacan, following a
pattern of intimidation prior to the murder. The CHR investigated a labor dispute related to
Hacienda Luisita as a possible motive and that soldiers from the 24th Infantry Battalion were
responsible. "Investigation Report Re: Killing of Jessie V. A.," (Commission on Human
Rights, August 14, 2006). Reyes and Orejas.
472
Tirso Cruz, an Ulwu union leader, was murdered on March 17, 2006; Cruz had received
death threats since he joined the Hacienda Luisita strike and prior to his death, soldiers
allegedly attempted to force Cruz to admitting to being a surrendered NPA rebel but Cruz
refused. Tonette Orejas, Russell Arador, and Blanche Rivera, "Another Luisita Union Leader
Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 18, 2006. Despite Cruz’s involvement with Ulwu,
the CHR noted in its resolution on the matter that the police had filed murder charges against
an alleged member of an armed group based on the theory that Cruz was a collector of
“revolutionary tax” for the NPA and the NPA killed Cruz as punishment for failing to remit
collection money. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2780 Re: Tirso M. Cruz (Extra-Legal
Killing)," (Commission on Human Rights, January 19, 2009). See also "Follow-up
Investigation Report Re: Tirso M. Cruz," (Commission on Human Rights, May 15, 2006).
In April 2006, Ronald Intal, reportedly leader of the Samahan ng mga Kabataang
Democratico sa Asyenda Luisita, a youth organization in Hacienda Luisita, was forcibly
disappeared by a group of armed men believed to be government soldiers. The police
suspected that rebels designed the abduction to put blame on the military. "CHR Resolution
Case No.: III-C-06-2760 Re: Ronald C. Intal for Abduction and Enforced Disappearance,"
(Commission on Human Rights, August 1, 2006). In January 2006, unidentified gunmen
attempted to kill Aglipayan parish priest and active supporter of Hacienda Luisita strikers,
Father Mario Quince, in early January 2006. "Initial Report Re: Attempted Killing of Fr.
Mario Quince," (Commission on Human Rights, January 6, 2005).
126
and the military’s “red tagging” them as communists suggests that the violence was
directly related to their alleged links to the armed underground. This was consistent
with anti-activist violence occurring at a higher scale throughout the rest of the region
at the time.
In Pampanga and Bulacan for instance, soldiers increasingly threatened
unionists and activists, and attempted to coerce them into confessing to having links
with armed insurgents. 473 Some local organizations were targeted in particular, such
as the farmers’ group Aguman da reng Maglalautang Talapagobra keng Gabun
(Association of Farmers and Land Workers or AMTG) in Mexico town, Pampanga.
Barely two weeks after the killing of AMTG leader Antonio Adriales, Perla
Rodriguez—a member of the group—was also killed. Soldiers had allegedly
threatened Rodriguez, coercing her to admit to being a NPA member. She filed a
complaint with the CHR and the Deputy Ombudsman for Military but unidentified
gunmen shot her dead in her home just as the investigation was concluding.474 In
Bulacan, the violence directed against activists created a climate of terror in towns but
General Palparan placed the blame on the NPA.475
473
In January 2006, gunmen killed peasant leader Antonio Adriales in Mexico town; while
police claimed Adriales was part of the RHB, the farmers’ group AMTG that Adriales had led
rejected this allegation. Police accused the NPA of the crime. "CHR Resolution Case No.:
III-C-07-2926 Re: Antonio D. Adriales," (Commission on Human Rights, July 31, 2008).
See also Tonette Orejas, "Farmer Leader Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 21,
2006. In January 2006, Bayan Muna leader Armando Leabres was killed in Peñaranda, Nueva
Ecija by suspected military elements a week after he expressed fear for his life at a meeting,
having been threatened by a soldier. "Another Militant Leader Slain," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, January 14, 2006.
474
"Memorandum Re: Killing of Perla T. Rodriguez," (Commission on Human Rights,
January 20, 2006). Also "Fact Sheet in Re: CHR Case No. III-06-2707 Re: Threats on the
Person of Perla Rodriguez and CHR Case No. III-06-2726 Re: Killing of Perla Rodriguez,"
(Commission on Human Rights, Republic of the Philippines, no date). See also Karapatan
(Alliance for the Advancement of People's Rights), "Karapatan Report on the Human Rights
Situation 2006," (Quezon City: Karapatan, 2006), 13-14.
475
Arlyn dela Cruz, "Fear Now Grips 3 Bulacan Barangays," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
March 15, 2006.
127
Violent excesses began to increase throughout the region as a consequence of
the heightened military presence. 476 In some cases, civilians got caught in the
crossfire.477 In others, civilians may have been punished in retaliation for NPA attacks
made on the army. For instance, in February 2006, twelve suspected members of the
military entered a farm in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, shooting and killing Ricardo
Valmocina, his sons and farm workers and abducting two. 478 An incident involving
the shooting of an army detachment a few days earlier might have precipitated the
killings.479 The same group may have been involved in the abduction and killing of a
barangay tanod in the same town days later. 480
A spate of forced disappearances of environmental, labor and leftist activists
in Aurora and Bulacan provinces occurred in March.481 On March 6, 2006, for
instance, unidentified men forcibly abducted Rogelio Concepcion, local Anakpawis
chapter coordinator and workers’ representative at his workplace, the Solid
Development Corporation.482 He has not resurfaced since. The CHR investigated a
number of disappearances around this time in places like Doña Remedios Trinidad
town, Bulacan. Alleged victims resurfaced even months later but were unwilling to
476
The only exception was in Nueva Ecija, which demonstrated a distinct pattern of violence
for social control (to be discussed in a subsequent section).
477
In January 2006, soldiers reported 10 NPA casualties resulting from an armed encounter in
Santa Ignacia town, Tarlac but human rights NGO Karapatan claimed that among the dead
were two civilians caught in the crossfire, Allan Ibasan and Dante Salgado. Tonette Orejas,
"Tarlac Clashes Death Toll Rises to 11," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 2, 2006.
478
"CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2751 Re: Killings of Ricardo Valmocina, Roel
Joseph Valmocina, Melchor Cardinal, Michael Milanay, Manuel Avila Jr. And Enforced
Disappearances of Reyante Valmocina and Robin Solano," (Commission on Human Rights,
April 11, 2012).
479
Cruz., “Fear Now Grips 3 Bulacan Barangays”.
480
Barangay tanod Danilo Fajardo was tied to a motorcycle, dragged and shot. Carmela
Reyes, "2 Slain in Bulacan," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 24, 2006.
481
In March 2006, suspected military elements, believed to be under the orders of then
general Jovito Palparan, forcibly abducted environmental activist and social worker Joey
Estriber in Baler. Tonette Orejas, "Legacy Left by Palparan: 35 'Archived' Abuse Cases,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 6, 2008. See also Tonette Orejas and Ansbert Joaquin,
"Anakpawis Leader Tags Army Man in Ambush," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 22, 2006.
482
"CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2774 Re: Enforced Disappearance of Rogelio
Concepcion," (Commission on Human Rights, March 28, 2007).
128
file complaints against the military.483 Most of the targets during this period were
“above ground” activists who were well known in their communities for their
advocacy. This suggests that the purpose of the violence was to sow terror and deter
community support for leftist advocacy and the insurgency.
Meanwhile, the killings continued. Shortly after Concepcion’s disappearance,
military agents were suspected of killing Bayan Muna’s Malolos chapter chairperson
in Bulacan and attempting to ambush the Anakpawis coordinator and peasant
association Alyansa ng Magbubukid sa Gitnang Luzon (Alliance of Central Luzon
Farmers, or AMGL) vice chairperson in Zambales.484 Members and leaders of Bayan
Muna and Anakpawis in Tarlac and Pampanga were forcibly abducted and killed in
the months that followed.485 In Nueva Ecija, members and leaders of the AMGL
483
For instance, "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2807 Re: Enforced Disappearance of
Eddie Pornellos and Junior Pornellos," (Commission on Human Rights, April 17, 2012).
Also "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2770 Re: Enforced Disappearance of Manuel
Sioson, Jr.," (Commission on Human Rights, January 14, 2013). In the Sioson case, soldiers
under General Palparan’s command were suspected of being responsible. Janess Ann Ellao,
"'Lolo' Is Palparan - Witness," Bulatlat April 27, 2015,
http://bulatlat.com/main/2015/04/27/lolo-is-palparan-witness/.
484
In March 2006 in Castillejos town, suspected military elements ambushed Amante Abelon;
Abelon survived but his wife and son were killed in the attack. Edgar Alejo, Tonette Orejas,
and Gill Francis Arevalo, "Attacks on Leftists Mount," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 21,
2006; Norman Bordadora and Luige del Puerto, "Bayan Exec Killed; 'Amnesty' Alarmed over
Leftist Deaths," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 10, 2006.
485
Rolando Mariano, Bayan Muna coordinator in Gerona town, Tarlac, was killed after
receiving death threats due to his association with the party. "Updated Report Re: Killing of
Rolando Mariano," (Commission on Human Rights, April 28, 2006). See also Russell Arador
and Anselmo Roque, "2 More Party-List Group Members Slain in Tarlac, Ecija," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, October 8, 2005. Benedicto Magdaong, alleged Anakpawis chairman and
member of an Abacan river residents’ association, was forcibly abducted by suspected
military intelligence agents in Angeles City. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2750 Re:
Benedicto B. Magdaong," (Commission on Human Rights, February 1, 2010). On May 13,
local Bayan Muna leader Manuel Nardo was killed in San Fernando City, Pampanga. "Initial
Report Re: Killing of Bayan Muna Leader Manuel Nardo," (Commission on Human Rights,
May 17, 2006). See also Tonette Orejas, "93rd Leftist Leader Killed," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, May 15, 2006. In July in San Felipe town, unknown assailants killed Charlie Daylo,
Aeta chieftain, vice-chairperson of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples and
former provincial coordinator of Anakpawis. Ansbert Joaquin and Tonette Orejas, "Aeta
Leader Latest Fatality in Attacks on Leftists," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 24, 2006.
129
were targeted in particular.486 By May 2006, eight months after Palparan had been
posted to Central Luzon, the military expanded their sights to target teachers’
organizations and church leaders.487
The police and military also began to flout legal restraints more openly. For
instance, Emerito Lipio, leader of the drivers’ association Pinagkaisang Samahan ng
Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (United Drivers and Operators Nationwide, also
known as PISTON) disappeared after his arrest by Angeles City police and military.
He was never formally charged and has not resurfaced since. 488 Another case
bordered on the absurd: a woman and her son were accused of rebellion and arrested
by the military at their homes in Nueva Ecija. Nine months later, the woman’s
husband told CHR investigators that they were “alive and well”, his wife had moved
to a different village and their son was in an army camp but so were no longer
interested in pursuing a case against the military. 489 Activists and community
486
In mid-May, a group of alleged military agents forcibly abducted Domingo Guinto and
two other civilians in Jaen, Nueva Ecija; the military claims there was an armed encounter
with insurgents in Pias village but the CHR investigation noted that villagers attest to no such
encounter. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2816 Re: Abduction and Enforced
Disappearance of Domingo Guinto, Avelino Interior and Virgilio Tranquilino," (Commission
on Human Rights, August 7, 2007). On June 11, Rodolfo de los Santos, a member of the
provincial council of the AMGL was murdered in Bongabon, Nueva Ecija. Tonette Orejas,
Anselmo Roque, and Desiree Caluza, "Farmer-Leader Slain in C. Luzon," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, June 13, 2006. A month later, suspected soldiers killed another member of the
peasant group AMGL and Bayan, John Gado, in Guimba, Nueva Ecija. "Memorandum Re:
Verification of Killing Cases Reported in Daily Newspapers," (Commission on Human
Rights, July 21, 2006).
487
Military agents were suspected of killing Kilusan ng Pambansang Demokrasya or National
Democracy Movement (KPD) member Audie Lucero and Analiza Abandor, provincial
coordinator of the Bataan Alliance of Teachers Association-Alliance of Concerned Teachers;
the army alleged Abandor was a collection officer of the RHB. Greg Refraccion, "Woman Is
10th Leftist Activist Slain in 2 Weeks," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 20, 2006. A few days
later, soldiers claim that they killed a United Church of Christ pastor, in the course of an
armed encounter in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija; however, the CHR indicated the likelihood
that the man was summarily executed. "Initial Investigation Report Re: CHR Case No. III-Cl06-2831," (Commission on Human Rights, March 25, 2008).
488
"CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2779 Re: Enforced Disappearance of Emerito Lipio,"
(Commission on Human Rights, March 16, 2011).
489
"Initial Investigation Report Re: CHR Case No. III-Cl-06-2802," (Commission on Human
Rights, April 4, 2007). Also Update Report on the case (no date).
130
organizers continued to receive death threats and warnings of being on state security
forces’ Order of Battle.490 In cases where specific soldiers or paramilitary “assets”
were charged or investigated, the police or military would claim that those killed were
suspected of being NPA members or sympathizers.491 Moreover, the military met
NPA attacks with brutal reprisals against civilians.492
In mid-2006, as Palparan’s mandatory retirement loomed on the horizon,
Arroyo announced the launch of Opan Bantay Laya II as a signal that the military
would redouble efforts against the communist insurgency. Just before the president’s
renewed “all out war” to defeat communist rebellion, new forms of militarization had
already begun in areas just outside Metro Manila, such as in the Central Luzon
provinces of Tarlac, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija and Bulacan.493 Despite Palparan’s claim
that the military campaign was coordinated with local officials and the police, local
officials began to balk at the army’s unrelenting encroachment. For instance, the
governor of Bulacan, Josefina de la Cruz, openly criticized Palparan, linking him to
490
In August 2006, fisherfolk association Samahan ng Pamalakaya of Obando member
Orlando Rivera was killed in Obando by suspected military soldiers; he was believed to be in
the military’s Order of Battle, moreover death threats had been made. "CHR Resolution Case
No.: III-C-06-2789 Re: Orlando M. Rivera," (Commission on Human Rights, April 27,
2007). In October, Aglipayan Church Bishop Alberto Ramento and chairperson of Karapatan
Central Luzon was killed in Tarlac City. prior to his death he said at a forum with the military
that he feared for his life and had been warned that he was in the army’s Order of Battle.
"Initial Report CHR Case No. III-Cl-06-2819 Re: Bishop Alberto Ramento," (Commission
on Human Rights, October 5, 2006).
491
An alleged military “asset” and former rebel was suspected of killing a man accused of
being a runner for the NPA "Investigation Report," (Commission on Human Rights, July 28,
2006). On August 15, 2006, a barangay councilman and tanod was killed at a wake in the
village by suspected government soldiers. The military alleged he was NPA sympathizer.
"Report Re: Killing," (Commission on Human Rights, October 11, 2006).
492
In September 2006, for instance, alleged NPA fighters killed two soldiers in Orani town,
Bataan. On the same day, suspected soliders killed Elmer Rufino and Mario Tubera of
Barangay Tala in Orani. The following day, Barangay Tala village secretary Romualdo
Flores was also killed in Orani."Memorandum Re: Killing of Elmer Rufino of Brgy. Tala,
Orani on October 1, 2004 and Abduction and Killing of Mario Tubera on September 27,
2005," (Commission on Human Rights, October 25, 2005). Visaya, "Village Chief Killed."
493
Tonette Orejas, "AFP Widens War Theater in C. Luzon," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June
29, 2006. "War on Reds Focuses on 4 Provinces," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 29, 2006.
131
complaints of abuse and killings in the province.494 Ultimately, with almost 200 cases
of extrajudicial killing or forced disappearance linked to Palparan in Mindoro, Eastern
Visayas and Central Luzon, it was in Bulacan where a local court indicted him in
2011.495
Although political violence in Central Luzon linked to the state’s counterinsurgency program had been lethal and repressive before General Jovito Palparan’s
involvement in the region, his year there was marked by the concerted use of state
terror against political opponents. Among the scores of murders, forced
disappearances, rapes and torture during this period, one particular case planted the
seeds of Palparan’s downfall: the disappearance of University of the Philippines (UP)
students Sherilyn Cadapan and Karen Empeño. Palparan was convicted of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention in Malolos, Bulacan on September 2018 along with two
former soldiers.496 The case had been well covered in the media for years, providing
insight into atrocities of Oplan Bantay Laya.
At the end of June 2006 in Hagonoy, Bulacan, soldiers of the 56th Infantry
Battalion, operating under General Palparan, abducted Cadapan and Empeño.497 They
also took Manuel Merino, who had rushed to the women’s aid. The two women have
494
Fe Zamora, Tonette Orejas, and Christine Avendaño, "Bulacan Governor Slams Palparan's
One-Man Army," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 22, 2006.
495
Purple Romero, "Poor Track Record in Curbing Human Rights Violations," ABS-CBN
News July 27, 2009, http://news.abs-cbn.com/special-report/07/20/09/poor-track-recordcurbing-human-rights-violations.
496
"Palparan Guilty of Kidnapping up Students Empeño, Cadapan," The Philippine Star
September 17, 2018, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/09/17/1852264/palparanguilty-kidnapping-students-empeo-cadapan. Palparan had evaded arrest and had been in
hiding from 2011 until his capture in 2014.
497
"CHR Resolution Case No.: III-W-06-2778 Re: Enforced Disappearance of Sherilyn
Cadapan, et. al.," (Commission on Human Rights, March 6, 2007). See also "Decision CaG.R. Sp No. 00002 (Supreme Court G R No. 179994 - for Write of Amparo and Resolution
Ca-G.R. Sp No. 95303 (Supreme Court G R No. 173288 for Writ of Habeas Corpus ",
(2007). Cadapan was also a community organizer for Alyansang Magbubukid ng Bulacan.
Kathleen de Villa, "The Kidnap Case of 2 up Students vs Palparan Et Al.," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, June 26, 2015.
132
not resurfaced although various witnesses have testified to having seen them in the
military’s custody soon after they vanished. Among these witnesses include Reynaldo
and Raymond Manalo, who had been abducted from their home in San Ildefonso
earlier that year, but managed to escape after 19 months of captivity.498 According to
these and other witnesses, detainees were interrogated, heavily tortured, and in the
cases of Cadapan and Empeño, repeatedly raped.499 Similar to other cases, detainees
were coerced to admit that they were NPA supporters—in some cases, they were
released afterwards.500 In other cases, they were killed and their remains were burned.
The abductions and treatment of the prisoners were carried out under Palparan’s
command, with his direct involvement.501 A month after the women had disappeared,
Arroyo singled the general out for praise in her 6th State of the Nation Address on July
24, 2006:502
“… Jovito Palparan continues to battle our enemies. He will not back down until the
communities he serves are released from the darkness of fear, able to rebuild their lives
in the dawn of justice and freedom.”
498
"Disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo CHRP-III-06-2725 Fact Sheet,"
(Commission on Human Rights, no date).
499
Carmela Reyes-Estrope, "Farmer Recounts Abuse Suffered by Missing Students,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 17, 2015. "Witness Says He Saw Palparan with Missing
up Students," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 14, 2015. "Ex-Security Guard Tells Court He
Saw Missing University of the Philippines Students," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 28,
2015.
500
Ernesto Santiago was taken by soldiers on July 24, 2006 in Pulilan Bulacan; he was
interrogated and forced to admit that he was an NPA supporter before he was released after
more than three months. He claims to have spotted Cadapan and Empeño, as well as a 15year-old boy among the detainees. "Final Investigation Report Re: CHRP-III-C-06-2783,"
(Commission on Human Rights, June 28, 2007). "Farmer Recounts Abuse Suffered by
Missing Students." Allison Lopez, "Torture Victim Recalls Ordeal in AFP Hands," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, September 12, 2007.
501
Leila Salaverria, "Court Says Palparan Knew of Abductions," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
December 28, 2007.
502
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, "Sixth State of the Nation Address of Her Excellency Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines, Delivered at the Batasang Pambansa,
Quezon City, on July 24, 2006," (Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, 2006).
133
Violence De-escalates
The posting to Central Luzon was Palparan’s final assignment on active duty;
he retired from the military in September 2006. However, Arroyo immediately
appointed him as the deputy for anti-insurgency operations at the National Security
Council.503 Palparan may have not been ready to leave the region, however. In April
2008, he seized a mine in Doña Remedios Trinidad town and a seaport in Masinloc
that had been embroiled in a land dispute, using soldiers and police without
authorization from their commanders. 504 Palparan was reportedly working as a
consultant at the security agency contracted by the owners of the facilities under
contention. The seizures prompted local officials in Bulacan and Zambales to protest
Palparan’s actions and a Department of National Defense investigation.505 The former
general may have also been involved in another land grab and the murder of a peasant
leader, Pascual Guevarra. 506 Palparan denied any wrongdoing. He claimed that
503
Christine Avendaño, "Palparan Gets New Job," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 9,
2006.
504
Tonette Orejas, "Palparan under Fire for Takeover of Mine, Port," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, May 1, 2008.
505
Carmela Reyes, "Local Execs Want Palparan out of Their Villages," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, June 4, 2008. Tonette Orejas, "DND Chief Orders Probe of Palparan," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, May 2, 2008. The military took over after ousting Palparan’s illegal
occupation of the areas. Months later in Zambales, the provincial government backed mine
workers and residents in an effort that ultimately resulted in the military’s withdrawal from
the mine. "Workers, Residents Drive Away Soldiers from Zambales Mine," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, August 19, 2008.
506
In Laur, in July 2010, unknown assailants attacked and killed peasant leader Pascual
Guevarra, leader of the Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association and the Alyansa ng
Magsasakang Nagkakaisa (ALMANA). Guevarra had mediated talks on compensation
payments over the right of way and damages disputes caused in the construction of the Sagan
Fort Magsaysay-Santa Rosa Road. ALMANA was formed to stop the Philippine Army from
removing farmers from 3,100 hectares of land inside what used to be an Army reservation.
The land may have been titled to retired military officials, including Palparan. Police
surmised this dispute led to his killing. "CHR Resolution Case No.: III-2010-0187
Re:Unlawful Killing of Pascual Guevarra," (Commission on Human Rights, June 7, 2012).
Armand Galang and Tonette Orejas, "78-Yr-Old Farmer Leader Gunned Down near Army
Camp in N. Ecija," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 11, 2010.
134
regardless of his retirement, he continued a personal crusade against communist
insurgents through his work for private security firms in Central Luzon.507
Palparan also briefly occupied a party-list seat in Congress by founding an
anti-communist party, Bantay, a name that evoked the bloody military campaign he
had championed. Running in 2007, Bantay failed to meet the threshold to send a
representative to Congress until a Supreme Court ruling more than doubled the
number of party list seats in Congress, paving the way for Palparan and others to enter
Congress in 2009.508
By some estimates, the greatest number of extrajudicial killings during
Arroyo's term occurred in Central Luzon. 509 The CHR reckons that around 52
extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances while Karapatan counts around 136
such cases linked to Palparan in Central Luzon. 510 After Palparan retired, the military
sought to build on the presence that he had established in the region’s rural and urban
centers. Part of this counter-insurgency strategy, as had been pursued in other regions,
was to bypass provincial officials and mobilize barangay officials into a paramilitary
force. In Central Luzon, contrary to the provincial governor’s criticism of Palparan’s
record of abuse, some mayors enthusiastically supported the continuation of a military
presence in the region even after his departure. 511
Levels of violence went down sharply after Palparan left but abductions and
the targeting of activists continued despite the military’s claims that Palparan was
507
Tonette Orejas, "Palparan Says Mining Job Part of War on Reds," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, May 3, 2008.
508
Vincent Cabreza, "SC Increases House Party-List Reps to 55," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
April 22, 2009.
509
Tonette Orejas, "40 Rights Violations Cases in C. Luzon Unsolved," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, December 12, 2011.
510
"Legacy Left by Palparan: 35 'Archived' Abuse Cases." Reyes, "Anti-Red Drive Pushed in
Bulacan."
511
"Bulacan Mayors Back Continued Army Presence," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September
29, 2006.
135
“the last of his kind”. 512 For instance, in April 2007, farmer and activist Jonas
Burgos was forcibly abducted in Quezon City. Burgos was targeted for his links to the
communist underground and alleged intelligence work to “infiltrate” the military in
Bulacan and obtain a copy of their Order of Battle.513
Ultimately, Arroyo was indebted to the military for backing her ascension to
the presidency in 2001, making her vulnerable to the prevailing hardliners in the
army. In the final analysis, however, there was an overriding strategic purpose to this
dirty war beyond the caprice of the national elites. The army’s main strategy targeted
NPA strongholds and, coupled with the illegal use of state terror against civilians, the
violence met the immediate objective of quelling the NPA surge in the early 2000s.
Undercutting the electoral success of the “above ground” left was both a goal of
counter-insurgency as well as of local, oligarchic politics. As a result of the violence
as well as other measures that favored mainstream parties and political dynasties,
Bayan Muna never again attained the level of electoral success as it had in the 2001
and 2004 party-list polls.514
Presidential elections in 2010 ended Arroyo’s unusually long tenure and
ushered in the government of Benigno Cojuangco Aquino. Under the Aquino
presidency, the military became more involved in the protection of private interests,
particularly in the extractive industries. For instance, suspected members of the
military killed Wilhelmus Geertman, a Dutch missionary in the Philippines since
1979. He had been tagged as a communist and harassed by the military since the
512
Marlon Ramos, "Palparan Last of His Kind in AFP," Philippine Daily Inquirer 2012.
Glenda Gloria, "Why Would the Army Abduct Jonas Burgos?," Rappler April 28, 2012,
http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/4466-why-would-the-army-abduct-jonas-burgos. See also
"Legal Analysis and Recommendations on Jonas Burgos Case," (Commission on Human
Rights, Republic of the Philippines, no date).
514
Alcuin Papa and Norman Bordadora, "Militant Groups List 54 Cases of Fraud, Violence,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 20, 2007. See also Nikko Dizon, "Bayan Muna Blames AFP
for Fall from Top Slot," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 23, 2007.
513
136
1980s.515 In 2012, he was ostensibly killed in the course of a robbery but his death
was suspected to be politically motivated.516 His family alleged that he was killed due
to his advocacy against mining and illegal logging.517
The Red Vigilante Group
In Central Luzon, a distinct pattern of violence emerged involving a local
militia group that claimed to be acting on behalf of the state, the Red Vigilante Group
or RVG. The RVG targeted neither insurgents nor political opponents but alleged
criminals like drug pushers and petty thieves. At a much smaller scale and for a
briefer period of time, the anti-crime vigilantism in Gapan City in Nueva Ecija
province bore a few similarities to violence related to “social control” in Southern
Mindanao and the national “war on drugs” that began in 2016 (discussed in the
following chapters).
Figure 11. Pattern of Social Control Violence in Central Luzon
25
20
15
10
5
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
0
Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly
disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 8 for frequency distribution table
515
"Report: Case Conference of the Extra-Judicial Killing of Wilhelmus Geertman and
Romualdo 'Waldo' Palispis," (Commission on Human Rights, August 14, 2012).
516
Tonette Orejas, "Military 'Asset,' 5 Other Suspects Charged with Geertman's Murder,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 17, 2012.
517
"Another Video Shows Killers of Dutch Dev't Worker," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
September 1, 2012.
137
Social control violence in Central Luzon peaked in 2001, with the RVG
violence accounting for 86 percent of the incidents until 2003. In 2011, there was
another spike of violence, consisting of isolated incidents across three provinces that
included police shootings of suspected criminals as well as a death and torture of
detainees in police custody.518 In 2016, weeks after President Rodrigo Duterte won
the May 9 election but prior to his assumption of office, fatal police shootings and
alleged vigilante attacks rose, likely to be in anticipation of Duterte’s national “war on
drugs”. (See Figure 11 above)
The focus in this section, however, is the vigilante violence against alleged
criminals and corrupt officials that emerged in Gapan City. Central government and
local officials’ tolerance enabled locally led vigilantism in Gapan, a consequence of
an unstable peace process between the state and a faction of the communist
insurgency. From 2001 to 2003, the RVG was responsible for a campaign of “total
cleansing” of alleged drug criminals throughout the province of Nueva Ecija,
dumping the bodies in Bulacan.519 The RVG killed around 30 to 40 people in the twoyear period, often dumping bodies outside Gapan. For instance, half a dozen corpses
were left with a message saying “pusher kami” (we are drug pushers), “all out war sa
pusher-drug lord para sa bayan” (we are pushers, all-out war against pusher-drug
lords for the country), signed off simply as “Vigilante”.520 With an estimated 60
fighters to its name, the group claimed to be the Nueva Ecija unit of the
518
For instance, in January 2011, in Angeles City, Pampanga, police allegedly tortured and
maltreated William Cortez, who was in custody for criminal activities. "CHR Resolution Case
No.: III-2011-0032 Re: William C. Cortez for Torture," (Commission on Human Rights,
May 16, 2011).
519
Carmela Reyes, "'Salvage' Survivors Key to Police Probe," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
October 5, 2001.
520
Carmela Reyes and Tonette Orejas, "Anti-Drug 'Vigilante' Massacres 6 Men," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, October 5, 2001.
138
Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Bongcayao Brigade (RPA-ABB), a breakaway
from the NPA based in Negros, Western Visayas. The RPA-ABB’s national
commander maintained that the RVG campaign against crime was part of the peace
agreement signed with the government in December 2000.521
Estrada’s ouster disrupted the peace process in 2001. Moreover, an internal
split left the Nueva Ecija’s RPA-ABB cut off from its links to civil society and
sources of funding while inheriting most of the fighters and arms.522 Armed but in
need of finance, the red vigilantes claimed that they waged a patriotic “all-out war”
against drug pushers and drug lords. 523 However, they were also likely to have
profited from crime themselves.524 Politicians and the police initially tolerated the
RVG’s operations, which targeted people on the police’s watchlists of criminals.525 In
2002, for example, the RVG claimed responsibility for the abduction and killing of
Romy Ferrer and Willy Chavez, suspected drug dealers, and Eric Francisco, an
alleged car thief, in Llanera town.526 The group claimed that Ferrer was a local drug
lord who had long been on the regional police’s Order of Battle and Chavez was his
henchman.527 Perente Tolentino and Joel Joaquin from Gapan City, whom the RVG
also allegedly executed in a spate of multiple killings in 2003, had also been in local
521
Anselmo Roque and Tonette Orejas, "Ecija Vigilantes Kill Suspected Drug Offender,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 3, 2003.
522
ICG, "The Philippines: Dismantling Rebel Groups," in Asia Report No. 248 (Brussels:
International Crisis Group, 2013), 22-23.
523
Reyes and Orejas, "Anti-Drug 'Vigilante' Massacres 6 Men."
524
Anselmo Roque, "Ecija 'Salvagings' on the Rise," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September
25, 2001.
525
Tonette Orejas, "Vigilante Group Turning into Kuratong," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
August 15, 2002.
526
Ding Cervantes, "Ecija Vigilantes Claim Having Killed Alleged Drug Lord, Pusher," The
Philippine Star September 7, 2002, http://www.philstar.com/nation/174999/ecija-vigilantesclaim-having-killed-alleged-drug-lord-pusher. See also "Ecija Vigilantes Kill Car Thief," The
Philippine Star August 22, 2002, http://www.philstar.com/nation/172977/ecija-vigilantes-killcar-thief.
527
The Nueva Ecija Police intelligence chief admitted only that Ferrer and Chavez were
known to be involved in petty drug pushing. Tonette Orejas, "Rebs-Turned-Assassins Execute
2 Drug Suspects in Nueva Ecija," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 9, 2002.
139
police records as drug crime suspects. 528 The group operated with relative ease
throughout Nueva Ecija and Bulacan, leaving corpses—hands and feet bound and
their mouths taped shut—one day after another, in different towns outside their base
in Gapan.529
If authorities had indeed turned a blind eye to the group’s activities, toleration
wore thin over time. Soldiers killed Miguel de la Cruz a.k.a. Ka Eagle and captured
three other alleged members of the RVG in Zaragoza town in April, 2003.530 The
conflict occurred five months after Arroyo ordered the implementation of the 2000
peace agreement with the RPA-ABB. Evidently, the government’s pact with the
larger RPA-ABB group in the Western Visayas region no longer extended to the RVG
rump in Central Luzon. The following year, police arrested the RVG’s leader Ricardo
Peralta in Pampanga.531 The RVG ceased its operations and was considered defunct
by 2003.532
“Seasonal” Electoral Violence
There was little electoral violence in Central Luzon during the Arroyo and
Benigno Aquino presidencies respectively due to the relatively stable consolidation of
dynastic rule by the early 2000s. By some measure, the Cojuangco-Aquinos in Tarlac,
the Magsaysays in Zambales, the Josons of Nueva Ecija, the Romans of Bataan and
528
Perente Tolentino, on the police’s watchlist of drug suspects, and three men were killed in
March were from Gapan in Nueva Ecija, although their bodies were dumped in San Miguel
town. Anselmo Roque, "Vigilantes Resurface, Kill 4 in Nueva Ecija," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, March 6, 2003.
529
For instance, six unidentified men were suspected killed by the Red Vigilante Group; the
bodies were found—some bound and their mouths taped—over four days in late January
2002 in the towns of Sta. Rosa, Carranglan, Cuyabo and Bongabon. "6 Men Found Dead in
Ecija Town," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 20, 2002.
530
Tonette Orejas and Anselmo Roque, "RPA-ABB Rebel Killed, 3 Captured in N. Ecija,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 25, 2003.
531
Tonette Orejas, "Suspected Assassin Guards 'Hanging Judge'," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
January 23, 2005.
532
"Rebolusyonaryong Partido Ng Manggagawa Ng Pilipinas (Revolutionary Workers Party
of the Philippines) and Its Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPMP/RPA-ABB)," 281.
140
the Oples of Bulacan had developed alternatives to violence in settling differences or
securing their position, such as alliance building with national centers of power or
making tactical compromises.533 “Mature” dynasties also had a tendency to split into
factions, maintaining fractious clan dominance to the exclusion of other entrants into
local politics. In 2007, for instance, except for Benigno Cojuangco Aquino, most local
candidates ran under the banner of the incumbent, President Arroyo, and Aquino’s
was the only opposition ticket in the province.534 The 2010 presidential elections
similarly split Tarlac between Aquino and his cousin Gilbert Teodoro, Arroyo’s
anointed successor. 535 While intra-dynastic violence does occur elsewhere in the
Philippines, there was little evidence of it in Central Luzon.536 Disruptions of dynastic
dominance did not lead to high levels of violence. Some dislodgement from power
was temporary, like jueteng power brokers in Pampanga. 537 In Doña Remedios
Trinidad and San Ildefonso, Bulacan, violence resulted in sympathy votes for the
perceived victims, in this case the widows of assassinated politicians.538
533
"Beyond the Picture of Calm," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 16, 2001. See also PDI
Northern Luzon Bureau and PDI Central Luzon Desk, "Political Clans Back in Power,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 20, 2001. Sidel describes a similar path to dynastic provincial
bossism in his case study of the Osmeñas of Cebu province. Sidel, 138-39.
534
The Cojuangcos nevertheless suffered from an internal split. Jo Martinez-Clemente, "No
Opposition, Unified Slate, Free Zone," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 28, 2007.
535
"Noynoy vs Gibo: Tough Call for Tarlac," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 23, 2009.
536
The Gordons of Olongapo City in Zambales were also divided internally and the 2013
ellections effectively ended more than 25 years of unbroken dominance. Robert Gonzaga,
"Deep Division Seen Cause of Gordons' Debacle in Olongapo," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
May 26, 2013.
537
Former priest Ed Panlilio defeated “Jueteng Lord” Bong Pineda’s wife Lilia for the
governorship only to later be stripped of the office by the Commission on Elections. He
served for most of one term but was unable to mount a successful electoral challenge
subsequently. See Tonette Orejas, "Pampanga Poll Fraud Tied to Gambling, Graft,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 18, 2007. "Miracle in Pampanga," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
May 19, 2007. Charlene Cayabyab, "Panlilio Resurrects Good Governance Crusade,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 6, 2010. "Jueteng in Pampanga, Floods in Laguna,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 10, 2010.
538
Doña Remedios Trinidad municipal mayor Esteban Paulino and two aides in as well as
San Ildefonso mayor Honorato Galvez and his bodyguard were assassinated prior to the 2001
elections. Their widows successfully ran against the prime suspects in the killings of their
141
Nonetheless, some electoral contests did result in violence. In Bulacan,
violence was localized to San Miguel town from 2006 to 2008.539 The 2012 election
season was particularly violent in several provinces, with killings related to disputes
over local legislation.540
The one location in Cental Luzon, where elections were unusually violent
elections, was in Nueva Ecija. There was regular intensification of violence around
the campaign season every three years. The Josons had dominated Nueva Ecija since
1960, resorting to brutal and lethal methods without compunction. Eduardo Joson was
provincial governor from 1959 who ruled Nueva Ecija with an iron fist until his death
of a heart attack in 1990. The power vacuum triggered a bloody crisis of
succession. 541 In 1995, his sons Tomas and Mariano were implicated in killing
husbands. Arzadon, "Ilocos Norte Arms Buildup Revealed." Carmela Reyes, "Widows of
Slain Bulacan Mayors Press Poll Bids," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 11, 2001.
539
Three local candidates were murdered in March 2006, including barangay chair Jessie
Velayo, who had run for vice mayor in San Miguel town in the 2004 elections. "Bulacan
Village Head Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 7, 2006. In June, armed men
entered the residence of Ronaldo Valdez, brother of the village’s former barangay captain
also murdered years before; they killed Valdez and his two young daughters. "CHR
Resolution Case No.: III-C-07-2881 Re: Myra Joson Valdez, Complainant, Versus Rudy
Mendoza et. al. Respondent," (Commission on Human Rights, April 27, 2007). In May 2008,
former Calumpit mayor Ramon Pagdanganan was gunned down; the assassination was
suspected to have been retaliation for his alleged role in the killing of a political rival’s
financier. "Investigation Report: The Killing of Two Men in Barangay Batia, Bocaue,
Bulacan," (Commission on Human Rights, July 28, 2008). ABS-CBN News, "Brother: Slain
Ex-Bulacan Mayor Knew Kill Plot against Him," ABS-CBN News May 5, 2008,
http://k2.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/regions/05/05/08/brother-slain-ex-bulacan-mayor-knewkill-plot-against-him.
540
On November 8, Cabanatuan City dwJJ radio commentator Julius Cauzo was killed after
having received death threats from local politicians amid a local plebescite over whether the
city should be reclassified as a highly urbanized city. The family of pro-reclassification
Mayor Julius Ceasar Vergara owns dwJJ. Anselmo Roque and Armand Galang, "Ecija
Radioman Slain Amid Gun Ban," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 9, 2012. See also
"Politics Eyed in Nueva Ecija Broadcaster's Slay," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 10,
2012. In Aurora province, local opposition to a Congressional bill to create a new town “Dr.
Juan C. Angara” out of the existing municipality of Maria Aurora was believed to be the
motive for the killing of Romualdo Palispis, who chaired a community group opposing the
bill. Tonette Orejas, "Poll Official in Aurora Shot Dead in His Own House," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, July 2, 2012.
541
William Branigin, "A Deadly Brand of Politics," The Washington Post December 25,
1990, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/12/25/a-deadly-brand-ofpolitics/d30fb505-a3f4-4fcc-aecb-5149d748859e/?utm_term=.7be7ee756fb7.
142
Eduardo’s former rival, Cabanatuan City Mayor Honorato Perez, who ran against
Tomas for the governorship.542 In the 1998 elections, the Josons delivered support
crucial to President Estrada’s bid for the presidency. When Estrada won, he pardoned
the Joson brothers and appointed another sibling to his cabinet.543 However, Aurelio
Umali of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (defeated Tomas Joson’s son in the
2001 congressional race—the first sign that the Josons were losing their grip.544 The
disturbance of Joson dominance in Nueva Ecija and the spread of electoral violence in
the province had its roots in a break with national elites.
With President Estrada’s fall in January 2001, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo had
not yet been able to consolidate her local reach before the May 2001 elections. With
the exception of Tarlac and Arroyo’s bailiwick Pampanga, the rest of Central Luzon
voted for deposed president Estrada’s party in local and congressional races. 545
Meanwhile, tensions had begun to rise between the Nueva Ecija governor and the
president’s office, with Malacañang thwarting Tomas Joson’s attempts to sanction
municipal mayors in the province in 2003.546 In the 2004 national and local elections,
again only Pampanga and Tarlac gave Arroyo more votes than contender Fernando
Poe, Jr.547
542
Anselmo Roque, "Josons Aim for Political Resurrection," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April
9, 2013.
543
Carlos Marquez and Vera Files, "All Quiet in 'Wild, Wild Nueva Ecija?'," GMA News
Online May 6, 2010, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/regions/190230/all-quiet-inwild-wild-nueva-ecija/story/.
544
Tina Arceo-Dumlao, Yolanda Fuertes, and Anselmo Roque, "New Faces Enter Northern
Luzon Politics," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 25, 2001.
545
Tonette Orejas, "'Political Immaturity' Seen in Opposition Win in Central Luzon,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 25, 2001. Nueva Ecija has the second highest number of
registered voters in the region, after Bulacan. Commission on Elections, "Philippine 2016
Voters Profile Consolidated Voter Statistics by Province and City/Municipality," 2016,
http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=2016NLE/Statistics/Philippine2016VotersProfile/ByProvCity.
546
Joson claimed that the president meddled with preventive suspension orders he issued
against Nueva Ecija mayors facing administrative charges. Anselmo Roque, "Ecija Gov
Slams Palace Hand in Mayors' Cases," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 13, 2003.
547
Tonette Orejas, "2004 a Bad Year for Central Luzon," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
December 29, 2004.
143
The 2007 election was critical. Joson was constrained by term limits from
running for re-election and fielded his brother Mariano to run for governor.548 Umali
ran against Mariano and requested that the national government to take steps to
forestall electoral violence. Nueva Ecija was declared a hotspot for violence and the
Commission on Elections deployed 350 soldiers to Nueva Ecija, to “maintain peace
and order”.549 Umali prevailed in this race and for the first time in almost half a
century, Nueva Ecija did not have a Joson in the provincial capitolio.550 Umali went
on to successfully remain governor over three terms, fending off various challenges
from the Josons and their allies. 551
Ultimately, the 2007 elections were the most violent since 2001, marked by
assassinations of candidates as well as violence against media workers. 552 The
weakening of the Josons’ supremacy resulted in greater violence among new political
actors seeking electoral success and aspiring to establish their own dynasties. 553
Shortly before the polls, a firefight between security forces of Congressman Rodolfo
548
Anselmo Roque, "Josons Continue to Dominate N. Ecija Politics," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, March 30, 2007.
549
"Comelec to Send New Teams to Keep Ecija Peace," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 1,
2007.
550
Manny Galvez, "Political Dynasties Rise, Fall in Ne," The Philippine Star May 19, 2013,
http://www.philstar.com/nation/2013/05/19/943615/political-dynasties-rise-fall-ne.
551
Anselmo Roque, "Umali, Joson Battle for Ecija Supremacy," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
December 22, 2009.
552
In January 2007 in Cabanatuan City, unknown gunmen killed Romulo Valisno, former
political leader of Nueva Ecija representative Pacifico Fajardo. Anselmo Roque and Carmela
Reyes, "Motorcycle Assassins Gun Down Ecija Trader," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 6,
2007. The day after the attack on Rueda, an attempt was likewise made on local radio station
dwNE reporter Rufino “Butch” Gamboa; a man on a motorcycle had shot and wounded
Gamboa. Anselmo Roque, "Radioman in Ecija Survives Attack," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
December 23, 2006. In April, Carmelo Palacios, a reporter for Radyo ng Bayan was killed in
Santa Rosa town. Dennis Santos, "Broadcaster Murdered," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
December 25, 2007.
553
On April 26, a firefight between security forces of Congressman Rodolfo Antonino and
Jaen mayoral candidate Antonio Esquivel resulted in the deaths of two unnamed men. Days
before the May 2007 elections, in San Isidro town, gunmen on a motorcycle killed Alex
Mempin, a barangay council member and political coordinator of Congressman Antonino; an
hour later Nestor Macabio, the driver of mayoral candidate Dennis Alejandro, was shot dead
in Quezon town. Anselmo Roque et al., "Death Toll in Poll Violence Hits 100," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, May 10, 2007.
144
Antonino and Jaen mayoral candidate Antonio Esquivel resulted in the deaths of two
unnamed men. Days afterwards, gunmen on a motorcycle killed Alex Mempin, a
barangay council member and political coordinator of Congressman Antonino. An
hour later Nestor Macabio, the driver of mayoral candidate Dennis Alejandro, was
shot dead in Quezon town.554 Equivel and Antonino were new entrants onto Nueva
Ecija’s political stage at the time; others like them sprang up throughout the province
during that period of relative uncertainty.555 Subsequent city and municipal elections
were considerably less violent.556 Village level elections continued to be bloody,
however.557 Moreover, while the Josons were hemmed in by the Umalis and won
fewer public offices than before, the Umalis in turn were unable to increase the
number of their relatives in office.558 Umali ostensibly shirked from using violence, at
554
In March 2006, former Gapan City mayor Ernesto Natividad arranged an attack on his
political rival Rodrigo Pascual, killing five people including two sons of Pascual. Leila
Salaverria, "Ombudsman Orders Murder Case Filed vs Ex-Mayor," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
January 19, 2012. While later that year in December, an attempt was made on Gapan City
Councilor Elpidio Rueda; Rueda survived but his aide Henry Managgit was killed. Anselmo
Roque, "Councilor Escapes Ambush, but Aide Killed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December
21, 2006.
555
Marquez and Vera Files.
556
Anselmo Roque et al., "N. Ecija 'Unusually' Calm, but Cops Keep Watch " Philippine
Daily Inquirer, May 7, 2010. While the 2013 local elections were somewhat calm overall,
assassins gunned down Carranglan Mayor Restituto Abad in Guimba the prior year. Mayor
Dies 5 Days after Gun Attack in N. Ecija," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 10, 2012.
"Election 2016: Agenda of the Nueva Ecija Gov," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 27, 2016.
557
The October village elections, however, were marked by some violence. In August, former
Jaen town barangay chair Noel Acosta, who had intended to run again for the position in the
October barangay elections, was killed in Cabanatuan City. Armand Galang, "Ex-Village
Chair Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 10, 2010. In October, municipal councilor
Alexander Ventura and a group of his followers killed Vice Mayor Luisito Caraang in Licab
Town. "Councilor Hunted," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 24, 2011. In June 2015,
motorbike-riding gunmen attempted to kill Jaen town barangay captain Arsenio Santos and,
within a week, lethally shot Camp Tinio barangay captain Roger Pascual. "Village Chief Shot
Dead in Cabanatuan City," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 7, 2015. Another Cabanatuan City
barangay captain Cesar Baltazar was killed in September and village chief Geral Fermin in
April 2016, prompting the national police to examine the link between the killings and the
May 9, 2016 elections. Armand Galang and Delfin Mallari, "Ecija Cops Grilled on Political
Killings," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 14, 2016. And Visaya and Galang.
558
In contrast, Arroyo’s former chief of the Philippine National Police and close adviser
Hermogenes Ebdane effectively began dominating Zambales politics as governor, dislodging
well established political families—but not before his struggle with the Deloso clan for
145
least overtly.559 The fall of Joson and the rise of Umali demonstrate how national
elites have the capacity to act against powerful local actors.
A Weak State’s Show of Strength
Central-local dynamics are critical in explaining patterns of political violence
in Central Luzon in four ways. First, the state violence for wealth control
characterizes the pattern of violence in Hacienda Luisita—until the political alliance
between Arroyo and the Cojuangco-Aquino dynasty fell apart. Initially, the
particularistic interests of Arroyo and the Cojuangco-Aquinos aligned. Arroyo
mobilized the military and police to intimidate the Hacienda Luisita strikers and
possibly even assassinate union organizers, designating the sugar plantation and
factory a matter of national interest. The violence was episodic, escalating and deescalating according to the political needs of President Arroyo.
Second, the state initially pursued a strategic interest in addressing insurgency
movements in the region. The NPA had regained its strength nationally and military
strategists within the government perceived leftist influence in populous, urban areas
as integral to the insurgency. This analysis resonated with the concerns of President
Arroyo, who was eager to strike two birds with one stone: one, reciprocate the
military’s backing of her ascension into office in 2001; and, two, arrest the electoral
rise of the leftist parties that would not be silenced over the exposure of electoral
fraud in 2004. Strategic and particularistic interests converged in the mobilization of
the military’s capacity for violence. The brutal campaign against activists coupled
political control turned bloody. Anselmo Roque, "In Nueva Ecija, the Winner Is..." Philippine
Daily Inquirer, May 15, 2013.
559
The rivalry may have resulted in the murder of Cezar Madoh, a bodyguard of former
governor Amor Deloso, in Iba town. Robert Gonzaga, "An Emerging Force in Zambales
Politics," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 7, 2013.. See also "Killing Increases Tension as
Zambales Polls Proceed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 4, 2012.
146
with the intensified counter-insurgency were effective in greatly weakening the NPA
in Central Luzon yet the anti-activist violence intensified in 2006 even after the armed
insurgents were virtually defeated.
A third dynamic involved the central government tolerating RVG vigilantes in
Nueva Ecija, obliging local governments and the police to turn a blind eye to the
violence in Gapan City. The RVG claimed that their attacks on alleged criminals was
part of the larger peace agreement between the government and the RPA-ABB in
Western Visayas, which included the RVG in Central Luzon. They were allowed to
retain their arms to help the government maintain peace and order. With the
government’s tolerance, the RVG’s vigilantism was sustained for two years. This
changed when President Arroyo affirmed the peace pact with the RPA-ABB
negotiated by deposed President Estrada before her. The police arrested the RVG’s
leader and dismantled the group, demonstrating the central state’s capacity to regulate
violence and crack down on armed groups.
Fourth, electoral violence in Central Luzon remained at a low level in
comparison to the other regions in this study. Intra-elite moderation among political
dynasties may account for part of this. Moreover, the central government—via the
military’s presence in the region—exerted an impact on local politics. Over time,
candidates were dissuaded from paying off NPA extortion. Moreover, military
deployment amplified the influence of the president during elections. This was
demonstrated in vote rich Nueva Ecija, when it became necessary for Arroyo to
dislodge the powerful Joson dynasty.
In Central Luzon, the state showed its
strength—pursuing its strategic interests, often converged with the particularistic
interests of the president and allies—and mobilizing capacity to achieve them.
147
Chapter 5. Safe City, Murder Capital in Southern Mindanao
To understand the current “war on drugs” in the Philippines, it is necessary to
study the Davao City Death Squad (DDS). State-sponsored vigilantism may have
claimed as many as 1,200 lives—mostly young men or boys, almost all of whom were
part of the city’s urban poor. When President Rodrigo Duterte was the mayor of
Davao City, he avoided overt political repression that would have courted backfire.
“Social cleansing” virtually gained social acceptability as an effective solution to
urban crime because it made the city otherwise safe.
Figure 12. Patterns of Political Violence in Southern Mindanao
100
Insurgency-related violence
90
80
Moro Insurgency* violence
70
60
50
Social control-related
violence
40
Election-related violence
30
Wealth control-related
violence
20
10
Unknown
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
0
Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly
disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 9 for frequency distribution table
* Refers to 2003 bombings of Sasa wharf and Davao airport
Southern Mindanao was the most violent of the regions in this study, with
insurgency-related violence accounting for the greatest proportion of victims (See
Figure 12).560 But in other respects Southern Mindanao diverged significantly. While
it would be reasonable to expect a substantial level of electoral violence, as was the
case in Northern and Central Luzon, in Southern Mindanao there was very little (4.1
560
See Appendix 2 for cross-regional comparision.
148
percent). Conversely, violence related to social control (i.e. crime, vice, etc.), which
was minimal in the other cases, made up almost a third (32.5 percent) of overall
political violence of Southern Mindanao between 2001 to 2016, and of this 73.57
percent was concentrated in Davao City and 12.33 percent in Tagum City.561 Southern
Mindanao Region is composed of five provinces: Davao del Sur, where Davao City is
located; Davao del Norte, where Tagum City is located; Davao Oriental; Davao
Occidental; and, Compostela Valley.562 (See Map 4 below)
Map 4. Southern Mindanao Provinces
Between 1988 and 2016, Rodrigo Duterte was re-elected every three years as
Davao City mayor, pausing only to serve in Congress (1998-2001) and as the vice
mayor (2010 to 2013) while his daughter, Sara, had the top job. These pauses were
561
All computations are based on data in Appendix 9.
The provinces referred to in this chapter belong to the administrative Region XI designated
as the “Davao Region”. With the inclusion of the provinces South Cotabato and Sarangani,
the region was called “Southern Mindanao” until 2001. In order to avoid confusion when
referring to the three different Davao provinces and Davao City, the old name Southern
Mindanao is used here when referring to the region.
562
149
due to legal limits on consecutive terms. Throughout the latter half of his tenure as a
city executive, Duterte effectively cordoned Davao City off from the anti-Communist
campaign that the military waged around the city. Duterte was a powerful third force
in the conflict between the army and the NPA. He exerted a strong influence over
military units in the city and the Southern Mindanao region more generally.
Moreover, he essentially permitted guerrillas to operate in certain areas of this city.
Duterte ensured that leftist activists were safe from state-sponsored killings, and in
turn, they were expected to remain silent over vigilante killings in the city.563
Figure 13. Pattern of Social Control Violence in Southern Mindanao
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
0
Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly
disappeared, tortured or raped; see Appendix 9 for frequency distribution table
This chapter focuses on the central-local dynamics that sustained the high
level of state sponsored vigilante killings in the region (See Figure 13). An earlier and
prominent example of this pattern of violence occurred in Manila during the tenure of
Mayor Alfredo Lim from 1992 to 1998. He was reputed to have tolerated summary
executions of criminals by the police, particularly in the slums of the country’s
563
ICG, "The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks," 11.
150
capital.564 Violence for social control in Southern Mindanao involved the convergence
of the state’s strategic aim of eradicating crime and the particularistic interest of local
political actors in using this tactic to gain power and influence. Moreover, using lethal
violence against the urban poor allows authorities to rule them using fear. Violence
thus becomes a lever with which to influence, if not control, a segment of society that
would otherwise be impenetrable.
The first section of the chapter explores how and why central-local dynamics
enabled the rise of state-sponsored vigilante violence for social control in Davao City,
and the second examines why the withdrawal of central support did not bring an end
to the violence in Davao City. The third section draws a comparison between the
central-local dynamics explaining the Davao Death Squad and the shorter-lived
Tagum City death squad. The fourth and final section of this chapter turns to the
dynamics of violence related to control over mining in Talaingod, Davao del Norte
province, Mount Diwalwal in Compostela Valley and in Kiblawan, Davao del Sur.
Petty Despotism and Central Support
As mayor, Duterte cultivated a reputation for being tough on crime, not the
least due to his association with vigilante killings by a group that became known as
the Davao Death Squad (DDS).565 By one estimate, the DDS committed 1,424 killings
in Davao City from 1998 to 2015 (See Figure 14).566
564
Gavin Shatkin, "Are Communities Organised? A Quantitative Investigation of Two Cities
in Metro Manila," International Development Planning Review 25, no. 3 (2003): 227. His
tough-on-crime platform made him an early favorite in the popularity polls when he ran (but
lost) for president in 1998. He was nonetheless catapulted into national politics. Lim was
elected senator from 2004 to 2007 and had a second stint as mayor of Manila from 2007 to
2013.
565
See, for instance, Phil Zabriskie, "The Punisher," Time Asia, June 24 2002.
566
The Coalition Against Summary Execution (CASE) is a Davao City-based group that
began monitoring the Davao Death Squad violence in 1998. CASE obtains its data from
regional and city newspapers and its constituent NGOs (e.g. church groups, street children
151
Figure 14. Davao Death Squad Killings
200
180
160
Coalition
Against
Summary
Execution
s estimate,
1998 to
2015
140
120
100
Author's
estimate,
2001 to
2016*
80
60
40
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
0
1998
20
Source: Coalition Against Summary Executions (CASE), unpublished; Author’s data,
number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured or raped; see
Appendix 9 for frequency distribution table
* As proportion of annual CASE estimate
The formation of the DDS dates back to Duterte’s narrow victory in the 1988
election, when Duterte ran against radio broadcaster Jun Pala, a popular spokesperson
for the anti-communist vigilante group Alsa Masa (Masses, Arise) set up by the
Davao City police commander. Having won the election, one of Duterte’s first
priorities was to establish his dominance in the city, which was beset by military,
paramilitary, vigilante and insurgent factions.567 Duterte exploited a fracture in the
shelters, etc.). Coalition Against Summary Execution, "Data on Summary Executions in
Davao City Based on News Clippings from Davao Sunstar, Sunstar Super Balita, Mindanao
Times and Brigada Editors from 19 August 1998 to December 2015," (Davao City2015).
Unpublished.
567
F.A. Mediansky, "The New People's Army: A Nation-Wide Insurgency in the Philippines,"
Contemporary Southeast Asia 8, no. 1 (1986). Oude Breuil, Brenda Carina, and Ralph
Rozema, "Fatal Imaginations: Death Squads in Davao City and Medellin Compared," Crime,
Law and Social Change 52, no. 4 (2009): 415. See also Sheila Coronel, "I Will Kill All the
152
communist insurgency and forged an alliance with the NPA. Yet Duterte also
supported and funded the Alsa Masa. By co-opting the Alsa Masa, Duterte may have
assisted the CPP leadership to purge urban insurgents who deviated from the party’s
Maoist line.568 Duterte disbanded the Alsa Masa, yet the Paquibato district in Davao
City long remained a stronghold of Duterte’s NPA ally Leonicio “Ka Parago” Pitao
until Parago’s death in 2015.569 Duterte deftly balanced his alliance with the left
through appeasing the locally stationed military, apparently by making regular
financial transfers from the city coffers and ensuring that communist insurgents
remained only at the city’s fringes.570
The DDS grew as Duterte consolidated his influence over the military and
paramilitary groups. DDS expanded from a handful of assassins in 1988 to a shadow
structure parallel to an official Anti-Crime Task Force, initially meant to address
organized crime. The DDS targeted gang members, thieves and drug addicts.571
Through a patchwork of deals with the military and insurgents, and using financial
incentives, Duterte had hegemonic control over the use of violence in Davao City by
Drug Lords: The Making of Rodrigo Duterte," The Atlantic September 20, 2016,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/09/rodrigo-duterte-philippinesmanila-drugs-davao/500756/.
568
John McBeth, "Duterte Always Loved Communists--except When He Was Killing Them,"
South China Morning Post October 19, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/weekasia/geopolitics/article/2038320/duterte-always-loved-communists-except-when-he-waskilling.
569
Military forces gunned down Pitao in 2015 and Duterte allowed a funeral march for Pitao
in the city streets. Allan Nawal, "Rebs Say Slain Leader, Medic Unarmed When Gunned
Down," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 2, 2015. Dennis Santos, "Duterte Defends Allowing
Hero's Burial for Slain NPA Leader," Philippine Daily Inquirer July 11, 2015,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/704460/duterte-defends-allowing-heros-burial-for-slain-npaleader.
570
The threat of withdrawing city financing from the military in 2010, for instance, and
Duterte’s role in regional security arrangements are discussed later in this section.
571
Leila de Lima, "Dissenting Report of Senator Leila M. De Lima to Joint Committee Report
No. 18 of the Committee on Justice and Human Rights Jointly with the Committee on Public
Order and Dangerous Drugs," (Manila: Senate of the Philippines, December 9, 2016), 22.
Arturo Bariquit Lascañas, "Affidavit," (February 19, 2017); ibid. de Lima, 26.
153
the late 1990s. 572
In this environment, Duterte began operating the DDS,
unencumbered by rival groups. From two suspected DDS killings in 1998, there were
an estimated 16 killings in 1999 and 11 in 2000.573
The state-sponsored vigilante killings in Davao City evolved over time but
some key characteristics remained consistent. DDS violence tended to occur in spates
of killings that fostered a dangerous atmosphere, with multiple killings in one day,
over the course of a few days or spread out over a month.574 At the start of a new
mayoral term in 2001, Duterte declared a “war on drugs” and vowed to eradicate drug
crime from the city by the end of that year. A few months after the election, a spate of
killings attributed to the DDS began with as many as eight alleged drug criminals
killed within a week.575 Duterte read lists of alleged criminals on the radio, and within
a certain period of time, sometimes as brief as a day or two, some of those on the list
would be killed by unidentified gunmen on motorcycles.576 The lists came from the
police anti-narcotics crime bureau and intelligence gathered by village officials. The
DDS also began targeting newly released convicts from prison, individuals with cases
pending against them or people with a criminal record.577 Typically, the targets or
572
TJ Burgonio and Dona Pazzibugan, "Move over Dirty Harry, Duterte's Here," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, July 10, 2002.
573
See Appendix 9.
574
Seven periods of heightened killings were documented in this study, including: September
to November, 2001; May to July, 2003; February 2004; June to August 2004; December 2004
to January 2005; Mar to April 2006; August 2009.
575
Anthony Allada, "Making Davao a Better Place to Live In," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
November 11, 2001; "More Suspects Slain as New Drug War Vowed," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, October 8, 2001.
576
For instance, unidentified gunmen killed Jomad Suma and Kiram Nakilan, suspected drug
pushers on a list of 500 names that Mayor Duterte had earlier read out over the radio. Both
had prior arrests on drug charges."2 More on Duterte Drug List Slain in Shootout," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, November 12, 2001.
577
"Death Squad Killings," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 17, 2003. An example is the 2005
killing of Roberto Gonzales, whom police identified as a member of the Akyat Bahay house
burglary gang with a criminal record for illegal drugs and robbery. The CHR also noted the
similarity of his case to prior DDS killings. Moreover, Gonzales’s death may have been one
of six such killings that day. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2400dc Re: Death of Intong
154
their families would learn directly from village officials or through word of mouth
that they were “on the list,” prior to the attacks.578 The violence was selective and not
indiscriminate.579 This personalized the threat and strengthened the ability of the local
state agents to control dense sections of the urban poor.
A crucial part of Duterte’s success stemmed from his ability to form alliances
with national politicians. In July 2002, President Arroyo threw her political weight
behind Duterte and appointed him to head a national consultative taskforce on
kidnapping and illegal drugs. In doing so, she endorsed his methods in no uncertain
terms. 580 Duterte also chaired the Regional Peace and Order Council (RPOC),
spanning the Davao provinces and Compostela Valley province.581 The purpose of the
RPOC and other sub-national councils were, inter alia, to coordinate the local offices
of national security, police and civilian agencies for “peace and order” concerns. The
RPOC oversaw counter-insurgency specifically, as well as monitored the activities of
paramilitary militias.582 As the RPOC chair, Duterte was involved in the management
of several security issues that went beyond the borders of Davao city. For instance, a
dispute between the local mayor and small-scale miners in Mount Diwalwal, in
Gonzales Alias "Pasmo" Tn: Roberto Gonzales," (Commission on Human Rights, September
28, 2006).
578
References to being “on the list” featured in almost half of the Davao City cases that
Human Rights Watch had investigated. See "You Can Die Any Time: Death Squad Killings
in Mindanao," (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009), 29-46.
579
On the theory of selective violence, see Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War.
580
Burgonio and Pazzibugan. Dona Pazzibugan, R. Nazareno, and R. Ponte, "Duterte's Tough
Stance Rubs Off on GMA," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 13, 2002.
581
Duterte was the regional chair for most of the post-Marcos period, having first been
appointed into the position by President Corazon Aquino. "The Rodrigo Duterte Interview,"
Esquire Magazine, August 25 2016.
582
"Executive Order No. 309 Reorganizing the Peace and Order Council," (Office of the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987). "Executive Order No. 320 Amending
Executive Order No. 309, S. 1987, Entitled "Reorganizing the Peace and Order Councnil," as
Amended by Executive Order No. 317, S. 1988," (Office of the President of the Republic of
the Philippines, 1988).
155
Compostela Valley province, turned bloody, with a series of assassinations in 2002.583
Arroyo appointed Duterte to resolve the conflict. 584 (The Diwalwal conflict is
discussed in detail at the final section of this chapter.)
In March and April 2003, the bombing of Sasa wharf and the Davao City
airport killed almost 40 people. The government held the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) responsible for the attacks.585 President Arroyo declared a state of
“lawless violence”—an executive measure that Arroyo used to skirt Congressional
review, unlike declaring martial law—in Davao City on April 2. Through this
measure, Arroyo created a military-led Task Force Davao to address the terrorist
attacks.586 The task force, with the support of Duterte as city mayor, immediately
established headquarters in the city center, operated checkpoints in strategic areas and
conducted street patrols in full battle gear. 587 While a specialized military unit
operating in the city might ordinarily signal the tightening of central control over the
locale, there were strong indications that Duterte maintained influence if not outright
operational control. Moreover, the Davao Task Force was likely to have indirectly
supported the DDS vigilantism in the city.588 It eventually expanded its activities
beyond the 2003 bombings in Davao City. The military-led security force was
583
Ayan Mellejor and Anthony Allada, "Duterte Vows to Disarm Miners on Mt. Diwalwal,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 6, 2002.
584
Anthony Allada, "Killings Continue in Mt. Diwalwal, Despite Agreement to End Rivalry,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 10, 2002.
585
Dennis Santos and Charlie Señase, "Duterte to MILF: Give up Bombers," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, March 10, 2003. PDI Mindanao Bureau, "Davao Bombed; 15 Killed," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, April 3, 2003.
586
Edith Regalado, "Task Force Formed to Beef up Davao Security," The Philippine Star
April 6, 2003, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/201678/task-force-formed-beef-davaosecurity.
587
Andres Rebana, "Task Force Davao: A Behemoth Gone Wild," Bulatlat October 10-16,
2004, http://www.bulatlat.com/news/4-36/4-36-davao.html.
588
"Bayan Slams Mayor for Continued Killings in Davao City," Bulatlat January 18-24,
http://bulatlat.com/news/3-49/3-49-davao.html.
156
accused of political repression of left-wing political parties like Bayan Muna and
NGOs like Karapatan, as well as harassment of Muslims residing in the city.589
Meanwhile, as Duterte re-asserted control following the terrorism incidents,
anti-crime vigilante killings intensified. A few weeks after the bombings, four men
were killed as soon as they stepped out of prison.590 Ten days later, suspected DDS
vigilantes gunned down Romeo Jaca, reportedly the leader of a youth gang.591 These
and other killings created such fear in Davao City that when President Arroyo
announced a national anti-drug campaign on June 16, 2003, dozens of people
surrendered to the local police.592
As a result, suspected vigilante violence intensified to an unprecedented
degree as the DDS began killing confessed criminals—bolstering the claim that the
vigilantes were cleansing society of its undersired elements. On the same day as
Arroyo’s announcement, suspected vigilantes killed Noel Valdueza and Wilfredo
Gabia, charged with theft, shortly after police released them from custody.593 Four
days later, Johnny Olarte, a former intelligence operative of Davao City police was
shot dead by vigilantes. Within a week, eight more suspected thieves and drug
pushers were killed.594 Duterte confirmed the existence of a vigilante group in the city
but denied any involvement.
589
"Task Force Davao: A Behemoth Gone Wild".
Allada, "Death Squad Killings."
591
Months prior, his mother heard rumors that barangay officials were collecting the names
of gang members and suspected that this explained why he had been killed. "You Can Die
Any Time: Death Squad Killings in Mindanao," 41.
592
"Pushers Fear Davao Death Squad, Surrender," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 4, 2003.
593
"CHR Joint Resolution Case No.: XI-03-1969dc Re: Death of Noel Valdueza, Case No.:
XI-03-1969dc Re: Death of Wildredo Gabia," (Commission on Human Rights, November
30, 2004).
594
Olarte was killed five days after Mayor Duterte announced in his weekly TV program that
he had a “special project” for officers in uniform and that Olarte was one of six policemen
whom he named as drug traffickers. Anthony Allada and Joselle Badilla, "Executions in
Davao: Duterte 'Special Project' Eyed," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 22, 2003. See also
Anthony Allada, "Woman Killed by Death Squad," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 8, 2003.
590
157
On September 6, 2003, however, gunmen shot Pala dead in the street near his
house.595 Pala had survived an attempt the past April and had made broad hints on air
that Duterte was responsible. 596 The brazen assassination of Duterte’s long-time
political opponent alarmed the local legislature, which had already been castigating
the local police for its inability to stop the DDS vigilante murders.597 The city council
decried the violence, saying that Davao City was turning into the country’s “murder
capital” and one councilor just stopped short of accusing Duterte of masterminding
the violence.598 The CHR noted that the assassination was likely a result of Pala’s
“hard line comments against prominent personalities”.599 The likelihood that Duterte
was responsible for Jun Pala’s death is high. 600 Ultimately, the murder accusations
did not slow Duterte’s political ascent and the DDS violence in Davao City increased
in its intensity.
In 2004, Duterte ran for re-election unopposed and campaigned on a platform
of vigilante justice. On the eve of the vote in May, Duterte told a crowd gathered for a
595
Anthony Allada and Dennis Santos, "Davao Broadcaster Jun Pala Shot Dead," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, September 8, 2003.
596
Ayan Mellejor and Anthony Allada, "Anti-Red Leader Wounded in Ambush," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, August 1, 2001. Also Ayan Mellejor, "Duterte Dares Pala to Confront Him on
Slay Try," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 6, 2003. As with the previous assassination
attempts on Pala, Duterte had denied any involvement and moreover claimed that Pala’s
former running mate ex-mayor Benjamin de Guzman may have had something to do with the
assassination. Anthony Allada, "Duterte Links Poll Foe to Pala Slay," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, September 30, 2003.
597
Anthony Allada, Ellen Red, and Franklin Caliguid, "85 Dead in Vigilante-Related Killings
in Davao since January," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 17, 2003.
598
Anthony Allada, "2 Slain as Davao Vigilantes Strike," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
September 19, 2003.
599
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-2008-3019 DO Re: Death of Elvis Española,"
(Commission on Human Rights, July 10, 2008).
600
Arthur Lascañas, Davao City senior police officer at the time, admitted in 2017 to having
been the DDS member behind the attempts on Pala’s life and that after Pala was killed,
Duterte paid him and his crew PhP 3 million. Audrey Morallo, "Lascañas: Duterte Behind
Killing of Jun Pala," The Philippine Star February 20, 2017,
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/02/20/1674120/lascanas-duterte-behind-killing-junpala. Lascanñas’s testimony corroborated statements of confessed DDS hitman Edgar
Matobato at a Senate hearing in September 2016. Dharel Placido, "NUJP Wants Probe into
Death of Duterte Critic," ABS-CBN News February 22, 2017, http://news.abscbn.com/news/02/22/17/nujp-wants-probe-into-death-of-duterte-critic.
158
press conference that if he won, more criminals would be killed. 601 Vigilantes
delivered on this promise over the two months following Duterte’s re-election. In
June, five were killed in three days, including Allen Tecson, who was tortured,
suffocated and then shot in the head. Police linked Tecson’s murder to two robberies
and speculated this was the motive for the killing.602 Days after the Tecson killing,
vigilantes on motorcycle killed a suspected member of a criminal gang and, within the
same week, an ex-convict linked to illegal drug activities.603 A few days later, three
alleged criminals were shot dead within 12 hours in separate incidents.604 Four more
people were killed soon afterwards, including Rolando Custodio, who had been on a
list of alleged drug personalities that Duterte had disclosed two years prior. 605 The
CHR observed that chains of summary executions began happening at a high
frequency.606
Over time, however, motives for some killings became less clear. Police
claimed that victims were known criminals, but CHR investigators would be unable to
find any evidence to substantiate the claim.607 The myth of the DDS eventually
601
"You Can Die Any Time: Death Squad Killings in Mindanao," 72.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2290dc, Case No.: XI-04-2297dc Re: Death of Allen
Tecson," (Commission on Human Rights, June 9, 2006).
603
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2298dc Re: Death of George Albores," (Commission
on Human Rights, October 11, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2308dc Re: Death
of Abraham Aquino," (Commission on Human Rights, February 9, 2006).
604
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2322dc Re: Death of Zandro Bajala," (Commission on
Human Rights, August 11, 2006). See also Anthony Allada, "Death Squad Kills 4,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 4, 2004.
605
Ibid. "3 More Persons, Including Trader, Killed by Vigilantes," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
August 6, 2004.
606
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2321dc Re: Death of Johnny "Jack-Jack" Moñeza,"
(Commission on Human Rights, October 17, 2006). In a 2009 confidential cable published by
Wikileaks in 2016, the American ambassador to the Philippines at the time reported that the
Duterte had admitted complicity in the Davao Death Squad killings to CHR regional
commissioner Alberto Sipaco. Sipaco allegedly expressed helplessness and fear for his own
safety to the ambassador. Paterno Esmaquel, "Duterte 'Admitted Complicity' in Davao
Killings - Wikileaks," Rappler September 25, 2016, https://www.rappler.com/nation/147244duterte-complicity-davao-killings-wikileaks-kenney.
607
For example, the case of Jorie Pacana, allegedly a member of the Simpleng Grupo gang in
Bankerohan and involved in snatching, extortion and robbery; however, the CHR found no
602
159
became self-referential. Throughout January 2005, killings that conformed to the
pattern of the DDS modus operandi occurred at a steady pace almost daily.608 During
this period, there could be as many as five or six killings a day, according to CHR
investigations.609 By July, the CHR estimated that motorcycle-riding gunmen had
killed 127 people in 2005 alone.610 In August, the bodies of three suspected victims
of extrajudicial killing were found dumped with their mouths covered in tape and
their hands, ankles and feet bound by barbed wire.611
corroborating evidence to substantiate the allegations. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-20083017dc Re: Case of Pacana, Jorie," (Commission on Human Rights, July 7, 2008).
608
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2388dc Re: Case of Risalito Abellana," (Commission
on Human Rights, August 30, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2390dc Re: Case of
Jason Dela Cerna," (Commission on Human Rights, September 8, 2006). "CHR Resolution
Case No.: XI-05-2389dc Re: Death of Alacel Jumat A.K.A. "Robot"," (Commission on
Human Rights, August 30, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2396dc Re: Case of
Glen Mulle," (Commission on Human Rights, September 15, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case
No.: XI-05-2394dc Re: Death of Leo Baogbog," (Commission on Human Rights, January 27,
2007).
609
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2400dc Re: Death of Intong Gonzales Alias "Pasmo"
Tn: Roberto Gonzales." "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2401dc Re: Case of Dante
Galarce," (Commission on Human Rights, September 20, 2006). Anthony Allada,
"Vigilantes Continue Killings of Davao Crime Suspects," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January
12, 2005. See also "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2398dc Re: Death of Reynaldo
Adolfo," (Commission on Human Rights, November 20, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case No.:
XI-05-2403dc Re: Death of Ruel Andia," (Commission on Human Rights, August 28, 2006).
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2404dc Re: Death of Cesarlito A. Tagod," (Commission
on Human Rights, September 22, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2405dc Re: Case
of Tata "Hudas" Toco/Charwin Tuco (Tn)," (Commission on Human Rights, August 3,
2006). "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2413dc Re: Death of Joel Castro," (Commission
on Human Rights, August 29, 2006). "Vigilantes Kill 5 in One Day in Davao," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, January 24, 2005.
610
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2641dc Re: Death of Romeo Hingcuy," (Commission
on Human Rights, February 28, 2006); "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2458dc Re: Death
of Richard Padua," (Commission on Human Rights, August 31, 2006). "CHR Resolution
Case No.: XI-05-2491dc Re: Death of Julius Antido," (Commission on Human Rights,
November 28, 2006); "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2613dc Re: Abduction of Lowell
Labajo," (Commission on Human Rights, September 2, 2005).
611
The CHR examination of police records showed that Alex Alagao and Dean Alagao while
Perdo Chaves might have also been involved in crime and were thus targeted by the killers.
"CHR Joint Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2623dc Re: Case of Alex Alagao, Dean Mark
Alagao and Pedro Chavez," (Commission on Human Rights, October 25, 2006).
160
In 2006, curiously, the pace of killings abated to a large extent. Only one spate
of summary executions may have occurred from around March 21 to April 25.612
However, the DDS formula for violence became so familiar that the police began to
use its logic openly. For instance, in 2006, Coca-Cola bottling plant worker Hilario
Ortega was shot dead. According to the CHR, police authorities believed that the
motive was a personal grudge, noting that Ortega was a “good person” and had no
criminal record, “and could not be a victim of ‘summary execution’ that frequently
transpires in this city.” 613 By the end of 2006, the DDS-linked killings were estimated
to have dropped by two-thirds from 2005. 614
The year 2007 marked the start of a turning point in protections against
summary executions in the country, with Davao City receiving special attention due
to the notoriety of the DDS. When the United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial Killings, Philip Alston, visited the Philippines to investigate summary
killings of leftist activists, he made it a point to visit Davao City.615 A side issue in his
report on military-led summary executions, Alston highlighted the obvious
inconsistency in the mayor’s reasoning that he knew nothing of the DDS yet at the
same time claimed to be in complete control of the city. Alston noted that the
assailants killed in broad daylight and did not even bother to wear masks, yet the
612
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2764dc Re: Case of Boyet Abella," (Commission on
Human Rights, November 26, 2007). Dennis Santos, "3 More Vigilante Killings," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, March 24, 2006. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2781dc Re:Death of
Maturan, Ramil," (Commission on Human Rights, June 5, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case
No.: XI-06-2715dc Re: Case of Andrew Mendez and Rexol Cabras," (Commission on
Human Rights, April 12, 2006). "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2787dc Re: Death of
Sasam Manuel," (Commission on Human Rights, June 29, 2006).
613
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2397dc Re: Death of Hilario C. Ortega," (Commission
on Human Rights, November 8, 2006).
614
Calculations based on data from the Coalition Against Summary Execution.
615
DJ Yap, Nikko Dizon, and Miko Morelos, "I'll Make Noise, UN Prober Vows," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, February 12, 2007.
161
mayor and police failed to bring the murderers to justice.616 Police records showed
that only two suspects had ever been arrested, and they were eventually released
because of a lack of evidence. 617
Furthermore, 2007 was an election year. However, the cooperation between
Arroyo and Duterte began to unravel. The alliance between Arroyo’s Team Unity
ticket, led locally by the incumbent representative of Davao City’s First District, and
Duterte’s own party fell apart. 618 Congresman Prospero Nograles and Duterte,
longtime rivals, had set their enmity aside to support President Arroyo but quarreled
over the allocation of positions between their camps. It is possible that Duterte timed
the break to the day before the election for full effect. Duterte had promised he would
deliver her the votes for her 12 senatorial candidates; instead, eight opposition
candidates and two independents topped the Davao City polls while two Team Unity
candidates barely squeezed into the city’s top rankings. In contrast, Duterte’s allies in
the local races left their opponents trailing far behind.619
Duterte, running unopposed, won another term as mayor and his daughter Sara
was elected as his deputy.620 A number of cases of suspected DDS murders targeting
city slum residents with criminal records, particularly for illegal drug use or
trafficking, occurred that year but the violence resumed and scaled up anew in the
months after the elections. 621
616
Sales, 329.
Rizalene Acac, "Davao Cops Told to Solve Killings," Philippine Daily Inquirer, January
25, 2007.
618
Germelina Lacorte, "Tu Hangs in Balance as Davao Alliance Snaps," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, May 16, 2007.
619
"Davao City Is Still Duterte Country," Mindanews May 18, 2007,
http://www.mindanews.com/c102-governormayorsanggunian/2007/05/davao-city-is-stillduterte-country/.
620
Rizalene Acac et al., "Duterte, Daughter Dominate Davao City Politics," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, May 21, 2007.
621
For instance, in April, Fernando Alia, was stabbed to death after having survived an earlier
attempt the previous November. Human Rights Watch documented Fernando’s murder as the
617
162
Amid the violence ostensibly aimed at petty criminals, a few cases indicated
that the DDS might have targeted individuals who posed threats to local police
officers. On July 4, unidentified assailants gunned down police officer Godofredo
Guritan, who had instituted an administrative case against a high ranking police
official before the Regional Internal Affairs Service. 622 Fifteen-year-old Adon
Mandangit had been arrested in the past for sniffing glue and theft, and his mother
filed a complaint against a Calinan police precinct officer for mistreating her son. The
officer was removed from the station and the police paid damages to the family, but
the boy was killed by suspected DDS assailants in July.623
The DDS continued to kill alleged criminals in Davao City’s slums. Suspected
DDS killers shot the anchorman of DXGO radio station, Ferdinand Lintuan, twice in
the head, in the middle of a snarl of Christmas eve traffic on December 24, 2007.
Once the shooter ascertained Lintuan was dead, he sped away on a motorcycle driven
by another man.624 Lintuan had bought block time from the radio station for his
program in which he criticized Mayor Duterte, particularly over Duterte’s “pet project
People’s Park”, resulting in a graft investigation.625 The police arrested one man as a
fourth in a series of lethal targeting of the Alia brothers from Bankerohan that started in 2001
with suspected gang member Richard and continued with the slaying of Christopher and, in
2003, of Bobby. However in May, August and October, suspected DDS vigilantes stabbed,
shot and killed targets who had been previously warned by barangay officials that they were
“on the list”. "You Can Die Any Time: Death Squad Killings in Mindanao," 34-38. Julius
Gumba, who had a criminal record with the police, was killed by unknown assassins. "CHR
Resolution Case No.: XI-07-2983dc Re: Death of Julius Gumba," (Commission on Human
Rights, June 10, 2008).
622
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-07-2984dc Re: Death of Godofredo Guritan,"
(Commission on Human Rights, December 22, 2007).
623
"You Can Die Any Time: Death Squad Killings in Mindanao," 30.
624
"Final Report CHR Case No. XI-07-3009dc (Re: Death of Lintuan, Ferdinand @
"Batman")," (Commission on Human Rights, 2008).
625
Rizalene Acac, "Duterte Takes Leave as Graft Probe Starts," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
January 10, 2008.
163
suspect but Lintuan’s family and former colleagues believed that the “real culprit”
and mastermind was someone else.626
Duterte Outlasts Rift with Center
After the 2007 election, Arroyo was bent on ending Duterte’s political career
as she had done to local strongmen during her tenure—even well entrenched ones like
Vicente Valera in Abra and Tomas Joson in Nueva Ecija. In a highly centralized
authoritarian regime, such as the Marcos dictatorship, this would have been a matter
of course. However, despite the repressiveness of the Arroyo government, Duterte
was able to fend off moves against him long enough to remain in elected office and
outlast Arroyo’s presidency. His trajectory ultimately led him to the highest office in
the country.
The first major sign of Duterte’s disfavor with Malacañang was his dismissal
from the regional security council in 2008. President Arroyo appointed Davao del Sur
governor Douglas Cagas as the new chair of the RPOC for Southern Mindanao to
replace Duterte.627 Cagas, was a relative of the wife of Congressman and Speaker of
the House, Prospero Nograles. Cagas, and his appointment added insult to Duterte’s
political injury, given the long and public animosity between him and Nograles.628
Just a year earlier, as the RPOC chair, Duterte had threatened to disarm opposing
626
The police held suspected shooter Oliver Antoc but then dropped the case for insufficient
evidence. The police then pursued Lintuan’s fellow broadcaster/commentator Leonilo Larosa,
whom Lintuan had attacked on air and who, according to a colleague, threatened Lintuan’s
life. Dennis Santos, Rizalene Acac, and Joselle Badilla, "Slain Davao City Broadcaster
Buried," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 31, 2007.
627
Duterte resigned, citing health reasons—likely in an attempt to save face.
628
Eldie Aguirre, "Duterte out, New GMA Ally in in Davao," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June
25, 2008.
164
factions—Cagas included, of course—embroiled in electoral violence over the Davao
del Sur elections. 629
The rift between Duterte and national elites was ever more apparent in a shift
in the military’s behavior in the city. A new military officer was assigned to Task
Force Davao, Lt. Col. Oscar Lactao, under whose command the military’s lethal, antileftist campaign affected Davao City in a significant manner for the first time since
the 1990s. 630 For instance, the secretary-general of the peasant union Kilusang
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) Celso Pojas was gunned down due to his advocacy
of farmers’ rights in 2008.631 Pojas was the first leftist leader killed in Davao City
despite the pattern of lethal military attacks against activists that began nationwide in
2001.632 A sign of his waning clout, Duterte was no longer able to guarantee the
safety of leftist groups. Under Lactao, Task Force Davao also rolled out an extensive
Barangay Defense System for counter-insurgency that claimed to have mobilized
4,000 militias in the outskirts of Davao City by the end of 2008.633 Earlier in the year,
Duterte had asked the military to stop recruiting barangay chairpersons into
paramilitary forces after the NPA targeted and killed village chiefs in Compostela
Valley and Davao del Sur provinces.634 Duterte’s warnings were ignored.
During this period of political realignment, DDS violence reached a historic
629
"Gov Bet Suspect in Killing of Davao Sur Bet, Son," Mindanews May 18, 2007,
http://www.mindanews.com/c102-governormayorsanggunian/2007/05/gov-bet-suspect-inkilling-of-davao-sur-bet-son/.
630
"Palparan Is Suspect Too, in Bloody Legacy in Mindanao," Davao Today August 14,
2014, http://davaotoday.com/main/politics/palparan-suspect-bloody-legacy-mindanao/.
631
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-2008-3041dc Re: Death of Celso Pojas," (Commission on
Human Rights, November 10, 2008).
632
Jeffrey Tupas and Dennis Santos, "Davao Farmer Leader Gunned Down," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, May 16, 2008.
633
Marilou Aguirre-Tuburan, "4,000-Strong Barangay Defense Force to Fight NPA," Davao
Today November 6, 2008, http://davaotoday.com/main/politics/crime-public-safety/4000strong-barangay-defense-force-to-fight-npa/.
634
Germelina Lacorte, Joselle Badilla, and Jani Arnaiz, "Stop Arming Village Execs, Army
Asked," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 3, 2008.
165
peak with an estimated 180 killed by the end of 2008, punctuated by a spate of 20
people killed by the following January.635 Duterte was nearing the end of a third and
final consecutive term in office and had lost President Arroyo’s support to
Congressman Nograles. Nograles was poised to wrest the Davao City mayoralty and
keep his congressional seat in Davao City’s First District within the Nograles clan.
Duterte’s strategy bore the marks of outward appeasement, offering little overt
opposition to the manuevers against him. Meanwhile he redoubled the use of violence
as a reminder that he remained firmly in control of covert force.
Soon enough, it seemed that Duterte’s impunity from accountability had come
to an end. In March 2009, the Commission on Human Rights chairperson Leila de
Lima opened a public inquiry into the unexplained killings of more than 800 people in
Davao City since 1998.636 In a reversal of her prior endorsement of Duterte’s anticrime methods, then President Arroyo vowed full support for the CHR’s
investigation.637 Coinciding with the CHR probe, Duterte relinquished control of the
local National Police Commission (Napolcom) personnel as well as all general and
operational supervision and control of the city’s police forces to the city police chief.
He also severed links between the mayor’s office and the military’s Task Force
Davao.638
Duterte’s rival Congressman Nograles crowed that the DDS’s existence
demonstrated Duterte’s failure as city mayor. 639 Nograles directed the House
635
Data from Coalition Against Summary Execution. Dennis Santos, "Davao City Vigilantes'
Toll: 20 Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 1, 2009.
636
Included in the inquiry was a special investigation into the abduction and killing of NPA
Commander Parago’s daughter Rebelyn Pitao. Nikko Dizon, "CHR Probes 800 Kills by
Davao Death Squad," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 30, 2009.
637
Christian Esguerra and Leila Salaverria, "Palace Backs CHR Probe," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, March 31, 2009.
638
Jeffrey Tupas and Leila Salaverria, "43 on PDEA Target List among Dead," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, April 1, 2009.
639
Esguerra and Salaverria.
166
committee on human rights to conduct a parallel inquiry into the killings in Davao
City, suggesting that the committee investigate how Davao City’s PhP476 million
annual peace and order fund had been spent.640 To mock Duterte, Nograles arranged
for a crowd of a hundred students to attend the launch of the NGO Human Rights
Watch report on the Davao Death Squad.641 Meanwhile, UN Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial Killings Philip Alston asserted that vigilante-style executions in Davao
City worsened since his visit to the Philippines. Alston noted that Duterte had done
nothing to stop the killings and supported the slayings in his public statements. Alston
claimed that the death squad members operate with complete impunity and had even
begun selling their services for about PhP5,000 per hit (US$100).642
Duterte continued to deny the charges and sparred lengthily with de Lima
during a public hearing that the CHR had organized in 2009.643 Furthermore, Davao
del Sur officials such as Digos City mayor Arsenio Latasa and the city’s police chief
Anthony Padua, continued to deny the existence of the vigilante group.644 From an
all-time peak in the previous year, the killings fell precipitously during the CHR
investigation. The police cited a drop to only four killings in May compared to 10 in
April that year and the lull continued for another three months.645 The CHR attempted
640
Tupas and Salaverria.
Jeffrey Tupas, "Politics Soils Probe of Death Squads," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 19,
2009.
642
Nikko Dizon, "Vigilante Killings in Davao Alarm UN," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May
11, 2009.
643
Moreover, the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court of Davao Isaac Robillo noted
that only one case of summary execution has ever been filed in court since 1998 despite the
hundreds of possible cases reviewed , Jeffrey Tupas and Nikko Dizon, "Duterte Tells CHR:
Prove Death Squad," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 31, 2009. The probe also resulted in
the disclosure that at least 43 people on the target list of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) have been killed since 1998. Tupas and Salaverria.
644
Orlando Dinoy, "We'll Face CHR, Say Davao Del Sur Execs," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
April 17, 2009.
645
The regional police for Southern Mindanao claimed credit for curbing the crime rate in the
region during the period, especially in Davao City. Rizalene Acac, "PNP Claims Credit for
Fall in Summary Killings," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 10, 2009. According to the
Coalition Against Summary Execution chairperson Father Amado Picardal, the CHR probe
641
167
to investigate claims that a quarry owned by a former police officer was used as a
dumpsite for DDS victims. By August, however, the CHR investigations hit a wall
when the inspection of the quarry was plagued with legal and procedural
impediments.646 However, the pause in the violence ended. From August until early
September, violence attributed to the DDS resumed with an estimated 22 more
killings in Davao City and at least one killing in nearby Digos City.647 Still, compared
to the height of an estimated 166 killed in 2008, DDS casualties may have dropped by
half to 78 by the end of 2009.648
Nevertheless, despite some difficulty, Duterte was able to survive the
investigations and maneuver through the 2010 national and local elections. The
challenge seemed insurmountable. The slew of investigations occurred toward the end
of Duterte’s third consecutive term. By this point, he was constrained by legal limits
from seeking re-election. Blood was in the water and political rivals circled closer.
Nograles, similarly, was on his third and final term as Congressman and decided to
run for Davao City mayor against Duterte’s daughter Sara in the 2010 elections.649
Scant weeks before the election, in a play for a new broker at the top, Duterte
endorsed the candidacy of Aquino over Arroyo’s favored candidate. 650 While
speculation had initially been rife that Duterte himself would run against Nograles’s
appeared to have been effective because the number of killings dropped over the past three
months. Jeffrey Tupas, "Ex-Davao Death Squad Member Surfaces," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, July 9, 2009.
646
"Legal Woes Stump Davao Killings Probe," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 16, 2009.
Confessed DDS member and former policeman Lascañas testified in 2016 to the Senate that
an estimated 100 bodies had been buried there, but the remains were moved a week prior to
the CHR visit in 2009. ABS-CBN News, "Davao Death Squad Probe Revives Interest in Laud
Quarry," ABS-CBN News March 6, 2017, http://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/03/06/17/davaodeath-squad-probe-revives-interest-in-laud-quarry.
647
Judy Quiros and Orlando Dinoy, "Davao Death Squad: 22 More Victims," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, September 11, 2009.
648
Coalition Against Summary Execution.
649
Tupas, "Politics Soils Probe of Death Squads."
650
Grace Uddin, "Why Duterte Endorses Aquino," Davao Today April 18, 2010,
http://davaotoday.com/main/davao-city/why-duterte-endorses-aquino/.
168
son Karlo in the race to represent the city’s First District in Congress, Duterte ran and
won the easier contest as his daughter’s vice mayor instead.651 Sara’s victory over
Nograles senior put the Dutertes on secure footing once again in the city. In the end,
Arroyo failed to dislodge the strongman of Davao City; moreover, her coalition was
roundly defeated in the 2010 polls and oppositionist candidate Benigno Aquino took
her place in Malacañang. Unlike when she moved against Valera and Joson at the
height of her power in the mid-2000s, Arroyo was in a much weaker position by
2010. As a lameduck president preoccupied by a fight for her own political survival,
she could not muster the resources for a coup de grâce and Rodrigo Duterte survived
the rift with the center. In a signal that political life would remain “normal” despite
Duterte’s official post as vice mayor, the scale of violence resumed at the same level
it had been since 2004. Suspected DDS killings picked up again toward the end of
2009, months prior to elections, with a total estimated dead of 100 people that year
alone. By the end of 2010, around 101 were believed to have been killed by the
DDS. 652 Meanwhile, potential rivals like Douglas Cagas began to face political
troubles of their own.653
651
Once more, Duterte prevailed over his former vice mayor-turned-rival Benjamin de
Guzman. Cheryll Fiel, "2010 Elections: Dutertes Proclaimed as Winners in Davao Polls,"
Bulatlat.com May 13, 2010, http://bulatlat.com/main/2010/05/13/2010-elections-dutertesproclaimed-as-winners-in-davao-polls/2/.
652
Tupas, "Ex-Davao Death Squad Member Surfaces." Also, see Figure 14 for annual data
from Coalition Against Summary Execution.
653
Former Davao del Sur governor Douglas Cagas was eventually charged for conspiring to
murder Nestor Bedolido, former editor of a weekly magazine the Digos Times. In 2014,
Cagas surrendered himself to the provincial police after charges were filed against him and
three others, including Matanao mayor Vicente Fernandez, Eldie Aguirre, "Ex-Gov Tied to
Newsman's Slay Yields," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 21, 2014. See also Karlos
Manlupig et al., "Ex-Gov Jailed for Media Killing to Seek Bail," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
October 23, 2014. However, before the trial could even begin, one judge after another
inhibited herself from handling the case. Allan Nawal, "Yet Another Judge Begs Off from
Case vs Cagas," Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 6, 2014.
169
Next Stop, Malacañang
Confident in their bailiwick of Davao City, the Dutertes reasserted themselves
in matters of local politics and remained overtly at odds with the central government
on various issues. For example, Davao City withdrew financial support of at least PhP
130,000 (US$2,600) in monthly assistance, reportedly to purchase food supplies, to
the 1003rd Infantry Brigade and two commands, 69th and 84th Infantry Battalions.
Sara Duterte asserted her disapproval of the military’s "combat heavy" approach;
moreover, the two battalions were linked to former general Jovito Palparan.654 There
had been no love lost between her father, the left-leaning mayor, and the military
hardliner.
The animosity between Duterte, who had cultivated friendly ties with the
NPA, and Palparan, infamous for lethal anti-Communist military campaign, had been
a matter of public knowledge. Shortly before elections in the previous year, two
campaigners for Bantay, the anti-communist party-list group that Palparan founded,
were abducted from a supermarket at gunpoint in Davao City. Their bodies were
found days later. Another anti-communist group associated with Palparan, the
Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD), asserted that Mayor Duterte was
behind the violence. Duterte scoffed at the allegation saying “What will I gain?
People will only sympathize with the party-list group.” 655 Confessed DDS killer
Edgar Matobato later claimed that he had been one of the killers, acing on Duterte’s
orders.656
654
Jeffrey Tupas, "Duterte, AFP Part Ways in Handling Insurgency," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, July 25, 2010.
655
Jeffrey Tupas and Dennis Santos, "2 Palparan Campaigners Found Dead," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, April 6, 2010.
656
de Lima, 41-43. To be precise, Matobato claimed that he had killed bodyguards of
Prospero Nograles and men of Jovito Palparan, including a female ex-barangay captain.
Journalists linked this testimony to the cases of Noquera and Miranda; noting that “Miranda
was one of the men Palparan sent to provide support to Nograles during the 2010 elections.”
170
Duterte also was out of step with the central government with respect to the
NPA. In December 2011, Davao City mayor Sara Duterte invited NPA rebels to leave
the countryside and enjoy the Christmas holiday in the city. However, the CIDG and
the Special Action Battalion arrested NPA rebel Edwin Brigano during a holiday
truce between the government and guerrillas. 657 Incensed, the younger Duterte
demanded the ouster of the chief of the police’s regional office for Southern
Mindanao, threatening to withdraw the city’s financial support to the regional
command for fuel and provisions.658 Furthermore, Duterte became a resource person
in the National Democratic Front of the Philippines moreover, which negotiates on
behalf of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the NPA in peace talks with the
state, over objections from the central government. 659 In another discordant note
between Duterte and the central government, the mayor’s office vehemently opposed
any mining activities in Davao City. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau in Southern
Mindanao of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources was forced to
exclude Davao City from participation in a national regulatory regime that would
have allowed small-scale mining to take place.660 In contrast, elsewhere in Southern
Mindanao, the military expanded its reach into the protection of private mining
interests (discussed in the final section of this chapter).
Jodesz Gavilan, "Matobato's Hits and Misses," Rappler October 3, 2016,
http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/147815-edgar-matobato-davao-death-squad-hitsmisses.
657
Jeffrey Tupas and Carla Gomez, "Arrest of NPA Rebel Angers Dutertes," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, January 5, 2011.
658
Jeffrey Tupas, "Duterte to Demand Ouster of Regional Cop Chief," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, January 10, 2011.
659
The Secretary for the Department of the Interior and Local Government at the time, Jesse
Robredo, consequently reprimanded Duterte for failing to remain on the government’s side of
the negotiations. Duterte then publicly withdrew himself from the process. Germelina
Lacorte, "Duterte Heeds DILG, Quits NDF Post," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 11,
2011.
660
Potential mining areas in the city were reportedly the largest in the world, in terms of land
size. Judy Quiros, "MGB Erases Davao City from Mining List," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
July 18, 2012.
171
In 2013, once again eligible to run for mayor, Duterte ran against four
inexperienced and largely unknown opponents while his son Paolo ran unopposed for
vice mayor.661 The estimated deaths attributed to the DDS began to decrease to 53 in
2014 and 2015 at 60. 662 It is likely that this de-escalation was calibrated in
preparation for Duterte’s presidential bid. During this period, for instance, overt
police participation in Duterte’s anti-crime strategies became more visible. For
example, a series of lethal police shootings of alleged drug and robbery criminals in
2015 were punctuated by Duterte’s public pronouncements against drug criminals. In
April, police killed three illegal drug suspects and seven in July in police raids and
alleged shootouts; Mayor Duterte quipped that the seven dead would have also “los(t)
their heads” if it were up to him.663 In August, police shot dead Rey Caroro, a suspect
in a robbery-murder of a taxi driver, just hours after Mayor Duterte promised to
deliver swift justice to the taxi driver’s family. 664 Duterte announced a 48-hour
ultimatum for drug pushers to leave the city after a police officer was killed in a drug
buy-bust operation. The next day, police operatives shot dead Armanuel Atienza after
he allegedly resisted arrest during a similar sting operation.665 Police fatally shot a
second crime suspect four days later.666
Duterte’s announcement that he would run for the presidency was made on
661
Sara Duterte was meant to run against Karlo Nograles for the First District; despite the
congressional seat being a key to complete the Dutertes’ political dominance of the city, Sara
refused to run and forced her father’s party to field a former vice mayor and party
lightweight, Luis Bonguyan instead. Germelina Lacorte, "Sara Duterte Defies Dad, Drops Out
" Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 7, 2012.
662
Data from Coalition Against Summary Execution. See Appendix 9.
663
Germelina Lacorte and Allan Nawal, "'They Would Have Lost Their Heads'," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, July 18, 2015.
664
Karlos Manlupig, "Duterte Justice: Robbery, Slay Suspect Dead," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, August 21, 2015.
665
Allan Nawal, "Davao Drug Suspect Dead after Duterte Ultimatum," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, October 30, 2015.
666
Dennis Santos, "2nd Crime Suspect Dead on Heels of Duterte Ultimatum " Philippine
Daily Inquirer, November 1, 2015.
172
November 21, 2015, more than a month past the candidacy filing deadline. This tactic
let the two front runners, Vice President Jejomar Binay and Senator Grace Poe, as
well as the incumbent administration’s candidate Interior and Local Government
Secretary Mar Roxas, undermine each other’s campaigns for months.667 It was likely
that Duterte has been preparing for a bid for the presidency as early as 2014, when he
launched an ostensible nationwide consultation on federalism.668 He pulled a typical
trick in local politics of using a loophole in COMELEC rules that allowed candidates
to be substituted even after all candidacies had been filed. Misleading his adversaries,
Duterte had earlier filed to run for re-election in Davao City. When Duterte switched
lanes into the presidential race, his daughter Sara ran for Davao City mayor in his
stead. 669 He then took the place of a nuisance candidate who had filed for the
candidacy of national party Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan
(Philippine Democratic Party-Power of the Nation or PDP-LABAN).670
After the May 9 presidential election and within days of his official
proclamation as the winner, the outgoing Justice Secretary Emmanuel Caparas
announced that the government was at a dead end in its investigation in to the DDS,
667
For instance, in 2014, a senate inquiry on corruption bogged down the Binay campaign. In
2015, the Poe campaign momentum stalled over a supreme court challenge over her
nationality.
668
Franklin Caliguid, "Duterte on 2016 Presidential Bid: I'm Waiting for 'Divine Signal',"
Philippine Daily Inquirer January 23, 2015, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/667533/duterte-on2016-presidential-bid-im-waiting-for-divine-signal. Gabriel Cardinoza, Germelina Lacorte,
and Yolanda Sotelo, "Duterte 'Eyes' Presidency in 2016 to Save Ph from 'Disaster',"
Philippine Daily Inquirer February 19, 2015, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/673999/duterteeyes-presidency-in-2016-to-save-ph-from-disaster.
669
Pia Ranada, "Duterte Not Running for President, Aide Files COC for Davao Mayor,"
Rappler October 15, 2015, https://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/109373rodrigo-duterte-run-davao-mayor. Yuji Gonzales, "Why Duterte Is Hesitant to Run for
President," Philippine Daily Inquirer June 24, 2015,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/700504/why-duterte-is-hesitant-to-run-for-president.
670
Paterno Esmaquel, "Duterte 'Placeholder' Diño Withdraws Presidential Bid," Rappler
October 29, 2015, https://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/111051-duterteplaceholder-dino-withdraws-presidential-bid. Yuji Gonzales, "It's Official, Duterte Now a
Candidate for President--Comelec," Philippine Daily Inquirer December 17, 2015,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/748425/duterte-now-officially-a-candidate-for-president-comelec.
173
citing the lack of evidence after a key witness disappeared.671 Prior to taking office,
Duterte announced that he would put up unspent campaign funds as a bounty for law
enforcement personnel who neutralize drug suspects “dead or alive”, offering: PhP 3
million (US$60,000) for a drug lord, PhP2 million (US$40,000) for a “second
echelon” syndicate members, and PhP50,000 (US$1,000) for an “ordinary” pusher.
Suspects who put up resistance during their arrest would be killed.672 Even before he
was sworn into office on July 1, 2016, DDS-style vigilante killings sprang up
throughout the country.
Tagum City Death Squad, A Pale Imitation
The death squad vigilantism under Duterte was not unique to Davao City.
Similar anti-crime vigilantism spread to Cebu City in Central Visayas, for instance.673
Although the death toll was higher in Davao City, police vigilantism was not
uncommon in Manila.674 Killings of alleged criminals raised suspicions of either the
existence of a Digos City Death Squad or of spillover from vigilante violence from
Davao City. The earliest documented report was a spate of killings that allegedly
targeted drug criminals from around October 2001, intensifying in March and April in
671
Niña Calleja, "Halt to Davao Death Squad Probe Hit," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 23,
2016.
672
Duterte had raised over PhP375 million and had PhP3.5 million left over, based on his
statement of contributions and expenditures to the Commission on Elections. Christine
Avendaño, "Ping Backs Duterte in War vs Drugs," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 3, 2016.
Jocelyn Uy, "Duterte Spent over P371m for Successful Campaign; Binay Poured P463m,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer June 8, 2016, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/789763/duterte-spentover-p371m-for-successful-campaign-binay-poured-p463m. See also Karol Ilagan and Malou
Mangahas, "13 Donors Raised P334m for Duterte Campaign Fund - PCIJ," Philippine Daily
Inquirer December 6, 2016, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/851212/13-donors-raised-p334m-forduterte-campaign-fund-pcij.
673
"One Shot to the Head: Death Squad Killings in Tagum City, Philippines," (New York:
Human Rights Watch, 2014), 10.
674
Peter Kreuzer, ""If They Resist, Kill Them All": Police Vigilantism in the Philippines,"
(Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2016).
174
2002. 675 While denying the existence of a vigilante death squad, local police
attributed the death of twenty suspected drug dealers to gang boss Polo Aznar’s
attempt to monopolize the drug trade.676 Aznar was found dead and mutilated in the
Digos City public market in 2002. Nonetheless, suspected vigilantes killed around 20
alleged drug criminals in 2006 and 14 others in 2007.677 Then governor of Davao del
Sur, Douglas Cagas, accused local police of direct involvement in a series of
summary executions in Digos City. He linked them to the Davao death squad, despite
denials from both the police and Duterte. However, another spate of killings in May
2011 throughout Davao del Sur raised alarm that Davao City vigilantism had spread
out its operations beyond its city limits.678
The Tagum City death squad under city mayor Reynaldo Uy was a separate
group from the Davao City Death Squad. Tagum had been elevated to city status in
1998, resulting in a 200 percent increase of central government budgetary transfers to
the local government coffers.679 Facing higher stakes, Uy was first elected to office in
675
See Anthony Allada and Dennis Santos, "Vigilante Killings Resume in Digos," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, January 9, 2002. Also Anthony Allada, "Death Squad Ends Brief Vacation,
Kills 3," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 13, 2002. "Drug Killings Won't Stop as 3 More
Slain in Digos," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 8, 2002.
676
"Cops Say Death Squad Men Known, on the Run," Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 25,
2002.
677
For instance, in October 2006, suspected drug criminal Ronel Racasa was shot dead in
Digos City by two gunmen riding tandem on a motorcycle; the Digos City Prosecutor charged
Jessie Silva and two others for the crime. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2882 Ds Re:
Death of Racasa, Ronel," (Commission on Human Rights, June 30, 2008); Eldie Aguirre,
"Alleged Drug Pusher Slain," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 9, 2007. See also "Gov
Tags Cops in Vigilante Killings," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 12, 2007. Eldie Aguirre
and Orlando Dinoy, "3 Killings Revive Fears of Return of Death Squads," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, July 25, 2009. Another spate of killings occurred around May to July of 2009.
Aguirre, "Gov Tags Cops in Vigilante Killings."
678
According to Davao del Sur police chief at the time, Ronald dela Rosa, police were
however checking the link to illegal drugs and the involvement of guns for hire. Orlando
Dinoy, "Vigilante-Style Slays Are Back," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 20, 2011. See also
"Torture, Slay of Teener Revives Talk of Death Squads," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
November 26, 2011. Dela Rosa was appointed chief of the Philippine National Police upon
Duterte’s assumption of the presidency.
679
Hope Gerochi, "Tagum City: Development at the Crossroads," in Discussion Paper Series
(Makati City: Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 2004).
175
1998 but lost a re-election bid in 2001, returning to the mayor’s office only in 2004.680
Uy swiftly asserted control by emulating Duterte in Davao City: 40 alleged criminals
were summarily executed within the first four months of his 2004 term in office.681
Known locally as the Underground Death Squad in Tagum City (UDS), the group
was an “outgrowth” of Tagum City’s Civil Security Unit, which was officially tasked
with overseeing safety in the local markets and other areas and part of a campaign to
rid the city of indigents and street people.682
Uy had been emboldened by the success of Duterte’s model of political
domination and social control in Davao City. Uy began to castigate criminals as
“weeds” that had to be rooted out of the city. In 2006, a spate of killings raised public
speculation about the UDS with dozens dead in April and May.683 Like the DDS, the
UDS targeted alleged gang members, thieves and drug traffickers.684
However, Uy also used the UDS to silence corruption allegations and forestall
opposition to unpopular policies, such as raising taxes to finance the construction of
680
Frinston Lim, "Tagum: From Rural Area to Boom City," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
February 20, 2011.
681
Grace Uddin, "Vigilantes Descend on Tagum," Bulatlat.com, no. September 26-October
2, 2004, http://bulatlat.com/news/4-34/4-34-tagum.html.
682
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2767dn Re: Death of Bernardo Chan," (Commission
on Human Rights, August 28, 2006). Also, see "One Shot to the Head: Death Squad Killings
in Tagum City, Philippines," 12.
683
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2807dn Re: Death Gumila, Alejandro Tn: Alejandro
Palin Gumela," (Commission on Human Rights, September 28, 2006). See also "CHR
Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2767dn Re: Death of Bernardo Chan."
684
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2718dn Re: Death of Rey Lumiguid," (Commission on
Human Rights, September 4, 2006). See also "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2735dn Re:
Case of Jomar Escobar," (Commission on Human Rights, August 8, 2006). Also "CHR
Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2744dn Re: Death of Noel Omos," (Commission on Human
Rights, August 23, 2006). Also "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2779dn Re: Death of
Enrique Catito," (Commission on Human Rights, September 7, 2006). Also "CHR
Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2805dn Re: Death of Armando Pawakil," (Commission on
Human Rights, October 31, 2006). Suspected UDS vigilantes killed Alejandro Gumela and
laborer Ronnie Aquino, neither had any criminal records. "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-062807dn Re: Death Gumila, Alejandro Tn: Alejandro Palin Gumela." See also "CHR
Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2808dn Re: Case of Ronnie Aquino," (Commission on Human
Rights, August 31, 2006).
176
“a sprawling and modern city hall.”685 The UDS also killed people to cover up the
vigilantes’ own crimes. 686 During the April 2006 wave of suspected UDS killings for
instance, unidentified gunmen on motorbike killed Jessie Opalla. The CHR
investigation indicates that he may have been killed in connection with his testimony
against police officer Alexis Manigo, who had been served summons by the PNP
Provincial Internal Affairs office on a murder charge the day before Opalia was
killed.687 This convergence of statist, anti-crime aims and particularistic interests in
Tagum City was characteristic of violence for social control.688
In 2012 however, former UDS hitmen confessed responsibility for a number
of assassinations.689 These included the murder of Roberto Onlos, in order to pave
the way for a replacement at the Ancestral Domain Council, a body involved in
mining projects, in neighboring Compostela Valley province. The self-professed
assassins also admitted to the slayings of Dennis Angeles, chair of an agrarian reform
beneficiaries cooperative and his bodyguard. They admitted killing Wilfredo Derecho,
a traffic aide with Tagum City’s Civil Security Unit, who may have learned too much
incriminating information about the UDS.
Nonetheless, Uy and his vice mayor Allan Rellon won two successive reelections by large margins in 2007 and 2010. Uy attempted to consolidate power and
supported his brother Arthur’s successful bid for the governorship of Compostela
685
"One Shot to the Head: Death Squad Killings in Tagum City, Philippines," 13.
Edu Punay, "Ex-Mayor, 29 Others Face Murder Raps over Tagum Death Squad," The
Philippine Star March 6, 2015, http://www.philstar.com:8080/nation/2015/03/06/1430374/exmayor-29-others-face-murder-raps-over-tagum-death-squad.
687
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2778dn Re: Case of Jessie Opalla," (Commission on
Human Rights, June 16, 2008).
688
The UDS was suspected of killing a succession of alleged gang members and criminals,
although local police attributed the bloodletting to rivalries among criminal gangs. Frinston
Lim, "Vigilante Killings?," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 30, 2011.
689
"One Shot to the Head: Death Squad Killings in Tagum City, Philippines," 25-36.
686
177
Valley, where the Uy family had made their fortune in small-scale gold mining.690
When Duterte vacated his chairmanship of the Regional Peace and Order Council in
2008, Uy joined the governors of Davao del Norte and Davao del Sur in jockeying for
the position, recognizing how influential the position could be.691
But Uy remained limited in his reach. He was unsuccessful in prolonging his
hold on political power once he reached his term limit in 2013. The lame duck
became a target when Uy’s erstwhile vice mayor Rellon handily defeated Uy’s son,
De Carlo, in the 2013 election. Uy had previously been able to control the Tagum
City police force through the city’s purse strings, allowing him to influence key
appointments in particular. He proved vulnerable from above without patronage of
Davao del Norte’s provincial governor, Rodolfo del Rosario. The Davao del Norte
provincial police, “on orders of their superiors”, began building a case against Uy
with testimony and evidence on the death squad. 692 The National Bureau of
Investigation task force concluded that Uy had created the death squad,
recommending charges against him and 28 death squad participants, including police
officers, ex-convicts, gangsters and former NPA fighters.693 Remaining free from any
conviction for the killings, Uy ran against Rellon for Tagum City mayor in 2016 but
lost. Even without Uy at the helm, the UDS is believed to continue to operate as guns
690
Ibid., 14.
CJ Kuizon, "Del Rosario, Cagas Welcome Possible RPOC Post," Davao Today March 8,
2017, http://davaotoday.com/main/politics/crime-public-safety/del-rosario-cagas-welcomepossible-rpoc-post/.
692
In fact, when Human Rights Watch published the findings of their two-year investigation
into the Tagum City Death Squad, their claim that the UDS was responsible for almost 300
killings from 2007 to 2013 was based on Davao del Norte’s provincial police investigations.
"One Shot to the Head: Death Squad Killings in Tagum City, Philippines," 12-14; footnote
22.
693
"Tagum Killings: NBI Files Murder Raps vs Ex-Mayor, 28 Others," Rappler March 4,
2015, http://www.rappler.com/nation/85782-tagum-killings-nbi-murder-raps-former-mayor.
See also Tarra Quismundo, "Ex-Mayor Charged in Death-Squad Slays," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, March 6, 2015.
691
178
for hire.694 While the tactics were similar to the Davao City death squad, Uy failed to
overcome the disadvantage of his bad relations with the provincial governor. Lacking
central support, Uy was vulnerable to Governor del Rosario’s machinations.
The Military and Investment Defense
In the early 2000s, the government warned that the NPA was “on the rebound”
in the Davao provinces and Compostela Valley, in part because the military had been
preoccupied with Moro separatism elsewhere in Mindanao.695 The military estimated
the NPA’s strength at nearly 12,000 in 2001 nationally, up from 11,255 the previous
year and the MILF at about 12,500, while the Abu Sayyaf strength had dropped from
about 1,000 to only 60. 696 By 2008 however, army officials said that these armed
insurgents had lost fighters in battles and surrenders, bringing them to their weakest
level in 20 years.697 In 2010, there were an estimated 800 NPA fighters in Southern
Mindanao, 60 to 70 percent of whom were allegedly lumad or indigenous peoples.698
694
Two unidentified gunmen on a motorcycle shot dead radio commentator and barangay
councilor Rogelio Butalid in December, outside his workplace in Tagum City. Human Rights
Watch accused former UDS members of killing radio commentator and barangay councilor
Rogelio Butalid. Government investigators found that Butalid’s radio program was sponsored
by the National Electrification faction of the Davao del Norte Electric Cooperative, which
was embroiled in a violent dispute with a pro-cooperative faction; they implied that Butalid’s
may have invited a violent response by training his hard-hitting commentary against the rivals
of his donors. "One Shot to the Head: Death Squad Killings in Tagum City, Philippines," 15;
39-41. Nancy Carvajal, "Some Journalists Had It Coming, Probers Say," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, December 14, 2013. Also "CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-2014-0004dn Re: Death
of Butalid, Rogelio E. "Tata"," (Commission on Human Rights, February 11, 2014).
695
Edith Regalado, "18 Soldiers, 10 NPAs Die in Davao Ambush," The Philippine Star
November 19, 2001, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/140615/18-soldiers-10-npas-diedavao-ambush.
696
Anthony Allada and Dennis Santos, "10 NPAs, 5 Soldiers Die in Clash," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, April 6, 2002.
697
Frinston Lim, Nikko Dizon, and Delfin Mallari, "5 Soldiers Dead in Clash with Rebs,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 31, 2008.
698
ICG, "The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks," 10. Lumad is
also used as a term to politically distinguish indigenous people in Mindanao from the
predominantly muslim, moro indigenous people. Arnold Alamon, "Wars of Extinction: The
179
Violence was concentrated in indigenous communities or lumad ancestral lands,
where the military protected resource extraction from insurgency attacks.
This section explains the central-local dynamics that produced insurgencyrelated violence in a larger pattern of militarization relating to mining interests that
intensified due to national directives in 2008 and 2012. Moreover, the political
dynamics of Davao City had a ripple effect elsewhere in the region as Mayor Duterte
played a leading role in regional security as part of his strategy to keep the insurgency
conflict outside his city gates. This section explains the dynamics of military
involvement in wealth control using three examples in Southern Mindanao. First,
violence over mining in Mount Diwalwal in Compostela Valley was locally initiated,
before the central government and military took over. Second, in Kiblawan in Davao
del Sur, military and local leaders directed violence against mining opponents among
the indigenous B’laan lumad community. Rather than insurgency or attacks against
the state, the conflict was over a highly contentious mining project. Third, in
Talaingod, Davao del Norte, the forcible displacement of indigenous lumad
communities was tantamount to a land grab by the military.
The dynamics of political violence in Southern Mindanao centered upon the
military’s strategy toward indigenous communities. This involved the recruitment of
lumad fighters for counter-insurgency and clearing lumad communities out of sites for
resource extraction. In Davao del Norte, the town of Talaingod was a key hive for the
mobilization of lumad fighters. The military had encouraged some indigenous groups
to wage a pangayao (tribal war) against the NPA in the early 2000s. 699 In Davao
Lumad Killings in Mindanao, Philippines," Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, no. 21 March
2017, https://kyotoreview.org/issue-21/lumad-killings-philippines/.
699
Ferdinand Zuasola, "Tribal Folk Demand Firearms to Fight Rebels," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, December 10, 2001. The regional office of the National Indigenous People’s
Commission even proposed the creation of an armed “Ancestral Domain Forces” as a defense
180
Oriental, a military-sponsored pangayao against the NPA also exploited a division
between lumad communities over the entry of mining firms into their territory. 700
In 2008, President Arroyo directed the military to deploy an Investment
Defense Force in Southern Mindanao to “protect vital infrastructures and projects
from terrorists, including the New People’s Army and other rebel groups who stand in
the way of development in the rural areas”.701 The military then capitalized on earlier
collaboration with lumad groups to mobilize indigenous communities against the
NPA with an Alsa Lumad (Lumad, Arise) campaign based out of Davao City.702 The
displacement of thousands of civilians, mostly lumad families from hinterland
villages in Davao Oriental, Davao del Norte and Compostela Valley, began to
intensify around this time.703 Displacement, violence and harassment were part of a
wider campaign to control the area’s resources.704
Mount Diwalwal, Compostela Valley. The conflict over mining in Mount
Diwalwal pitted local political actors against one another, with the national
against land-grabbing, armed conflict and destruction of the environment. "Gov't Exec
Pushes for Formation of Tribal Armed Force," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 18, 2002.
700
The military mainly armed the Mandaya lumad groups, while Higaonon and anti-mining
Mandaya lumad opposed the entry of mining firms into their territory. The groups had been
united in protecting their ancestral domains from logging in the past. Mining divided them.
"'Lumad' Armed to Fight NPA," Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 21, 2002. See also NCIP
and military encouragement of lumad participation in the government’s counter-insurgency
campaign. Ferdinand Zuasola and Ayan Mellejor, "'Lumad' Urged to Make a Strong Stand
against Violence," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 21, 2002. Ferdinand Zuasola, "Entry of
Mining Firms Divides Davao 'Lumads'," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 2, 2002.
701
"PGMA Orders AFP to Create Investment Defense Force," Philippine Information
Agency Press Release February 9, 2008,
http://archives.pia.gov.ph/?m=12&sec=reader&rp=2&fi=p080209.htm&no=18&date=02/09/2
008.
702
ICG, "The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks," 12.
703
An estimated 2,500 people from several towns in Davao Oriental fled their homes due to
intensified military-NPA fighting; most were lumad families from the hinterland villages of
Baganga, Boston and Cateel towns. Jeffrey Tupas, "Anti-NPA Drive: 400 'Lumad' Families
Flee," Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 11, 2008. In May, residents of at least two villages,
in Talaingod, Davao del Norte and Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, about 400 lumad
families or an estimated 2,000 members of the Ata-Manobo fled flighting between the
military and NPA. "Ex-Davao Death Squad Member Surfaces."
704
Carlos Conde, "Arroyo Troops Continue Reign of Terror in Southern Mindanao,"
Bulatlat.com, no. 21, http://www.bulatlat.com/archive1/021Arroyo%20troops%20SMR.html.
181
government initially remaining on the periphery. With the elimination of a key local
interlocutor, the national government became directly engaged in the conflict. A joint
venture between a large-scale mining company Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining
Corporation and local mining firm JB Management and Mining Corporation
(JBMMC) owned by Monkayo town mayor Joel Brillantes escalated the violence in
Diwalwal from 1999 to 2002, resulting in the murder of about 100 miners and
residents.705
Until this point, legal challenges had prevented large mining companies from
proceeding with exploration and artisanal miners from all over the Philippines
descended on Diwalwal. Brillantes, a former military intelligence operative, sought to
control the informal mining sector through the imposition of a temporary restraining
order on their mining activities. Mount Diwalwal barangay captain Franco Tito
emerged as the small scale miners’ voice in opposition to Brillantes and JBMMC.706
In April 2002, the local judge Eugenio Valles that issued the order and denied the
small scale miners’ petition against it was shot dead by unidentified gunmen.707 In
July, unidentified gunmen shot dead Arnold Tabigue, an employee of JB Management
and Mining, a firm identified with Brillantes; the next day, gunmen killed Jesus
Milay, an employee of Blucor Minerals Group, one of the mining groups involved in
the long-standing dispute.708
Davao City mayor Rodrigo Duterte, who also chaired the Regional
Development Council at the time, vowed to disarm the miners forcibly. President
705
Tito warned of a bloodbath in Diwalwal. Daisy Gonzales and Carlos Conde, "Entry of
Huge Mining Firm Turns Diwalwal into Powder Keg," Bulatlat 2, no. 30 September 1-7,
2002, http://bulatlat.com/news/2-30/2-30-caloy2.html.
706
Ayan Mellejor and Ferdinand Zuasola, "Cops Eye Guns-for-Hire in Slay," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, April 27, 2002.
707
"Judge in Mt. Diwalwal Mining Case Shot Dead," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 26,
2002.
708
Allada, "Killings Continue in Mt. Diwalwal, Despite Agreement to End Rivalry."
182
Arroyo appointed Duterte to oversee the resolution of the conflict.709 Duterte thus
convened the various stakeholders in the gold rush area to end their disputes by
entering a joint mining venture.710 The military also claimed that mining activities in
Diwalwal has been the largest source of funds for NPA rebels operating in the area.711
In the course of 2002, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) took over Diwalwal, declaring 8,100 hectares a mineral reservation area
enforced by the police and military.712 In June 2003, Brillantes was killed in Monkayo
while his bodyguards shot and killed the gunman, Aniceto Dejito, a former NPA
rebel.713 Police started a manhunt for a former police officer, Reynaldo Cajes, and
four others who were with Dejito during the assassination. Cajes was a bodyguard of
Nelson “Tata” Sala, president of the Monkayo Integrated Small Scale Miners
Association.714 Sala was the principal suspect in the Brillantes assassination. In the
following year’s elections, Manuel Brillantes, the brother of the slain mayor,
successfully ran for office. Throughout late April and May 2004, a spate of violence
accompanied elections in Monkayo, primarily between the Brillantes and Sala camps.
Among the incidents included the murder of Barangay chair and Brillantes supporters
Arthur Baltazar and Felix Petero.715 For instance, police attributed the murder of
709
Ibid.
Mellejor and Allada, "Duterte Vows to Disarm Miners on Mt. Diwalwal."
711
Santos and Allada.
712
Daisy Gonzales and Carlos Conde, "Gov't Takeover to Bring in More Mining Giants to
Diwalwal," Bulatlat 2, no. 31 September 8-14, 2002, http://bulatlat.com/news/2-31/2-31diwalwal.html.
713
Anthony Allada, "Monkayo Mayor Killed for P1m, Suspect's Wife Claims," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, July 2, 2003.
714
Other incidents included the lethal shooting of Henry Buduan, a supporter of Monkayo
mayoral candidate Franco Tito and the killing of Virgilio Baquiano, a fruit and vegetable
trader. Anthony Allada and Ferdinand Zuasola, "Ex-Cop Hunted for Slay of Compostela
Mayor," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 5, 2003.
715
Gentugaya had been vice mayor but took over as mayor as a result of Joel Brillantes’s
assassination the year before while Estrada, who had been the highest ranked town councilor,
was appointed vice mayor. "CHR Joint Resolution Cases No.: XI-2014-2159 to 66 DO Re:
Case of Hentry Buduan, Domingo Estrada, Franklin Estrada, Jessielyn Bybay, Arthur
710
183
barangay councilor Rodolfo Gogo to his switching sides from Manuel Brillantes to
Rizal Gentugaya.716
Violence flared up again in the locale after the national government unveiled a
renewed plan for the mineral reservation. In February 2008, the NPA attacked a gold
processing plant in Monkayo allegedly owned by Monkayo mayor Manuel Brillantes,
killing two unnamed security guards. The NPA reportedly declared Brillantes to be a
counterrevolutionary enemy, and the prior year they had burned two of his company’s
dump trucks, as well as chopped down palm trees in his plantation. Meanwhile, the
national government intensified its military presence, purportedly to protect local
communities from “extortionist” communist insurgents.717
Ultimately, although issues over electoral dominance and access to resource
wealth were never fully resolved by the use of force, the deployment of the military
was a trump card whenever local conflict over the mine pit the mayor against the
small scale miners and communist insurgents.718 The involvement of national actors
was essentially mediated by Joel Brillantes, who acted as the interlocutor in Diwalwal
for both the central government and the mining companies until his assassination in
2003. Afterwards, the military tightened its control and took charge of the mine.
Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. Unlike in Diwalwal, the military was directly
involved in the protection of mining interests from the outset, fueling political
violence in Davao del Sur, particularly in Kiblawan town. The military had been
Baltazar, Rodolfo Gogo, Felix Pequero, Virgilio Baquiano," (Commission on Human Rights,
October 28, 2004).
716
Anthony Allada, "NPAs Kill Head of Monkayo Village Chiefs," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
May 4, 2004.
717
The small-scale miners rallied around a figure like Franco Tito but the NPA also
maintained an interest in profiting from the artisanal miners in the form of “revolutionary”
taxes, thus adding a plausible counter-insurgency dimension to justify the military’s
involvement. Boris Verbrugge, "Decentralization, Institutional Ambiguity, and Mineral
Resource Conflict in Mindanao, Philippines," World Development 67 (2015): 456.
718
ICG, "The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks." See also
Verbrugge, 456.
184
active in the area and was embroiled in cases of violent excess in 2005 and 2007,
intensifying greatly in 2012 and 2013. The conflict between the military and the local
indigenous community did not stem from insurgency or attacks against the state.
Instead, the root of the conflict was a highly contentious large-scale mining project
located mainly in Tampakan town in neighboring South Cotabato province.
In 2003, the foreign-financed company Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (SMI) launched
the Tampakan project, which also encompasses Kiblawan town in Davao del Sur. The
mineral deposits are on an ancestral domain claimed by the B’laan tribe.719 Soldiers
from the 25th Infantry Battalion fired on B’laan tribe members killing Francisco,
Promencio and Padilla Bulane and wounding two other relatives in Kiblawan town on
February 8, 2005. The military claimed that the three were killed in a legitimate
military encounter but human rights groups claimed that the Bulane massacre was a
human rights violation.720 The provincial prosecutor filed criminal charges of murder
against army lieutenants Roberto Betita and Josue Erie. On March 2, 2007, provincial
coordinator of labor group Anakpawis and peasant group Nagkakaisang Magsasaka
ng Davao del Sur (United Farmers of Davao del Sur) Renato Pacaide was shot by
gunmen on a motorcycle in Digos City.721 Human rights activists suspected that he
was assassinated due to his sustained advocacy for an investigation of the Bulane
killings.722
719
Bong Sarmiento, "Special Report: The Tampakan Project: Battle over Southeast Asia's
Largest Copper-Gold Reserves," Mindanews November 11, 2012,
http://www.mindanews.com/environment/2012/11/special-report-the-tampakan-projectbattle-over-southeast-asias-largest-copper-gold-reserve-1/.
720
"CHR Joint Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2470 to 5 Ds, Re: Massacre of Indigenous Group
at Barangay Abnate, Kiblawan, Davao Del Sur by the 25th I.B., 6 I.D., Pa," (Commission on
Human Rights, September 1, 2005).
721
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-07-2946 Ds Re: Death of Renato "Atong" Torrecampo
Pacaide," (Commission on Human Rights, August 13, 2008).
722
Pacaide was also organizing a union in the Nakayama corporation, which had been
expected to lay off about 80 laborers that may have been a motive for his murder. Eldie
185
The bitter dispute delayed the development of the project and in 2012, both
mining opponents and pro-mining local officials appealed to the national government
to intervene decisively. Farmers and irrigators’ associations in Davao del Sur and
Davao City asked the government to stop the multi-billion dollar SMI open-pit mine
for copper and gold, saying that it would destroy the watershed that irrigates 13,000
hectares of rice farmland.723 However, Marivic Diamante, the mayor of Kiblawan,
Davao del Sur, as well as mayors of two affected towns in South Cotabato and Sultan
Kudarat, sought the intercession of President Aquino for the project to commence. At
least seven military detachments were deployed to the area to enforce a curfew and
restrict people’s movements. The anti-mining B’laan Tampakan Forum accused the
companies of using the military to stifle opposition. 724 Diamante, the military and the
SMI later revealed that the company was paying the town PhP180,000 (US$3,600) to
PhP 850,000 (US$17,000) per month for the deployment of soldiers and paramilitary
forces to the site, as part of the government’s counter-insurgency campaign.725
In response to the sustained protests and a 2010 ban on open pit mining
imposed by the provincial government of South Cotabato, the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) rejected the project’s environmental
compliance certificate application in 2012.726 The violence escalated afterwards on
the Davao del Sur side of the project. Members of the 27th Infantry Batallion killed
Aguirre and Cecilia Rodriguez, "DOJ to Reinvestigate 15-Month-Old Killing of Militant
Leader in Davao," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 24, 2008.
723
The mining site straddles 10,000 hectares of agricultural land located between the towns of
Tampakan, South Cotabato and Kiblawan, Davao del Sur. Kristine Alave, "Farmers Decry
Loss of Water to Mine," Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 28, 2012.
724
Judy Quiros, Aquiles Zonio, and Orlando Dinoy, "3 Mayors Ask Palace Help for Mine
Project," Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 2, 2012.
725
The information came to light in the course of a congressional hearing to investigate the
killing of Juvy Capion and her children. Lorie Ann Cascaro, "SMI Should Stop Funding Gov't
Forces in Tampakan Mining Site--Bayan Muna," Mindanews February 24, 2013,
http://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2013/02/smi-should-stop-funding-govt-forces-intampakan-mining-site-bayan-muna/.
726
Sarmiento.”Special Report: The Tampakan Project”.
186
Juvy Campion, wife of anti-mining activist and B’laan leader Dagil Campion, in an
alleged “legitimate encounter” with a “bandit group”; two of their children were also
killed in the attack with a third child wounded.727 Campion had been waging an armed
campaign against SMI. The military stated that his wife and children were caught in
the cross fire but human rights groups cited reports that there was no gunfight.728
By mid-January 2013, military personnel were posted to protect the mine
site.729 Within two weeks, suspected members of a special military taskforce created
to secure the mining area killed Campion’s younger brother Kitari and two others in
Kiblawan.730 Shortly after, civilians began to flee the area, particularly from B’laan
territories. 731 Meanwhile, the DENR issued environmental clearance for the project,
giving the government a green light to proceed with the project.732 A few months
later, taskforce militias allegedly killed anti-mining leader Datu Anti Freay and his
son Victor in Kiblawan. 733 With the procedural victory of the government over
mining opponents, the violence slowed down but did not cease entirely.
Talaingod, Davao del Norte. In 2011, shortly after simultaneous raids on
three mining firms in northeastern Mindanao, President Aquino initiated a
government plan to use paramilitary groups to protect mining companies.734 The
727
Nikko Dizon et al., "Army Probes Soldiers in Davao Sur Massacre," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, October 20, 2013.
728
Germelina Lacorte, "Independent Probe of B'laan Slays Sought," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, November 4, 2012.
729
Bong Sarmiento, "Tribal Members Flee Tampakan Mine Site Due to Heavy Military
Presence," Mindanews February 3, 2013, http://www.mindanews.com/topstories/2013/02/tribal-members-flee-tampakan-mine-site-due-to-heavy-military-presence/.
730
Aquiles Zonio, "B’laan Leader Capion Confirms Brother Killed in Clash with Soldiers,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer January 31, 2013, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/350539/blaan-leadercapion-confirms-brother-killed-in-clash-with-soldiers.
731
Sarmiento, "Tribal Members Flee Tampakan Mine Site Due to Heavy Military Presence".
732
"Stakeholders Note Pros and Cons of $5.9 Tampakan Mine Project," GMA News Online
February 21, 2013, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/money/content/296041/stakeholdersnote-pros-and-cons-of-5-9-b-tampakan-mine-project/story/.
733
Aquiles Zonio, "Antimining Head, Son Slain in Davao Del Sur," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, August 26, 2013.
734
The mobilization of the military to protect mining sites is discussed in earlier chapters.
187
following year, Aquino issued Executive Order 79 on mining reform, signaling
increased central support for military and paramilitary defense of resource extraction
from insurgents and other opponents.735 In 2014, at least 300 Manobo lumad families
fled Talaingod for fear of getting caught in armed conflicts between the military and
the NPA after two helicopters and four military planes dropped bombs near their
villages.736 The villagers sought refuge in Davao City while the military occupied
their lands. The military justified their presence in response to NPA presence in the
locale but anti-mining groups claimed that their opposition to logging and mining in
the Pandtaron Range must have prompted the military to intensify their operations in
the area.737 After a few weeks, the military pulled out after a meeting among the
evacuees, officials of the military’s Eastern Mindanao Command, and Davao del
Norte governor Rodolfo del Rosario, facilitated by Davao City Mayor Duterte.738
Incidents of military excesses continued to perturb communities in Davao del Norte.
Later that year, three soldiers were accused of raping a teenaged lumad girl in
Talaingod, Davao del Norte.739
Lumad community leaders accused the military of violence and displacement
aimed at eroding their resistance to extractive economic activities like mining and
735
"2012 Karapatan Year-End Report on the Human Rights Situation in the Philippines," 9.
Dee Ayroso, "Mining Act: '20 Years of Plunder, Destruction and Pollution Must End',"
Bulatlat March 3, 2015, http://bulatlat.com/main/2015/03/03/mining-act-20-destruction-andpollution-must-years-of-plunder-end/.
736
Karlos Manlupig, "Manobo Families Flee from Davao Clashes," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
April 1, 2014.
737
"Dreams Die Young in Talaingod," Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 4, 2014.
738
A similar humanitarian problem faced Davao City’s Paquibato District but Duterte
opposed a military withdrawal. Nonetheless, Duterte asked the soldiers to stop conducting a
community “census” about their affiliations and activities, sowing fear of red-tagging among
local leaders. Germelina Lacorte, "Army Agrees to Pullout in Davao Norte," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, May 6, 2014.
739
Julie Aurelio, "Militants Rally at Camp Agui over Rape of 'Lumad' Girl," Philippine Daily
Inquirer, September 12, 2015.
188
logging. 740 In late 2015, more than 700 lumad were displaced from Talaingod. When
refugees began to return to Talaingod two months later, harassment and violence
resumed within days of their return—including the killing of a 15 year old boy.741 The
villagers were forced to evacuate the area once more, following a pattern of recurrent
violence aimed at dispossession.742
The Violent South
In this study, political violence at the highest scale occurred in Southern
Mindanao. The main pattern of violence in the region presented a puzzle at the outset:
why was so much political violence unrelated to either insurgency or elections? The
relationship was indirect. The state-sponsored vigilantism in Davao City and Tagum
City was aimed at particularistic political control. The violence followed a distinct
pattern aimed at social control. Primarily, the violence was effective at controlling the
city’s urban poor. While the victims may have seemed anonymous to the general
public, the violence was acutely personal. Individuals were selected based on lists
generated from local knowledge of community leaders, manifesting the city
government’s capacity for surveillance and punitive action.
Duterte’s also contributed towards perpetuating his hold on political office.
Duterte expanded the traditional use of a politician’s private army. A vigilante group,
the DDS was rendered virtually invisible to monitors of electoral violence. Unlike
elsewhere in the country, violence decreased prior to elections and typically scaled
upwards in the months after the vote. This strategy forestalled the risk of COMELEC
interference during elections. Furthermore, except in very rare cases, the DDS was not
740
Karlos Manlupig, "'Lumad' in Gold-Rich Mindanao Targeted," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
September 7, 2015.
741
Frinston Lim, "'Lumad' Seek Help Amid New Abuses," Philippine Daily Inquirer,
February 1, 2016.
742
See also Alamon.
189
used against political opponents. In other regions, political assassinations sometimes
resulted in a backlash at the polls or criminal prosecutions pursued by highly
motivated political families.
Duterte’s political tenacity went beyond the control of violence within the
city; his strategy also entailed influencing the contours of violence within the wider
region. Facilitated by his initial alliance with President Arroyo, Duterte built upon a
careful balancing act between the NPA and the military to effectively minimize the
encroachment of insurgency violence into Davao City. In the rest of Southern
Mindanao, other dynamics were at play. The Arroyo government enabled the military
to pursue the communist insurgency with little restraint. In the final years of Arroyo’s
tenure, the government was able to exploit a weakened insurgency and penetrate new
areas for resource control and extraction, particularly in Southern Mindanao. The
Aquino government continued in this direction and expanded the military’s role in
mining.
190
Chapter 6. The Extra-Judicial Killing of Philippine Democracy?
To what extent do central-local dynamics help to explain the violence of
Duterte’s first eighteen months in office? The sheer scale of the violence – as well as
its demographic, geographic and temporal features – signifies that a new set of
dynamics is at play. Nonetheless, this concluding chapter will endeavor to answer the
question. The first section synthesizes the key contributions this dissertation has made
to understanding political violence in post-authoritarian democracies such as the
Philippines. The second section attempts an initial sketch of the central-local
dynamics of the national “war on drugs” that has made so much violence possible
throughout the country in such a short period of time.
Central-Local Dynamics of Political Violence
While much of the scholarship on Philippine politics has concerned itself with
how violence has been used to win elections, this dissertation instead situates violence
and local politics in its broader relationships within the state. Unlike security studies
or the social movements literature, moreover, insurgency and counterinsurgency are
placed in their political context. For more than a century, elections have linked Manila
to the provinces, leaders to vote banks, and patrons to their clients. However, the use
of force also activates relationships that are not oriented for elections, or bypass them
altogether. Local bosses and petty strongmen may rely on political thuggery to make
their way to the top. However, the heights they reach and the scale of violence usually
remain limited. In areas with active insurgency groups and military encampments,
moreover, parochial powers and agents of the central state need to either gain mutual
advantage, augment their resources and exploit the other, or unilaterally pursue their
aims.
191
Patterns of political violence. Central-local dynamics shape the contours of
political violence. Political violence is constituted of distinct but overlapping forms of
violence associated with different processes. In the Philippine case, state weakness
and precarious democratic consolidation blur the distinction between strategic and
particularistic interests. Moreover, interactions between actors in the national capital
and provincial peripheries result in inter-related forms of violence. Political partisans
may use the state’s coercive apparatus during elections, for instance. “Insurgent” may
be a label for recalcitrant labor unionists or peasant organizers. Political violence is
best understood in its broadest, rather than most parsimonious, sense. It includes
traversing categories of direct state violence, electoral violence, protection of
economic plunder and racketeering, as well as the illicit state-sponsored violence for
social cleansing. Here, violence is politics by other means.743 While stark episodes
like high profile assassinations or mass killings may receive public attention, this
study demonstrates that assassinations and massacres have occurred frequently
throughout the country. Political violence is everyday and commonplace.
The largest single category of targets in this study is unaffiliated civilians (see
Appendix 4). The Philippine case affirms the argument that counter-insurgency has
been waged not only against insurgents but also against civilians.744 Furthermore, the
“social cleansing” of the urban poor in Davao City resulted in death tolls at a
comparable scale. Both kinds of violence point to a key insight from this research:
violence against a large number of unarmed, non-combatant and unaligned civilians is
a common strategy for political gain.
even in the absence of conflict
743
Tambiah borrows the famous (some argue misunderstood) turn of phrase about war, but
applies it to collective violence. Stanley Tambiah, Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist
Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1996), 223.
744
See Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay, 401-02.
192
Examining each incident for its specific narrative – who committed violence
against whom, and why – made it possible to discern how single occurrences were
part of broader patterns: larger, sustained interests attributable to identifiable groups
of national and local elites, who targeted what specific groups of people, in certain
areas, and at certain periods of time. In recognizing these patterns of political
violence, the specific nature of how violence escalated, de-escalated or ended often
revealed actors and actions of considerable political power. 745 Analyzing the
modulation of violence to lower or higher scales is a crucial innovation. This study
accounted for observations of discernible and relative shifts in the use of violence,
rather than absolute increases or decreases in the levels of violence.
The four previous chapters trace central-local dynamics that explain political
violence in the regions studied. Each case demonstrated the inter-relatedness of
violence, the salience of local context, the importance of endings and significance of
shifts in scale. Central actors were often involved in cases in which a significant
change in the scale of violence occurred, whether escalation or de-escalation. Most
episodes of violence were terminated by some form of decisive action from above,
typically through the military. Violence was also de-escalated or curtailed by the
withdrawal of support from the center or transference of central support. Finally,
violence also ended at the initiative of local actors due to the consolidation of their
primacy in their bailiwicks or because of intra-elite moderation.
Inter-related types of violence. The inter-connectedness between different
forms of violence is best conceptualized as a system in which changes occur to the
system as a whole. A counter-insurgency campaign pits the military against armed
745
I adapt ideas on the dynamics of “endings” of mass atrocities; although these are at a much
higher scale, the notion of analyzing how violence ends was a crucial insight. See ConleyZilkic, 5-6.
193
insurgents in a classic model of state violence. However, military encampment near or
inside communities has often resulted in violent excesses. A poorly paid standing
army has also supplied mercenaries and assassins for a thriving market for murder.746
Local political actors will also exploit opportunities to amplify their power from the
military and gain an advantage over their opponents.747 In the crackdown on Hacienda
Luisita labor protests, the central government involved the military under the pretext
that the sugar plantation fell within the realm of a national security interest. Suspected
military involvement in the assassination of union leaders and sympathizers were
precipitated by “red baiting” and militarization under the guise of counterinsurgency.
When the Cojuangco-Aquino dynasty fell out with President Arroyo, the continued
military presence in the plantation under the famed “butcher” General Jovito Palparan
was an ominous warning to the family. Lethal violence against activists took on a
different meaning and shifted to a larger scale in terms of magnitude and location.
Attacks against activists in the locale were part of a broader pattern of violence
against leftist activists and community organizers across the country.
Locality. Insurgency and elections motivated patterns of political violence
across all the cases in this study. However, the central-local dynamics were distinct in
each region because local politics, particularly structures of domination, change at a
slower pace than national politics. Political dynasties could endure for decades, as
exemplified by the old “Solid North” families in the Ilocos and Cagayan regions.
Compared to the other regional groups in this study, the scale of the violence was low
in Northern Luzon. In Southern Mindanao, the violent dispute over mining in
746
See for instance Cabreza, "This Business of Fixing Abra." See also Herman Kraft, "The
Foibles of an Armed Citizenry: Armed Auxilliaries of the State and Private Armed Groups in
the Philippines," in Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the
Philippines, ed. Diana Rodriguez (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of
International and Development Studies, 2010).
747
Kalyvas, "The Ontology of Political Violence," 486.
194
Diwalwal is another example of a distinct regional context. Natural resource
endowment is part of the geographic context of political violence. Under a weak state
in which elites are predisposed to predatory behavior, the exploitation of resources is
a strong motivation for violence. Violence escalated with the entry of the military as
an enforcer of private control of wealth in the extractive industries elsewhere in the
region. Indigenous lumad communities became targets for violence aimed at
dispossessing them of their ancestral domain.
Endings. Why does violence end? Generally, these cases of political violence
lead to three main categories of termination: (1) the consolidation of a local actor’s
dominance obviates the need for violence; (2) central support for violence is
withdrawn or shifted to a rival; and, (3) a resolute, centrally directed effort at ending
the violence or “crackdown”. In most cases in this study, violence ended when the
central state took decisive, even forcible, action. For instance, the central government
launched a crackdown on private armies in Abra province from 2004 to 2007, most
notably the forces under the command of the Valera clan. The governor, Vicente
Valera, had also fallen out with President Arroyo. In the case of the final crumbling of
the Joson dynasty in Nueva Ecija province, President Arroyo may have tipped the
balance in their opponent’s favor in the 2007 elections by deploying military
personnel to the province. In contrast, the retirement of Chavit Singson from active
political contests and his successful bargaining among other political families
forestalled further bloodshed, which already had been scaling down during his final
years in office. This is an example of how the consolidation of local dominance can
transform dynamics and lead to non-violence—albeit effectively constraining
democratic outcomes by gaming elections so that politicians run unopposed.
Moreover, this dissertation offers evidence that the Philippine state is not simply
195
weak. When particularistic interests converge with the government’s statist aims, the
state is able to act with strength and regulate political violence “in society”.
However, there was one example in which the central government sought to
break the local strongman’s hold and failed. When the alliance between Arroyo and
Davao City mayor Rodrigo Duterte collapsed in 2007, she mustered a considerable
amount of central power in an attempt to dislodge him. Arroyo encouraged the
Commission on Human Rights to launch an investigation into the Davao Death
Squad. Constrained by term limits in 2010, Duterte was vulnerable and ran as his
daughter Sara’s vice mayor rather than seeking a more powerful congressional seat.
Prior to the elections, Arroyo had eased Duterte out of national and regional
appointments, appointed new military officials into Davao City and encouraged CHR
investigations into the vigilante crimes linked to him. Arroyo endorsed the Dutertes’
rivals—giving them the support of the incumbent national party—yet she still failed
to topple him from power. The vigilante violence in the city continued unabated, only
diminishing in scale just prior to Duterte’s presidential campaign in 2016. Thus, the
Davao City case also shows that while national level actors and resources usually tip
the scales in favor of the center, other factors such as the uncertainty of elections
mitigate and constrain central power. Under authoritarian rule, in comparison, Marcos
possessed greater capacity to achieve his desired outcome vis-à-vis recalcitrant local
bosses. Similar to any lame duck incumbent, Arroyo was furthermore hamstrung at
the end of her final term.
Scale. In understanding the temporal and geographic dimensions of political
violence in these cases, it is necessary to use meaningful descriptors. In the database
developed for this research, information on individual victims is captured as well as
the specific details of the violence. Counts are thereby possible, giving an idea of how
196
the magnitude of violence changes over time and place. However, understanding
patterns of violence required local context. The scale of violence is best understood
within its specific milieu. For instance, while elections and insurgency produced
violence in all the regions studied, the magnitude was lowest in Northern Luzon but
highest in Southern Mindanao. Yet in all places, the scale of electoral violence was
dwarfed by violence related to insurgency. This observation bears emphasis,
considering that the scholarship on political violence in the Philippines concentrates
on elections while insurgency normally falls under security studies.
An important empirical problem that demanded explanation was the high scale
of violence that was related neither to elections nor insurgency: anti-crime, vigilante
violence in Southern Mindanao. Why did this type of violence emerge? Why was the
scale so high and sustained over so many years? In the preceding chapter, I offer
evidence to substantiate the argument that violence perpetrated in the name of
eradicating crime in Davao City resulted from a specific political objective: Rodrigo
Duterte’s aim to exert a monopoly of control over violence in the city. The Tagum
City Death Squad was a pale imitation.
Sidel and Hedman argue that vigilantism must be seen in the context of the
longer history of “sub-contracted” state violence in the country.748 In other words,
heavily armed groups have fought dirty fights against insurgents and other opponents
at the government’s behest in the past. In the immediate post-Marcos period, these
paramilitary vigilantes were aimed at the armed communist insurgency. From 2001 to
2003 in Gapan City, Central Luzon, the Red Vigilante Group (RVG) targeted
criminals, ostensibly to amplify state force and assist with the peace and order
748
The authors make this observation in relation to anti-communist vigilantism that sprang to
fore in the immediate post-Marcos period. Eva-Lotta Hedman and John Sidel, Philippine
Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century: Colonial Legacies, Post-Colonial Trajectories
(London: Routledge, 2000), 57.
197
challenges of the government. An erstwhile rebel breakaway faction from the New
People’s Army, the group claimed that this was part of their return to the fold, under
the peace agreement with the state.
The anti-drug vigilantism of the Davao Death Squad and Tagum City Death
Squad likewise seemed to pursue a “public service” of ridding the cities of drug
criminals. The city mayors in Southern Mindanao publicly endorsed the vigilantism
(though stopped short of taking official responsibility). Unlike the RVG however, the
Davao and Tagum city vigilante groups were operated by active duty police officers.
A key feature in Davao City has been the identification of targets and the plausibility
that they were criminal elements. Victims who confessed to drug use or crime and had
surrendered to the police were often victimized. In addition, however, there were
victims whose names had been on lists of drug peddlers, addicts and other alleged
criminals. Village heads, police authorities, informants, neighbors and family
members compiled these lists. As Kalyvas argues, if private information is used in
determining who is punished and who is rewarded, political actors are able to use
violence more effectively to control the population in a contested area.749 For a state
determined to exert control over society, regulating urban slums requires personal
knowledge generated through confession and from informants in the community. In
this way, these ordinarily opaque sections of the population can be, as Scott puts it,
legible.750
The most remarkable characteristic of violence for social control is the sheer
scale of killing—offering clues to how tens of thousands could be killed in the first 18
months of the national “war on drugs”. On one hand, the scale of the violence in
749
Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, 12, 144-45.
James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Scheme to Improve the Human Condition
Have Failed, Yale Agrarian Studies Series (New Haven Yale University Press, 1998), 77-80.
750
198
Gapan City was extraordinary enough to generate public alarm in Nueva Ecija and the
neighboring province of Bulacan, where the bodies were often dumped. Yet the scale
of the violence in Tagum City and Davao City were out of proportion compared to
any violence at the hand of primarily local officials in this research. I argue that the
violence at this scale was made possible by two factors. First, overt and covert
instrumentalization of the police was key to making the strategy work. Police violence
against civilians – criminals, suspects and otherwise – is not unique to Southern
Mindanao nor the Philippines.751 Similar cases were documented in Northern Luzon,
including the story of Mountain Province State Polytechnic student Stefen Galidan,
who was killed in police custody.752 So the death squad killings appeared to be no
more than casual violence experienced elsewhere and the numbers could rise without
attracting immediate censure.
Second, central support allowed the violence to escalate and continue
unrelentingly especially in the Davao City case. In 2001, after about a dozen deaths in
each of the two prior years, Davao City groups staged a public protest and the local
lawyers’ association and the Commission on Human Rights decried the violence in
the national media.753 It was only after Arroyo publicly endorsed Duterte and his
methods that the upward shift in scale occurred. By 2004, an average of 100 people
were killed by the Davao City Death Squad each year, with as many as 180 killed in
2008. For locally led campaigns of political violence to escalate, central actor
participation was required.
751
Jyoti Belur, Permission to Shoot? Police Use of Deadly Force in Democracies (New York:
Springer, 2010), 10; 26-27.
752
Vincent Cabreza and Kimberlie Quitasol, "Bontoc Outraged by Student's Killing,"
Philippine Daily Inquirer, November 10, 2014.
753
Anthony Allada, "Davao Killings Alarm Lawyers," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 29,
2001. "Davao Becoming 'Salvage' Capital-CHR," Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 26,
2001.
199
Synthesis. Why does political violence occur in a post-authoritarian
democracy in the Philippines? This question has taken on a greater significance in
light of the unprecedented state-sponsored violence of the Duterte government since
July 2016. The central-local dynamics have changed, exhibiting greater centralization
and authoritarianism, enabling a shift in scale of political violence. The period
preceding the Duterte presidency, the focus of the empirical work in this research,
adds to our understanding of why such a shift was possible.
This study argues that central-local dynamics explain patterns of political
violence. Statist aims and political actors’ personal ambitions motivate violence, and
these machinations are enabled through the mobilization of central and local
capacities for violence. In a weak state like the Philippines, the state’s predatory
capability exceeds its developmental orientation. Capabilities include state security
forces such as the military and police at various levels. These are comprised of locally
stationed forces and those deployed ad hoc (e.g. during elections or specific security
campaigns) as well as private armies, mercenaries, militias, and paid assassins. Two
main patterns of political violence are discernable: electoral violence and insurgencyrelated violence. Two other categories are closely related: violence for wealth control
and economic extraction, often masked as counter-insurgency; and violence for social
control, for which the anti-crime rhetoric itself is often the mask.
The main central-local dynamic is of accommodation between the central and
local actors. This study illuminates how a weak state governs without a monopoly on
the legitimate use of violence nor the illegitimate use of force. First, when
particularistic interests are enabled by local capacity for violence, this is likely to
result in political violence, typically cyclical around election seasons, locally
contained and accommodated by central authorities. Rarely does the violence
200
escalate. When it does, and if local political actors antagonize powerful national
actors, this will likely result in a centrally-led dislodgement or takedown of
entrenched, local strongmen. A variant of this dynamic is that the state’s strategic
interests diverge from the particularistic aims of local actors, making a takedown also
a likely outcome.
If statist, strategic aims are pursued by central authorities through security
forces such as the military and police, as well as deputized militias, then political
violence can be sustained over a long period and spread across political boundaries,
escalating over time and across space in response to security threats. This is likely to
result in a crackdown on state opponents, often by legitimate security forces but
through illegitimate means.
When particularistic and statist aims converge, however, this usually
necessitates a central-local joint production of violence. When centrally led, it is
typically for the purpose of resource extraction or exploitation. It can result in
violence that is sustained and escalated against opponents of the exploitation, but
localized at the site of economic extraction. When the violence is at the behest of
local political allies, the center provides the “muscle” but the violence is episodic.
Escalation and de-escalation turn on the longevity and exigencies of the alliance.
When the violence is locally led, depending on the capacities of a private army or
other form of locally organized force, violence can be sustained and escalated in the
locale for as long as the central-local alliance holds and the relationship can be
characterized as delegative in nature.
However, when there is divergence between the state’s strategic interests and
local actors’ particularistic motives, they may mobilize their respective capacities in
an antagonistic manner. In a contest between a national leader and a local strongman,
201
the center will usually prevail. However, if the center is particularly weak under
certain conditions—such as the final election of what amounts to a lame duck
incumbency—the attempt may fail. President Arroyo was not in a good position to
dislodge Duterte in 2010 for instance. Still, Duterte was forced to feint and dodge by
running for a lower position in Davao City rather than a congressional seat, which
was controlled by a rival political family. Arroyo’s relative weakness is more
apparent when compared to her actions against entrenched strongmen at high points
of her political strength: against Vicente Valera after ostensibly winning the 2004, for
instance, and against Thomas Joson, in 2007. The Philippine state’s power was not
absolute. Democratic institutions, even if flawed, imposed constraints.
The next section compares the Davao City experience with the national “war
on drugs”. I will show why the scale of the new violence can be explained by centrallocal dynamics, but only to a certain extent. The Philippines is currently undergoing a
process of political transition. The dynamics specified in this dissertation operate
within the context of democracy and a weak state plagued by centrifugal forces.
Within a scant 18 months however, Duterte’s presidency has rapidly moved in the
direction of centralized authoritarianism.
Shock Therapy: Duterte’s War on Drugs
On August 16, 2017, teenager Kian delos Santos was killed in Caloocan City,
Metro Manila. According to the police, delos Santos was another drug crime suspect
who was allegedly armed and put up a fight with arresting police officers.754 The boy
would have been no different from the thousands killed at the hands of police officers
754
Officers before a Senate inquiry on August 24, 2017 admitted that they had only
determined that delos Santos may have been a drug courier after he was killed. Camille
Elemia, "Cops 'Confirmed' Kian 'Drug Ties' after Operation, through Social Media," Rappler
August 24, 2017, https://www.rappler.com/nation/179883-caloocan-police-confirm-kiandelos-santos-drug-ties-social-media.
202
and unidentified assailants had the moments prior to his death not been captured in
CCTV footage. The video was made public, witnesses came forward to discredit the
police version of the story, and the first major street protests against the president’s
“war on drugs” took place in Manila. During this period, human rights groups made
the highest claim of the death toll published so far: 13,000 killed by August, 2017.755
At the time, the official Philippine National Police claim of the number of “drug
personalities who died in anti-drug operations” under the Duterte government was
3,811.756 Including an official count of deaths under investigation of possible vigilante
killings, a credible low estimate on the lower end is 7,080 fatalities.757 With around
7,000 to 13,000 killed during the Duterte government’s first 13 months in office, it
appears that Rodrigo Duterte’s tactic of extrajudicial killing in Davao City as mayor
has been scaled up to the national level.
Some features of the national “war on drugs” are familiar. There is Duterte
himself, who had publicly said that the government would employ lethal force against
suspected drug criminals on several occasions as candidate as well as president.758
The president’s threats resemble the radio and TV broadcasts that Duterte had aired as
mayor, forewarning spates of vigilante violence in Davao City. In 2003, as the Davao
755
"Thousands Demand End to Killings in Duterte's Drug War," Al Jazeera August 22,
2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/thousands-demand-killings-duterte-drug-war170821124440845.html. The reference to 13,000 from August 2017 remained unchanged
until the end of that year. However, unlike media monitoring sites that either reported specific
information on victim names (when available), time and location, the supporting basis for the
claim has not been made publicly available. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1003944/intl-localprofessors-verify-5000-deaths-in-ph-due-to-drug-war#Echobox=1529914664
756
From the period July 1, 2016 to August 29, 2017. Vera Files, "Vera Files Fact Check: PNP
Chief Dela Rosa Understates War on Drugs Figures," Vera Files September 5, 2017,
http://verafiles.org/articles/vera-files-fact-check-pnp-chief-dela-rosa-understates-war-dr.
757
Estimate for the period July 1, 2016 until January 31, 2017, based on official police
statistics. Michael Bueza, "In Numbers: The Philippines' "War on Drugs"," Rappler
December 12, 2016, http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/145814-numbers-statisticsphilippines-war-drugs.
758
Martin Petty and Karen Lema, "Expecting Policy Speech, Filipino Businessmen Hear
Duterte's Wartalk," Reuters, April 27, 2016. Phelim Kine, "The Philippines' Duterte Incites
Vigilante Violence," Human Rights Watch Dispatches April 19, 2017,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/19/philippines-duterte-incites-vigilante-violence.
203
City Death Squad began scaling up its operations, a few dozen self-professed drug
users and small time pushers gave themselves up to the city police out of fear for their
lives. Under the Duterte presidency, the national police reported over a million people
had “surrendered” or reported to police authorities in response to the anti-drug crime
campaign by the end of 2016.759 As in Davao City, the profile of victims is mainly
poor, young and male.760 Moreover, to bolster claims that the national “war on drugs”
is waged against only the guilty, violence has been targeted at those who had earlier
surrendered and confessed to crimes committed.761 As noted in the previous chapter,
victims in Davao City included newly released convicts from prison, individuals with
pending cases or those with a criminal record. However, despite superficial
similarities in appearance and scheme, the sheer magnitude of the violence—not to
mention the coerced surrender of over a million people to police authorities—reveals
that the violence under the Duterte presidency is something new and unprecedented.
From relatively low levels of violence during the preceding Aquino
government, the scale of the violence under President Duterte has shifted upwards.
Even if the comparison were narrowed to anti-drug crime campaigns, an average of
three people were killed a month under the previous government.762 In the first six
759
Leila Salaverria, "More Than 1 Million Drug Users, Pushers Have Surrendered, Says
PNP," Philippine Daily Inquirer December 30, 2016,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/858077/more-than-1-million-drug-users-pushers-havesurrendered-says-palace.
760
"Philippines: Abusive 'Drug War' Targets Children," Human Rights Watch September 9,
2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/09/philippines-abusive-drug-war-targets-children.
Al Jazeera, "Children and Duterte's Drug War: Lessons from the Past," Rappler February 19,
2017, https://www.rappler.com/nation/161904-children-duterte-drug-war-lessons-past?
761
Jodesz Gavilan, "PNP Says Most Murder Victims Are Drug Personalities, Not Innocents,"
Rappler December 27, 2016, https://www.rappler.com/nation/156770-pnp-murder-victimswar-drugs. Amnesty International, "If You Are Poor, You Are Killed: Extrajudicial
Executions in the Philippines' War on Drugs," (London: Amnesty International, 2017), 20-25;
34-5.
762
Citing police records from the last six months of the Arroyo government to the entire
period of the second Aquino administration (January 2010 to June 2016), 256 were “killed in
action” over 78 months. Vino Lucero and Malou Mangahas, "Big Kill of Small Fry, Puny
204
months of President Duterte’s term in office, an estimated 1,000 people were killed
each month.763 Moreover, a Reuters investigative report of the national anti-drugs
campaign observed that lethal force was used in 97 percent of drug crime related,
shooting incidents involving the police in Metro Manila. 764 Most of the killings
occurred between midnight and 3 am, in raids and drive-by shootings.765 Many bodies
were simply found with hands or feet bound, heads wrapped in tape, and with a sign
reading “drug pusher ako, addict ako—huwag tularan” (I am a drug pusher, I am an
addict—do not end up like me).
The massive shift in the scale of these killings is only half the story: in a
remarkable contrast of political violence concentrations in the past, most of the
killings have occurred in urban rather than in rural areas. An estimated 39 percent of
those killed were in Metro Manila (National Capital Region) and 20 percent in nearby
Central Luzon (20%), 10 percent in the industrial zones of Southern Tagalog or
Calabarzon (10%) and 8 percent in the metropolitan area of Central Visayas (8%).766
Drugs Haul, Defies PNP Rules," Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism July 25,
2016, http://pcij.org/uncategorized/big-kill-of-small-fry-puny-drugs-haul-defies-pnp-rules/.
763
Author’s calculation using data from July 2016 to January 2017. See graph “Killed during
Police Operations vs Deaths under Investigation” in Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism, "PCIJ Findings: What's Flawed, Fuzzy with Drug War Numbers?," Philippine
Center for Investigative Journalism June 8, 2017, http://pcij.org/stories/pcij-findings-whatsflawed-fuzzy-with-drug-war-numbers/.
764
Clare Baldwin, Andrew Marshall, and Damir Sagolj, "Police Rack up an Almost Perfectly
Deadly Record in Philippine Drug War," Reuters December 5, 2016,
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/philippines-duterte-police/.
765
Yvonne Chua, "War on Drugs: What the Numbers Show," Vera Files October 8, 2016,
http://verafiles.org/articles/war-drugs-what-numbers-show.
766
ABS-CBN Investigative and Research Group, "Map, Charts: The Death Toll of the War on
Drugs," 2018, http://news.abs-cbn.com/specials/map-charts-the-death-toll-of-the-war-ondrugs.The count starts shortly before Duterte assumed office on July 1, 2016 likely due to
pronounced violence in several areas as soon as his victory in the presidential elections
became evident and continued until January 2018, without any indication of discontinuation.
The other two main media monitors of the government’s “war on drugs” statistics ceased
updating their counts: Philippine Daily Inquirer’s “The Kill List” on February 14, 2017; and,
Rappler’s “In Numbers, The Philippines’ War on Drugs” on January 31, 2017, with one
update for the period March 1 to April 23, 2017. Rappler Research Team, "Timeline: The
PNP's Use of the Term 'Deaths under Investigation'," Rappler March 31, 2017,
https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/165534-timeline-philippines-pnp-deaths-under-
205
Almost 80 percent of the violence occurred in these locations (See Appendix 10).
Specifically, fatalities were highest in the cities of Metro Manila and Cebu.767 The
rural-to-urban, periphery-to-center inversion of political violence based on the data in
this study surfaces when expressed as a ratio to the voting population. In Northern
Luzon, an estimated six victims per 100,000 from the 2001 to 2016 data across all
categories of political violence while under the Duterte presidency, the “drug war”
related fatalities is slightly higher at a ratio of seven to the population. In Central
Luzon, the violence was nine victims per 100,000 and is now 14. On the other hand,
in less densely populated, less urbanized areas, the violence is much lower now than
before. In Eastern Visayas, the ratio was 12 per 100,000 population and now is only
two to 100,000; in Southern Mindanao, the ratio was 26 per 100,000 and now is only
three per 100,000.768
At a meeting in Manila on August 12, 2017, President Duterte was reportedly
overheard telling Indonesian President Joko Widodo that he learned from the “Petrus”
killings during the authoritarian regime of former president Suharto.769 In 1983 and
1984, an estimated 2,000 or 3,000, perhaps as many as 10,000 killings, occurred in
Jakarta and other major cities in a clandestine anti-crime operation later known as
Petrus (a portmanteau from Penembak Misterius, or mysterious shootings).770 Over
these two years, state-sponsored death squads roamed the cities at night, targeting
investigation; "The Kill List," Inquirer.net July 7, 2016,
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/794598/kill-list-drugs-duterte.
767
Ronald Mendoza and Miann Banaag, "Epicenters of Fatalities in Drug War: Metro Manila,
Cebu Top List," Rappler December 19, 2016, https://www.rappler.com/thoughtleaders/155983-epicenters-fatalities-drug-campaign-december-2016.
768
Author’s calculations.
769
The story was related by Political, Legal and Security Affairs minister Wiranto, himself a
Suharto era general and army commander. Jakarta Post, "Duterte Inspired by 'Petrus'Wiranto," Philippine Daily Inquirer August 16, 2017,
http://globalnation.inquirer.net/159756/rodrigo-duterte-wiranto-petrus-mysterious-shootingspenembakan-soeharto-joko-widodo-extrajudicial-killings-war-on-drugs.
770
"Shooters in the Dark," Tempo Magazine 23, no. VIII,
https://papindo.wordpress.com/2008/02/08/soeharto-killings/.
206
criminals, gang members or ex-prisoners. The targets were removed from the scene to
maintain an image of order, usually taken to a quiet place and shot at close range, and
later staged in public areas as a spectacle for all to see that the targets had been truly
eliminated.
771
Reported crime, particularly cases of violent crime, dropped
significantly following the Petrus operation.772 President Suharto subsequently stated
in his 1989 biography that this campaign of mysterious shootings was meant as
“shock therapy” for the general public to appreciate the power of the state.773
Another comparison is with the “war on drugs” in 2003 in Thailand. Former
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra pursued a bloody anti-drug crime campaign that
resulted in an estimated 2,800 fatalities in the first three months.774 The police drew
up blacklists of suspected drug traffickers using information obtained from village
heads. Each province set targets for the number of arrests within the three-month
deadline. Police were incentivized with bonuses for arrests and threatened with
removal if targets were unmet. The cumulative death toll was publicly announced
daily, at an average of 30 deaths a day. A pattern emerged in the killings of a lone
gunman shooting the victims from a motorcycle—“the classic style of professional
hits.”775 At the height of the slayings, polls showed 60 to 90 percent public approval
and the extra-judicial killings might have continued regardless of investigations by the
National Human Rights Commission until the king intervened and put an end to it.776
771
Joshua Barker, "State of Fear: Controlling the Criminal Contagion in Suharto's New
Order," Indonesia 66, no. October 1998 (1998): 18.
772
"Shooters in the Dark".
773
Translated into English and quoted in "Suharto Authorized the Death Squads," TAPOL
Bulletin February 1989, 1.
774
"Thailand's 'War on Drugs'," Human Rights Watch March 12, 2008,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/03/12/thailands-war-drugs.
775
Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, Thaksin (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books,
2009), 160-62.
776
Ibid.166-67.
207
Like the Indonesian and Thai cases, President Duterte’s “war on drugs”
exemplifies the political use of a ‘social problem’ to justify violence. Unlike the
Philippine case however, neither Suharto nor Thaksin required these drastic anticrime campaigns as a foundation for their political dominance. The Petrus killings
may have been aimed at eliminating or subordinating organized crime.777 The Thai
crackdown on drugs was only one part of Thaksin’s populist politics of reform, which
was mainly oriented toward the economy.778
It is unlikely that an acute public emergency is the primary motivation for the
Philippine anti-drugs operation. The claims that Duterte has made about the
magnitude of drug crime incidence are spurious and omit the considerable decline in
illegal drug use since 2004. 779 Moreover, as this study shows, Duterte wielded
violence for political control in Davao City, for influence within Southern Mindanao
and for leverage against the center, or what he called “Imperial Manila”. As a new
president, the promise to use violence to curb crime was a principal element of his
approach to government. Davao City is the template. Duterte’s aim is to consolidate a
stronghold in national politics, with a strategic interest in subordinating other centers
of coercive force, including in illicit trade, and a particularistic interest in quickly
enlarging the projection of his power from his bailiwick in the south. A thousand
murders a month was the shock therapy needed to condition the populace to a new
kind of politics.
Yet the logistics of killing thousands of young men and boys would be a
complex endeavor. Sheila Coronel argues that this was possible only because the
777
Barker, 28-29.
Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand (Copenhagen:
NIAS Press, 2005), 226-38.
779
Lucero and Mangahas. See also Manuel Quezon, "Opinion: Lies, Damned Lies, and Drug
Statistics," ABS-CBN News October 5, 2016, http://news.abscbn.com/blogs/opinions/10/04/16/opinion-lies-damned-lies-and-drug-statistics.
778
208
national police was a “ready, willing and able killing machine”. She argues that
Duterte’s drug war was enabled by existing forms of routine police corruption780 A
Human Rights Watch investigation documented many cases in which the police killed
alleged drug criminals, and then later staged the crime scene with planted weapons,
spent ammunition and small quantities of prohibited substances to falsely claim selfdefense.781 In the three decades since the overthrow of Marcos, politicians have been
reliant on illegal gambling syndicates for campaign finances. The national police
fused legitimate force with corrupt control over the illicit economy and routinized
brutality as an extension of presidential power.782
The “war on drugs” also reverses the reliance of regional and provincial police
directors on local elected officials for resources and appointments. The president is
appointing “trusted” representatives to key positions throughout the country and is
strengthening their incentives to follow the chain of command, beginning with the top
police officials at the national headquarters.783 The subordination of local officials to
central power is exemplified by highly public attacks against municipal mayors
accused of being petty drug lords. Barely over a month into his presidency Duterte
began brandishing a list of local officials, judges and police officers, who he claimed
to be drug lords or protectors of crime lords.784 The process of determining the list has
been opaque and the contents of the lists are not fully public. Some high-profile
780
Sheila Coronel, "Murder as Enterprise: Police Profiteering in Duterte's War on Drugs," in
A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo Duterte's Early Presidency, ed. Nicole Curato
(Quezon City: Atenedo de Manila University Press, 2017), 169.
781
"License to Kill: Philippine Police Killings in Duterte's War on Drugs," (New York:
Human Rights Watch, 2017), 38-41.
782
McCoy, Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the
Surveillance State, 533-34.
783
Kreuzer, ""If They Resist, Kill Them All": Police Vigilantism in the Philippines," 20.
784
"The Duterte List: Judges, Mayors, Police Officials Linked to Drugs," Rappler August 8,
2016, https://www.rappler.com/nation/142210-duterte-list-lgu-police-officials-linked-drugs.
Pia Ranada, "Duterte to Mayors on 'Final' Drug List: Resign or Die," Rappler January 10,
2017, https://www.rappler.com/nation/157815-duterte-threat-mayors-final-drug-list.
209
violence of targets on this list include a Maguindanao mayor killed in a shootout at a
police checkpoint in October 2016, a Leyte province municipal mayor shot dead
while in police detention a week later, and a Mizamis Oriental mayor massacred with
14 members of his family in a police raid of his home in July 2017.785 Another
scheme of centralization is manifested in police intelligence bypassing provincial and
municipal officials to generate lists of purported drug offenders directly from
barangay or village leaders.786
An Amnesty International investigation and anonymous police sources have
claimed that the police national headquarters provides cash incentives for drug war
murders under the table. Around PhP 8,000 (US$160) to PhP 15,000 (US$300) for
drug pushers, rapists, pickpockets, gang members, alcoholics, “and other
troublemakers” is paid per head, and distributed throughout the local police unit.787
The payment per individual killed may have been a key mechanism driving the high
number of murders. When the police involvement in the kidnapping and murder of a
South Korean businessman in January 2017 was publicly exposed, the president
temporarily suspended the “war on drugs”—and the violence turned off like water
from a tap—indicating central control and direction.788 The scale of the killing and
evidence of police involvement have sparked fears that the Philippine National Police
785
"Albuera Mayor Espinosa Killed in Jail Operation," Rappler November 5, 2016,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/151353-albuera-mayor-rolando-espinosa-killed-jail. Katerina
Francisco and Jodesz Gavilan, "Timeline: Parojinog, from Duterte's Narco List to a Bloody
Raid," Rappler August 1, 2017, https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/177238-timelineparojinog-ozamiz-duterte-drug-list-ozamiz-raid.
786
Jayson Lamcheck, "A Mandate for Mass Killings? Public Support for Duterte's War on
Drugs," in A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo Duterte's Early Presidency, ed.
Nicole Curato (Quezon City: Atenedo de Manila University Press, 2017), 210-13.
787
See also Amnesty International, 29-30. Manuel Mogato and Clare Baldwin, "Special
Report: Police Describe Kill Rewards, Staged Crime Scene in Duterte's Drug War," Reuters
April 18, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-duterte-policespecialrep/special-report-police-describe-kill-rewards-staged-crime-scenes-in-dutertes-drugwar-idUSKBN17K1F4.
788
Avendano and Cabreza., “Aquino on New Mining EO”.
210
has become the president’s personal killers and that extrajudicial killing has been
institutionalized.
However, paying attention to the central-local dynamics of the violence
reveals that while the government may be projecting a strong, centralized state,
authoritarian consolidation is not a fait accompli. First of all, while the police as an
institution has been mobilized and the violence is widespread, it should be recalled
that the great concentration of violence is in a few densely populated, urban areas.
Kreuzer also observes that there is significant variation between regions with regard
to the share of the violence committed in on-duty police shootings and those
attributed to unidentified vigilantes. He argues that in areas where the level of police
violence is high, like Central Luzon, the violence is likely to be under police control.
On the other hand, where violence is mostly attributed to vigilantes like the Ilocos and
Cagayan regions in Northern Luzon, local elites may be tolerating or even supporting
vigilante violence. 789 He notes that the provincial police chief and the elected
governor of Bulacan province are Duterte allies, possibly explaining the heightened
scale of police killings there. In contrast, the Tarlac provincial governor and
congressional representative are aligned with a rival national party, allowing the
police director to “drag his feet with respect to the new policy”.790
Even in areas where the police are suspected of being responsible for lethal
violence during police operations as well as masked vigilantism, much of the violence
can be attributed to only specific police precincts.791 During the height of the lethal
violence from July 2016 to January 2017, the officers who formed the core of the
789
Kreuzer, ""If They Resist, Kill Them All": Police Vigilantism in the Philippines," 11.
Ibid.18-19.
791
Investigative journalists reported this finding after examining police records from July 1,
2016 to January 1, 2017 in Quezon City. Patricia Evangelista, "This Is Where They Do Not
Die," Rappler November 25, 2017,
https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/investigative/188904-impunity-series-police-killingsquezon-city-ejk.
790
211
anti-drug unit in one such precinct, Batasan Station 6 in Quezon City, were from or
near Davao City. According to a Reuters investigative report, six officers were
transferred to Quezon City from Southern Mindanao when Duterte assumed the
presidency. 792 They called themselves the “Davao Boys”, spoke Visayan and
remained aloof from rest of the precinct and local community. According to the
report, police precinct records show that the group was involved in a majority of the
lethal drug crime-related shootings. After 13 months, the unit leader was promoted to
the elite Criminal Investigation and Detection Group reporting directly to National
Police chief Ronald dela Rosa – the highest-ranking “Davao Boy”.793
The national deployment of police officers with experience in Davao City and
nearby underscores how the Philippine “war on drugs” might actually rely upon a
small group of people. The police may have also “outsourced” the violence to paid
assassins, a practice allegedly employed in the past by the Davao City Death
Squad.794 Rather than a total instrumentalization of the national police as an entire
institution, top to bottom, these methods also indicate an intention to exaggerate the
breadth and scope of this “war”, as part of Duterte’s shock tactics.
792
Clare Baldwin and Andrew Marshall, "Special Report: How a Secretive Police Squad
Racked up Kills in Duterte's Drug War," Reuters December 19, 2017,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-drugs-squad/special-report-how-a-secretivepolice-squad-racked-up-kills-in-dutertes-drug-war-idUSKBN1ED1KZ.
793
National police chief dela Rosa was Davao City police chief from 2012 to 2013, and held
several senior postings in Southern Mindanao provinces of Compostela Valley and Davao del
Sur. Bea Cupin, "Duterte's 'Bato': Who Is Ronald Dela Rosa?," Rappler May 19, 2016,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/133519-ronald-dela-rosa-duterte-pnp-chief.
794
Coronel, "Murder as Enterprise: Police Profiteering in Duterte's War on Drugs," 175. Also
Jonathan Head, "Philippines Drugs War: The Woman Who Kills Dealers for a Living," BBC
August 26, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-37172002.
212
War on Drugs, War on Democracy
The Duterte government deploys violence for political control, not against
illegal drugs. The rhetoric on eradicating drug crime is but a fig leaf. The
government’s narrative goes like this: its campaign against illegal drugs is anti-crime
and targets people who are most probably criminals. Therefore, they argue that this
“war” is legitimate, it is a top national priority, it makes society safer, and it is
progress from previous governments’ ineptitude.
The president has mobilized the country’s security apparatus to make state
power immediate to the population. Because suspicion is based on lists of offenders
that provided by neighborhood and village officials, the threat of violence is personal.
With the nightly killings, people are habituated to an excessive use of state force and
supposed vigilantism. At the top, the efficacy of a purported anti-drugs campaign has
been effective in neutralizing opposition. Most notably, Duterte and his allies tarred
his most vocal critic in the senate, Leila de Lima, with the same brush of suspected
drug-related crime.795
This purported anti-crime campaign must thus be understood alongside
Duterte’s attempts to consolidate political control. In the first 18 months of
government, the president has imposed a state of national emergency since September
2016 and placed a third of the country under martial law. Duterte has even tried to
sweeten the memory of dictatorship via the rehabilitation of the legacy of Ferdinand
Marcos.
Yet the most instructive comparison is with former president Gloria Arroyo,
who was in office from 2001 to 2010. Fending off impeachment proceedings for
electoral fraud, Arroyo employed repression, including the use of violence, against
795
"Senator Leila De Lima Arrested," Rappler February 24, 2017,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/161278-leila-de-lima-surrender-drug-charges.
213
dissidents and activists. When Arroyo attempted to suspend civil liberties, opposition
coalesced quickly such that she could only declare a state of national emergency over
a 10-day period in 2006, and in a restricted area, Maguindanao, in 2009. In contrast,
Duterte has victimized thousands of mainly young, urban poor, imposed martial law
in Mindanao and has kept the entire country under a state of national emergency since
his second month in office.
Duterte's repertoire of political violence is unprecedented. Yet his use of a
violent anti-crime campaign as a pretext for total control is an unmistakable refrain
from his time as mayor of Davao City. The national “war on drugs” is a campaign of
state terror. Its strategic purpose is not to combat the drug trade but rather to control
the population and contain dissent. Compared to the Marcos dictatorship, the Duterte
regime needs to maintain the façade of democracy—for now. Building directly on his
long experience in Davao City, he has learnt from Arroyo’s example not to launch a
frontal assault but instead attack Philippine democracy’s vulnerable flank: crime and
corruption.
214
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"CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2774 Re: Enforced Disappearance of Rogelio
Concepcion." Commission on Human Rights, March 28, 2007.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2779 Re: Enforced Disappearance of Emerito Lipio."
Commission on Human Rights, March 16, 2011.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2780 Re: Tirso M. Cruz (Extra-Legal Killing)."
Commission on Human Rights, January 19, 2009.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2789 Re: Orlando M. Rivera." Commission on Human
Rights, April 27, 2007.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2807 Re: Enforced Disappearance of Eddie Pornellos
and Junior Pornellos." Commission on Human Rights, April 17, 2012.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-06-2816 Re: Abduction and Enforced Disappearance of
Domingo Guinto, Avelino Interior and Virgilio Tranquilino." Commission on Human
Rights, August 7, 2007.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-07-2881 Re: Myra Joson Valdez, Complainant, Versus
Rudy Mendoza et. al. Respondent." Commission on Human Rights, April 27, 2007.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: III-C-07-2926 Re: Antonio D. Adriales." Commission on Human
Rights, July 31, 2008.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: III-Lo-05-2676 Re: Ricardo S. Ramos." Commission on Human
Rights, June 21, 2009.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: III-W-06-2778 Re: Enforced Disappearance of Sherilyn
Cadapan, et. al.". Commission on Human Rights, March 6, 2007.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-05-02 Re: Jose A. Ducalang." Commission on Human
Rights, January 4, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-05-36 Re: Constancio Calubid, Ismael Solayao."
Commission on Human Rights, September 1, 2005.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-06-04 Re: Renato Dizon et. al." Commission on Human
Rights, March 20, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-06-12 Re: Noel Labong, Levi Labong." Commission on
Human Rights, June 9, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-06-48 Re: Norman Bocar." Commission on Human Rights,
March 26, 2007.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-06-53 Re: Eddie R. Albay." Commission on Human Rights,
April 4, 2007.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-24 Re: Dominador De Luna." Commission on Human
Rights, November 7, 2007.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-25 Re: Augusto Daclitan." Commission on Human
Rights, August 16, 2007.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-27 Re: Charlie Solayao." Commission on Human Rights,
October 16, 2007.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-28 Re: Rogelio B. Picoy." Commission on Human
Rights, September 28, 2007.
223
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-32 Re: Feliciano Labrador et. al.". Commission on
Human Rights, August 10, 2007.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-41 Re: Vivincio L. Ellantos." Commission on Human
Rights, October 8, 2008.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-44 Re: Bonifacio Dunghit." Commission on Human
Rights, February 22, 2008.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-47 Re: Alipio Tagle." Commission on Human Rights,
November 5, 2007.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-07-54 Re: Elizabeth M. Gutierrez." Commission on Human
Rights, January 2, 2008.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0074 Re: The Killing of Sgt. Reynaldo Bantayan."
Commission on Human Rights, April 29, 2008.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0075 Re: Pepe Legria." Commission on Human
Rights, April 9, 2008.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0079 Re: Alberto Calzado, Sr.". Commission on
Human Rights, February 14, 2008.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0080 Re: Rufino G. Silla and Rufa Joy S. Silla."
Commission on Human Rights, March 13, 2008.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-81 Re: Felomino G. Catambis." Commission on
Human Rights, April 29, 2008.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0087 Re: Celestino P. Almerino." Commission on
Human Rights, May 14, 2008.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0111 Re: Leopoldo Fernando." Commission on
Human Rights, July 18, 2011.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0115 Re: Rafael Papiona, Arnuldo Mabesa and
Romeo Vencio." Commission on Human Rights, March 3, 2009.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0119 Re: Oscar Laboc." Commission on Human
Rights, January 23, 2009.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0121 Re: Rogelio Dacutanan." Commission on
Human Rights, January 12, 2009.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0122 Re: Jonathan T. Dacutanan." Commission on
Human Rights, December 24, 2008.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0123 and Final Report Re: Noel Versoza Alias Twin
and Boranting." Commission on Human Rights, March 23, 2009.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0124 Re: Lindon Pacon "A.K.A. Boranting"."
Commission on Human Rights, May 20, 2009.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0126 Re: Roberto A. Cabaljo." Commission on
Human Rights, January 12, 2010.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0139 Re: Noe Pagarao." Commission on Human
Rights, November 7, 2008.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0140 Re: Ernesto General." Commission on Human
Rights, April 28, 2009.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0168 Re: Arturo Gabiana." Commission on Human
Rights, October 7, 2009.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0170 Re: Pedro Dacles." Commission on Human
Rights, September 15, 2009.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2008-0174 Re: Generoso Labong." Commission on Human
Rights, October 12, 2009.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0002 Re: Guilermo Robin." Commission on Human
Rights, January 23, 2009.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0324 Re: The Killing of Rev. Fr. Cecilio P. Lucero."
Commission on Human Rights, October 19, 2009.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0446 Re: Michael Oñate." Commission on Human
Rights, August 19, 2011.
224
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0447 Re: Arturo Pasacas." Commission on Human
Rights, September 13, 2011.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0448 Re: The Killing of Manuel A. Daza."
Commission on Human Rights, August 12, 2010.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2009-0489 Re: Romulo Mendova." Commission on Human
Rights, November 4, 2009.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2010-0011 Re: Dr. Bartolome M. Resuello." Commission
on Human Rights, April 22, 2010.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2010-0027 Re: The Alleged Killing of Jojo Basiloy and
Jerwin Marino." Commission on Human Rights, September 27, 2010.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2010-0135 Re: Domingo De La Cruz, Junie De La Cruz and
Mylene De La Cruz." Commission on Human Rights, May 4, 2010.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2010-0307 Re: Geronimo E. Tan." Commission on Human
Rights, September 17, 2011.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2011-0233 Re: Reynaldo S. Uy." Commission on Human
Rights, September 27, 2010.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-2011-0318 Re: Sonny Boy Dacles." Commission on Human
Rights, December 28, 2011.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII- 2010-0144 Re: Caesar Y. Vicencio." Commission on
Human Rights, May 12, 2010.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-DO-07-001 Re: Extra-Judicial Killing of Jose Maria Cui."
Commission on Human Rights, March 19, 2007.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-DO-07-011 Re: Manuel Pajarito, Juliet Fernandez."
Commission on Human Rights, February 19, 2008.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: VIII-DO-07-59 Re: Sgt. Jose Baccol." Commission on Human
Rights, December 28, 2007.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2290dc, Case No.: XI-04-2297dc Re: Death of Allen
Tecson." Commission on Human Rights, June 9, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2298dc Re: Death of George Albores." Commission on
Human Rights, October 11, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2308dc Re: Death of Abraham Aquino." Commission on
Human Rights, February 9, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2321dc Re: Death of Johnny "Jack-Jack" Moñeza."
Commission on Human Rights, October 17, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-04-2322dc Re: Death of Zandro Bajala." Commission on
Human Rights, August 11, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2388dc Re: Case of Risalito Abellana." Commission on
Human Rights, August 30, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2389dc Re: Death of Alacel Jumat A.K.A. "Robot"."
Commission on Human Rights, August 30, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2390dc Re: Case of Jason Dela Cerna." Commission on
Human Rights, September 8, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2394dc Re: Death of Leo Baogbog." Commission on
Human Rights, January 27, 2007.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2396dc Re: Case of Glen Mulle." Commission on Human
Rights, September 15, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2397dc Re: Death of Hilario C. Ortega." Commission on
Human Rights, November 8, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2398dc Re: Death of Reynaldo Adolfo." Commission on
Human Rights, November 20, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2400dc Re: Death of Intong Gonzales Alias "Pasmo" Tn:
Roberto Gonzales." Commission on Human Rights, September 28, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2401dc Re: Case of Dante Galarce." Commission on
Human Rights, September 20, 2006.
225
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2403dc Re: Death of Ruel Andia." Commission on
Human Rights, August 28, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2404dc Re: Death of Cesarlito A. Tagod." Commission on
Human Rights, September 22, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2405dc Re: Case of Tata "Hudas" Toco/Charwin Tuco
(Tn)." Commission on Human Rights, August 3, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2413dc Re: Death of Joel Castro." Commission on Human
Rights, August 29, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2458dc Re: Death of Richard Padua." Commission on
Human Rights, August 31, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2491dc Re: Death of Julius Antido." Commission on
Human Rights, November 28, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2613dc Re: Abduction of Lowell Labajo." Commission on
Human Rights, September 2, 2005.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-05-2641dc Re: Death of Romeo Hingcuy." Commission on
Human Rights, February 28, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2715dc Re: Case of Andrew Mendez and Rexol Cabras."
Commission on Human Rights, April 12, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2718dn Re: Death of Rey Lumiguid." Commission on
Human Rights, September 4, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2735dn Re: Case of Jomar Escobar." Commission on
Human Rights, August 8, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2744dn Re: Death of Noel Omos." Commission on
Human Rights, August 23, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2764dc Re: Case of Boyet Abella." Commission on
Human Rights, November 26, 2007.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2767dn Re: Death of Bernardo Chan." Commission on
Human Rights, August 28, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2778dn Re: Case of Jessie Opalla." Commission on
Human Rights, June 16, 2008.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2779dn Re: Death of Enrique Catito." Commission on
Human Rights, September 7, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2781dc Re:Death of Maturan, Ramil." Commission on
Human Rights, June 5, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2787dc Re: Death of Sasam Manuel." Commission on
Human Rights, June 29, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2805dn Re: Death of Armando Pawakil." Commission on
Human Rights, October 31, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2807dn Re: Death Gumila, Alejandro Tn: Alejandro Palin
Gumela." Commission on Human Rights, September 28, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2808dn Re: Case of Ronnie Aquino." Commission on
Human Rights, August 31, 2006.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-06-2882 Ds Re: Death of Racasa, Ronel." Commission on
Human Rights, June 30, 2008.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-07-2946 Ds Re: Death of Renato "Atong" Torrecampo
Pacaide." Commission on Human Rights, August 13, 2008.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-07-2983dc Re: Death of Julius Gumba." Commission on
Human Rights, June 10, 2008.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-07-2984dc Re: Death of Godofredo Guritan." Commission on
Human Rights, December 22, 2007.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-2008-3017dc Re: Case of Pacana, Jorie." Commission on
Human Rights, July 7, 2008.
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-2008-3019 DO Re: Death of Elvis Española." Commission on
Human Rights, July 10, 2008.
226
"CHR Resolution Case No.: XI-2008-3041dc Re: Death of Celso Pojas." Commission on
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Private Armies and Guerrilla Fronts
Region
Number of Local Private
Armed Groups
0
Number of Insurgent
Guerrilla Fronts
0
5
4
4
0
- Cagayan Valley
Central Luzon
Calabarzon
Southern
Tagalog/Mimaropa
Bicol
Western Visayas
Central Visayas
Eastern Visayas
Western Mindanao
4
3
7
4
2
11
8
6
8
1
2
2
0
11
13
6
7
2, no data on MNLF/MILF
high insurgency intensity*
Northern Mindanao
0
3, no data on MNLF/MILF
medium insurgency
intensity*
Southern Mindanao
Sockskargen
0
4
11
3, no data on MNLF/MILF
high insurgency intensity*
Caraga
Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao
0
41
5
No data;
high insurgency intensity*
National Capital Region
Northern Luzon
- Cordillera Autonomous
Region
- Ilocos
Sources: Local private armies: Mendoza, Gemma. "85 Armed Groups Maintained
by Politicians-PNP." Rappler (2012). (accessed November 27, 2014).
Number of Insurgent Guerrilla Fronts: "The Strategic and Tactical
Activities of CPP-NPA-NDF in the White Areas." Knowledge Management
Division, Office of the Presidential Adviser for Special Concerns, 2003.
*Alternate source based on number of armed encounters between government
and insurgents: Bautista, Cynthia. Ideologically-motivated Conflicts in the
Philippines: A Background Paper submitted to the Human Development
Network Foundation for the Philippine Human Development Report 2005.
Diliman, Quezon City: Human Development Network, 2005.
253
Appendix 2. Political Violence by Region and Pattern
2001 to 2016
Regional
Group
Total
Victims
Insurgencyrelated
Electionsrelated
Wealth
controlrelated
Social
controlrelated
Unknown
Northern
Luzon
Eastern
Visayas
Central
Luzon
Southern
Mindanao
Totals
327
149
137
11
18
12
323
224
48
9
40
2
541
325
67
58
76
15
699
386
29
43
227
14
1890
1084
281
121
361
43
254
Appendix 3. Political Violence by Type of Incident
2001 to 2016
Type of Incident
Total
1651
Northern
Luzon
299
Eastern
Visayas
274
Central
Luzon
440
Southern
Mindanao
638
Killing
Forced
Disappearance
108
4
30
54
20
Attempted Killing
80
20
12
21
27
Rape/Torture
51
4
7
26
14
Total
1890
327
323
541
699
255
Appendix 4. Political Violence by Target
2001 to 2016
Target
Total
561
Northern
Luzon
34
Eastern
Visayas
86
Central
Luzon
133
Southern
Mindanao
308
Civilians w/ no
known political
affiliation
Military/Police
373
81
97
36
159
Insurgents
354
48
29
172
105
Local Officials
336
128
59
96
53
Activists
216
30
48
85
53
Journalists
27
6
2
8
11
Others/Unknown
23
0
2
11
10
Total
1890
327
323
541
699
256
Appendix 5. Political Violence by Known or Suspected Aggressor
Percentage share (%), 2001 to 2016
Aggressor
All
Regions
32%
25%
14%
9%
9%
7%
Military
Insurgent
Unknown
Vigilante
Local official
Police
Private armed
group/assassin
Civilian
Totals
Aggressor
Military
Insurgent
Unknown
Vigilante
Local official
Police
Private armed
group/assassin
Civilian
Totals
Aggressor
Military
Insurgent
Unknown
Vigilante
Local official
Police
Private armed
group/assassin
Civilian
Totals
4%
1%
100%
Northern
Luzon
23%
25%
15%
0%
21%
6%
Aggressor
Military
Insurgent
Unknown
Vigilante
Local official
Police
Private armed
group/assassin
Civilian
Totals
10%
0%
100%
Eastern
Visayas
35%
39%
7%
1%
7%
7%
Aggressor
Military
Insurgent
Unknown
Vigilante
Local official
Police
Private armed
group/assassin
Civilian
Totals
5%
0%
100%
257
Central
Luzon
45%
12%
15%
6%
9%
9%
2%
2%
100%
Southern
Mindanao
24%
29%
15%
20%
4%
5%
2%
0%
100%
Appendix 6. Political Violence in Northern Luzon
2001 to 2016
Year
Insurgency
related
10
17
14
1
28
17
5
2
1
2
12
13
3
11
7
6
Election
related
15
4
8
17
9
9
20
9
1
15
0
7
8
8
1
6
Other
patterns
2
0
2
3
3
4
0
2
2
1
1
5
1
3
0
0
Unknown
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Annual
Total
27
21
25
22
42
30
28
13
4
18
13
26
13
25
8
12
Total
327
149
137
29
12
0
0
1
1
2
0
3
0
0
0
0
1
1
3
0
0
Insurgency-related Violence Only, in Northern Luzon, by Administrative Region
Annual Total
Year
Cordilleras
Ilocos
Cagayan
2001
10
0
5
5
2002
17
0
7
10
2003
14
10
4
0
2004
1
0
0
1
2005
28
9
11
8
2006
17
3
5
9
2007
5
1
1
3
2008
2
2
0
0
2009
1
0
0
1
2010
2
0
0
2
2011
12
11
0
1
2012
13
11
0
2
2013
3
2
0
1
2014
11
11
0
0
2015
7
2
5
0
2016
6
0
0
6
Total
149
62
38
Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly
disappeared, tortured or raped
258
49
Appendix 7. Political Violence in Eastern Visayas
2001 to 2016
Year
Insurgency
related
11
14
28
2
45
20
36
15
12
29
3
8
0
1
0
0
Election
related
14
3
0
6
0
1
10
0
7
0
1
0
4
1
0
1
Other
patterns
2
6
3
9
5
1
6
3
2
5
3
3
0
0
1
0
Unknown
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Annual
Total
27
23
31
17
50
22
52
18
21
34
7
11
5
3
1
1
Total
323
224
48
49
2
Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly
disappeared, tortured or raped
259
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
Appendix 8. Political Violence in Central Luzon
2001 to 2016
Year
Annual
Total
Election
related
Wealth
Control
Social
Control
Unknown
42
45
86
29
88
96
20
20
20
29
30
12
3
4
8
9
Insurgency
related
16
30
73
17
64
70
6
7
13
10
17
2
0
0
0
0
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
3
4
8
3
1
15
10
4
1
3
0
7
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
9
18
2
1
6
1
10
1
1
0
1
5
0
22
10
3
0
4
3
3
2
4
5
11
1
0
0
0
8
0
0
1
0
1
6
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
Total
541
325
67
58
76
15
Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly
disappeared, tortured or raped
260
Appendix 9. Political Violence in Southern Mindanao
2001 to 2016
Year
Annual
Total
Insurgency
related
Election
related
Davao
City DDS
(Author’s
data)
Davao City
DDS
(CASE
data**)
1998
--
--
--
---
--
2
1999
--
--
--
--
--
--
16
2000
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
11
2001
70
53
0
1
16
0
16
29
2002
45
29
1
3
12
0
1
59
2003
96
72
1
1
22
0
19
98
2004
65
33
5
1
25
1
23
107
2005
70
28
1
5
33
3
33
154
2006
49
15
1
6
25
2
14
65
2007
30
11
4
2
11
2
7
116
2008
45
28
2
14
1
14
180
2009
49
17
2
3
26
1
22
100
2010
40
26
9
0
5
0
3
101
2011
34
12
4
16
2
2
111
2012
16
7
1
3
4
1
0
61
2013
13
4
1
4
4
0
1
101
2014
39
34
2
3
0
0
0
53
2015
30
16
0
2
11
1
10
60
2016
8
1
1
3
3
0
2
--
Total
699
386
29
43
227*
14
167
1,424
Wealth
Control
--
Social
Control
Unknown
--
Source: Author’s data; number of people killed, attempted killed, forcibly
disappeared, tortured or raped
* Includes 167 in Davao City and 28 in Tagum City
** Coalition Against Summary Executions (CASE).
261
Appendix 10. Fatalities in “War on Drugs”
May 10, 2016 to 31 December 2017
REGION
National Capital Region (Metro Manila)
Northern Luzon
• Cordillera Autonomous Region
• Ilocos Region (R1)
• Cagayan Valley (R2)
Central Luzon (R3)
Calabarzon (R4 A)
MIMAROPA (R4 B)
Bicol Region (R 5)
Western Visayas (R6)
Central Visayas (R7)
Eastern Visayas (R8)
Zamboanga Region (R9)
Northern Mindanao (R10)
Southern Mindanao/
Davao Region (R11)
Socccsksargen (R12)
Caraga (R13)
ARMM
Negros Island Region
TOTAL
Source: ABS-CBN
262
Number Killed
1665
Percentage
39%
43
204
129
861
432
7
112
41
364
49
51
54
1%
5%
3%
20%
10%
0%
3%
1%
8%
1%
1%
1%
85
89
67
19
52
4324
2%
2%
2%
0%
1%