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CONSTI-2-MT-CASES

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
MIDTERM CASES NOTES
PART 2: POLICE POWER
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS VS. DRILON

CONCEPT OF POLICE POWER.
o The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction.
o It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare."

"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate
the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."

It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most
vital functions of governance.

What are the two elements of police power according to PASEI vs. Drilon?
o 1. Imposing a restraint on the use of liberty or property
o 2. In order to foster common good

It is dynamic. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled
in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

It may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.

Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that
is, to advance the public good.
o Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of
the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power.
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ

POLICE POWER; NATURE AND SCOPE.
o Police power is far-reaching in scope, and it is almost impossible to limit its
sweep.

It is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the
most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential,
insistent, and illimitable.

The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.

Police power covers all persons and all imaginable activities from womb to tomb
and anything in between.

The SC said in Ichong vs. Hernandez that the conflict between in the exercise of
police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection is more
apparent than real.
o They supposed to co-exist.

How can the courts maintain peaceful coexistence of these two-conflicting
interest?
o Balancing is the essence.
o There can be no absolute power whoever is exercising it, it would be tyranny
and yet there would be no absolute liberty because it would result to
anarchy.
LUTZ VS. ARANETA

POWER OF TAXATION MAY BE USED AS AN IMPLEMENT OF POLICE
POWER.
o Analysis of the Act, and particularly of section 6 (heretofore quoted in full),
will show that the tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means
for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry.
o In other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the police power.

The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that sugar production is one of the
great industries of our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its export
products;
o that it gives employment to thousands of laborers in fields and factories;
o that it is a great source of the state's wealth, is one of the important sources
of foreign exchange needed by our government, and is thus pivotal in the
plans of a regime committed to a policy of currency stability.

Its promotion, protection, and advancement, therefore, redounds
greatly to the general welfare.

Once it is conceded, as it must, that the protection and promotion of the sugar
industry is a matter of public concern, it follows that the Legislature may determine
within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its
promotion.

If objective and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the
state may not be levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment.
o Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police power.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
REFORM

POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN MAY BE USED AS AN IMPLEMENT OF
POLICE POWER.

Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose,
o such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for
the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the
interest of public morals.

The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property
under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation
to the owner.

"The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."

Recent trends would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power
and the power of eminent domain, with the latter being used as an implement of
the former like the power of taxation.
o The employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose has long
been accepted.

Eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of private property for
improvements that would be available for "public use," literally construed.

To the police power, on the other hand, they assigned the less intrusive task of
preventing harmful externalities, a point reflected in the Euclid opinion's reliance
on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support of zoning.
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK VS. DSWD

The case involves the senior citizen discount.

Prior to its amendment, all discounts intended to senior citizens may be reimbursed
by the establishments as tax credit which means that whatever may be extended
can be recovered by the establishments, peso for peso centavo for centavo.

As tax credit if the establishment has extended say for example P10.00 discount
and the establishment needs to pay P100.00 as taxes, instead of paying P100.00
pesos, the P10.00 discount shall be deducted from the tax due which means that
the establishment shall only be paying P90.00.

When the law was amended, the senior citizen discount was only treated as
deductible taxes, which means that the establishment cannot recover everything.
They can only recover up to extent of 32%.

Is there taking or regulation?
o Ans: Only regulation.

The discount extended to senior citizen, are not yet part of the profit
of the establishments. Since they are not part of the profit, they are
not yet properties of the establishments.

For example, Before the Senior Citizen Discount Law, the price of
one medicine is 10 pesos.

Once the law has been passed the establishment can sell the
medicine for 11 pesos.

Senior citizens can enjoy 1 percent 11, therefore there’s a way
to recover.

The purpose of the Senior Citizen Discount law is to regulate the
amount of profit the establishment can make.

Since there is no taking, there is no requirement for just
compensation.
PART 3: POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA

NECESSITY OF EXPROPRIATION IS A JUSTICEABLE QUESTION WHEN THE
POWER IS EXERCISED BY A DELEGATE.

Eminent domain originates from necessity.

Rules in controversies involving the necessity in the exercise of eminent
domain:
o 1. When the power of eminent domain is exercised directly by congress, the
question of necessity is a political question.
o 2. When the power of eminent domain is exercised by a delegate under a
specific delegation, the question of necessity is a political question.
o 3. When the power of eminent domain is exercised by a delegate under a
general delegation, the question of necessity is a justiciable controversy.

Rule in determining the extent of authority in the exercise of eminent
domain:
o According to the Supreme Court, it shall be construed liberally in favor of
the owner of the property and strictly construed against the expropriator.
o Any doubtful exercise of the eminent domain shall be strictly construed
against the expropriator.

“The exercise of the right of eminent domain is necessarily in derogation of private
rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No
species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity and none is guarded
by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of
inhabitants.” (City of Manila vs Chinese Community)
o When the legislature, in the exercise if its right for public purpose,
appropriates the land of the Filipino people without its consent the rule is
any doubtful interpretation cannot be expounded. Any doubt shall be
construed against the expropriator.

Properties that can be expropriated:
o 1. Tangible
o 2. Intangible
o 3. Real
o 4. Personal
o 5. Property devoted to public use

Properties devoted to Public Use can be expropriated.
o Case of city of Manila v Chinese Community, Supreme Court said that the
Chinese cemetery is a property already devoted to public use.
o Properties which are devoted to public use can no longer be taken by the
government in the exercise of power of eminent domain.
o When the power of eminent domain is exercised directly by congress, as
long as the property is private even if the property is devoted to public use
they can be further expropriated.
SUMULONG VS. GUERRERO

Does size matter?
o No.

In this case, the petitioner believes that the power of eminent domain may only be
exercised for large stocks of land because according to him his properties are only
less 2 hectares and there are hundreds of hectares in Antipolo which are available
and why is the government is interested in this small property.
o Only big proprieties can be expropriated, small properties cannot be
expropriated.

In the case of Sumulong vs Guerrero, the case of Guido vs. Rural Progress
Administration was cited. In Guido, the Supreme Court said that the conclusive
factor in determining proper exercise of the power of eminent domain is the size of
the property.

In Sumulong vs Guerrero, the Supreme Court abandoned the doctrine in Guido
from size of the property to number of beneficiaries.
o Primarily, there’s nothing in the constitution that limits the exercise of the
power of eminent domain.
o Secondly, according to the Supreme Court the government deals small
problems and is not limited in addressing big problems.

The government did not wait for a small problem to become a big problem before
it can act.
o The size of the property is not a determinative factor of beneficiary. If it will
benefit number then still be taken in the exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
o Size does not matter.
REPUBLIC VS. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO

In this case, there was an agreement between Bureau of Telecommunications and
PLDT in the interconnection of trap lines of PLDT. When the contract expired,
PLDT refused to renew it.

Can the government compel PLDT to renew the contract?
o Since the essential element of a contract is consent voluntarily given, the
party cannot be compelled to enter into a contract.
o When government cannot compel PLDT to renew the contract, the
government can compel PLDT to render the services through expropriation.
o As long as the service is for public use and there is a payment of just
compensation, it can be expropriated.

Services may be expropriated.
o Services that can be expropriated are public utilities services.

Taking in Eminent Domain.
o “Taking” in the eminent domain does not require transfer of possession or
transfer of ownership.
PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO

In this case, an ordinance was issued to preserve the viewing of public plaza.
o The ordinance imposes that any construction should not obstruct the view
of the public plaza.

Unfortunately, the property of the accused adjoins the plaza and he cannot
construct anything in his property that will not obstruct the view of the public plaza.

Taking or Mere Regulation
o Taking because it deprives the accused from all use of the property.
o In order to comply the ordinance, the accused must maintain the conditions
of his property because he cannot construct anything in his property that
will not obstruct the view of public plaza.

The Supreme Court said that it is an invalid exercise of police power, it could have
been property subject to the controversy that could be taken in eminent domain
but not in police power.
REPUBLIC VS. VDA. DE CASTELVI

5 Elements of “Taking” in Eminent Domain
o 1. The expropriator must enter a private property.
o 2. The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary
period.
o 3. The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority.
o 4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected.
o 5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

For there to be taking in eminent domain, all elements must be present.

In the case, dates of taking in eminent domain:
o July 1, 1947 - the first time the government entered into the property.
o July 1, 1956 - the owner refused to renew the contract, but the government
continue to stay in the property even after the decision of disagreement.
o June 26, 1959 - the government filed for expropriation.
o August 10, 1959 - the expropriation court issued a writ of possession to the
government.

Taking or no taking:
o July 1, 1947
o No taking, element number 2 and 5 are absent.
o In element number 1:

The entry to the property is not for more than momentary period. It is
only temporary. The government is only allowed for 1 year.

The Government argued:
o
The intention of the government is to stay in the proper indefinitely.
o
The intention can be determined when the government introduced
permanent improvements, and this shows that government intended to
stay.

The Supreme Court ruled:
o
Intent of the parties can only be determined from the expressed terms in the
contract because the contract is the law between contracting parties.

July 1, 1956 - No taking, element 3 is absent.
o
The entry was not under the warrant of legal authority.
o
The government has no right to stay in the property nor is entitled to stay
there.
o

The government was an intruder as of July 1, 1956.
June 26, 1959 - Taking.
o
All elements of taking is present in June 26 when the government filed for
expropriation proceedings.
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC

The Comelec issued a resolution which requires all newspaper publishers to give
a COMELEC space in the newspapers to be use for the announcement of the
names of the candidates of the department free of charge.

Was that a valid act?
o
No. To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec space" amounts
to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes.

Instead of police power, the court should’ve exercised the power of eminent
domain because there’s taking of the property and the property taken was a lawful
property therefore it is subject to just compensation, and the objective of taking is
for public use, the dissemination of information.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC. VS COMELEC

Same Comelec Resolution was challenged, and the media involved is radio and
television. In this case, all tv and radio are required to give COMELEC free air time.
The Supreme Court said valid.

In this case, the radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given
franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit
broadcast signals and images.
o
In TELEBAP, there’s no taking but mere regulation because the property
involved was not private property.

Public Use in Eminent Domain
o

SUMULONG VS GUERRERO
o

Public use means any direct or indirect public benefit or advantage.
in socialize housing indirect public advantage, housing is a basic necessity.
Land of housing is a social problem.
o
While constructing a socialized housing, the government is addressing a
social problem.
o

In that return, there is an indirect public advantage.
Direct public advantage.
o
Can only be enjoyed by beneficiaries.
MANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioner:
o
According to the petitioner, the expropriation of the property for the land
marker is only for the benefit of Iglesia ni Cristo and is not for public use in
eminent domain.

Supreme Court:
o
In determining the validity of the exercise of eminent domain in taking public
property for public use upon payment of just compensation, the
determinative factor is the objective of the taking and not the incidental
benefits that may be derive by INC.

Therefore, the main objective of taking of the property for the construction of the
marker to recognize the contribution of Manalo to the culture of the Philippines will
prevail.
o
“The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the
distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the
Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the
Iglesia ni Cristo.
o
The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such a peculiar
advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature.”
(Manosca v CA)
SUMULONG VS. GUERRERO

Estoppel is not applicable to eminent domain.
o
Estoppel is only an equitable principle, and the Constitutional mandate (Art.
3 Sec. 9) will prevail over the former.

The assessment values of the property for taxation purposes do not reflect the real
condition of the property taken because the assessment values are zonal values.
It is based on general characteristics.
o
Valuation is not dependent on peculiar circumstances of each property.

The court determines just compensation. It is a judicial function.

The duty to appoint commissioner is mandatory.
o
In all circumstances, the court must appoint not more than three
commissioners to recommend the amount of just compensation.
o
Any amount that may be fixed by the commissioners is subject to the
approval of the expropriation board.

The court can totally disregard the recommendations of the commissioners.
o
The appointment of commissioners is indispensable because presentation
of evidence to support just compensation is with the commissioners.

2 stages in expropriation proceedings:
o
1) the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit.
o
2) the determination by the Court of "the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken."
REPUBLIC VS. LIM

Prior to the ruling in Republic vs. Lim, the rule was,
o
“Non-payment of just compensation does no entitle the property owner to
recover physical possession”.
o
The only remedy of the owner is to demand the payment with penalties,
interests and supercharges.

Republic vs Lim supersedes the previous rule and ruled that the non-payment of
just compensation after 5 years, the government must return the property.
o
The wisdom is to give the government pressure in prompt payment of just
compensation.

Supposing the property of Mr. Juan dela Cruz was expropriated to construct an
expressway.
o

The government failed to pay within 5 years.
Supposing the value of the property prior to expropriation is 10M and the value of
the expressway is 10 Billion.

Mr. JDC wants to have the possession of his property including its improvement
as his argument is that Republic vs. Lim is the new rule.
o
The answer is that the ruling of SC in Republic vs. Lim is not the new rule.
It is an exception to the rule.
o
The rule remains that “non-payment of just compensation will not entitle the
property owner to recover physical possession.
o
The only remedy of the owner is to demand the payment of just
compensation together with damages, interests, and supercharges.

We apply Republic vs. Lim only when there is an expressed or implied
abandonment of the public use of the property.
o
If the government still pursued the public use, the property owner cannot
demand the return of the property.

Supposing the property of Mr. JDL was fully paid by the government, after 5 years
there was no expressway. Can Mr. JDL demand the return of his property as well
as the ownership of the property?
o
No more. The ownership is now transferred to the expropriator upon full
payment of just compensation.
PART 4: POWER OF TAXATION
SISON VS. ANCHETA

Equality is different from equity.
o
Uniformity is synonymous with equality in taxation, and these terms are
different from equity or equitable taxation.
o
Uniformity or equality in taxation means persons or things belonging to the
same class shall be taxed at the same rate wherever they may be found.

Equity in taxation means the burden of taxation is imposed upon those who are
able to pay.

Does the Constitution prohibit regressive system of taxation?
o
The answer is No.
o
There is no Constitutional provision prohibiting a regressive system of
taxation.
Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works

In taxation, public purpose must be direct and exclusive. Indirect public purpose is
not enough.

The subsequent donation of the property to the government after the approval of
the act did not cure the defect that said property is still a private property.

At the time of the appropriation of the funds, the purpose is not public. The
expropriation is already illegal and unconstitutional.
PART 5: DUE PROCESS
YNOT VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

The Supreme Court said the concept of due process is distilled in the immortal cry
of Themistocles to Alcibiades:
o “Strike but hear me first!”

The Supreme Court said that a person may be punished as long he’s given the
opportunity to be heard.

In that regard the SC laid down the minimum requirement of administrative due
process which are:
o (1) there must be a notice and
o (2) hearing for the defendant to be heard.

Notice and hearing are mandatory in administrative proceeding except in certain
circumstances like in administrative proceeding or administrative agencies
discharge administrative, executive, or quasi-legislative functions.
PEOPLE VS. CAYAT

REQUISITES OF EQUAL PROTECTION: It is an established principle of
constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not
violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.
o (1) Must rest on substantial distinctions.
o (2) Must be germane to the purposes of the law.
o (3) Must not be limited to existing conditions only.
o (4) Must apply equally to all members of the same class.
PHILPHOS VS. GOMEZ

The right to be heard as an essential element of administrative due process does
it require a trial type or adversarial proceeding in administrative proceeding?
o No, the right to be heard is only opportunity to be heard or to seek for
reconsideration to hear the other side, and on the given case the philphos
has given the opportunity to be heard because they have given a position
paper and they did not demand for retrial.

In admin proceedings the right to a hearing does not require an adversarial
proceeding it may be satisfied through filing a pleading (position paper).

Is the requirement of notice and hearing in administrative proceedings allowed?
o For quasi-judicial functions, notice and hearing are mandatory, and it is
specific.
o For admin agencies performing an administrative or quasi-legislative
functions, it is general and prospective;

thus, notice and hearing are not mandatory.
ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

The SC enumerated 7 cardinal primary rights in admin proceedings, and what
are these?
o 1. Right to hearing and the right of the party interest to present his own case,
o 2. Consider the evidence presented by the court,
o 3. The decision must support itself,
o 4. Evidence must be substantial,
o 5. Evidence is sufficient to support the conclusion (decision),
o 6. Tribunal rendered its decision based on the evidence presented at the
trial,
o 7. The tribunal must render its decision based on its independent
consideration in the facts of the law.
ALONTE VS. SAVELLANO JR.

Four Requisites of Criminal Due Process
o 1. That the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine matter before it,
o 2. That jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused,
o 3. That the accused is given the opportunity to be heard, and
o 4. That judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
ANIAG VS. COMELEC

What is the effect or consequence of the violation of due process?

IF SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT IS VIOLATED,
o the law itself would be unconstitutional.

IF PROCEDURAL ASPECT,
o only the process or steps will be declared illegal, but the law remains valid.
PART 6: EQUAL PROTECTION
PEOPLE VS. VERA

Difference between law that allows discrimination and law that discriminates?
o None. Both violates Equal Protection.
o When the law is on its face is fair and on its appearance is impartial however
when it had been exercised by the governmental authority it becomes
discriminatory.

A LAW MAY APPEAR FAIR ON ITS FACE OR IMPARTIAL IN APPEARANCE,
YET IF IT PERMITS UNJUST AND ILLEGAL DISCRIMINATION, IT IS STILL
SUBJECT TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION.
o In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from
the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is
not necessarily the result in every case.

“No existing controversy yet” – applicable to equal protection clause (EPC).

“As applied doctrine” – all elements of judicial inquiry need not satisfied.

A law may appear on its face or impartial in appearance, yet if permits unjust and
illegal discrimination, it is still subject to the constitutional prohibition.
PART 7: RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
PEOPLE VS. MARTI

Mere look or observance of the governmental officer does not convert it to be an
act done by governmental officer because they did not directed Mr. Reyes.

If they directed him, it will be covered by sec 2 because it will fall under the
supervision and control of governmental officer.
ALVAREZ VS. COURT OF INSTANCE OF TAYABAS

SSA may be valid kahit walang warrant. Basta under warrantless arrest or other
valid mode.
MANTARING VS. JUDGE ROMAN

Si Mantaring Sr. chinallange niya ung warrant kasi di daw siya yung naka-name
sa search warrant.

So valid ba ung warrant?
o It needs qualify answer because SW has diffrent probabilities as to warrant
of arrest.
SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR (1988)

Construing the real meaning of determined personally under Art. 3 Sec. 2 in
warrant of arrest.

SEC. 4. RULE 126:
o “A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.”

Supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to
existence of probable cause.
o Reason: unduly burden kasi sa dami ng complaint for WA.
SILVA VS. PRESIDING JUDGE (1991) (Search Warrant)

Sec 4 Rule 126 of Rules of Court
o The issuing judge must determine the existence of probable cause by
personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of
searching question and answer.

The probable cause here must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of
the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.

In the said case, the disposition did not only contain leading questions, but it was
also very broad. It was merely routinary.
o The deposition was already mimeographed and all that the witnesses had
to do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided by yes or no.
SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO

Art 38 of labor code becomes functus officio upon the effectivity of the 1987
constitution. This authority is no longer carried over to the 1987 constitution.

Q: THAT DOES THAT MEAN THAT UNDER THE 1987 OTHER OFFICERS
CANNOT ANYMORE ISSUE WARRANTS?
o A: IT DEPENDS UPON THE OBJECTIVE OF THE WARRANT.
HARVEY VS. SANTIAGO:

ALL OTHER OFFICERS CAN ALSO BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO ISSUE A
WARRANT, ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXECUTING A FINAL AND
EXECUTORY JUDGMENT.

HELD: ART 38 OF THE LABOR CODE
o Unconstitutional because the objective of the warrant under this provision
is to obtain custody over the person of the accused or the items in violation
of the law.
ALVAREZ VS. CFI

THE PROBABLE CAUSE MUST BE BASED ON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF
THE COMPLAINANT OR HIS WITNESSES.

Q: INFORMATION CAME FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE. IS IT SUFFICIENT?
o A: No. Because the person who made the statement cannot be held liable
for perjury.

SC: TEST OF SUFFICENT OATH OR AFFIRMATION:

Personal knowledge and whether it is sufficient charge affiant with perjury.
o Witnesses are not necessary as long as Probable Cause is sufficiently
established by complainant.
o Not mandatory notwithstanding the use of “and”.

Affiant could be held liable for perjury IF HE MISDECLARES A FACT

Q: SUPPOSING THE SOURCE OF AFFIANT IS UNIMPEACHABLE/WHO DOES
NOT TELL A LIE, THE POPE HIMSELF, WILL THE ANSWER BE THE SAME?
o A: Yes, it is not enough that the applicant himself is convinced. It is his
obligation to convince the issuing judge.
o WHY?

The affiant must convince the judge as to the existence of probable
cause based only on facts which are personally known to him.

Because our courts are courts of law and bound by the rules of
evidence that courts will not admit in evidence those which are not in
the personal knowledge of the complainant or witnesses.

“…the complainant AND the witness he may produce…”

IN
ALVAREZ,
PETITIONER
CONTENDS
THAT
THERE
MUST
BE
COMPLAINANT AND WITNESSES.
o THE AFFIDAVIT OF THE COMPLAINANT ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH
BECAUSE OF THE CONJUNCTIVE WORD “AND”

SC: NO. IF THE JUDGE IS ALREADY CONVINCED ON THE EXISTENCE
PROBABLE
CAUSE
BASED
ONLY
IN
THE
STATEMENT
OF
THE
COMPLAINANT,
THERE
IS
NO
NEED
TO
PRESENT
SUPPORTING
WITNESSES. SUPPORTING STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES ARE REQUIRED
ONLY IF THE JUDGE ISNOT CONVINCED UPON THE STATEMENT OF THE
COMPLAINANT.
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