G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984
The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 25 of the
Interim Rules and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440, a 1968 law which superseded Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court.
ANSELMO
L.
PESIGAN
and
MARCELINO
L.
PESIGAN, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City Branch 129,
acting for REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Camarines Norte, now presided over by JUDGE
NICANOR ORIÑO, Daet Branch 40; DRA. BELLA S. MIRANDA, ARNULFO V. ZENAROSA, ET
AL., respondents.
We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2,
1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in
the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as
provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations which
prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations
and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. (People vs. Que Po Lay, 94
Phil. 640; Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil. 573; Balbuna vs. Secretary of
Education, 110 Phil. 150.)
At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the Official Gazette of June 14,
1982, of Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for
the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to
another.
The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de
conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.
Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler
truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur
with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination.
Thus, in the Que Po Lay case, a person, convicted by the trial court of having violated Central Bank
Circular No. 20 and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P1,000,
was acquitted by this Court because the circular was published in the Official Gazette three months
after his conviction. He was not bound by the circular.
They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur,
issued under the Revised Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to transport large cattle issued under the authority of the
provincial commander; and (3) three certificates of inspection, one from the Constabulary
command attesting that the carabaos were not included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable
animals; one from the LIvestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines
Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot.
That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and
forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public
must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the
executive order can be bound thereby.
In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos, while passing at
Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police
station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was
basis on the aforementioned Executive Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no
carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported
from one province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive
Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be
distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see
fit, in the case of carabaos" (78 OG 3144).
The cases of Police Commission vs. Bello, L-29960, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 230 and Philippine
Blooming Mills vs. Social Security System, 124 Phil. 499, cited by the respondents, do not involve
the enforcement of any penal regulation.
Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general
applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that "every order or document
which shag prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect."
Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among twenty-five farmers of Basud, and to a farmer
from the Vinzons municipal nursery (Annex 1).
Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette. Section 551 of
the Revised Administrative Code provides that even bureau "regulations and orders shall become
effective only when approved by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise publicly promulgated". (See Commissioner of Civil Service vs. Cruz, 122 Phil. 1015.)
The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for replevin for the recovery of
the carabaos allegedly valued at P70,000 and damages of P92,000. The replevin order could not
be executed by the sheriff. In his order of April 25, 1983 Judge Domingo Medina Angeles, who
heard the case at Daet and who was later transferred to Caloocan City, dismissed the case for lack
of cause of action.
In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Norte and
the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order
No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not have been expected to be cognizant of such an executive order.
It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary
confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans.
However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the
1
said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa acted in
good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. REGINO VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Zambales and Olongapo City, Branch I, and BENITO GO BIO, JR., respondents.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos
are reversed and set aside. Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to restore the
carabaos, with the requisite documents, to the petitioners, who as owners are entitled to possess
the same, with the right to dispose of them in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.
RELOVA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Private respondent Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in
Criminal Case No. 5396 in the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, presided by respondent
judge. The information reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£
That on or about and during the second week of May 1979, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, guaranteeing the
authenticity and genuineness of the same and with intent to defraud one Filipinas Tan by means
of false pretenses and pretending to have sufficient funds deposited in the Bank of the Philippine
Island, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make and issue Bank of Philippine
Island Check No. D-357726 in the amount of P200,000.00 Philippine Currency, said accused well
knowing that he has no sufficient funds at the Bank of the Philippine Island and upon
presentation of the said check to the bank for encashment, the same was dishonored for the
reason that the said accused has no sufficient funds with the said bank and despite repeated
demands made by Filipinas Tan on the accused to redeem the said check or pay the amount of
P200,000.00, said accused failed and continues to fail to redeem the said check or to pay the
said amount, to the damage and prejudice of said Filipinas Tan in the aforementioned amount
of P200,000.00 Philippine Currency. (pp. 23-24, Rollo)
Before he could be arraigned respondent Go Bio, Jr. filed a Motion to Quash the information on
the ground that the information did not charge an offense, pointing out that at the alleged
commission of the offense, which was about the second week of May 1979, Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 has not yet taken effect.
The prosecution opposed the motion contending, among others, that the date of the dishonor of
the check, which is on September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense; and that
assuming that the effectivity of the law — Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 — is on June 29, 1979,
considering that the offense was committed on September 26, 1979, the said law is applicable.
In his reply, private respondent Go Bio, Jr. submits that what Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 penalizes
is not the fact of the dishonor of the check but the act of making or drawing and issuing a check
without sufficient funds or credit.
Resolving the motion, respondent judge granted the same and cancelled the bail bond of the
accused. In its order of August 23, 1982, respondent judge said: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The Court finds merit to the contention that the accused cannot be held liable for bouncing
checks prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 although the check may have
matured after the effectivity of the said law. No less than the Minister of Justice decreed that
the date of the drawing or making and issuance of the bouncing check is the date to reckon with
and not on the date of the maturity of the check. (Resolution No. 67, S. 1981, People's Car vs.
Eduardo N. Tan, Feb. 3, 1981; Resolution No. 192, S. 1981, Ricardo de Guia vs. Agapito Miranda,
March 20, 1981).
G.R. No. L-62243 October 12, 1984
2
Hence, the Court believes that although the accused can be prosecuted for swindling (Estafa,
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code), the Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 cannot be given a
retroactive effect to apply to the above entitled case. (pp. 49- 50, Rollo)
May 1979, there was no law to be violated and, consequently, respondent Go Bio, Jr. did not
commit any violation thereof.
With respect to the allegation of petitioner that the offense was committed on September 26, 1979
when the check was presented for encashment and was dishonored by the bank, suffice it to say
that the law penalizes the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check and not only
the fact of its dishonor. The title of the law itself states:
AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK WITHOUT
SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner submitting for review respondent judge's
dismissal of the criminal action against private respondent Go Bio, Jr. for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
Petitioner contends that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was published in the April 9, 1979 issue of the
Official Gazette. Fifteen (15) days therefrom would be April 24, 1979, or several days before
respondent Go Bio, Jr. issued the questioned check around the second week of May 1979; and
that respondent judge should not have taken into account the date of release of the Gazette for
circulation because Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that for the purpose
of ascertaining the date of effectivity of a law that needed publication, "the Gazette is conclusively
presumed to be published on the day indicated therein as the date of issue."
and, Sections 1 and 2 of said Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provide: têñ.£îhqwâ£
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. — Any person who makes or draws and issues any
check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds ... shall be punished ...
Private respondent Go Bio, Jr. argues that although Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was published in
the Official Gazette issue of April 9, 1979, nevertheless, the same was released only on June 14,
1979 and, considering that the questioned check was issued about the second week of May 1979,
then he could not have violated Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 because it was not yet released for
circulation at the time.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient
funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period
of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the
drawee bank.
We uphold the dismissal by the respondent judge of the criminal action against the private
respondent.
SECTION 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making, drawing and issuance
of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds ... .
(Emphasis supplied)
The Solicitor General admitted the certification issued by Ms. Charito A. Mangubat, Copy Editor of
the Official Gazette Section of the Government Printing Office, stating-têñ.£îhqwâ£
This is to certify that Volume 75, No. 15, of the April 9, 1979 issue of the Official Gazette
was officially released for circulation on June 14, 1979. (p. 138, Rollo)
ACCORDINGLY, the order of respondent judge dated August 23, 1982 is hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.
It is therefore, certain that the penal statute in question was made public only on June 14, 1979
and not on the printed date April 9, 1979. Differently stated, June 14, 1979 was the date of
publication of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Before the public may be bound by its contents especially
its penal provisions, the law must be published and the people officially informed of its contents
and/or its penalties. For, if a statute had not been published before its violation, then in the eyes
of the law there was no such law to be violated and, consequently, the accused could not have
committed the alleged crime.
The effectivity clause of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 specifically states that "This Act shall take
effect fifteen days after publication in the Official Gazette." The term "publication" in such clause
should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, that is, to make known to the people in general.
If the Batasang Pambansa had intended to make the printed date of issue of the Gazette as the
point of reference in determining the effectivity of the statute in question, then it could have so
stated in the special effectivity provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
When private respondent Go Bio, Jr. committed the act, complained of in the Information as
criminal, in May 1979, there was then no law penalizing such act. Following the special provision
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, it became effective only on June 29, 1979. As a matter of fact, in
3
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view
is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected
or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said
petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they
are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required
to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY
AND
NATIONALISM,
INC.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific
interest for their petition to be given due course.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265,
286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427,
429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658,
661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061,
1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 18131817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155,
161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299,
301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599,
600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881,
882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532,
1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 16121628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 17461751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 18121814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847,
1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952,
1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510,
522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593,
594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94,
95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted
to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the
public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights
are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is
one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty,
the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it
being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws
[High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper
party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special
election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking
for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the
relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be
enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable
to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular
case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular
circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance
upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person
could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear
and represent the people in cases of this character.
4
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be
enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of
the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to
conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the
government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for
respondents in this case.
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno
en uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in
the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed
on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of
what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents
with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special
provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures,
fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article.
In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary
in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date
of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following
its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound
by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio
Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the
law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official
Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such
decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and
specific contents.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of
laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue
at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus,
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes
of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes
of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have
general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not
been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive
about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity
of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have
put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been
enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar
situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot
County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to
be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however,
that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be
taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity
may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and
official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature
both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are
among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal
and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws
taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass
media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
5
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a
party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was
declared unconstitutional by this Court.
G.R. No. 179579
February 1, 2012
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF
SUBIC, Petitioners,
vs.
HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, Respondent.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the
Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement
of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
DECISION
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential
decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees
Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so
published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no
copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none
of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan
vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on
the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent
officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of
policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been
published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws
provide that they shall take effect immediately.
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45,1 assailing the Decision2 and the Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), which nullified the Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 27-20034 on
the tariff classification of wheat issued by petitioner Commissioner of Customs.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the
Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or
consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge.5 The regulation provided an exclusive
list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending
on these factors, wheat would be classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding
tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have
no binding force and effect.
CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and Classification
Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the release of the articles that were the
subject of protest required the importer to post a cash bond to cover the tariff differential.6
A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003, respondent filed a Petition
for Declaratory Relief7 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. It anticipated the
implementation of the regulation on its imported and perishable Chinese milling wheat in transit
from China.8 Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate
of the Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or
registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center.
Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier
without the benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite having imported food grade
wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing them to
pay 133% more than was proper.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated
when the regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all.
Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in
nature.
On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for twenty
(20) days from notice.9
6
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss.10 They alleged that: (1) the RTC did not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, because respondent was asking for a judicial
determination of the classification of wheat; (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper; (3)
CMO 27-2003 was an internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature; and (4) the claims
of respondent were speculative and premature, because the Bureau of Customs (BOC) had yet to
examine respondent’s products. They likewise opposed the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction on the ground that they had not inflicted any injury through the issuance of the
regulation; and that the action would be contrary to the rule that administrative issuances are
assumed valid until declared otherwise.
The Petition has no merit.
We shall first discuss the propriety of an action for declaratory relief.
Rule 63, Section 1 provides:
Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance,
or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in
the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising,
and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the
party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue
involved must be ripe for judicial determination.15 We find that the Petition filed by respondent
before the lower court meets these requirements.
On 28 February 2005, the parties agreed that the matters raised in the application for preliminary
injunction and the Motion to Dismiss would just be resolved together in the main case. Thus, on
10 March 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision11 without having to resolve the application for
preliminary injunction and the Motion to Dismiss.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent, to wit:
First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003 issued by petitioner
Commissioner of Customs. In Smart Communications v. NTC,16 we held:
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency
contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed,
the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial
power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the
validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is GRANTED and the subject Customs
Memorandum Order 27-2003 is declared INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT. Respondents
Commissioner of Customs, the District Collector of Subic or anyone acting in their behalf are to
immediately cease and desist from enforcing the said Customs Memorandum Order 27-2003.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, given that the issue raised by
respondent concerned the quasi-legislative powers of petitioners. It likewise stated that a petition
for declaratory relief was the proper remedy, and that respondent was the proper party to file it.
The court considered that respondent was a regular importer, and that the latter would be
subjected to the application of the regulation in future transactions.
Meanwhile, in Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance
Secretary,17 we said:
xxx [A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a
primary legislation by providing the details thereof. xxx
With regard to the validity of the regulation, the trial court found that petitioners had not followed
the basic requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-2003. It likewise held
that petitioners had "substituted the quasi-judicial determination of the commodity by a quasilegislative predetermination."13 The lower court pointed out that a classification based on importers
and ports of discharge were violative of the due process rights of respondent.
In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to
provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the lower court, petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same
allegations in defense of CMO 27-2003.14 The appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal. It
held that, since the regulation affected substantial rights of petitioners and other importers,
petitioners should have observed the requirements of notice, hearing and publication.
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether
the rule is within the delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is
reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is not free
to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by
its delegation of administrative judgment, has committed those questions to administrative
judgments and not to judicial judgments. In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not
into the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court,
when confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go
to the opposite extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of
authoritative weight to the interpretative rule. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, this Petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD
WITH THE LAW AND PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
7
Second, the controversy is between two parties that have adverse interests. Petitioners are
summarily imposing a tariff rate that respondent is refusing to pay.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing
further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has
already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely
providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the
law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at
least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before
that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.20
Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the implementation of CMO
27-2003. Respondent has adequately shown that, as a regular importer of wheat, on 14 August
2003, it has actually made shipments of wheat from China to Subic. The shipment was set to
arrive in December 2003. Upon its arrival, it would be subjected to the conditions of CMO 272003. The regulation calls for the imposition of different tariff rates, depending on the factors
enumerated therein. Thus, respondent alleged that it would be made to pay the 7% tariff applied
to feed grade wheat, instead of the 3% tariff on food grade wheat. In addition, respondent would
have to go through the procedure under CMO 27-2003, which would undoubtedly toll its time and
resources. The lower court correctly pointed out as follows:
xxx As noted above, the fact that petitioner is precisely into the business of importing wheat,
each and every importation will be subjected to constant disputes which will result into (sic)
delays in the delivery, setting aside of funds as cash bond required in the CMO as well as the
resulting expenses thereof. It is easy to see that business uncertainty will be a constant
occurrence for petitioner. That the sums involved are not minimal is shown by the discussions
during the hearings conducted as well as in the pleadings filed. It may be that the petitioner can
later on get a refund but such has been foreclosed because the Collector of Customs and the
Commissioner of Customs are bound by their own CMO. Petitioner cannot get its refund with the
said agency. We believe and so find that Petitioner has presented such a stake in the outcome
of this controversy as to vest it with standing to file this petition.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, in Tañada v. Tuvera,21 we held:
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of
the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice
and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws
taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President
a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the
mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa – and for the diligent
ones, ready access to the legislative records – no such publicity accompanies the law-making
process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what
presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial determination, because litigation is
inevitable19 for the simple and uncontroverted reason that respondent is not included in the
enumeration of flour millers classified as food grade wheat importers. Thus, as the trial court
stated, it would have to file a protest case each time it imports food grade wheat and be subjected
to the 7% tariff.
Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative
Code, the assailed regulation must be struck down.
It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy given the circumstances
of the case.
Going now to the content of CMO 27-3003, we likewise hold that it is unconstitutional for being
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive rights of respondent as
explained above, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent provisions
of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code, to wit:
The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the
same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in like
circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not violated if there is a
reasonable classification. For a classification to be reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests
on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same class.22
Section 3. Filing. – (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center
three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of
this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the
bases of any sanction against any party of persons.
Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. We do not see how the quality
of wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from.
Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as
practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the
opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have imported food
grade wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting
them to 7% tariff. On the other hand, even if the importers listed under CMO 27-2003 have
imported feed grade wheat, they would only be made to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of
the taxes due. The regulation, therefore, does not become disadvantageous to respondent only,
but even to the state.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have
been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first
hearing thereon.
8
It is also not clear how the regulation intends to "monitor more closely wheat importations and
thus prevent their misclassification." A careful study of CMO 27-2003 shows that it not only fails
to achieve this end, but results in the opposite. The application of the regulation forecloses the
possibility that other corporations that are excluded from the list import food grade wheat; at the
same time, it creates an assumption that those who meet the criteria do not import feed grade
wheat. In the first case, importers are unnecessarily burdened to prove the classification of their
wheat imports; while in the second, the state carries that burden.
G.R. No. 187587
June 5, 2013
NAGKAKAISANG
MARALITA
NG
SITIO
MASIGASIG,
INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went beyond his powers when the regulation limited the
customs officer’s duties mandated by Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended.
The law provides:
Section 1403. – Duties of Customs Officer Tasked to Examine, Classify, and Appraise Imported
Articles. – The customs officer tasked to examine, classify, and appraise imported articles shall
determine whether the packages designated for examination and their contents are in
accordance with the declaration in the entry, invoice and other pertinent documents and shall
make return in such a manner as to indicate whether the articles have been truly and correctly
declared in the entry as regard their quantity, measurement, weight, and tariff classification and
not imported contrary to law. He shall submit samples to the laboratory for analysis when
feasible to do so and when such analysis is necessary for the proper classification, appraisal,
and/or admission into the Philippines of imported articles.
Likewise, the customs officer shall determine the unit of quantity in which they are usually
bought and sold, and appraise the imported articles in accordance with Section 201 of this Code.
Failure on the part of the customs officer to comply with his duties shall subject him to the
penalties prescribed under Section 3604 of this Code.1âwphi1
G.R. No. 187654
WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Board of
Directors, Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision1 promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.
The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine the classification
of the imported article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already
classified the article even before the customs officer had the chance to examine it. In effect,
petitioner Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs
Code with regard to wheat importation when it no longer required the customs officer’s prior
examination and assessment of the proper classification of the wheat.
THE FACTS
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels
of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a
military reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on
renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create
new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that it be not in contradiction
to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.23
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208,
amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it
for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under
the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office
(MSS-PVAO).
In summary, petitioners violated respondent’s right to due process in the issuance of CMO 272003 when they failed to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative Code.
Petitioners likewise violated respondent’s right to equal protection of laws when they provided for
an unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation. Finally, petitioner Commissioner
of Customs went beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers
of the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles.
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending
Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village
from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the
provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which
reads:
"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.
9
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official
Gazette3 on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which was denied by the COSLAP
in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10
Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued
Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this
time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and
declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP Resolutions
dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed Decision
granting MSS-PVAO’s Petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions
dated September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission on the Settlement of
Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu
thereof, the petitions of respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of
merit, as discussed herein. Further, pending urgent motions filed by respondents are likewise
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same day.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including
portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General
Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized
occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective Petitions for
Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI)
filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was
docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1) the reclassification
of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public
land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of
the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the
distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona fide occupants.4
THE ISSUES
Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE
HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS NOT
PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY MEMBER
OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT
>INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS LAND CASES.14
On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a
Petition-in-Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for by NMSMI
with regard to the area the former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western
Bicutan.5
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting the Petition and declaring the
portions of land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral dissenting.7
On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF
PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT
FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS NOT
INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.15
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of
Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not be
defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that Proclamation
No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could not be
amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172
could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued
on October 16, 1987 when President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.
Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
the subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the
ground that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the publication of
the said law.
In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral stressed that pursuant to
Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that when
the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court to look
into legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or
subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the Commission had no authority to supply the
addendum originally omitted in the published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would
be tantamount to encroaching on the field of the legislature.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.
Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their
claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No.
10
2476. They allege that the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the
reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation
just below the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation
No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President
in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature
or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the
determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect
of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
such publication.
xxxx
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only
a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a
favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars
issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but
to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the
law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers
to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s
publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be
dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark
case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera,16 in which we had the occasion to rule thus:
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the
present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which
did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one
year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."
xxxx
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the
mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts
(e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of
the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement.1âwphi1 This is not even
substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations
Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was
"published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than
disclose information on this vital law.
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny
the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could
validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding
the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely
that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because
of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly,
this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal
measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.
xxxx
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows
with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
xxxx
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a
law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people.
The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may
question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact,
a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect
the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole.
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that
was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had any
legal force and effect.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of
any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence
of its authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not
only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent
of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word
appears in the law when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,18 we
11
ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean,
however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it.
To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the
sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae
exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating."
The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation that
would amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in the reclassification.
G.R. No. 46623 December 7, 1939
MARCIAL
KASILAG, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and IGNACIO DEL
ROSARIO, respondents.
IMPERIAL, J.:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is
AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED.
Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is DENIED, having been rendered
moot. No costs.
This is an appeal taken by the defendant-petitioner from the decision of the Court of Appeals which
modified that rendered by the court of First Instance of Bataan in civil case No. 1504 of said court
and held: that the contract Exhibit "1" is entirely null and void and without effect; that the
plaintiffs-respondents, then appellants, are the owners of the disputed land, with its
improvements, in common ownership with their brother Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled
to the possession thereof; that the defendant-petitioner should yield possession of the land in their
favor, with all the improvements thereon and free from any lien; that the plaintiffs-respondents
jointly and severally pay to the defendant-petitioner the sum of P1,000 with interest at 6 percent
per annum from the date of the decision; and absolved the plaintiffs-respondents from the crosscomplaint relative to the value of the improvements claimed by the defendant-petitioner. The
appealed decision also ordered the registrar of deeds of Bataan to cancel certificate of title No.
325, in the name of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio and to issue in lieu thereof another certificate
of title in favor of the plaintiffs-respondents and their brother Gavino Rodriguez, as undivided
owners in equal parts, free of all liens and incumbrances except those expressly provided by law,
without special pronouncement as to the costs.
The respondents, children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced the aforesaid
civil case to the end that they recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its
improvements granted by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio under patent No. 16074 issued
on January 11, 1931, with certificate of title No. 325 issued by the registrar of deeds of Bataan on
June 27, 1931 in her favor, under section 122 of Act No. 496, which land was surveyed and
identified in the cadastre of the municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan, as lot No. 285; that the
petitioner pay to them the sum of P650 being the approximate value of the fruits which he received
from the land; that the petitioner sign all the necessary documents to transfer the land and its
possession to the respondents; that he petitioner be restrained, during the pendency of the case,
from conveying or encumbering the land and its improvements; that the registrar of deeds of
Bataan cancel certificate of title No. 325 and issue in lieu thereof another in favor of the
respondents, and that the petitioner pay the costs of suit.
The petitioner denied in his answer all the material allegations of the complaint and by way of
special defense alleged that he was in possession of the land and that he was receiving the fruits
thereof by virtue of a mortgage contract, entered into between him and the deceased Emiliana
Ambrosio on May 16, 1932, which was duly ratified by a notary public; and in counterclaim asked
that the respondents pay him the sum of P1,000 with 12 per cent interest per annum which the
deceased owed him and that, should the respondents be declared to have a better right to the
possession of the land, that they be sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000 as value of all the
improvements which he introduced upon the land.lawphil.net
On May 16, 1932 Emiliana Ambrosio, in life, and the petitioner executed the following public deed:
12
"This agreement, made and entered into this 16th day of May, 1932, by and between Emiliana
Ambrosio, Filipino, of legal age, widow and resident of Limay, Bataan, P.L., hereinafter called the
party of the first part, and Marcial Kasilag, Filipino, of legal age, married to Asuncion Roces, and
resident at 312 Perdigon Street, Manila, P.L., hereinafter called party of the second part.
WITNESSETH: That the parties hereto hereby covenant and agree to and with each other as
follows:
ARTICLE I. That the party of the first part is the absolute registered owner of a parcel of land
in the barrio of Alngan, municipality of Limay, Province of Bataan, her title thereto being
evidenced by homestead certificate of title No. 325 issued by the Bureau of Lands on June 11,
1931, said land being lot No. 285 of the Limay Cadastre, General Land Registration Office
Cadastral Record No. 1054, bounded and described as follows:
ARTICLE VII. That within thirty (30) days after date of execution of this agreement, the party of
the first part shall file a motion before the Court of First Instance at Balanga, Bataan, P. I.,
requesting cancellation of Homestead Certificate of Title No. 325 referred to in Article I hereof
and the issuance, in lieu thereof, of a certificate of title under the provisions of Land Registration
Act No. 496, as amended by Act 3901.
Beginning at point marked 1 on plan E-57394, N. 84º 32' W. 614.82 m. from B.B.M. No. 3, thence
N. 66º 35' E. 307.15 m. to point "2"; S. 5º 07' W. to point "5"; S.6º 10' E. 104.26 m. to point "4";
S. 82º 17' W. to point "5"; S. 28º 53' W. 72.26 m. to point "6"; N. 71º 09' W. to point "7"; N. 1º
42' E. 173.72 m. to point 1, point of beginning, "Containing an area of 6.7540 hectares. "Points
1,2,6 and 7, B.L.; points 3,4 and 5, stakes; points 4, 5 and 6 on bank of Alangan River. "Bounded
on the North, by property claimed by Maria Ambrosio; on the East, by Road; on the South, by
Alangan River and property claimed by Maxima de la Cruz; and on the West, by property claimed
by Jose del Rosario. "Bearing true. Declination 0º 51' E. "Surveyed under authority of sections 1222, Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing regulations of the Bureau of Lands, by Mamerto
Jacinto, public land surveyor, on July 8, 1927 and approved on February 25, 1931.
ARTICLE IX. That in the event the contemplated motion under Article VII hereof is not approved
by the Court, the foregoing contract of sale shall automatically become null and void, and the
mortgage stipulated under Article IV and V shall remain in full force and effect.
ARTICLE III. It if further agreed that if upon the expiration of the period of time (4½) years
stipulated in this mortgage, the mortgagor should fail to redeem this mortgage, she would
execute a deed of absolute sale of the property herein described for the same amount as this
mortgage, including all unpaid interests at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, in favor of the
mortgagee.
In testimony whereof, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands the day and year first
herein before written.
(Sgd.) MARCIAL KASILAG
(Sgd.) EMILIANA AMBROSIO
Signed in the presence of:
(Sgd.) ILLEGIBLE
(Sgd.) GAVINO RODRIGUEZ.
ARTICLE II. That the improvements on the above described land consist of the following:
Four (4) mango trees, fruit bearing: one hundred ten (110) hills of bamboo trees; one (1)
tamarind and six (6) boñga trees.
PHILIPPINE
BALANGA, BATAAN } ss.
ARTICLE III. That the assessed value of the land is P940 and the assessed value of the
improvements is P860, as evidenced by tax declaration No. 3531 of the municipality of Limay,
Bataan.
ISLANDS
}
ss.
Before me this day personally appeared Emiliana Ambrosio without cedula by reason of her sex,
to me known and known to me to be the person who signed the foregoing instrument, and
acknowledged to me that she executed the same as her free and voluntary act and deed.
ARTICLE IV. That for and in consideration of the sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) Philippine
currency, paid by the party of second part to the party of the first part, receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged, the party of the first part hereby encumbers and hypothecates, by way of
mortgage, only the improvements described in Articles II and III hereof, of which improvements
the party of the first part is the absolute owner.
I hereby certify that this instrument consists of three (3) pages including this page of the
acknowledgment and that each page thereof is signed by the parties to the instrument and the
witnesses in their presence and in the presence of each other, and that the land treated in this
instrument consists of only one parcel.
ARTICLE V. That the condition of said mortgage is such that if the party of the first part shall
well and truly pay, or cause to paid to the party of the second part, his heirs, assigns, or
executors, on or before the 16th day of November, 1936, or four and one-half (4½) years after
date of the execution of this instrument, the aforesaid sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) with
interest at 12 per cent per annum, then said mortgage shall be and become null and void;
otherwise the same shall be and shall remain in full force and effect, and subject to foreclosure
in the manner and form provided by law for the amount due thereunder, with costs and also
attorney's fees in the event of such foreclosure.lawphil.net
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my notarial seal, this 16th day of
May, 1932.
(Sgd.)
Notary Public
My commission expires December 31, 1933.
ARTICLE VI. That the party of the first part shall pay all taxes and assessments which are or
may become due on the above described land and improvements during the term of this
agreement.
13
NICOLAS
NAVARRO
Doc.
Page
Book No. IV
36
No.
of
my
178
register
by the Court of First Instance of Bataan, the contract of sale would automatically become void and
the mortgage would subsist in all its force.
Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts, not less important than those
indicated, is to the effect that the terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals and public
order should be separated from the valid and legal contract and when such separation can be
made because they are independent of the valid contract which expresses the will of the
contracting parties. Manresa, commenting on article 1255 of the Civil Code and stating the rule of
separation just mentioned, gives his views as follows:
On the supposition that the various pacts, clauses or conditions are valid, no difficulty is
presented; but should they be void, the question is as to what extent they may produce the
nullity of the principal obligation. Under the view that such features of the obligation are added
to it and do not go to its essence, a criterion based upon the stability of juridical relations should
tend to consider the nullity as confined to the clause or pact suffering therefrom, except in case
where the latter, by an established connection or by manifest intention of the parties, is
inseparable from the principal obligation, and is a condition, juridically speaking, of that the
nullity of which it would also occasion. (Manresa, Commentaries on the Civil Code, Volume 8, p.
575.)
One year after the execution of the aforequoted deed, that is, in 1933, it came to pass that
Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated interests as well as the tax on the land and
its improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract
whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would
not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by
the fruits of the land, and would introduce improvements thereon. By virtue of this verbal contract,
the petitioner entered upon the possession of the land, gathered the products thereof, did not
collect the interest on the loan, introduced improvements upon the land valued at P5,000,
according to him and on May 22, 1934 the tax declaration was transferred in his name and on
March 6, 1936 the assessed value of the land was increased from P1,020 to P2,180.
After an analysis of the conditions of Exhibit "1" the Court of Appeals came to the conclusion and
so held that the contract entered into by and between the parties, set out in the said public deed,
was one of absolute purchase and sale of the land and its improvements. And upon this ruling it
held null and void and without legal effect the entire Exhibit 1 as well as the subsequent verbal
contract entered into between the parties, ordering, however, the respondents to pay to the
petitioner, jointly and severally, the loan of P1,000 with legal interest at 6 per cent per annum
from the date of the decision. In this first assignment of error the petitioner contends that the
Court of Appeals violated the law in holding that Exhibit 1 is an absolute deed of sale of the land
and its improvements and that it is void and without any legal effect.
The same view prevails in the Anglo-American law, as condensed in the following words:
Where an agreement founded on a legal consideration contains several promises, or a promise
to do several things, and a part only of the things to be done are illegal, the promises which can
be separated, or the promise, so far as it can be separated, from the illegality, may be valid.
The rule is that a lawful promise made for a lawful consideration is not invalid merely because
an unlawful promise was made at the same time and for the same consideration, and this rule
applies, although the invalidity is due to violation of a statutory provision, unless the statute
expressly or by necessary implication declares the entire contract void…
The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to the effect that the intention of the
contracting parties should always prevail because their will has the force of law between them.
Article 1281 of the Civil Code consecrates this rule and provides, that if the terms of a contract
are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal sense of its
stipulations shall be followed; and if the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of
the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail. The contract set out in Exhibit 1 should be
interpreted in accordance with these rules. As the terms thereof are clear and leave no room for
doubt, it should be interpreted according to the literal meaning of its clauses. The words used by
the contracting parties in Exhibit 1 clearly show that they intended to enter into the principal
contract of loan in the amount of P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent per annum, and into the
accessory contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead, the
parties having moreover, agreed upon the pacts and conditions stated in the deed. In other words,
the parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as
homestead, to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 and the stipulated interest
thereon. In clause V the parties stipulated that Emiliana Ambrosio was to pay, within four and a
half years, or until November 16, 1936, the debt with interest thereon, in which event the
mortgage would not have any effect; in clause VI the parties agreed that the tax on the land and
its improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid by the owner of the land;
in clause VII it was covenanted that within thirty days from the date of the contract, the owner of
the land would file a motion in the Court of First Instance of Bataan asking that certificate of title
No. 325 be cancelled and that in lieu thereof another be issued under the provisions of the Land
Registration Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3901; in clause VIII the parties agreed that
should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to redeem the mortgage within the stipulated period of four years
and a half, she would execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee, the
petitioner, for the same amount of the loan of P1,000 including unpaid interest; and in clause IX
it was stipulated that in case the motion to be presented under clause VII should be disapproved
Addressing ourselves now to the contract entered into by the parties, set out in Exhibit 1, we
stated that the principal contract is that of loan and the accessory that of mortgage of the
improvements upon the land acquired as a homestead. There is no question that the first of these
contract is valid as it is not against the law. The second, or the mortgage of the improvements, is
expressly authorized by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended by section 23 of Act No. 3517,
reading:
SEC. 116. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or institutions, or
legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under the free patent or homestead
provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the
application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or
grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or
pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
It will be recalled that by clause VIII of Exhibit 1 the parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio
fail to redeem the mortgage within the stipulated period of four and a half years, by paying the
loan together with interest, she would execute in favor of the petitioner an absolute deed of sale
of the land for P1,000, including the interest stipulated and owing. The stipulation was verbally
modified by the same parties after the expiration of one year, in the sense that the petitioner
would take possession of the land and would benefit by the fruits thereof on condition that he
would condone the payment of interest upon the loan and he would attend to the payment of the
land tax. These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to alter the mortgage a
contract clearly entered into, converting the latter into a contract of antichresis. (Article 1881 of
14
the Civil Code.) The contract of antichresis, being a real encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal
and void because it is legal and valid.
"We do not believe that in real life there are not many cases of good faith founded upon an error
of law. When the acquisition appears in a public document, the capacity of the parties has already
been passed upon by competent authority, and even established by appeals taken from final
judgments and administrative remedies against the qualification of registrars, and the possibility
of error is remote under such circumstances; but, unfortunately, private documents and even
verbal agreements far exceed public documents in number, and while no one should be ignorant
of the law, the truth is that even we who are called upon to know and apply it fall into error not
infrequently. However, a clear, manifest, and truly unexcusable ignorance is one thing, to which
undoubtedly refers article 2, and another and different thing is possible and excusable error arising
from complex legal principles and from the interpretation of conflicting doctrines.
But even ignorance of the law may be based upon an error of fact, or better still, ignorance of a
fact is possible as to the capacity to transmit and as to the intervention of certain persons,
compliance with certain formalities and appreciation of certain acts, and an error of law is
possible in the interpretation of doubtful doctrines.
The foregoing considerations bring us to the conclusion that the first assignment of error is wellfounded and that error was committed in holding that the contract entered into between the parties
was one of absolute sale of the land and its improvements and that Exhibit 1 is null and void. In
the second assignment of error the petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that he is guilty of violating the Public Land Act because he entered into the contract, Exhibit 1.
The assigned error is vague and not specific. If it attempts to show that the said document is valid
in its entirety, it is not well-founded because we have already said that certain pacts thereof are
illegal because they are prohibited by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended.
In the third assignment of error the petitioner insists that his testimony, as to the verbal agreement
entered into between him and Emiliana Ambrosio, should have been accepted by the Court of
Appeals; and in the fourth and last assignment of error the same petitioner contends that the
Court of Appeals erred in holding that he acted in bad faith in taking possession of the land and in
taking advantage of the fruits thereof, resulting in the denial of his right to be reimbursed for the
value of the improvements introduced by him.
According to this author, gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good
faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not
conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the
improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition
regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its
fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits
are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section
116. These considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance
of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith.
We do not give much importance to the change of the tax declaration, which consisted in making
the petitioner appear as the owner of the land, because such an act may only be considered as a
sequel to the change of possession and enjoyment of the fruits by the petitioner, to about which
we have stated that the petitioner's ignorance of the law is possible and excusable. We, therefore,
hold that the petitioner acted in good faith in taking possession of the land and enjoying its fruits.
We have seen that subsequent to the execution of the contract, Exhibit 1, the parties entered into
another verbal contract whereby the petitioner was authorized to take possession of the land, to
receive the fruits thereof and to introduce improvements thereon, provided that he would renounce
the payment of stipulated interest and he would assume payment of the land tax. The possession
by the petitioner and his receipt of the fruits of the land, considered as integral elements of the
contract of antichresis, are illegal and void agreements because, as already stated, the contract
of antichresis is a lien and such is expressly prohibited by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended.
The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner acted in bad faith in taking possession of the land
because he knew that the contract he made with Emiliana Ambrosio was an absolute deed of sale
and, further, that the latter could not sell the land because it is prohibited by section 116. The
Civil Code does not expressly define what is meant by bad faith, but section 433 provides that
"Every person who is unaware of any flaw in his title, or in the manner of its acquisition, by which
it is invalidated, shall be deemed a possessor in good faith"; and provides further, that "Possessors
aware of such flaw are deemed possessors in bad faith". Article 1950 of the same Code, covered
by Chapter II relative to prescription of ownership and other real rights, provides, in turn, that
"Good faith on the part of the possessor consists in his belief that the person from whom he
received the thing was the owner of the same, and could transmit the title thereto." We do not
have before us a case of prescription of ownership, hence, the last article is not squarely in point.
In resume, it may be stated that a person is deemed a possessor in bad faith when he knows that
there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated.
The petitioner being a possessor in good faith within the meaning of article 433 of the Civil Code
and having introduced the improvements upon the land as such, the provisions of article 361 of
the same Code are applicable; wherefore, the respondents are entitled to have the improvements
and plants upon indemnifying the petitioner the value thereof which we fix at P3,000, as appraised
by the trial court; or the respondents may elect to compel the petitioner to have the land by paying
its market value to be fixed by the court of origin.
The respondents also prayed in their complaint that the petitioner be compelled to pay them the
sum of P650, being the approximate value of the fruits obtained by the petitioner from the land.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying the claim or indemnity for
damages, being of the same opinion as the trial court that the respondents may elect to compel
the petitioner to have the land. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court that
the respondents have not established such damages. Under the verbal contract between the
petitioner and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, during the latter's lifetime, the former would take
possession of the land and would receive the fruits of the mortgaged improvements on condition
that he would no longer collect the stipulated interest and that he would attend to the payment of
the land tax. This agreement, at bottom, is tantamount to the stipulation that the petitioner should
apply the value of the fruits of the land to the payment of stipulated interest on the loan of P1,000
which is, in turn, another of the elements characterizing the contract of antichresis under article
1881 of the Civil Code. It was not possible for the parties to stipulate further that the value of the
fruits be also applied to the payment of the capital, because the truth was that nothing remained
Borrowing the language of Article 433, the question to be answered is whether the petitioner
should be deemed a possessor in good faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in
the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated. It will be noted that ignorance of the flaw
is the keynote of the rule. From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither
deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its
acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the question
is whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws. Manresa, commenting on
article 434 in connection with the preceding article, sustains the affirmative. He says:
15
after paying the interest at 12% per annum. This interest, at the rate fixed, amounted to P120
per annum, whereas the market value of the fruits obtainable from the land hardly reached said
amount in view of the fact that the assessed value of said improvements was, according to the
decision, P860. To this should be added the fact that, under the verbal agreement, from the value
of the fruits had to be taken a certain amount to pay the annual land tax. We mention these data
here to show that the petitioner is also not bound to render an accounting of the value of the fruits
of the mortgaged improvements for the reason stated that said value hardly covers the interest
earned by the secured indebtednes.
G.R. No. L-4963
January 29, 1953
MARIA
USON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR
NEBREDA, AND FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-appellants.
Priscilo
Evangelista
Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.
For all the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision is reversed, and we hereby adjudge:
(1) that the contract of mortgage of the improvements, set out in Exhibit 1, is valid and binding;
(2) that the contract of antichresis agreed upon verbally by the parties is a real incumbrance which
burdens the land and, as such, is a null and without effect; (3) that the petitioner is a possessor
in good faith; (4) that the respondents may elect to have the improvements introduced by the
petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and
have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market value to
be filed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties; (5) that the respondents have a right to
the possession of the land and to enjoy the mortgaged improvements; and (6) that the
respondents may redeem the mortgage of the improvements by paying to the petitioner within
three months the amount of P1,000, without interest, as that stipulated is set off by the value of
the fruits of the mortgaged improvements which petitioner received, and in default thereof the
petitioner may ask for the public sale of said improvements for the purpose of applying the
proceeds thereof to the payment of his said credit. Without special pronouncement as to the costs
in all instances. So ordered.
for
appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated
in the Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del
Rosario and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed
Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands
involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson.
However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria
del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and
enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and
her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to
separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a
parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property
that may be left by her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered decision
ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in
dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the present appeal.
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda,
former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute
that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the
late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It
likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil
Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels
of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his
widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to
the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed
and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil.,
321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in
question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question
because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and
leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot
16
be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract
nor can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs.
Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).
G.R. No. L-44466 January 30, 1989
MAGDALENA V. ACOSTA, JULIANA V. ACOSTA and ROSITA V. ACOSTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ANDRES B. PLAN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
Branch II, HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, and BERNARDINO MAGDAY, respondents.
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children
of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional
rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given
the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law
accords to the latter (article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional
rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even
though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article
2253, new Civil Code).
GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
The only issue in this petition for review on certiorari is whether the petitioners' appeal from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela in Civil Case No. 1201, may be dismissed for
tardiness in submitting their record on appeal.
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which
are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise
to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights
do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that
"if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even
though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under
the prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired
right, of the same origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership
of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband
and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to
succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right
recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot,
therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in
dispute.
On January 8, 1962, the petitioners filed an accion publiciana (Civil Case No. 1201) in the Court
of First Instance of Isabela against the private respondent Bernardino Magday. After the defendant
had filed his answer, the complaint was amended on August 25, 1971, to implead the Department
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Bureau of Lands as additional defendants. Magday
filed an amended answer. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of
Lands filed separate answers to the amended complaint.
After the parties had submitted a stipulation of facts, the court, upon plaintiffs' motion for
judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment, which the defendant did not oppose,
rendered judgment on October 3, 1975, dismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiffs
(Annex F, pp. 35- 46, Rollo).
The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration (Annex G, p. 47, Rollo) of the decision. It was
denied by the respondent Judge on December 12, 1975 (Annex H, p. 50, Rollo).
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture
of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason
that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted
to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact
that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the
nature of a donation of real property, inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in
order that it may be valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in
the same document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential
formality has not been followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid
effect.
On December 22, 1975, they filed a motion for leave to appeal as paupers (Annex J, p. 52, Rollo)
and on December 23, 1975, they filed a notice of appeal (Annex I, p. 51, Rollo). The trial court
granted on January 19, 1976 their motion to appeal as paupers (Annex K, p. 55, Rollo).
Believing that as pauper litigants they did not have to submit a record on appeal, they waited for
the trial court to elevate the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals as provided in
Section 16, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. On June 16, 1976, respondent Judge dismissed the
appeal for failure to file a record on appeal (Annex L, p. 56, Rollo). A motion for reconsideration
(Annex M, p. 57, Rollo) of the dismissal order was filed by the appellants on July 26, 1976. On
August 10, 1976, they mailed their record on appeal to the Court. On August 23, 1976, the lower
court denied their motion for reconsideration (Annex 0, p. 60, Rollo). Hence, this petition
for certiorari by the appellants raising the lone legal question of whether for the perfection of an
appeal by a pauper litigant, the timely submission of a record on appeal is required.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.
Under the Rules of Court then in force, a record on appeal was indeed required to be filed by a
pauper appellant although it did not have to be printed. As argued by the Solicitor General in his
brief.
Petitioners contend, however, that having been allowed by the lower court to appeal as paupers,
they are not required to file a record on appeal since the entire record of the case shall be
17
transmitted to the appellate court and the case shall be heard upon the original record so
transmitted without printing the same.
G.R. No. 188056
January 8, 2013
SPOUSES
AUGUSTO
G.
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
JUSTICE, Respondent.
Sec. 16, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, provides:
Sec. 16. Appeal by pauper. — Where a party desiring to appeal shall establish to the satisfaction
of the trial court that he is a pauper and unable to pay the expenses of prosecuting the appeal,
and that the case is of such importance, by reason of the amount involved, or the nature of the
questions raised, that it ought to be reviewed by the appellate court, the trial judge may enter
an order entitling the party to appeal as pauper. The clerk shall transmit to the appellate court
the entire record of the case, including the evidence taken on trial and the record on appeal, and
the case shall be heard in the appellate court upon the original record so transmitted without
printing the same.' (Emphasis types supplied.)
DACUDAO
AND
RAUL
GONZALES
M.
OFELIA
OF
R.
THE
DACUDAO, Petitioners,
DEPARTMENT
OF
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioners - residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were among the investors whom Celso G.
Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group) allegedly
defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that earned them check payments
that were dishonored. After their written demands for the return of their investments went
unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et
al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City on February 6, 2009. Three of the cases were
docketed as NPS Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-A-00356, Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-00752, and
Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-00753.1
'It is clear that even a pauper litigant is required to file a record on appeal. What is not required
of him is the filing of a printed record on appeal, and, of course, an appeal bond, since the cited
Rule is designed to help the pauper litigant who may not be able to pay the expenses of
prosecuting the appeal. In contrast, Sec. 17 of the same Rule 41 which refers to appeals
in certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and employee's liability cases categorically
provides that 'the original record of the case shall be transmitted to the appellate court in lieu
of the record on appeal.' In other words, appeals in special civil actions do not require record on
appeal; they are perfected by the mere filing of the notice of appeal (Embroidery and Apparel
Control and Inspection Board vs. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 517 [1967]).
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182
(DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors
to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ
Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action.
DO No. 182 reads:2
All cases against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr., et al. under Legacy Group of Companies, may be
filed with the docket section of the National Prosecution Service, Department of Justice, Padre
Faura, Manila and shall be forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special Panel for assignment and
distribution to panel members, per Department Order No. 84 dated February 13, 2009.
However, cases already filed against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr. et al. of Legacy group of
Companies in your respective offices with the exemption of the cases filed in Cagayan de Oro
City which is covered by Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, should be forwarded to the
Secretariat of the Special Panel at Room 149, Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila, for
proper disposition.
For information and guidance.
'Indeed, records on appeal have been filed by pauper litigants as a matter of course (Tiozon vs.
Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 284 ,[1976]).' (pp. 7-9, Brief for the Respondents; p. 109, Rollo.)
However, under B.P. Blg. 129, which has overtaken this case before it could be decided, a record
on appeal is no longer required for the perfection of an appeal. This new rule was given retroactive
effect in Alday vs. Camilon, 120 SCRA 521 where We Ruled:
The reorganization having been declared to have been completed, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is
now in full force and effect. A record on appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal. The
same proviso appears in Section 18 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on
January 11, 1983. Being procedural in nature, those provisions may be applied retroactively for
the benefit of petitioners, as appellants. 'Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural
laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.' (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764).'
Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ.3
WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 3, 1975, of the trial court and its orders of June 16, 1976
and August 23, 1976 are hereby set aside. The trial court is hereby ordered to forward the entire
records of Civil Case No. 1201 to the Court of Appeals for the determination and disposition of the
petitioners' appeal on the merits.
Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court via petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of
discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They claim that DO No. 182 violated their right to due process,
their right to the equal protection of the laws, and their right to the speedy disposition of cases.
They insist that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against
enactment of laws with retroactive effect.
Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of DOJ Memorandum dated March 2,
2009 exempting from the coverage of DO No. No. 182 all the cases for syndicated estafa already
filed and pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City. They aver that DOJ
Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violated their right to equal protection under the Constitution.
18
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent Secretary of Justice, maintains
the validity of DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, and prays that the petition
be dismissed for its utter lack of merit.
In People v. Cuaresma, the Court has also amplified the need for strict adherence to the policy of
hierarchy of courts. There, noting "a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have
their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed
upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land," the Court has
cautioned lawyers and litigants against taking a direct resort to the highest tribunal, viz:
Issues
x x x. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this
Court with Regional Trial Courts x x x, which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their
respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court
of Appeals x x x, although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14,
1981, the latter's competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as
according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard
for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a
policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which
are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals in this regard, supra— resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction" — was evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto
of the burden of dealing with applications for the extraordinary writs which, but for the expansion
of the Appellate Court corresponding jurisdiction, would have had to be filed with it.1âwphi1
The following issues are now to be resolved, to wit:
1. Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus directly
to the Court?
2. Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182?
3. Did DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violate petitioners’
constitutionally guaranteed rights?
Ruling
The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being bereft of substance and merit, is
dismissed.
Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the Court
with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering therein any special,
important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the petition.
We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum.4 An undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the dismissal
of the recourse. In Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion,5 we explained why, to wit:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms
that the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is
designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the
competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act
on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when
absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the
policy. This was why the Court stressed in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto:
The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration for the information and evidence of
all concerned, that it will not only continue to enforce the policy, but will require a more strict
observance thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum from which
to seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances. As a rule, the Court is a court of last
resort, not a court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings the petitions for the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy
on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly defined and enjoined in Section 4
of Rule 65, Rules of Court, viz:
Section 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or
new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall
be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed
in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
x x x. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily
perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It
cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its
original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where
absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that
jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of
Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason
or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary
writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either
of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented. This is and
should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe. (Emphasis supplied)
19
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the
petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.6
to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused,
not the fiscal.11
There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public prosecutor’s power
to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature. Still, this characterization is true
only to the extent that the public prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the executive
department exercising powers akin to those of a court of law.
Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ direct resort to the Court was permissible,
the petition must still be dismissed.
The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.7 "The sole office of the writ of
certiorari," according to Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:8
x x x is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough
to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either
that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded
a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted
in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
But the limited similarity between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial body quickly
endsthere. For sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court of law or
a legislative office that affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rulemaking; it performs adjudicatory functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights
of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same effect as the judgments of a court of
law. In contrast, that is not the effect whenever a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary
investigation to determine probable cause in order to file a criminal information against a person
properly charged with the offense, or whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public
prosecutor’s orders or resolutions.
Petitioners have self-styled their petition to be also for prohibition. However, we do not see how
that can be. They have not shown in their petition in what manner and at what point the Secretary
of Justice, in handing out the assailed issuances, acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On the other hand, we
already indicated why the issuances were not infirmed by any defect of jurisdiction. Hence, the
blatant omissions of the petition transgressed Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must concur,
namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c)
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.9 The
burden of proof lies on petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed order was issued without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or
otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To start with, they merely alleged
that the Secretary of Justice had acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction. Also, the petition
did not show that the Secretary of Justice was an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Instead, the Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any judicial or quasijudicial functions because his questioned issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure his
subordinates’ efficiency and economy in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of all the
cases involving the Legacy Group. The function involved was purely executive or administrative.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto,
and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3,
Rule 46. (2a) Similarly, the petition could not be one for mandamus, which is a remedy available
only when "any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other
is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court."12 The main objective
of mandamus is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent.
Plainly enough, the writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion
or to compel a course of conduct,13 which, it quickly seems to us, was what petitioners would have
the Secretary of Justice do in their favor. Consequently, their petition has not indicated how and
where the Secretary of Justice’s assailed issuances excluded them from the use and enjoyment of
a right or office to which they were unquestionably entitled.
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a quasijudicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding.
Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public
prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of
Appeals,10 the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding, stating:
x x x the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who
may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe
that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said
20
Thirdly, there is no question that DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong presumption of its validity. In
ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima,14 the Court has extended the presumption of validity to
legislative issuances as well as to rules and regulations issued by administrative agencies, saying:
nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to
some legitimate government end.19
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, the
Secretary of Justice took into account the relative distance between Cagayan de Oro, where many
complainants against the Legacy Group resided, and Manila, where the preliminary investigations
would be conducted by the special panel. He also took into account that the cases had already
been filed in the City Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan de Oro at the time he issued DO No. 182.
Given the considerable number of complainants residing in Cagayan de Oro City, the Secretary of
Justice was fully justified in excluding the cases commenced in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of
DO No. 182. The classification taken into consideration by the Secretary of Justice was really valid.
Resultantly, petitioners could not inquire into the wisdom behind the exemption upon the ground
that the non-application of the exemption to them would cause them some inconvenience.
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law
which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules
and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been
written in the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate
case by a competent court.15
DO No. 182 was issued pursuant to Department Order No. 84 that the Secretary of Justice had
promulgated to govern the performance of the mandate of the DOJ to "administer the criminal
justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof"16 as expressed in Republic Act
No. 10071 (Prosecution Service Act of 2010) and Section 3, Chapter I, Title III and Section 1,
Chapter I, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).
Fifthly, petitioners contend that DO No. 182 violated their right to the speedy disposition of cases
guaranteed by the Constitution. They posit that there would be considerable delay in the resolution
of their cases that would definitely be "a flagrant transgression of petitioners’ constitutional rights
to speedy disposition of their cases."20
To overcome this strong presumption of validity of the questioned issuances, it became incumbent
upon petitioners to prove their unconstitutionality and invalidity, either by showing that the
Administrative Code of 1987 did not authorize the Secretary of Justice to issue DO No. 182, or by
demonstrating that DO No. 182 exceeded the bounds of the Administrative Code of 1987 and other
pertinent laws. They did not do so. They must further show that the performance of the DOJ’s
functions under the Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws did not call for the
impositions laid down by the assailed issuances. That was not true here, for DO No 182 did not
deprive petitioners in any degree of their right to seek redress for the alleged wrong done against
them by the Legacy Group. Instead, the issuances were designed to assist petitioners and others
like them expedite the prosecution, if warranted under the law, of all those responsible for the
wrong through the creation of the special panel of state prosecutors and prosecution attorneys in
order to conduct a nationwide and comprehensive preliminary investigation and prosecution of the
cases. Thereby, the Secretary of Justice did not act arbitrarily or oppressively against petitioners.
We cannot favor their contention.
In The Ombudsman v. Jurado,21 the Court has clarified that although the Constitution guarantees
the right to the speedy disposition of cases, such speedy disposition is a flexible concept. To
properly define that concept, the facts and circumstances surrounding each case must be
evaluated and taken into account. There occurs a violation of the right to a speedy disposition of
a case only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays,
or when unjustified postponements of the trial are sought and secured, or when, without cause or
justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried.22 It is cogent to mention that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not
determinant of the concept.23
Fourthly, petitioners attack the exemption from the consolidation decreed in DO No. 182 of the
cases filed or pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City, claiming that
the exemption traversed the constitutional guaranty in their favor of the equal protection of law.17
The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. was ordered obviously to obtain
expeditious justice for the parties with the least cost and vexation to them. Inasmuch as the cases
filed involved similar or related questions to be dealt with during the preliminary investigation, the
Secretary of Justice rightly found the consolidation of the cases to be the most feasible means of
promoting the efficient use of public resources and of having a comprehensive investigation of the
cases.
The exemption is covered by the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, to wit:
It has come to the attention of the undersigned that cases for syndicated estafa were filed with
your office against officers of the Legacy Group of Companies. Considering the distance of the
place of complainants therein to Manila, your Office is hereby exempted from the directive
previously issued by the undersigned requiring prosecution offices to forward the records of all
cases involving Legacy Group of Companies to the Task Force.
On the other hand, we do not ignore the possibility that there would be more cases reaching the
DOJ in addition to those already brought by petitioners and other parties. Yet, any delays in
petitioners’ cases occasioned by such other and subsequent cases should not warrant the
invalidation of DO No. 182. The Constitution prohibits only the delays that are unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive, and tend to render rights nugatory.24 In fine, we see neither undue
delays, nor any violation of the right of petitioners to the speedy disposition of their cases.
Anent the foregoing, you are hereby directed to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases
involving the Legacy Group of Companies filed in your office with dispatch and to file the
corresponding informations if evidence warrants and to prosecute the same in court.
Sixthly, petitioners assert that the assailed issuances should cover only future cases against Delos
Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being investigated. They maintain that DO No. 182 was
issued in violation of the prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.
Petitioners’ attack deserves no consideration. The equal protection clause of the Constitution does
not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction; what
it requires is simply equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification.18 Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right
21
Petitioners’ assertion is baseless.
G.R. No. L-66826 August 19, 1988
As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such
exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a
statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away vested
rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already existing
rights.25 A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. All procedural laws are retroactive
in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person
who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches to or arises from
procedural laws.
BANK
OF
THE
PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ZSHORNACK respondents.
CORTES, J.:
The original parties to this case were Rizaldy T. Zshornack and the Commercial Bank and Trust
Company of the Philippines [hereafter referred to as "COMTRUST."] In 1980, the Bank of the
Philippine Islands (hereafter referred to as BPI absorbed COMTRUST through a corporate merger,
and was substituted as party to the case.
Finally, petitioners have averred but failed to establish that DO No. 182 constituted obstruction of
justice. This ground of the petition, being unsubstantiated, was unfounded.
Rizaldy Zshornack initiated proceedings on June 28,1976 by filing in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal — Caloocan City a complaint against COMTRUST alleging four causes of action. Except for
the third cause of action, the CFI ruled in favor of Zshornack. The bank appealed to the
Intermediate Appellate Court which modified the CFI decision absolving the bank from liability on
the fourth cause of action. The pertinent portions of the judgment, as modified, read:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant COMTRUST to restore to the dollar savings account of plaintiff (No.
25-4109) the amount of U.S $1,000.00 as of October 27, 1975 to earn interest together with
the remaining balance of the said account at the rate fixed by the bank for dollar deposits
under Central Bank Circular 343;
2. Ordering defendant COMTRUST to return to the plaintiff the amount of U.S. $3,000.00
immediately upon the finality of this decision, without interest for the reason that the said
amount was merely held in custody for safekeeping, but was not actually deposited with the
defendant COMTRUST because being cash currency, it cannot by law be deposited with
plaintiffs dollar account and defendant's only obligation is to return the same to plaintiff upon
demand;
5. Ordering defendant COMTRUST to pay plaintiff in the amount of P8,000.00 as damages in
the concept of litigation expenses and attorney's fees suffered by plaintiff as a result of the
failure of the defendant bank to restore to his (plaintiffs) account the amount of U.S. $1,000.00
and to return to him (plaintiff) the U.S. $3,000.00 cash left for safekeeping.
Costs against defendant COMTRUST.
Nonetheless, it is not amiss to reiterate that the authority of the Secretary of Justice to assume
jurisdiction over matters involving the investigation of crimes and the prosecution of offenders is
fully sanctioned by law. Towards that end, the Secretary of Justice exercises control and
supervision over all the regional, provincial, and city prosecutors of the country; has broad
discretion in the discharge of the DOJ’s functions; and administers the DOJ and its adjunct offices
and agencies by promulgating rules and regulations to carry out their objectives, policies and
functions.
Consequently, unless and until the Secretary of Justice acts beyond the bounds of his authority,
or arbitrarily, or whimsically, or oppressively, any person or entity who may feel to be thereby
aggrieved or adversely affected should have no right to call for the invalidation or nullification of
the rules and regulations issued by, as well as other actions taken by the Secretary of Justice.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the omnibus petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
for lack of merit.
Petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.
Undaunted, the bank comes to this Court praying that it be totally absolved from any liability to
Zshornack. The latter not having appealed the Court of Appeals decision, the issues facing this
Court are limited to the bank's liability with regard to the first and second causes of action and its
liability for damages.
1. We first consider the first cause of action, On the dates material to this case, Rizaldy Zshornack
and his wife, Shirley Gorospe, maintained in COMTRUST, Quezon City Branch, a dollar savings
account and a peso current account.
On October 27, 1975, an application for a dollar draft was accomplished by Virgilio V. Garcia,
Assistant Branch Manager of COMTRUST Quezon City, payable to a certain Leovigilda D. Dizon in
the amount of $1,000.00. In the application, Garcia indicated that the amount was to be charged
to Dollar Savings Acct. No. 25-4109, the savings account of the Zshornacks; the charges for
commission, documentary stamp tax and others totalling P17.46 were to be charged to Current
22
Acct. No. 210465-29, again, the current account of the Zshornacks. There was no indication of the
name of the purchaser of the dollar draft.
December 8, 1975
MR. RIZALDY T. ZSHORNACK
&/OR MRS SHIRLEY E. ZSHORNACK
Sir/Madam:
We acknowledged (sic) having received from you today the
sum of US DOLLARS: THREE THOUSAND ONLY
(US$3,000.00) for safekeeping.
Received by:
(Sgd.) VIRGILIO V. GARCIA
On the same date, October 27,1975, COMTRUST, under the signature of Virgilio V. Garcia, issued
a check payable to the order of Leovigilda D. Dizon in the sum of US $1,000 drawn on the Chase
Manhattan Bank, New York, with an indication that it was to be charged to Dollar Savings Acct.
No. 25-4109.
When Zshornack noticed the withdrawal of US$1,000.00 from his account, he demanded an
explanation from the bank. In answer, COMTRUST claimed that the peso value of the withdrawal
was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, Jr., brother of Rizaldy, on October 27, 1975 when he
(Ernesto) encashed with COMTRUST a cashier's check for P8,450.00 issued by the Manila Banking
Corporation payable to Ernesto.
It was also alleged in the complaint that despite demands, the bank refused to return the money.
In its answer, COMTRUST averred that the US$3,000 was credited to Zshornack's peso current
account at prevailing conversion rates.
Upon consideration of the foregoing facts, this Court finds no reason to disturb the ruling of both
the trial court and the Appellate Court on the first cause of action. Petitioner must be held liable
for the unauthorized withdrawal of US$1,000.00 from private respondent's dollar account.
It must be emphasized that COMTRUST did not deny specifically under oath the authenticity and
due execution of the above instrument.
In its desperate attempt to justify its act of withdrawing from its depositor's savings account, the
bank has adopted inconsistent theories. First, it still maintains that the peso value of the amount
withdrawn was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, Jr. when the latter encashed the Manilabank
Cashier's Check. At the same time, the bank claims that the withdrawal was made pursuant to an
agreement where Zshornack allegedly authorized the bank to withdraw from his dollar savings
account such amount which, when converted to pesos, would be needed to fund his peso current
account. If indeed the peso equivalent of the amount withdrawn from the dollar account was
credited to the peso current account, why did the bank still have to pay Ernesto?
During trial, it was established that on December 8, 1975 Zshornack indeed delivered to the bank
US $3,000 for safekeeping. When he requested the return of the money on May 10, 1976,
COMTRUST explained that the sum was disposed of in this manner: US$2,000.00 was sold on
December 29, 1975 and the peso proceeds amounting to P14,920.00 were deposited to
Zshornack's current account per deposit slip accomplished by Garcia; the remaining US$1,000.00
was sold on February 3, 1976 and the peso proceeds amounting to P8,350.00 were deposited to
his current account per deposit slip also accomplished by Garcia.
Aside from asserting that the US$3,000.00 was properly credited to Zshornack's current account
at prevailing conversion rates, BPI now posits another ground to defeat private respondent's claim.
It now argues that the contract embodied in the document is the contract of depositum (as defined
in Article 1962, New Civil Code), which banks do not enter into. The bank alleges that Garcia
exceeded his powers when he entered into the transaction. Hence, it is claimed, the bank cannot
be liable under the contract, and the obligation is purely personal to Garcia.
At any rate, both explanations are unavailing. With regard to the first explanation, petitioner bank
has not shown how the transaction involving the cashier's check is related to the transaction
involving the dollar draft in favor of Dizon financed by the withdrawal from Rizaldy's dollar account.
The two transactions appear entirely independent of each other. Moreover, Ernesto Zshornack,
Jr., possesses a personality distinct and separate from Rizaldy Zshornack. Payment made to
Ernesto cannot be considered payment to Rizaldy.
Before we go into the nature of the contract entered into, an important point which arises on the
pleadings, must be considered.
As to the second explanation, even if we assume that there was such an agreement, the evidence
do not show that the withdrawal was made pursuant to it. Instead, the record reveals that the
amount withdrawn was used to finance a dollar draft in favor of Leovigilda D. Dizon, and not to
fund the current account of the Zshornacks. There is no proof whatsoever that peso Current
Account No. 210-465-29 was ever credited with the peso equivalent of the US$1,000.00 withdrawn
on October 27, 1975 from Dollar Savings Account No. 25-4109.
The second cause of action is based on a document purporting to be signed by COMTRUST, a copy
of which document was attached to the complaint. In short, the second cause of action was based
on an actionable document. It was therefore incumbent upon the bank to specifically deny under
oath the due execution of the document, as prescribed under Rule 8, Section 8, if it desired: (1)
to question the authority of Garcia to bind the corporation; and (2) to deny its capacity to enter
into such contract. [See, E.B. Merchant v. International Banking Corporation, 6 Phil. 314 (1906).]
No sworn answer denying the due execution of the document in question, or questioning the
authority of Garcia to bind the bank, or denying the bank's capacity to enter into the contract, was
ever filed. Hence, the bank is deemed to have admitted not only Garcia's authority, but also the
bank's power, to enter into the contract in question.
2. As for the second cause of action, the complaint filed with the trial court alleged that on
December 8, 1975, Zshornack entrusted to COMTRUST, thru Garcia, US $3,000.00 cash (popularly
known as greenbacks) for safekeeping, and that the agreement was embodied in a document, a
copy of which was attached to and made part of the complaint. The document reads:
Makati Cable Address:
Philippines "COMTRUST"
COMMERCIAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
of the Philippines
Quezon City Branch
In the past, this Court had occasion to explain the reason behind this procedural requirement.
23
The reason for the rule enunciated in the foregoing authorities will, we think, be readily
appreciated. In dealing with corporations the public at large is bound to rely to a large extent
upon outward appearances. If a man is found acting for a corporation with the external indicia
of authority, any person, not having notice of want of authority, may usually rely upon those
appearances; and if it be found that the directors had permitted the agent to exercise that
authority and thereby held him out as a person competent to bind the corporation, or had
acquiesced in a contract and retained the benefit supposed to have been conferred by it, the
corporation will be bound, notwithstanding the actual authority may never have been granted
2. Transactions in the assets described below and all dealings in them of whatever nature,
including, where applicable their exportation and importation, shall NOT be effected, except with
respect to deposit accounts included in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of this paragraph, when such
deposit accounts are owned by and in the name of, banks.
(a) Any and all assets, provided they are held through, in, or with banks or banking institutions
located in the Philippines, including money, checks, drafts, bullions bank drafts, deposit
accounts (demand, time and savings), all debts, indebtedness or obligations, financial brokers
and investment houses, notes, debentures, stocks, bonds, coupons, bank acceptances,
mortgages, pledges, liens or other rights in the nature of security, expressed in foreign
currencies, or if payable abroad, irrespective of the currency in which they are expressed, and
belonging to any person, firm, partnership, association, branch office, agency, company or
other unincorporated body or corporation residing or located within the Philippines;
... Whether a particular officer actually possesses the authority which he assumes to exercise is
frequently known to very few, and the proof of it usually is not readily accessible to the stranger
who deals with the corporation on the faith of the ostensible authority exercised by some of the
corporate officers. It is therefore reasonable, in a case where an officer of a corporation has
made a contract in its name, that the corporation should be required, if it denies his authority,
to state such defense in its answer. By this means the plaintiff is apprised of the fact that the
agent's authority is contested; and he is given an opportunity to adduce evidence showing either
that the authority existed or that the contract was ratified and approved. [Ramirez v. Orientalist
Co. and Fernandez, 38 Phil. 634, 645- 646 (1918).]
(b) Any and all assets of the kinds included and/or described in subparagraph (a) above,
whether or not held through, in, or with banks or banking institutions, and existent within the
Philippines, which belong to any person, firm, partnership, association, branch office, agency,
company or other unincorporated body or corporation not residing or located within the
Philippines;
Petitioner's argument must also be rejected for another reason. The practical effect of absolving a
corporation from liability every time an officer enters into a contract which is beyond corporate
powers, even without the proper allegation or proof that the corporation has not authorized nor
ratified the officer's act, is to cast corporations in so perfect a mold that transgressions and wrongs
by such artificial beings become impossible [Bissell v. Michigan Southern and N.I.R. Cos 22 N.Y
258 (1860).] "To say that a corporation has no right to do unauthorized acts is only to put forth a
very plain truism but to say that such bodies have no power or capacity to err is to impute to them
an excellence which does not belong to any created existence with which we are acquainted. The
distinction between power and right is no more to be lost sight of in respect to artificial than in
respect to natural persons." [Ibid.]
(c) Any and all assets existent within the Philippines including money, checks, drafts, bullions,
bank drafts, all debts, indebtedness or obligations, financial securities commonly dealt in by
bankers, brokers and investment houses, notes, debentures, stock, bonds, coupons, bank
acceptances, mortgages, pledges, liens or other rights in the nature of security expressed in
foreign currencies, or if payable abroad, irrespective of the currency in which they are
expressed, and belonging to any person, firm, partnership, association, branch office, agency,
company or other unincorporated body or corporation residing or located within the Philippines.
4. (a) All receipts of foreign exchange shall be sold daily to the Central Bank by those authorized
to deal in foreign exchange. All receipts of foreign exchange by any person, firm, partnership,
association, branch office, agency, company or other unincorporated body or corporation shall
be sold to the authorized agents of the Central Bank by the recipients within one business day
following the receipt of such foreign exchange. Any person, firm, partnership, association, branch
office, agency, company or other unincorporated body or corporation, residing or located within
the Philippines, who acquires on and after the date of this Circular foreign exchange shall not,
unless licensed by the Central Bank, dispose of such foreign exchange in whole or in part, nor
receive less than its full value, nor delay taking ownership thereof except as such delay is
customary; Provided, further, That within one day upon taking ownership, or receiving payment,
of foreign exchange the aforementioned persons and entities shall sell such foreign exchange to
designated agents of the Central Bank.
Having determined that Garcia's act of entering into the contract binds the corporation, we now
determine the correct nature of the contract, and its legal consequences, including its
enforceability.
The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by the bank
for safekeeping. The subsequent acts of the parties also show that the intent of the parties was
really for the bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it to Zshornack at a later time, Thus,
Zshornack demanded the return of the money on May 10, 1976, or over five months later.
The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to
another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of
the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some
other contract.
8. Strict observance of the provisions of this Circular is enjoined; and any person, firm or
corporation, foreign or domestic, who being bound to the observance thereof, or of such other
rules, regulations or directives as may hereafter be issued in implementation of this Circular,
shall fail or refuse to comply with, or abide by, or shall violate the same, shall be subject to the
penal sanctions provided in the Central Bank Act.
Note that the object of the contract between Zshornack and COMTRUST was foreign exchange.
Hence, the transaction was covered by Central Bank Circular No. 20, Restrictions on Gold and
Foreign Exchange Transactions, promulgated on December 9, 1949, which was in force at the time
the parties entered into the transaction involved in this case. The circular provides:
Paragraph 4 (a) above was modified by Section 6 of Central Bank Circular No. 281, Regulations
on Foreign Exchange, promulgated on November 26, 1969 by limiting its coverage to Philippine
residents only. Section 6 provides:
24
SEC. 6. All receipts of foreign exchange by any resident person, firm, company or corporation
shall be sold to authorized agents of the Central Bank by the recipients within one business day
following the receipt of such foreign exchange. Any resident person, firm, company or
corporation residing or located within the Philippines, who acquires foreign exchange shall not,
unless authorized by the Central Bank, dispose of such foreign exchange in whole or in part, nor
receive less than its full value, nor delay taking ownership thereof except as such delay is
customary; Provided, That, within one business day upon taking ownership or receiving payment
of foreign exchange the aforementioned persons and entities shall sell such foreign exchange to
the authorized agents of the Central Bank.
G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE
BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE
BORJA
(deceased)
as
Children
of
Josefa
Tangco, appellees,
vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco
de Borja, appellant. .
G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972
As earlier stated, the document and the subsequent acts of the parties show that they intended
the bank to safekeep the foreign exchange, and return it later to Zshornack, who alleged in his
complaint that he is a Philippine resident. The parties did not intended to sell the US dollars to the
Central Bank within one business day from receipt. Otherwise, the contract of depositum would
never have been entered into at all.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA,
special
Administratrix
appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant.
Since the mere safekeeping of the greenbacks, without selling them to the Central Bank within
one business day from receipt, is a transaction which is not authorized by CB Circular No. 20, it
must be considered as one which falls under the general class of prohibited transactions. Hence,
pursuant to Article 5 of the Civil Code, it is void, having been executed against the provisions of a
mandatory/prohibitory law. More importantly, it affords neither of the parties a cause of action
against the other. "When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the
contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall
have no cause of action against each other. . ." [Art. 1411, New Civil Code.] The only remedy is
one on behalf of the State to prosecute the parties for violating the law.
G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972
TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late Francisco
de
Borja, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Josefa
Tangco, defendant-appellant.
L-28040
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for administrator-appellee.
Quiogue & Quiogue for appellee Matilde de Borja.
Andres Matias for appellee Cayetano de Borja.
Sevilla & Aquino for appellant.
We thus rule that Zshornack cannot recover under the second cause of action.
3. Lastly, we find the P8,000.00 awarded by the courts a quo as damages in the concept of
litigation expenses and attorney's fees to be reasonable. The award is sustained.
L-28568
Sevilla & Aquino for special administratrix-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for oppositor-appellant.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner is ordered to restore to
the dollar savings account of private respondent the amount of US$1,000.00 as of October 27,
1975 to earn interest at the rate fixed by the bank for dollar savings deposits. Petitioner is further
ordered to pay private respondent the amount of P8,000.00 as damages. The other causes of
action of private respondent are ordered dismissed.
L-28611
Sevilla & Aquino for plaintiff-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir and David Gueverra for defendant-appellant.
Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja,
special administratrix of the testate estate of Francisco de Borja,1 from the approval of a
compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in its Special Proceeding
No. R-7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja, Administrator".
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the disapproval of the same
compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special
Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja,
Special Administratrix".
25
And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala
Poblacion, which is the main object of the aforesaid compromise agreement, as the separate and
exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset of the community with
his first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate estate,
which is under administrator in Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, Branch II.
Sur con los herederos de Marcelo de Borja; y por el Este con los terrenos de la Familia
Maronilla
with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount of P0.30 per square
meter.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja
the total amount of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000) Philippine Currency, in cash,
which represent P200,000 as his share in the payment and P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the
heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja and this shall be considered as
full and complete payment and settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late
Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and
Sp. Proc. No. 7866-Rizal, respectively, and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her
favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or
Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise. The funds for this
payment shall be taken from and shall depend upon the receipt of full payment of the proceeds
of the sale of Jalajala, "Poblacion."
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October
1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In
1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de
Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the
sole administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco
de Borja allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death,
Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955,
she was appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was
questioned in said proceeding.
3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that particular
obligation incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, now Development Bank of the Philippines, amounting to approximately
P30,000.00 and also assumes payment of her 1/5 share of the Estate and Inheritance taxes
on the Estate of the late Francisco de Borja or the sum of P3,500.00, more or less, which shall
be deducted by the buyer of Jalajala, "Poblacion" from the payment to be made to Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under paragraph 2 of this Agreement and paid directly to the
Development Bank of the Philippines and the heirs-children of Francisco de Borja.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been
plagued with several court suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some eighteen
(18) cases remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone
has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to all these
litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963,2 by and between
"[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally
and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse
of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her
lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr." The terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are as
follows:
AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally
and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,
AND
The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr.
WITNESSETH
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and settle, with finality, the
various court litigations, controversies, claims, counterclaims, etc., between them in
connection with the administration, settlement, partition, adjudication and distribution of the
assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse
of Francisco de Borja.
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily and without any
reservations to enter into and execute this agreement under the following terms and
conditions:
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly to Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of the payment due her under paragraph 2 of this
Agreement (approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
de Borja, corresponding certified checks/treasury warrants, who, in turn, will issue the
corresponding receipt to Jose de Borja.
5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, and Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja, for themselves and for their heirs, successors, executors, administrators,
and assigns, hereby forever mutually renounce, withdraw, waive, remise, release and
discharge any and all manner of action or actions, cause or causes of action, suits, debts, sum
or sums of money, accounts, damages, claims and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity,
which they ever had, or now have or may have against each other, more specifically Sp.
Proceedings Nos. 7866 and 1955, CFI-Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case No.
3033, CFI Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as the case filed against
Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, the intention being to completely,
absolutely and finally release each other, their heirs, successors, and assigns, from any and
all liability, arising wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, from the administration,
settlement, and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de
Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda.
de de Borja expressly and specifically renounce absolutely her rights as heir over any
hereditary share in the estate of Francisco de Borja.
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties situated in
Jalajala, Rizal, presently under administration in the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc.
No. 7866, Rizal), more specifically described as follows:
Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del Municipio de Pililla de la
Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte Zambrano; al Oeste con Laguna de Bay; por el
26
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the payment under paragraph 4
hereof, shall deliver to the heir Jose de Borja all the papers, titles and documents belonging
to Francisco de Borja which are in her possession and said heir Jose de Borja shall issue in turn
the corresponding receive thereof.
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent
from an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco.
Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana
Ongsingco —
shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of her hereditary share in the
estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, ... and to any
properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and
Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for
consideration or otherwise.
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the sale of the properties
mentioned under paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon receipt of the total and full payment
of the proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala property "Poblacion", otherwise, the non-fulfillment
of the said sale will render this instrument NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT
THEREAFTER.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the
cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja
among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely
the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or
eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any
other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted
or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest
(Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777)3 there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite
contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even
if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the
estate.4 Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately
adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the
validity of the transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations
between the parties (the approving order of the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec.
App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and should be dismissed, although such stipulation,
as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the character of a compromise that the law favors,
for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their hands in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12 October 1963
to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August
1966, to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise
agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme
Court G.R. case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval
(G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963 is not
disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1)
the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de
Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco
de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and
effect.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja,
Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code.
Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed
independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were
not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the
Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate
Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein
the Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that
the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will,
is against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial
settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the
decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by
their judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having been submitted to
the Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, those
circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja personally
and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other,
"the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their individual capacities,
upon the perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the
same. The only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and
approved by the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of
the Civil Code is explicit on the point:
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses
that at the time it was entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision was Section 1,
Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He also relies on the
dissenting opinion of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was expressed
the view that if the parties have already divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will,
the probate of the will is a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different
manner, the probate of the will is worse than useless.
8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but
there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no definite period
for its performance, the same was intended to have a resolutory period of 60 days for its
effectiveness. In support of such contention, it is averred that such a limit was expressly
27
stipulated in an agreement in similar terms entered into by said Ongsingco with the brothers
and sister of Jose de Borja, to wit, Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, all surnamed de Borja, except
that the consideration was fixed at P600,000 (Opposition, Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp.
39- 46) and which contained the following clause:
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is void because
it amounts to a compromise as to her status and marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The
point is without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose de Borja (Annex
"A") describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite admission of her civil status. There
is nothing in the text of the agreement that would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status
as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the cession of her
hereditary rights.
III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation of the sale of the property
mentioned herein and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale by
the herein owner heirs-children of Francisco de Borja, namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde,
all surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no sale of the said property mentioned herein is
consummated, or the non-receipt of the purchase price thereof by the said owners within the
period of sixty (60) days from the date hereof, this agreement will become null and void and of
no further effect.
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija in its order of 21 September 1964, in Special Proceedings No. 832 (Amended Record on
Appeal in L-28568, page 157), that the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963 (Annex "A")
had been abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija, in its order of 21 September 1964, had declared that "no amicable settlement had
been arrived at by the parties", and that Jose de Borja himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had
stated that the proposed amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a party to
this particular contract (Annex 1), and that the same appears not to have been finalized, since it
bears no date, the day being left blank "this — day of October 1963"; and while signed by the
parties, it was not notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, since it carries a proposed
notarial ratification clause. Furthermore, the compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A),
provides in its par. 2 heretofore transcribed that of the total consideration of P800, 000 to be paid
to Ongsingco, P600,000 represent the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde
all surnamed de Borja" which corresponds to the consideration of P600,000 recited in Annex 1,
and that circumstance is proof that the duly notarized contract entered into wit Jose de Borja
under date 12 October 1963 (Annex A), was designed to absorb and supersede the separate
unformalize agreement with the other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days resolutory term in the
contract with the latter (Annex 1) not being repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the formal
compromise with Jose de Borja. It is moreover manifest that the stipulation that the sale of the
Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made within sixty days from the date of the agreement with Jose
de Borja's co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as improper and ineffective, since
the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was to be sold to raise the P800,000 to be paid to
Ongsingco for her share formed part of the estate of Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until
authorized by the Probate Court. The Court of First Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in
approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days counted from the finality of the order now
under appeal, for the carrying out by the parties for the terms of the contract.
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in the order and motion
above-mentioned was the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963, which already had been
formally signed and executed by the parties and duly notarized. What the record discloses is that
some time after its formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to back out from the
compromise agreement, pleading various reasons restated in the opposition to the Court's
approval of Annex "A" (Record on Appeal, L-20840, page 23): that the same was invalid because
of the lapse of the allegedly intended resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was
not preceded by the probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as required by this Court's Guevarra vs.
Guevara ruling; that Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting Ongsingco's status as wife and
widow of Francisco de Borja, etc., all of which objections have been already discussed. It was
natural that in view of the widow's attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to reach a new
settlement or novatory agreement before seeking judicial sanction and enforcement of Annex "A",
since the latter step might ultimately entail a longer delay in attaining final remedy. That the
attempt to reach another settlement failed is apparent from the letter of Ongsingco's counsel to
Jose de Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No. 28040; and
it is more than probable that the order of 21 September 1964 and the motion of 17 June 1964
referred to the failure of the parties' quest for a more satisfactory compromise. But the inability
to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the original compromise (Annex "A") and justifies
the act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court order for its approval and enforcement from the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore described, decreed that the agreement be
ultimately performed within 120 days from the finality of the order, now under appeal.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve
the compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the
estate of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco de
Borja, whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only
her eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown,
that eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija
could not bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of
it in favor of whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by
article 1088 of the present Civil Code:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition,
any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him
for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they
were notified in writing of the sale of the vendor.
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and, therefore, its
order should be upheld, while the contrary resolution of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
should be, and is, reversed.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has affected her
unfavorably, in that while the purchasing power of the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished,
the value of the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is that her delay in receiving the
payment of the agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to her attempts to nullify
the agreement (Annex "A") she had formally entered into with the advice of her counsel, Attorney
Panaguiton. And as to the devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs.
Dizon, L-24561, 30 June 1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if there were
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir
could not be forbidden.
28
to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency and properties of
the estate", is particularly opposite in the present case.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of the Hacienda in
question as owned by the conjugal partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted by the
late Francisco de Borja no less than two times: first, in the Reamended Inventory that, as executor
of the estate of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings No. 7866 of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the Reamended
Accounting of the same date, also filed in the proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the
plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted
therein an inventory dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the Jalajala property among the
"Conjugal Properties of the Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once more,
Tasiana Ongsingco, as administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in Special Proceedings
No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955, an
inventory wherein she listed the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading "Conjugal Property of the
Deceased Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, which are in the possession of the
Administrator of the Testate Estate of the Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special Proceedings No. 7866
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal" (Exhibit "4").
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion),
concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is
the husband's private property (as contended by his second spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or
whether it forms part of the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, presiding) declared that there was adequate
evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of its conjugal character established by Article 160
of the Civil Code.
We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has
become moot and academic, in view of the conclusion reached by this Court in the two preceding
cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana Ongsingco's eventual share
in the estate of her late husband, Francisco de Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with the
accompanying reciprocal quit-claims between the parties. But as the question may affect the rights
of possible creditors and legatees, its resolution is still imperative.
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are plain admissions against
interest made by both Francisco de Borja and the Administratrix of his estate, in the course of
judicial proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts, supporting the legal presumption in favor
of the conjugal community, the Court below declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion)
was not conjugal property, but the private exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja. It did
so on the strength of the following evidences: (a) the sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6
August 1951 (Exhibit "F") that —
He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte, 337
hectareas) adjunto a mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal).
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had been originally acquired
jointly by Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja and their title thereto was
duly registered in their names as co-owners in Land Registration Case No. 528 of the province of
Rizal, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465). Subsequently, in 1931, the
Hacienda was partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja; the
Bagombong section to Bernardo de Borja, and the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded
to Francisco de Borja (V. De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that the entire Hacienda
had been bought at a foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of which amount P25,100 was contributed
by Bernardo de Borja and P15,000. by Marcelo de Borja; that upon receipt of a subsequent demand
from the provincial treasurer for realty taxes the sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his brother Bernardo
that Francisco (son of Marcelo) wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon Bernardo's assent to the
proposal, Marcelo issue a check for P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes and said that the amount
would represent Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The witness further
testified that —
Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by Francisco de Borja when he was
still a bachelor and which he derived from his business transactions. (Hearing, 2 February 1965,
t.s.n., pages 13-15) (Emphasis supplied)
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as —
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena Romero; S. Heirs
of Marcelo de Borja O. Laguna de Bay; containing an area of 13,488,870 sq. m. more or less,
assessed at P297,410. (Record on Appeal, pages 7 and 105)
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Francisco de Borja, instituted a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No.
7452) against Jose de Borja, in his capacity as Administrator of Josefa Tangco (Francisco de Borja's
first wife), seeking to have the Hacienda above described declared exclusive private property of
Francisco, while in his answer defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was conjugal
property of his parents (Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco), conformably to the presumption
established by Article 160 of the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the Civil Code
of 1889), to the effect that:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement overweighed the admissions
in the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant Jose de Borja since probate courts can not
finally determine questions of ownership of inventoried property, but that the testimony of
Gregorio de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the original Hacienda with
his private funds, for which reason that share can not be regarded as conjugal partnership
property, but as exclusive property of the buyer, pursuant to Article 1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889
and Article 148(4) of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory, moral and
exemplary, as well as for attorney's fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano, held that the plaintiff
had adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of the late Francisco de Borja, and his
Administratrix, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose
de Borja then appealed to this Court.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
29
We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place, witness Gregorio de
Borja's testimony as to the source of the money paid by Francisco for his share was plain hearsay,
hence inadmissible and of no probative value, since he was merely repeating what Marcelo de
Borja had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of ascertaining the truth of the statement, since
both Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were already dead when Gregorio testified. In addition, the
statement itself is improbable, since there was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain
to Gregorio how and when Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A
ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in this portion of Gregorio's testimony.
G.R. No. 186550
July 5, 2010
ASIAN
CATHAY
FINANCE
AND
LEASING
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES CESARIO GRAVADOR and NORMA DE VERA and SPOUSES EMMA CONCEPCION
G. DUMIGPI and FEDERICO L. DUMIGPI, Respondents.
DECISION
As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof (ante, page 14) does
not clearly demonstrate that the "mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal) "
refers precisely to the Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits 3 and 4) disclose that there
were two real properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m., assessed
at P44,600, and a much bigger one of 1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda de
Jalajala (Poblacion). To which of these lands did the affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F")
refer to? In addition, Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y exclusivo"
is plainly self-serving, and not admissible in the absence of cross examination.
NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the June 10, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 83197,
setting aside the April 5, 2004 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 9, Bulacan, as
well as its subsequent Resolution3 dated February 11, 2009, denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
On October 22, 1999, petitioner Asian Cathay Finance and Leasing Corporation (ACFLC) extended
a loan of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱800,000.00) 4 to respondent Cesario Gravador, with
respondents Norma de Vera and Emma Concepcion Dumigpi as co-makers. The loan was payable
in sixty (60) monthly installments of ₱24,400.00 each. To secure the loan, respondent Cesario
executed a real estate mortgage5 over his property in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-29234.6
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and
"7") are not conclusive on the conjugal character of the property in question; but as already noted,
they are clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the declarants, Francisco de Borja and
his executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater probative weight than the
self-serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the legal presumption in favor of the
conjugal character of the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted
but actually confirmed by proof. Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda
de Jalajala (Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco.
Respondents paid the initial installment due in November 1999. However, they were unable to pay
the subsequent ones. Consequently, on February 1, 2000, respondents received a letter
demanding payment of ₱1,871,480.00 within five (5) days from receipt thereof. Respondents
requested for an additional period to settle their account, but ACFLC denied the request. Petitioner
filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage with the Office of the Deputy Sheriff of
Malolos, Bulacan.
No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that claims for damages should
be ventilated in the corresponding special proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the
deceased, the same requires no pro announcement from this Court.
On April 7, 2000, respondents filed a suit for annulment of real estate mortgage and promissory
note with damages and prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of
preliminary injunction. Respondents claimed that the real estate mortgage is null and void. They
pointed out that the mortgage does not make reference to the promissory note dated October 22,
1999. The promissory note does not specify the maturity date of the loan, the interest rate, and
the mode of payment; and it illegally imposed liquidated damages. The real estate mortgage, on
the other hand, contains a provision on the waiver of the mortgagor’s right of redemption, a
provision that is contrary to law and public policy. Respondents added that ACFLC violated Republic
Act No. 3765, or the Truth in Lending Act, in the disclosure statement that should be issued to the
borrower. Respondents, thus, claimed that ACFLC’s petition for foreclosure lacked factual and legal
basis, and prayed that the promissory note, real estate mortgage, and any certificate of sale that
might be issued in connection with ACFLC’s petition for extrajudicial foreclosure be declared null
and void. In the alternative, respondents prayed that the court fix their obligation at ₱800,000.00
if the mortgage could not be annulled, and declare as null and void the provisions on the waiver
of mortgagor’s right of redemption and imposition of the liquidated damages. Respondents further
prayed for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, and for the issuance of a
TRO to enjoin ACFLC from foreclosing their property.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case
No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are
reversed and set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three
(3) cases.
30
On April 12, 2000, the RTC issued an Order,7 denying respondents’ application for TRO, as the
acts sought to be enjoined were already fait accompli.
The claim of the [respondents] for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is
dismissed for lack of merit.
On May 12, 2000, ACFLC filed its Answer, denying the material allegations in the complaint and
averring failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action, as defenses. ACFLC claimed
that it was merely exercising its right as mortgagor; hence, it prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint.
ACFLC filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on February 11, 2009.
ACFLC is now before us, faulting the CA for reversing the dismissal of respondents’ complaint. It
points out that respondents are well-educated persons who are familiar with the execution of loan
documents. Thus, they cannot be deceived into signing a document containing provisions that they
are not amenable to. ACFLC ascribes error on the part of the CA for invalidating the interest rates
imposed on respondents’ loan, and the waiver of the right of redemption.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action.
Sustaining the validity of the promissory note and the real estate mortgage, the RTC held that
respondents are well-educated individuals who could not feign naiveté in the execution of the loan
documents. It, therefore, rejected respondents’ claim that ACFLC deceived them into signing the
promissory note, disclosure statement, and deed of real estate mortgage. The RTC further held
that the alleged defects in the promissory note and in the deed of real estate mortgage are too
insubstantial to warrant the nullification of the mortgage. It added that a promissory note is not
one of the essential elements of a mortgage; thus, reference to a promissory note is neither
indispensable nor imperative for the validity of the mortgage. The RTC also upheld the interest
rate and the penalty charge imposed by ACFLC, and the waiver of respondents’ right of redemption
provided in the deed of real estate mortgage.
The appeal lacks merit.
It is true that parties to a loan agreement have a wide latitude to stipulate on any interest rate in
view of Central Bank Circular No. 905, series of 1982, which suspended the Usury Law ceiling on
interest rate effective January 1, 1983. However, interest rates, whenever unconscionable, may
be equitably reduced or even invalidated. In several cases,10 this Court had declared as null and
void stipulations on interest and charges that were found excessive, iniquitous and unconscionable.
The RTC disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence on record and the laws/jurisprudence applicable
thereto, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint in the above-entitled case for
want of cause of action as well as the counterclaim of [petitioner] Asian Cathay Finance & Leasing
Corporation for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees for abject lack of proof to
justify the same.
Records show that the amount of loan obtained by respondents on October 22, 1999 was
₱800,000.00. Respondents paid the installment for November 1999, but failed to pay the
subsequent ones. On February 1, 2000, ACFLC demanded payment of ₱1,871,480.00. In a span
of three months, respondents’ obligation ballooned by more than ₱1,000,000.00. ACFLC failed to
show any computation on how much interest was imposed and on the penalties charged. Thus,
we fully agree with the CA that the amount claimed by ACFLC is unconscionable.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA. On June 10, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed
Decision, reversing the RTC. It held that the amount of ₱1,871,480.00 demanded by ACFLC from
respondents is unconscionable and excessive. Thus, it declared respondents’ principal loan to be
₱800,000.00, and fixed the interest rate at 12% per annum and reduced the penalty charge to
1% per month. It explained that ACFLC could not insist on the interest rate provided on the note
because it failed to provide respondents with the disclosure statement prior to the consummation
of the loan transaction. Finally, the CA invalidated the waiver of respondents’ right of redemption
for reasons of public policy. Thus, the CA ordered:
In Spouses Isagani and Diosdada Castro v. Angelina de Leon Tan, Sps. Concepcion T. Clemente
and Alexander C. Clemente, Sps. Elizabeth T. Carpio and Alvin Carpio, Sps. Marie Rose T. Soliman
and Arvin Soliman and Julius Amiel Tan,11 this Court held:
The imposition of an unconscionable rate of interest on a money debt, even if knowingly and
voluntarily assumed, is immoral and unjust. It is tantamount to a repugnant spoliation and an
iniquitous deprivation of property, repulsive to the common sense of man. It has no support in
law, in principles of justice, or in the human conscience nor is there any reason whatsoever which
may justify such imposition as righteous and as one that may be sustained within the sphere of
public or private morals.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Judgment
is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Affirming the amount of the principal loan under the REM and Disclosure Statement both
dated October 22, 1999 to be ₱800,000.00, subject to:
a. 1% interest per month (12% per annum) on the principal from November 23, 1999 until
the date of the foreclosure sale, less ₱24,000.00 paid by [respondents] as first month
amortization[;]
b. 1% penalty charge per month on the principal from December 23, 1999 until the date of
the foreclosure sale.
2) Declaring par. 14 of the REM as null and void by reason of public policy, and granting
mortgagors a period of one year from the finality of this Decision within which to redeem the
subject property by paying the redemption price as computed under paragraph 1 hereof, plus
one percent (1%) interest thereon from the time of foreclosure up to the time of the actual
redemption pursuant to Section 28, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
Stipulations authorizing the imposition of iniquitous or unconscionable interest are contrary to
morals, if not against the law. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, these contracts are inexistent
and void from the beginning. They cannot be ratified nor the right to set up their illegality as a
defense be waived. The nullity of the stipulation on the usurious interest does not, however, affect
the lender’s right to recover the principal of the loan. Nor would it affect the terms of the real
estate mortgage. The right to foreclose the mortgage remains with the creditors, and said right
can be exercised upon the failure of the debtors to pay the debt due. The debt due is to be
considered without the stipulation of the excessive interest. A legal interest of 12% per annum
will be added in place of the excessive interest formerly imposed.12 The nullification by the CA of
the interest rate and the penalty charge and the consequent imposition of an interest rate of 12%
and penalty charge of 1% per month cannot, therefore, be considered a reversible error.
31
ACFLC next faults the CA for invalidating paragraph 14 of the real estate mortgage which provides
for the waiver of the mortgagor’s right of redemption. It argues that the right of redemption is a
privilege; hence, respondents are at liberty to waive their right of redemption, as they did in this
case.
G.R. No. 94571
April 22, 1991
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary, Budget & Management, HON.
ROZALINA S. CAJUCOM in her capacity as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondents.
Settled is the rule that for a waiver to be valid and effective, it must, in the first place, be couched
in clear and unequivocal terms which will leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up
a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. Additionally, the intention to waive a right or an
advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly.13 Unfortunately, ACFLC failed to convince us
that respondents waived their right of redemption voluntarily.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.
GANCAYCO, J.:
As the CA had taken pains to demonstrate:
The supposed waiver by the mortgagors was contained in a statement made in fine print in the
REM. It was made in the form and language prepared by [petitioner]ACFLC while the
[respondents] merely affixed their signatures or adhesion thereto. It thus partakes of the nature
of a contract of adhesion. It is settled that doubts in the interpretation of stipulations in contracts
of adhesion should be resolved against the party that prepared them. This principle especially
holds true with regard to waivers, which are not presumed, but which must be clearly and
convincingly shown. [Petitioner] ACFLC presented no evidence hence it failed to show the efficacy
of this waiver.
This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic
appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget.
As alleged in the petition, the facts are as follows:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt
service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the
General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion,1 while the appropriations for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.2
Moreover, to say that the mortgagor’s right of redemption may be waived through a fine print in
a mortgage contract is, in the last analysis, tantamount to placing at the mortgagee’s absolute
disposal the property foreclosed. It would render practically nugatory this right that is provided by
law for the mortgagor for reasons of public policy. A contract of adhesion may be struck down as
void and unenforceable for being subversive to public policy, when the weaker party is completely
deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.14
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending
Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended
(Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An
Act Strenghthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its
Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.
In fine, when the redemptioner chooses to exercise his right of redemption, it is the policy of the
law to aid rather than to defeat his right.15 Thus, we affirm the CA in nullifying the waiver of the
right of redemption provided in the real estate mortgage.
There can be no question that petitioners as Senators of the Republic of the Philippines may bring
this suit where a constitutional issue is raised.3 Indeed, even a taxpayer has personality to restrain
unlawful expenditure of public funds.
Finally, ACFLC claims that respondents’ complaint for annulment of mortgage is a collateral attack
on its certificate of title. The argument is specious.
The instant complaint for annulment of mortgage was filed on April 7, 2000, long before the
consolidation of ACFLC’s title over the property. In fact, when respondents filed this suit at the
first instance, the title to the property was still in the name of respondent Cesario. The instant
case was pending with the RTC when ACFLC filed a petition for foreclosure of mortgage and even
when a writ of possession was issued. Clearly, ACFLC’s title is subject to the final outcome of the
present case.1avvphi1
The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D.
1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service
under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.
Respondents contend that the petition involves a pure political question which is the repeal or
amendment of said laws addressed to the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of the legislative body
and not this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 83197 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
In Gonzales,5 the main issue was the unconstitutionality of the presidential veto of certain
provision particularly Section 16 of the General Appropriations Act of 1990, R.A. No. 6831. This
Court, in disposing of the issue, stated —
The political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival
claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It
32
cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by
no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases.
Sec. 1. The judicial power shad be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
With the Senate maintaining that the President's veto is unconstitutional and that charge being
controverted, there is an actual case or justiciable controversy between the Upper House of
Congress and the executive department that may be taken cognizance of by this Court.
of remuneration and other incentives that would make teaching competitive again and
attractive to the best available talents in the nation.
Finally, Mr. Ople recalled that before World War II, teaching competed most successfully
against all other career choices for the best and the brightest of the younger generation. It is
for this reason, he stated, that his proposed amendment if approved, would ensure that
teaching would be restored to its lost glory as the career of choice for the most talented and
most public-spirited of the younger generation in the sense that it would become the
countervailing measure against the continued decline of teaching and the wholesale desertion
of this noble profession presently taking place. He further stated that this would ensure that
the future and the quality of the population would be asserted as a top priority against many
clamorous and importunate but less important claims of the present. (Journal of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 1172)
The questions raised in the instant petition are —
I. IS THE APPROPRIATION OF P86 BILLION IN THE P233 BILLION 1990 BUDGET VIOLATIVE OF
SECTION 5, ARTICLE XIV OF THE CONSTITUTION?
II. ARE PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 AND PD No. 1967 STILL OPERATIVE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION?
III. ARE THEY VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 29(l), ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION?6
However, as against this constitutional intention, P86 Billion is appropriated for debt service while
only P27 Billion is appropriated for the Department of Education in the 1990 budget. It plain,
therefore, that the said appropriation for debt services is inconsistent with the Constitution, hence,
viod (Art. 7, New Civil Code).7
There is thus a justiciable controversy raised in the petition which this Court may properly take
cognizance of On the first issue, the petitioners aver —
According to Sec. 5, Art. XIV of the Constitution:
(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching
will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate
remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.
While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to
"assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract
and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other
means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress
are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest
and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
The reason behind the said provision is stated, thus:
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to upgrade
and improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of teachers has been
doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.008 set aside for the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports under the General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary
allocation among all department budgets. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid
constitutional mandate according highest priority to education.
In explaining his proposed amendment, Mr. Ople stated that all the great and sincere piety
professed by every President and every Congress of the Philippines since the end of World War
II for the economic welfare of the public schoolteachers always ended up in failure and this
failure, he stated, had caused mass defection of the best and brightest teachers to other
careers, including menial jobs in overseas employment and concerted actions by them to
project their grievances, mainly over low pay and abject working conditions.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by
its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt,
the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only a matter
of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of
our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service
bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation
cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
He pointed to the high expectations generated by the February Revolution, especially keen
among public schoolteachers, which at present exacerbate these long frustrated hopes.
Mr. Ople stated that despite the sincerity of all administrations that tried vainly to respond to
the needs of the teachers, the central problem that always defeated their pious intentions was
really the one budgetary priority in the sense that any proposed increase for public
schoolteachers had to be multiplied many times by the number of government employees in
general and their equitable claims to any pay standardization such that the pay rate of teachers
is hopelessly pegged to the rate of government workers in general. This, he stated, foredoomed
the prospect of a significant pay increase for teachers.
Now to the second issue. The petitioners made the following observations:
To begin with, Rep. Act 4860 entitled "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO OBTAIN SUCH FOREIGN LOANS AND CREDITS, OR TO INCUR SUCH FOREIGN
INDEBTEDNESS, AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO FINANCE APPROVED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
PURPOSES OR PROJECTS, AND TO GUARANTEE, IN BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, FOREIGN LOANS OBTAINED OR BONDS ISSUED BY CORPORATIONS OWNED OR
CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
PURPOSES INCLUDING THOSE INCURRED FOR PURPOSES OF RELENDING TO THE PRIVATE
Mr. Ople pointed out that the recognition by the Constitution of the highest priority for public
schoolteachers, and by implication, for all teachers, would ensure that the President and
Congress would be strongly urged by a constitutional mandate to grant to them such a level
33
SECTOR, APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,
provides:
and PD 1967, which provides:
Sec. 1. There is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to effect payments on foreign or domestic
loans, or foreign or domestic loans whereon creditors make a call on the direct and indirect
guarantee of the Republic of the Philippines, obtained by:
a. The Republic of the Philippines the proceeds of which were relent to government-owned
or controlled corporations and/or government financial institutions;
b. government-owned or controlled corporations and/or government financial institutions the
proceeds of which were relent to public or private institutions;
c. government-owned or controlled corporations and/or financial institutions and guaranteed
by the Republic of the Philippines;
d. other public or private institutions and guaranteed by government-owned or controlled
corporations and/or government financial institutions.
Sec. 2. All repayments made by borrower institutions on the loans for whose account advances
were made by the National Treasury will revert to the General Fund.
Sec. 3. In the event that any borrower institution is unable to settle the advances made out of
the appropriation provided therein, the Treasurer of the Philippines shall make the proper
recommendation to the Minister of Finance on whether such advances shall be treated as
equity or subsidy of the National Government to the institution concerned, which shall be
considered in the budgetary program of the Government.
Sec. 2. The total amount of loans, credits and indebtedness, excluding interests, which the
President of the Philippines is authorized to incur under this Act shall not exceed one billion
United States dollars or its equivalent in other foreign currencies at the exchange rate
prevailing at the time the loans, credits and indebtedness are incurred: Provided, however,
That the total loans, credits and indebtedness incurred under this Act shall not exceed two
hundred fifty million in the fiscal year of the approval of this Act, and two hundred fifty million
every fiscal year thereafter, all in United States dollars or its equivalent in other currencies.
Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the President, within thirty days after the opening of every
regular session, to report to the Congress the amount of loans, credits and indebtedness
contracted, as well as the guarantees extended, and the purposes and projects for which the
loans, credits and indebtedness were incurred, and the guarantees extended, as well as such
loans which may be reloaned to Filipino owned or controlled corporations and similar purposes.
Sec. 6. The Congress shall appropriate the necessary amount out of any funds in the National
Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to cover the payment of the principal and interest on
such loans, credits or indebtedness as and when they shall become due.
In the "Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing Fiscal Year 1990," which accompanied
her budget message to Congress, the President of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino, stated:
Sources Appropriation
The P233.5 billion budget proposed for fiscal year 1990 will require P132.1 billion of new
programmed appropriations out of a total P155.3 billion in new legislative authorization from
Congress. The rest of the budget, totalling P101.4 billion, will be sourced from existing
appropriations: P98.4 billion from Automatic Appropriations and P3.0 billion from Continuing
Appropriations (Fig. 4).
However, after the declaration of martial law, President Marcos issued PD 81 amending Section 6,
thus:
Sec. 7. Section six of the same Act is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 6. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and in order to enable the
Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking
charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures, securities or other
evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred under the authority of this
Act, the proceeds of which are deemed appropriated for the projects, all the revenue realized
from the projects financed by such loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures,
securities or other evidences of indebtedness, shall be turned over in full, after deducting
actual and necessary expenses for the operation and maintenance of said projects, to the
National Treasury by the government office, agency or instrumentality, or government-owned
or controlled corporation concerned, which is hereby appropriated for the purpose as and when
they shall become due. In case the revenue realized is insufficient to cover the principal,
interest and other charges, such portion of the budgetary savings as may be necessary to
cover the balance or deficiency shall be set aside exclusively for the purpose by the government
office, agency or instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation
concerned: Provided, That, if there still remains a deficiency, such amount necessary to cover
the payment of the principal and interest on such loans, credit or indebtedness as and when
they shall become due is hereby appropriated out of any funds in the national treasury not
otherwise appropriated: . . .
And according to Figure 4, . . ., P86.8 billion out of the P98.4 Billion are programmed for debt
service. In other words, the President had, on her own, determined and set aside the said amount
of P98.4 Billion with the rest of the appropriations of P155.3 Billion to be determined and fixed by
Congress, which is now Rep. Act 6831.9
President Marcos also issued PD 1177, which provides:
Sec. 31. Automatic appropriations. –– All expenditures for (a) personnel retirement premiums,
government service insurance, and other similar fixed expenditures, (b) principal and interest
on public debt, (c) national government guarantees of obligations which are drawn upon, are
automatically appropriated; Provided, that no obligations shall be incurred or payments made
from funds thus automatically appropriated except as issued in the form of regular budgetary
allotments.
Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and P.D.
No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of President Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative under Section 3, Article XVIII which provides ––
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and
other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed, or revoked." (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then
President Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the
expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative power was
restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was ratified by the people; that
there is a need for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but
Congress, up to the present, has not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion
automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus,
it cannot be enforced.
34
They then point out that since the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24, Article VI of the
Constitution, i.e.,
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. (Emphasis supplied.)
have already drastically changed. In the meantime, also, delayed payments and arrearages may
have supervened, only to worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in the budget due
to penalties and/or demand for immediate payment even before due dates.
Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon the
continuance of the person of President Marcos and his legislative power goes against the intent
and purpose of the law. The purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without the person of Marcos.13
whereby bills have to be approved by the President,10 then a law must be passed by Congress to
authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees violate Section 29(l)
of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as follows ––
Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.
The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not meet the requirement and
are therefore inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitution which requires,
among others, that "all appropriations, . . . bills authorizing increase of public debt" must be
passed by Congress and approved by the President is untenable. Certainly, the framers of the
Constitution did not contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including existing
presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced to mere "bills" that must again go
through the legislative million The only reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the
Constitution which refer to "bills" is that they mean appropriation measures still to be passed by
Congress. If the intention of the framers thereof were otherwise they should have expressed their
decision in a more direct or express manner.
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an
appropriation,11 otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who
determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service.12
The Court is not persuaded.
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with
the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked."
Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally
fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied
prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.
This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve
the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are
to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or, are otherwise
amended, repealed or revoked.
On the third issue that there is undue delegation of legislative power, in Edu vs. Ericta,14 this Court
had this to say ––
An examination of the aforecited presidential decrees show the clear intent that the amounts
needed to cover the payment of the principal and interest on all foreign loans, including those
guaranteed by the national government, should be made available when they shall become due
precisely without the necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds
therefor, since both the periods and necessities are incapable of determination in advance.
What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and
repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation
of legislative power, the inequity must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure
enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its function when it describes what job must be done,
who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed
be the only way in which legislative process can go forward . . .
The automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective execution of debt management
policies. Its political wisdom has been convincingly discussed by the Solicitor General as he argues
—
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation there must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental
policy . . .
. . . First, for example, it enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of
market conditions by redeeming high-interest securities and borrowing at lower rates, or to shift
from short-term to long-term instruments, or to enter into arrangements that could lighten our
outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity, debt to asset, debt-to-debt or other such schemes.
Second, the automatic appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in debt servicing arising
from any deviation from what has been previously programmed. The annual debt service
estimates, which are usually made one year in advance, are based on a mathematical set or
matrix or, in layman's parlance, "basket" of foreign exchange and interest
rate assumptions which may significantly differ from actual rates not even in proportion to
changes on the basis of the assumptions. Absent an automatic appropriation clause, the
Philippine Government has to await and depend upon Congressional action, which by the time
this comes, may no longer be responsive to the intended conditions which in the meantime may
The standard may be either express or implied . . . from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as whole . . .
In People vs. Vera,15 this Court said "the true distinction is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what the law shall be, and conferring
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."
Ideally, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him except
enforce it. If there are gaps in the law that will prevent its enforcement unless they are first filled,
35
the delegate will then have been given the opportunity to step in the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a discretion essentially legislative in order to repair the omissions. This is invalid
delegation.16
established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury
except in accordance with an appropriation made by law.
Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act, since authorization therefor
already exists under RA No. 4860 and 245, as amended and PD 1967. Precisely in the fight of
this subsisting authorization as embodied in said Republic Acts and PD for debt service,
Congress does not concern itself with details for implementation by the Executive, but largely
with annual levels and approval thereof upon due deliberations as part of the whole obligation
program for the year. Upon such approval, Congress has spoken and cannot be said to have
delegated its wisdom to the Executive, on whose part lies the implementation or execution of
the legislative wisdom.
The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms and
conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.
The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No.
1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic
of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the
loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without
the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose of
these laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to
protect and maintain the credit standing of the country.
3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget process covers
the various operational aspects of budgeting. The establishment of obligation authority
ceilings, the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities, the continuing
review of government fiscal position, the regulation of funds releases, the implementation of
cash payment schedules, and other related activities comprise this phase of the budget cycle.
Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated
by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain
by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion
as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal,
interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the
bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets
incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in
executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the
Treasury.
Release from the debt service fired is triggered by a request of the Bureau of the Treasury for
allotments from the Department of Budget and Management, one quarter in advance of
payment schedule, to ensure prompt payments. The Bureau of Treasury, upon receiving official
billings from the creditors, remits payments to creditors through the Central Bank or to the
Sinking Fund established for government security issues (Annex F).
4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of actual performance and
initially approved work targets, obligations incurred, personnel hired and work accomplished
are compared with the targets set at the time the agency budgets were approved.
The Government budgetary process has been graphically described to consist of four major phases
as aptly discussed by the Solicitor General:
The Government budgeting process consists of four major phases:
There being no undue delegation of legislative power as clearly above shown, petitioners insist
nevertheless that subject presidential decrees constitute undue delegation of legislative power
to the executive on the alleged ground that the appropriations therein are not exact,
certain or definite, invoking in support therefor the Constitution of Nebraska, the constitution
under which the case of State v. Moore, 69 NW 974, cited by petitioners, was decided. Unlike
the Constitution of Nebraska, however, our Constitution does not require a definite, certain,
exact or "specific appropriation made by law." Section 29, Article VI of our 1987 Constitution
omits any of these words and simply states:
Section 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
1. Budget preparation. The first step is essentially tasked upon the Executive Branch and
covers the estimation of government revenues, the determination of budgetary priorities and
activities within the constraints imposed by available revenues and by borrowing limits, and
the translation of desired priorities and activities into expenditure levels.
Budget preparation starts with the budget call issued by the Department of Budget and
Management. Each agency is required to submit agency budget estimates in line with the
requirements consistent with the general ceilings set by the Development Budget Coordinating
Council (DBCC).
More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any
particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by
Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the authorization
or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time
horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as
well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress),
just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The
Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations
act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public
funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure
With regard to debt servicing, the DBCC staff, based on the macro-economic projections of
interest rates (e.g. LIBOR rate) and estimated sources of domestic and foreign financing,
estimates debt service levels. Upon issuance of budget call, the Bureau of Treasury computes
for the interest and principal payments for the year for all direct national government
borrowings and other liabilities assumed by the same.
2. Legislative authorization. –– At this stage, Congress enters the picture and deliberates
or acts on the budget proposals of the President, and Congress in the exercise of its own
judgment and wisdom formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process
36
is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language
employed (In re Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present.17
G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG
vs.
WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, defendant-appellant.
Thus, in accordance with Section 22, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, President Corazon C.
Aquino submitted to Congress the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing for the Fiscal
Year 1990. The proposed 1990 expenditure program covering the estimated obligation that will be
incurred by the national government during the fiscal year amounts to P233.5 Billion. Of the
proposed budget, P86.8 is set aside for debt servicing as follows:
Lionel
D.
Sanz and Oppisso for appellee.
National Government Debt
Service Expenditures, 1990
(in million pesos)
for
appellant.
MORELAND, J.:
The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party in this case. They are —
Domestic
Foreign
Total
RA 245, as RA
4860
amended
as amended,
PD 1967
Interest
Payments
P36,861
P18,570
P55,431
Principal
Amortization
16,310
15,077
31,387
Total
Hargis
DE MARTINEZ, plaintiffs-appellees,
P53,171
P33,647
P86,818
======== ======== ========
That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in
a carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the
street as she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the purpose
of transportation of fodder by the defendant, and to which was attached a pair of horses, came
along the street in the opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and
that thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of
the defendant was coming at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side
of the street and stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to pass
by, but that instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the carromata
occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff by
making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon
the horse which was drawing it.
18
These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented evidence to the effect that the cochero,
who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and
was considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had sent to deliver some
forage at Paco Livery Stable on Calle Herran, and that for the purpose of delivery thereof the
cochero driving the team as defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the
front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon for the purpose of
unloading the forage to be delivered; that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying
some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some
other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away,
and the driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground
and was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and on which street they came
into collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding.
as authorized under P.D. 1967 and R.A. 4860 and 245, as amended.
The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177
and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or
otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to
implement the same.
There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of petitioners in filing this petition.
Unfortunately, the petition must fail on the constitutional and legal issues raised. As to whether or
not the country should honor its international debt, more especially the enormous amount that
had been incurred by the past administration, which appears to be the ultimate objective of the
petition, is not an issue that is presented or proposed to be addressed by the Court. Indeed, it is
more of a political decision for Congress and the Executive to determine in the exercise of their
wisdom and sound discretion.
The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question.
Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave judgment
against him for P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 17th
day of October, 1908, and for the costs of the action. The case is before us on an appeal from that
judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
37
There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except that embodied in the Civil
Code. The provisions of that code pertinent to this case are —
442; Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. vs. Lally, 48 N. J. L., 604; Wasmer vs. D. L. & W. R. R.
Co., 80 N. Y., 212.) lawphi1.net
Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
In the case of Hayman vs. Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. 170), Lord Kenyon said:
He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the house, and, if every person who
suffered a cart to remain in the street while he took goods out of it was obliged to employ
another to look after the horses, it would be impossible for the business of the metropolis to go
on.
Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts
and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the
minors who live with them.
Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons who are under
their authority and live with them.
Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused
by the employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on
account of their duties.
The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damages
should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed,
in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by their pupils
or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.
In the case of Griggs vs. Fleckenstein (14 Minn., 81), the court said:
The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged of his horse, at the time of the
injury, is that which would be exercised by a person of ordinary care and prudence under like
circumstances. It can not be said that the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is in itself
negligence. Whether it is negligence to leave a horse unhitched must be depend upon the
disposition of the horse; whether he was under the observation and control of some person all
the time, and many other circumstances; and is a question to be determined by the jury from
the facts of each case.
In the case of Belles vs. Kellner (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held that it was error on the part of the
trial court to refuse to charge that "it is not negligence for the driver of a quite, gentle horse to
leave him unhitched and otherwise unattended on the side of a public highways while the driver
is upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon." The said court closed its opinion with these
words:
There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury in finding that the horse was quite
and gentle, and that the driver was upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon, at time of
the alleged injury, and that the horse had been used for years in that way without accident. The
refusal of the trial court to charge as requested left the jury free to find was verdict against the
defendant, although the jury was convinced that these facts were proven.lawphil.net
Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team
and a trusty and capable driver is, under the last paragraph of the above provisions, liable for the
negligence of such driver in handling the team, we are of the opinion that the judgment must be
reversed upon the ground that the evidence does not disclose that the cochero was negligent.
While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may possibly be some what different from
that in Anglo-Saxon countries, a question we do not now discuss, the rules under which the fact
of negligence is determined are, nevertheless, generally the same. That is to say, while the law
designating the person responsible for a negligent act may not be the same here as in many
jurisdictions, the law determining what is a negligent act is the same here, generally speaking, as
elsewhere. (Supreme court of Spain, 4 December, 1903; 16 May, 1893; 27 June, 1894; 9 April,
1896; 14 March, 1901; 2 March, 1904; 7 February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June, 1905; 13 April,
1903; 7 March, 1902; 12 June, 1900; 2 March, 1907; 18 March, 1898; 3 June, 1901.)
In the case of Southworth vs. Ry. Co. (105 Mass., 342), it was held:
That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to deliver goods, upon stopping with his
horse and wagon to deliver a parcel at a house from fifty to a hundred rods from a railroad
crossing, left the horse unfastened for four or five minutes while he was in the house, knowing
that it was not afraid of cars, and having used it for three or four months without ever hitching
it or knowing it to start, is not conclusive, as a matter of law, of a want of due care on his part.
The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect in question, is to exercise
reasonable care and prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal
or inherently likely to produce damage to others, there will be no liability, although damage in fact
ensues. (Milwaukee Ry. Co. vs. Arms, 91 U. S., 489; Parrott vs. Wells, 15 Wall., 524;
Brown vs. Kendall, 6 Cushing, 292; Jackson Architectural Iron Works vs. Hurlbut, 158 N. Y., 34
Westerfield vs. Levis, 43 La. An., 63; Niosi vs. Empire Steam Laundry, 117 Cal., 257.)
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle
and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses
several years and the other five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time,
of leaving them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident; that they had
never run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice;
that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the
day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of
that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which
custom was sanctioned by their employers.
The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or
imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have,
therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom,
can not be held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they
have been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial.itc-alf Accidents
sometimes happen and injuries result from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their
natural or customary results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted in accident or injury,
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the
manner described by the evidence in this case, either under Spanish or American jurisprudence.
(Lynch vs. Nurdin, 1 Q. B., 422; Rumsey vs. Nelson, 58 Vt., 590; Drake vs. Mount, 33 N. J. L.,
38
the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far. The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
sometimes successfully invoked in such a case, does not in any sense militate against the
reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates a prima facie case, and that only in the
absence of proof of the circumstances under which the act complained of was performed. It is
something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant's case showing the conditions and
circumstances under which the injury occurred, the creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur disappears. This is demonstrated by the case of Inland and Seaboard Costing Co. vs.
Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court said (p. 554):
. . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to the case before the jury, was
that if the steamboat, on a calm day and in smooth water, was thrown with such force against
a wharf properly built, as to tear up some of the planks of the flooring, this would be prima
facie evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant's agent in making the landing, unless
upon the whole evidence in the case this prima facie evidence was rebutted. As such damage to
a wharf is not ordinarily done by a steamboat under control of her officers and carefully managed
by them, evidence that such damage was done in this case was prima facie, and, if unexplained,
sufficient evidence of negligence on their part, and the jury might properly be so instructed.
G.R. No. L-50654 November 6, 1989
There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs themselves, not only the fact of the runway
and the accident resulting therefrom, but also the conditions under which the runaway occurred.
Those conditions showing of themselves that the defendant's cochero was not negligent in the
management of the horse, the prima facie case in plaintiffs' favor, if any, was destroyed as soon
as made.
The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against the herein petitioner with the
Municipal Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 971, for the collection of
damages and attorney's fees. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the private respondent
and against the herein petitioner. A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on 8 June
1977, and the following day, 9 June 1977, he filed a notice of appeal with the said municipal court,
and on 24 June 1977, he completed the other requirements for the perfection of an appeal,
including the filing of an appeal bond and the payment of the appellate court docket fee. However,
when the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur (Branch V) for the
consideration of the appeal, the presiding judge thereof ruled that the appeal was filed beyond the
reglementary period; consequently, he dismissed the appeal.
RUDY
GLEO
ARMIGOS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CRISTITO MATA, and JUDGE L. D. CARPIO, in his capacity as Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Review on certiorari of the decisio * of the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition filed and
docketed
therein
as
CA-G.R.
No.
SP-07192-R,
entitled:
"Rudy
Gleo
Armigos,
petitioner, versus Judge L.D. Carpio, respondent," and the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration of said decision.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants
to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner
in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in
the manner in which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It
has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such
practice, has acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the public now, through the courts,
without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades and thereby
make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to believe that he was acting
under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people? We think not.
Whereupon, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus with preliminary injunction with
the Court of Appeals, claiming that from 8 June 1977, when he received a copy of the decision of
the municipal court, to 24 June 1977, when he perfected his appeal, only fifteen (15) days had
elapsed so that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, dismissing his appeal
for having been filed beyond the reglementary period, is erroneous and contrary to law. The
petitioner contended that the computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour
he received copy of the decision, so that the first of the 1 5-day period comprising 24 hours is
from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the last day, from
4:00 o'clock p.m. of 23 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 June 1977.
The judgement is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.
The Court of Appeals, however, rejected the novel interpretation suggested as it would result in
many confusing situations and many unreliable testimonies as to the time a copy of a decision,
order or pleading is received, and cited the case of Republic of the Philippines vs.
Encarnacion, 1 where this Court held that when a law was to be effective upon approval by the
President and the President signed the same on 16 June 1950, the law should be considered to
have taken effect not on the exact hour when the President signed the same on 16 June 1950 but
from the very first minute or hour of said day of 16 June 1950.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's decision, but his motion
was denied in a resolution promulgated on 7 December 1978.
Hence, the present recourse.
39
We find no merit in the petition. The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that
"In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included" is similar, but
not Identical to Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that "Unless otherwise
specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed
by excluding the first day and including the last; and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it
shall be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of the Rules of Court which stated that "In computing
any period of time prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by order of a court, or by any other
applicable statute, the day of the act, event or default after which the designated period of time
begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless
it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day
which is neither a Sunday or a legal holiday." In applying this rule, the Court considered the day
as synonymous with the date and we find no cogent reason to adopt a different view.
G.R. No. L-29131
August 27, 1969
NATIONAL
MARKETING
vs.
MIGUEL
D.
TECSON,
MIGUEL
D.
THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, petitioner.
CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,
ET
AL., defendants,
TECSON, defendant-appellee,
Government Corporate Counsel Leopoldo M. Abellera and Trial Atty. Antonio M. Brillantes for
plaintiff-appellant.
Antonio
T.
Lacdan
for
defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Besides, human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an extraordinary one for a
person, there is no reasonable certainty of its correctness. What more for the exact hour when a
pleading, order or decision is received by a party?
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This appeal has been certified to us by the Court of Appeals only one question of law being involved
therein.
Petitioner's suggestion, however, may find application in appeals in habeas corpus cases where
the law requires that such appeals should be made within 48 hours from notice of judgment. 2
On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, in Civil Case No.
20520 thereof, entitled "Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc.," the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
For the foregoing consideration, the Court decides this case:
(a) Ordering the defendants Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety Insurance Co., Inc. to pay jointly
and severally plaintiff PRATRA the sum of P7,200.00 plus 7% interest from May 25, 1960 until
the amount is fully paid, plus P500.00 for attorney's fees, and plus costs;
(b) ordering defendant Miguel D. Tecson to indemnify his co-defendant Alto Surety & Insurance
Co., Inc. on the cross-claim for all the amounts it would be made to pay in this decision, in
case defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. pay the amount adjudged to plaintiff in this
decision. From the date of such payment defendant Miguel D. Tecson would pay the Alto Surety
& Insurance Co., Inc., interest at 12% per annum until Miguel D. Tecson has fully reimbursed
plaintiff of the said amount.
While it is true that rules of procedure are to be interpreted liberally so that the real matter in
dispute may be submitted to the judgment of the court, and that the trial court is vested with
discretion to allow or admit an appeal filed out of time, this discretion is not unconditional. There
must be justifiable reason to warrant such action, since the perfection of an appeal in the manner
and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and in the absence
of any justifying circumstance, the court has no jurisdiction to approve or admit an appeal filed
out of time. 3 In the instant case, the petitioner failed to prove, or even claim, that his failure to
appeal on time was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. With costs against the petitioner.
Copy of this decision was, on November 21, 1955, served upon the defendants in said case. On
December 21, 1965, the National Marketing Corporation, as successor to all the properties, assets,
rights, and choses in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation, as plaintiff in that case and
judgment creditor therein, filed, with the same court, a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
63701 thereof, against the same defendants, for the revival of the judgment rendered in said Case
No. 20520. Defendant Miguel D. Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof and prescription of action. Acting upon the motion
and plaintiff's opposition thereto, said Court issued, on February 14, 1966, an order reading:
Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and prescription. As for lack of jurisdiction, as the amount involved is less than
P10,000 as actually these proceedings are a revival of a decision issued by this same court, the
matter of jurisdiction must be admitted. But as for prescription. Plaintiffs admit the decision of
this Court became final on December 21, 1955. This case was filed exactly on December 21,
1965 — but more than ten years have passed a year is a period of 365 days (Art. 13, CCP).
Plaintiff forgot that 1960, 1964 were both leap years so that when this present case was filed it
was filed two days too late.
40
The complaint insofar as Miguel Tecson is concerned is, therefore, dismissed as having
prescribed.1äwphï1.ñët
Although some members of the Court are inclined to think that this legislation is not realistic, for
failure to conform with ordinary experience or practice, the theory of plaintiff-appellant herein
cannot be upheld without ignoring, if not nullifying, Art. 13 of our Civil Code, and reviving Section
13 of the Revised Administrative Code, thereby engaging in judicial legislation, and, in effect,
repealing an act of Congress. If public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the
Revised Administrative Code, this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree.
The National Marketing Corporation appealed from such order to the Court of Appeals, which, on
March 20, 1969t certified the case to this Court, upon the ground that the only question therein
raised is one of law, namely, whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgment is
barred by the statute of limitations.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, without costs. It is so
ordered.
Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment "must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues," which, in the language of Art. 1152 of the
same Code, "commences from the time the judgment sought to be revived has become final."
This, in turn, took place on December 21, 1955, or thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment
— which was received by the defendants herein on November 21, 1955 — no appeal having been
taken therefrom. 1 The issue is thus confined to the date on which ten (10) years from December
21, 1955 expired.
Plaintiff-appellant alleges that it was December 21, 1965, but appellee Tecson maintains
otherwise, because "when the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are of three
hundred sixty-five days each" — according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code — and, 1960 and 1964
being leap years, the month of February in both had 29 days, so that ten (10) years of 365 days
each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from December 21, 1955, expired on December 19, 1965.
The lower court accepted this view in its appealed order of dismissal.
Plaintiff-appellant insists that the same "is erroneous, because a year means a calendar
year (Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, by Crawford, p. 383) and since what is being
computed here is the number of years, a calendar year should be used as the basis of computation.
There is no question that when it is not a leap year, December 21 to December 21 of the following
year is one year. If the extra day in a leap year is not a day of the year, because it is the 366th
day, then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong to the year where it falls and,
therefore, that the 366 days constitute one year." 2
The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory contravenes the explicit
provision of Art. 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, limiting the connotation of each "year" —
as the term is used in our laws — to 365 days. Indeed, prior to the approval of the Civil Code of
Spain, the Supreme Court thereof had held, on March 30, 1887, that, when the law spoke of
months, it meant a "natural" month or "solar" month, in the absence of express provision to the
contrary. Such provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain, subsequently promulgated.
Hence, the same Supreme Court declared 3 that, pursuant to Art. 7 of said Code, "whenever
months ... are referred to in the law, it shall be understood that the months are of 30 days," not the
"natural," or "solar" or "calendar" months, unless they are "designated by name," in which case
"they shall be computed by the actual number of days they have. This concept was
later, modified in the Philippines, by Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, Pursuant to
which, "month shall be understood to refer to a calendar month." 4 In the language of this Court,
in People vs. Del Rosario, 5 with the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act 386)
... we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month
is to be considered as the regular 30-day month ... and not the solar or civil month," with the
particularity that, whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned "months, days or nights," ours has
added thereto the term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it shall be understood that years are
of three hundred sixty-five days."
41
G.R. No. L-37048
March 7, 1933
of reducing attorneys fees to three thousand, and also granted costs of the action against the
defendant. From this judgment defendant appeals and makes the following assignment of errors:
I. The lower court erred in not declaring that paragraph 2 of section 9 of the Philippine Divorce
Law, is unconstitutional, null and void.
II. The lower court erred in holding that section 9 of Act No. 2710 (Divorce Law) applies to the
Nevada decree of divorce issued in favor of appellant Augusto C. Gonzalez, said decree being
entitled to confirmation and recognition.
III. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint in intervention for lack of cause of
action against appellant and appellee.
IV. The lower court erred in not declaring the notice of lis pendens filed by intervenors to be null
and void.
V. The lower court erred in ordering the appellant to pay the sum of P500 per month for the
support not only of his children but also of his ex-wife, appellee herein, Manuela Barretto.
VI. The lower court erred in not holding that plaintiff- appellee, Manuela Barretto, is not entitled
to support from her ex-husband, herein appellant, over and beyond the alimony fixed by the
divorce decree in Exhibit A.
VII. The lower court erred in condemning defendant appellant to pay to plaintiff-appellee P3,000
attorney's fees.
VIII. The lower court erred in denying appellant's motion for new trial.
MANUELA
BARRETTO
GONZALEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AUGUSTO
C.
GONZALEZ, defendant-appellant.
AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ, Jr., ET AL., intervenors-appellees.
HULL, J.:
Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine Islands and at present residents of the City of
Manila. They were married in the City of Manila on January 19, 1919, and lived together as man
and wife in the Philippine Islands until the spring of 1926. They voluntarily separated and since
that time have not lived together as man and wife. Of this union four children were born who are
now 11, 10, 8 and 6 years of age. Negotiations between the parties, both being represented by
attorneys, continued for several months, whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff
for her support and that of her children, five hundred pesos (P500) monthly; this amount to be
increased in case of illness or necessity, and the title of certain properties to be put in her name.
Shortly after this agreement the husband left the Islands, betook himself to Reno, Nevada, and
secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion, which decree was dated
November 28, 1927. Shortly thereafter the defendant moved to California and returned to these
Islands in August 1928, where he has since remained. On the same date that he secured a divorce
in Nevada he went through the forms of marriage with another citizen of these Islands and now
has three children as a result of that marriage. Defendant, after his departure from these Islands,
reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support of his wife and four minor
children and has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.
While the parties in this action are in dispute over financial matters they are in unity in trying to
secure the courts of this jurisdiction to recognize and approve of the Reno divorce. On the record
here presented this can not be done. The public policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce
is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710, and the decisions of this court: Goitia vs. Campos Rueda (35
Phil., 252); Garcia Valdez vs. Soteraña Tuason (40 Phil., 943-952); Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil.,
855); Chereau vs. Fuentebella (43 Phil., 216); Fernandez vs. De Castro (48 Phil., 123); Gorayeb
vs. Hashim (50 Phil., 22); Francisco vs. Tayao (50 Phil., 42); Alkuino Lim Pang vs. Uy Pian Ng
Shun and Lim Tingco (52 Phil., 571); and the late case of Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, decided March
21, 1931, and reported in 55 Phil., 851.
Shortly after his return his wife brought action in the Court of First Instance of Manila requesting
that the courts of the Philippine Islands confirm and ratify the decree of divorce issued by the
courts of the State of Nevada; that section 9 of Act No. 2710, which reads as follows:
The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of property as soon as such decree becomes
final, but shall not dissolve the bonds of matrimony until one year thereafter.
The bonds of matrimony shall not be considered as dissolved with regard to the spouse who,
having legitimate children, has not delivered to each of them or to the guardian appointed by
the court, within said period of one year, the equivalent of what would have been due to them
as their legal portion if said spouse had died intestate immediately after the dissolution of the
community of property.
The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted to
this court, in which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates
a purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for
themselves a change of status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our law. At all
times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the
residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband of the purpose of securing a divorce
was not a bona fide residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to
dissolve the bonds if matrimony in which he had entered in 1919. While the decisions of this court
heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity of foreign divorce has usually been expressed in
the negative and have been based upon lack of matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have
not overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now in force in these Islands. Article 9 thereof
reads as follows:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity or
persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country.
be enforced, and that she and the defendant deliver to the guardian ad litem the equivalent of
what would have been due to their children as their legal portion from the respective estates had
their parents did intestate on November 28, 1927. It is also prayed that the community existing
between plaintiff and defendant be declared dissolved and the defendant be ordered to render an
accounting and to deliver to the plaintiff her share of the community property, that the defendant
be ordered to pay the plaintiff alimony at the rate of five hundred pesos (P500) per month, that
the defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiff, as counsel fees, the sum of five thousand pesos
(P5000), and that the defendant be ordered to pay plaintiff the expenses incurred in educating the
three minor sons.
And article 11, the last part of which reads:
. . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended
to promote public order and good morals, shall nor be rendered without effect by any foreign
laws or judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign country.
A guardian ad litem was appointed for the minor children, and they appear as intervenors and join
their mother in these proceedings. The Court of First Instance, after hearing, found against the
defendant and granted judgment as prayed for by the plaintiff and intervenors, with the exception
42
It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce relating to citizens of the Philippine
Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for
which the courts of Philippine Islands would grant a divorce. The lower court in granting relief as
prayed for frankly stated that the securing of the divorce, the contracting of another marriage and
the bringing into the world of innocent children brings about such a condition that the court must
grant relief. The hardships of the existing divorce laws of the Philippine Islands are well known to
the members of the Legislature. It is of no moment in this litigation what he personal views of the
writer on the subject of divorce may be. It is the duty of the courts to enforce the laws of divorce
as written by the Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws
are too strict or too liberal.
G.R. No. L-19671
November 29, 1965
PASTOR
B.
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B.
Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-inlaw, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2
Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit
the personal relations of the citizens of these Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign courts
in a manner which our Government believes is contrary to public order and good morals. Holding
the above views it becomes unnecessary to discuss the serious constitutional question presented
by appellant in his first assignment of error.
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City,
where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of
age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a
"sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an
engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents,
before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city.
The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local
civil register.
The judgment of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila must therefore be reversed and
defendant absolved from the demands made against him in this action. This, however, without
prejudice to any right of maintenance that plaintiff and the intervenors may have against
defendant. No special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply
in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned
out their marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started
saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was
broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love
for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to
get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes
to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however,
materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who
got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken
home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were
surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the
great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The
following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a
recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the
Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating
chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February
1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a
letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship
between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and
thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of
Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned
to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's
welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.
43
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She
fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from
communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the days
passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had
gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu
society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul
her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice
because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and
otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest
(army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said
priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary,
as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church
and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in
force at the time) expressly provided that —
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the
contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu
City, and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left
for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the
herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County
of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950,
a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore,
not essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said
marriage act, which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid
because of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was
performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized
the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal
dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be
presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs.
Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority
of the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father
Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original
action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage
to plaintiff was valid and binding.
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now
lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship
on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents,
Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta
from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church,
for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for
legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff
and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied
that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue
influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez.
Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's
consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab
initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent
civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First
Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting
his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto
Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the
plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of
absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial
District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental
in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was
still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for
damages and in dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño
liable for damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents
on their counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on
the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of
adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee,
Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly
44
Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that
case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted
to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute
divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the
state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the
following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage
to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is
authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore,
justifies an action for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage,
that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether
divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind
are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58
Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members
of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by
Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or
too liberal. (p. 72)
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in
effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the
detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and
obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in
the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of
private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of
a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs.
Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife,
the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct
toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez
about the Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration,
and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and
"Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants
for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and
"sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit
and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted
to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded.
Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event,
the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict
conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically
defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants
Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses
Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected
her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of
affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United
States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they
did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid;
for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It
follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and
her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the
husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an
unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the
husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and
cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband"
from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of
"legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in
accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that
were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a
vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the
Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the
subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to
the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur,
42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr.
Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the
circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is
wholly without legal significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of
Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate,
legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her
original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently,
and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in
the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always
presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between the right of a
parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger
to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that
45
of strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of
affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or
daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without
justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in
good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it,
the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be
extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice
suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or
where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet
or unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting
from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her
protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not
maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more
frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally
applicable in the case of advice given to a son.
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other
to recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in
the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the
amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate
of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination
and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably
caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have
been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts
and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or
spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from
defendant Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable
claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure
was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties
never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the
annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy
(cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a
consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and
with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion
that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena
Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this
unfounded suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same
could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits
having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly
established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any
improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages
awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of
the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction;
and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently
to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the
lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
46
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal
funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
ALICE
REYES
VAN
DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail
over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations
between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside
the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by
respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner
who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction
over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California,
authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the
ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor
community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the
law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce
proceedings:
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf
and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to
the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that,
after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children
born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in
Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila,
(the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with
right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property"
as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the
ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no
bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and
wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry
again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to
appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court
in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed
which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would
be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed
in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property
in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that
47
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA
MANALAYSAY
PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of
Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only
to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the
opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved
jurisdictional question.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started
auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their
only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg
Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they
had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the
same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody
of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was
locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said
marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while
still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as
1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A.
de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal
approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery
against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch
48
XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda
Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge
Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
the prosecutory proceeding
the case.
19
and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian
of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first
four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that
while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to
initiate the action therefor.
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid
resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar
petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary
of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the
respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been
arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire
records of both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date,
petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in
said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending
before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated
September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that
is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused
to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct
contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted
herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions;
in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined
as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that
the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found
necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State,
through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness
therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio,
and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more
predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter
exclusively within his power and option.
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without
jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be
prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an
offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing
the criminal complaint." 15
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer
the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently
argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This
is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the
supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the
filing of the criminal case. 21
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents
from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations,
issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints
against the petitioner. 16
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his
capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was
acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would
thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without
the legal capacity to do so.
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes
against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended
spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this
rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the
jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for
a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue
as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal
49
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such
status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it
is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between
the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the
action by the former against the latter.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was
the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no
longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that
the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where,
however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have
no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of
divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case.
When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no
longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be
one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not
affect or cast obloquy on the other.
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'
Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have
been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant
insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly
said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the
reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse
must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of
the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared
void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of
a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled
to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal
judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the
complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the
marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage
from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer
have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of
the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the
termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and
requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this
case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a
United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed
a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and
praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to
manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error
of such stance, thus:
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must
suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended
spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was
raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not
involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy
herein.
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another
one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The
temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of
such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the
time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended
spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing
of the complaint.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. ...
50
G.R. No. 88582
March 5, 1991
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant,
to be the foreign object which was inserted inside the vagina of Rosario Baluyot. The other
objects were later established to be anti-nasal inhalers against pollution purchased by the
accused in Bangkok when he went there as a tourist. While Rosario was in the bathroom, accused
told Ramirez to lay down on bed, and so did the accused. He then started masturbating the
young boy and also guided the boy's hand for him to be masturbated, so that they masturbated
each other, while they were both naked, and he gave Jessie Ramirez an erection. When Rosario
Baluyot came out of the bathroom, she was told to remove her clothes by accused and to join
him in bed. The accused then placed himself between the two (2) children and accused started
fingering Rosario.
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a young girl of about 12 years old
who had been allegedly raped and who later died because of a foreign object left inside her vaginal
canal.
At this time, Ramirez was already sleepy, but Rosario touched him to call his attention. He
looked, and he saw accused placing his penis against the vagina of Rosario and that he was
trying to penetrate the vagina but it would not fit. After what he saw, Ramirez did not anymore
bother to look because he was sleepy and fell asleep.
Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide under an information
which reads:
That on or about the tenth (10th day of October, 1986 in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design and
with intent to kill one Rosario Baluyot, a woman under twelve (12) years of age, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said Rosario Baluyot and
inserted a foreign object into the vaginal canal of said Rosario Baluyot which caused her death
shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of her relatives. (66)
The following morning, the accused, whom the juveniles described as an "American, paid
Ramirez alias "Egan" P200.00 and Rosario P300.00. He then left them in the hotel. After the
American left, they went downstairs, and Rosario told Egan that the American inserted
something in her vagina. But they could not do anything anymore, because the American had
already left, and neither did they report the matter to the police. Sometime the following day,
Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her whether the object was already removed from her body
and Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie Ramirez claimed that on the evening of that same date,
he saw Rosario and she was complaining of pain in her vagina and when Egan asked her, she
said that the foreign object was not yet removed. Then there was another occasion wherein
Jessie was summoned and when he came he saw Rosario writhing in pain and when he tried to
talk to Rosario she scolded him with defamatory remarks. Thereafter, he did not see Rosario
anymore because he already went home to his aunt's house who resided at Barrio Barretto and
resumed his studies in the primary grades.
When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty". Thereafter, the case was set for trial on the
merits.
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecutor presented the following witnesses, namely: (1)
Jessie Ramirez, (2) Maria Burgos y Turla, (3) P/Cpl. Mariano Victoria, (4) Policarpio Baluyot, (5)
Dr. Reino Rosete, (6) Sumulong Daniel, (7) Jessica Herrera, (8) Sister Eva Palencia, (9) Conrado
Salonga, (10) Dr. Devonne Loop, (11) Dr. Leo Cruz, (12) Paul Maclor, (13) Aida Sarmiento, (14)
Patricia Prollamanta (15) Mel Santos, (16) Lorna Limos, (17) Eduard Lee Bungarner, (18) Ronaldo
Marquez, (19) Tom Bonte, (20) 2nd Asst. City Fiscal Nini Alcala, (21) lst Asst. City Fiscal Dorentino
Z. Floresta, (22) Corazon Caber, (23) Rodolfo Mercurio and (24) Fe Israel.
On May 14, 1987, Gaspar Alcantara, a defense witness, while garbage scavenging at Lot 21,
near the gate of the U.S. Naval Base saw Rosario at Magsaysay Drive near the Happy Bake Shop
near Lot 21, being ogled by people because Rosario's skirt was bloodied and she was unconscious
and foul smelling. Since nobody helped Rosario, he took pity on her condition and brought her
to the Olongapo City General Hospital in an unconscious condition, via jeepney. He went to the
Information desk and he was the one who gave the personal circumstances of Rosario as to her
name, age, her residence as Nagbakulaw, Lower Kalaklan, and Gaspar Alcantara signed as
"guardian" of Rosario, while Rosario was already in the emergency room. Although Gaspar
Alcantara denied that he did not know the name of Rosario Baluyot when he brought her to the
hospital, this is belied by the testimony of the Information clerk Lorna Limos, who was then on
duty. Limos testified that it was Alcantara who supplied the personal circumstances of Rosario.
The Court gives more credence to the testimony of Miss Limos as against Gaspar Alcantara who
became a defense witness, for the reason that through his own testimony, Gaspar Alcantara
claimed that even prior to May 14, 1987, he had already known Rosario Baluyot for more than
one (1) year, because he has seen the said girl go to the house of his twin brother, Melchor
Alcantara, who is his immediate neighbor. Rosario used to visit a girl by the name of "Nora" who
was then in the custody of his brother. His brother Melchor was also living with their mother,
brother and sister-in-law and their two (2) children in his house. Rosario as per Gaspar's
testimony even stays for one week or a few days at his brother's house when she visits Nora.
So the Court can safely assume that of all the more than one (1) year that he had regularly seen
Rosario at his brother's house, he must have already did come to know the name of Rosario
Baluyot including her age. In his testimony in Court he stated that he even asked Rosario for
On the other hand, the defense offered in evidence Exhibits "1" to "24" and the testimonies of (1)
Heinrich S. Ritter, (2) Father Roque Villanueva, (3) Angelita Amulong (4) Gaspar Alcantara, (5)
Dr. Val Barcinal and (6) Dr. Pedro C. Solis.
The facts of the case upon which the lower court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
are summarized in its decision, as follows:
The people's evidence show that on October 10, 1986 about midnight, accused Heinrich Stefan
Ritter brought a boy and girl namely: Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel room
at MGM Hotel along Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. These two (2) children were chosen from
among a bunch of street children. Once inside the hotel room accused told them to take a bath.
Jessie Ramirez, alias "Egan", was the first to take a bath and when he came out Rosario Baluyot
went to the bathroom to do the same. While Rosario Baluyot was inside the bathroom, accused
Ritter took out some pictures depicting dressed up young boys, and put them on top of the table.
Other things which were taken out and placed on top of a table were three (3) other objects
which he described as like that of a vicks inhaler. One of these objects the accused played with
his hands and placed it on his palms. The color of which is grayish blue which turned out later
51
movie and softdrinks money which can safely be concluded that he knows her very well. It is
against normal behavior especially to a Filipino who have a characteristic of curiosity not to have
found out the real name of the girl he claims to know only as "Tomboy".
The foreign object was washed by nurse Obedina, then placed it in a transparent small jar and
labelled "Rosario Baluyot". Jessica Herrera asked the nurse for the foreign object, and it was
given to her under proper receipt. Herrera then showed the same to the persons who helped
financially Rosario's case, and afterwards she gave it to Sister Eva Palencia. Sis. Palencia was in
custody of the said object until Mr. Salonga came and asked her for the object.
While Rosario Baluyot was confined at the Olongapo City General Hospital, nobody was attending
to her since she is a street child, having stowed away from the custody of her grandmother.
Three (3) good samaritans who belong to religious and civic organizations, in the persons of
Jessica Herrera, Fe Israel and Sr. Eva Palencia, in one of their missions in the hospital chanced
upon Rosario Baluyot who was all alone with no relatives attending to her and after finding out
that she was only 12 years old decided to help her. After a short interview with Rosario, regarding
her name and age only because she clamped up about her residence and her relatives, they
decided to help her by providing her the medicine she needed during her confinement in
readiness for an operation. It was Fe Israel who was able to get the name and age of Rosario
Baluyot from Rosario Baluyot herself when she saw her for the first time. For Fe Israel, the age
of Rosario Baluyot was an important factor because their program assisted only indigent patients
from infants up to 13 years old.
After Rosario Baluyot died, Sis. Palencia and a companion went to Gaspar Alcantara to ask him
in locating the relatives of Rosario. They were able to trace Rosario's grandmother, Mrs. Maria
Burgos Turla, and informed her that her granddaughter was already dead and lying in state at
St. Martin Funeral Parlor. Mrs. Turla went there with her son, who shouldered all the burial
expenses for Rosario.
Subsequently, Sis. Palencia, Fr. Cullens and Mr. Salonga came to her residence at Sta. Rita and
asked her if she was interested in filing a case against the person who caused the death of her
granddaughter. Of course she agreed. Hence, she was brought to the Fiscal's (City) Office to file
the same.
Rosario's first ailment at the Olongapo City General Hospital was loose bowel movement and
vomiting, which was first suspected as gastro-enteritis, but which came out later as symptoms
of peritonitis due to a massive infection in the abdominal cavity. Subsequently, on May 17, 1987,
after she was examined by the physicians at the hospital, it was found out that there was a
foreign object lodged in her vaginal canal and she had vaginal discharge tinged with blood and
foul smelling odor emanating from her body. One of the doctors who attended to her was Dr.
Barcinal, an OB-GYNE. Dr. Barcinal tried to extract the foreign object by means of a forceps, but
several attempts proved futile because said object was deeply embedded in the vaginal canal
and was covered by tissues. Her abdomen was enlarged, tender and distended, symptoms of
peritonitis. The patient was feverish and incoherent when she was scheduled for operation on
May 19, 1987, after the first attempt for an operation on May 17 was aborted allegedly because
the consent of Dr. Reino Rosete, the hospital director was not obtained. The surgeon who
operated on her was Dr. Rosete himself. He testified that Rosario had to be operated even in
that condition in order to save her life. Her condition was guarded. This was corroborated by Dr.
Leo Cruz, the anesthesiologist during Rosario's operation. It was in the evening of May 19 at
about 7:00 p.m. when Dr. Rosete opened her abdomen by making a 5 inch incision on her
stomach. He found out that the fallopian tubes were congested with pus and so with the
peritonieum, and the pelvic cavity, and patches of pus in the liver, although the gallbladder and
kidney appeared to have septicemia, poisoning of the blood. The peritonitis and septicemia were
traced to have been caused through infection by the foreign object which has been lodged in the
intra-vaginal canal of Rosario. The foreign object which was already agreed upon by both parties
that it is a portion of a sexual vibrator was extracted from the vagina of Rosario while under
anesthesia. Said object was coated with tissues, pus and blood. Dr. Rosete gave it to the
assisting surgical nurse for safekeeping and gave instructions to release it to the authorized
person. This object was shown by the nurse to Dr. Leo Cruz. Dr. Rosete considered the operation
successful and the patient was alive when he left her under Dr. Cruz. Dr. Cruz stayed with said
patient in the ward for about 30 minutes and thereafter he left. The following day, Rosario got
serious and it was Dr. Leo Cruz who pronounced her death at 2:00 to 2:15 in the afternoon of
May 20, 1987.
After the case was filed against the herein accused, Atty. Edmundo Legaspi with his messenger
came to her house and told her that the accused was willing to settle the case, but that accused
Ritter had only P15,000.00. The old woman did not accept it because she knows that the accused
is liable to pay damages anyway. After that, she received a letter from Atty. Legaspi telling her
to get a lawyer for her case. By this time, Mrs. Turla, who wanted to have the case settled once
and for all giving the reason that she can no longer bear the situation, sent her nephew, Conrado
Marcelo to Atty. Legaspi. Her nephew obliged and told her that she will be paid at the office of
Atty. Legaspi. On a date not clear in the records, she went with her nephew Conrado Marcelo,
and Roberto Sundiam, an assistant barangay tanod of Sta. Rita, and while they were there, she
saw Ritter arrive at the law office. Ritter and Atty. Legaspi talked at the office near the bathroom,
and thereafter Ritter left. After he left, Atty. Legaspi told Rosario's grandmother that they are
willing to settle for P20,000.00, but that Ritter left only P15,000.00, so she received the money
with the understanding that there was a balance of P5,000.00 yet. She was made to sign a
statement, and she was asked to change the age of her granddaughter Rosario. With the
document prepared, she and the lawyer's messenger went to the Fiscal's office to have it
subscribed, and was subscribed before an assistant city fiscal. But the balance of P5,000.00 was
not paid, because later on Atty. Legaspi became the OIC of Olongapo City and he could no longer
attend to it. Atty. Legaspi, during one of the hearings before the Court even apologized to her.
As to the case, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria, as criminal investigator of Station "A", was directed by
Col. Daos, Station Commander of the Olongapo Police Department to make a follow up of the
case of Rosario Baluyot. On the other hand, since the suspect who inserted the foreign object
inside Rosario's vagina was said to be an American, the NISRA Subic Naval Base also conducted
its investigation headed by criminal investigator Agent Conrado Salonga. Coordinating with the
local police and with Sister Eva Palencia, since Rosario was a street child at Magsaysay Drive,
they rounded up about 43 street children and from some of them they learned that Rosario
Baluyot was with Jessie Ramirez with an American at the MGM Hotel when the foreign object
was inserted in her vagina. After finding Jessie Ramirez, they asked him about Rosario Baluyot.
They found out that indeed he was with Rosario Baluyot sometime before Christmas of 1986
with an American, who brought them to the said hotel. Jessie Ramirez was taken inside the U.S.
Naval Base, Olongapo City and took his statement. Then he was brought to Mr. Edward Lee
Bungarner, a cartographer, and out of the description supplied by Ramirez, a composite drawing
was photocopied and copies thereof were distributed to the local police and to the sentries at
the gate of the U.S. Naval Base. Some American servicemen who had resemblance to the
Thereafter, a death certificate was prepared under the direction of Dr. Cruz which was indicated
therein that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest, secondary to septicemia caused
by the foreign object lodged in the intra uteral vaginal canal of Rosario Baluyot.
52
composite drawing were photographed and these were shown to Jessie Ramirez, but the result
was negative. Aside from the physical description by Ramirez about the appearance of the
suspect, he also described him as having the mannerisms of a homo-sexual.
custody and possession of the book of baptism for the year 1975, but admitted that he had no
personal knowledge about the matters or entries entered therein. Likewise, the defense's stand
is that the accused cannot be liable for Homicide because a vibrator is not a weapon of death
but it is a thing for the purpose of giving sexual pleasure, and that the death of Rosario Baluyot
was due to the incompetence of Dr. Rosete, the surgeon and Director of the Olongapo City
General Hospital, who operated on her. (Rollo, pp. 109-116)
After obtaining information that foreign homo-sexuals frequented Ermita, Manila, and thinking
that the so-called American may be European or Australian national, the team composed of
Agent Salonga, Mr. Heinsell, P/Cpl. Marino Victoria and P/Cpl. Andres Montaon, Jessie Ramirez
and Michael Johnson, another juvenile, proceeded to Manila. They first went to the Manila NISRA
Office, and thereafter checked in a hotel. That was on September 23, 1987. On the first night,
they went to Luneta Park where foreign homo-sexuals were said to be frequenting, but the result
was negative. Then on September 25, at about 11:00 p.m., while they were standing at the
corner of A. Mabini and M.H. del Pilar Street, a male caucasian who looked like a homo-sexual
stopped by admiringly infront of the two (2) juveniles, Ramirez and Johnson. Jessie Ramirez
then reported to Mr. Salonga that this foreigner had a similarity with the American suspect, so
the two minors were instructed to follow the foreigner and to strike a conversation. They did,
and when they returned, Jessie Ramirez told them that indeed the said foreigner was the one
who brought him and Rosario Baluyot to the MGM Hotel. Bobby Salonga told Ramirez that this
foreigner had no beard while the one previously described by Ramirez had a beard. Jessie
Ramirez told them that maybe he have just shaved it off. The said caucasian then entered a bar,
and after several minutes he came out, and Jessie Ramirez upon his signal with his thumbs up,
as a signal to confirm that the said foreigner is the suspect, arrested Ritter and brought him to
the Manila Western Police District. It could be mentioned at this stage that in this operation they
were accompanied by two (2) policemen from the Western Police District. The foreigner was
hand cuffed and was told that he was a suspect for Rape with Homicide. After the arrest, they
first went to the pension house of the suspect in Ermita, Manila to get his shoulder bag which
contained his personal belongings, and from there they brought him to the Western Police
Department. At the said police headquarters, they were allowed a permissive search by the
foreigner of his clutch bag and his small shoulder bag and confiscated his passport, I.D., 3
inhalers, money in the form of dollars and travellers checks amounting about $1,500.00 and
about P100.00, all duly receipted for. From the passport they learned that the suspect's name
was Heinrich Stefan Ritter, an Austrian national. During the questioning of Hitter, Salonga and
his team already left the headquarters and went to their hotel, because at this time Jessie
Ramirez was already shaking with fear after he identified the accused.
On March 29, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court holds, that the prosecution
has established the GUILT of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Rape
with Homicide as defined and penalized in Art. 335 No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, and
hereby sentences HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00)
Philippine Currency, and TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) by way of attorney's fees
to the private prosecutors and to pay the costs. (Rollo, p. 126)
The accused now comes to this Court on the following assigned errors allegedly committed by the
court:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE
ALLEGED OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED ON OCTOBER 10, 1986 AND THAT IT WAS ACCUSEDAPPELLANT WHO COMMITTED IT.
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT
ROSARIO BALUYOT WAS LESS THAN TWELVE (12) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED OFFENSE
WAS COMMITTED AND IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.
III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING CREDENCE
TO AND NOT REJECTING THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE AND IN NOT UPHOLDING THAT OF
THE DEFENSE AND ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.
The following day, they brought the accused to Olongapo and was detained at the Olongapo City
Jail. The case for Rape with Homicide was filed against him at the City Fiscal of Olongapo. At the
preliminary investigation, accused was assisted by his own counsel. The private complainant was
Maria Burgos Turla because it was she who had custody of Rosario Baluyot after her mother
Anita Burgos died on January 12, 1982, and their father Policarpio Baluyot had left them under
her custody. When this case was filed, the father's whereabouts was unknown, and he only
appeared when the trial of this case before the Court was already in progress. And upon his
(Policarpio Baluyot) own admission, he only learned about the death of his daughter Rosario
Baluyot from the newspaper, long after Rosario was already gone.
Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of conviction only if the guilt
of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, it behooves us to exert the most
painstaking effort to examine the records in the light of the arguments of both parties if only to
satisfy judicial conscience that the appellant indeed committed the criminal act (See People v.
Villapaña, 161 SCRA 73 [1988]).
The appellant was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape with homicide of a young girl
who died after the rape because of a foreign object, believed to be a sexual vibrator, left inside
her vagina.
The defense tried to dislodge the case by claiming that there could be no crime of Rape with
Homicide because the suspect was described as an American while Ritter is an Austrian. Also
advanced by the defense is that, it is a case of mistaken identity. That Rosario Baluyot was at
the time of the commission of the offense, already more than 13 years old, she having been
born on December 26, 1973 as per baptismal certificate, wherein it appears that Rosario Baluyot
was baptized on December 25, 1974 and was born on December 26, 1973 as testified to by Fr.
Roque Villanueva of St. James Parish Church who issued the Baptismal Certificate, having
As stated by the trial court one crucial issue in this case is the age of the victim—whether or not
Rosario Baluyot was less than twelve (12) years old at the time the alleged incident happened on
October 10, 1986. The age is important in determining whether or not there was statutory rape,
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines the third type of rape as having carnal knowledge of
a woman under 12 years of age, in which case force, intimidation, deprivation of reason or
unconscious state do not have to be present.
53
The trial court found that Rosario was below 12 years old when she was sexually abused by the
accused and, therefore, rape was committed inspite of the absence of force or intimidation.
(5) That the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question
must as a general rule be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
In resolving the issue, the trial court put great weight on the testimonies of the victim's
grandmother and father who testified that she was born on December 22, 1975. These oral
declarations were admitted pursuant to then Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of Court where, in
the absence of a birth certificate, the act or declaration about pedigree may be received in evidence
on any notable fact in the life of a member of the family. Since birth is a matter of pedigree within
the rule which permits the admission of hearsay evidence, oral declarations are therefore
admissible as proof of birth (Decision, p. 54).
These requirements were not satisfied by the evidence for the prosecution nor do the declarations
fall within the purview of the rule.
The victim's grandmother and father whose declarations regarding Rosario's age were admitted
by the trial court are both alive, in the Philippines and able to testify as they both did testify in
court. Their declarations were made at the trial which is certainly not before the controversy arose.
The other witnesses who testified on Rosario's age are not members of the victim's family. The
testimonies of Rosario's relatives must be weighed according to their own personal knowledge of
what happened and not as hearsay evidence on matters of family history.
The grandmother, Maria Burgos Turla, testified that she remembered Rosario's birth date because
her brother died in Pampanga and her daughter, Anita (Rosario's mother) was the only one who
failed to attend the funeral because the latter has just given birth allegedly to Rosario (T.S.N. p.
8, Jan. 13, 1988).
At this point, we find the evidence regarding Rosario's age of doubtful value.
The trial court justified the admissibility of the grandmother's testimony pursuant to the ruling laid
down in U.S. v. Bergantino, (3 Phil., 118 [1903]) where the Court accepted the testimony of the
mother that her daughter was 14 years old and 4 months old. The mother stated that she knew
the age because the child was born about the time of the cholera epidemic of 1889. This was not
hearsay, but came from one who had direct knowledge of the child's birth.
The father likewise testified that as far as he could remember, Rosario was born on December 22,
1975 (T.S.N., p. 4, Jan. 27, 1988) and he was certain that Rosario was more than one (1) year
old when she was baptized (T.S.N., p. 45, Jan. 27, 1988).
The trial court further added that their testimony is supported by the clinical record and the death
certificate indicating that she was 12 years old when she was admitted at the Olongapo City
General Hospital for treatment. The age was supplied by Rosario's alleged guardian, Gaspar
Alcantara to the hospital's clinical record clerk, Lorna Limos. Fe Israel, a social worker who
interviewed Rosario Baluyot also testified that she was told by Rosario that she was 12 years old.
The trial court accepted this as adequate evidence of the truth. Moreover, Jessie Ramirez, the
principal witness in this case declared that he was born on September 5, 1973 and that he was
older than Rosario Baluyot. Therefore, since he was 13 years old in 1986, Rosario must have been
less than 12 yeas old in 1986. (Decision, p. 55)
It is however, equally true that human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an
extraordinary or unusual one for the witness, there is no reasonable assurance of its correctness.
(People v. Dasig 93 Phil. 618, 632 [1953])
With respect to the grandmother's testimony, the date of the brother's death or funeral was never
established, which indicates that the day was rather insignificant to be remembered. The father's
declaration is likewise not entirely reliable. His testimony in court does not at all show that he had
direct knowledge of his daughter's birth. He was certain though that she was more than one (1)
year old at the time she was baptized.
The trial court concluded that the oral declarations of the grandmother and father supported by
other independent evidence such as the clinical record, death certificate and the testimonies of Fe
Israel and Jessie Ramirez, rendered the baptismal certificate presented by the defense without
any probative or evidentiary value. (Decision, p. 55)
The other witnesses are not at all competent to testify on the victim's age, nor was there any basis
shown to establish their competence for the purpose. The clinical records were based on Gaspar
Alcantara's incompetent information given when he brought the victim to the hospital. Alcantara
came to know her only about a year before her death. He had absolutely no knowledge about the
circumstances of Rosario's birth. The death certificate relied upon by the trial court was merely
based on the clinical records. It is even less reliable as a record of birth.
The findings of the trial court with respect to Rosario Baluyot's age cannot stand the application
of evidentiary rules.
The trial court relied on Section 33, Rule 130 (now Section 40 of Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised
Rules of Court).
All the evidence presented by the prosecution showing that Rosario Baluyot was less than 12 years
old at the time of the alleged incident are not adequate to establish the exact date of birth, much
less offset a documentary record showing a different date.
For oral evidence to be admissible under this Rule, the requisites are:
(1) That the declarant must be dead or outside of the Philippines or unable to testify;
(2) That pedigree is in issue;
(3) That the person whose pedigree is in question must be related to the declarant by birth or
marriage;
(4) That the declaration must be made before the controversy occurred or ante litem motam;
and
The defense presented Rosario Baluyot's baptismal certificate which the trial court rejected as
being hearsay and of no value. As against the oral declarations made by interested witnesses
establishing Rosario's age to be less than 12 years old, the evidence on record is more convincing
and worthy of belief. (See Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 664, 673 [1990]).
By virtue of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum, issued by the lower court to the St.
James Parish Church, Subic, Zambales, Fr. Roque Villanueva a Roman Catholic priest testified and
54
stated that he is the head of said parish. He brought with him Baptismal Register No. 9 entitled
"Liber Baptisnorum", a latin term for baptismal book or record. On page 151, No. 3 of the said
Registry Book, there appears the name of Rosario Baluyot who was baptized on December 25,
1974, and born on December 26, 1973. Parents are Policarpio Baluyot and Anita Burgos, residents
of Subic, Zambales. Edita R. Milan appears as the only sponsor with Olongapo City as her address.
Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years of age at the time of the alleged
sexual violation, it was necessary to prove that the usual elements of rape were present; i.e. that
there was force of intimidation or that she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious in
accordance with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
We agree with the defense that there was no proof of such facts. On the contrary, the evidence
shows that Rosario submitted herself to the sexual advances of the appellant. In fact, she appears
to have consented to the act as she was paid P300.00 the next morning while her companion,
Jessie Ramirez was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50, January 6, 1988). The environmental
circumstances coupled with the testimonies and evidence presented in court clearly give the
impression that Rosario Baluyot, a poor street child, was a prostitute inspite of her tender age.
Circumstances in life may have forced her to submit to sex at such a young age but the
circumstances do not come under the purview of force or intimidation needed to convict for rape.
In the case of Macadangdang v. Court of appeals (100 SCRA 73 [1980]), we held that:
In our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of
baptismal certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be
considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specified—but not the veracity of the status or declarations
made therein with respect to his kinsfolk and/or citizenship (Paa v. Chan, L-25945, Oct. 31,
1967). Again, in the case of Fortus v. Novero (L-22378, 23 SCRA 1331 [1968]), this Court held
that a baptismal certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, in conformity
with the rites of the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove
the veracity of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate that concern the
relationship of the person baptized. Such declarations and statements, in order that their truth
may be admitted, must indispensably be shown by proof recognized by law. (At pp. 84-85)
In view of these clear facts which the prosecution failed to refute, no rape was committed. But
was Ritter guilty of homicide?
The trial court justified its ruling by saying that the death of the victim was a consequence of the
insertion of the foreign object into the victim's vagina by the appellant.
In the same light, the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in
the course of business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule.
The baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical
duties and recorded in a book of the church during the course of its business. (U.S. v. de Vera, 28
Phil. 105 [1914] Hence, the certificate (Exhibit "22") presented by the defense that Rosario Baluyot
was baptized on December 25, 1974 may be admitted in evidence as proof of baptism. Policarpio
Baluyot, the victim's father testified that he had in his possession a baptismal certificate different
from the one presented in court. However, no other baptismal record was ever presented to prove
a date different from that brought by the official custodian. Since the baptismal certificate states
that Rosario was baptized on December 25, 1974, it is therefore highly improbable that Rosario
could have been born on December 22, 1975. She could not have been baptized before she was
born. Exhibit "22" may be proof only of baptism but it puts a lie to the declaration that Rosario
was born in 1975. With the father's assertion that Rosario was more than one (1) year old when
she was baptized, we are then more inclined to agree that Rosario was born in 1973 as stated in
the Baptismal Registry.
We now ask "Was the appellant responsible for the sexual vibrator left inside Rosario's vagina
which led to her death?
The trial court convicted the accused based on circumstantial evidence. Unfortunately, the
circumstances are capable of varying interpretations and are not enough to justify conviction.
Jessie Ramirez, the principal witness did not actually see the object inserted in Rosario's vagina.
Neither could he identify the object (Exhibit "C-2") taken from Rosario as the same object which
the appellant was holding at that time of the alleged incident.
In his sworn statement given to the police investigator on September 4, 1987, he answered that:
T Habang kayo ay nasa loob ng kuwarto ng otel, mayroon ka bang napansin na inilabas ng kano
sa kanyang daladalahan kung mayroon man?
S Ang Amerikano ay may dala-dalang shoulder bag na kulay itim, at napansin ko na may inilabas
siya sa kanyang bag na parang vicks inhaler, na kanyang inamoy-amoy habang nasa otel kami
at pagkatapos niya ay inilapag niya sa lamiseta.
T Ilarawan mo nga sa akin ang bagay na nakita mong inilabas ng Amerikano?
S Ito ay may habang tatlong pulgada at ang takip nito ay may habang dalawang pulgada. Iyong
takip ay bilog na patulis at may tabang mga kalahating pulgada. Hindi ko napansin ang hugis ng
dulo ng bagay na may takip dahil natatakpan ng kamay at ilong ng Amerikano.
T Ipinakikita ko sa iyo ang isang larawan. Tignan mong mabuti ang larawang ito at sabihin mo
nga sa akin kung makikilala mo ang mga bagay na nasa larawang ito, na may kinalaman sa
nakita mong kinuha ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag?
S Napansin ko na ang kulay asul na bagay sa larawan ay katulad na katulad noong takip ng
bagay na inilabas ng Amerikano sa kanyang bag. Kaya lang ay bakit naging kulay asul gayong
ng makita ko ito ay kulay puti? (Exhibit "A", p. 2; Emphasis Supplied)
In the case of People v. Rebancos (172 SCRA 425 [1989]), the Court stated:
. . . Although no birth certificate was presented because her birth had allegedly not been
registered, her baptismal certificate, coupled by her mother's testimony, was sufficient to
establish that Mary Rose was below twelve years old when she was violated by Rebancos. (At.
p. 426)
Unfortunately, in the instant case, nobody could corroborate the date on a more reliable document
as to Rosario's birth which could serve as sufficient proof that she was born on December 26,
1973. Therefore, she was more than 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident on October
10, 1986.
Moreover, it is not incumbent upon the defense to prove Rosario's age. The burden of proof lies
on the prosecution to prove that Rosario was less than 12 years old at the time of the alleged
incident in a charge of statutory rape. The prosecution failed in this respect.
55
Presumably, what Jessie Ramirez saw was merely the Vicks inhaler which the appellant does not
deny having possessed at that time. He was certain that the object was white. (T.S.N. p. 91,
January 6, 1988)
At this juncture, we find Dr. Pedro Solis' testimony rather significant. Dr. Pedro Solis, a witness
for the defense is considered an expert witness. (A Doctor of Medicine and a graduate of the State
University in 1940, a degree of Bachelor of Laws and member of the Bar 1949, and a graduate of
the Institute of Criminology University. He was awarded Post Graduate Diploma in Criminology in
1963, and also a graduate of United Nations Asia and Far East Asia Institute on the Prevention of
Crimes in Tokyo Japan 1965. He was appointed Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation in 1940 until 1944. He became Chief Medico Legal Officer in 1970 and became the
Deputy Director of the NBI up to 1984. He is at present a Professorial Lecturer on Legal Medicine
at the UP, FEU, UE, and Fatima College of Medicine; a Medico Legal Consultant of the PGH Medical
Center, Makati Medical Center, UERM Medical Center, MCU Medical Center. He has been with the
NBI for 43 years. He has attended no less than 13 conferences abroad. He is the author of the
textbooks entitled "Legal Medicine" and "Medical Jurisprudence".) With his impressive legal and
medical background, his testimony is too authoritative to ignore. We quote the pertinent portions
of his testimony:
Later, Ramirez retracted and corrected himself. He said that it was grayish in color with color blue
(Medyo kulay abo na may kulay na parang blue). (T.S.N. p. 92, January 6, 1988) The inconsistency
of the witness' testimony casts doubt as to the veracity of the statements made especially when
he answered on additional cross-examination that the reason why he concluded that Exhibit "C-2"
was the same object being held by Ritter was because it was the only one shown to him by the
prosecution (T.S.N. pp. 109-110, January 6, 1988). Jessie Ramirez was not all certain about the
sexual vibrator because he did not actually see it in the possession of the appellant.
What he merely remembers is the revelation made by Rosario the next morning that the foreigner
inserted something inside her vagina. The trial court admitted such statement as part of the res
gestae. In a strained effort to accept such statement as part of res gestae, the trial court focused
the test of admissibility on the lapse of time between the event and the utterance. For the average
13 years old, the insertion of a mechanical device or anything for that matter into the vagina of a
young girl is undoubtedly startling. For Rosario and Jessie, however, there must be more evidence
to show that the statement, given after a night's sleep had intervened, was given instinctively
because the event was so startling Res gestae does not apply. (Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of
Court)
Q Now Dr. Solis, would you kindly go over this object marked as Exh. "C-2" which object was
described as a part of a sexual vibrator battery operated. Now, given this kind of object, would
you kindly tell us what would be the probable effect upon a 12 years old girl when it is inserted
into her vagina?
A Well, this vibrator must be considered a foreign body placed into a human being and as such
be considered a foreign object. As a foreign object, the tendency of the body may be: No. 1—
expel the foreign body—No. 2.—The tendency of the body is to react to that foreign body. One
of the reactions that maybe manifested by the person wherein such foreign body is concerned
is to cover the foreign body with human tissue, in a way to avoid its further injury to the body.
Now, the second reaction is irritation thereby producing certain manifest symptoms and changes
in the area where the foreign body is located.
In severe cases, the symptoms manifestation might not only be localized but may be felt all over
the body, we call it systemic reaction. Now, considering the fact that this foreign body as shown
to me is already not complete, this shows exposure of its different parts for the body to react.
If there is mechanism to cause the foreign body to vibrate, there must be some sort of power
from within and that power must be a dry cell battery. [The] composition of the battery are,
manganese dioxide ammonium, salts, water and any substance that will cause current flow. All
of these substances are irritants including areas of the container and as such, the primary
reaction of the body is to cause irritation on the tissues, thereby inflammatory changes develop
and in all likelihood, aside from those inflammatory changes would be a supervening infection in
a way that the whole generative organ of the woman will suffer from diseased process causing
her the systemic reaction like fever, swelling of the area, and other systemic symptoms. . . . .
(TSN., pp. 13-15, October 19,1988)
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q Now, given this object, how long would it take, Doctor before any reaction such as an infection
would set in, how many days after the insertion of this object in the vagina of a 12 year old girl?
A In the example given to me, considering that one of the ends is exposed, in a way that vaginal
secretion has more chance to get in, well, liberation of this irritant chemicals would be enhanced
and therefore in a shorter period of time, there being this vaginal reaction.
Q How many days or weeks would you say would that follow after the insertion?
A As I said, with my experience at the NBI, insertion of any foreign body in the vaginal canal
usually developed within, a period of two (2) weeks . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q . . . [T]he subject in this case was allegedly raped, and a sexual vibrator was inserted in her
vagina on October 10, 1986 and she was operated on, on May 19, 1987 the following year, so
it took more than 7 months before this was extracted, would you say that it will take that long
before any adverse infection could set in inside the vagina?
Even if it were established that the appellant did insert something inside Rosario's vagina, the
evidence is still not adequate to impute the death of Rosario to the appellant's alleged act.
Jessie Ramirez testified that Rosario was able to remove the object inserted in her vagina. We
quote:
Q Now, you also stated on direct examination that later on Rosario even categorically admitted
to you that she was already able to remove the object allegedly inserted inside her vagina, is
that correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
ATTY. CARAAN:
Q Will you kindly tell to this Honorable Court the exact words used by Rosario Baluyot later on
when you met her when you asked her and when she told you that she was already able to
remove that object from her vagina?
A "Oy, Jessie, natanggal na, "she told me that. I asked her, "Was it already removed?" And she
answered, "Yes, it was removed." But the same night, she again complained of pain of her
stomach. She sent one of her friends to call for me. And as a matter of fact, Tomboy was uttering
defamatory words against me as she was groaning in pain. (TSN, Jan. 6,1988, pp. 72-73)
This encounter happened on the night of the day following the day after both children were invited
by the foreigner to the hotel. (T.S.N. p. 73, January 6, 1988). Rosario was said to be groaning in
pain so we can just imagine the distress she was undergoing at this point in time. If the device
inserted by the appellant caused the pain, it is highly inconceivable how she was able to endure
the pain and discomfort until May, 1987, seven (7) months after the alleged incident. Evidence
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such
as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. (People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]).
56
A Infection and inflamatory changes will develop in a shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19,1988, p. 18)
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q When you said shorter, how long would that be, Doctor?
A As I said, in my personal experience, hair pins, cottonballs and even this lipstick of women
usually, there are only about two (2) weeks time that the patient suffer some abnormal
symptoms.
Q Now, considering that this is a bigger object to the object that you mentioned, this object has
a shorter time?
A Yes, Sir shorter time. (TSN., Oct. 19. 1988, p. 20)
Dr. Barcinal, another witness for the defense also testified that he examined Rosario Baluyot on
May 17, 1986 as a referral patient from the Department of Surgery to give an OB-GYN clearance
to the patient prior to operation. (T.S.N. p. 6, September 28, 1988)
Q And how many times did you examine this patient Rosario Baluyot on that day?
A I examined her twice on that day.
Q The first time that you examined her, what is the result of your findings, if any?
A My first examination, I examined the patient inside the delivery room. The patient was brought
to the delivery room wheel-chaired then from the wheel chair, the patient was ambigatory (sic).
She was able to walk from the door to the examining table. On examination, the patient is
conscious, she was fairly nourished, fairly developed, she had fever, she was uncooperative at
that time and examination deals more on the abdomen which shows slightly distended abdomen
with muscle guarding with tenderness all over, with maximum tenderness over the hypogastric
area. (T.S.N. p. 5, September 28, 1988)
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q What about your second examination to the patient, what was your findings, if any?
A In my second examination, I repeated the internal examination wherein I placed my index
finger and middle finger inside the vagina of the patient and was able to palpate a hard object.
After which, I made a speculum examination wherein I was able to visualize the inner portion of
the vaginal canal, there I saw purulent foul smelling, blood tints, discharge in the vaginal canal
and a foreign body invaded on the posterior part of the vaginal canal.
xxx
xxx
xxx
A I referred back to Dr. Fernandez about my findings and he asked me to try to remove the said
foreign object by the use of forceps which I tried to do so also but I failed to extract the same.
Q All this time that you were examining the patient Rosario Baluyot both in the first and second
instance, Rosario Baluyot was conscious and were you able to talk to her when you were
examining her?
A Yes, sir.
Q And did you ask her why there is a foreign object lodge inside her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her.
Q And what did she tell you, if any?
A She said in her own words that "GINAMIT AKO NG NEGRO AT SIYA ANG NAGLAGAY NITO."
Q Did she also tell you when, this Negro who used her and who inserted and placed the foreign
object on her vagina?
A Yes, Sir I asked her and she said he used me three (3) months ago from the time I examined
her.
Q Now, you said that you referred the patient to the ward, what happened next with your patient?
A To my knowledge, the patient is already scheduled on operation on that date.
Q Meaning, May 17, 1987?
A Yes, Sir I was presuming that the patient would undergo surgery after that?
The trial court, however, ruled that "there is no hard and fast rule as to the time frame wherein
infection sets in upon insertion of a foreign body in the vagina canal. For Dr. Solis, the time frame
is not more than 10 months, and this case is still within the said time frame."
A more generous time interval may be allowed in non-criminal cases. But where an accused is
facing a penalty of reclusion perpetua, the evidence against him cannot be based on probabilities
which are less likely than those probabilities which favor him.
It should be clarified that the time frame depends upon the kind of foreign body lodged inside the
body. An examination of the object gave the following results:
(1) Color: Blue
Size: (a) Circumference—3.031
inches (b) Length—approximately
2.179 inches.
Composition: Showed the general
characteristics of a styrene-butadiene plastic.
(2) The specimen can be electrically operated by means of a battery as per certification
dated 01 June 1988, signed by Mr. Rodolfo D. Mercuric, Shipboard Electrical Systems
Mechanics, Foreman II, SRF Shop 51, Subic (see attached certification).
(3) No comparative examination was made on specimen #1 and vibrator depicted in
the catalog because no actual physical dimensions and/or mechanical characteristics
were shown in the catalog. (Exhibit "LL")
The vibrator end was further subjected to a macro-photographic examination on the open end
portion which revealed the following:
Result of Examination
Macro-photographic examination on the open end portion of specimen #1 shows the
following inscription:
MABUCHI MOTOR JAPAN RE 14 PAT (Exhibit "MM")
(TSN, Sept. 28,1988, pp. 8-9; Emphasis supplied)
From the above results, the subject object is certainly not considered as inert and based on Dr.
Solis' testimony, it is more likely that infection should set in much earlier. Considering also that
the object was inserted inside the vagina which is part of the generative organ of a woman, an
organ which is lined with a very thin layer of membrane with plenty of blood supply, this part of
the body is more susceptible to infection. (T.S.N. p. 34, October 19, 1988)
The trial court debunked Dr. Barcinals testimony considering Rosario's condition at that time. It
ruled that it is inconceivable that she would be striking a normal conversation with the doctors
and would be sitting on the examination table since Gaspar Alcantara stated that when he brought
Rosario Baluyot to the hospital, she was unconscious and writhing in pain.
The truth of Dr. Solis' testimony is more probable under the circumstances of the case. We see no
reason why his opinions qualified by training and experience should not be controlling and binding
upon the Court in the determination of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Tolentino, 166
SCRA 469 [1988]).
It was not improbable for Rosario Baluyot to still be conscious and ambulant at that time because
there were several instances testified to by different witnesses that she was still able to talk prior
to her operation:
57
(1) Fe Israel, a witness for the prosecution and a member of the Olongapo Catholic Charismatic
Renewal Movement testified that as a member of this group she visits indigent children in the
hospital every Saturday and after office hours on working days.
The evidence for the accused maybe numerically less as against the number of witnesses and
preponderance of evidence presented by the prosecution but there is no direct and convincing
proof that the accused was responsible for the vibrator left inside the victim's vagina which caused
her death seven (7) months after its insertion. What the prosecution managed to establish were
mere circumstances which were not sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. While circumstantial evidence may suffice to support a conviction it is imperative,
though, that the following requisites should concur:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. (Rule 133, Sec. 4 Revised Rules of Court)
On the Saturday prior to Rosario's death which was May 17, she was still able to talk to Rosario
Baluyot. In fact, one of her groupmates helped Rosario go to the comfort room to urinate. (T.S.N.,
pp. 16-19, May 25, 1988)
(2) Angelita Amulong, a witness for the defense is another para social worker who worked at Pope
John 23rd Community Center under Sister Eva Palencia. In one of her hospital visits, she
encountered Rosario Baluyot in the month of May, 1987. She actually saw a child who happened
to be Rosario Baluyot seated on the cement floor and when she asked why she was seated there,
she was told that it was too hot in the bed. She saw Rosario Baluyot for about 2 or 3 days
successively. (T.S.N. pp. 10-13, September 7, 1988)
For the well-entrenched rule in evidence is that "before conviction can be had upon circumstantial
evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the author
of the crime (People v. Subano, 73 Phil. 692 [1942]; Emphasis supplied). It must fairly exclude
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420, 433
[1987]). In this case the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution does not
conclusively point to the liability of the appellant for the crime charged. (People v.
Tolentino, supra)
(3) Gaspar Alcantara, the person who brought Rosario to the hospital actually testified that she
was conscious (T.S.N. p. 36, September 14, 1988) but writhing in pain. He took pity on her so he
brought her to the hospital (T.S.N. p. 12, September 14, 1988)
From the above testimonies, it is clear that Rosario was still conscious and could still answer
questions asked of her although she was complaining of stomach pains. Unfortunately, the medical
attention given to her failed to halt the aggravation of her condition. The operation on May 19 was
too late.
We are aware of the wide publicity given to the plight of Rosario Baluyot and how her death
exemplified starkly the daily terrors that most street children encounter as they sell their bodies
in order to survive. At an age when innocence and youthful joys should preponderate in their lives,
they experience life in its most heartless and inhuman form. Instead of nothing more than gentle
disappointments occupying their young minds, they daily cope with tragedies that even adults
should never be made to carry.
Rosario died because of septicemia, which in layman's language is blood poisoning, and peritonitis,
which is massive infection, in the abdominal cavity caused by the foreign object or the cut sexual
vibrator lodged in the vagina of the victim. This led to the infection from the uterus to the fallopian
tubes and into the peritoneum and the abdominal cavity.
It is with distressing reluctance that we have to seemingly set back the efforts of Government to
dramatize the death of Rosario Baluyot as a means of galvanizing the nation to care for its street
children. It would have meant a lot to social workers and prosecutors alike if one pedophile-killer
could be brought to justice so that his example would arouse public concern, sufficient for the
formulation and implementation of meaningful remedies. However, we cannot convict on anything
less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. The protections of the Bill of Rights and our criminal
justice system are as much, if not more so, for the perverts and outcasts of society as they are
for normal, decent, and law-abiding people.
The trial court convicted the accused citing the rationale of Article 4 of the RPC
He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
But before the conviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule as stated in the case of Urbano
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind
beyond reasonable doubt. (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty or conviction
that the accused did commit the offense has not been satisfied.
In People v. Tempongko, Jr., (144 SCRA 583, 592 [1986]), we explained that:
The basic principle in every criminal prosecution is that accusation is not synonymous with guilt.
The accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by the prosecution. If the
prosecution fails, it fails utterly, even if the defense is weak or, indeed, even if there is no defense
at all. The defendant faces the full panoply of state authority with all "The People of the
Philippines" arrayed against him. In a manner of speaking, he goes to bat with all the bases
loaded. The odds are heavily against him. It is important, therefore, to equalize the positions of
the prosecution and the defense by presuming the innocence of the accused until the state is
able to refute the presumption by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (At. p. 592)
By way of emphasis, we reiterate some of the factors arousing reasonable doubt:
1. The evidence on Rosario Baluyot's baptism creates reasonable doubt about her being less
than 12 years old when the carnal knowledge took place. If the evidence for the prosecution is
to be believed, she was not yet born on the date she was baptized.
2. Since the proof of Rosario's being under 12 years of age is not satisfactory, the prosecution
has to prove force, intimidation, or deprivation of reason in order to convict for rape. There is
no such proof. In fact, the evidence shows a willingness to submit to the sexual act for monetary
considerations.
58
3. The only witness to the fact of Ritter's placing a vibrator inside the vagina of Rosario was
Jessie Ramirez. This witness did not see Ritter insert the vibrator. The morning after the
insertion, he was only told by Rosario about it. Two days later, he allegedly met Rosario who
informed him that she was able to remove the object. And yet, Ramirez testified that on the
night of that second encounter, he saw Rosario groaning because of pain in her stomach. She
was even hurling invectives. Ramirez' testimony is not only hearsay, it is also contradictory.
true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral
certainty—a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of those who
are to act upon it. (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Edition, p. 379, citing U.S. v. Reyes,
3 Phil. 3). . . .
In the instant case, since there are circumstances which prevent our being morally certain of the
guilt of the appellant, he is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal.
4. It was improbable, according to expert medical testimony, for a foreign object with active
properties to cause pain, discomfort, and serious infection only after seven months inside a
young girl's vaginal canal. Infection would have set in much earlier. Jessie Ramirez recalled that
the incident happened in December of 1986. (TSN., January 6, 1988, pp. 15-17) The evidence,
however shows that the appellant was not here in the Philippines that December. As per the
Commission on Immigration Arrival and Departure Report, Heinrich Ritter arrived in the
Philippines on October 7, 1986 and left on October 12, 1986. He never returned until September
23, 1987 (Exhibits "DD" and "EE") The incident could have happened only in October, but then
it would have been highly improbable for the sexual vibrator to stay inside the vagina for seven
(7) months with the kind of serious complications it creates.
This notwithstanding, the Court can not ignore the acts of the appellant on the children, Jessie
Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in October, 1986 at the MGM Hotel. Inspite of his flat denials, we are
convinced that he comes to this country not to look at historical sights, enrich his intellect or
indulge in legitimate pleasures but in order to satisfy the urgings of a sick mind.
With the positive Identification and testimony by Jessie Ramirez that it was the appellant who
picked him and Rosario from among the children and invited them to the hotel; and that in the
hotel he was shown pictures of young boys like him and the two masturbated each other, such
actuations clearly show that the appellant is a pedophile. When apprehended in Ermita, he was
sizing up young children. Dr. Solis defined pedophilia in his book entitled Legal Medicine, 1987
edition, as follows:
Pedophilia—A form of sexual perversion wherein a person has the compulsive desire to have
sexual intercourse with a child of either sex. Children of various ages participate in sexual
activities, like fellatio, cunnilingus, fondling with sex organs, or anal sexual intercourse. Usually
committed by a homosexual between a man and a boy the latter being a passive partner.
5. The gynecologist who attended to Rosario during her hospital confinement testified that she
told him "Ginamit ako ng Negro at siya ang naglagay nito." The accused is not a black.
Noteworthy is the fact that nothing was mentioned about Rosario's activities after the hotel
incident. Considering Dr. Barcinal's testimony indicating that she was "used" by a "Negro" three
(3) months prior to admission in the hospital and Rosario's unfortunate profession, there is always
the possibility that she could have allowed herself to be violated by this perverse kind of sexual
behavior where a vibrator or vibrators were inserted into her vagina between October, 1986 and
May, 1987.
Ritter was prosecuted for rape with homicide and not pedophilia, assuming this is a crime by itself.
Pedophilia is clearly a behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of
the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well-being of our youth.
(Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution) (Harvey v. Defensor Santiago, 162 SCRA 840, 848
[1989]). Pedophiles, especially thrill seeking aliens have no place in our country.
Moreover, the long delay of seven (7) months after the incident in reporting the alleged crime
renders the evidence for the prosecution insufficient to establish appellant's guilty connection with
the requisite moral certainty. (See People v. Mula Cruz, 129 SCRA 156 [1984]).
In this case, there is reasonable ground to believe that the appellant committed acts injurious not
only to Rosario Baluyot but also to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people. The
state has expressly committed itself to defend the right of children to assistance and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial
to their development. (Art. XV, Section 3 [2] . . . (Harvey v. Santiago, supra). The appellant has
abused Filipino children, enticing them with money. The appellant should be expelled from the
country.
The established facts do not entirely rule out the possibility that the appellant could have inserted
a foreign object inside Rosario's vagina. This object may have caused her death. It is possible that
the appellant could be the guilty person. However, the Court cannot base an affirmance of
conviction upon mere possibilities. Suspicions and possibilities are not evidence and therefore
should not be taken against the accused. (People v. Tolentino, supra)
Well-established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to the accused should be duly taken
into account. This rule applies even to hardened criminals or those whose bizarre behaviour
violates the mores of civilized society. The evidence against the accused must survive the test of
reason. The strongest suspicion must not be allowed to sway judgment. (See Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]). As stated in the case of People v. Ng (142 SCRA 615
[1986]):
. . . [F]rom the earliest years of this Court, it has emphasized the rule that reasonable doubt in
criminal cases must be resolved in favor of the accused. The requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt calls for moral certainty of guilt. It has been defined as meaning such proof
"to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes
every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the
proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely to be
Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Rule III, Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is
that a person while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. We reiterate what has been
stated in Urbano v. IAC, supra.
. . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages.
(Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused
only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of
the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not
59
necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by
the Code Commission as follows:
And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal laws which will adequately protect street
children from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents or guardians who
profit from the sale of young bodies. The provisions on statutory rape and other related offenses
were never intended for the relatively recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of rampant
poverty among the forgotten segments of our society. Newspaper and magazine articles, media
exposes, college dissertations, and other studies deal at length with this serious social problem
but pedophiles like the appellant will continue to enter the Philippines and foreign publications
catering to them will continue to advertise the availability of Filipino street children unless the
Government acts and acts soon. We have to acquit the appellant because the Bill of Rights
commands us to do so. We, however, express the Court's concern about the problem of street
children and the evils committed against them. Something must be done about it.
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil
liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not
proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal
liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two
liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other,
private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for
the reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so
different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus:
"There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action
for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper
that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party,
why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or
violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right
of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the
criminal law?
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN
RITTER is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is ordered to pay the amount
of P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to institute proper deportation
proceedings against the appellant and to immediately expel him thereafter with prejudice to reentry into the country.
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion.
It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice—
a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged.
Rosario
Baluyot
is
a
street
child
who
ran
away
from
her
grandmother's
house.1âwphi1 Circumstances forced her to succumb and enter this unfortunate profession.
Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who have certainly suffered mental anguish, anxiety and
moral shock by her sudden and incredulous death as reflected in the records of the case. Though
we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize that we are not
ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption of innocence and
the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the
facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there is the likelihood that he did insert
the vibrator whose end was left inside Rosario's vaginal canal and that the vibrator may have
caused her death. True, we cannot convict on probabilities or possibilities but civil liability does
not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of indemnity on the
facts found in the records of this case.
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public
policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the appellant has abused Filipino children,
enticing them with money. We can not overstress the responsibility for proper behavior of all adults
in the Philippines, including the appellant towards young children. The sexual exploitation
committed by the appellant should not and can not be condoned. Thus, considering the
circumstances of the case, we are awarding damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot in the amount
of P30,000.00.
60
G.R. No. 161921
July 17, 2013
On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager, [respondent] Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr.,
answered the letter dated March 15, 1999 and reiterated that it was at the instance of Joyce
Ardiente that the water line was cut off (Records, p. 161).
JOYCE
V.
ARDIENTE, PETITIONER,
vs.
SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT
AND GASPAR GONZALEZ,* JR., RESPONDENTS.
Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide [and her husband] filed [a] complaint for
damages [against petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez] (Records, pp. 2-6).
PERALTA, J.:
In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was only restored and reconnected when the
[trial] court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on December 14, 1999 (Records, p.
237).4
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August
28, 2003 and December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000. The CA Decision
affirmed with modification the August 15, 2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 24, while the CA Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as follows:
In the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties, defendants did not act with justice,
gave plaintiffs their due and observe honesty and good faith. Before disconnecting the water
supply, defendants COWD and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales did not even send a disconnection notice
to plaintiffs as testified to by Engr. Bienvenido Batar, in-charge of the Commercial Department
of defendant COWD. There was one though, but only three (3) days after the actual
disconnection on March 12, 1999. The due date for payment was yet on March 15. Clearly, they
did not act with justice. Neither did they observe honesty.
The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
[Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a
housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City with a lot area of one hundred fiftythree (153) square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 69905.
They should not have been swayed by the prodding of Joyce V. Ardiente. They should have
investigated first as to the present ownership of the house. For doing the act because Ardiente
told them, they were negligent. Defendant Joyce Ardiente should have requested before the
cutting off of the water supply, plaintiffs to pay. While she attempted to tell plaintiffs but she did
not have the patience of seeing them. She knew that it was plaintiffs who had been using the
water four (4) years ago and not hers. She should have been very careful. x x x5
On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (Exh. "B", pp. 470473, Records) selling, transferring and conveying in favor of [respondent] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide
all their rights and interests in the housing unit at Emily Homes in consideration of ₱70,000.00.
The Memorandum of Agreement carries a stipulation:
"4. That the water and power bill of the subject property shall be for the account of the Second
Party (Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective June 1, 1994." (Records, p. 47)
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants [Ardiente,
COWD and Gonzalez] to pay jointly and severally plaintiffs, the following sums:
(a) ₱200,000.00 for moral damages;
(b) 200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee.
vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the payment of the mortgage loan secured by
Joyce Ardiente from the National Home Mortgage (Records, Exh. "A", pp. 468-469)
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in the name of Joyce Ardiente was
never questioned nor perturbed (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 7-8) until on March 12, 1999,
without notice, the water connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the office of the
Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) to complain, a certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa that
she was delinquent for three (3) months corresponding to the months of December 1998, January
1999, and February 1999. Ma. Theresa argued that the due date of her payment was March 18,
1999 yet (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 11-12). Mrs. Madjos later told her that it was at the
instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off (T.S.N., February 5, 2001, p. 31).
The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales is hereby
dismissed. The Court is not swayed that the cutting off of the water supply of plaintiffs was
because they were influenced by defendant Joyce Ardiente. They were negligent too for which
they should be liable.
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the CA.
On August 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision disposing as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with the modification
that the awarded damages is reduced to ₱100,000.00 each for moral and exemplary damages,
while attorney's fees is lowered to ₱25,000.00. Costs against appellants.
On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, p. 12). On
the same date, through her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to the COWD to explain who
authorized the cutting of the water line (Records, p. 160).
The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a "legal duty to honor the possession and
use of water line by Ma. Theresa Pastorfide pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement" and
61
"that when [petitioner] applied for its disconnection, she acted in bad faith causing prejudice and
[injury to] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide."8
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, but these were
denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 17, 2003.
At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and Gonzalez, who were petitioner's co-defendants
before the RTC and her co-appellants in the CA, were impleaded as respondents in the instant
petition. This cannot be done. Being her co-parties before the RTC and the CA, petitioner cannot,
in the instant petition for review on certiorari, make COWD and Gonzalez, adversary parties. It is
a grave mistake on the part of petitioner's counsel to treat COWD and Gonzalez as respondents.
There is no basis to do so, considering that, in the first place, there is no showing that petitioner
filed a cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a
cross-claim which is not set up shall be barred. Thus, for failing to set up a cross-claim against
COWD and Gonzalez before the RTC, petitioner is already barred from doing so in the present
petition.
COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, which was docketed
as G.R. No. 161802. However, based on technical grounds and on the finding that the CA did not
commit any reversible error in its assailed Decision, the petition was denied via a
Resolution10 issued by this Court on March 24, 2004. COWD and Gonzalez filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied with finality through this Court's Resolution11 dated June
28, 2004.
More importantly, as shown above, COWD and Gonzalez's petition for review on certiorari filed
with this Court was already denied with finality on June 28, 2004, making the presently assailed
CA Decision final and executory insofar as COWD and Gonzalez are concerned. Thus, COWD and
Gonzalez are already precluded from participating in the present petition. They cannot resurrect
their lost cause by filing pleadings this time as respondents but, nonetheless, reiterating the same
prayer in their previous pleadings filed with the RTC and the CA.
Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant petition with the following Assignment of
Errors:
As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court likewise noticed that the main issues raised by
petitioner are factual and it is settled that the resolution of factual issues is the function of lower
courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and considered binding by the
Supreme Court subject only to certain exceptions, none of which is present in this instant
petition.13 This is especially true when the findings of the RTC have been affirmed by the CA as in
this case.14
As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they "failed to give a notice of disconnection and
derelicted in reconnecting the water line despite payment of the unpaid bills by the [respondent
spouses Pastorfide]."9
7.1 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (ALTHOUGH IT HAS REDUCED THE LIABILITY INTO HALF)
HAS STILL COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE JOINT AND
SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE WITH CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER
DISTRICT (COWD) AND ENGR. GASPAR D. GONZALES FOR THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO SERVE
NOTICE UPON RESPONDENTS SPOUSES PASTORFIDE PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL DISCONNECTION
DESPITE EVIDENCE ADDUCED DURING TRIAL THAT EVEN WITHOUT PETITIONER'S REQUEST,
COWD WAS ALREADY SET TO EFFECT DISCONNECTION OF RESPONDENTS' WATER SUPPLY DUE
TO NON-PAYMENT OF ACCOUNT FOR THREE (3) MONTHS.
In any case, a perusal of the records at hand would readily show that the instant petition lacks
merit.
Petitioner insists that she should not be held liable for the disconnection of respondent spouses'
water supply, because she had no participation in the actual disconnection. However, she admitted
in the present petition that it was she who requested COWD to disconnect the Spouses Pastorfide's
water supply. This was confirmed by COWD and Gonzalez in their cross-claim against petitioner.
While it was COWD which actually discontinued respondent spouses' water supply, it cannot be
denied that it was through the instance of petitioner that the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply
was disconnected in the first place.
7.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT
RULED TOTALLY AGAINST PETITIONER AND FAILED TO FIND THAT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHEN THEY FAILED TO PAY THEIR WATER BILLS FOR THREE
MONTHS AND TO MOVE FOR THE TRANSFER OF THE COWD ACCOUNT IN THEIR NAME, WHICH
WAS A VIOLATION OF THEIR MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH PETITIONER JOYCE V.
ARDIENTE. RESPONDENTS LIKEWISE DELIBERATELY FAILED TO EXERCISE DILIGENCE OF A
GOOD FATHER OF THE FAMILY TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE UNDER ART. 2203 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE.
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require the Spouses Pastorfide to cause
the transfer of the former's account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their
Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the
disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to harm another.15 Otherwise, liability for damages to the
injured party will attach.16 In the present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of
petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of respondent spouses’ water supply without
warning or informing the latter of such request. Petitioner claims that her request for disconnection
was based on the advise of COWD personnel and that her intention was just to compel the Spouses
Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that petitioner's account with COWD be transferred in
respondent spouses' name. If such was petitioner's only intention, then she should have advised
respondent spouses before or immediately after submitting her request for disconnection, telling
them that her request was simply to force them to comply with their obligation under their
7.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE FACT
THAT RESPONDENT SPOUSES PASTORFIDE ARE LIKEWISE BOUND TO OBSERVE ARTICLE 19 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE, i.e., IN THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHTS AND IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
THEIR DUTIES TO ACT WITH JUSTICE, GIVE EVERYONE HIS DUE AND OBSERVE HONESTY AND
GOOD FAITH.
7.4 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED AN AWARD OF
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AS AGAINST PETITIONER
ARDIENTE.12
62
Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. What made matters worse is the fact that COWD
undertook the disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to reconnect the Spouses
Pastorfide’s water supply despite payment of their arrears. There was clearly an abuse of right on
the part of petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith.
wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation,
an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in
damages under Article 20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of
each case. x x x18
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned provisions of law is her
unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected, coupled with her
failure to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such intention. On the part of COWD and
Gonzalez, it is their failure to give prior notice of the impending disconnection and their subsequent
neglect to reconnect respondent spouses' water supply despite the latter's settlement of their
delinquent account.
In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation17 is
instructive, to wit:
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of one’s rights as
well as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due; and
observe honesty and good faith.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of both
the RTC and the CA that petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez are solidarily liable.
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was elucidated that while
Article 19 "lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper." The Court said:
The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages based on the provisions of Article 2219,19 in
connection with Articles 2020 and 2121 of the Civil Code.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of
the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit,
incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that
spring from the fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for
human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may
approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost among
these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 x x x.
As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by
way of example or correction for the public good. Nonetheless, exemplary damages are imposed
not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.22 In the instant case, the Court agrees with the CA
in sustaining the award of exemplary damages, although it reduced the amount granted,
considering that respondent spouses were deprived of their water supply for more than nine (9)
months, and such deprivation would have continued were it not for the relief granted by the RTC.
With respect to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides, among others,
that such fees may be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded, when the defendant's
act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest, and where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiffs’ plainly valid, just and demandable claim.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also
in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth
in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by
law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised
in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage
to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
WHEREFORE, instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals, dated August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 73000 are AFFIRMED.
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks of the general
sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When
a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said
provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
63
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated April 14,
1980, for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction.
LEONILO
C.
DONATO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA,
BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B.
ABAYAN, respondents.
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which
question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal.3 It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related
to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and
a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.5
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for the
resolution of the Court is whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of
First Itance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending
before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a
prejudicial question. The respondent judge ruled in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila
acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein
petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 43554 and assigned to Branch XXXII of said court. The information was filed based on the
complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the
issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second
marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.
Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who
filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was
obtained through deceit.
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978, which action was docketed as Civil
Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on the ground that private respondent consented to
entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no previous
knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30,
1978. Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second
marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's
consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent or second marriage,
petitioner and private respondent had lived together and deported themselves as husband and
wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint
affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage
license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of
exceptional character.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null
and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private
respondent only sometime later when he was required to answer the civil action for anulment of
the second marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon by the case of Landicho vs. Relova 6 may be
applied to the present case. Said case states that:
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a
bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions
as to warrant the suspension of the case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be
considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that
the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress,
force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and
cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case
is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963,
the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it
was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force,
threats and intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the
civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with
her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming
that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not
be material to the outcome of the case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge
for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he
who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not abused
much less gravely abused, its discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion
to suspend the proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the
annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which
must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.
In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the
ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order further directed that the
proceedings in the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his grounds
for suspension of proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs.
Ejercito 2 which was a much later case than that cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second
marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.
64
Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a
later case and as such it should be the one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The
situation in the case at bar is markedly different. In the aforecited case it was accused Milagros
dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having contracted a second marriage while a previous
one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filed an action for annulment on
the ground of duress, as contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was private
respondent Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the
second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit since she was not
aware that petitioner's marriage was still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was
already rendered in the civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz was null and void, thus
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the present case,
there is as yet no such judgment in the civil case.
G.R. No. L-22579
February 23, 1968
ROLANDO
LANDICHO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch I, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question before
the Court is whether or not the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage at the
instance of the second wife against petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party complaint
against the first spouse for the annulment of the first marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question
in a pending suit for bigamy against him. Respondent, Judge Relova answered in the negative. We
sustain him.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule
on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent
to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish
that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be
the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the petition follow. On February 27, 1963, petitioner was
charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent
Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then
lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia."
On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance ofBatangas, likewise
presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner
as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly
employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963,
petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant
Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant
be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she
compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati,
Rizal.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of
the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26,
1978, he had been living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more
than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was
obtained by private respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in
entering a subsequent marriage is belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent
executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit
of marriage for five years, one month and one day until their marital union was formally ratified
by the second marriage and that it was private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for
nullity.
Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was only when Civil
Case No. E-02627 was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the
solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came up with the story that his consent to
the marriage was secured through the use of force, violence, intimidation and undue influence.
Petitioner also continued to live with private respondent until November 1978, when the latter left
their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already previously married.
Thereafter, on October 7, 1963, petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal
case pending the decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the
pending civil suit. Respondent Judge on November 19, 1963 denied the motion for lack of merit.
Then came a motion for reconsideration to set aside the above order, which was likewise denied
on March 2, 1964. Hence this petition, filed on March 13, 1964.
In a resolution of this Court of March 17, 1964, respondent Judge was required to answer
within ten (10) days, with a preliminary injunction being issued to restrain him from further
proceeding with the prosecution of the bigamy case. In the meanwhile, before the answer was
filed there was an amended petition for certiorari, the amendment consisting solely in the inclusion
of the People of the Philippines as another respondent. This Court admitted such amended petition
in a resolution of April 3, 1964.
In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent Judge did
not err in his earlier order. There is no pivotal issue that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil
Case No. E-02627 before proceedings in the criminal action for bigamy can be undertaken.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the
respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to
costs.
Then came the answer to the amended petition on May 14 of that year where the statement
of facts as above detailed was admitted, with the qualifications that the bigamy charge was filed
upon the complaint of the first spouse Elvira Makatangay. It alleged as one of its special and
affirmative defenses that the mere fact that "there are actions to annul the marriages entered into
by the accused in a bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial questions are automatically raised
in said civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy." 1 The answer
65
stressed that even on the assumption that the first marriage was null and void on the ground
alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. It
continued, referring to Viada, that "parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only
when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, according to Viada, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage incurs
the penalty provided for in this Article. . . ." 2
opinion of Viada preclude a finding that respondent Judge abused, much less gravely abused, his
discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of preliminary injunction
issued dissolved. With costs.1äwphï1.ñët
This defense is in accordance with the principle implicit in authoritative decisions of this
Court. In Merced v. Diez, 3 what was in issue was the validity of the second marriage, "which must
be determined before hand in the civil action before the criminal action can proceed." According
to the opinion of Justice Labrador: "We have a situation where the issue of the validity of the
second marriage can be determined or must first be determined in the civil action before the
criminal action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second marriage
is, therefore, a prejudicial question because determination of the validity of the second marriage
is determinable in the civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy." It was the
conclusion of this Court then that for petitioner Merced to be found guilty of bigamy, the second
marriage which he contracted "must first be declared valid." Its validity having been questioned
in the civil action, there must be a decision in such a case "before the prosecution for bigamy can
proceed."
To the same effect is the doctrine announced in Zapanta v. Mendoza. 4 As explained in the
opinion of Justice Dizon: "We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises
in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. . . . The prejudicial question — we further said
— must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be
lodged in another court. . . . These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the question
for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper
on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means
of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and can not be the
basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage
is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. . . ."
The situation in this case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted for
bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted
appeared to be indisputable. Then on March 15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not petitioner
who filed an action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. It was sometime
later, on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a
third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be
declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. As was correctly stressed
in the answer of respondent Judge relying on Viada, parties to a marriage should not be permitted
to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts
a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Such was the situation of petitioner. There is no occasion to indulge in the probability that
the third-party complaint against the first wife brought almost five months after the prosecution
for bigamy was started could have been inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a
defense based on an alleged prejudicial question. The above judicial decisions as well as the
66
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
one, except with respect to "an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose
of saving the life of the mother." Similar statutes are in existence in a majority of the States.
Roe v. Wade
Texas first enacted a criminal abortion statute in 1854. Texas Laws 1854, c. 49, § 1, set forth in
3 H. Gammel, Laws of Texas 1502 (1898). This was soon modified into language that has remained
substantially unchanged to the present time. See Texas Penal Code of 1857, c. 7, Arts. 531-536;
G. Paschal, Laws of Texas, Arts. 2192-2197 (1866); Texas Rev.Stat., c. 8, Arts. 536-541 (1879);
Texas Rev.Crim.Stat., Arts. 1071-1076 (1911). The final article in each of these compilations
provided the same exception, as does the present Article 1196, for an abortion by "medical advice
for the purpose of saving the life of the mother." [Footnote 3]
No. 70-18
Argued December 13, 1971
Reargued October 11, 1972
Decided January 22, 1973
II
410 U.S. 113
Jane Roe, [Footnote 4] a single woman who was residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted this
federal action in March 1970 against the District Attorney of the county. She sought a declaratory
judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face, and an
injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the statutes.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This Texas federal appeal and its Georgia companion, Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179, present
constitutional challenges to state criminal abortion legislation. The Texas statutes under attack
here are typical of those that have been in effect in many States for approximately a century. The
Georgia statutes, in contrast, have a modern cast, and are a legislative product that, to an extent
at least, obviously reflects the influences of recent attitudinal change, of advancing medical
knowledge and techniques, and of new thinking about an old issue.
Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant; that she wished to terminate her pregnancy
by an abortion "performed by a competent, licensed physician, under safe, clinical conditions";
that she was unable to get a "legal" abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be
threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy; and that she could not afford to travel to another
jurisdiction in order to secure a legal abortion under safe conditions. She claimed that the Texas
statutes were unconstitutionally vague and that they abridged her right of personal privacy,
protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. By an amendment to
her complaint, Roe purported to sue "on behalf of herself and all other women" similarly situated.
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion
controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and
seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's experiences,
one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes
toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to
observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion.
James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's
action. In his complaint, he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas
abortion statutes, and that two such prosecutions were pending against him. He described
conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions, and he claimed that for many cases he,
as a physician, was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception
recognized by Article 1196. He alleged that, as a consequence, the statutes were vague and
uncertain, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that they violated his own and his
patients' rights to privacy in the doctor-patient relationship and his own right to practice medicine,
rights he claimed were guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
In addition, population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial overtones tend to complicate and not
to simplify the problem.
Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of
predilection. We seek earnestly to do this, and, because we do, we have inquired into, and in this
opinion place some emphasis upon, medical and medical-legal history and what that history
reveals about man's attitudes toward the abortion procedure over the centuries. We bear in mind,
too, Mr. Justice Holmes' admonition in his now-vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.
S. 45, 76 (1905):
"[The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our
finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude
our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution
of the United States."
John and Mary Doe, [Footnote 5] a married couple, filed a companion complaint to that of Roe.
They also named the District Attorney as defendant, claimed like constitutional deprivations, and
sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Does alleged that they were a childless couple; that
Mrs. Doe was suffering from a "neural-chemical" disorder; that her physician had "advised her to
avoid pregnancy until such time as her condition has materially improved" (although a pregnancy
at the present time would not present "a serious risk" to her life); that, pursuant to medical advice,
she had discontinued use of birth control pills; and that, if she should become pregnant, she would
want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent, licensed physician
under safe, clinical conditions. By an amendment to their complaint, the Does purported to sue
"on behalf of themselves and all couples similarly situated."
I
The Texas statutes that concern us here are Arts. 1191-1194 and 1196 of the State's Penal Code.
[Footnote 1] These make it a crime to "procure an abortion," as therein defined, or to attempt
The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district
court. The suits thus presented the situations of the pregnant single woman, the childless couple,
67
with the wife not pregnant, and the licensed practicing physician, all joining in the attack on the
Texas criminal abortion statutes. Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal
and for summary judgment. The court held that Roe and members of her class, and Dr. Hallford,
had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies, but that the Does had failed to allege
facts sufficient to state a present controversy, and did not have standing. It concluded that, with
respect to the requests for a declaratory judgment, abstention was not warranted. On the merits,
the District Court held that the "fundamental right of single women and married persons to choose
whether to have children is protected by the Ninth Amendment, through the Fourteenth
Amendment,"
when she filed an alias affidavit with the District Court; and her inability to obtain a legal abortion
in Texas.
Viewing Roe's case as of the time of its filing and thereafter until as late a May, there can be little
dispute that it then presented a case or controversy and that, wholly apart from the class aspects,
she, as a pregnant single woman thwarted by the Texas criminal abortion laws, had standing to
challenge those statutes. Indeed, we do not read the appellee's brief as really asserting anything
to the contrary. The "logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be
adjudicated," Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 102, and the necessary degree of
contentiousness, Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103 (1969), are both present.
and that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face because they were both
unconstitutionally vague and constituted an overbroad infringement of the plaintiffs' Ninth
Amendment rights. The court then held that abstention was warranted with respect to the requests
for an injunction. It therefore dismissed the Does' complaint, declared the abortion statutes void,
and dismissed the application for injunctive relief. 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1225 (ND Tex.1970).
The appellee notes, however, that the record does not disclose that Roe was pregnant at the time
of the District Court hearing on May 22, 1970, [Footnote 6] or on the following June 17 when the
court's opinion and judgment were filed. And he suggests that Roe's case must now be moot
because she and all other members of her class are no longer subject to any 1970 pregnancy.
The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253, have
appealed to this Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction. The
defendant District Attorney has purported to cross-appeal, pursuant to the same statute, from the
court's grant of declaratory relief to Roe and Hallford. Both sides also have taken protective appeals
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court ordered the appeals held in
abeyance pending decision here. We postponed decision on jurisdiction to the hearing on the
merits.
The usual rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or
certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated.
But when, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the normal 266-day human
gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process
is complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive much
beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively denied. Our law should not be that
rigid. Pregnancy often comes more than once to the same woman, and in the general population,
if man is to survive, it will always be with us. Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a
conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
It might have been preferable if the defendant, pursuant to our Rule 20, had presented to us a
petition for certiorari before judgment in the Court of Appeals with respect to the granting of the
plaintiffs' prayer for declaratory relief. Our decisions in Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U. S. 427 (1970),
and Gunn v. University Committee, 399 U. S. 383 (1970), are to the effect that § 1253 does not
authorize an appeal to this Court from the grant or denial of declaratory relief alone. We conclude,
nevertheless, that those decisions do not foreclose our review of both the injunctive and the
declaratory aspects of a case of this kind when it is properly here, as this one is, on appeal under
1253 from specific denial of injunctive relief, and the arguments as to both aspects are necessarily
identical. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U. S. 320 (1970); Florida Lime Growers v.
Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73, 80-81 (1960). It would be destructive of time and energy for all concerned
were we to rule otherwise. Cf. Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179.
We, therefore, agree with the District Court that Jane Roe had standing to undertake this litigation,
that she presented a justiciable controversy, and that the termination of her 1970 pregnancy has
not rendered her case moot.
B. Dr. Hallford. The doctor's position is different. He entered Roe's litigation as a plaintiffintervenor, alleging in his complaint that he:
"[I]n the past has been arrested for violating the Texas Abortion Laws and at the present time
stands charged by indictment with violating said laws in the Criminal District Court of Dallas
County, Texas to-wit: (1) The State of Texas vs. James H. Hallford, No. C-69-5307-IH, and (2)
The State of Texas vs. James H. Hallford, No. C-692524-H. In both cases, the defendant is
charged with abortion. . . ."
IV
We are next confronted with issues of justiciability, standing, and abstention. Have Roe and the
Does established that "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy," Baker v. Carr, 369 U.
S. 186, 204 (1962), that insures that "the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in
an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution," Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 101 (1968), and Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 732 (1972)? And
what effect did the pendency of criminal abortion charges against Dr. Hallford in state court have
upon the propriety of the federal court's granting relief to him as a plaintiff-intervenor?
In his application for leave to intervene, the doctor made like representations as to the abortion
charges pending in the state court. These representations were also repeated in the affidavit he
executed and filed in support of his motion for summary judgment.
Dr. Hallford is, therefore, in the position of seeking, in a federal court, declaratory and injunctive
relief with respect to the same statutes under which he stands charged in criminal prosecutions
simultaneously pending in state court. Although he stated that he has been arrested in the past
for violating the State's abortion laws, he makes no allegation of any substantial and immediate
threat to any federally protected right that cannot be asserted in his defense against the state
prosecutions. Neither is there any allegation of harassment or bad faith prosecution. In order to
A. Jane Roe. Despite the use of the pseudonym, no suggestion is made that Roe is a fictitious
person. For purposes of her case, we accept as true, and as established, her existence; her
pregnant state, as of the inception of her suit in March 1970 and as late as May 21 of that year
68
escape the rule articulated in the cases cited in the next paragraph of this opinion that, absent
harassment and bad faith, a defendant in a pending state criminal case cannot affirmatively
challenge in federal court the statutes under which the State is prosecuting him, Dr. Hallford seeks
to distinguish his status as a present state defendant from his status as a "potential future
defendant," and to assert only the latter for standing purposes here.
The Does therefore are not appropriate plaintiffs in this litigation. Their complaint was properly
dismissed by the District Court, and we affirm that dismissal.
V
The principal thrust of appellant's attack on the Texas statutes is that they improperly invade a
right, said to be possessed by the pregnant woman, to choose to terminate her pregnancy.
Appellant would discover this right in the concept of personal "liberty" embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause; or in personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to be
protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S.
479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); id. at 460 (WHITE, J., concurring in
result); or among those rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Before addressing this claim, we feel it
desirable briefly to survey, in several aspects, the history of abortion, for such insight as that
history may afford us, and then to examine the state purposes and interests behind the criminal
abortion laws.
We see no merit in that distinction. Our decision in Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U. S. 66 (1971),
compels the conclusion that the District Court erred when it granted declaratory relief to Dr.
Hallford instead of refraining from so doing. The court, of course, was correct in refusing to grant
injunctive relief to the doctor. The reasons supportive of that action, however, are those expressed
in Samuels v. Mackell, supra, and in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401
U. S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82 (1971); and Byrne v. Karaleis, 401 U. S.
216 (1971). See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 (1965). We note, in passing,
that Younger and its companion cases were decided after the three-judge District Court decision
in this case.
Dr. Hallford's complaint in intervention, therefore, is to be dismissed. [Footnote 7] He is remitted
to his defenses in the state criminal proceedings against him. We reverse the judgment of the
District Court insofar as it granted Dr. Hallford relief and failed to dismiss his complaint in
intervention.
VI
It perhaps is not generally appreciated that the restrictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a
majority of States today are of relatively recent vintage. Those laws, generally proscribing abortion
or its attempt at any time during pregnancy except when necessary to preserve the pregnant
woman's life, are not of ancient or even of common law origin. Instead, they derive from statutory
changes effected, for the most part, in the latter half of the 19th century.
C. The Does. In view of our ruling as to Roe's standing in her case, the issue of the Does' standing
in their case has little significance. The claims they assert are essentially the same as those of
Roe, and they attack the same statutes. Nevertheless, we briefly note the Does' posture.
1. Ancient attitudes. These are not capable of precise determination. We are told that, at the time
of the Persian Empire, abortifacients were known, and that criminal abortions were severely
punished. [Footnote 8] We are also told, however, that abortion was practiced in Greek times as
well as in the Roman Era, [Footnote 9] and that "it was resorted to without scruple." [Footnote
10] The Ephesian, Soranos, often described as the greatest of the ancient gynecologists, appears
to have been generally opposed to Rome's prevailing free-abortion practices. He found it necessary
to think first of the life of the mother, and he resorted to abortion when, upon this standard, he
felt the procedure advisable. [Footnote 11] Greek and Roman law afforded little protection to the
unborn. If abortion was prosecuted in some places, it seems to have been based on a concept of
a violation of the father's right to his offspring. Ancient religion did not bar abortion. [Footnote 12]
Their pleadings present them as a childless married couple, the woman not being pregnant, who
have no desire to have children at this time because of their having received medical advice that
Mrs. Doe should avoid pregnancy, and for "other highly personal reasons." But they "fear . . . they
may face the prospect of becoming parents." And if pregnancy ensues, they "would want to
terminate" it by an abortion. They assert an inability to obtain an abortion legally in Texas and,
consequently, the prospect of obtaining an illegal abortion there or of going outside Texas to some
place where the procedure could be obtained legally and competently.
We thus have as plaintiffs a married couple who have, as their asserted immediate and present
injury, only an alleged "detrimental effect upon [their] marital happiness" because they are forced
to "the choice of refraining from normal sexual relations or of endangering Mary Doe's health
through a possible pregnancy." Their claim is that, sometime in the future, Mrs. Doe might become
pregnant because of possible failure of contraceptive measures, and, at that time in the future,
she might want an abortion that might then be illegal under the Texas statutes.
2. The Hippocratic Oath. What then of the famous Oath that has stood so long as the ethical guide
of the medical profession and that bears the name of the great Greek (460(?)-377(?) B. C.), who
has been described as the Father of Medicine, the "wisest and the greatest practitioner of his art,"
and the "most important and most complete medical personality of antiquity," who dominated the
medical schools of his time, and who typified the sum of the medical knowledge of the past?
[Footnote 13] The Oath varies somewhat according to the particular translation, but in any
translation the content is clear:
This very phrasing of the Does' position reveals its speculative character. Their alleged injury rests
on possible future contraceptive failure, possible future pregnancy, possible future unpreparedness
for parenthood, and possible future impairment of health. Any one or more of these several
possibilities may not take place, and all may not combine. In the Does' estimation, these
possibilities might have some real or imagined impact upon their marital happiness. But we are
not prepared to say that the bare allegation of so indirect an injury is sufficient to present an
actual case or controversy. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 41-42; Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. at
109-110; Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d at 1124-1125; Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d at 839.
"I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked, nor suggest any such counsel; and in like
manner, I will not give to a woman a pessary to produce abortion, [Footnote 14]" or
"I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this
effect. Similarly, I will not give to a woman an abortive remedy. [Footnote 15]"
69
Although the Oath is not mentioned in any of the principal briefs in this case or in Doe v. Bolton,
post, p. 179, it represents the apex of the development of strict ethical concepts in medicine, and
its influence endures to this day. Why did not the authority of Hippocrates dissuade abortion
practice in his time and that of Rome? The late Dr. Edelstein provides us with a theory: [Footnote
16] The Oath was not uncontested even in Hippocrates' day; only the Pythagorean school of
philosophers frowned upon the related act of suicide. Most Greek thinkers, on the other hand,
commended abortion, at least prior to viability. See Plato, Republic, V, 461; Aristotle, Politics, VII,
1335b 25. For the Pythagoreans, however, it was a matter of dogma. For them, the embryo was
animate from the moment of conception, and abortion meant destruction of a living being. The
abortion clause of the Oath, therefore, "echoes Pythagorean doctrines," and "[i]n no other stratum
of Greek opinion were such views held or proposed in the same spirit of uncompromising
austerity." [Footnote 17]
followed, saying that, while abortion after quickening had once been considered manslaughter
(though not murder), "modern law" took a less severe view. [Footnote 25] A recent review of the
common law precedents argues, however, that those precedents contradict Coke, and that even
post-quickening abortion was never established as a common law crime. [Footnote 26] This is of
some importance, because, while most American courts ruled, in holding or dictum, that abortion
of an unquickened fetus was not criminal under their received common law, [Footnote 27] others
followed Coke in stating that abortion of a quick fetus was a "misprision," a term they translated
to mean "misdemeanor." [Footnote 28] That their reliance on Coke on this aspect of the law was
uncritical and, apparently in all the reported cases, dictum (due probably to the paucity of common
law prosecutions for post-quickening abortion), makes it now appear doubtful that abortion was
ever firmly established as a common law crime even with respect to the destruction of a quick
fetus.
Dr. Edelstein then concludes that the Oath originated in a group representing only a small segment
of Greek opinion, and that it certainly was not accepted by all ancient physicians. He points out
that medical writings down to Galen (A.D. 130-200) "give evidence of the violation of almost every
one of its injunctions." [Footnote 18] But with the end of antiquity, a decided change took place.
Resistance against suicide and against abortion became common. The Oath came to be popular.
The emerging teachings of Christianity were in agreement with the Pythagorean ethic. The Oath
"became the nucleus of all medical ethics," and "was applauded as the embodiment of truth."
Thus, suggests Dr. Edelstein, it is "a Pythagorean manifesto, and not the expression of an absolute
standard of medical conduct." [Footnote 19]
4. The English statutory law. England's first criminal abortion statute, Lord Ellenborough's Act, 43
Geo. 3, c. 58, came in 1803. It made abortion of a quick fetus, § 1, a capital crime, but, in § 2, it
provided lesser penalties for the felony of abortion before quickening, and thus preserved the
"quickening" distinction. This contrast was continued in the general revision of 1828, 9 Geo. 4, c.
31, § 13. It disappeared, however, together with the death penalty, in 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c.
85. § 6, and did not reappear in the Offenses Against the Person Act of 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c.
100, § 59, that formed the core of English anti-abortion law until the liberalizing reforms of 1967.
In 1929, the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 34, came into being. Its emphasis
was upon the destruction of "the life of a child capable of being born alive." It made a willful act
performed with the necessary intent a felony. It contained a proviso that one was not to be found
guilty of the offense "unless it is proved that the act which caused the death of the child was not
done in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother."
This, it seems to us, is a satisfactory and acceptable explanation of the Hippocratic Oath's apparent
rigidity. It enables us to understand, in historical context, a long-accepted and revered statement
of medical ethics.
A seemingly notable development in the English law was the case of Rex v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B.
687. This case apparently answered in the affirmative the question whether an abortion necessary
to preserve the life of the pregnant woman was excepted from the criminal penalties of the 1861
Act. In his instructions to the jury, Judge Macnaghten referred to the 1929 Act, and observed that
that Act related to "the case where a child is killed by a willful act at the time when it is being
delivered in the ordinary course of nature." Id. at 691. He concluded that the 1861 Act's use of
the word "unlawfully," imported the same meaning expressed by the specific proviso in the 1929
Act, even though there was no mention of preserving the mother's life in the 1861 Act. He then
construed the phrase "preserving the life of the mother" broadly, that is, "in a reasonable sense,"
to include a serious and permanent threat to the mother's health, and instructed the jury to acquit
Dr. Bourne if it found he had acted in a good faith belief that the abortion was necessary for this
purpose. Id. at 693-694. The jury did acquit.
3. The common law. It is undisputed that, at common law, abortion performed before "quickening"
-- the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usually from the 16th to the
18th week of pregnancy [Footnote 20] -- was not an indictable offense. [Footnote 21] The absence
of a common law crime for pre-quickening abortion appears to have developed from a confluence
of earlier philosophical, theological, and civil and canon law concepts of when life begins. These
disciplines variously approached the question in terms of the point at which the embryo or fetus
became "formed" or recognizably human, or in terms of when a "person" came into being, that is,
infused with a "soul" or "animated." A loose consensus evolved in early English law that these
events occurred at some point between conception and live birth. [Footnote 22] This was "mediate
animation." Although Christian theology and the canon law came to fix the point of animation at
40 days for a male and 80 days for a female, a view that persisted until the 19th century, there
was otherwise little agreement about the precise time of formation or animation. There was
agreement, however, that, prior to this point, the fetus was to be regarded as part of the mother,
and its destruction, therefore, was not homicide. Due to continued uncertainty about the precise
time when animation occurred, to the lack of any empirical basis for the 40-80-day view, and
perhaps to Aquinas' definition of movement as one of the two first principles of life, Bracton focused
upon quickening as the critical point. The significance of quickening was echoed by later common
law scholars, and found its way into the received common law in this country.
Recently, Parliament enacted a new abortion law. This is the Abortion Act of 1967, 15 & 16 Eliz.
2, c. 87. The Act permits a licensed physician to perform an abortion where two other licensed
physicians agree (a) "that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the
pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any
existing children of her family, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated," or (b) "that there
is a substantial risk that, if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental
abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped."
Whether abortion of a quick fetus was a felony at common law, or even a lesser crime, is still
disputed. Bracton, writing early in the 13th century, thought it homicide. [Footnote 23] But the
later and predominant view, following the great common law scholars, has been that it was, at
most, a lesser offense. In a frequently cited passage, Coke took the position that abortion of a
woman "quick with childe" is "a great misprision, and no murder." [Footnote 24] Blackstone
The Act also provides that, in making this determination, "account may be taken of the pregnant
woman's actual or reasonably foreseeable environment." It also permits a physician, without the
concurrence of others, to terminate a pregnancy where he is of the good faith opinion that the
70
abortion "is immediately necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent injury to the
physical or mental health of the pregnant woman."
suppression." It deplored abortion and its frequency and it listed three causes of "this general
demoralization":
"The first of these causes is a widespread popular ignorance of the true character of the crime - a belief, even among mothers themselves, that the foetus is not alive till after the period of
quickening."
"The second of the agents alluded to is the fact that the profession themselves are frequently
supposed careless of foetal life. . . ."
"The third reason of the frightful extent of this crime is found in the grave defects of our laws,
both common and statute, as regards the independent and actual existence of the child before
birth, as a living being. These errors, which are sufficient in most instances to prevent conviction,
are based, and only based, upon mistaken and exploded medical dogmas. With strange
inconsistency, the law fully acknowledges the foetus in utero and its inherent rights, for civil
purposes; while personally and as criminally affected, it fails to recognize it, and to its life as yet
denies all protection."
5. The American law. In this country, the law in effect in all but a few States until mid-19th century
was the preexisting English common law. Connecticut, the first State to enact abortion legislation,
adopted in 1821 that part of Lord Ellenborough's Act that related to a woman "quick with child."
[Footnote 29] The death penalty was not imposed. Abortion before quickening was made a crime
in that State only in 1860. [Footnote 30] In 1828, New York enacted legislation [Footnote 31]
that, in two respects, was to serve as a model for early anti-abortion statutes. First, while barring
destruction of an unquickened fetus as well as a quick fetus, it made the former only a
misdemeanor, but the latter second-degree manslaughter. Second, it incorporated a concept of
therapeutic abortion by providing that an abortion was excused if it "shall have been necessary to
preserve the life of such mother, or shall have been advised by two physicians to be necessary for
such purpose."
The Committee then offered, and the Association adopted, resolutions protesting "against such
unwarrantable destruction of human life," calling upon state legislatures to revise their abortion
laws, and requesting the cooperation of state medical societies "in pressing the subject." Id. at
28, 78.
By 1840, when Texas had received the common law, [Footnote 32] only eight American States
had statutes dealing with abortion. [Footnote 33] It was not until after the War Between the States
that legislation began generally to replace the common law. Most of these initial statutes dealt
severely with abortion after quickening, but were lenient with it before quickening. Most punished
attempts equally with completed abortions. While many statutes included the exception for an
abortion thought by one or more physicians to be necessary to save the mother's life, that
provision soon disappeared, and the typical law required that the procedure actually be necessary
for that purpose. Gradually, in the middle and late 19th century, the quickening distinction
disappeared from the statutory law of most States and the degree of the offense and the penalties
were increased. By the end of the 1950's, a large majority of the jurisdictions banned abortion,
however and whenever performed, unless done to save or preserve the life of the mother.
[Footnote 34] The exceptions, Alabama and the District of Columbia, permitted abortion to
preserve the mother's health. [Footnote 35] Three States permitted abortions that were not
"unlawfully" performed or that were not "without lawful justification," leaving interpretation of
those standards to the courts. [Footnote 36] In the past several years, however, a trend toward
liberalization of abortion statutes has resulted in adoption, by about one-third of the States, of
less stringent laws, most of them patterned after the ALI Model Penal Code, § 230.3, [Footnote
37] set forth as Appendix B to the opinion in Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 205.
In 1871, a long and vivid report was submitted by the Committee on Criminal Abortion. It ended
with the observation "We had to deal with human life. In a matter of less importance, we could
entertain no compromise. An honest judge on the bench would call things by their proper names.
We could do no less."
22 Trans. of the Am.Med.Assn. 268 (1871). It proffered resolutions, adopted by the
Association, id. at 38-39, recommending, among other things, that it "be unlawful and
unprofessional for any physician to induce abortion or premature labor without the concurrent
opinion of at least one respectable consulting physician, and then always with a view to the safety
of the child -- if that be possible," and calling "the attention of the clergy of all denominations to
the perverted views of morality entertained by a large class of females -- aye, and men also, on
this important question."
6. The position of the American Medical Association. The anti-abortion mood prevalent in this
country in the late 19th century was shared by the medical profession. Indeed, the attitude of the
profession may have played a significant role in the enactment of stringent criminal abortion
legislation during that period.
Except for periodic condemnation of the criminal abortionist, no further formal AMA action took
place until 1967. In that year, the Committee on Human Reproduction urged the adoption of a
stated policy of opposition to induced abortion except when there is "documented medical
evidence" of a threat to the health or life of the mother, or that the child "may be born with
incapacitating physical deformity or mental deficiency," or that a pregnancy "resulting from legally
established statutory or forcible rape or incest may constitute a threat to the mental or physical
health of the patient," two other physicians "chosen because of their recognized professional
competence have examined the patient and have concurred in writing," and the procedure "is
performed in a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals." The
providing of medical information by physicians to state legislatures in their consideration of
legislation regarding therapeutic abortion was "to be considered consistent with the principles of
ethics of the American Medical Association." This recommendation was adopted by the House of
Delegates. Proceedings of the AMA House of Delegates 40-51 (June 1967).
An AMA Committee on Criminal Abortion was appointed in May, 1857. It presented its report, 12
Trans. of the Am.Med.Assn. 778 (1859), to the Twelfth Annual Meeting. That report observed that
the Committee had been appointed to investigate criminal abortion "with a view to its general
In 1970, after the introduction of a variety of proposed resolutions and of a report from its Board
of Trustees, a reference committee noted "polarization of the medical profession on this
controversial issue"; division among those who had testified; a difference of opinion among AMA
It is thus apparent that, at common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, and
throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than
under most American statutes currently in effect. Phrasing it another way, a woman enjoyed a
substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States today. At least
with respect to the early stage of pregnancy, and very possibly without such a limitation, the
opportunity to make this choice was present in this country well into the 19th century. Even later,
the law continued for some time to treat less punitively an abortion procured in early pregnancy.
71
councils and.committees; "the remarkable shift in testimony" in six months, felt to be influenced
"by the rapid changes in state laws and by the judicial decisions which tend to make abortion more
freely available; " and a feeling "that this trend will continue." On June 25, 1970, the House of
Delegates adopted preambles and most of the resolutions proposed by the reference committee.
The preambles emphasized "the best interests of the patient," "sound clinical judgment," and
"informed patient consent," in contrast to "mere acquiescence to the patient's demand." The
resolutions asserted that abortion is a medical procedure that should be performed by a licensed
physician in an accredited hospital only after consultation with two other physicians and in
conformity with state law, and that no party to the procedure should be required to violate
personally held moral principles. [Footnote 38] Proceedings of the AMA House of Delegates 220
(June 1970). The AMA Judicial Council rendered a complementary opinion. [Footnote 39]
VII
Three reasons have been advanced to explain historically the enactment of criminal abortion laws
in the 19th century and to justify their continued existence. It has been argued occasionally that
these laws were the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct. Texas,
however, does not advance this justification in the present case, and it appears that no court or
commentator has taken the argument seriously. [Footnote 42] The appellants and amici contend,
moreover, that this is not a proper state purpose, at all and suggest that, if it were, the Texas
statutes are overbroad in protecting it, since the law fails to distinguish between married and
unwed mothers.
A second reason is concerned with abortion as a medical procedure. When most criminal abortion
laws were first enacted, the procedure was a hazardous one for the woman. [Footnote 43] This
was particularly true prior to the development of antisepsis. Antiseptic techniques, of course, were
based on discoveries by Lister, Pasteur, and others first announced in 1867, but were not generally
accepted and employed until about the turn of the century. Abortion mortality was high. Even after
1900, and perhaps until as late as the development of antibiotics in the 1940's, standard modern
techniques such as dilation and curettage were not nearly so safe as they are today. Thus, it has
been argued that a State's real concern in enacting a criminal abortion law was to protect the
pregnant woman, that is, to restrain her from submitting to a procedure that placed her life in
serious jeopardy.
7. The position of the American Public Health Association. In October, 1970, the Executive Board
of the APHA adopted Standards for Abortion Services. These were five in number:
"a. Rapid and simple abortion referral must be readily available through state and local public
health departments, medical societies, or other nonprofit organizations."
"b. An important function of counseling should be to simplify and expedite the provision of
abortion services; it should not delay the obtaining of these services."
"c. Psychiatric consultation should not be mandatory. As in the case of other specialized medical
services, psychiatric consultation should be sought for definite indications, and not on a routine
basis."
"d. A wide range of individuals from appropriately trained, sympathetic volunteers to highly
skilled physicians may qualify as abortion counselors."
"e. Contraception and/or sterilization should be discussed with each abortion patient."
"Recommended Standards for Abortion Services, 61 Am.J.Pub.Health 396 (1971). Among factors
pertinent to life and health risks associated with abortion were three that 'are recognized as
important': "
"a. the skill of the physician,"
"b. the environment in which the abortion is performed, and above all"
"c. the duration of pregnancy, as determined by uterine size and confirmed by menstrual
history."
Modern medical techniques have altered this situation. Appellants and various amici refer to
medical data indicating that abortion in early pregnancy, that is, prior to the end of the first
trimester, although not without its risk, is now relatively safe. Mortality rates for women
undergoing early abortions, where the procedure is legal, appear to be as low as or lower than the
rates for normal childbirth. [Footnote 44] Consequently, any interest of the State in protecting the
woman from an inherently hazardous procedure, except when it would be equally dangerous for
her to forgo it, has largely disappeared. Of course, important state interests in the areas of health
and medical standards do remain.
The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical procedure,
is performed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient. This interest
obviously extends at least to the performing physician and his staff, to the facilities involved, to
the availability of after-care, and to adequate provision for any complication or emergency that
might arise. The prevalence of high mortality rates at illegal "abortion mills" strengthens, rather
than weakens, the State's interest in regulating the conditions under which abortions are
performed. Moreover, the risk to the woman increases as her pregnancy continues. Thus, the
State retains a definite interest in protecting the woman's own health and safety when an abortion
is proposed at a late stage of pregnancy.
It was said that "a well equipped hospital" offers more protection "to cope with unforeseen
difficulties than an office or clinic without such resources. . . . The factor of gestational age is of
overriding importance."
Thus, it was recommended that abortions in the second trimester and early abortions in the
presence of existing medical complications be performed in hospitals as inpatient procedures. For
pregnancies in the first trimester, abortion in the hospital with or without overnight stay "is
probably the safest practice." An abortion in an extramural facility, however, is an acceptable
alternative "provided arrangements exist in advance to admit patients promptly if unforeseen
complications develop." Standards for an abortion facility were listed. It was said that, at present,
abortions should be performed by physicians or osteopaths who are licensed to practice and who
have "adequate training." Id. at 398.
The third reason is the State's interest -- some phrase it in terms of duty -- in protecting prenatal
life. Some of the argument for this justification rests on the theory that a new human life is present
from the moment of conception. [Footnote 45] The State's interest and general obligation to
protect life then extends, it is argued, to prenatal life. Only when the life of the pregnant mother
herself is at stake, balanced against the life she carries within her, should the interest of the
embryo or fetus not prevail. Logically, of course, a legitimate state interest in this area need not
stand or fall on acceptance of the belief that life begins at conception or at some other point prior
to live birth. In assessing the State's interest, recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that
as long as at least potential life is involved, the State may assert interests beyond the protection
of the pregnant woman alone.
8. The position of the American Bar Association. At its meeting in February, 1972, the ABA House
of Delegates approved, with 17 opposing votes, the Uniform Abortion Act that had been drafted
and approved the preceding August by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
58 A.B.A.J. 380 (1972). We set forth the Act in full in the margin. [Footnote 40] The Opinion of
the Court Conference has appended an enlightening Prefatory Note. [Footnote 41]
72
Parties challenging state abortion laws have sharply disputed in some courts the contention that
a purpose of these laws, when enacted, was to protect prenatal life. [Footnote 46] Pointing to the
absence of legislative history to support the contention, they claim that most state laws were
designed solely to protect the woman. Because medical advances have lessened this concern, at
least with respect to abortion in early pregnancy, they argue that with respect to such abortions
the laws can no longer be justified by any state interest. There is some scholarly support for this
view of original purpose. [Footnote 47] The few state courts called upon to interpret their laws in
the late 19th and early 20th centuries did focus on the State's interest in protecting the woman's
health, rather than in preserving the embryo and fetus. [Footnote 48] Proponents of this view
point out that in many States, including Texas, [Footnote 49] by statute or judicial interpretation,
the pregnant woman herself could not be prosecuted for self-abortion or for cooperating in an
abortion performed upon her by another. [Footnote 50] They claim that adoption of the
"quickening" distinction through received common law and state statutes tacitly recognizes the
greater health hazards inherent in late abortion and impliedly repudiates the theory that life begins
at conception.
one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All
these are factors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation.
On the basis of elements such as these, appellant and some amici argue that the woman's right is
absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way,
and for whatever reason she alone chooses. With this we do not agree. Appellant's arguments that
Texas either has no valid interest at all in regulating the abortion decision, or no interest strong
enough to support any limitation upon the woman's sole determination, are unpersuasive. The
Court's decisions recognizing a right of privacy also acknowledge that some state regulation in
areas protected by that right is appropriate. As noted above, a State may properly assert important
interests in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life.
At some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain
regulation of the factors that govern the abortion decision. The privacy right involved, therefore,
cannot be said to be absolute. In fact, it is not clear to us that the claim asserted by
some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close
relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the Court's decisions. The Court has
refused to recognize an unlimited right of this kind in the past. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.
S. 11 (1905) (vaccination); Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200 (1927) ( sterilization).
It is with these interests, and the eight to be attached to them, that this case is concerned.
VIII
We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that
this right is not unqualified, and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however,
going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 251 (1891), the Court
has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy,
does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have,
indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.
S. 557, 564 (1969); in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 8-9
(1968), Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 350 (1967), Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S.
616 (1886), see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 484-485; in the Ninth
Amendment, id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923).
These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937), are
included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that the right has some
extension to activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967);
procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541-542 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. at 453-454; id. at 460, 463-465 (WHITE, J., concurring in result); family
relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944); and childrearing and
education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, supra.
We note that those federal and state courts that have recently considered abortion law challenges
have reached the same conclusion. A majority, in addition to the District Court in the present case,
have held state laws unconstitutional, at least in part, because of vagueness or because of
overbreadth and abridgment of rights. Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (Conn.1972), appeal
docketed, No. 72-56; Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (Conn.1972), appeal docketed, No. 72730; Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (ND Ga.1970), appeal decided today, post, p. 179; Doe v.
Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (ND Ill.1971), appeal docketed, No. 70-105; Poe v. Menghini, 339 F.
Supp. 986 (Kan.1972); YWCA v. Kuler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (NJ 1972); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F.
Supp. 293 (ED Wis.1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U. S. 1 (1970); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954,
458 P.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970); State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d
431 (Fla.1972).
Others have sustained state statutes. Crossen v. Attorney General, 344 F. Supp. 587 (ED
Ky.1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-256; Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical
Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (ED La.1970), appeal docketed, No. 70-42; Corkey v.
Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (WDNC 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-92; Steinberg v. Brown, 321
F. Supp. 741 (ND Ohio 1970); Doe v. Rampton (Utah 1971), appeal docketed, No. 715666; Cheaney v. State, ___ Ind. ___, 285 N.E.2d 265 (1972); Spears v. State, 257 So. 2d
876 (Miss. 1972); State v. Munson, 86 S.D. 663, 201 N.W.2d 123 (1972), appeal docketed, No.
72-631.
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in
the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State would
impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and
direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or
additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm
may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress,
for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child
into a family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this
Although the results are divided, most of these courts have agreed that the right of privacy,
however based, is broad enough to cover the abortion decision; that the right, nonetheless, is not
absolute, and is subject to some limitations; and that, at some point, the state interests as to
protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant. We agree with this
approach.
73
Where certain "fundamental rights" are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these
rights may be justified only by a "compelling state interest," Kramer v. Union Free School
District, 395 U. S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 634 (1969), Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 406 (1963), and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to
express only the legitimate state interests at stake. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at
485; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.
S. 296, 307-308 (1940); see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 460, 463-464 (WHITE, J., concurring
in result).
All this, together with our observation, supra, that, throughout the major portion of the 19th
century, prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that
the word "person," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn. [Footnote
55] This is in accord with the results reached in those few cases where the issue has been squarely
presented. McGarvey v. Magee-Womens Hospital, 340 F. Supp. 751 (WD Pa.1972); Byrn v. New
York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887 (1972), appeal docketed, No.
72-434; Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (Conn.1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-730. Cf.
Cheaney v. State, ___ Ind. at ___, 285 N.E.2d at 270; Montana v. Rogers, 278 F.2d 68, 72 (CA7
1960), aff'd sub nom. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U. S. 308 (1961); Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.
3d 619, 470 P.2d 617 (1970); State v. Dickinson, 28
In the recent abortion cases cited above, courts have recognized these principles. Those striking
down state laws have generally scrutinized the State's interests in protecting health and potential
life, and have concluded that neither interest justified broad limitations on the reasons for which
a physician and his pregnant patient might decide that she should have an abortion in the early
stages of pregnancy. Courts sustaining state laws have held that the State's determinations to
protect health or prenatal life are dominant and constitutionally justifiable.
Ohio St.2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971). Indeed, our decision in United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S.
62 (1971), inferentially is to the same effect, for we there would not have indulged in statutory
interpretation favorable to abortion in specified circumstances if the necessary consequence was
the termination of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection.
IX
This conclusion, however, does not of itself fully answer the contentions raised by Texas, and we
pass on to other considerations.
The District Court held that the appellee failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the Texas
statute's infringement upon Roe's rights was necessary to support a compelling state interest, and
that, although the appellee presented "several compelling justifications for state presence in the
area of abortions," the statutes outstripped these justifications and swept "far beyond any areas
of compelling state interest." 314 F. Supp. at 1222-1223. Appellant and appellee both contest that
holding. Appellant, as has been indicated, claims an absolute right that bars any state imposition
of criminal penalties in the area. Appellee argues that the State's determination to recognize and
protect prenatal life from and after conception constitutes a compelling state interest. As noted
above, we do not agree fully with either formulation.
B. The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She carries an embryo and, later, a
fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions of the developing young in the human
uterus. See Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 478-479, 547 (24th ed.1965). The situation
therefore is inherently different from marital intimacy, or bedroom possession of obscene material,
or marriage, or procreation, or education, with which Eisenstadt and Griswold, Stanley, Loving,
Skinner, and Pierce and Meyer were respectively concerned. As we have intimated above, it is
reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that, at some point in time another interest, that
of health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The
woman's privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured
accordingly.
A. The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a "person" within the language and
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, they outline at length and in detail the
well known facts of fetal development. If this suggestion of personhood is established, the
appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed
specifically by the Amendment. The appellant conceded as much on reargument. [Footnote 51]
On the other hand, the appellee conceded on reargument [Footnote 52] that no case could be
cited that holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins at conception and is present
throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest in protecting that
life from and after conception. We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When
those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to
arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not
in a position to speculate as to the answer.
The Constitution does not define "person" in so many words. Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment contains three references to "person." The first, in defining "citizens," speaks of
"persons born or naturalized in the United States." The word also appears both in the Due Process
Clause and in the Equal Protection Clause. "Person" is used in other places in the Constitution: in
the listing of qualifications for Representatives and Senators, Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, and § 3, cl. 3; in
the Apportionment Clause, Art. I, § 2, cl. 3; [Footnote 53] in the Migration and Importation
provision, Art. I, § 9, cl. 1; in the Emolument Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 8; in the Electors provisions,
Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, and the superseded cl. 3; in the provision outlining qualifications for the office
of President, Art. II, § 1, cl. 5; in the Extradition provisions, Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, and the superseded
Fugitive Slave Clause 3; and in the Fifth, Twelfth, and Twenty-second Amendments, as well as in
§§ 2 and 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is
such that it has application only post-natally. None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any
possible pre-natal application. [Footnote 54]
It should be sufficient to note briefly the wide divergence of thinking on this most sensitive and
difficult question. There has always been strong support for the view that life does not begin until
live' birth. This was the belief of the Stoics. [Footnote 56] It appears to be the predominant, though
not the unanimous, attitude of the Jewish faith. [Footnote 57] It may be taken to represent also
the position of a large segment of the Protestant community, insofar as that can be ascertained;
organized groups that have taken a formal position on the abortion issue have generally regarded
abortion as a matter for the conscience of the individual and her family. [Footnote 58] As we have
noted, the common law found greater significance in quickening. Physician and their scientific
colleagues have regarded that event with less interest and have tended to focus either upon
conception, upon live birth, or upon the interim point at which the fetus becomes "viable," that is,
potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid. [Footnote 59] Viability
is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.
[Footnote 60] The Aristotelian theory of "mediate animation," that held sway throughout the
74
Middle Ages and the Renaissance in Europe, continued to be official Roman Catholic dogma until
the 19th century, despite opposition to this "ensoulment" theory from those in the Church who
would recognize the existence of life from
This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior to this "compelling" point,
the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation
by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that
decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the
State.
the moment of conception. [Footnote 61] The latter is now, of course, the official belief of the
Catholic Church. As one brief amicus discloses, this is a view strongly held by many non-Catholics
as well, and by many physicians. Substantial problems for precise definition of this view are posed,
however, by new embryological data that purport to indicate that conception is a "process" over
time, rather than an event, and by new medical techniques such as menstrual extraction, the
"morning-after" pill, implantation of embryos, artificial insemination, and even artificial wombs.
[Footnote 62]
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the "compelling"
point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful
life outside the mother's womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both
logical and biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability,
it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve
the life or health of the mother.
In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life,
as we recognize it, begins before live birth, or to accord legal rights to the unborn except in
narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live birth. For example,
the traditional rule of tort law denied recovery for prenatal injuries even though the child was born
alive. [Footnote 63] That rule has been changed in almost every jurisdiction. In most States,
recovery is said to be permitted only if the fetus was viable, or at least quick, when the injuries
were sustained, though few courts have squarely so held. [Footnote 64] In a recent development,
generally opposed by the commentators, some States permit the parents of a stillborn child to
maintain an action for wrongful death because of prenatal injuries. [Footnote 65] Such an action,
however, would appear to be one to vindicate the parents' interest and is thus consistent with the
view that the fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality of life. Similarly, unborn children
have been recognized as acquiring rights or interests by way of inheritance or other devolution of
property, and have been represented by guardians ad litem. [Footnote 66] Perfection of the
interests involved, again, has generally been contingent upon live birth. In short, the unborn have
never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense.
Measured against these standards, Art. 1196 of the Texas Penal Code, in restricting legal abortions
to those "procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother,"
sweeps too broadly. The statute makes no distinction between abortions performed early in
pregnancy and those performed later, and it limits to a single reason, "saving" the mother's life,
the legal justification for the procedure. The statute, therefore, cannot survive the constitutional
attack made upon it here.
This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider the additional challenge to the Texas
statute asserted on grounds of vagueness. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 67-72.
XI
To summarize and to repeat:
1. A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excepts from criminality only
a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without
recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision
and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending
physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in
promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion
procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality
of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.
2. The State may define the term "physician," as it has been employed in the preceding
paragraphs of this Part XI of this opinion, to mean only a physician currently licensed by the
State, and may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician as so defined.
X
In view of all this, we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the
rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake. We repeat, however, that the State does have an
important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman,
whether she be a resident of the State or a nonresident who seeks medical consultation and
treatment there, and that it has still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the
potentiality of human life. These interests are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality
as the woman approaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes "compelling."
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the
"compelling" point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the
first trimester. This is so because of the now-established medical fact, referred to above at 149,
that, until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal
childbirth. It follows that, from and after this point, a State may regulate the abortion procedure
to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal
health. Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to the
qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as
to the facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or
may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility;
and the like.
In Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179, procedural requirements contained in one of the modern abortion
statutes are considered. That opinion and this one, of course, are to be read together. [Footnote
67]
This holding, we feel, is consistent with the relative weights of the respective interests involved,
with the lessons and examples of medical and legal history, with the lenity of the common law,
75
and with the demands of the profound problems of the present day. The decision leaves the State
free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens, so long as
those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state interests. The decision vindicates the right
of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the
points where important state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention. Up to
those points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision,
and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician. If an individual practitioner abuses the
privilege of exercising proper medical judgment, the usual remedies, judicial and intraprofessional, are available.
G.R. No. L-16439
July 20, 1961
XII
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo,
the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of
the complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo
and against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's
fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained
the award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting
opinion.
ANTONIO
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
GELUZ, petitioner,
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.
Our conclusion that Art. 1196 is unconstitutional means, of course, that the Texas abortion
statutes, as a unit, must fall. The exception of Art. 1196 cannot be struck down separately, for
then the State would be left with a statute proscribing all abortion procedures no matter how
medically urgent the case.
Although the District Court granted appellant Roe declaratory relief, it stopped short of issuing an
injunction against enforcement of the Texas statutes. The Court has recognized that different
considerations enter into a federal court's decision as to declaratory relief, on the one hand, and
injunctive relief, on the other. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 252-255 (1967); Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 (1965). We are not dealing with a statute that, on its face, appears to
abridge free expression, an area of particular concern under Dombrowski and refined in Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 50.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through
her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were
legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of
her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she
again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her
pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October
1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955,
accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to
the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the
defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of
the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of
Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his
consent, to the abortion.
We find it unnecessary to decide whether the District Court erred in withholding injunctive relief,
for we assume the Texas prosecutorial authorities will give full credence to this decision that the
present criminal abortion statutes of that State are unconstitutional.
The judgment of the District Court as to intervenor Hallford is reversed, and Dr. Hallford's
complaint in intervention is dismissed. In all other respects, the judgment of the District Court is
affirmed. Costs are allowed to the appellee.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of
damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06
upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This
we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death
of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality.
Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural
y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de
Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily
to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf
of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn
child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take
place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity
to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro
76
nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive:
"provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case,
there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA
CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery
can not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555;
Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10
ALR, (2d) 639).
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge
Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and
damages, and another order denying amendment of the same pleading.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages
must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the
rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect
either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral
damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the foetus,
i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their
parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances
should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's
indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly
indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The
lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict
it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was
likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have
taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the
responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to
have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern
appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued
for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the
circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her
complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and
confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal
intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as
a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had
to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint
did not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained
defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse,
plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled
that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action.
Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the
abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded
rather than mercenary; and that his primary concern would be to see to it that the medical
profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal
profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the criminal cases he had
filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which not only
he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as
yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as
explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore,
has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity
is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en
ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as
prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament
may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even
if such child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without
medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too
severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it.
But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons
who would legally represent them if they were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not inofficious.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical
Examiners for their information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio
Geluz as the facts may warrant.
77
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual,
without prejudice to the right of 'representation.
G.R. No. L-39110
November 28, 1933
ANTONIA
L.
DE
vs.
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support
is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as
yet unborn," violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in
the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be
considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later
with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent
to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely
useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of
the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points this out:
JESUS,
ET
AL., plaintiff-appellant,
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Loanco de Jesus in
her own right and by her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next friend and representative of Ismael and
Pacita Loanco, infants, children of the first-named plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the
defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of thirty thousand pesos as damages resulting to the firstnamed plaintiff from breach of a marriage promise, to compel the defendant to recognize Ismael
and Pacita as natural children begotten by him with Antonia, and to pay for the maintenance of
the three the amount of five hundred pesos per month, together with costs. Upon hearing the
cause, after answer of the defendant, the trial court erred a decree requiring the defendant to
recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay maintenance for him at the rate of fifty
pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the action in other respects. From this judgment both
parties appealed, the plaintiffs from so much of the decision as denied part of the relief sought by
them, and the defendant from that feature of the decision which required him to recognize Ismael
Loanco and to pay for his maintenance.
Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico
que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que constituyen un caso de los propiamente
Ilamados 'derechos en estado de pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas
por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano),
sino que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman
not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear
violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused.
Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia was of the age of
twenty-three years, and an unmarried scion of the prominent family in Manila, being possessed of
a considerable property in his own right. His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a
barber shop in Tondo, where the defendant was accustomed to go for tonsorial attention. In the
month of June Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was taken on as
cashier in this barber shop. Syquia was not long in making her acquaintance and amorous relations
resulted, as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten with child and a baby boy was born on
June 17, 1931. The defendant was a constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the early months
of her pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and placed in her hands a note directed to
the padre who has expected to christen the baby. This note was as follows:
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a
cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for
failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.
Saturday,
1:30
p.
February 14, 1931
Rev. FATHER,
The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
CESAR SYQUIA
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee
Felix Icao. So ordered.
m.
The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his departure on a trip
to China and Japan; and while he was abroad on this visit he wrote several letters to Antonia
showing a paternal interest in the situation that had developed with her, and cautioning her to
keep in good condition in order that "junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might be
strong, and promising to return to them soon. The baby arrived at the time expected, and all
necessary anticipatory preparations were made by the defendant. To this he employed his friend
Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to attend at the birth, and made arrangements for the hospitalization
of the mother in Saint Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila, where she was cared for during
confinement.
78
When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother and the baby, to
a house at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, where they lived together for about a year in regular
family style, all household expenses, including gas and electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In
course of time, however, the defendant's ardor abated and, when Antonia began to show signs of
a second pregnancy the defendant decamped, and he is now married to another woman. A point
that should here be noted is that when the time came for christening the child, the defendant,
who had charge of the arrangement for this ceremony, caused the name Ismael Loanco to be
given to him, instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at first planned.
defendant had acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be taken in connection
with the facts found by the court upon the second point. It is undeniable that from the birth of this
child the defendant supplied a home for it and the mother, in which they lived together with the
defendant. This situation continued for about a year, and until Antonia became enciente a second
time, when the idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning her. The law fixes no period
during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the
period in this case was long enough to evince the father's resolution to concede the status. The
circumstance that he abandoned the mother and child shortly before this action was started is
unimportant. The word "continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean
that the concession of status shall continue forever, but only that it shall not be of an intermittent
character while it continues.
The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to the padre, quoted above, in
connection with the letters written by the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an
acknowledgment of paternity, within the meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.
Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that the acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient.
It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal
rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no
impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of unborn
child is really not different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child
already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources of identification are
different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual
intended with the name used.
What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal. With respect to
the appeal of the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial court was right in refusing to give
damages to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise
is not satisfactorily proved, and we may add that the action for breach of promise to marry has no
standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the
plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the features necessary to
maintain such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based
requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used in the writings
before us are not legally sufficient to indemnify the child now suing as Ismael Loanco. This
contention is not, in our opinion, well founded. The words of recognition contained in the note to
the padre are not capable of two constructions. They refer to a baby then conceived which was
expected to be born in June and which would thereafter be presented for christening. The baby
came, and though it was in the end given the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr.,
its identity as the child which the defendant intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that
might arise on this point is removed by the letters Exhibit F, G, H, and J. In these letters the
defendant makes repeated reference to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom the letters
were addressed, was then carrying in her womb, and the writer urged Antonia to eat with good
appetite in order that junior might be vigorous. In the last letter (Exhibit J) written only a few days
before the birth of the child, the defendant urged her to take good care of herself and of junior also.
Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount of the
maintenance which the trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And in this connection we merely
point out that, as conditions change, the Court of First Instance will have jurisdiction to modify
the order as to the amount of the pension as circumstances will require.
The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiency of
acknowledgment is whether the acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of
the Civil Code must be made in a single document or may be made in more than one document,
of indubitable authenticity, written by the recognizing father. Upon this point we are of the opinion
that the recognition can be made out by putting together the admissions of more than one
document, supplementing the admission made in one letter by an admission or admissions made
in another. In the case before us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to
the padre and the other letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then being carried
by Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed
to one, or any particular individual. It is merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.
The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court erred in holding that
Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified
by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should
be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code.
The facts already stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the conclusion of the trial court on
this point, and we may add here that our conclusion upon the first branch of the case that the
79
G.R. No. L-770
April 27, 1948
assets of his estate, for which a right was property despite the possibility that in the end the
commission might have denied application, although under the facts of the case, the commission
granted the application in view of the financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice
plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (page 3) that the certificate of
public convenience once granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate as an asset". Such
certificate would certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by complying
with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his estate
and judicial administrator after his death.
ANGEL
T.
LIMJOCO, petitioner,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent.
HILADO, J.:
Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel
Ibañez, rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate
of public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said
commission held that the evidence therein showed that the public interest and convenience will
be promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of
another ice plant of two and one-half (2-½) tons in the municipality of San Juan; that the original
applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate
estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service". The commission, therefore,
overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of
Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of public convenience be issued to the
Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its
Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to
maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2)
tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from said plant in the said
Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject
to the conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).
If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and during the
life of the option he died, if the option had been given him in the ordinary course of business and
not out of special consideration for his person, there would be no doubt that said option and the
right to exercise it would have survived to his estate and legal representatives. In such a case
there would also be the possibility of failure to acquire the property should he or his estate or legal
representative fail to comply with the conditions of the option. In the case at bar Pedro O.
Fragrante's undoubted right to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public convenience
— the evidence established that the public needed the ice plant — was under the law conditioned
only upon the requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain and operate the service. Of
course, such right to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience was subject to failure
to secure its objective through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation here is no
different from the legal standpoint from that of the option in the illustration just given.
Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions, among
other cases, for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased which survive, and it says
that such actions may be brought or defended "in the right of the deceased".
Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows:
1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law.
2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by evidence.
3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and Cold Storage
Industries of the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the
increased demand.
4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unwarranted departure from its
announced policy with respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2,
petitioner's brief.)
Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or administrator,
the making of an inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which
shall come to his possession or knowledge, or to the possession of any other person for him.
In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367) the present chief
Justice of this Court draws the following conclusion from the decisions cited by him:
Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action affecting the property
or rights (emphasis supplied) of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him if
he were alive, may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless
the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it
cannot survive, because death extinguishes the right . . . .
In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the
substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party
applicant in the case then pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said
estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law.
It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the
Public Service Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove
that the decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a
part and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management
of the executor or administrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate
for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if
the right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an
application for a certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public Service
Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of
the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding.
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to
prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied
him that right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in
question P 35,000, and from what the commission said regarding his other properties and
business, he would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate said plant had he
not died. His transportation business alone was netting him about P1,440 a month. He was a
Filipino citizen and continued to be such till his demise. The commission declared in its decision,
in view of the evidence before it, that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the
ice plant. The aforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion
was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the
80
Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the Civil Code,
respectively, consider as immovable and movable things rights which are not material. The same
eminent commentator says in the cited volume (p. 45) that article 336 of the Civil Code has been
deficiently drafted in that it is not sufficiently expressive of all incorporeal rights which are
also property for juridical purposes.
purporting to be a promissory note must be regarded as having intended to defraud the estate
of the decedent, and not the natural persons having diverse interests in it, since ha cannot be
presumed to have known who those persons were, or what was the nature of their respective
interest. The fraudulent intent is against the artificial person, — the estate — and not the natural
persons who have direct or contingent interest in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E. 914-915.)
Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property includes, among
other things, "an option", and "the certificate of the railroad commission permitting the operation
of a bus line", and on page 748 of the same volume we read:
However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have also been declared to include
every species of title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights which lie in contract, whether
executory or executed. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante
is considered a "person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would
entail prejudicial results to his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission,
not counting the expenses and disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to have
occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this
jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the estate of a deceased person is also
considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs. Among the most recent cases
may be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal
plaintiff was the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave judgment in favor of said
estate along with the other plaintiffs in these words:
. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that defendants Concepcion
and Whitaker are indebted to he plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . . .
Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a
"person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act.
Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine in the jurisdiction
of the State of Indiana:
As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery committed after the death
of the man whose name purports to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as with the
intent to defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57
Am. Rep. 77.
Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
heirs of a deceased person were considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his
personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all
the rights and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death. It was so held by this
Court in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after the enactment of the Code of Civil
Procedure, article 661 of the Civil Code was abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan,
12 Phil., 13, 22. In that case, as well as in many others decided by this Court after the innovations
introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been
the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the
decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and
obligations which survive after his demise.
The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of forgery committed
after the death of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his estate. The objection was urged
that the information did not aver that the forgery was committed with the intent to defraud any
person. The Court, per Elliott, J., disposed of this objection as follows:
. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not regard the estate
of a decedent as a person. This intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of the decedent
is a person in legal contemplation. "The word "person" says Mr. Abbot, "in its legal signification,
is a generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural persons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs.
Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal. 304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in
another work that 'persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is a human
being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a
corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights
and duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law.
"Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person." 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954. Our
own cases inferentially recognize the correctness of the definition given by the authors from
whom we have quoted, for they declare that it is sufficient, in pleading a claim against a
decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the estate of the deceased person, naming
him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept this definition as correct, there would be a
failure of justice in cases where, as here, the forgery is committed after the death of a person
whose name is forged; and this is a result to be avoided if it can be done consistent with principle.
We perceive no difficulty in avoiding such a result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that
the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. It is the creation of law for
the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made, and, although natural
persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an interest in the property, the artificial creature is
a distinct legal entity. The interest which natural persons have in it is not complete until there
has been a due administration; and one who forges the name of the decedent to an instrument
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by
legal fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood — the reason was one in the nature of
a legal exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations
of the decedent. Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death
have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction
were not indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor
or administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased. The
reason and purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is why
according to the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L.
Dictionary, 954, among the artificial persons recognized by law figures "a collection of property to
which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance, the estate of a
bankrupt or deceased person.
Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be
considered a "citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act,
as amended, particularly the proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting the power of the
commission to issue certificates of public convenience or certificates of public convenience and
necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to corporations,
copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock companies constituted and organized under the laws
81
of the Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of
such entities must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.
Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the evidence of
record, he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying.
The situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino
citizen. And its economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service
of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence of a
contrary showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens;
and if they are not, there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from
inheriting it.
Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction by
which, for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the
avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights
and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is
indulged. Substantially the same reason is assigned to support the same rule in the jurisdiction of
the State of Indiana, as announced in Billings vs. State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said
State said:
. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person.
it is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly
made . . . .
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No.
4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship
of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public
Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the
bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases
relate to natural persons, the term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to
include artificial or juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional
guarantee against being deprived of property without due process of law, or the immunity from
unreasonable searches and seizures. We take it that it was the intendment of the framers to
include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional immunities and
in others of similar nature. Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased
persons. Hence, we hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O.
Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement
and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial
administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived
after his death. One of those rights was the one involved in his pending application before the
Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to
its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would ensue from the opposite course.
Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered extended so
that any debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights
may be exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, respectively, we find no sound and
cogent reason for denying the application of the same fiction to his citizenship, and for not
considering it as likewise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished proceeding before
the Public Service Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if successful, would in the end
inure to the benefit of the same creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not
allege any prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could have done if Fragrante had lived
longer and obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is
grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the
extension of personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his
estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the loss of the investment amounting
to P35,000, which he has already made in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses
occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the Public Service Commission of this Court.
We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution (Article IV),
its provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension above adverted to.
If for reasons already stated our law indulges the fiction of extension of personality, if for such
reasons the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person
herein, we can find no justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the extension of his
citizenship for the purposes of this proceeding.
82
G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were aware of the suit against
Soliven and his sureties and that the said heirs were estopped to question the court's jurisdiction
over Oria.
DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as Administrator of the Testate
Estate of the late Pedro Oria; FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN
DUMLAO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.
After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the other
defendants in Civil Case No. T-662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. It reasoned out that
Soliven acted in bad faith because he did not apprise the court that Oria was dead. It specifically
ruled that "it had acquired jurisdiction over the person" of Oria and that the judgment was valid
as to him. From that decision the plaintiffs appealed.
AQUINO, J.:p
The four assignments of error of appellants Dumlao may be boiled down to the issue as to the
validity of the lower court's judgment against the deceased Pedro Oria who, being already in the
other world, was never served with summons.
On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No.
T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio,
Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of
P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from November, 1958. The lower court directed that in
case the defendants failed to pay the said amount before its decision became final, then Quality
Plastic Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with
law, for the satisfaction of the judgment". (Under that bond the four sureties bound themselves
to answer solidarity for the obligations of the principal, Vicente Soliven and certain real properties
of the sureties were "given as security for" their undertaking).
There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the
judgment against him is a patent nullity (Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447;
Asuncion vs. Nieto, 4 Phil. 97; Gorostiaga vs. Sarte, 68 Phil. 4).
As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is
void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly served
with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be
the subject of legal relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).
Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had become
final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of the
surety bond and the sale at public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security
under the bond. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has
an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction
on September 24, 1962. The sale was confirmed by the lower court in its order of November 20,
1962.
The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there
was a voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as
contemplated in section 23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Soliven's counsel could not
have validly appeared for a dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.
It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action was
filed. Oria's death was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor were the representatives of
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. aware that in the same Tayug court Special Proceeding No. T-212,
Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending.
But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in order to annul
the judgment against Oria, it does not follow that they are entitled to claim attorney's fees against
that corporation. The parties herein agreed in their stipulation of facts that Quality Plastic Products,
Inc. was unaware of Oria's death. Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted in
good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.
The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants in Civil Case No.
T-662 had been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff on Soliven, the principal
in the bond, who acknowledged such service by signing on the back of the original summons in
his own behalf and again signing for his co-defendants.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No.
T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land
covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void. No costs.
On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all
testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the
Tayug court for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land.
(Dionisio Dumlao also sued in his capacity as administrator of Oria's testate estate).
The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Oria (Civil Case
No. T- 873). It was only when Quality Plastic Products, Inc. received the summons in Civil Case
No. T-873 that it learned that Oria was already dead at the time the prior case, Civil Case No. T662, was filed.
83
G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his
residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of
her body. These reasons were incorporated in an explanation filed before the respondent court.
Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30 September 1988 were then issued by respondent court, directing
delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy.
TOMAS
EUGENIO,
SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan
de Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional
Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, and the Private Respondents, the petitioners in Sp.
Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus", namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS
and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents.
Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to dismiss the
petition therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action under sec.
1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.1 A special proceeding for habeas
corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention of a live person.
G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.
Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below) were granted
leave to amend their petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28
September 1988 (or after the filing of the habeas corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases')
alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully
interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil
Code, 3 the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal
custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. The
motion to dismiss was finally submitted for resolution on 21 October 1988.
TOMAS
EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan
de Oro City, CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO VARGAS,
NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS
SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents-appellees.
PADILLA, J.:
In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before the respondent
court; the body was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills Memorial Homes in Cagayan
de Oro City, viewed by the presiding Judge of respondent court, and examined by a duly authorized
government pathologist. 4
On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application for restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as G.R. No. 85140) seeking to enjoin
respondent Judge from proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC,
Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), * the respondent Sheriff from enforcing and implementing the
writ and orders of the respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30 September 1988, and to declare
said writ and orders as null and void. In a resolution issued on 11 October 1988, this Court required
comment from the respondents on the petition but denied the application for a temporary
restraining order.
Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an order,
November 1988, that:
5
dated 17
It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended petition, up to the second
amended petition that the ultimate facts show that if the person of Vitaliana Vargas turns out to
be dead then this Court is being prayed to declare the petitioners as the persons entitled to the
custody, interment and/or burial of the body of said deceased. The Court, considering the
circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was already dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to
the Court on September 29, 1988 by respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the
nature and subject matter of this case because it may entertain this case thru the allegations in
the body of the petition on the determination as to who is entitled to the custody of the dead
body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or interment thereof, for the reason that
under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as follows:
The records disclose the following:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity), her full blood
brothers and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27 September
1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de
Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and
confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her
desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the
time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with
petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
xxx
xxx
xxx
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions:
it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try this case. The
authority to try the issue of custody and burial of a dead person is within the lawful jurisdiction
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but
the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had
died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject
of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial
permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace
quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious
sect, of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.
84
of this Court because of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and because of the allegations of the pleadings
in this case, which are enumerated in Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas
corpus may be granted by a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary
rule of procedure that what controls is not the caption of the complaint or petition; but the
allegations therein determine the nature of the action, and even without the prayer for a specific
remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint
and the evidence introduced so warrant. 13
Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course, rendered a decision
on 17 January 1989, 6 resolving the main issue of whether or not said court acquired jurisdiction
over the case by treating it as an action for custody of a dead body, without the petitioners having
to file a separate civil action for such relief, and without the Court first dismissing the original
petition for habeas corpus.
When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain whether
Vitaliana was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of
course or as a mere perfimetory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is
exercised in its issuance, and such facts must be made to appear to the judge to whom the petition
is presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the writ. 14 While the court
may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and substance, the writ should
issue if the petition complies with the legal requirements and its averments make a prima
facie case for relief. However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus need not be
very critical in looking into the petition for very clear grounds for the exercise of this jurisdiction.
The latter's power to make full inquiry into the cause of commitment or detention will enable him
to correct any errors or defects in the petition. 15
Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1981), 7 Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court8 Articles 305 and 308 in relation to
Article 294 of the Civil Code and Section 1104 of the Revised Administrative Code, 9 the decision
stated:
. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the allegations in the original
petition as well as in the two amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas has been restrained
of her liberty and if she were dead then relief was prayed for the custody and burial of said dead
person. The amendments to the petition were but elaborations but the ultimate facts remained
the same, hence, this court strongly finds that this court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and
sit on this case as an action for custody and burial of the dead body because the body of the
petition controls and is binding and since this case was raffled to this court to the exclusion of
all other courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide and dispose of this case. . . . . 10
In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of a habeas
corpus petition filed by a brother to obtain custody of a minor sister, stating:
Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of rightful custody
over the dead body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The order of preference to give support under
Art. 294 was used as the basis of the award. Since there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or
descendants, the brothers and sisters were preferred over petitioner who was merely a common
law spouse, the latter being himself legally married to another woman. 11
All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case should not have been
dismissed. The court below should not have overlooked that by dismissing the petition, it was
virtually sanctioning the continuance of an adulterous and scandalous relation between the minor
and her married employer, respondent Benildo Nunez against all principles of law and morality.
It is no excuse that the minor has expressed preference for remaining with said respondent,
because the minor may not chose to continue an illicit relation that morals and law repudiate.
On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction was filed with this Court (G.R. No. 86470). Raised therein were pure
questions of law, basically Identical to those raised in the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence,
the consolidation of both cases. 12 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the
issuance of an injunction to maintain status quo pending appeal, which this Court denied in a
resolution dated 23 February 1989 stating that "Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to sufficiently
establish a clear legal right to the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana Vargas, which now needs
a decent burial." The petitions were then submitted for decision without further pleadings.
The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below should not allow the
technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in the way of its giving
the child full protection. Even in a habeas corpus proceeding the court had power to award
temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some other suitable person, after summoning and
hearing all parties concerned. What matters is that the immoral situation disclosed by the records
be not allowed to continue. 17
Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:
1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to recover
custody of the dead body of a 25 year old female, single, whose nearest surviving claimants are
full blood brothers and sisters and a common law husband.
2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority to treat the action as one
for custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of the dead.
3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art. 199 of the new Family Code) which
states:
After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to
avoid multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally
allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on
its real facts and in order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of action and unnecessary
expense, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse
party by surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of permission to amend. 18 As correctly alleged
by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and academic due to the
death of the person allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which the
court a quo had to resolve.
Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more persons are obliged to give it,
shall be made in the following order:
(1) From the spouse;
Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse
used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification,
85
he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise.
Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public
as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they
live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. 19
G.R. No. L-5426
May 29, 1953
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present
in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed
by law, 20 authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that
the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. 21 In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal
impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of
Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of
Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted
however that with respect to 'spouse', the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law
spouses)."
This three proceedings was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila in the summary
settlement of states of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin Navarro,
Jr., and Pilar Navarro, deceased. All of them having been heard jointly, Judge Rafael Amparo
handed down a single decision which was appealed to the Court of Appeals, whose decision,
modifying that the Court of First Instance, in turn was elevated to the Supreme Court for review.
RAMON
vs.
ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent.
JOAQUIN, petitioner,
The main question represented in the first two courts related to the sequence of the deaths of
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children, all of whom were killed in the massacre of
civilians by Japanese troops in Manila in February 1945. The trial court found the deaths of this
persons to have accurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and
Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro,
Sr. The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court except that, with regard to Angela Joaquin
de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have survived his mother.
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces
common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling
and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is
said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or
legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto.23 But this view cannot even apply to the
facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing
to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded
spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not
legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being contested by the petitioner.
The importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before Joaquin Navarro,
Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact that it radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin,
the present petitioner who was an acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child
of the deceased spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first
marriage.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters
(the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of burying the body of a
deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon
the persons hereinbelow specified:
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of
burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the
Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.
"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses Joaquin
Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their three daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and
Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in
the ground floor of the building known as the German Club, at the corner of San Marcelino and
San Luis Streets of this City. During their stay, the building was packed with refugees, shells were
exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at
the people inside the building, especially those who were trying to escape. The three daughters
were hit and fell of the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided
to abandon the premises to seek a safer heaven. They could not convince Angela Joaquin who
refused to join them; and son Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's
wife, Angela Conde, and a friend and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning
edifice. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and
immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the
bullets. Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside,
presumably including Angela Joaquin.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No
Costs.
"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air
raid shelter nearby, the stayed there about three days, until February 10, 1915, when they were
forced to leave the shelter be- cause the shelling tore it open. They flied toward the St. Theresa
Academy in San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, who fired at the
refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his daughter-in-law.
86
"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife Angela Joaquin was
about 67 years old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro was two or three years older
than her brother; while the other sisters, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were
between 23 and 25."
on the assumption that there is total lack of evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela
Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under article 33, be held to have died at the same time.
The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left open for the consideration when obsolute
necessity there for arises. We say irrelevant because our opinion is that neither of the two
provisions is applicable for the reasons to be presently set forth.
The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez, who
miraculously survived the holocaust, and upon them the Court of Appeals opined that, "as between
the mother Angela Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence of the survivorship is
uncertain and insufficient" and the statutory presumption must be applied. The appellate Court's
reasoning for its conclusion is thus stated:
Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
When two person perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle or conflagration, and it is
not (1) shown who died first, and there are no (2) particular circumstances from when it can be
inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from the strength and
ages of the sexes, according to the following rules:
"It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be established by proof of the
death of only one of the parties; but that there must be adequate proof that one was alive when
the other had already died. Now in this case before us, the testimony of the sole witness Lopez is
to the effect that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot and died shortly after the living the German Club
in the company of his father and the witness, and that the burning edified entirely collapsed
minutes after the shooting of the son; but there is not a scintilla of evidence, direct or
circumstantial, from which we may infer the condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during the
appreciable interval from the instant his son turned his back to her, to dash out to the Club, until
he died. All we can glean from the evidence is that Angela Joaquin was unhurt when her son left
her to escape from the German Club; but she could have died almost immediately after, from a
variety of causes. She might have been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters, killed by falling
beams from the burning edifice, overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by splinters from the
exploding shells. We cannot say for certain. No evidence is available on the point. All we can decide
is that no one saw her alive after her son left her aside, and that there is no proof when she died.
Clearly, this circumstance alone cannot support a finding that she died latter than her son, and we
are thus compelled to fall back upon the statutory presumption. In deed, it could be said that the
purpose of the presumption of survivorship would be precisely to afford a solution to uncertainties
like these. Hence the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have survived his
mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec.
(ii), Rules of Court).
Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or more persons who would
inherent one from the other, the persons who alleges the prior death of either must prove the
allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time,
and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place.
Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a substitute for lacks and so
are not to be available when there are facts. With particular reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule
123, "the situation which it present is one in which the facts are not only unknown but unknowable.
By hypothesis, there is no specific evidence as to the time of death . . . ." . . . it is assumed that
no evidence can be produced. . . . Since the facts are unknown and unknowable, the law may
apply the law of fairness appropriate to the different legal situation that arises." (IX Wigmore on
Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.)
In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of Appeals cited the applied with the
respect to the deaths of the Navarro girls, pointing out that "our rule is taken from the Fourth
Division of sec. 1936 of the California Code of Civil Procedure," the Supreme Court of California
said:
When the statue speaks of "particular circumstances from which it can be inferred" that one died
before the other it means that there are circumstances from which the fact of death by one
before the other may be inferred as a relation conclusion from the facts proven. The statue does
not mean circumstances which would shown, or which would tend to show, probably that one
died before the other. Grand Lodge A.O.W.W. vs. Miller, 8 Cal. App. 28, 96 Pac. 22. When by
circumstantial evidence alone, a party seeks to prove a survivorship contrary to the statutory
presumption, the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship must be such as
are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of evidence in civil cases. The
inference of survivorship cannot rest upon mere surmise, speculation, or conjecture. As was said
in Grand Lodge vs. Miller, supra, "if the matter is left to probably, then the statue of the
presumption."
"The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of the question whether
she and her deceased children perished in the same calamity. There being no evidence to the
contrary, the only guide is the occasion of the deaths, which is identical for all of them; that battle
for the liberation of Manila. A second reason is that the law, in declaring that those fallen in the
same battle are to be regarded as perishing in the same calamity, could not overlooked that a
variety of cause of death can ( and usually do) operate in the source of combats. During the same
battle, some may die from wounds, other from gages, fire, or drowning. It is clear that the law
disregards episodic details, and treats the battle as an overall cause of death in applying the
presumption of survivorship.
"We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which the members of the Navarro-Joaquin family
met their end is as follows: first, the three daughters Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad; then the
mother Angela Joaquin; then the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days later (of which there is no
doubt), the father Joaquin Navarro, Sr."
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the foregoing decision
that the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or
inferential. Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be
made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.
Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of whether section 334(37) of Act No. 129, now
section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, has repealed article 33 of the civil code of 1889,
now article 43 of the New Civil Code. It is the contention of the petitioner that it did not, and that
Are there particular circumstances on record from which reasonable inference of survivorship
between Angela Joaquin and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' testimony competent and
87
sufficient for this purpose? For a better appreciation of this issue, it is convenient and necessary
to detail the testimony, which was described by the trial court as "disinterested and trustworthy"
and by the Court of Appeals as "entitled to credence."
It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem
of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory
presumption out of the case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a
fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his
mother.
Lopez testified:
Q. You said you were also heat at that time as you leave the German Club with Joaquin Navarro,
Sr., Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the latter's wife?- A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you fall? — A. I fell down.
Q. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro, Jr.? A. Yes, sir.
Q. When the German Club collapsed where were you? — A. We were out 15 meters away from
the building but I could see what was going on.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Could there have been an interval of fifteen minutes between the two events, that is the
shooting of Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the collapse of the German Club? — A. Yes, sir, I could not
say exactly, Occasions like that, you know, you are confused.
Q. Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead of fifteen minutes? — A. Possible, but
not probable.
Q. Could it have been 40 minutes? — A. Yes, sir, about 40 minutes.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela Joaquin die? — A. Well, a few minutes after
we have dashed out, the German Club, which was burning, collapsed over them, including Mrs.
Joaquin Navarro, Sr.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. From your testimony it would appear that while you can give positive evidence to the fact
that Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro, and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died, you can not give
the same positive evidence to the fact that Angela Joaquin also died? — A. Yes, sir, in the sense
that I did not see her actually die, but when the building collapsed over her I saw and I am
positive and I did not see her come out of that building so I presumed she died there.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. Why did you have to dash out of the German Club, you, Mr. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Mr.
Joaquin Navarro Jr. and the latter's wife? — A. Because the Japanese had set fire to the Club
and they were shooting people outside, so we thought of running away rather than be roasted.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out of the German Club all the Navarro girls, Pilar,
Concepcion, and Natividad, were already wounded? — A. to my knowledge, yes.
Q. They were wounded? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were they lying on the ground or not? — A. On the ground near the entrance, because most
of the people who were shot by the Japanese were those who were trying to escape, and as far
as I can remember they were among those killed.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the Japanese a few minutes before you left
the place? — A. That is what I think, because those Japanese soldiers were shooting the people
inside especially those trying to escape.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. And none of them was not except the girls, is that what you mean? A — . There were many
people shot because they were trying to escape.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q. How come that these girls were shot when they were inside the building, can you explain
that? — A. They were trying to escape probably.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must be noted
that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from
proven facts that it was the other way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was killed,
while running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the German Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he
must have negotiated that distance in five seconds or less, and so died within that interval from
the time he dashed out of the building. Now, when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife
started to flee from the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so that the Navarro
father and son tried hard to have her come along. She could have perished within those five or
fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote. True, people in the
building were also killed but these, according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who had tried to slip
away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro,
Sr. made an attempt to escape. She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband and son
from leaving the place and exposing themselves to gun fire.
This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an idea, at the
same time, of a condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the moment her husband, son, and
daughter-in-law left her. It strongly tends to prove that, as the situation looked to her, the perils
of death from staying were not so imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement that
the collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot
in the head and dropped dead, and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. The
Court of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and the breaking down of the
edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much longer than five seconds, long enough to warrant the
inference that Mrs. Angela Joaquin was sill alive when her son expired
The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of the building, by which Mrs.
Navarro could have been killed. All these are speculative , and the probabilities, in the light of the
known facts, are against them. Dreading Japanese sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her
refusal to follow the only remaining living members of her family, she could not have kept away
form protective walls. Besides, the building had been set on fire trap the refugees inside, and there
was no necessity for the Japanese to was their ammunition except upon those who tried to leave
the premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely to have been killed by falling beams because the
building was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes,
these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly not within the brief space of five seconds
between her son's departure and his death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Section 69(ii) of Rule
123 does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided be
certain. It is the "particular circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are
required to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not
mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but if may be plain enough to justify a
finding of fact." (In re Bohenko's Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, citing Tortora vs. State of New York,
269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y.). 622.) As the California courts
have said, it is enough that "the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship
must be such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of evidence in civil
cases." (In re Wallace's Estate, supra.) "Juries must often reason," says one author, "according
88
to probabilities, drawing an inference that the main fact in issue existed from collateral facts not
directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence. The vital question in such cases is
the cogency of the proof afforded by the secondary facts. How likely, according to experience, is
the existence of the primary fact if certain secondary facts exist?" (1 Moore on Facts, Sec. 596.)
The same author tells us of a case where "a jury was justified in drawing the inference that the
person who was caught firing a shot at an animal trespassing on his land was the person who fired
a shot about an hour before at the same animal also trespassing." That conclusion was not airtight,
but rational. In fact, the circumstances in the illustration leave greater room for another possibility
than do the facts of the case at hand.
G.R. No. 15574
September 17, 1919
SMITH,
BELL
&
COMPANY
(LTD.), petitioner,
vs.
JOAQUIN NATIVIDAD, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, respondent.
A writ of mandamus is prayed for by Smith, Bell & Co. (Ltd.), against Joaquin Natividad, Collector
of Customs of the port of Cebu, Philippine Islands, to compel him to issue a certificate of Philippine
registry to the petitioner for its motor vessel Bato. The Attorney-General, acting as counsel for
respondent, demurs to the petition on the general ground that it does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. While the facts are thus admitted, and while, moreover, the pertinent
provisions of law are clear and understandable, and interpretative American jurisprudence is found
in abundance, yet the issue submitted is not lightly to be resolved. The question, flatly presented,
is, whether Act. No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is valid — or, more directly stated, whether
the Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the registry of vessels
in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders.
In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is based purely
on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. the
opposite theory — that the mother outlived her son — is deduced from established facts which,
weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by
the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this inference ought
to prevail. It can not be defeated as in an instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon, "bordering
on the ridiculous, where in an action on the game laws it was suggested that the gun with which
the defendant fired was not charged with shot, but that the bird might have died in consequence
of the fright." (1 Moore on Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)
FACTS.
Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine
Islands. A majority of its stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of a motor vessel known
as the Bato built for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons gross
The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose of transporting plaintiff's
merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application was made at Cebu, the home port of the
vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector refused to
issue the certificate, giving as his reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were
not citizens either of the United States or of the Philippine Islands. The instant action is the result.
It is said that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which the appellant impugns, and which
has been discussed, involves findings of fact which can not be disturbed. The point is not, in our
judgment, well considered. The particular circumstances from which the parties and the Court of
Appeals drew conclusions are, as above seen, undisputed, and this being the case, the correctness
or incorrectness of those conclusions raises a question of law, not of fact, which the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction to look into. As was said in 1 Moran Commentaries on the Rules of ?Court,
3rd Ed. 856, 857, "Undisputed evidence is one thing, and contradicted evidence is another. An
incredible witness does not cease to be such because he is not impeached or contradicted. But
when the evidence is purely documentary, the authenticity of which is not questioned and the only
issue is the construction to be placed thereon, or where a case is submitted upon an agreement
of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the correctness of the
conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court."
LAW.
The Act of Congress of April 29, 1908, repealing the Shipping Act of April 30, 1906 but reenacting
a portion of section 3 of this Law, and still in force, provides in its section 1:
That until Congress shall have authorized the registry as vessels of the United States of vessels
owned in the Philippine Islands, the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized
to adopt, from time to time, and enforce regulations governing the transportation of merchandise
and passengers between ports or places in the Philippine Archipelago. (35 Stat. at L., 70; Section
3912, U. S. Comp Stat. [1916]; 7 Pub. Laws, 364.)
The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory presumption is to be
invoked is a question of law.
The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence refers to decisions
supported by substantial evidence. By substantial evidence is meant real evidence or at least
evidence about which reasonable men may disagree. Findings grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures come within the exception to the general rule.
The Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law, still in force, provides
in section 3, (first paragraph, first sentence), 6, 7, 8, 10, and 31, as follows.
We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the distribution of the
decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the decision of the trial court. This result
precludes the necessity of passing upon the question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward
on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that of her son. Without
costs.
SEC. 3. That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of
the laws. . . .
SEC. 6. That the laws now in force in the Philippines shall continue in force and effect, except as
altered, amended, or modified herein, until altered, amended, or repealed by the legislative
authority herein provided or by Act of Congress of the United States.
89
SEC. 7. That the legislative authority herein provided shall have power, when not inconsistent
with this Act, by due enactment to amend, alter modify, or repeal any law, civil or criminal,
continued in force by this Act as it may from time to time see fit
SEC. 1176. Investigation into character of vessel. — No application for a certificate of Philippine
register shall be approved until the collector of customs is satisfied from an inspection of the
vessel that it is engaged or destined to be engaged in legitimate trade and that it is of domestic
ownership as such ownership is defined in section eleven hundred and seventy-two of this Code.
This power shall specifically extend with the limitation herein provided as to the tariff to all laws
relating to revenue provided as to the tariff to all laws relating to revenue and taxation in effect
in the Philippines.
The collector of customs may at any time inspect a vessel or examine its owner, master, crew,
or passengers in order to ascertain whether the vessel is engaged in legitimate trade and is
entitled to have or retain the certificate of Philippine register.
SEC. 8. That general legislative power, except as otherwise herein provided, is hereby granted
to the Philippine Legislature, authorized by this Act.
SEC. 1202. Limiting number of foreign officers and engineers on board vessels. — No Philippine
vessel operating in the coastwise trade or on the high seas shall be permitted to have on board
more than one master or one mate and one engineer who are not citizens of the United States
or of the Philippine Islands, even if they hold licenses under section one thousand one hundred
and ninety-nine hereof. No other person who is not a citizen of the United States or of the
Philippine Islands shall be an officer or a member of the crew of such vessel. Any such vessel
which fails to comply with the terms of this section shall be required to pay an additional tonnage
tax of fifty centavos per net ton per month during the continuance of said failure.
SEC. 10. That while this Act provides that the Philippine government shall have the authority to
enact a tariff law the trade relations between the islands and the United States shall continue to
be governed exclusively by laws of the Congress of the United States: Provided, That tariff acts
or acts amendatory to the tariff of the Philippine Islands shall not become law until they shall
receive the approval of the President of the United States, nor shall any act of the Philippine
Legislature affecting immigration or the currency or coinage laws of the Philippines become a
law until it has been approved by the President of the United States: Provided further, That the
President shall approve or disapprove any act mentioned in the foregoing proviso within six
months from and after its enactment and submission for his approval, and if not disapproved
within such time it shall become a law the same as if it had been specifically approved.
ISSUES. Predicated on these facts and provisions of law, the issues as above stated recur, namely,
whether Act No 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is valid in whole or in part — whether the
Government of the Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the registry of vessel in its
coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders .
SEC. 31. That all laws or parts of laws applicable to the Philippines not in conflict with any of the
provisions of this Act are hereby continued in force and effect." (39 Stat at L., 546.)
OPINION.
On February 23, 1918, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2761. The first section of this
law amended section 1172 of the Administrative Code to read as follows:
1. Considered from a positive standpoint, there can exist no measure of doubt as to the power of
the Philippine Legislature to enact Act No. 2761. The Act of Congress of April 29, 1908, with its
specific delegation of authority to the Government of the Philippine Islands to regulate the
transportation of merchandise and passengers between ports or places therein, the liberal
construction given to the provisions of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, by
the courts, and the grant by the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, of general legislative power
to the Philippine Legislature, are certainly superabundant authority for such a law. While the Act
of the local legislature may in a way be inconsistent with the Act of Congress regulating the
coasting trade of the Continental United States, yet the general rule that only such laws of the
United States have force in the Philippines as are expressly extended thereto, and the abnegation
of power by Congress in favor of the Philippine Islands would leave no starting point for convincing
argument. As a matter of fact, counsel for petitioner does not assail legislative action from this
direction (See U. S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7; Sinnot vs. Davenport [1859] 22 How., 227.)
SEC. 1172. Certificate of Philippine register. — Upon registration of a vessel of domestic
ownership, and of more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued
for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less, the taking of the
certificate of Philippine register shall be optional with the owner.
"Domestic ownership," as used in this section, means ownership vested in some one or more of
the following classes of persons: (a) Citizens or native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands; (b)
citizens of the United States residing in the Philippine Islands; (c) any corporation or company
composed wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States or of both, created
under the laws of the United States, or of any State thereof, or of thereof, or the managing
agent or master of the vessel resides in the Philippine Islands
2. It is from the negative, prohibitory standpoint that counsel argues against the constitutionality
of Act No. 2761. The first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights of the Philippine Bill, repeated
again in the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights as set forth in the Jones Law, provides
"That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the
laws." Counsel says that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of
the laws because it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from owning vessels, and because
classification of corporations based on the citizenship of one or more of their stockholders is
capricious, and that Act No. 2761 deprives the corporation of its properly without due process of
law because by the passage of the law company was automatically deprived of every beneficial
attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the naked title to a boat it could not use .
Any vessel of more than fifteen gross tons which on February eighth, nineteen hundred and
eighteen, had a certificate of Philippine register under existing law, shall likewise be deemed a
vessel of domestic ownership so long as there shall not be any change in the ownership thereof
nor any transfer of stock of the companies or corporations owning such vessel to person not
included under the last preceding paragraph.
Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 2761 amended sections 1176 and 1202 of the Administrative Code to
read as follows:
90
The guaranties extended by the Congress of the United States to the Philippine Islands have been
used in the same sense as like provisions found in the United States Constitution. While the "due
process of law and equal protection of the laws" clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights is couched
in slightly different words than the corresponding clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, the first should be interpreted and given the same force and effect as
the latter. (Kepner vs. U.S. [1904], 195 U. S., 100; Sierra vs. Mortiga [1907], 204 U. S.,.470; U.
S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7.) The meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment has been announced
in classic decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Even at the expense of restating what is
so well known, these basic principles must again be set down in order to serve as the basis of this
decision.
society, legislation of a special character, having these objects in view, must often be had in certain
districts." (Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27; New Orleans Gas Co. vs. Lousiana Light Co.
[1885], 115 U.S., 650.) This is the same police power which the United States Supreme Court say
"extends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in the state as to bring out of them the
greatest welfare in of its people." (Bacon vs. Walker [1907], 204 U.S., 311.) For quite similar
reasons, none of the provision of the Philippine Organic Law could could have had the effect of
denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to
exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in
the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. (U. S. vs. Toribio [1910], 15 Phil.,
85; Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro
[1919], 39 Phil., 660.) Another notable exception permits of the regulation or distribution of the
public domain or the common property or resources of the people of the State, so that use may
be limited to its citizens. (Ex parte Gilleti [1915], 70 Fla., 442; McCready vs. Virginia [1876], 94
U. S., 391; Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [1914], 232U. S., 138.) Still another
exception permits of the limitation of employment in the construction of public works by, or for,
the State or a municipality to citizens of the United States or of the State. (Atkin vs. Kansas
[1903],191 U. S., 207; Heim vs. McCall [1915], 239 U.S., 175; Crane vs. New York [1915], 239
U. S., 195.) Even as to classification, it is admitted that a State may classify with reference to the
evil to be prevented; the question is a practical one, dependent upon experience.
(Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [1914], 232 U. S., 138.)
The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of
Rights, are universal in their application to all person within the territorial jurisdiction, without
regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality. The word "person" includes aliens. (Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356; Truax vs. Raich [1915], 239 U. S., 33.) Private
corporations, likewise, are "persons" within the scope of the guaranties in so far as their property
is concerned. (Santa Clara County vs. Southern Pac. R. R. Co. [1886], 118.U. S., 394; Pembina
Mining Co. vs. Pennsylvania [1888],.125 U. S., 181 Covington & L. Turnpike Road Co. vs. Sandford
[1896], 164 U. S., 578.) Classification with the end in view of providing diversity of treatment may
be made among corporations, but must be based upon some reasonable ground and not be a mere
arbitrary selection (Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. vs. Ellis [1897],.165 U. S., 150.)
Examples of laws held unconstitutional because of unlawful discrimination against aliens could be
cited. Generally, these decisions relate to statutes which had attempted arbitrarily to forbid aliens
to engage in ordinary kinds of business to earn their living. (State vs. Montgomery [1900], 94
Maine, 192, peddling — but see. Commonwealth vs. Hana [1907], 195 Mass., 262;
Templar vs. Board of Examiners of Barbers [1902], 131 Mich., 254, barbers; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins
[1886], 118 U. S.,.356, discrimination against Chinese; Truax vs. Raich [1915], 239 U. S., 33; In
re Parrott [1880], 1 Fed , 481; Fraser vs. McConway & Torley Co. [1897], 82 Fed , 257; Juniata
Limestone Co. vs. Fagley [1898], 187 Penn., 193, all relating to the employment of aliens by
private corporations.)
To justify that portion of Act no. 2761 which permits corporations or companies to obtain a
certificate of Philippine registry only on condition that they be composed wholly of citizens of the
Philippine Islands or of the United States or both, as not infringing Philippine Organic Law, it must
be done under some one of the exceptions here mentioned This must be done, moreover, having
particularly in mind what is so often of controlling effect in this jurisdiction — our local experience
and our peculiar local conditions.
To recall a few facts in geography, within the confines of Philippine jurisdictional limits are found
more than three thousand islands. Literally, and absolutely, steamship lines are, for an Insular
territory thus situated, the arteries of commerce. If one be severed, the life-blood of the nation is
lost. If on the other hand these arteries are protected, then the security of the country and the
promotion of the general welfare is sustained. Time and again, with such conditions confronting
it, has the executive branch of the Government of the Philippine Islands, always later with the
sanction of the judicial branch, taken a firm stand with reference to the presence of undesirable
foreigners. The Government has thus assumed to act for the all-sufficient and primitive reason of
the benefit and protection of its own citizens and of the self-preservation and integrity of its
dominion. (In re Patterson [1902], 1 Phil., 93; Forbes vs. Chuoco, Tiaco and Crossfield [1910], 16
Phil., 534;.228 U.S., 549; In re McCulloch Dick [1918], 38 Phil., 41.) Boats owned by foreigners,
particularly by such solid and reputable firms as the instant claimant, might indeed traverse the
waters of the Philippines for ages without doing any particular harm. Again, some evilminded
foreigner might very easily take advantage of such lavish hospitality to chart Philippine waters, to
obtain valuable information for unfriendly foreign powers, to stir up insurrection, or to prejudice
Filipino or American commerce. Moreover, under the Spanish portion of Philippine law, the waters
within the domestic jurisdiction are deemed part of the national domain, open to public use. (Book
II, Tit. IV, Ch. I, Civil Code; Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, arts 1, 2, 3.) Common
carriers which in the Philippines as in the United States and other countries are, as Lord Hale said,
"affected with a public interest," can only be permitted to use these public waters as a privilege
and under such conditions as to the representatives of the people may seem wise. (See De
Villata vs. Stanley [1915], 32 Phil., 541.)
A literal application of general principles to the facts before us would, of course, cause the
inevitable deduction that Act No. 2761 is unconstitutional by reason of its denial to a corporation,
some of whole members are foreigners, of the equal protection of the laws. Like all beneficient
propositions, deeper research discloses provisos. Examples of a denial of rights to aliens
notwithstanding the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment could be cited. (Tragesser vs. Gray
[1890], 73 Md., 250, licenses to sell spirituous liquors denied to persons not citizens of the United
States; Commonwealth vs. Hana [1907], 195 Mass , 262, excluding aliens from the right to
peddle; Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [1914], 232 U. S. , 138, prohibiting the killing
of any wild bird or animal by any unnaturalized foreign-born resident; Ex parte Gilleti [1915], 70
Fla., 442, discriminating in favor of citizens with reference to the taking for private use of the
common property in fish and oysters found in the public waters of the State; Heim vs. McCall
[1915], 239 U. S.,.175, and Crane vs. New York [1915], 239 U. S., 195, limiting employment on
public works by, or for, the State or a municipality to citizens of the United States.)
One of the exceptions to the general rule, most persistent and far reaching in influence is, that
neither the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, broad and comprehensive
as it is, nor any other amendment, "was designed to interfere with the power of the State,
sometimes termed its `police power,' to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace,
morals, education, and good order of the people, and legislate so as to increase the industries of
the State, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities of
91
In Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ([1913], 232 U.S., 138), a case herein before
mentioned, Justice Holmes delivering the opinion of the United States Supreme Court said:
attempts at restriction on the right to enter the coastwise trade, and might thus furnish valuable
aid by which to ascertain and, if possible, effectuate legislative intention.
3. The power to regulate commerce, expressly delegated to the Congress by the Constitution,
includes the power to nationalize ships built and owned in the United States by registries and
enrollments, and the recording of the muniments of title of American vessels. The Congress
"may encourage or it may entirely prohibit such commerce, and it may regulate in any way it
may see fit between these two extremes." (U.S. vs. Craig [1886], 28 Fed., 795;
Gibbons vs. Ogden [1824], 9 Wheat., 1; The Passenger Cases [1849], 7 How., 283.)
This statute makes it unlawful for any unnaturalized foreign-born resident to kill any wild bird or
animal except in defense of person or property, and `to that end' makes it unlawful for such
foreign-born person to own or be possessed of a shotgun or rifle; with a penalty of $25 and a
forfeiture of the gun or guns. The plaintiff in error was found guilty and was sentenced to pay
the abovementioned fine. The judgment was affirmed on successive appeals. (231 Pa., 46; 79
Atl., 928.) He brings the case to this court on the ground that the statute is contrary to the 14th
Amendment and also is in contravention of the treaty between the United States and Italy, to
which latter country the plaintiff in error belongs .
Acting within the purview of such power, the first Congress of the United States had not been long
convened before it enacted on September 1, 1789, "An Act for Registering and Clearing Vessels,
Regulating the Coasting Trade, and for other purposes." Section 1 of this law provided that for any
ship or vessel to obtain the benefits of American registry, it must belong wholly to a citizen or
citizens of the United States "and no other." (1 Stat. at L., 55.) That Act was shortly after repealed,
but the same idea was carried into the Acts of Congress of December 31, 1792 and February 18,
1793. (1 Stat. at L., 287, 305.).Section 4 of the Act of 1792 provided that in order to obtain the
registry of any vessel, an oath shall be taken and subscribed by the owner, or by one of the owners
thereof, before the officer authorized to make such registry, declaring, "that there is no subject or
citizen of any foreign prince or state, directly or indirectly, by way of trust, confidence, or
otherwise, interested in such vessel, or in the profits or issues thereof." Section 32 of the Act of
1793 even went so far as to say "that if any licensed ship or vessel shall be transferred to any
person who is not at the time of such transfer a citizen of and resident within the United States,
... every such vessel with her tackle, apparel, and furniture, and the cargo found on board her,
shall be forefeited." In case of alienation to a foreigner, Chief Justice Marshall said that all the
privileges of an American bottom were ipso facto forfeited. (U.S. vs. Willings and Francis [1807],
4 Cranch, 48.) Even as late as 1873, the Attorney-General of the United States was of the opinion
that under the provisions of the Act of December 31, 1792, no vessel in which a foreigner is directly
or indirectly interested can lawfully be registered as a vessel of the United. States. (14 Op. Atty.Gen. [U.S.], 340.)
Under the 14th Amendment the objection is twofold; unjustifiably depriving the alien of property,
and discrimination against such aliens as a class. But the former really depends upon the latter,
since it hardly can be disputed that if the lawful object, the protection of wild life
(Geer vs. Connecticut, 161 U.S., 519; 40 L. ed., 793; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 600), warrants the
discrimination, the, means adopted for making it effective also might be adopted. . . .
The discrimination undoubtedly presents a more difficult question. But we start with reference
to the evil to be prevented, and that if the class discriminated against is or reasonably might be
considered to define those from whom the evil mainly is to be feared, it properly may be picked
out. A lack of abstract symmetry does not matter. The question is a practical one, dependent
upon experience. . . .
The question therefore narrows itself to whether this court can say that the legislature of
Pennsylvania was not warranted in assuming as its premise for the law that resident
unnaturalized aliens were the peculiar source of the evil that it desired to prevent.
(Barrett vs. Indiana,. 229 U.S., 26, 29; 57 L. ed., 1050, 1052; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 692.)
These laws continued in force without contest, although possibly the Act of March 3, 1825, may
have affected them, until amended by the Act of May 28, 1896 (29 Stat. at L., 188) which extended
the privileges of registry from vessels wholly owned by a citizen or citizens of the United States to
corporations created under the laws of any of the states thereof. The law, as amended, made
possible the deduction that a vessel belonging to a domestic corporation was entitled to registry
or enrollment even though some stock of the company be owned by aliens. The right of ownership
of stock in a corporation was thereafter distinct from the right to hold the property by the
corporation (Humphreys vs. McKissock [1890], 140 U.S., 304; Queen vs. Arnaud [1846], 9 Q. B.,
806; 29 Op. Atty.-Gen. [U.S.],188.)
Obviously the question, so stated, is one of local experience, on which this court ought to be
very slow to declare that the state legislature was wrong in its facts (Adams vs. Milwaukee, 228
U.S., 572, 583; 57 L. ed., 971,.977; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 610.) If we might trust popular speech
in some states it was right; but it is enough that this court has no such knowledge of local
conditions as to be able to say that it was manifestly wrong. . . .
Judgment affirmed.
We are inclined to the view that while Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation having alien
stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the due-process of law and equal protection
of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine
Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels
in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious species of class legislation which
must always be condemned, but does fall within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview
of the police power, and so does not offend against the constitutional provision.
On American occupation of the Philippines, the new government found a substantive law in
operation in the Islands with a civil law history which it wisely continued in force Article fifteen of
the Spanish Code of Commerce permitted any foreigner to engage in Philippine trade if he had
legal capacity to do so under the laws of his nation. When the Philippine Commission came to
enact the Customs Administrative Act (No. 355) in 1902, it returned to the old American policy of
limiting the protection and flag of the United States to vessels owned by citizens of the United
States or by native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands (Sec. 117.) Two years later, the same
body reverted to the existing Congressional law by permitting certification to be issued to a citizen
of the United States or to a corporation or company created under the laws of the United States
or of any state thereof or of the Philippine Islands (Act No. 1235, sec. 3.) The two administration
codes repeated the same provisions with the necessary amplification of inclusion of citizens or
This opinion might well be brought to a close at this point. It occurs to us, however, that the
legislative history of the United States and the Philippine Islands, and, probably, the legislative
history of other countries, if we were to take the time to search it out, might disclose similar
92
native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands (Adm. Code of 1916, sec. 1345; Adm. Code of 1917,
sec. 1172). And now Act No. 2761 has returned to the restrictive idea of the original Customs
Administrative Act which in turn was merely a reflection of the statutory language of the first
American Congress.
not attempt to nullify the action of the Legislature. "In construing a statute enacted by the
Philippine Commission (Legislature), we deem it our duty not to give it a construction which would
be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another
construction not in conflict with the higher law." (In re Guariña [1913], 24. Phil., 36; U.S. vs. Ten
Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1.) That is the true construction which will best carry legislative intention into
effect.
Provisions such as those in Act No. 2761, which deny to foreigners the right to a certificate of
Philippine registry, are thus found not to be as radical as a first reading would make them appear.
With full consciousness of the importance of the question, we nevertheless are clearly of the
opinion that the limitation of domestic ownership for purposes of obtaining a certificate of
Philippine registry in the coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippine Islands, and to citizens of the
United States, does not violate the provisions of paragraph 1 of section 3 of the Act of Congress
of August 29, 1916 No treaty right relied upon Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature is held
valid and constitutional .
Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of the Philippine Legislature is seen to be to enact
an anti-alien shipping act. The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to encourage Philippine shipbuilding. This, without doubt, has, likewise, been the intention of the United States Congress in
passing navigation or tariff laws on different occasions. The object of such a law, the United States
Supreme Court once said, was to encourage American trade, navigation, and ship-building by
giving American ship-owners exclusive privileges. (Old Dominion Steamship Co. vs. Virginia
[1905], 198 U.S., 299; Kent's Commentaries, Vol. 3, p. 139.)
The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
In the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in Gibbons vs. Ogden ([1824], 9 Wheat., 1) is found
the following:
Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts
licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly
of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which is to encourage
American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations. Almost
every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a
countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation
of the United States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an American character, that the
license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is
to confer on her American privileges, as contradistinguished from foreign; and to preserve the.
Government from fraud by foreigners, in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American
commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole
system is projected.
The United States Congress in assuming its grave responsibility of legislating wisely for a new
country did so imbued with a spirit of Americanism. Domestic navigation and trade, it decreed,
could only be carried on by citizens of the United States. If the representatives of the American
people acted in this patriotic manner to advance the national policy, and if their action was
accepted without protest in the courts, who can say that they did not enact such beneficial laws
under the all-pervading police power, with the prime motive of safeguarding the country and of
promoting its prosperity? Quite similarly, the Philippine Legislature made up entirely of Filipinos,
representing the mandate of the Filipino people and the guardian of their rights, acting under
practically autonomous powers, and imbued with a strong sense of Philippinism, has desired for
these Islands safety from foreign interlopers, the use of the common property exclusively by its
citizens and the citizens of the United States, and protection for the common good of the people.
Who can say, therefore, especially can a court, that with all the facts and circumstances affecting
the Filipino people before it, the Philippine Legislature has erred in the enactment of Act No. 2761?
Surely, the members of the judiciary are not expected to live apart from active life, in monastic
seclusion amidst dusty tomes and ancient records, but, as keen spectators of passing events and
alive to the dictates of the general — the national — welfare, can incline the scales of their decisions
in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the public policy. All the presumption
is in favor of the constitutionally of the law and without good and strong reasons, courts should
93
G.R. No. L-2832
November 24, 1906
The municipality of this town and some of its most prominent citizens having learned through
the papers from the capital of these Islands of the constitution of the Filipino National Church,
separate from the control of the Pope at Rome by reason of the fact that the latter has refused
to either recognize or grant the rights to the Filipino clergy which have many times been urged,
and it appearing to us that the reasons advanced why such offices should be given to the Filipino
clergy are evidently well-founded, we have deemed it advisable to consult with the parish priest
of this town as to whether it would be advantageous to join the said Filipino Church and to
separate from the control of the Pope as long as he continues to ignore the rights of the said
Filipino clergy, under the conditions that there will be no change in the articles of faith, and that
the sacraments and other dogmas will be recognized and particularly that of the immaculate
conception of the mother of our Lord. But the moment the Pope at Rome recognizes and grants
the rights heretofore denied to the Filipino clergy we will return to his control. In view of this,
and subject to this condition, the reverend parish priest, together with the people of the town,
unanimously join in declaring that from this date they separate themselves from the obedience
and control of the Pope and join the Filipino National Church. This assembly and the reverend
parish priest have accordingly adopted this resolution written in triplicate, and resolved to send
a copy thereof to the civil government of this province for its information, and do sign the same
below. Vicente Ramirez, Francisco Israel, Ambrosio Bocon, Florentino Relloso, Macario P.
Ledesma, Cecilio Obias, Balbino Imperial, Juan Preseñada, Fernando Deudor, Mauricio Torres,
Adriano Sabater.
REV. JORGE BARLIN, in his capacity as apostolic administrator of this vacant bishopric
and legal representative of the general interests of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church
in
the
diocese
of
Nueva
Caceres, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
P. VICENTE RAMIREZ, ex-rector of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Parochial Church of
Lagonoy, AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF LAGONOY, defendants-appellants.
There had been priests of the Roman Catholic Church in the pueblo of Lagonoy, in the Province of
Ambos Camarines, since 1839. On the 13th of January, 1869, the church and convent were
burned. They were rebuilt between 1870 and 1873. There was evidence that this was done by the
order of the provincial governor. The labor necessary for this reconstruction was performed by the
people of the pueblo the direction of the cabeza de barangay. Under the law then in force, each
man in the pueblo was required to work for the government, without compensation, for forty days
every year. The time spent in the reconstruction of these buildings was counted as a part of the
forty days. The material necessary was brought and paid for in part by the parish priest from the
funds of the church and in part was donated by certain individuals of the pueblo. After the
completion of the church it was always administered, until November 14, 1902, by a priest of a
Roman Catholic Communion and all the people of the pueblo professed that faith and belonged to
that church.
At the meeting at which the resolution spoken of in this document was adopted, there were present
about 100 persons of the pueblo. There is testimony in the case that the population of the pueblo
was at that time 9,000 and that all but 20 of the inhabitants were satisfied with the action there
taken. Although it is of no importance in the case, we are inclined to think that the testimony to
this effect merely means that about 100 of the principal men of the town were in favor of the
resolution and about 20 of such principal men were opposed to it. After the 14th of November, the
defendant, Ramirez, continued in the possession of the church and other property and
administered the same under the directions of his superior, the Obispo Maximo of the Independent
Filipino Church. The rites and ceremonies and the manner of worship were the same after the 14th
day of November as they were before, but the relations between the Roman Catholic Church and
the defendant had been entirely severed.
The defendant, Ramirez, having been appointed by the plaintiff parish priest, took possession of
the church on the 5th of July, 1901. he administered it as such under the orders of his superiors
until the 14th day of November, 1902. His successor having been then appointed, the latter made
a demand on this defendant for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and cemetery, and the
sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other property of the church. The defendant, by a
written document of that date, refused to make such delivery. That document is as follows:
At 7 o'clock last night I received through Father Agripino Pisino your respected order of the 12th
instant, wherein I am advised of the appointment of Father Pisino as acting parish priest of this
town, and directed to turn over to him this parish and to report to you at the vicarage. In reply
thereto, I have the honor to inform you that the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction with the parish
priest thereof, has seen fit to sever connection with the Pope at Rome and his representatives
in these Islands, and join the Filipino Church, the head of which is at Manila. This resolution of
the people was reduced to writing and triplicate copies made, of which I beg to inclose a copy
herewith.
In January, 1904, the plaintiff brought this action against the defendant, Ramirez, alleging in his
amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the church building, the
convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other property belonging thereto, and asking that it
be restored to the possession thereof and that the defendant render an account of the property
which he had received and which was retained by him, and for other relief.
For this reason I regret to inform you that I am unable to obey your said order by delivering to
Father Agripino Pisino the parish property of Lagonoy which, as I understand, is now outside of
the control of the Pope and his representatives in these Islands. May God guard you many years.
Lagonoy,
(Signed) VICENTE RAMIREZ.
November
14,
The answer of the defendant, Ramirez, in addition to a general denial of the allegation of the
complaint, admitted that he was in the possession and administration of the property described
therein with the authority of the municipality of Lagonoy and of the inhabitants of the same, who
were the lawful owners of the said property. After this answer had been presented, and on the 1st
day of November, 1904, the municipality of Lagonoy filed a petition asking that it be allowed to
intervene in the case and join with the defendant, Ramirez, as a defendant therein. This petition
been granted, the municipality of the 1st day of December filed an answer in which it alleged that
the defendant, Ramirez, was in possession of the property described in the complaint under the
authority and with the consent of the municipality of Lagonoy and that such municipality was the
owner thereof.
1902.
RT. REV. VICAR OF THIS DISTRICT.
The document, a copy of which is referred to in this letter, is as follows:
LAGONOY, November, 9, 1902.
94
Plaintiff answered this complaint, or answer in intervention, and the case was tried and final
judgment in entered therein in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. The defendants
then brought the case here by a bill of exceptions.
his possession, and who can not produce any written evidence of title, the mere fact that the
defendant is in possession does not entitle the defendant to retain that possession. In order that
he may continue in possession, he must show a better right thereto.
That the person in the actual possession of the church and other property described in the
complaint is the defendant, Ramirez, is plainly established by the evidence. It does not appear
that the municipality, as a corporate body, ever took any action in reference to this matter until
they presented their petition for intervention in this case. In fact, the witnesses for the defense,
when they speak of the ownership of the buildings, say that they are owned by the people of the
pueblo, and one witness, the president, said that the municipality as a corporation had nothing
whatever to do with the matter. That the resolution adopted on the 14th of November, and which
has been quoted above, was not the action of the municipality, as such, is apparent from an
inspection thereof.
The evidence in this case does not show that the municipality has, as such, any right of whatever
in the property in question. It has produced no evidence of ownership. Its claim of ownership is
rested in its brief in this court upon the following propositions: That the property in question
belonged prior to the treaty of Paris to the Spanish Government; that by the treaty of Paris the
ownership thereof passed to the Government of the United States; that by section 12 of the act
of Congress of July 1, 1902, such property was transferred to the Government of the Philippine
Islands, and that by the circular of that Government, dated November 11, 1902, the ownership
and the right to the possession of this property passed to the municipality of Lagonoy. If, for the
purposes of the argument, we should admit that the other propositions are true, there is no
evidence whatever to support the last proposition, namely that the Government of the Philippine
Islands has transferred the ownership of this church to the municipality of Lagonoy. We have found
no circular of the date above referred to. The one of February 10, 1903, which is probably the one
intended, contains nothing that indicates any such transfer. As to the municipality of Lagonoy,
therefore, it is very clear that it has neither title, ownership, nor right of possession.
The witnesses for the defenses speak of a delivery of the church by the people of the pueblo to
the defendant, Ramirez, but there is no evidence in the case of any such delivery. Their testimony
in regard to the delivery always refers to the action taken on the 14th of November, a record of
which appears that in the document above quoted. It is apparent that the action taken consisted
simply in separating themselves from the Roman Catholic Church, and nothing is said therein in
reference to the material property then in possession of the defendant, Ramirez.
(3) We have said that it would have no such title or ownership ever admitting that the Spanish
Government was the owner of the property and it has passed by the treaty of Paris to the American
Government. But this assumption is not true. As a matter of law, the Spanish Government at the
time the treaty of peace was signed, was not the owner of this property, nor of any other property
like it, situated in the Philippine Islands.
There are several grounds upon which this judgment must be affirmed.
(1) As to the defendant, Ramirez, it appears that he took possession of the property as the servant
or agent of the plaintiff. The only right which he had to the possession at the time he took it, was
the right which was given to him by the plaintiff, and he took possession under the agreement to
return that possession whenever it should be demanded of him. Under such circumstances he will
not be allowed, when the return of such possession is demanded by him the plaintiff, to say that
the plaintiff is not the owner of the property and is not entitled to have it delivered back to him.
The principle of law that a tenant can not deny his landlord's title, which is found in section 333,
paragraph 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and also in the Spanish law, is applicable to a case of
this kind. An answer of the defendant, Ramirez, in which he alleged that he himself was the owner
of the property at the time he received it from the plaintiff, or in which he alleged that the pueblo
was the owner of the property at that time, would constitute no defense. There is no claim made
by him that since the delivery of the possession of the property to him by the plaintiff he has
acquired the title thereto by other means, nor does he is own behalf make any claim whatever
either to the property or to the possession thereof.
It does not admit of doubt that from the earliest times the parish churches in the Philippine Islands
were built by the Spanish Government. Law 2, title 2, book 1, of the Compilation of the Laws of
the Indies is, in part, as follows:
Having erected all the churches, cathedrals, and parish houses of the Spaniards and natives of
our Indian possessions from their discovery at the cost and expense of our royal treasury, and
applied for their service and maintenance the part of the tithes belonging to us by apostolic
concession according to the division we have made.
Law 3 of the same title to the construction of parochial churches such as the one in question. That
law is as follows:
The parish churches which was erected in Spanish towns shall be of durable and decent
construction. Their costs shall be divided and paid in three parts: One by our royal treasury,
another by the residents and Indian encomenderos of the place where such churches are
constructed, and the other part by the Indians who abide there; and if within the limits of a city,
village, or place there should be any Indians incorporated to our royal crown, we command that
for our part there be contributed the same amount as the residents and encomenderos,
respectively, contribute; and the residents who have no Indians shall also contribute for this
purpose in accordance with their stations and wealth, and that which is so given shall be
deducted from the share of the Indians should pay.1âwphil.net
(2) The municipality of Lagonoy, in its answer, claims as such, to be the owner of the property.
As we have said before, the evidence shows that it never was in the physical possession of the
property. But waiving this point and assuming that the possession of Ramirez, which he alleges in
his answer is the possession of the municipality, gives the municipality the rights of a possessor,
the question still arises, Who has the better right to the present possession of the property? The
plaintiff, in 1902, had been in the lawful possession thereof for more than thirty years and during
all that time its possession had never been questioned or disturbed. That possession has been
taken away from it and it has the right now to recover the possession from the persons who have
so deprived it of such possession, unless the latter can show that they have a better right thereto.
This was the preposition which was discussed and settled in the case of Bishop of Cebu vs.
Mangaron, 1No. 1748, decided June 1, 1906. That decision holds that as against one who has been
in possession for the length of the plaintiff has been in possession, and who had been deprived of
Law 11 of the same title is as follows:
We command that the part of the tithes which belongs to the fund for the erection of churches
shall be given to their superintendents to be expended for those things necessary for these
churches with the advice of the prelates and officials, and by their warrants, and not otherwise.
95
And we request and charge the archbishops and bishops not to interfere in the collection and
disbursement thereof, but to guard these structures.
Title 28 of the third partida is devoted to the ownership of things and, after discussing what can
be called public property and what can be called private property, speaks, in Law 12, of those
things which are sacred, religious, or holy. That law is as follows:
Law 4, title 3, book 6, is as follows:
In all settlements, even though the Indians are few, there shall be erected a church where mass
can be decently held, and it shall have a donor with a key, notwithstanding the fact that it be
the subject to or separate from a parish.
Law XII. — HOW SACRED OR RELIGIOUS THINGS CAN NOT BE OWNED BY ANY PERSON.
No sacred, religious, or holy thing, devoted to the service of God, can be the subject of ownership
by any man, nor can it be considered as included in his property holdings. Although the priests
may have such things in their possession, yet they are not the owners thereof. They, hold them
thus as guardians or servants, or because they have the care of the same and serve God in or
without them. Hence they were allowed to take from the revenues of the church and lands what
was reasonably necessary for their support; the balance, belonging to God, was to be devoted
to pious purposes, such as the feeding and clothing of the poor, the support of orphans, the
marrying of poor virgins to prevent their becoming evil women because of their poverty, and for
the redemption of captives and the repairing of the churches, and the buying of chalices,
clothing, books, and others things which they might be in need of, and other similar charitable
purposes.
Not only were all the parish churches in the Philippines erected by the King and under his direction,
but it was made unlawful to erect a church without the license of the King. This provision is
contained in Law 2, title 6, book 1, which is as follows:
Whereas it is our intention to erect, institute, found, and maintain all cathedrals, parish churches,
monasteries, votive hospitals, churches, and religious and pious establishments where they are
necessary for the teaching, propagation, and preaching of the doctrine of our sacred Roman
Catholic faith, and to aid to this effect with out royal treasury whenever possible, and to receive
information of such places where they should be founded and are necessary, and the
ecclesiastical patronage of all our Indies belonging to us:
And then taking up for consideration the first of the classes in to which this law has divided these
things, it defines in Law 13, title 28, third partida, consecrated things. That law is as follows:
Sacred things, we say, are those which are consecrated by the bishops, such as churches, the
altars therein, crosses, chalices, censers, vestments, books, and all other things which are in
tended for the service of the church, and the title to these things can not be alienated except in
certain specific cases as we have already shown in the first partida of this book by the laws
dealing with this subject. We say further that even where a consecrated church is razed, the
ground upon which it formerly stood shall always be consecrated ground. But if any consecrated
church should fall into the hands of the enemies of our faith it shall there and then cease to be
sacred as long as the enemy has it under control, although once recovered by the Christians, it
will again become sacred, reverting to its condition before the enemy seized it and shall have all
the right and privileges formerly belonging to it.
We command that there shall not be erected, instituted, founded, or maintained any cathedral,
parish church, monastery, hospital, or votive churches, or other pious or religious establishment
without our express permission as is provided in Law 1, title 2, and Law 1, title 3, of this book,
notwithstanding any permission heretofore given by our viceroy or other ministers, which in this
respect we revoke and make null, void, and of no effect.
By agreement at an early date between the Pope and the Crown of Spain, all tithes in the Indies
were given by the former to the latter and the disposition made the King of the fund thus created
is indicated by Law 1, title 16, book 1, which is as follows:
Whereas the ecclesiastical tithes from the Indies belong to us by the apostolic concessions of
the supreme pontiffs, we command the officials of our royal treasury of those provinces to collect
and cause to be collected all tithes due and to become due from the crops and flocks of the
residents in the manner in which it has been the custom to pay the same, and from these tithes
the churches shall be provided with competent persons of good character to serve them and
with all ornaments and things which may be necessary for divine worship, to the end that these
churches may be well served and equipped, and we shall be informed of God, our Lord; this
order shall be observed where the contrary has not already been directed by us in connection
with the erection of churches.
That the principles of the partida in reference to churches still exist is indicated by Sanchez Roman,
whose work on the Civil Law contains the following statement:
First Group. Spiritual and corporeal or ecclesiastical. A. Spiritual. — From early times distinction
has been made by authors and by law between things governed by divine law, called divine, and
those governed by human law, called human, and although the former can not be the subject of
civil juridical relations, their nature and species should be ascertained either to identify them
and exclude them from such relations or because they furnish a complete explanation of the
foregoing tabulated statement, or finally because the laws of the partida deal with them.
That the condition of things existing by virtue of the Laws of the Indies was continued to the
present time is indicated by the royal order of the 31st of January, 1856, and by the royal order
of the 13th of August, 1876, both relating to the construction and repair of churches, there being
authority for saying that the latter order was in force in the Philippines.
Divine things are those which are either directly or indirectly established by God for his service
and sanctification of men and which are governed by divine or canonical laws. This makes it
necessary to divide them into spiritual things, which are those which have a direct influence on
the religious redemption of man such as the sacrament, prayers, fasts, indulgences, etc., and
corporeal or ecclesiastical, which are those means more or less direct for the proper religious
salvation of man.
7. First Group. Divine things. B. Corporeal or ecclesiastical things (sacred, religious, holy, and
temporal belonging to the church). — Corporeal or ecclesiastical things are so divided.
(a) Sacred things are those devoted to God, religion, and worship in general, such as temples,
altars, ornaments, etc. These things can not be alienated except for some pious purpose and
This church, and other churches similarly situated in the Philippines, having been erected by the
Spanish Government, and under its direction, the next question to be considered is, To whom did
these churches belong?
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in such cases as are provided for in the laws, according to which their control pertains to the
ecclesiastical authorities, and in so far as their use is concerned, to the believers and the
clergy. (2 Derecho Civil Español, Sanchez Roman, p. 480; 8 Manresa, Commentaries on the
Spanish Civil Code, p. 636; 3 Alcubilla, Diccionario de la Administracion Española, p. 486.)
any private person could the owner thereof. They constituted a kind of property distinctive
characteristic of which was that it was devoted to the worship of God.
But, being material things was necessary that some one should have the care and custody of them
and the administration thereof, and the question occurs, To whom, under the Spanish law, was
intrusted that possession and administration? For the purposes of the Spanish law there was only
one religion. That was the religion professed by the Roman Catholic Church. It was for the purposes
of that religion and for the observance of its rites that this church and all other churches in the
Philippines were erected. The possession of the churches, their care and custody, and the
maintenance of religious worship therein were necessarily, therefore, intrusted to that body. It
was, by virtue of the laws of Spain, the only body which could under any circumstances have
possession of, or any control over, any church dedicated to the worship of God. By virtue of those
laws this possession and right of control were necessarily exclusive. It is not necessary or
important to give any name to this right of possession and control exercised by the Roman Catholic
Church in the church buildings of the Philippines prior to 1898. It is not necessary to show that
the church as a juridical person was the owner of the buildings. It is sufficient to say that this right
to the exclusive possession and control of the same, for the purposes of its creation, existed.
The partidas defined minutely what things belonged to the public in general and what belonged to
private persons. In the first group churches are not named. The present Civil Code declares in
article 338 that property is of public or private ownership. Article 339, which defines public
property, is as follows:
Property of public ownership is —
1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges
constructed by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of similar character.
2. That belonging exclusively to the state without being for public use and which is destined
to some public service, or to the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses,
and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until their concession has been
granted.
The code also defines the property of provinces and of pueblos, and in defining what property is
of public use, article 344 declares as follows:
Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the
squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of general
service supported by the said towns or provinces.
All other property possessed by either is patrimonial, and shall be governed by the provisions of
this code, unless otherwise prescribe in special laws.
The right of patronage, existing in the King of Spain with reference to the churches in the
Philippines, did not give him any right to interfere with the material possession of these buildings.
Title 6 of book 1 of the Compilation of the laws of the Indies treats Del Patronazgo Real de las
Indias. There is nothing in any one of the fifty-one laws which compose this title which in any way
indicates that the King of Spain was the owner of the churches in the Indies because he had
constructed them. These laws relate to the right of presentation to ecclesiastical charges and
offices. For example, Law 49 of the title commences as follows:
Because the patronage and right of presentation of all archbishops, bishops, dignitaries,
prevents, curates, and doctrines and all other beneficiaries and ecclesiastical offices whatsoever
belong to us, no other person can obtain or possess the same without our presentation as
provided in Law 1 and other laws of this title.
It will be noticed that in either one of these articles is any mention made of churches. When the
Civil Code undertook to define those things in a pueblo which were for the common use of the
inhabitants of the pueblo, or which belonged to the State, while it mentioned a great many other
things, it did not mention churches.
It has been said that article 25 of the Regulations for the Execution of the Mortgage Law indicates
that churches belong to the State and are public property. That article is as follows:
There shall be excepted from the record required by article 2 of the law:
First. Property which belongs exclusively to the eminent domain of the State, and which is for
the use of all, such as the shores of the sea, islands, rivers and their borders, wagon roads,
and the roads of all kinds, with the exception of railroads; streets, parks, public promenades,
and commons of towns, provided they are not lands of common profit to the inhabitants; walls
of cities and parks, ports, and roadsteads, and any other analogous property during the time
they are in common and general use, always reserving the servitudes established by law on
the shores of the sea and borders of navigable rivers.
Second. Public temples dedicated to the Catholic faith.
Title 15 of the first partida treats of the right of patronage vesting in private persons, but there is
nothing in any one of its fifteen laws which in any way indicates that the private patron is the
owner of the church.
When it is said that this church never belonged to the Crown of Spain, it is not intended to say
that the Government and had no power over it. It may be that by virtue of that power of eminent
domain which is necessarily resides in every government, it might have appropriated this church
and other churches, and private property of individuals. But nothing of this kind was ever
attempted in the Philippines.
It, therefore, follows that in 1898, and prior to the treaty of Paris, the Roman Catholic Church had
by law the exclusive right to the possession of this church and it had the legal right to administer
the same for the purposes for which the building was consecrated. It was then in the full and
peaceful possession of the church with the rights aforesaid. That these rights were fully protected
by the treaty of Paris is very clear. That treaty, in article 8, provides, among other things, as
follows:
And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the
preceding paragraph refers, can not in any respect impair the property or rights which by law
belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, or provinces, municipalities, public or
A reading of this article shows that far from proving that churches belong to the State and to the
eminent domain thereof, it proves the contrary, for, if they had belonged to the State, they would
have been included in the first paragraph instead of being placed in a paragraph by themselves.
The truth is that, from the earliest times down to the cession of the Philippines to the United
States, churches and other consecrated objects were considered outside of the commerce of man.
They were not public property, nor could they be subjects of private property in the sense that
97
private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal
capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of
private individuals, or whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.
G.R. No. L-5921
July 25, 1911
THE
STANDARD
OIL
COMPANY
vs.
JUAN
CODINA
ARENAS
VICENTE SIXTO VILLANUEVA, appellant.
It is not necessary, however, to invoke the provisions of that treaty. Neither the Government of
the United States, nor the Government of these Islands, has ever attempted in any way to interfere
with the rights which the Roman Catholic Church had in this building when Spanish sovereignty
ceased in the Philippines. Any interference that has resulted has been caused by private
individuals, acting without any authority from the Government.
OF
NEW
AND
YORK, plaintiff-appellee,
OTHERS, defendants;
ARELLANO, C.J.:
On December 15, 1908, Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara del Pino, as principals, and Alipio
Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as sureties, assumed the obligation to
pay, jointly and severally, to the corporation, The Standard Oil Company of New York, the sum of
P3,305. 76, at three months from date, with interest at P1 per month.
No point is made in the brief of the appellant that any distinction should be made between the
church and the convent. The convent undoubtedly was annexed to the church and, as to it, the
provisions of Law 19, title 2, book 1, of the Compilation of the Laws of the Indies would apply.
That law is as follows:
We command that the Indians of each town or barrio shall construct such houses as may be
deemed sufficient in which the priests of such towns or barrios may live comfortably adjoining
the parish church of the place where that may be built for the benefit of the priests in charge of
such churches and engaged in the education and conversion of their Indian parishioners, and
they shall not be alienated or devoted to any other purpose.
On April 5, 1909, The Standard Oil Company of New York sued the said five debtors for payment
of the P3,305.76, together with the interest thereon at the rate of 1 per cent per month from the
15th of December, 1908, and the costs.
The defendants were summoned, the record showing that summons was served on Vicente Sixto
Villanueva on April 17, 1909.
The evidence in this case makes no showing in regard to the cemetery. It is always mentioned in
connection with the church and convent and no point is made by the possession of the church and
convent, he is not also entitled to recover possession of the cemetery. So, without discussing the
question as to whether the rules applicable to churches are all respects applicable to cemeteries,
we hold for the purpose of this case that the plaintiff has the same right to the cemetery that he
has to the church.
On May 12, 1909, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and Siy Ho were declared to be in default and were so
notified, the latter on the 14th and the former on the 15th of May, 1909.
On August 28, 1909, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila sentenced all the defendants
to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff company the sum of P3,305.76, together with the
interest thereon at 1 per cent per month from December 15, 1908, until complete payment should
have been made of the principal, and to pay the costs.
(4) It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality in
the Philippine Islands. This suggestion, made with reference to an institution which antedates by
almost a thousand years any other personality in Europe, and which existed "when Grecian
eloquence still flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still worshiped in the temple of Mecca,"
does not require serious consideration. In the preamble to the budget relating to ecclesiastical
obligations, presented by Montero Rios to the Cortes on the 1st of October 1871, speaking of the
Roman Catholic Church, he says:
Persecuted as an unlawful association since the early days of its existence up to the time of
Galieno, who was the first of the Roman emperors to admit it among the juridicial entities
protected by the laws of the Empire, it existed until then by the mercy and will of the faithful
and depended for such existence upon pious gifts and offerings. Since the latter half of the third
century, and more particularly since the year 313, when Constantine, by the edict of Milan,
inaugurated an era of protection for the church, the latter gradually entered upon the exercise
of such rights as were required for the acquisition, preservation, and transmission of property
the same as any other juridical entity under the laws of the Empire. (3 Dictionary of Spanish
Administration, Alcubilla, p. 211. See also the royal order of the 4th of December, 1890, 3
Alcubilla, 189.)
While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa Torres de Villanueva, the wife of Vicente
Sixto Villanueva, appeared and alleged: (1) That on July 24, 1909, the latter was declared to be
insane by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila; (2) that she was appointed his guardian
by the same court; (3) that, on October 11, following, she was authorized by the court, as
guardian, to institute the proper legal proceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by
her husband while in a state of insanity, among them that concerned in the present cause, issued
in behalf of The Standard Oil Company of New York; (4) that she, the guardian, was not aware of
the proceedings had against her husband and was only by chance informed thereof; (5) that when
Vicente S. Villanueva gave the bond, the subject of this suit, he was already permanently insane,
was in that state when summoned and still continued so, for which reason he neither appeared
nor defended himself in the said litigation; and, in conclusion, she petitioned the court to relieve
the said defendant Villanueva from compliance with the aforestated judgment rendered against
him in the suit before mentioned, and to reopen the trial for the introduction of evidence in behalf
of the said defendant with respect to his capacity at the time of the execution of the bond in
question, which evidence could not be presented in due season on account of the then existing
incapacity of the defendant.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
After the expiration of twenty days from the date hereof let judgment be entered in accordance
herewith, and ten days thereafter the record be remanded to the court below for execution. So
ordered.
The court granted the petition and the trial was reopened for the introduction of evidence, after
due consideration of which, when taken, the court decided that when Vicente Villanueva, on the
15th of December, 1908, executed the bond in question, he understood perfectly well the nature
98
and consequences of the act performed by him and that the consent that was given by him for the
purpose was entirely voluntary and, consequently, valid and efficacious. As a result of such findings
the court ruled that the petition for an indefinite stay of execution of the judgment rendered in the
case be denied and that the said execution be carried out.
first of whom had visited him some eight times during the years 1902 and 1903, and the latter,
only once, in 1908.
Dr. Cuervo:
Q.
But if you should present to him a document which in no wise concerns his houses and if
you should direct him to read it, do you believe that he would understand the contents of the
document?
A.
As to understanding it, it is possible that he might, in this I see nothing particularly
remarkable; but afterwards, to decide upon the question involved, it might be that he could not
do that; it depends upon what the question was.
Dr. Ocampo:
Q.
Do you say that he is intelligent with respect to things other than those concerning
greatness?
A.
Yes, he reasons in matters which do not refer to the question of greatness and wealth.
Q.
He can take a written paper and read it and understand it, can he not?
A.
Read it, yes, he can read it and understand it, it is probable that he can, I have made no
trial.
Q.
Is he not a man of considerable intelligence, only with the exception of this monomania
of greatness and wealth?
A.
Of not much intelligence, an ordinary intelligence.
Q.
He knows how to read and write, does he not?
A.
Yes, sir I believe that he does.
After the filing of an exception to the above ruling, a new hearing was requested "with reference
to the defendant Vicente S. Villanueva" and, upon its denial, a bill of exceptions was presented in
support of the appeal submitted to this court and which is based on a single assignment of error
as follows:
Because the lower court found that the monomania of great wealth, suffered by the defendant
Villanueva, does not imply incapacity to execute a bond such as the one herein concerned.
Certainly the trial court founded its judgment on the basis of the medico-legal doctrine which
supports the conclusion that such monomania of wealth does not necessarily imply the result that
the defendant Villanueva was not a person capable of executing a contract of bond like the one
here in question.
This court has not found the proof of the error attributed to the judgment of the lower court. It
would have been necessary to show that such monomania was habitual and constituted a veritable
mental perturbation in the patient; that the bond executed by the defendant Villanueva was the
result of such monomania, and not the effect of any other cause, that is, that there was not, nor
could there have been any other cause for the contract than an ostentation of wealth and this
purely an effect of monomania of wealth; and that the monomania existed on the date when the
bond in question was executed.
Mr. F.B. Ingersoll, a witness for the plaintiff, testified that as a notary he had prepared the
instrument of bond and received the statements of the signers; that he explained to Mr. Villanueva
its contents and when the witness asked the latter whether he wished to sign it he replied that he
was willing and did in fact do so; that the defendant's mental condition appeared to the witness
to be normal and regular and that he observed nothing to indicate the contrary; and that the
defendant was quiet and composed and spoke in an ordinary way without giving cause fir any
suspicion that there was anything abnormal.
With regard to the first point: "All alienists and those writers who have treated of this branch of
medical science distinguish numerous degrees of insanity and imbecility, some of them, as Casper,
going so far into a wealth of classification and details as to admit the existence of 60 to 80 distinct
states, an enumeration of which is unnecessary. Hence, the confusion and the doubt in the minds
of the majority of the authors of treatises on the subject in determining the limits of sane judgment
and the point of beginning of this incapacity, there being some who consider as a sufficient cause
for such incapacity, not only insanity and imbecility, but even those other chronic diseases or
complaints that momentarily perturb or cloud the intelligence, as mere monomania,
somnambulism, epilepsy, drunkenness, suggestion, anger, and the divers passional states which
more or less violently deprive the human will of necessary liberty." (Manresa, Commentaries on
the Civil Code, Vol. V, p. 342.) In our present knowledge of the state of mental alienation such
certainly has not yet been reached as to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that he who
suffers the monomania of wealth, believing himself to be very wealthy when he is not, is really
insane and it is to be presumed, in the absence of a judicial declaration, that he acts under the
influence of a perturbed mind, or that his mind is deranged when he executes an onerous contract
.The bond, as aforesaid, was executed by Vicente S. Villanueva on December 15, 1908, and his
incapacity, for the purpose of providing a guardian for him, was not declared until July 24, 1909.
Honorable Judge Araullo testified as a witness for the plaintiff that while trying in the Court of First
Instance, over which he presided, the case concerning the estate of the Chinaman Go-Cho-Co,
and Mr. Villanueva having been proposed as a surety therein, the witness asked him some
questions about his property, in order to ascertain whether he was solvent and would be adequate
surety, and that Villanueva testified the same as many, others had done, and witness did not
notice any particular disorder or perturbation of his mental faculties; that he answered the
questions concerning the property that he held, stated its value, specified the place where it was
situated, his answers being precisely relevant to the matter treated; that he therefore approved
the bond; and that all this took place between July and September, 1908. This witness having
been asked, on cross-examination, whether Mr. Villanueva, subsequent to the date mentioned,
had again been surety in any other case, and whether it appeared strange to witness that Mr.
Villanueva should engage in giving bonds and whether for that reason he rejected this new bond,
replied that it was in that same case relative to the estate of the Chinaman Go-Cho-Co that he
endeavored to investigate, as he customarily did, with regard to whether Mr. Villanueva had given
any other previous bond, and the discovered that he had in fact previously given bond in a criminal
case, but that, as it had already been cancelled, he had no objection to accepting the one offered
by Mr. Villanueva in the said Go-Cho-Co case.
The trial court, although it conceded as a fact that the defendant had for several years suffered
from such monomania, decided, however, guided by the medico-legal doctrine above cited, that a
person's believing himself to be what he is not or his taking a mere illusion for a reality is not
necessarily a positive proof of insanity or incapacity to bind himself in a contract. Specifically, in
reference to this case, the following facts were brought out in the testimony given by the
physicians, Don Rudesino Cuervo and Don Gervasio de Ocampo, witnesses for the defendant, the
Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared
incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved, that
99
is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out his mind: which, in
the opinion of this court, has not been proved in this case.
up in the insane ward; to which Villanueva's wife replied "that her husband was not exactly
insane enough to be placed among the insane." This same lady, testifying as a witness in this
case, stated: that no restrictions had ever been placed upon her husband's liberty to go wherever
he wished and do what he liked; that her husband had property of his own and was not deprived
of its management; that he went out every morning without her knowing where he went; that she
did not know whether he had engaged in the business of signing bonds, and that, with reference
to the one now concerned, she had learned of it only by finding to note, before mentioned, wherein
Arenas invited him to a rendezvous on the benches in front of the Delmonico Hotel; that she had
not endeavored legally to deprive him of the management of his own real estate which had been
inherited by him, although he did not attend to the collection of the rents and the payment of the
land tax, all this being done by her, and she also it was who attended to the subsistence of the
family and to all their needs. Finally, and with direct reference to the point under discussion, she
was asked:
With regard to the second point, it is very obvious that in every contract there must be a
consideration to substantiate the obligation, so much so that, even though it should not be
expressed in the contract, it is presumed that it exists and that it is lawful, unless the debtor
proves the contrary. (Civil Code, art. 1277.) In the contract of bond the consideration, general, is
no other, as in all contract of pure beneficence, than the liberality of the benefactor. (Id, 1274.)
Out of the ordinary, a bond may be given for some other consideration, according to the agreement
and the free stipulation of the parties and may be, as in onerous and remuneratory contracts,
something remunerative stipulated as an equivalent, on the part of the beneficiary of the bond.
It is not clear as to the reason why Villanueva gave the bond in favor of the two members of the
firm of Arenas & Co., Francisco Lara, and Juan Arenas. Lara testified that he had never had dealings
with Villanueva; from which it is inferred that the latter could hardly have been moved to favor
the former by the benefit of an assumed obligation to pay him some three thousand pesos, with
monthly interest .But he added that Arenas & Co. obtained an agent to look for sureties for them,
to whom Arenas paid a certain sum of money. The witness did not know, however, whether Arenas
gave the money for the signature of the bond or simply in order that the agent might find sureties.
The fact is that the sureties came with the agent and signed the bond.
Q.
It is not true that, up to the date of his signing this bond, he used to go out of the house
and was on the streets nearly every day? to which she replied:
A.
He went where he pleased, he does this even now. He goes to the markets, and buys
provisions and other things. In fact I don't know where he goes go.
Q.
From his actions toward others, did he show any indication of not being sane when he
was on the street, according to your opinion?
A.
Half of Manila knows him and are informed of this fact and it is very strange that this
should have occurred. If you need witnesses to prove it, there are many people who can testify
in regard to this particular.
The appellant presented, as proof that Villanueva concealed from his family his dealings with
Arenas, a note by the latter addressed to his friend, Mr. Villanueva, on the 13th of May, 1909, that
is, two days before Villanueva was declared to be in default, inviting him to a conference "for the
purpose of treating of a matter of great importance of much interest to Villanueva, between 5 and
6 of that same day, in the garden and on the benches which are in front of the Delmonico Hotel,
on Calle Palacio, corner of Calle Victoria, and if rained, in the bar on the corner." It can not be
affirmed with certainty (the trial court considers it probable) that Villanueva engaged in the
business of giving bonds for a certain consideration or remuneration; but neither can it be
sustained that there was no other cause for the giving of the bond in question than the mental
disorder that dominated the intellect of the person obligated, to the extent of his believing himself
so oversupplied with money as to be able to risk it in behalf of any person whatever. There is no
proof that the said bond was merely the product of an insensate ostentation of wealth, nor that,
if Villanueva boasted of wealth in giving several bonds, among them that herein concerned, he
was influenced only by the monomania of boasting of being wealthy, when he was not.
The only incorrectness mentioned by this lady is that her husband, when he went to the market,
would return to the house with his pockets full of tomatoes and onions, and when she was asked
by the judge whether he was a man of frugal habits, she replied that, as far as she knew, he had
never squandered any large sum of money; that he had never been engaged in business; that he
supported himself on what she gave him; and that if he had something to count on for his living,
it was the product of his lands.
Such is a summary of the facts relating to the debated incapacity of the appellant, and it is very
evident that it can not be concluded therefrom that, on December 15, 1908, when Villanueva
subscribed the obligation now contested, he did not possess the necessary capacity to give efficient
consent with respect to the bond which he freely executed.
Neither is there any proof whatever with respect to the third point, that is, that, granting that he
was a monomaniac, he was dominated by that malady when he executed the bond now under
discussion. In the interpretative jurisprudence on this kind of incapacity, to wit, lunacy or insanity,
it is a rule of constant application that is not enough that there be more or less probability that a
person was in a state of dementia at a given time, if there is not direct proof that, at the date of
the performance of the act which it is endeavored to invalidate for want of capacity on the part of
the executor, the latter was insane or demented, in other words, that he could not, in the
performance of that act, give his conscious, free, voluntary, deliberate and intentional consent.
The witness who as physicians testified as to extravagancies observed in Villanueva's conduct,
referred, two of them, to a time prior to 1903, and another of them to the year 1908, but none to
December 15, 1908, the date of the execution of the bond sought to be invalidated. the testimony
of one of these witnesses shows that when Villanueva's wife endeavored, in 1908, to have her
husband confined in the Hospicio de San Jose and cared for therein, objection was made by the
director of the institution who advised her that if he entered in that way and lodged in the ward
for old men, as soon as he shouted and disturbed them in their sleep he would have to be locked
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. So ordered.
100
G.R. No. L-11872
December 1, 1917
and this amount being still insufficient the successively borrowed from said Luis Espiritu other
sums of money aggregating a total of P600; but that later, on May 17,1910, the plaintiffs, alleging
themselves to be of legal age, executed, with their sisters Maria del Consejo and Maria dela Paz,
the notarial instrument inserted integrally in the 5th paragraph of the answer, by which
instrument, ratifying said sale under pacto de retro of the land that had belonged to their mother
Margarita Espiritu, effected by their father Wenceslao Mercado in favor of Luis Espiritu for the sum
of P2,600, they sold absolutely and perpetually to said Luis Espiritu, in consideration of P400, the
property that had belonged to their deceased mother and which they acknowledged having
received from the aforementioned purchaser. In this cross-complaint the defendant alleged that
the complaint filed by the plaintiffs was unfounded and malicious, and that thereby losses and
damages in the sum of P1,000 had been caused to the intestate estate of the said Luis Espiritu.
He therefore asked that judgment be rendered by ordering the plaintiffs to keep perpetual silence
with respect to the land in litigation and, besides, to pay said intestate estate P1,000 for losses
and damages, and that the costs of the trial be charged against them.
DOMINGO
MERCADO
and
JOSEFA
MERCADO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu, defendantappellee.
TORRES, J.:
This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, filed by the counsel for the plaintiffs from the judgment of
September 22, 1914, in which the judge of the Seventh Judicial District dismissed the complaint
filed by the plaintiffs and ordered them to keep perpetual silence in regard to the litigated land,
and to pay the costs of the suit.
By a complaint dated April 9, 1913, counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu, but, as the latter died soon thereafter, the
complaint was amended by being directed against Jose Espiritu in his capacity of his administrator
of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu. The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters
Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado, were the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu,
a sister of the deceased Luis Espiritu; that Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as her
paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares in area situated in the barrio of Panducot,
municipality of Calumpit, Bulacan, and bounded as described in paragraph 4 of the amended
complaint, which hereditary portion had since then been held by the plaintiffs and their sisters,
through their father Wenceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita Espiritu; that, about the year 1910,
said Luis Espiritu, by means of cajolery, induced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting the
plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their mother, for
the sum of P400, which amount was divided among the two plaintiffs and their sisters Concepcion
and Paz, notwithstanding the fact that said land, according to its assessment, was valued at
P3,795; that one-half of the land in question belonged to Margarita Espiritu, and one-half of this
share, that is, one-fourth of said land , to the plaintiffs, and the other one-fourth, to their two
sisters Concepcion and Paz; that the part of the land belonging to the two plaintiffs could produce
180 cavanes of rice per annum, at P2.50 per cavan, was equivalent to P450 per annum; and that
Luis Espiritu had received said products from 1901 until the time of his death. Said counsel
therefore asked that judgment be rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to be null and void the
sale they made of their respective shares of their land, to Luis Espiritu, and that the defendant be
ordered to deliver and restore to the plaintiffs the shares of the land that fell to the latter in the
partition of the estate of their deceased mother Margarita Espiritu, together with the products
thereof, uncollected since 1901, or their equivalent, to wit, P450 per annum, and to pay the costs
of the suit.
In reply to the cross-complaint, the plaintiffs denied each and all of the facts therein set forth, and
in special defense alleged that at the time of the execution of the deed of sale inserted in the
cross-complaint the plaintiffs were still minors, and that since they reached their majority the four
years fixed by law for the annulment of said contract had not yet elapsed. They therefore asked
that they be absolved from the defendant's cross-complaint.
After trial and the introduction of evidence by both parties, the court rendered the judgment
aforementioned, to which the plaintiffs excepted and in writing moved for a reopening of the case
and a new trial. This motion was overruled, exception was taken by the petitioners, and the proper
bill of exceptions having been presented, the same was approved and transmitted to the clerk of
this court.
As the plaintiffs assailed the validity of the deed of sale, Exhibit 3, executed by them on May 17,
1910, on the ground that they were minors when they executed it, the questions submitted to the
decision of this court consist in determining whether it is true that the plaintiffs were then minors
and therefore incapable of selling their property on the date borne by the instrument Exhibit 3;
and in case they then were such, whether a person who is really and truly a minor and,
notwithstanding, attests that he is of legal age, can, after the execution of the deed and within
legal period, ask for the annulment of the instrument executed by him, because of some defect
that invalidates the contract, in accordance with the law (Civ. Code, arts. 1263 and 1300), so that
he may obtain the restitution of the land sold.
The records shows it to have been fully proven that in 1891 Lucas Espiritu obtained title by
composition with the State, to three parcels of land, adjoining each other, in the sitio of Panducot
of the pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, containing altogether an area of 75 hectares, 25 ares, and 59
centares, which facts appear in the title Exhibit D; that, upon Luis Espiritu's death, his said lands
passed by inheritance to his four children named Victoria, Ines, Margarita, and Luis; and that, in
the partition of said decedent's estate, the parcel of land described in the complaint as containing
forty-seven and odd hectares was allotted to the brother and sister Luis and Margarita, in equal
shares. Margarita Espiritu, married to Wenceslao Mercado y Ardeno Cruz, had by this husband five
children, Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, all surnamed Mercado y
Espiritu, who, at the death of their mother in 1896 inherited, by operation of law, one-half of the
land described in the complaint.
In due season the defendant administrator answered the aforementioned complaint, denying each
and all of the allegations therein contained, and in special defense alleged that the land, the
subject-matter of the complaint, had an area of only 21 cavanes of seed rice; that, on May 25,
1894, its owner, the deceased Margarita Espiritu y Yutoc, the plaintiffs' mother, with the due
authorization of her husband Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz sold to Luis Espiritu for the sum
of P2,000 a portion of said land, to wit, an area such as is usually required for fifteen cavanes of
seed; that subsequently, on May 14, 1901, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the plaintiffs'
father, in his capacity as administrator of the property of his children sold under pacto de retro to
the same Luis Espiritu at the price of P375 the remainder of the said land, to wit, an area covered
by six cavanes of seed to meet the expenses of the maintenance of his (Wenceslao's) children,
101
The plaintiffs' petition for annulment of the sale and the consequent restitution to them of twofourths of the land left by their mother, that is, of one-fourth of all the land described in the
complaint, and which, they stated, amounts to 11 hectares, 86 ares and 37 centares. To this claim
the defendant excepted, alleging that the land in question comprised only an area such as is
customarily covered by 21 cavanes of seed.
on May 17,1910, when the instrument of purchase and sale, Exhibit 3, was executed, the plaintiffs
must have been, respectively, 19 and 18 years of age.
The witness Maria Consejo Mercado also testified that after her father's death her brother and
sisters removed to Manila to live there, although her brother Domingo used to reside with his uncle
Luis Espiritu, who took charge of the administration of the property left by his predecessors in
interest; that it was her uncle Luis who got for her brother Domingo the other cedula, Exhibit B,
pertaining to the year 1910, where in it appears that the latter was then already 23 years of age;
that she did not know why her uncle did so; that she and her brother and sisters merely signed
the deed of May 17, 1910; and that her father Wenceslao Mercado, prior to his death had pledged
the land to her uncle Luis Espiritu.
It was also duly proven that, by a notarial instrument of May 25, 1894, the plaintiffs' mother
conveyed by actual and absolute sale for the sum of P2,000, to her brother Luis Espiritu a portion
of the land now on litigation, or an area such as is usually covered by about 15 cavanes of seed;
and that, on account of the loss of the original of said instrument, which was on the possession of
the purchaser Luis Espiritu, and furthermore because, during the revolution, the protocols or
registers of public documents of the Province of Bulacan were burned, Wenceslao Mercado y
Arnedo Cruz, the widower of the vendor and father of the plaintiffs, executed, at the instance of
the interested party Luis Espiritu, the notarial instrument Exhibit 1, of the date of May 20, 1901,
in his own name and those of his minor children Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo, Josefa,
and Amalia, and therein set forth that it was true that the sale of said portion of land had been
made by his aforementioned wife, then deceased, to Luis Espiritu in 1894.
The witness Ines Espiritu testified that after the death of the plaintiffs' father, it was Luis Espiritu
who directed the cultivation of the land in litigation. This testimony was corroborated by her sister
Victoria Espiritu, who added that her nephew, the plaintiff Domingo, had lived for some time, she
did not know just how long, under the control of Luis Espiritu.
Roque Galang, married to a sister of Luis Espiritu, stated that the land that fell to his wife and to
his sister-in-law Victoria, and which had an area of about 8 hectares less than that of the land
allotted to the aforementioned Luis and Margarita produced for his wife and his sister-in-law
Victoria a net and minimum yield of 507 cavanes in 1907, in spite of its being high land and of
inferior quality, as compared with the land in dispute, and that its yield was still larger in 1914,
when the said two sisters' share was 764 cavanes.
However, even prior to said date, to wit, on May 14th of the same year, 1901, the widower
Wenceslao Mercado, according to the private document Exhibit 2, pledged or mortgaged to the
same man, Luis Espiritu, for P375, a part, or an area covered by six cavanes of seed, of the land
that had belonged to this vendor's deceased wife, to the said Luis Espiritu and which now forms a
part of the land in question — a transaction which Mercado was obliged to make in order to obtain
funds with which "to cover his children's needs." Wenceslao Mercado, the plaintiffs' father, having
died, about the year 1904, the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa Mercado, together with their sisters
Consejo and Paz, declaring themselves to be of legal age and in possession of the required legal
status to contract, executed and subscribed before a notary the document Exhibit 3, on May 17,
1910, in which referring to the previous sale of the land, effected by their deceased mother for
the sum of P2,600 and with her husband's permission and authorization, they sold absolutely and
in perpetuity to Luis Espiritu, for the sum of P400 "as an increase" of the previous purchase price,
the land described in said instrument and situated in Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, of an
area equal to that usually sown with 21 cavanes of seed bounded on the north by the lands of
Flaviano Abreu and the heirs of Pedro Espiritu, on the east by those of Victoria Espiritu and Ines
Espiritu, on the south by those of Luis Espiritu, and on the west by those of Hermogenes Tan-Toco
and by the Sapang-Maitu stream.
Patricio Tanjucto, the notary before whom the deed Exhibit 3 was ratified, was a witness for the
defendant. He testified that this deed was drawn up by him at the request of the plaintiff Josefa
Mercado; that the grantors of the instrument assured him that they were all of legal age; that said
document was signed by the plaintiffs and the other contracting parties, after it had been read to
them and had been translated into the Pampangan dialect for those of them who did not
understand Spanish. On cross-examination, witness added that ever since he was 18 years of age
and began to court, he had known the plaintiff Josefa Mercado, who was then a young maiden,
although she had not yet commenced to attend social gatherings, and that all this took place about
the year 1898, for witness said that he was then [at the time of his testimony, 1914,] 34 years of
age.
Antonio Espiritu, 60 years of age, who knew Lucas Espiritu and the properties owned by the latter,
testified that Espiritu's land contained an area of 84 cavanes, and after its owner's death, was
under witness' administration during to harvest two harvest seasons; that the products yielded by
a portion of this land, to wit, an area such as is sown by about 15 cavanes of seed, had been,
since 1894, utilized by Luis Espiritu, by reason of his having acquired the land; and that, after
Margarita Espiritu's death, her husband Wenceslao Mercado took possession of another portion of
the land, containing an area of six cavanes of seed and which had been left by this deceased, and
that he held same until 1901, when he conveyed it to Luis Espiritu. lawphi1.net
In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the deed Exhibit 3, on the ground
that on the date of its execution they were minors without legal capacity to contract, and for the
further reason that the deceased purchaser Luis Espiritu availed himself of deceit and fraud in
obtaining their consent for the execution of said deed.
As it was proven by the testimony of the clerk of the parochial church of Apalit (plaintiffs were
born in Apalit) that the baptismal register books of that parish pertaining to the years 1890-1891,
were lost or burned, the witness Maria Consejo Mercado recognized and identified the book Exhibit
A, which she testified had been kept and taken care of by her deceased father Wenceslao Mercado,
pages 396 and 397 of which bear the attestation that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado was born on
August 4, 1890, and Josefa Mercado, on July 14, 1891. Furthermore, this witness corroborated
the averment of the plaintiffs' minority, by the personal registration certificate of said Domingo
Mercado, of the year 1914, Exhibit C, by which it appears that in 1910 he was only 23 years old,
whereby it would also be appear that Josefa Mercado was 22 years of age in 1910, and therefore,
The defendant-administrator, Jose Espiritu, son of the deceased Luis Espiritu, testified that the
plaintiff Domingo Mercado used to live off and on in the house of his deceased father, about the
year 1909 or 1910, and used to go back and forth between his father's house and those of his
other relatives. He denied that his father had at any time administered the property belonging to
the Mercado brother and sisters.
102
In rebuttal, Antonio Mercado, a cousin of Wenceslao, father of the plaintiffs, testified that he
mediate in several transactions in connection with a piece of land belonging to Margarita Espiritu.
When shown the deed of purchase and sale Exhibit 1, he stated that he was not acquainted with
its contents. This same witness also testified that he mediated in a transaction had between
Wenceslao Mercado and Luis Espiritu (he did not remember the year), in which the former sold to
the latter a parcel of land situated in Panducot. He stated that as he was a witness of the deed of
sale he could identify this instrument were it exhibited to him; but he did not do so, for no
instrument whatever was presented to him for identification. The transaction mentioned must have
concerned either the ratification of the sale of the land of 15 cavanes, in 1901, attested in Exhibit
1, or the mortgage or pledge of the other parcel of 6 cavanes, given on May 14, 1901, by
Wenceslao Mercado to Luis Espiritu, as may be seen by the private document Exhibit 2. In rebuttal,
the plaintiff Josefa Mercado denied having gone to the house of the notary Tanjutco for the purpose
of requesting him to draw up any document whatever. She stated that she saw the document
Exhibit 3 for the first time in the house of her uncle Luis Espiritu on the day she signed it, on which
occasion and while said document was being signed said notary was not present, nor were the
witnesses thereto whose names appear therein; and that she went to her said uncle's house,
because he had sent for her, as well as her brother and sisters, sending a carromata to fetch them.
Victoria Espiritu denied ever having been in the house of her brother. Luis Espiritu in company
with the plaintiffs, for the purpose of giving her consent to the execution of any deed in behalf of
her brother.
Considering the relation that exists between the document Exhibit 3 and those of previous dates,
Exhibits 1 and 2, and taking into the account the relationship between the contracting parties, and
also the general custom that prevails in many provinces of these Islands for the vendor or debtor
to obtain an increase in the price of the sale or of the pledge, or an increase in the amount loaned,
without proof to the contrary, it would be improper and illegal to hold, in view of the facts
hereinabove set forth, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu, now deceased, had any need to forge or
simulate the document Exhibit 3 inasmuch as, since May, 1894, he has held in the capacity of
owner by virtue of a prior acquisition, the parcel of land of 15 cavanes of seed, and likewise, since
May, 1901, according to the contract of mortgage or pledge, the parcel of 6 cavanes, or the
remainder of the total area of 21 cavanes.
So that Luis Espiritu was, during his lifetime, and now, after his death, his testate or intestate
estate is in lawful possession of the parcel of land situated in Panducot that contains 21 cavanes
of seed, by virtue of the title of conveyance of ownership of the land measuring 15 cavanes, and,
in consequence of the contract of pledge or mortgage in security for the sum of P600, is likewise
in lawful possession of the remainder of the land, or an area containing 6 cavanes of seed.
The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel of land, as its ownership
was conveyed to the purchaser by means of a singular title of purchase and sale; and as to the
other portion of 6 cavanes of seed, they could have redeemed it before May 17, 1910, upon the
payment or the return of the sum which their deceased father Wenceslao Mercado had, during his
lifetime, received as a loan under security of the pledged property; but, after the execution of the
document Exhibit 3, the creditor Luis Espiritu definitely acquired the ownership of said parcel of 6
cavanes. It is therefore a rash venture to attempt to recover this latter parcel by means of the
contract of final and absolute sale, set forth in the deed Exhibit 3.
The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even circumstantially, that the purchaser Luis
Espiritu employed fraud, deceit, violence, or intimidation, in order to effect the sale mentioned in
the document Exhibit 3, executed on May 17, 1910. In this document the vendors, the brother
and the sisters Domingo, Maria del Consejo, Paz and, Josefa surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, attested
the certainty of the previous sale which their mother, during her lifetime, had made in behalf of
said purchaser Luis Espiritu, her brother with the consent of her husband Wenceslao Mercado,
father of the vendors of the portion of land situated in the barrio of Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit,
Bulacan; and in consideration of the fact that the said vendor Luis Espiritu paid them, as an
increase, the sum of P400, by virtue of the contract made with him, they declare having sold to
him absolutely and in perpetuity said parcel of the land, waive and thenceforth any and all rights
they may have, inasmuch as said sum constitutes the just price of the property.
Moreover, the notarial document Exhibit 1, are regards the statements made therein, is of the
nature of a public document and is evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution and of the
date of the latter, even against a third person and his predecessors in interest such as are the
plaintiffs. (Civ. Code, art. 1218.)
The plaintiffs' father, Wenceslao Mercado, recognizing it to be perfectly true that his wife Margarita
Espiritu sold said parcel of land which she inherited from her father, of an area of about "15
cavanes of seed," to her brother Luis Espiritu, by means of an instrument executed by her on May
25,1894 — an instrument that disappeared or was burned — and likewise recognizing that the
protocols and register books belonging to the Province of Bulacan were destroyed as a result of
the past revolution, at the request of his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu he had no objection to give
the testimony recorded in said notarial instrument, as it was the truth regarding what had
occurred, and in so doing he acted as the plaintiffs' legitimate father in the exercise of his parental
authority, inasmuch as he had personal knowledge of said sale, he himself being the husband who
authorized said conveyance, notwithstanding that his testimony affected his children's interest and
prejudiced his own, as the owner of any fruits that might be produced by said real property.
So that said document Exhibit 3 is virtually an acknowledgment of the contract of sale of the parcel
or portion of land that would contain 15 cavanes of seed rice made by the vendors' mother in favor
of the purchaser Luis Espiritu, their uncle, and likewise an acknowledgment of the contract of
pledge or mortgage of the remainder of said land, an area of six cavanes, made with the same
purchaser, at an increase of P400 over the price of P2,600, making an aggregate sum of P3,000,
decomposed as follows: P2,000, collected during her lifetime, by the vendors' father; and the said
increase of P400, collected by the plaintiffs.
In the aforementioned sale, according to the deed of May 25, 1894, Margarita Espiritu conveyed
to her brother Luis the parcel of 15 cavanes of seed, Exhibit 1, and after her death the plaintiffs'
widowed father mortgaged or pledged the remaining parcel or portion of 6 cavanes of seed to her
brother-in-law, Luis Espiritu, in May, 1901 (Exhibit 2). So it is that the notarial instrument Exhibit
3, which was assailed by the plaintiffs, recognized the validity of the previous contracts, and the
totality of the land, consisting of an area containing 21 cavanes of seed rice, was sold absolutely
and in perpetuity, the vendors receiving in exchange P400 more; and there is no conclusive proof
in the record that this last document was false and simulated on account of the employment of
any violence, intimidation, fraud, or deceit, in the procuring of the consent of the vendors who
executed it.
The signature and handwriting of the document Exhibit 2 were identified as authentic by one of
the plaintiffs, Consejo Mercado, and as the record shows no evidence whatever that this document
is false, and it does not appear to have been assailed as such, and as it was signed by the plaintiffs'
father, there is no legal ground or well-founded reason why it should be rejected. It was therefore
properly admitted as evidence of the certainty of the facts therein set forth.
103
The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs to the document Exhibit 3 consists in that, on the
date of May 17, 1910, when it was executed that they signed it, they were minors, that is, they
had not yet attained the age of 21 years fixed by Act No. 1891, though no evidence appears in
the record that the plaintiffs Josefa and Domingo Mercado were in fact minors, for no certified
copies were presented of their baptismal certificates, nor did the plaintiffs adduce any
supplemental evidence whatever to prove that Domingo was actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of
age when they signed the document Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, inasmuch as the copybook,
Exhibit A, notwithstanding the testimony of the plaintiff Consejo Mercado, does not constitute
sufficient proof of the dates of births of the said Domingo and Josefa.
received and divided between themselves the sum of P400, which sum, added to that P2,000
received by Margarita Espiritu, and to that of the P600 collected by Wenceslao Mercado, widower
of the latter and father of the plaintiffs, makes all together the sum of P3,000, the amount paid
by the purchaser as the price of all the land containing 21 cavanes of seed, and is the just price
of the property, was not impugned, and, consequently, should be considered as equivalent to, and
compensatory for, the true value of said land.
For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from have been
refuted, and deeming said judgment to be in accordance with law and the evidence of record, we
should, and do hereby, affirm the same, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
However, even in the doubt whether they certainly were of legal age on the date referred to, it
cannot be gainsaid that in the document Exhibit 3 they stated that they were of legal age at the
time they executed and signed it, and on that account the sale mentioned in said notarial deed
Exhibit 3 is perfectly valid — a sale that is considered as limited solely to the parcel of land of 6
cavanes of seed, pledged by the deceased father of the plaintiffs in security for P600 received by
him as a loan from his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu, for the reason that the parcel of 15 cavanes
had been lawfully sold by its original owner, the plaintiffs' mother.
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate,
made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, and they will
not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them,
or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of the 6th Partida; and
the judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint
filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property, nor the juridical
rules established in consonance therewith. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain, of April 27,
1860, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.) itc@alf
With respect to the true age of the plaintiffs, no proof was adduced of the fact that it was Luis
Espiritu who took out Domingo Mercado's personal registration certificate on April 13, 1910,
causing the age of 23 years to be entered therein in order to corroborate the date of the notarial
instrument of May 17th of the same year; and the supposition that he did, would also allow it to
be supposed, in order to show the propriety of the claim, that the cedula Exhibit C was taken out
on February 14, 1914, where in it is recorded that Domingo Mercado was on that date 23 years of
age, for both these facts are not proved; neither was any proof adduced against the statement
made by the plaintiffs Domingo and Josefa in the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, that, on the date
when they executed it, they were already of legal age, and, besides the annotation contained in
the copybook Exhibit A, no supplemental proof of their true ages was introduced.
Aside from the foregoing, from a careful examination of the record in this case, it cannot be
concluded that the plaintiffs, who claim to have minors when they executed the notarial instrument
Exhibit 3, have suffered positive and actual losses and damages in their rights and interests as a
result of the execution of said document, inasmuch as the sale effected by the plaintiffs' mother,
Margarita Espiritu, in May, 1894, of the greater part of the land of 21 cavanes of seed, did not
occasion any damage or prejudice to the plaintiffs, inasmuch as their father stated in the document
Exhibit 2 that he was obliged to mortgage or pledge said remaining portion of the land in order to
secure the loan of the P375 furnished by Luis Espiritu and which was subsequently increased to
P600 so as to provide for certain engagements or perhaps to meet the needs of his children, the
plaintiff; and therefore, to judge from the statements made by their father himself, they received
through him, in exchange for the land of 6 cavanes of seed, which passed into the possession of
the creditor Luis Espiritu, the benefit which must have accrued to them from the sums of money
received as loans; and, finally, on the execution of the impugned document Exhibit 3, the plaintiffs
104
G.R. No. L-27710
January 30, 1928
In regard to the amount of money that the defendants allege to have given the plaintiff and her
son in 1992 as the price of the land, the preponderance of evidence shows that no amount was
given by the defendants to the alleged vendors in said year, but that the sum of P663.40, which
appears in the document Exhibit 1, is arrived at, approximately, by taking the P150 received by
Paula Prado and her husband in 1915 and adding thereto interest at the rate of 50 per cent annum,
then agreed upon, or P75 a year for seven years up to July 31, 1922, the sate of Exhibit 1.
ISIDRO
BAMBALAN
Y
PRADO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GERMAN MARAMBA and GENOVEVA MUERONG, defendants-appellants.
Pedro
C.
Quinto
Turner, Rheberg and Sanchez for defendants-appellants.
for
plaintiff-appellant.
The damages claimed by the plaintiff have not been sufficiently proven, because the witness Paula
Prado was the only one who testified thereto, whose testimony was contradicted by that of the
defendant Genoveva Muerong who, moreover, asserts that she possesses about half of the land
in question. There are, therefore, not sufficient data in the record to award the damages claimed
by the plaintiff.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The defendants admit in their amended answer those paragraphs of the complaint wherein it is
alleged that Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura was the owner, with Torrens title, of the land here in
question and that the plaintiff is the sole and universal heir of the said deceased Isidro Bambalan
y Colcotura, as regards the said land. This being so, the fundamental question to be resolved in
this case is whether or not the plaintiff sold the land in question to the defendants.
In view of the foregoing, the dispositive part of the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
without any express findings as to the costs in this instance. So ordered.
The defendants affirm they did and as proof of such transfer present document Exhibit 1, dated
July 17, 1922. The plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he signed said document, yet he did
so by intimidation made upon his mother Paula Prado by the defendant Genoveva Muerong, who
threatened the former with imprisonment. While the evidence on this particular point does not
decisively support the plaintiff's allegation, this document, however, is vitiated to the extent of
being void as regards the said plaintiff, for the reason that the latter, at the time he signed it, was
a minor, which is clearly shown by the record and it does not appear that it was his real intention
to sell the land in question.
What is deduced from the record is, that his mother Paula Prado and the latter's second husband
Vicente Lagera, having received a certain sum of money by way of a loan from Genoveva Muerong
in 1915 which, according to Exhibit 3, was P200 and according to the testimony of Paula Prado,
was P150, and Genoveva Muerong having learned later that the land within which was included
that described in said Exhibit 3, had a Torrens title issued in favor of the plaintiff's father, of which
the latter is the only heir and caused the plaintiff to sign a conveyance of the land.
At any rate, even supposing that the document in question, Exhibit 1, embodies all of the requisites
prescribed by law for its efficacy, yet it does not, according to the provisions of section 50 of Act
No. 496, bind the land and would only be a valid contract between the parties and as evidence of
authority to the register of deeds to make the proper registration, inasmuch as it is the registration
that gives validity to the transfer. Therefore, the defendants, by virtue of the document Exhibit 1
alone, did not acquire any right to the property sold as much less, if it is taken into consideration,
the vendor Isidro Bambalan y Prado, the herein plaintiff, was a minor.
As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs.
Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to be estopped from contesting the contract
executed by him pretending to be age, is not applicable herein. In the case now before us the
plaintiff did not pretend to be of age; his minority was well known to the purchaser, the defendant,
who was the one who purchased the plaintiff's first cedula used in the acknowledgment of the
document.
105
G.R. No. L-1720
March 4, 1950
SIA
SUAN
vs.
RAMON ALCANTARA, respondent.
and
GAW
The purchaser having been apprised of incapacity of his vendor shortly after the contract was
made, the delay in bringing the action of annulment will not serve to bar it unless the period
fixed by the statute of limitations expired before the filing of the complaint. . . . (Decision.)
CHIAO, petitioners,
In support of the contend that the deed of sale is binding on the appellee, counsel for the appellants
invokes the decision in Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein this court held:
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate,
made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when it fact they are not, is valid, and they will
not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them,
or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6 title 19, of the 6th Partida;
and the judgment that holds such a sale to valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint
filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of minors' property, nor the
juridical rules established in consonance therewith.
On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by Rufino Alcantara and his sons Damaso
Alcantara and Ramon Alcantara conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land. Ramon Alcantara was
then 17 years, 10 months and 22 days old. On August 27, 1931, Gaw Chiao (husband of Sia Suan)
received a letter from Francisco Alfonso, attorney of Ramon Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao that
Ramon Alcantara was a minor and accordingly disavowing the contract. After being contacted by
Gaw Chiao, however, Ramon Alcantara executed an affidavit in the office of Jose Gomez, attorney
of Gaw Chiao, wherein Ramon Alcantara ratified the deed of sale. On said occasion Ramon
Alcantara received from Gaw Chiao the sum of P500. In the meantime, Sia Suan sold one of the
lots to Nicolas Azores from whom Antonio Azores inherited the same.
The Court of Appeals has refused to apply this doctrine on the ground that the appellants did not
actually pay any amount in cash to the appellee and therefore did not suffer any detriment by
reason of the deed of sale, it being stipulated that the consideration therefore was a pre-existing
indebtedness of appellee's father, Rufino Alcantara. We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals
erred. In the first place, in the case cited, the consideration for sale consisted in greater part of
pre-existing obligation. In the second place, under the doctrine, to bind a minor who represents
himself to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long as
the contract is supported by a valid consideration. Since appellee's conveyance to the appellants
was admittedly for and in virtue of a pre-existing indebtedness (unquestionably a valid
consideration), it should produce its full force and effect in the absence of any other vice that may
legally invalidate the same. It is not here claimed that the deed of sale is null and void on any
ground other than the appellee's minority. Appellee's contract has become fully efficacious as a
contract executed by parties with full legal capacity.
On August 8, 1940, an action was instituted by Ramon Alcantara in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna for the annulment of the deed of sale as regards his undivided share in the two parcels of
land covered by certificates of title Nos. 751 and 752 of Laguna. Said action was against Sia Suan
and her husband Gaw Chiao, Antonio, Azores, Damaso Alcantara and Rufino Alcantara (the latter
two being, respectively, the brother and father of Ramon Alcantara appealed to the Court of
Appealed which reversed the decision of the trial court, on the ground that the deed of sale is not
binding against Ramon Alcantara in view of his minority on the date of its execution, and
accordingly sentenced Sia Suan to pay to Ramon Alcantara the sum of P1,750, with legal interest
from December 17, 1931, in lieu of his share in the lot sold to Antonio Azores (who was absolved
from the complaint), and to reconvey to Ramon Alcantara an undivided one-fourth interest in the
lot originally covered by certificate of title NO. 752 of Laguna plus the cost of the suit. From this
judgment Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao have come to us on appeal by certiorari.
The circumstance that, about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee informed
the appellants of his minority, is of no moment, because appellee's previous misrepresentation
had already estopped him from disavowing the contract. Said belated information merely leads to
the inference that the appellants in fact did not know that the appellee was a minor on the date
of the contract, and somewhat emphasizes appellee's had faith, when it is borne in mind that no
sooner had he given said information than he ratified his deed of sale upon receiving from the
appellants the sum of P500.
It is undeniable that the deed of sale signed by the appellee, Ramon Alcantara, On August 3, 1931,
showed that he, like his co-signers (father and brother), was then of legal age. It is not pretend
and there is nothing to indicate that the appellants did not believe and rely on such recital of fact.
This conclusion is decisive and very obvious in the decision of the Court of Appeals It is true that
in the resolution on the for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals remarked that "The fact that
when informed of appellant's minority, the appellees too no steps for nine years to protect their
interest beyond requiring the appellant to execute a ratification of the sale while still a minor,
strongly indicates that the appellees knew of his minority when the deed of sale was executed."
But the feeble insinuation is sufficiently negative by the following positive pronouncements of the
Court of Appeals as well in said resolution as in the decision.
Counsel for the appellees argues that the appellants could not have been misled as to the real age
of the appellee because they were free to make the necessary investigation. The suggestion, while
perhaps practicable, is conspicuously unbusinesslike and beside the point, because the findings of
the Court of Appeals do not show that the appellants knew or could suspected appellee's minority.
As to the complaint that the defendant is guilty of laches, suffice it to say that the appellees
were informed of his minority within one (1) month after the transaction was completed.
(Resolution.)
Finally, the appellees were equally negligent in not taking any action to protect their
interest form and after August 27, 1931, when they were notified in writing of appellant's
minority. (Resolution.)
. . . The fact remains that the appellees were advised within the month that appellant was a
minor, through the letter of Attorney Alfonso (Exhibit 1) informing appellees of his client's desire
to disaffirm the contract . . . (Decision.)
The Court of Appeals seems to be of the opinion that the letter written by the appellee informing
the appellants of his minority constituted an effective disaffirmance of the sale, and that although
the choice to disaffirm will not by itself avoid the contract until the courts adjudge the agreement
to be invalid, said notice shielded the appellee from laches and consequent estoppel. This position
is untenable since the effect of estoppel in proper cases is unaffected by the promptness with
which a notice to disaffirm is made.
The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and the appellants absolved from
the complaint, with costs against the appellee, Ramon Alcantara. So ordered.
106
G.R. No. L-12471
April 13, 1959
ROSARIO
L.
DE
BRAGANZA,
vs.
FERNANDO F. DE VILLA ABRILLE, respondent.
Oscar
M.
Herrera
R. P. Sarandi and F. Valdez Anama for respondents.
ET
for
. . . . Some authorities consider that a false representation as to age including a contract as part
of the contract and accordingly hold that it cannot be the basis of an action in tort. Other
authorities hold that such misrepresentation may be the basis of such an action, on the theory
that such misrepresentation is not a part of, and does not grow out of, the contract, or that the
enforcement of liability for such misrepresentation as tort does not constitute an indirect of
enforcing liability on the contract. In order to hold infant liable, however, the fraud must be
actual and not constructure. It has been held that his mere silence when making a contract as
to age does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of decit. (Emphasis
Ours.)
AL., petitioners,
petitioners.
BENGZON, J.:
The fraud of which an infant may be held liable to one who contracts with him in the belief that
he is of full age must be actual not constructive, and mere failure of the infant to disclose his
age is not sufficient. (27 American Jurisprudence, p. 819.)
Rosario L. de Braganza and her sons Rodolfo and Guillermo petition for review of the Court of
Appeal's decision whereby they were required solidarily to pay Fernando F. de Villa Abrille the sum
of P10,000 plus 2 % interest from October 30, 1944.
The Mecado case1 cited in the decision under review is different because the document signed
therein by the minor specifically stated he was of age; here Exhibit A contained no such statement.
In other words, in the Mercado case, the minor was guilty of active misrepresentation; whereas in
this case, if the minors were guilty at all, which we doubt it is of passive (or constructive)
misrepresentation. Indeed, there is a growing sentiment in favor of limiting the scope of the
application of the Mercado ruling, what with the consideration that the very minority which
incapacitated from contracting should likewise exempt them from the results of misrepresentation.
The above petitioners, it appears, received from Villa Abrille, as a loan, on October 30, 1944
P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof, promised in writing (Exhibit A) to pay
him P10,000 "in legal currency of the P. I. two years after the cessation of the present hostilities
or as soon as International Exchange has been established in the Philippines", plus 2 % per annum.
Because payment had not been made, Villa Abrille sued them in March 1949.
We hold, on this point, that being minors, Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza could not be legally
bound by their signatures in Exhibit A.
In their answer before the Manila court of first Instance, defendants claimed to have received
P40,000 only — instead of P70,000 as plaintiff asserted. They also averred that Guillermo and
Rodolfo were minors when they signed the promissory note Exhibit A. After hearing the parties
and their evidence, said court rendered judgment, which the appellate court affirmed, in the terms
above described.
It is argued, nevertheless, by respondent that inasmuch as this defense was interposed only in
1951, and inasmuch as Rodolfo reached the age of majority in 1947, it was too late to invoke it
because more than 4 years had elapsed after he had become emancipated upon reaching the age
of majority. The provisions of Article 1301 of the Civil Code are quoted to the effect that "an action
to annul a contract by reason of majority must be filed within 4 years" after the minor has reached
majority age. The parties do not specify the exact date of Rodolfo's birth. It is undenied, however,
that in October 1944, he was 18 years old. On the basis of such datum, it should be held that in
October 1947, he was 21 years old, and in October 1951, he was 25 years old. So that when this
defense was interposed in June 1951, four years had not yet completely elapsed from October
1947.
There can be no question about the responsibility of Mrs. Rosario L. Braganza because the minority
of her consigners note release her from liability; since it is a personal defense of the minors.
However, such defense will benefit her to the extent of the shares for which such minors may be
responsible, (Art. 1148, Civil Code). It is not denied that at the time of signing Exhibit A, Guillermo
and Rodolfo Braganza were minors-16 and 18 respectively. However, the Court of Appeals found
them liable pursuant to the following reasoning:
. . . . These two appellants did not make it appears in the promissory note that they were not
yet of legal age. If they were really to their creditor, they should have appraised him on their
incapacity, and if the former, in spite of the information relative to their age, parted with his
money, then he should be contended with the consequence of his act. But, that was not the
case. Perhaps defendants in their desire to acquire much needed money, they readily and
willingly signed the promissory note, without disclosing the legal impediment with respect to
Guillermo and Rodolfo. When minor, like in the instant case, pretended to be of legal age, in fact
they were not, they will not later on be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of
the obligation contracted by them or to have it annulled. (Mercado, et al. vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil.,
215.) [Emphasis Ours.]
Furthermore, there is reason to doubt the pertinency of the 4-years period fixed by Article 1301
of the Civil Code where minority is set up only as a defense to an action, without the minors asking
for any positive relief from the contract. For one thing, they have not filed in this case an action for
annulment.2 They merely interposed an excuse from liability.
Upon the other hand, these minors may not be entirely absolved from monetary responsibility. In
accordance with the provisions of Civil Code, even if their written contact is unenforceable because
of non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they have profited by the money they
received. (Art. 1340) There is testimony that the funds delivered to them by Villa Abrille were used
for their support during the Japanese occupation. Such being the case, it is but fair to hold that
they had profited to the extent of the value of such money, which value has been authoritatively
established in the so-called Ballantine Schedule: in October 1944, P40.00 Japanese notes were
equivalent to P1 of current Philippine money.
We cannot agree to above conclusion. From the minors' failure to disclose their minority in the
same promissory note they signed, it does not follow as a legal proposition, that they will not be
permitted thereafter to assert it. They had no juridical duty to disclose their inability. In fact,
according to Corpuz Juris Secundum, 43 p. 206;
107
Wherefore, as the share of these minors was 2/3 of P70,000 of P46,666.66, they should now
return P1,166.67.3 Their promise to pay P10,000 in Philippine currency, (Exhibit A) can not be
enforced, as already stated, since they were minors incapable of binding themselves. Their liability,
to repeat, is presently declared without regard of said Exhibit A, but solely in pursuance of Article
1304 of the Civil Code.
G.R. Nos. L-9471 and L-9472
March 13, 1914
Accordingly, the appealed decision should be modified in the sense that Rosario Braganza shall
pay 1/3 of P10,000 i.e., P3,333.334 plus 2% interest from October 1944; and Rodolfo and
Guillermo Braganza shall pay jointly5 to the same creditor the total amount of P1,166.67 plus 6%
interest beginning March 7, 1949, when the complaint was filed. No costs in this instance.
The appellant, Evaristo Vaquilar, was charged in two separate informations with parricide, in one
for the killing of his wife and in the other for the killing of his daughter. He was sentenced to life
imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs, to the accessory penalties, and to the payment of the costs
in each case. From this judgment he appealed. The two cases have been submitted to this court
together.
THE
UNITED
vs.
EVARISTO VAQUILAR, defendant-appellant.
STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
The appellant in these two cases was proven to have killed his wife and daughter in the manner
charged and to have wounded other persons with a bolo. The commission of these crimes is not
denied. The defendant did not testify but several witnesses were introduced in his behalf, testifying
that the defendant appeared to them to be insane at and subsequent to the commission of the
crimes. they also testified that he had been complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to
the killing.
Our attention has been directed to the following testimony: Martin Agustin, witness for the
prosecution, testified that he heard the appellant, his uncle, making a noise, and that he refused
into the house and saw the appellant kill his wife and daughter; that he was cut by the appellant;
that there "were seven, including the small boys and girls who were cut by him;" that he did not
know of any disagreement between the appellant and the two deceased; that on the morning
before she was killed that the appellant had 'felt pains in his head and stomach." The witness
further stated that the appellant's "eyes were very big and red and his sight penetrating" at the
time he was killing his wife and daughter, and that "according to my own eyes as he looked at me
he was crazy because if he was not crazy he would not have killed his family — his wife and child."
Diego Agustin, a witness for the defense, testified that he helped Martin Agustin capture the
appellant; that the appellant "himself used to say before that time he had felt pains in the head
and the stomach;" that at the moment he was cutting those people " he looked like a madman;
crazy because he would cut everybody at random without paying any attention to who it was."
Alejandra Vaquilar, the appellant's sister, testified that her brother had headache and stomach
trouble about five days prior to the commission of the crimes; that "he looked very sad at the
time, but I saw him run downstairs and then he pursued me;" and that "he must have been crazy
because he cut me."
Estanislao Canaria, who was a prisoner confined in the same jail with the appellant, testified that
he had observed the appellant about five months and that sometimes "his head is not all right;"
that "oftentimes since he came to the jail when he is sent for something he goes back he does
without saying anything, even if he comes back he does not say anything at all;" that when the
appellant returns from work he does not say a word; and that about every other night he, the
appellant, cries aloud, saying, "What kind of people are you to me, what are you doing to me, you
are beasts."
The health officer who examined the two deceased and the other wounded parties found that the
appellant's wife had five mortal wounds on the head, besides several other wounds on her hands;
108
and that the daughter's skull was split "through and through from one side to the other." The
witness stated that he made a slight examination of the defendant in the jail and that he did not
notice whether defendant in the jail and that he did not notice whether defendant was suffering
from any mental derangement or not.
Although there have been decisions to the contrary, it is now well settled that mere mental
depravity, or moral insanity, so called, which results, not from any disease of mind, but from a
perverted condition of the moral system, where the person is mentally sense, does not exempt
one from responsibility for crimes committed under its influence. Care must be taken to
distinguish between mere moral insanity or mental depravity and irresistable impulse resulting
from disease of the mind.
There is vast different between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such a
frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. Persons who get
into a quarrel of fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An extremely angry man,
often, if not always, acts like a madman. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that
he is insane. The popular meaning of the word "crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms
"insane," "non compos mentis," "unsound mind," "idiot," or "lunatic." In this case as before
indicated, one witness testified that "according to my own eyes as he looked at me he was crazy
because if he was not crazy he would not have killed his family." That witness' conception of the
word "crazy" evidently is the doing of some act by a person which an ordinarily rational person
would not think of doing. Another witness testified that "he looked like a madman; crazy, because
he would cut everybody at random without paying any attention to who it was." It is not at all
unnatural for a murderer, caught in the act of killing his wife and child, to fly into a passion and
strike promiscuously at those who attempt to capture him. The appellant's sister said "he must
have been crazy because he cut me." This is another illustration of the popular conception of the
word "crazy," it being thus used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary.
In the case of United States vs. Carmona (18 Phil. Rep., 62), the defendant was convicted of the
crime of lesiones graves. The defendant's counsel, without raising any question as to the actual
commission of the alleged acts, or the allegation that the accused committed them, confined
himself to the statement, in behalf of his client, that on the night of the crime the defendant was
sick with fever and out of his mind and that in one of his paroxysms he committed the said acts,
wounding his wife and the other members of her family, without any motives whatever. In the
decision in that case this court stated:
In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or became demented a few
moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal
condition of mind. It is improper to conclude that he acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him
from responsibility on the ground of exceptional mental condition, unless his insanity and
absence of will are proven.
Regarding the burden of proof in cases where insanity is pleaded in defense of criminal actions,
we quote as follows from State vs. Bunny (24 S. C., 439; 58 Am. Rep., 262, 265):
But as the usual condition of men is that of sanity, there is a presumption that the accused is
sane, which certainly in the first instance affords proof of the fact. (State vs. Coleman, 20 S. C.,
454.) If the killing and nothing more appears, this presumption, without other proof upon the
point of sanity, is sufficiently to support a conviction and as the State must prove every element
of the crime charged "beyond a reasonable doubt," it follows that this presumption affords such
proof. This presumption however may be overthrow. It may be shown on the part of the accused
that the criminal intent did not exist at the time the act was committed. This being exceptional
is a defense, and like other defenses must be made out by the party claiming the benefit of it.
"The positive existence of that degree and kind of insanity that shall work a dispensation to the
prisoner in the case of established homicide is a fact to be proved as it s affirmed by him."
The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail as described by his fellow prisoner is not
inconsistent with the actions of a sane person. The reflection and remorse which would follow the
commission of such deeds as those committed by the appellant might be sufficient to cause the
person to cry out, "What kind of people are you to me; what are you doing to me; you are beast,"
and yet such conduct could not be sufficient to show that the person was insane at the time the
deeds were committed.
In People vs. Mortimer (48 Mich., 37; 11 N. W., 776), the defendant was indicated for an assault
with intent to murder. The defense attempted to prove "a mental condition which would involved
no guilt." The supreme court on appeal in this decision distinguished between passion and insanity
as follows:
But passion and insanity are very different things, and whatever indulgence the law may extend
to persons under provocation, it does not treat them as freed from criminal responsibility. Those
who have not lost control of their reason by mental unsoundness are bound to control their
tempers and restrain their persons, and are liable to the law if they do not. Where persons allow
their anger to lead them so far as to make them reckless, the fact that they have become at last
too infuriated to keep them from mischief is merely the result of not applying restraint in season.
There would be no safety for society if people could with impunity lash themselves into fury, and
then to desperate acts of violence. That condition which springs from undisciplined and unbridled
passion is clearly within legal as well as moral censure and punishment.
What then is necessary to make out this defense? It surely cannot be sufficient merely to allege
insanity to put his sanity "in issue." That is merely a pleading, a denial, and ineffectual without
proof. In order to make not such defense, as it seems to us, sufficient proof must be shown to
overcome in the first place the presumption of sanity and then any other proof that may be
offered.
In the case of State vs. Stickley (41 Iowa, 232), the court said (syllabus):
One who, possession of a sound mind, commits a criminal act under the impulse of passion or
revenge, which way temporarily dethrone reason and for the moment control the will, cannot
nevertheless be shield from the consequences of the act by the plea of insanity. Insanity will
only excuse the commission of a criminal act, when it is made affirmatively to appear that the
person committing it was insane, and that the offense was the direct consequences of his
insanity.
In People vs. Foy (138 N. Y., 664), the court sad: "The court very properly continued with an
explanation to the jury that 'the heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred,
or revenge, is not insanity. The law holds the doer of the act, under such conditions, responsible
for the crime, because a large share of homicides committed are occasioned by just such motives
as these.' "
The appellant's conduct, as appears from the record, being consistent with the acts of an enlarged criminal, and
it not having been satisfactorily, shown that he was of unsound mind at the time he committed the crimes, and
the facts charged in each information having been proven, and the penalty imposed being in accordance with the
law, the judgments appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
The Encyclopedia of Law and Procedure (vol. 12, p. 170), cites many cases on the subject of anger
and emotional insanity and sums up those decisions in the following concise statement:
109
G.R. No. L-54135 November 21, 1991
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
vs.
POLICARPIO RAFANAN, JR., defendant-appellant.
while he went to fetch the accused. The accused was later brought to the police headquarter
with the bolo, Exhibit "E", which the accused allegedly used in threatening the complainant. 1
plaintiff-appellee,
At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial and in due
course of time, the trial court, as already noted, convicted the appellant.
The instant appeal is anchored on the following:
FELICIANO, J.:
Assignment of Errors
Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
convicting him of the crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
complainant Estelita Ronaya in the amount of P10,000.00 by way of moral damages, and to pay
the costs.
1. The lower court erred in basing its decision of conviction of appellant solely on the testimony
of the complainant and her mother.
2. The lower court erred in considering the hearsay evidence for the prosecution, "Exhibits B and
C".
3. The lower court erred in not believing the testimony of the expert witnesses, as to the mental
condition of the accused-appellant at the time of the alleged commission of the crime of rape.
4. The lower court erred in convicting appellant who at the time of the alleged rape was suffering
from insanity. 2
The facts were summarized by the trial court in the following manner:
The prosecution's evidence shows that on February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita Ronaya who
was then only fourteen years old was hired as a househelper by the mother of the accused, Ines
Rafanan alias "Baket Ines" with a salary of P30.00 a month.
Appellant first assails the credibility of complainant as well as of her mother whose testimonies he
contends are contradictory. It is claimed by appellant that the testimony of complainant on direct
examination that she immediately went home after the rape incident, is at variance with her
testimony on cross examination to the effect that she had stayed in the house of appellant until
the following day. Complainant, in saying that she left the house of appellant by herself, is also
alleged to have contradicted her mother who stated that she (the mother) went to the store in the
evening of 17 March 1979 and brought Estelita home.
The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same house at
Barangay San Nicholas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was then married and had two children.
On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother of the
accused to help in their store which was located in front of their house about six (6) meters
away. Attending to the store at the time was the accused. At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the
accused called the complainant to help him close the door of the store and as the latter complied
and went near him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the store and said, "Come, let us
have sexual intercourse," to which Estelita replied, "I do not like," and struggled to free herself
and cried. The accused held a bolo measuring 1-1/2 feet including the handle which he pointed
to the throat of the complainant threatening her with said bolo should she resist. Then, he forced
her to lie down on a bamboo bed, removed her pants and after unfastening the zipper of his own
pants, went on top of complainant and succeeded having carnal knowledge of her inspite of her
resistance and struggle. After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not
to report the matter to her mother or anybody in the house, otherwise he would kill her.
The apparently inconsistent statements made by complainant were clarified by her on cross
examination. In any case, the inconsistencies related to minor and inconsequential details which
do not touch upon the manner in which the crime had been committed and therefore did not in
any way impair the credibility of the complainant. 3
The commission of the came was not seriously disputed by appellant. The testimony of
complainant in this respect is clear and convincing:
Fiscal Guillermo:
Q Now, we go back to that time when according to you the accused pulled you from the door
and brought you inside the store after you helped him closed the store. Now, after the accused
pulled you from the door and brought you inside the store what happened then?
A "You come and we will have sexual intercourse," he said.
Q And what did you say?
A "I do not like," I said.
Q And what did you do, if any, when you said you do not like to have sexual intercourse with
him?
A I struggled and cried.
Q What did the accused do after that?
A He got a knife and pointed it at my throat so I was frightened and he could do what he wanted
to do. He was able to do what he wanted to do.
Q This "kutsilyo" you were referring to or knife, how big is that knife? Will you please
demonstrate, if any?
A This length, sir. (Which parties agreed to be about one and one-half [1-1/2] feet long.)
xxx
xxx
xxx
Fiscal Guillermo:
Because of fear, the complainant did not immediately report the matter and did not leave the
house of the accused that same evening. In fact, she slept in the house of the accused that
evening and the following morning she scrubbed the floor and did her daily routine work in the
house. She only left the house in the evening of March 17, 1976.
Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned what happened
the night before in the store between Policarpio and Estelita and a quarrel ensued among them
prompting Estelita Ronaya to go back to her house. When Estelita's mother confronted her and
asked her why she went home that evening, the complainant could not answer but cried and
cried. It was only the following morning on March 18, 1976 that the complainant told her mother
that she was raped by the accused. Upon knowing what happened to her daughter, the mother
Alejandra Ronaya, immediately accompanied her to the house of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina of
the Villasis Police Force who lives in Barrio San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Patrolman Mairina
is a cousin of the father of the complainant. He advised them to proceed to the municipal building
110
Q Now, you said that the accused was able to have sexual intercourse with you after he placed
the bolo or that knife [at] your throat. Now, will you please tell the court what did the accused
do immediately after placing that bolo your throat and before having sexual intercourse you?
A He had sexual intercourse with me.
Q What was your wearing apparel that evening?
A I was wearing pants, sir.
Q Aside from the pants, do you have any underwear?
A Yes, sir, I have a panty.
Q Now, before the accused have sexual intercourse with you what, if any, did he do with respect
to your pants and your panty?
A He removed them, sir.
Q Now, while he was removing your pants and your panty what, if any, did you do?
A I continued to struggle so that he could not remove my pants but he was stronger that's why
he succeeded.
Q Now, after he had removed your panty and your pants or pantsuit what else happened?
A He went on top of me, sir.
Q At the time what was the accused wearing by way of apparel?
A He was wearing pants.
Q When you said he went on top of you after he has removed your pantsuit and your panty, was
he still wearing his pants?
A He unbuttoned his pants and unfastened the zipper of his pants.
Q And after he unbuttoned and unfastened his pants what did you see which he opened?
A I saw his penis.
Q Now, you said that after the accused has unzipped his pants and brought out his penis which
you saw, he went on top of you. When he was already on top of you what did you do, if any?
A I struggled.
Q Now, you said that you struggled. What happened then when you struggled against the
accused when he was on top of you?
A Since he was stronger, he succeeded doing what he wanted to get.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q After that where did you go?
A I went home already, sir. 4
The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal aberration characterized
as schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. At the urging of his counsel,
the trial court suspended the trial and ordered appellant confined at the National Mental Hospital
in Mandaluyong for observation and treatment. In the meantime, the case was archived. Appellant
was admitted into the hospital on 29 December 1976 and stayed there until 26 June 1978.
During his confinement, the hospital prepared four (4) clinical reports on the mental and physical
condition of the appellant, all signed by Dr. Simplicio N. Masikip and Dr. Arturo E. Nerit, physicianin-charge and chief, Forensic Psychiatry Service, respectively.
In the first report dated 27 January 1977, the following observations concerning appellant's mental
condition were set forth:
On admission he was sluggish in movements, indifferent to interview, would just look up
whenever questioned but refused to answer.
On subsequent examinations and observations he was carelessly attired, with dishevelled hair,
would stare vacuously through the window, or look at people around him. He was indifferent and
when questioned, he would just smile inappropriately. He refused to verbalize, even when
persuaded, and was emotionally dull and mentally inaccessible. He is generally seclusive, at
times would pace the floor, seemingly in deep thought. Later on when questioned his frequent
answers are "Aywan ko, hindi ko alam." His affect is dull, he claimed to hear strange voices
"parang ibon, tinig ng ibon," but cannot elaborate. He is disoriented to 3 spheres and has no
idea why he was brought here.
The report then concluded:
In view of the foregoing examinations and observations, Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is
found suffering from a mental disorder called schizophrenia, manifested by carelessness in
grooming, sluggishness in movements, staring vacuously, indifferen[ce], smiling
inappropriately, refusal to verbalize, emotional dullness, mental inaccessibility, seclusiveness,
preoccupation, disorientation, and perceptual aberrations of hearing strange sounds. He is
psychotic or insane, hence cannot stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and
treatment. 5
COURT:
Alright, what do you mean by he was able to succeed in what he wanted to get?
Fiscal Guillermo:
Considering the condition of the witness, your honor, with tears, may we just be allowed to ask
a leading question which is a follow-up question?
Witness:
A He inserted his private part inside my vagina.
Fiscal Guillermo:
Q Now, when he inserted his private part inside your vagina what did you feel, if any?
A I felt something that came out from his inside.
Q Now, how long, if you remember, did the accused have his penis inside your vagina:?
A Around five minutes maybe, sir.
Q After that what happened then?
A He removed it.
Q After the accused has removed his penis from your vagina what else happened?
A No more, sir, he sat down.
Q What, if any, did he tell you?
A There was, sir. He told me not to report the matter to my
mother and to anybody in their house.
Q What else did he tell you?
A He told me that if I told anyone what happened, he will kill me.
The second report, dated 21 June 1977, contained the following description of appellant's mental
condition:
At present he is still seclusive, undertalkative and retarded in his reponses. There is dullness of
his affect and he appeared preoccupied. He is observed to mumble alone by himself and would
show periods of being irritable saying — "oki naman" with nobody in particular. He claim he does
not know whether or not he was placed in jail and does not know if he has a case in court. Said
he does not remember having committed any wrong act
and the following conclusions:
111
In view of the foregoing examinations and observations Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is
at present time still psychotic or insane, manifested by periods of irritability — cursing nobody
in particular, seclusive, underactive, undertalkative, retarded in his response, dullness of his
affect, mumbles alone by himself, preoccupied and lack of insight.
April 9, 1872; 6 Jur. Crim. 239) For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the
time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom
of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. (Decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 20, 1911; 86 Jur. Crim. 94, 97.)
He is not yet in a condition to stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and
treatment. 6
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be [equated with]
imbecility or insanity.
In the third report, dated 5 October 1977, appellant was described as having become "better
behaved, responsive" and "neat in person," and "adequate in his emotional tone, in touch with his
surroundings and . . . free from hallucinatory experiences." During the preceding period, appellant
had been allowed to leave the hospital temporarily; he stayed with a relative in Manila while
coming periodically to the hospital for check-ups. During this period, he was said to have been
helpful in the doing of household chores, conversed and as freely with other members of the
household and slept well, although, occasionally, appellant smiled while alone. Appellant
complained that at times he heard voices of small children, talking in a language he could not
understand. The report concluded by saying that while appellant had improved in his mental
condition, he was not yet in a position to stand trial since he needed further treatment, medication
and check-ups. 7
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that
the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during
the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts
penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person
acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition,
unless his insanity and absence of will are proved. (Emphasis supplied.)
The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases. 11 A linguistic
or grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones established two (2)
distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition — "complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the [criminal] act," and (b) the test of volition — "or that there be a total deprivation
freedom of the will." But our caselaw shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than
on a test relating to "freedom of the will;" examination of our caselaw has failed to turn up any
case where this Court has exempted an accused on the sole ground that he was totally deprived
of "freedom of the will," i.e., without an accompanying "complete deprivation of intelligence." This
is perhaps to be expected since a person's volition naturally reaches out only towards that which
is presented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. In
any case, where the accused failed to show complete impairment or loss of intelligence, the Court
has recognized at most a mitigating, not an exempting, circumstance in accord with Article 13(9)
of the Revised Penal Code: "Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the willpower of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts." 12
In the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as behaved, helpful in household
chores and no longer talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly groomed" and "oriented" and
as denying having hallucinations. The report concluded that he was in a "much improved condition"
and "in a mental condition to stand court trial." 8
Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who suggested that
appellant was sick one or two years before his admission into the hospital, in effect implying that
appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia when he raped complainant. 9 The defense
next presented Raquel Jovellano, a psychiatrist engaged in private practice, who testified that she
had examined and treated the appellant.
Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized
by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations
and delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is said to be the most common form of
psychosis an usually develops between the ages 15 and 30. 13 A standard textbook in psychiatry
describes some of the symptoms of schizophrenia in the following manner:
Appellant's plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. —
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a
felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first
obtaining the permission of the same court.
Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms of schizophrenia: a disturbance
of association, a disturbance of affect, and a disturbance of activity. Bleuler also stressed the
dereistic attitude of the schizophrenic — that is, his detachment from reality and consequent
autism and the ambivalence that expresses itself in his uncertain affectivity and initiative. Thus,
Bleuler's system of schizophrenia is often referred to as the four A's: association, affect, autism,
and ambivalence.
Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense, it was only in People
vs. Formigones 10 that the Court elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity, quoting
extensively from the Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the Revised Penal Code, thus:
Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia that he considered
in no way specific for the disease but of great pragmatic value in making a diagnosis. Schneider's
first-rank symptoms include the hearing of one's thoughts spoken aloud, auditory hallucinations
that comment on the patient's behavior, somatic hallucinations, the experience of having one's
thoughts controlled, the spreading of one's thoughts to others, delusions, and the experience of
having one's actions controlled or influenced from the outside.
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken
into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his
own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain
of November 21, 1891; 47 Jur. Crim. 413.) that there be a complete absence of the power to
discern, (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 29, 1916; 96 Jur. Crim. 239) or that
there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
112
Schizophrenia, Schneider pointed out, also can be diagnosed exclusively on the basis of secondrank symptoms, along with an otherwise typical clinical appearances. Second-rank symptoms
include other forms of hallucination, perplexity, depressive and euphoric disorders of affect, and
emotional blunting.
Q Now, this condition of the accused schizophrenic as you found him, would you say doctor
that he was completely devoid of any consciousness of whatever he did in connection with the
incident in this case?
A He is not completely devoid of consciousness.
Q Would you say doctor, therefore, that he was conscious of threatening the victim at the time
of the commission of the alleged rape?
A Yes, he was conscious.
Q And he was conscious of forcing the victim to lie down?
A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious of removing the panty of the victim at the time?
A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious and knows that the victim has a vagina upon which he will place
his penis?
A Yeah.
Q And he was conscious enough to be competent and have an erection?
A Yes.
Q Would you say that those acts of a person no matter whether he is schizophrenic which you
said, it deals (sic) some kind of intelligence and consciousness of some acts that is committed?
A Yes, it involves the consciousness because the consciousness there in relation to the act is
what we call primitive acts of any individual. The difference only in the act of an insane and a
normal individual, a normal individual will use the power of reasoning and consciousness within
the standard of society while an insane causes (sic) already devoid of the fact that he could
no longer withstand himself in the ordinary environment, yet his acts are within the bound of
insanity or psychosis.
Q Now, Doctor, of course this person suffering that ailment which you said the accused here
is suffering is capable of planning the commission of a rape?
A Yes, they are also capable.
Q He is capable of laying in wait in order to assault?
A Yes.
Q And would you say that condition that ability of a person to plan a rape and to perform all
the acts preparatory to the actual intercourse could be done by an insane person?
A Yes, it could be done.
Q Now, you are talking of insanity in its broadest sense, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, is this insane person also capable of knowing what is right and what is wrong?
A Well, there is no weakness on that part of the individual. They may know what is wrong but
yet there is no inhibition on the individual.
Q Yes, but actually, they are mentally equipped with knowledge that an act they are going to
commit is wrong?
A Yeah, they are equipped but the difference is, there is what we call they lost the inhibition.
The reasoning is weak and yet they understand but the volition is [not] there, the drive is [not]
there. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
Perceptual Disorders
Various perceptual disorders occur in schizophrenia . . . .
Hallucinations. Sensory experiences or perceptions without corresponding external stimuli are
common symptoms of schizophrenia. Most common are auditory hallucinations, or the hearing
of voices. Most characteristically, two or more voices talk about the patient, discussing him in
the third person. Frequently, the voices address the patient, comment on what he is doing and
what is going on around him, or are threatening or obscene and very disturbing to the patient.
Many schizophrenic patients experience the hearing of their own thoughts. When they are
reading silently, for example, they may be quite disturbed by hearing every word they are
reading clearly spoken to them.
Visual hallucinations occur less frequently than auditory hallucinations in schizophrenic patients,
but they are not rare. Patients suffering from organic of affective psychoses experience visual
hallucinations primarily at night or during limited periods of the day, but schizophrenic patients
hallucinate as much during the day as they do during the night, sometimes almost continuously.
They get relief only in sleep. When visual occur in schizophrenia, they are usually seen nearby,
clearly defined, in color, life size, in three dimensions, and moving. Visual hallucinations almost
never in one of the other sensory modalities.
Cognitive Disorders
Delusions. By definition, delusions are false ideas that cannot be corrected by reasoning, and
that are idiosyncratic for the patient — that is, not part of his cultural environment. They are
among the common symptoms of schizophrenia.
Most frequent are delusions of persecution, which are the key symptom in the paranoid type of
schizophrenia. The conviction of being controlled by some unseen mysterious power that
exercises its influence from a distance is almost pathognomonic for schizophrenia. It occurs in
most, if not all, schizophrenics at one time or another, and for many it is a daily experience. The
modern schizophrenic whose delusions have kept up with the scientific times may be preoccupied
with atomic power, X-rays, or spaceships that take control over his mind and body. Also typical
for many schizophrenics are delusional fantasies about the destruction of the world. 14
it has mostly been rejected by the
Court. In each of these cases, the evidence presented tended to show that if there was impairment
of the mental faculties, such impairment was not so complete as to deprive the accused of
intelligence or the consciousness of his acts.
In previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting circumtance, 15
The above testimony, in substance, negates complete destruction of intelligence at the time of
commission of the act charged which, in the current state of our caselaw, is critical if the defense
of insanity is to be sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with
death should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the
Court, that Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault. The defense
sought to suggest, through Dr. Jovellano's last two (2) answers above, that person suffering from
schizophrenia sustains not only impairment of the mental faculties but also deprivation of there
power self-control. We do not believe that Dr. Jovellano's testimony, by itself, sufficiently
The facts of the instant case exhibit much the same situation. Dr. Jovellano declared as follows:
(Fiscal Guillermo:)
113
demonstrated the truth of that proposition. In any case, as already pointed out, it is complete loss
of intelligence which must be shown if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found.
G.R. No. 100710 September 3, 1991
BENJAMIN
P.
ABELLA, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL, respondents.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving
his affirmative allegation of insanity. 17 Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing
evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita.
It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period
immediately before or at the very moment the act is committed. 18 Appellant rested his case on
the testimonies of two (2) physicians (Dr. Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not purport
to characterize his mental condition during that critical period of time. They did not specifically
relate to circumtances occurring on or immediately before the day of the rape. Their testimonies
consisted of broad statements based on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with
schizophrenia. Curiously, while it was Dr. Masikip who had actually observed and examined
appellant during his confinement at the National Mental Hospital, the defense chose to present Dr.
Nerit.
G.R. No. 100739 September 3, 1991
ADELINA
Y.
LARRAZABAL, petitioner,
vs.
COMMSSION ON ELECTIONS and SILVESTRE DE LA CRUZ, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan.
The main issue in these consolidated petitions centers on who is the rightful governor of the
province of Leyte 1) petitioner Adelina Larrazabal (G.R. No. 100739) who obtained the highest
number of votes in the local elections of February 1, 1988 and was proclaimed as the duly elected
governor but who was later declared by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) "... to lack both
residence and registration qualifications for the position of Governor of Leyte as provided by Art.
X, Section 12, Philippine Constitution in relation to Title II, Chapter I, Sec. 42, B.P. Blg. 137 and
Sec. 89, R.A. No. 179 and is hereby disqualified as such Governor"; 2) petitioner Benjamin Abella
(G.R. No. 100710), who obtained the second highest number of votes for the position of governor
but was not allowed by the COMELEC to be proclaimed as governor after the disqualification of
Larrazabal; or 3) Leopoldo E. Petilla, the vice-governor of the province of. Leyte.
In People vs. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction, although not exempting
because it does not completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of his acts, may be
considered as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., as an
illness which diminishes the exercise of the offender's will-power without, however, depriving him
of the consciousness of his acts. Appellant should have been credited with this mitigating
circumstance, although it would not have affected the penalty imposable upon him under Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code: "in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty
(reclusion perpetua in this case), it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed."
This is the fourth time that the controversy relating to the local elections in February 1, 1988 for
governor of the province of Leyte is elevated to this Court. The antecedent facts of these cases
are stated in the earlier consolidated cases of BENJAMIN P. ABELLA and SILVESTRE T. DE LA CRUZ,
petitioners, v. ADELINA INDAY LARRAZABAL, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF LEYTE and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents (G.R. Nos. 87721-30) and BENJAMN P. ABELLA and
SILVESTRE T. DE LA CRUZ, petitioners v. ADELINA LARRAZABAL and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents (G. R. No. 88004) 180 SCRA 509 [1989]), to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the amount of moral
damages is increased to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant.
The Court has ordered the consolidation of G.R. Nos 87721-30 and G.R. No. 88004 involving the
same parties and the same election in 1988 for the office of provincial governor of Leyte.
Challenged in the petitions for certiorari are the resolutions of the respondent Commission on
Elections dismissing the pre-proclamation and disqualification cases filed by the herein
petitioners against private respondent Adelina Larrazabal.
Petitioner Benjamin P. Abella was the official candidate of the Liberal Party for provincial
governor of Leyte in the local election held on February 1, 1988. The private respondent is the
wife of Emeterio V. Larrazabal, the original candidate of the Lakas ng Bansa-PDP-Laban who was
disqualified by the Commission on Elections on January 18, 1988, for lack of residence. (G.R.
No. 88004, Rollo, pp. 102-104) (He filed a petition for certiorari to challenge this resolution. He,
however, filed an urgent ex-parte motion to withdraw petition which was granted in a resolution
dated January 21, 1988 and the case was dismissed. [G.R. No. 81313]) On January 31, 1988,
the day before the election, she filed her own certificate of candidacy in substitution of her
husband. (Ibid., p. 48) The following day, at about 9:30 o'clock in the morning, Silvestre de la
Cruz, a registered voter of Tacloban City, filed a petition with the provincial election supervisor
114
of Leyte to disqualify her for alleged false statements in her certificate of candidacy regarding
her residence. (Id., pp. 113-118) This was immediately transmitted to the main office of the
Commission on Elections, which could not function, however, because all but one of its members
had not yet been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. De la Cruz then came to this
Court, which issued a temporary restraining order on February 4, 1988, enjoining the provincial
board of canvassers of Leyte 'from proclaiming Adelina Larrazabal as the winning candidate for
the Office of the Governor in the province of Leyte, in the event that she obtains the winning
margin of votes in the canvass of election returns of said province.' (Id., p. 179) On March 1,
1988, the Commission on Elections having been fully constituted, we remanded the petition
thereto for appropriate action, including maintenance or lifting of the Court's temporary
restraining order of February 4, 1988. (Id. pp. 182-184)
The parties are enjoined to resolve this case with all possible speed, to the end that the Governor
of Leyte may be ascertained and installed without further delay. (p. 520)
In view of these rulings, the COMELEC, upon motion of Larrazabal, lifted its temporary restraining
order against her proclamation paving Larrazabal's proclamation and her assumption to the Office
of Governor of Leyte while the hearings in the disqualification case (SPC No. 88-546) continued.
On February 14, 1991, the second division in a 2-1 vote rendered a decision disqualifying
Larrazabal as governor.
On July 18, 1991, the Commission en banc issued a resolution which denied Larrazabal's motion
to declare decision void and/or motion for reconsideration and affirmed the second division's
decision. In the same resolution, the Commission disallowed Abella's proclamation as governor of
Leyte.
In the meantime, petitioner Abella, after raising various verbal objections (later duly reduced to
writing) during the canvass of the election returns, seasonably elevated them to the Commission
on Elections in ten separate appeals docketed as SPC Nos. 88-627 to 88627-I. Pending resolution
of these cases, Abella intervened on March 7, 1988 in the disqualification case, docketed as SPC
No. 88-546, and the following day filed a complaint, with the Law Department of the COMELEC
charging the private respondent with falsification and misrepresentation of her residence in her
certificate of candidacy. On March 22, 1988, the public respondent consolidated the preproclamation and disqualification cases with the Second Division.
Hence, these petitions.
We treat the various Comments as Answers and decide the petitions on their merits.
Acting on a most urgent petition (motion) for the issuance of a restraining order filed by petitioner
Larrazabal, this Court issued a temporary restraining order on August 1, 1991.
On February 3, 1989, this Division unanimously upheld virtually all the challenged rulings of the
provincial board of canvassers, mostly on the ground that the objection raised were merely
formal and did not affect the validity of the returns or the ballots, and ordered the proclamation
of the winner after completion of the canvass. (G.R. Nos. 87721-30, Rollo, pp. 18-50) On that
same date, the disqualification case was also dismissed by a 2-1 decision, and the matter was
referred to the Law Department for 'preliminary investigation for possible violation of Section 74
of the Omnibus Election Code. ' (G.R. Nos. 88004, Rollo, pp. 26-40)
... [E]ffective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering the
respondent on on Elections to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing, implementing and executing
the decision and resolution, respectively dated February 14, 1991 and July 18, 1991.
The motion for reconsideration of the resolution on the pre-proclamation cases was denied by
the COMELEC en banc on April 13, 1989, with no dissenting vote. (G.R. Nos. 87721-30, Rollo,
pp. 51-56) These cases are the subject of G.R. Nos. 87721-30, where we issued on April 18,
1989, another temporary restraining order to the provincial board of canvassers of Leyte to
CEASE and DESIST from resuming the canvass of the contested returns and/or from proclaiming
private respondent Adelina Larrazabal Governor of Leyte.
It appearing that despite the filing of this petition before this Court and during its pendency, the
incumbent Vice-Governor of Leyte Hon. Leopoldo E. Petilla, took his oath as Provincial Governor
of Leyte and assumed the governorship as contained in his telegraphic message, pursuant to
COMELEC resolution SPC No. 88-546, promulgated on July 18, 1991, the Court further Resolved
to ORDER Hon. Leopoldo E. Petilla to MAINTAIN the status quo ante then prevailing and/or
existing before the filing of this petition and to DESIST from assuming the office of the Governor
and from discharging the duties and functions thereof. (Rollo-100739, p. 204)
The motion for reconsideration of the resolution on the qualification case was also denied by the
COMELEC en banc on May 4, 1989, but with three commissioners dissenting. (G.R. No. 88004,
Rollo, pp 47-61; penned by Commissioner Abueg, Jr., with Commissioners Africa Rama, and
Yorac, dissenting) The dismissal of this case is the subject of G.R. No. 88004. (at pp. 511-513)
In G.R. No. 100739, petitioner Larrazabal professes that the COMELEC completely disregarded our
pronouncement in G.R. No. 88004 in that instead of acting on SPC Case No. 88-546 under section
78 of the Election Code, the COMELEC proceeded with a disqualification case not contemplated in
G.R. No. 88004.
The argument is not meritorious.
Disposing of the consolidated petitions, this Court rendered judgment as follows:
1. In G.R.Nos. 87721-30, the decision dated February 3, 1989, the resolution dated April 13,
1989, are affirmed and the petition is DISMISSED.
2. In G.R. No. 88004, the decision dated February 3,1989, and the resolution dated May 4, 1989,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Commission on Elections is ORDERED to directly
hear and decide SPC Case No. 88-546 under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, with
authority to maintain or lift our temporary restraining order of April 18, 1989, according to its
own assessment of the evidence against the private respondent.
The questioned decision and resolution of the COMELEC conform with this Court's decision in G.R.
No. 88004.
Initially, herein respondent Silvestre T. de la Cruz (Benjamin P. Abella, petitioner in G.R. No.
100710 was allowed to intervene in the case) filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify
petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented
her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact
115
a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same
office. The COMELEC dismissed the petition and referred the case to its Law Department for proper
action on the ground that the petition was a violation of Section 74 of the Election Code and,
pursuant to it rules, should be prosecuted as an election offense under Section 262 of the Code.
registered voter in the province, as required by Title II, Chapter I, Section 42, B.P. Blg. 337, in
relation to Article X, Section 12 of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 42. Qualification. — (1) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay,
municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected, a resident therein for at least
one year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write
English, Pilipino, or any other local language or dialect.
This Court reversed and set aside the COMELEC's ruling, to wit:
The Court holds that the dismissal was improper. The issue of residence having been squarely
raised before it, it should not have been shunted aside to the Law Department for a roundabout
investigation of the private respondent's qualification through the filing of a criminal prosecution,
if found to be warranted, with resultant disqualification of the accused in case of conviction. The
COMELEC should have opted for a more direct and speedy process available under the law,
considering the vital public interest involved and the necessity of resolving the question of the
earliest possible time for the benefit of the inhabitants of Leyte.
Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose
charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of
the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such
prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
The position of petitioners De la Cruz and Abena was that respondent Larrazabal is neither a
resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte as she claimed but a resident and registered
voter of Ormoc City, a component city of the province of Leyte but independent of the province
pursuant to Section 12, Article X of the Constitution thereby disqualifying her for the position of
governor of Leyte. They presented testimonial as well as documentary evidence to prove their
stance.
In the view of the Court, the pertinent provision is Section 78 in relation to Section 6 of R.A. No.
6646.
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
On the other hand, respondent Larrazabal maintained that she was a resident and a registered
voter of Kananga, Leyte. She, too presented testimonial as well as documentary evidence to prove
her stand.
Section 6 of R.A. 6646 states as follows:
The COMELEC ruled against the respondent, now petitioner Larrazabal.
Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he
is voted in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during
the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong. ...
In its questioned decision and resolution, the COMELEC found that petitioner Larrazabal was
neither a resident of Kananga, Leyte nor a registered voter thereat. With these findings, the
COMELEC disqualified the petitioner as governor of the province of Leyte.
The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is erroneous when it relied on the
provisions of the Family Code to rule that the petitioner lacks the required residence to qualify her
to run for the position of governor of Leyte. She opines that under "the Election Law, the matter
of determination of the RESIDENCE is more on the principle of INTENTION, the animus revertendi
rather than anything else."
The above-stressed circumstances should explain the necessity for continuing the investigation
of the private respondent's challenged disqualification even after the election notwithstanding
that such matter is usually resolved before the election. Independently of these circumstances,
such proceedings are allowed by Section 6 of RA. 6646 if for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified ...
In this regard she states that ... "her subsequent physical transfer of residence to Ormoc City
thereafter, did not necessarily erased (sic) or removed her Kananga residence, for as long as she
had the ANIMUS REVERTENDI evidenced by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in
the course of the years, although she had physically resided at Ormoc City." (Petition, Rollo, p.
40)
In fine, the Court directed the COMELEC to determine the residence qualification of petitioner
Larrazabal in SPC Case No. 88-546. Concomitant with this directive would be the disqualification
of petitioner Larrazabal in the event that substantial evidence is adduced that she really lacks the
residence provided by law to qualify her to run for the position of governor in Leyte.
As can be gleaned from the questioned decision, the COMELEC based its finding that the petitioner
lacks the required residence on the evidence of record to the effect that despite protestations to
the contrary made by the petitioner, she has established her residence at Ormoc City from 1975
to the present and not at Kananga, Leyte. Her attempt to purportedly change her residence one
year before the election by registering at Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to ran for the position of
governor of the province of Leyte clearly shows that she considers herself already a resident of
In line with the Court's directive, the COMELEC conducted hearings in SPC Case No. 88-546 to
resolve the qualification of Larrazabal on the basis of two (2) legal issues raised by Silvestre T. de
la Cruz namely, Larrazabal's lack of legal residence in the province of Leyte and her not being a
116
Ormoc City. In the absence of any evidence to prove otherwise, the reliance on the provisions of
the Family Code was proper and in consonance with human experience. The petitioner did not
present evidence to show that she and her husband maintain separate residences, she at Kananga,
Leyte and her husband at Ormoc City. The second division of the COMELEC in its decision dated
February 14, 1991 states:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court
shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should
live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
But there is the more fundamental issue of residence. The only indications of a change of
residence so far as respondent is concerned are: the address indicated in the application for
cancellation filed by respondent indicating her postal address as Kananga, Leyte, the annotation
in her Voter's affidavit for Precinct No. 15 that her registration was cancelled due to lack of
residence; the testimony of Anastacia Dasigan Mangbanag that she entered into a contract of
lease with option to buy with the spouses Emeterio and Inday Larrazabal over two parcels of
land the witness owned in Mahawan, Kananga, Leyte; that she sees the spouses in the leased
house in Kananga, that she was informed by Inday Larrazabal that the spouses had decided to
buy their property because she wanted to beautify the house for their residence. She attached
as annex the written contract signed by her and the spouses; and the testimony of Adolfo
Larrazabal Exh. "10" cousin of the spouses that 'at a family meeting ... the political plan of the
Larrazabal clan was discussed, among which were (sic) the problem of Terry's residence in
Ormoc City' and that it was decided in said meeting ... that Inday Larrazabal, wife of Terry, will
transfer her Ormoc Registration as a voter to Kananga, Leyte (so) she will be able to vote for
Terry and also help me in my candidacy; that they have been staying in Kananga, very often as
they have properties in Lonoy and a house in Mahawan.
Husband and wife as a matter of principle live together in one legal residence which is their usual
place of abode. (COMELEC decision, pp. 21-23; Rollo – 100710, pp. 67-69; Emphsis supplied)
As regards the principle of ANIMUS REVERTENDI we ruled in the case of Faypon v. Quirino, 96
Phil. 294 [1954]):
... [M]ere absence from one's residence or origin-domicile-to pursue studies, engage in business,
or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.'
... The determination of a persons legal residence or domicile largely depends upon intention
which may be inferred from his acts, activities and utterances. The party who claims that a
person has abandoned or left his residence or origin must show and prove pre-ponderantly such
abandonment or loss.
... A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for 'greener pastures' as the saying goes, to
improve his life, and that, of course, includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or
engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve
his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business
reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from the place of his professional
or business activities; so there he registers as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and
is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the
government especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to
his home, to his domicile or residence of origin, has not forsaken him. ... (at pp. 297-300)
The references to residence in the documents of cancellation and registration are already
assessed for their evidentiary value in relation to the documents themselves above. The question
must therefore be addressed in relation to the testimony of Anastacia Dasigan Mangbanag and
Adolfo V. Larrazabal. The gist of the testimonies is that they leased properties in Mahawan, Leyte
and that they are seen in the house on the land leased. But the contract of lease with option to
purchase itself indicates as to where the legal residence of the Jarrazabal is. The pertinent portion
states:
In the instant case, there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner temporarily left her residence
in Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any calling, profession or business. What is clear is that she
established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers herself a resident therein.
The intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her residence in Kananga, Leyte therefor, is
nor present. The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the years does not signify
an intention to continue her residence therein. It is common among us Filipinos to often visit places
where we formerly resided specially so when we have left friends and relatives therein although
for intents and purposes we have already transferred our residence to other places.
SPS EMETERIO V. LARRAZABAL AND ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL, both of legal age, Filipino,
and residents of Ormoc City, Philippines, hereinafter referred to as the LESSEES.
The acknowledgment also indicates that Emeterio V. Larrazabal presented his Residence
Certificate No. 155774914 issued in Ormoc City.
The testimony of Adolfo Larrazabal reenforces this conclusion. It admits, as of the second or
third week of November, that the residence of Emeterio Larrazabal was Ormoc City and that
Inday Larrazabal was going to transfer her registration so she may be able to vote for him.
Anent the issue of whether or not the petitioner is a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, the
petitioner insists that she is such a registered voter based on the following antecedents: 1) She
cancelled her registration in Ormoc City on November 25, 1987, and 2) she then transferred her
registration to Kananga, Leyte on November 25, 1987 by registering thereat and 3) she later voted
on election day (February 1, 1988) in Kananga, Leyte.
For the purpose of running for public office, the residence requirement should be read as legal
residence or domicile, not any place where a party may have properties and may visit from time
to time.
The Civil Code is clear that '[F]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations,
the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence.
Despite the insistence of the petitioner, the evidence shows that her supposed cancellation of
registration in Ormoc City and transfer of registration in Kananga, Leyte, is not supported by the
records. As the COMELEC stated:
Arts. 68 and 69 of the Family Code, E.O. No. 209 also provide as follows:
117
The train of events, which led to respondent's g of her certificate of candidacy on the basis of
her registration started on November 25, 1987, when she allegedly filed all application for
cancellation of registration Exh. "2-B". Subsequent to this request, her voter's affidavit in
Precinct 15, Ormoc City with Serial No. 0918394 J was annotated with the words 'cancelled upon
application of the voter due to transfer of residence.' Thereafter, she registered in Precinct No.
17, Mahawan, Kananga, Leyte on November 28,1987 which registration was contained in Voter's
Affidavit with Serial No. 0190840-J The cancellation of registration was submitted to the Board
of Election Inspectors on January 9, 1988 (Revision Day) on the submission of the sworn
application at 4:30 p.m. allegedly by a clerk from the Election Registrar's Office with only the
poll clerk and the third member because the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors
allegedly left earlier and did not come back. Exh. "3-B".
We find the version pressed by respondent unworthy of belief. The story is marked by so many
bizarre cirumtances not consistent with the ordinary course of events or the natural behavior of
persons. Among these are:
the list of new voters after the November 28, 1987 for Precinct No. 17, Mahawan, Kananga,
Leyte submitted by the Election of Kananga to the National Central File of the Commission per
certification of the Chief, National Central File Division on January 25, 1988 dated January 25,
1988, Exh. 'C'. The affidavits submitted by the Election Registrar to the Commission could only
have come from the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 17, after the November 28,
1987 registration, for the Election Registrar could not have had the affidavits of these new
registrants apart from those supplied by the Precinct itself. Why were not the affidavits of the
Larrazabals included? Was this part of the incredibly bizarre series of inadvertence and neglect
that spanned Ormoc City and Kananga? This also explains the certification dated January 29,
1988, of the Election Registrar of Kananga that as of that date Mrs. Adelina Larrazabal was not
a registered voter in any of the' precincts in Kananga. Exh. "L". It was only on February 15,
1988, or two weeks after the election day that the same Registrar certified for the first time that
there were two voters lists, the first without the names of the Larrazabals and the second, which
appeared only after February 1, submitted by the Chairman of the Board for Precinct 17 which
contained the spouses Larrazabals' names.
(1) The application for cancellation of registration by respondent Adelina Y. Larrazabal happened
to be misplaced by a clerk in the Election Registrar's Office for Ormoc City so it was not sent to
the Board of Election Inspectors in a sealed envelope;
It might also be stressed that one set of voter's list Exh. "G" had the signature of both the
Chairman, poll clerk and third member of the board, while the one which appeared later which
included the names of the Larrazabal had the signature only of the Chairman. Exh. "I".
(2) The 'inadverterment' (sic) misplacement was discovered only on January 9,1988;
From the certification of the National Central Files, it appears that the Serial Nos. of the newly
registered voters were as follows: 0189821-J 018922-J 0189823-J 0189824-J 0189825-J
0189826-J 0189827-J 0189828-J 0189839-J The alleged registration of Emeterio V. Larrazabal
and Adelina Y. Larrazabal are inexplicably effected through voter's affidavits with Serial Nos.
0190893J and 01 90840-J. These serial numbers are traced per record of the Commission to
Precinct No. 6, municipality of Kananga, Leyte. Per official Project of precincts on file with the
Commission, Precinct No. 6 is a poblacion precinct located in Kananga, Municipal High School
Building. How these documents came to be used in Precinct No. 17 in Barangay Mahawan and
only by the Larrazabals has never been explained.
(3) The voter's affidavit was delivered by itself without any endorsement or covering letter from
the Election Registrar or anybody else;
(4) The election clerk delivered the application for cancellation only towards the last hour of the
revision day, allegedly at 4:30 P.M., January 9, 1988;
(5) All the members of the Board of Election Inspectors had already signed the Minutes indicating
that no revision of the voter's list was made as of 5:00 PM
It also takes a lot of straining to believe the story about the effort to cancel registration on
November 25, 1987, which application surfaced before the Board of Election inspectors for
Precinct No. 15, Ormoc City only on January 9, 1988, Revision Day. As pointed out by Petitioner,
it is absurd that it would only be on Revision Day, normally set aside for the purpose of receiving
inclusion and exclusion orders from the courts, that the application for cancellation would be
coincidentally found and delivered to the Board of Election Inspectors for Precinct 15.
Furthermore, the entire membership of the Board of Inspectors for said precinct, signed a
Minutes, Exh. "3-A" which indicates that no order of inclusion or exclusion was received from
any court and that the board proceeded with the numbering of a total 229 voters for the precinct.
The Minutes also indicates that the Board adjourned at 5:00 p.m. Exh. "3-B" which was
supposedly prepared after Exh. "3-A" signed only by the poll clerk and third member indicates
that at 4:30 P.M. an unidentified clerk from the Election Registrar's Office arrived with the
application for cancellation of Vilma Manzano and Adelina Larrazabal.
(6) The poll clerk and the third member prepared another minutes stating that the election clerk
had delivered the application for cancellation at 4:30 P.M. without any reference to the minutes
they had previously signed;
(7) Emeterio Larrazabal, who was supposed to have registered in Precinct 17, Mahawan,
Kananga, was supposed to have filled up an application for cancellation of his registration in
Precinct No. 15, Ormoc City at Precinct 17 concurrent with his registration. His application for
cancellation was never submitted in evidence.
(8) The serial number of the voter's affidavits of the spouses Larrazabal in Precinct No. 17 are
far removed from the serial numbers of the other new registrants in November 28, 1987 in the
same precinct.
It also appears that on November 28, 1987, the Board of Election Inspectors for Precinct 15,
Ormoc City prepared the list of voters for said precinct, Exh. 'N' where the name of Adelina Y.
Larrazabal appears as voter No. 96 and Emeterio V. Larrazabal is listed as Voter No. 98. At the
back of the list there is a certification that there was no voter which was included by court order
and that to voters, one Montero and one Salvame were excluded by virtue of such order. As of
January 29, 1988, when the certified true copy of the Voter's List for Precinct 15 was furnished
the petitioner, no additional entry was reflected on the list which would show what transpired on
The most telling evidence is the list of voters (Form 2-A), Exh. "G", that the Chairman and the
poll clerk had written in Part II of the same, closed by the signatures of both officials showing
that there were only nine (9) additional registered voters in Precinct 17, Mahawan, Kananga,
Leyte, namely, Bantasan, Merly; Conie; Limosnero Anita; Limosnero W; Pame Virginia;
Savenario, Analiza; Verallo, Ofelia; Basan, Juanita; and Acgang Bonifacio. This is consistent with
118
January 9, 1988, as alleged by the Election Registrar for Ormoc City and the poll clerk and third
member of the board of inspectors that a cancellation was effected. It taxes credulity therefore,
to lend belief to Exh. "2-C", when was issued by the City Registrar for Ormoc only on February
1, 1990, which for the first time showed handwritten annotations of cancellation of the
registration of Adelina Larrazabal and Vilma Manzano by witnesses Gratol and Patonog. If this
evidence did not exist at the time of the entry which purports to have been on January 9, 1988,
this evidence could have been used to confront within Carolina Quezon when she testified and
identified Exh. "N" on April 14, 1988. In fact if these entries indicating (sic) were made, they
would have been evident in Exh. 'W. The failure to confront Quezon with the entries and the late
submission of Exh. "2-C" can only lead to two conclusions: these entries did not exist as of
January 29, 1988 when the certification of the list of voters was made and that they were
annotated in the voter's list after that date. This is consistent with Exh. "P" which was issued on
February 11, 1988.
The petitioner citing section 4, Article X of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
submits that "while a Component City whose charter prohibits its voters from participating in the
elections for provincial office, is indeed independent of the province, such independence cannot
be equated with a highly urbanized city; rather it is limited to the administrative supervision
aspect, and nowhere should it lead to the conclusion that said voters are likewise prohibited from
running for the provincial offices." (Petition, p. 29)
The argument is untenable.
The relative weight of the parties' evidence supports petitioner's thesis that respondent was not
a registered voter in Precinct No. 17, Brgy. Mahawan, Kananga, Leyte, and, that she and her
husband Emeterio Larrazabal continued to be registered voters in Precinct No. 15, Ormoc City.
(Rollo, pp. 62-67; COMELEC decision, pp. 22-27)
Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly-urbanized cities,
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials
are independent of the province. In the same provision, it provides for other component cities
within a province whose charters do not provide a similar prohibition. Necessarily, component
cities like Ormoc City whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective
officials are treated like highly urbanized cities which are outside the supervisory power of the
province to which they are geographically attached. This independence from the province carries
with it the prohibition or mandate directed to their registered voters not to vote and be voted for
the provincial elective offices. The resolution in G.R. No. 80716 entitled Peralta v. The Commission
on Elections, et al. dated December 10, 1987 applies to this case. While the cited case involves
Olongapo City which is classified as a highly urbanized city, the same principle is applicable.
The Court is bound by these factual findings as they are supported by substantial evidence:
In Aratuc v. Commission on Elections (88 SCRA 251), speaking of the need to preserve the
'independence and all the needed concomitant powers' of the Commission on Elections, Justice
Antonio P. Barredo declared that it is but proper that the Court should accord the greatest
measures of presumption of regularity to its course of action ... to the end it may achieve its
designed place in the democratic fabric of our government ... (Abella v. Larrazabal, supra)
Failing in her contention that she is a resident and registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, the
petitioner poses an alternative position that her being a registered voter in Ormoc City was no
impediment to her candidacy for the position of governor of the province of Leyte.
Moreover, Section 89 of Republic Act 179, independent of the constitutional provision, prohibits
registered voters of Ormoc City from voting and being voted for elective offices in the province of
Leyte. We agree with the COMELEC en banc that "the phrase 'shall not be qualified and entitled to
vote in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the
Province of Leyte' connotes two prohibitions — one, from running for and the second, from voting
for any provincial elective official." (Resolution En Banc, p. 6)
Section 12, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the
province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such
prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
The petitioner takes exception to this interpretation. She opines that such interpretation is "wrong
English" since nowhere in the provision is there any reference to a prohibition against running for
provincial elective office. She states that if the prohibition to run was indeed intended, the
provision should have been phrased "Shall not be qualified TO RUN in the election FOR provincial
governor." A comma should have been used after the word qualified and after the word "vote" to
clearly indicate that the phrase "in the election of the provincial governor" is modified separately
and distinctly by the words "not qualified" and the words "not entitled to vote." (Petition, p. 19)
Section 89 of Republic Act No. 179 creating the City of Ormoc provides:
Election of provincial governor and members of the Provincial Board of the members of the
Provincial Board of the Province of Leyte — The qualified voters of Ormoc City shall not be
qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the
provincial board of the Province of Leyte.
The Court finds the petitioner's interpretation fallacious.
Relating therefore, section 89 of R.A. 179 to section 12, Article X of the Constitution one comes
up with the following conclusion: that Ormoc City when organized was not yet a highly-urbanned
city but is, nevertheless, considered independent of the province of Leyte to which it is
geographically attached because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for the provincial
elective officials. The question now is whether or not the prohibition against the 'city's registered
voters' electing the provincial officials necessarily mean, a prohibition of the registered voters to
be elected as provincial officials.
In the case of Mapa v. Arroyo (175 SCRA 76 [1989]) this Court interpreted Section 20 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 in relation to the conjunction and, to wit:
Time of Completion. — Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the facilities,
improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, including water supply and
lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium
plans. ...
119
The Court ruled:
We further reject petitioner's strained and tenuous application of the called doctrine of last
antecedent in the interpretation of Section 20 and, correlatively, of Section 21. He would thereby
have the enumeration of 'facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of
development' interpreted to mean that the demonstrative Phrase 'which are offered and
indicated in the approved subdivision plans, etc,' refer only to 'other forms of development' and
not to 'facilities, improvements and infrastructures.' While this subserves his purpose, such
bifurcation whereby the supposed adjectives phrase is set apart from the antecedent words, is
illogical and erroneous. The complete and applicable rule is ad proximum antedecens flat
relationisi impediatursentencia (See Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 57 citing Brown v. Brown,
Delta 3 Terry 157, 29 A. 2d 149, 153) Relative words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it
be prevented by the context. In the present case, the employment of the word 'and' between
'facilities, improvements, infrastructures' and 'other forms of development,' far from supporting
petitioner's theory, enervates it instead since it is basic in legal hermeneutics that and is not
meant to separate words but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union. (at pp. 81-83)
... This Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary
to a decision of the case. If there exists some other ground based on statute or general law or
other grounds of construction, we decide the case on a non-constitutional determination. (See
Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283; Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. 213 U.S. 175; Berea
College v. Kentucky 211 U.S. 45.) (at p. 45)
Even if we concede that Commissioner Flores' term expired on February 2, 1991, we fail to see
how this could validate the holding of an elective office by one who is clearly disqualified from
running for that position and the continued exercise of government powers by one without legal
authority to do so. The powers of this Court are broad enough to enjoin the violation of
constitutional and statutory provisions by public officers especially where, as in this case, we
merely affirm the decision of the COMELEC en banc promulgated at a time when Commissioner
Flores was no longer a member.
Moreover, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the decision of the second division of
COMELEC would still be valid under the de facto doctrine.
Applying these principles to the instant case, the conjunction and between the phrase shall not be
qualified and entitled to vote refer to two prohibitions as ruled by the COMELEC in relation to the
demonstrative phrase "in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial
board of the Province of Leyte."
Commissioner Flores was appointed for a three-year term from February 15, 1988 to February 15,
1991. In these three years he exercised his duties and functions as Commissioner. Granting in the
absence of a statute expressly stating when the terms of the COMELEC Chairman and members
commence and expire, that his term expired on February 2, 1991 to enable a faithful compliance
with the constitutional provision that the terms of office in the COMELEC are on a staggered basis
commencing and ending at fixed intervals, his continuance in office until February 15, 1991 has a
color of validity. Therefore, all his official acts from February 3, 1991 to February 15, 1991, are
considered valid. The Court ruled in the case of Leyte Acting Vice-Governor Aurelio D. Menzon v.
Leyte Acting Governor Leopoldo E. Perilla, et al. G.R. No. 90762, May 20, 1991:
Finally, the petitioner contends that the February 14, 1991 decision of the COMELEC's second
division is null and void on the ground that on that date, the term of Commissioner Andres Flores,
one of the signatories of the majority opinion (vote was 2-1) had already expired on February 2,
1991. (Commissioner Flores was nominated by the President on January 30, 1988 and was
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on February 15, 1988. His term of office was fixed
by the President for three years from February 15, 1988 to February 15, 1991.)
And finally, even granting that the President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government,
possesses no power to appoint the petitioner, at the very least, the petitioner is a de facto officer
entitled to compensation.
The petitioner postulates that the President has no power to fix the terms of office of the
Commissioners of the COMELEC because the Constitution impliedly fixes such terms of office. With
regards to Commissioner Flores, the petitioner professes that Flores' term of three (3) years
expired on February 2, 1991 based in section 1(2), Article IX, C, of the Constitution, to wit:
There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor under color of
a known appointment. As revealed by the records, the petitioner was appointed by no less than
the alter ego of the President, the Secretary of Local Government, after which he took his oath
of office before Senator Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department of Local Government
Regional Director Res Salvatierra. Concededly, the appointment has the color of validity.
(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and
the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Any appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity. In relation to the Transitory Provision of the 1987
Constitution (Article XVIII) particularly Section 15 thereof, to wit:
Petitioner Benjamin P. Abella in G.R. No. 100710 obtained the second highest number of votes,
next to Larrazabal in the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte. The COMELEC
en banc, after affirming the February 14, 1991 decision of its second division disqualifying
arrazabal as governor disallowed Abella from assuming position of governor in accordance with
section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 and the rulings in the cases of Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections (174 SCRA 245 [1989]) and Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections (176 SCRA 1 [1989]).
The incumbent Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution,
unless they are sooner removed for cause or become incapacitated to discharge The duties of
their office or appointed to a new term thereunder. In no case shall any Member serve longer
than seven years including service before the ratification of this Constitution.
Abella claims that the Frivaldo and Labo cases were misapplied by the COMELEC. According to him
these cases are fundamentally different from SPC No. 88-546 in that the Frivaldo and Labo cases
were petitions for a quo warranto filed under section 253 of the Omnibus Code, contesting the
eligibility of the respondents after they had been proclaimed duly elected to the Office from which
they were sought to be unseated while SPC No. 88-546 which was filed before proclamation under
section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code sought to deny due course to Larrazabal's certificate of
There is no need to pass upon this constitutional issue raised by the petitioner. The Court ruled in
the case of Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (135 SCRA 37 [1985]):
120
candidacy for material misrepresentations and was seasonably filed on election day. He, therefore,
avers that since under section 6 of Republic Act 6646 it is provided therein that:
and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar,
J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and
Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes case for him shall not be counted.
... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
the votes cast in favor of Larrazabal who obtained the highest number of votes are not considered
counted making her a non-candidate, he, who obtained the second highest number of votes should
be installed as regular Governor of Leyte in accordance with the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 88004.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The petitioner's arguments are not persuasive.
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate
of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact remains
that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal
considered as a bona-fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief
that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were counted and she
obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He
was repudiated by the electorate. In the Frivaldo and Labo cases, this is precisely the reason why
the candidates who obtained the second highest number of votes were not allowed to assume the
positions vacated by Frivaldo the governorship of Sorsogon, and Labo, the position of mayor in
Baguio City. The nature of the proceedings therefore, is not that compelling. What matters is that
in the event a candidate for an elected position who is voted for and who obtains the highest
number of votes is disqualified for not possessing the eligibility requirements at the time of the
election as provided by law, the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes for
the same position can not assume the vacated position. It should be stressed that in G.R. No.
88004, the Court set aside the dismissal of SPC No. 88-546, and directed the COMELEC to conduct
hearings to determine whether or not Larrazabal was qualified to be a candidate for the position
of governor in the province of Leyte. This is the import of the decision in G.R. No. 88004. Thus,
the Court ruled in the case of Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections:
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle
the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of
the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be
valid the vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However the absence of a statute
which clearly asserts a contrary politics and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were
cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be
treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
In sum, the Court does not find any reason to reverse and set aside the questioned decision and
resolution of the COMELEC. The COMELEC has not acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
in grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the second
division of the Commission on Elections dated February 14, 1991 and the questioned Resolution
en banc of the Commission dated July 18, 1991 are hereby AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining
order issued on August 1, 1991 is LIFTED. Costs against the petitioners.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto
petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained
only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the
people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA
740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected
after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a noncandidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision
was supported by eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar,
Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three
dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two
reserving their vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of
the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and
democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio v.
Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente,
with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas
121
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015)
reached the courts, where they could be discussed in the formal discourse of the law. In 2003,
this Court overruled its 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 , which upheld a
Georgia law that criminalized certain homosexual acts, concluding laws making same-sex intimacy
a crime “demea[n] the lives of homosexual persons.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 . In 2012,
the federal Defense of Marriage Act was also struck down. United States v. Windsor, 570 U. S.
___. Numerous same-sex marriage cases reaching the federal courts and state supreme courts
have added to the dialogue. Pp. 6–10.
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection
with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of
the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the
reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
(b) The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the
same sex. Pp. 10–27.
Syllabus
OBERGEFELL et al. v. HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al.
(1) The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate
choices defining personal identity and beliefs. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438
; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 –486. Courts must exercise reasoned judgment in
identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect.
History and tradition guide and discipline the inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. When
new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal
stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
No. 14–556. Argued April 28, 2015—Decided June 26, 2015[1]
Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee define marriage as a union between one man and one
woman. The petitioners, 14 same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are
deceased, filed suits in Federal District Courts in their home States, claiming that respondent state
officials violate the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have
marriages lawfully performed in another State given full recognition. Each District Court ruled in
petitioners’ favor, but the Sixth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed.
Applying these tenets, the Court has long held the right to marry is protected by the Constitution.
For example, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 , invalidated bans on interracial unions,
and Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 , held that prisoners could not be denied the right to marry. To
be sure, these cases presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex partners, as
did Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810 , a one-line summary decision issued in 1972, holding that the
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage did not present a substantial federal question. But
other,
more
instructive
precedents
have
expressed
broader
principles.
See, e.g., Lawrence, supra, at 574. In assessing whether the force and rationale of its cases apply
to same-sex couples, the Court must respect the basic reasons why the right to marry has been
long protected. See, e.g., Eisenstadt, supra, at 453–454. This analysis compels the conclusion that
same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry. Pp. 10–12.
Held: The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of
the same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their
marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-State. Pp. 3–28.
(a) Before turning to the governing principles and precedents, it is appropriate to note the history
of the subject now before the Court. Pp. 3–10.
(2) Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the
Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples. The first premise of this Court’s relevant
precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of
individual autonomy. This abiding connection between marriage and liberty is
why Loving invalidated interracial marriage bans under the Due Process Clause. See 388 U. S., at
12. Decisions about marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make.
See Lawrence, supra, at 574. This is true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation.
(1) The history of marriage as a union between two persons of the opposite sex marks the
beginning of these cases. To the respondents, it would demean a timeless institution if marriage
were extended to same-sex couples. But the petitioners, far from seeking to devalue marriage,
seek it for themselves because of their respect—and need—for its privileges and responsibilities,
as illustrated by the petitioners’ own experiences. Pp. 3–6.
(2) The history of marriage is one of both continuity and change. Changes, such as the decline of
arranged marriages and the abandonment of the law of coverture, have worked deep
transformations in the structure of marriage, affecting aspects of marriage once viewed as
essential. These new insights have strengthened, not weakened, the institution. Changed
understandings of marriage are characteristic of a Nation where new dimensions of freedom
become apparent to new generations.
A second principle in this Court’s jurisprudence is that the right to marry is fundamental because
it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.
The intimate association protected by this right was central to Griswold v. Connecticut, which held
the Constitution protects the right of married couples to use contraception, 381 U. S., at 485, and
was acknowledged in Turner, supra, at 95. Same-sex couples have the same right as oppositesex couples to enjoy intimate association, a right extending beyond mere freedom from laws
making same-sex intimacy a criminal offense. See Lawrence, supra, at 567.
This dynamic can be seen in the Nation’s experience with gay and lesbian rights. Well into the
20th century, many States condemned same-sex intimacy as immoral, and homosexuality was
treated as an illness. Later in the century, cultural and political developments allowed same-sex
couples to lead more open and public lives. Extensive public and private dialogue followed, along
with shifts in public attitudes. Questions about the legal treatment of gays and lesbians soon
A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus
draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.
122
See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 . Without the recognition, stability, and
predictability marriage offers, children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow
lesser. They also suffer the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents,
relegated to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue thus harm and
humiliate the children of same-sex couples. See Windsor, supra, at ___. This does not mean that
the right to marry is less meaningful for those who do not or cannot have children. Precedent
protects the right of a married couple not to procreate, so the right to marry cannot be conditioned
on the capacity or commitment to procreate.
(5) There may be an initial inclination to await further legislation, litigation, and debate, but
referenda, legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns; studies and other writings; and
extensive litigation in state and federal courts have led to an enhanced understanding of the issue.
While the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change,
individuals who are harmed need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental
right. Bowers, in effect, upheld state action that denied gays and lesbians a fundamental right.
Though it was eventually repudiated, men and women suffered pain and humiliation in the interim,
and the effects of these injuries no doubt lingered long after Bowers was overruled. A ruling
against same-sex couples would have the same effect and would be unjustified under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The petitioners’ stories show the urgency of the issue they present to the
Court, which has a duty to address these claims and answer these questions. Respondents’
argument that allowing same-sex couples to wed will harm marriage as an institution rests on a
counterintuitive view of opposite-sex couples’ decisions about marriage and parenthood. Finally,
the First Amendment ensures that religions, those who adhere to religious doctrines, and others
have protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their
lives and faiths. Pp. 23–27.
Finally, this Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of
the Nation’s social order. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 . States have contributed to the
fundamental character of marriage by placing it at the center of many facets of the legal and social
order. There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this
principle, yet same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked
to marriage and are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples would find intolerable.
It is demeaning to lock same-sex couples out of a central institution of the Nation’s society, for
they too may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage.
(c) The Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize same-sex marriages validly
performed out of State. Since same-sex couples may now exercise the fundamental right to marry
in all States, there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage
performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character. Pp. 27–28.
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and just, but its
inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest. Pp. 12–
18.
(3) The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of equal protection. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are
connected in a profound way. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may
rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet each may be instructive as to the
meaning and reach of the other. This dynamic is reflected in Loving, where the Court invoked both
the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause; and in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374
, where the Court invalidated a law barring fathers delinquent on child-support payments from
marrying. Indeed, recognizing that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified
inequality within fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged, this Court
has invoked equal protection principles to invalidate laws imposing sex-based inequality on
marriage, see, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U. S. 455 –461, and confirmed the relation
between liberty and equality, see, e.g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102 –121.
The Court has acknowledged the interlocking nature of these constitutional safeguards in the
context of the legal treatment of gays and lesbians. See Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 575. This dynamic
also applies to same-sex marriage. The challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples,
and they abridge central precepts of equality. The marriage laws at issue are in essence unequal:
Same-sex couples are denied benefits afforded opposite-sex couples and are barred from
exercising a fundamental right. Especially against a long history of disapproval of their
relationships, this denial works a grave and continuing harm, serving to disrespect and subordinate
gays and lesbians. Pp. 18–22.
(4) The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. Same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental
right to marry. Baker v. Nelson is overruled. The State laws challenged by the petitioners in these
cases are held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the
same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples. Pp. 22–23.
123
G.R. No. 198780
October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC
OF
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
THE
her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum
of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned
to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay
him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled
that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and
family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying
the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties
failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by
it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the
marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the
beginning.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
The facts
Ruling of the CA
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia
I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Hence, this petition.
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios
filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a
collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not
make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE
CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST,
HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of
being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter
being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits
ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest.
The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of
Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as
she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the
wife of respondent.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence
to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable
124
Ruling of the Court
they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation
as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover,
to deceive others.18
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the
sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the
ground of lack of consent?
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared
as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating
that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a
limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud
for the purposes of immigration.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is
first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving"
limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have
upheld such marriages as valid.23
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development
of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States,
marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits,
have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is
one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the
present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention
of the couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage
solely to achieve immigration status.14
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void
In declaring the respondent’s marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into
for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held
that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in
the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering
that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in
exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended
to live as husband and wife or build a family.
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time
they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed lack of consent.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab
initio.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the
limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited
purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within
six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary
into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to
wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary
to every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating
the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x
x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is
quite true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses
agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with
the understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive,
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family
Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24 Consent must also be conscious
or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and
both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be
affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
125
was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their
consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as
to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and
complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of
the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute
fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2)
concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted
disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage.
Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under
any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only
be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because
Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to
a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered
into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be
real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent,
but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have
absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage
with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits,
after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous
individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios
already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be
allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer
had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow
them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage
status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore,
clearly present.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded
from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression
that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish
a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention
to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in
accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of
marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be
declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a
marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares,
such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided
by law, it shall be declared valid.28
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack
of merit.
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate
on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go
into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right
to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see
fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and
so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not
the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support
a marriage.
126
G.R. No. L-5028
November 26, 1952
G.R. No. L-8166
February 8, 1916
FELIPE
CABAGUE
and
GERONIMO
CABAGUE, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MATIAS AUXILIO and SOCORRO AUXILIO, defendants-appellees.
JORGE
vs.
CARLOS BOLIFER, defendant-appellant.
According to the Rules of Court parol evidence is not admissible to prove an agreement made upon
the consideration of marriage other than a mutual promise to marry.1 This litigation calls for
application of that rule.
JOHNSON, J.:
DOMALAGAN, plaintiff-appellee,
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Misamis, on the 17th
of December, 1910. It was not presented to the Supreme Court until the 11th of January 1916.
Its purpose was to recover of the defendant the sum of P516, together with damages estimated
in the sum of P350 and interest, and costs.
In the justice of the peace court of Basud, Camarines Norte, Felipe Cabague and his son Geronimo
sued the defendant Matias Auxilio and his daughter Socorro to recover damages resulting from
defendants' refusal to carry out the previously agreed marriage between Socorro and Geronimo.
In support of his claim the plaintiff alleged that, in the month of November, 1909, he and the
defendant entered into a contract by virtue of the terms of which he was to pay to the defendant
the sum of P500 upon the marriage of his son Cipriano Domalagan with the daughter of the
defendant, Bonifacia Bolifer, that later, in the month of August, 1910, he completed his obligation
under said contract by paying to the defendant the said sum of 500, together with the further sum
of P16 "as hansel or token of future marriage," that, notwithstanding said agreement, the said
Bonifacio Bolifer, in the month of August, 1910, was joined in lawful wedlock to Laureano Sisi;
that immediately upon learning of the marriage of Bonifacia Bolifer he demanded of the defendant
the return of the said sum of P516 together with the interest and damages; that the damages
which he suffered resulted from the fact that he, in order to raise said sum of P500, was obliged
to sell certain real property belonging to him, located in the Province of Bohol, at a great sacrifice.
The complaint alleged, in short: (a) that defendants promised such marriage to plaintiffs, provided
the latter would improve the defendants' house in Basud and spend for the wedding feast and the
needs of the bride; (b) that relying upon such promises plaintiffs made the improvement and spent
P700; and (c) that without cause defendants refused to honor their pledged word.
The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the contract was oral, unenforceable under the
rule of evidence hereinbefore mentioned. And the court dismissed the case. On appeal to the Court
of First Instance, the plaintiffs reproduced their complaint and defendants reiterated their motion
to dismiss. From an order of dismissal this appeal was perfected in due time and form.
It should be observed preliminarily that, under the former rules of procedure, when the complaint
did not state whether the contract sued on was in writing or not, the statute of frauds could be no
ground for demurrer. Under the new Rules "defendant may now present a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the contract was not in writing, even if such fact is not apparent on the face of
the complaint. The fact may be proved by him." (Moran Rules of Court 2d ed. p. 139 Vol. I.)
To the complaint the defendant presented a general denial. He also alleged that the facts stated
in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action. Upon the issue presented the cause was
brought on for trial. After hearing the evidence the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno, judge, in an
extended opinion in which all of the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause is carefully
analyzed reached the conclusion "of fact that plaintiff delivered to defendant the sum of P516 sued
for and that Carlos Bolifer and Laureana Loquero received and did not return the said amount,"
and for the reason that the evidence did not sufficiently show that the plaintiff had suffered any
additional damages, rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in said
sum of P516 together with the interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the 17th of December, 1910,
and costs.
There is no question here that the transaction was not in writing. The only issue is whether it may
be proved in court.
The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the defendants on the other, really
involves two kinds of agreement. One, the agreement between Felipe Cabague and the defendants
in consideration of the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo. Another, the agreement between the
two lovers, as "a mutual promise to marry". For breach of that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo
may sue Socorro for damages. This is such action, and evidence of such mutual promise is
admissible.2 However Felipe Cabague's action may not prosper, because it is to enforce an
agreement in consideration of marriage. Evidently as to Felipe Cabague and Matias Auxilio this
action could not be maintained on the theory of "mutual promise to marry".3 Neither may it be
regarded as action by Felipe against Socorro "on a mutual promise to marry."
From that judgment the defendant appealed to this court and made the following assignments of
error:
1. In holding to be proven the fact of the delivery by the plaintiff of the sum of P516 to the
defendant, Carlos Bolifer; and
2. In holding to be valid and effective the verbal contract entered into by the plaintiff and the
defendant in regard to the delivery of the money by reason of a prospective marriage.
The first assignment of error presents a question of fact. The lower court found that a large
preponderance of the evidence showed that the plaintiff had delivered to the defendant the sum
of P516 in substantially the manner alleged in the complaint. Taking into consideration that the
lower court saw and heard the witnesses, together with the further fact that there is an abundance
of uncontradicted proof supporting the findings of the lower court, we are not inclined to disturb
its judgment for any of the reasons given by the appellant in support of his first assignment of
error.
Consequently, we declare that Geronimo may continue his action against Socorro for such
damages as may have resulted from her failure to carry out their mutual matrimonial promises.
Wherefore this expediente will be returned to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance
with this opinion. So ordered.
127
With reference to the second assignment of error, the appellant calls our attention to the provisions
of paragraph 3 of section 335 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Action. The appellant argues that
by virtue of the provisions of said paragraph and by virtue of the fact that the agreement upon
which the plaintiff relies and under which he paid to the defendant the sum of P516 had not been
reduced to writing, he could therefore not recover. The appellant contends that a contract, such
as the one relied upon by the plaintiff, in order to be valid, must be reduced to writing. We have
examined the record in vain to find that the defendant during the trial of the cause objected to
any proof or any part thereof, presented by the plaintiff which showed or tended to show the
existence of the alleged contract. That part of said section 335 which the appellant relies upon for
relief provides:
In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action unless the
same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged,
or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement can not be received without the writing
or secondary evidence of its contents:
1. . . .
2. . . .
3. An agreement made upon the consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to
marry.
G.R. No. L-14628
September 30, 1960
FRANCISCO
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, petitioner,
CONCEPCION, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of Court of
Appeals modifying that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed with said of her
child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise.
Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but
denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered
petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which
was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said court
rendered a decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the
natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to
pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before
the fifth day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant.
It will be noted, by reference to said section, that "evidence " of the agreement referred to "can
not be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents." As was said above all
of the "evidence" relating to said "agreement" was admitted without the slightest objection.
Said section (335) does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract may be valid and yet, by
virtue of said section, the parties will be unable to prove it. Said section provides that the contract
shall not be enforced by an action unless the same is evidence by some note or memorandum.
Said section simply provides the method by which the contract mentioned therein may be proved.
It does not declare that said contract are invalid, which have not been reduced to writing, except
perhaps those mentioned in paragraph 5 of said section (335). A contract may be a perfectly valid
contract even though it is not clothed with the necessary form. If it is not made in confirmity with
said section of course it cannot be proved, if proper objection is made. But a failure to except to
evidence presented in order to prove the contract, because it does not conform to the statute, is
a waiver of the provisions of the law. If the parties to an action, during the trial of the cause, make
no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in question and
permit the contract to be proved, by evidence other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon
the parties as if it had been reduced to writing. (Anson on Contracts, p. 75; Conlu vs. Araneta and
Guanko, 15 Phil. Rep., 387; Gallemit vs. Tabiliran, 20 Phil. Rep., 241, 246; Kuenzle and Streiff vs.
Joingco, 22 Phil. Rep., 110, 112; Gomez vs. Salcedo, 26 Phil. Rep., 485, 489.)
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual
and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and
P7,000.00, respectively.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach
of promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the
Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger
than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no
promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance
underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since
one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin
on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954,
Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her.
Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic.
However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the
present action, which was commenced on or about October 4, 1954.
For the foregoing reasons we find nothing in the record justifying a reversal or modification of the
judgment of the lower court based upon either assignment of error. Therefore the judgment of the
lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of Spain permitted
the recovery of damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of said Code provides:
128
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to contract marriage.
No court shall entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of such promise is sought.
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved party even
though a minor without the assistance of his parent or guardian. Should the minor refuse to
bring suit, the parent or guardian may institute the action.
ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by a minor
with the concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration of the
marriage, or if the banns have been published, the one who without just cause refuses to marry
shall be obliged to reimburse the other for the expenses which he or she may have incurred by
reason of the promised marriage.
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and pecuniary
losses but also compensation for mental and moral suffering.
Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of the affianced
parties, who cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable for damages, both
material and moral, to the engaged person who is rejected.
The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers must be brought
within one year, computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the marriage.
Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement shall be
obliged to return what he or she has received from the other as gift on account of the promise
of the marriage.
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs.
Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil
law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such
promise". The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the
Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote from the report of the
Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:
Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these articles are
not enforced in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the Proposed Civil Code not only as
to the aspect treated of in said articles but also in other particulars. It is advisable to furnish
legislative solutions to some questions that might arise relative to betrothal. Among the
provisions proposed are: That authorizing the adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach
of promise of marriage, and that creating liability for causing a marriage engagement to be
broken.1awphîl.nèt
These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in the report
of the corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has
been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of
promise suit in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more
readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led
to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of the American States.
See statutes of:
Florida 1945 — pp. 1342 — 1344
Maryland 1945 — pp. 1759 — 1762
Nevada 1943 — p. 75
Maine 1941 — pp. 140 — 141
New Hampshire 1941 — p. 223
California 1939 — p. 1245
Massachusetts 1938 — p. 326
Indiana 1936 — p. 1009
Michigan 1935 — p. 201
New York 1935
Pennsylvania p. 450
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under Chapter I,
Title III, Book I thereof:
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.
Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future spouses.
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent or guardian,
be entered into by a male between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or by a female between
the ages of sixteen and eighteen years. Without such consent of the parents or guardian, the
engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil action for damages in case of breach of the
promise.
The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression trend in legislation
when it provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the creation of such
causes of action at a time when so many States, in consequence of years of experience are doing
away with them, may well prove to be a step in the wrong direction. (Congressional Record, Vol.
IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years is not civilly
actionable, even though approved by the parent or guardian.
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil responsibility of a
male for seduction shall not be affected.
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear and
manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry,
the award of moral damages made by the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of
Appeals said award:
Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee,
overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be brought.
129
control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction
and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219,
paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
G.R. No. L-20089
December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ
P.
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs
preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in
said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished
as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does
not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of
seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant —
who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher
and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then
a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant
"surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to
bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate
planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public
humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for
his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet —
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the
Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only
create a scandal.
Paquing
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly pension of
P30.00 for the support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had
allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and
compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The
Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 — consisting of P144.20, for
hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and the balance
representing expenses incurred to support the child — and increased the moral damages to
P7,000.00.
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE
MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in this instance.
It is so ordered.
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced
evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and
motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August
2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore
at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added
that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be
deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his
counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The
counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence
— on the possibility of an amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted from August
25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on
September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
130
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling
the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel
informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise
to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the abovedescribed preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has
appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged
excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated
that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No
question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert
hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00,
should be totally eliminated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence,
must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec.
3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21,
1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure
to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances
beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of
facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros.,
L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable
in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends
that the same could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code
the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive,
or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated
circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive
manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this
case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere
surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based
on evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519,
October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as
commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court.
Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was
declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs.
Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is
hereby affirmed, with costs.
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment
is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an
action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that
"mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract
marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4,
1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5;
Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion
were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A
matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn.,
6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years
old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes
it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding,
he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was
never heard from again.
131
Estremos v. Ephan, (CA) 83 OG 4022 No. 35
G.R. No. L-18630
A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. The SC previously emphasized
“that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that
would have it so.
December 17, 1966
APOLONIO
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.
The Supreme Court, however, laid down certain exceptions, as in the case of Wassmer v. Velez
(Dec. 26, 1964). Under Art. 21 of the Civil Code, the SC found that “to formally set a wedding and
go through the preparation and publicity only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different [from a breach of promise to marry]. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages
in accordance with Art 21.”
TANJANCO, petitioner,
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797) dismissing appellant's action for support
and damages.
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December, 1957, the
defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being
of adult age; that "defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff
who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration of defendant's promise
of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge; that
regularly until December 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage,
defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived
a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff
had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 a
month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to support herself and her baby; that due to
defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree
compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not
less than P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and
exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees.
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a cause of action.
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately decided the case,
holding with the lower court that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child as
yet unborn, nor for its support, but decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for
damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing as follows:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the
court of origin to proceed with the case.
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry
are not permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay,
L-14733, September 30, 1960; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962;
and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
We find this appeal meritorious.
132
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21 above
mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the
Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code.
Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 of the Code), the Commission stated:
But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by
positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral
injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the
proposed Civil Code the following rule:
"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E. Diliman, Quezon City,
while defendant is also of legal age, single and residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila, where he
may be served with summons;
II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other sometime in
December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the defendant started visiting and courting the plaintiff;
III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time the defendant
expressed and professed his undying love and affection for the plaintiff who also in due time
reciprocated the tender feelings;
IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant as are wont of young
people in love had frequent outings and dates, became very close and intimate to each other
and sometime in July, 1958, in consideration of the defendant's promises of marriage, the
plaintiff consented and acceded to the former's earnest and repeated pleas to have carnal
knowledge with him;
V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a short period in
December, 1958 when the defendant was out of the country, the defendant through his
protestations of love and promises of marriage succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the
plaintiff;
VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started conceiving which was
confirmed by a doctor sometime in July, 1959;
VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed the defendant and
pleaded with him to make good his promises of marriage, but instead of honoring his promises
and righting his wrong, the defendant stopped and refrained from seeing the plaintiff since about
July, 1959 has not visited the plaintiff and to all intents and purposes has broken their
engagement and his promises.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old
daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years
of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though
the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under
the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code
Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential
feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of
marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27
Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958
to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with
appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of
seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of
the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without
exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual
relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that
no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no
error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and
the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from
carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit.
Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some
species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and
which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27
Phil. 123).
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may
correspond to the child of the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this
Court makes no pronouncement, since the child's own rights are not here involved.
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the
essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the
Court of First Instance is affirmed. No costs.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of
the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of
the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the
demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)
Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material allegations there are
as follows:
133
Panganiban
September 9, 1933
JOSE
vs.
ELIAS BORROMEO, respondent.
R.
notary public of a disgraceful or immoral character may be held to account by the court even to
the extent of disbarment. (See 2 Thornton on Attorneys At Law, pp. 1258, 1259; In re Chappell
[1909], 115 N.Y.S., 868; In re Bernard [1912], 136 N.Y.S., 185; In re Arctander [1879], 1 N.W.,
43; In re Terrell [1903], 2 Phil., 266; In re Adriatico [1906], 7 Phil., 173; U.S. vs. Kilayko [1916],
34 Phil., 796; De la Cruz vs. Capinpin and Albea [1918], 38 Phil., 492.)
PAÑGANIBAN, complainant,
It now becomes necessary to pronounce sentence. As mitigating circumstances, there may be
taken into consideration (1) that the attorney may not have realized the full purport of the
document to which he took acknowledgment, (2) that no falsification of facts was attempted, and
(3) that the commission of the respondent as a notary public has been revoked. Accordingly, we
are disposed in this case to exercise clemency and to confine our discipline of the respondent to
severe censure. So ordered.
MALCOLM, J.:
These proceedings looking to the disbarment of the respondent attorney are before us on the
representations of the Solicitor-General that the respondent appear and show cause, if any he has,
why he should not be proceeded against for professional malpractice. The respondent admits that,
in his capacity as notary public he legalized the document which is the basis of the complaint
against him, and that the document contains provisions contrary to law, morals and good customs,
but by way of defense disclaims any previous knowledge of the illegal character of the document.
On November 25, 1931, Alejandro Pabro and Juana Mappala husband and wife, subscribed a
contract before the notary public Elias Borromeo, who was at that time a regularly admitted
member of the Philippine Bar. The contract in question had been prepared by the municipal
secretary of Naguilian, Isabela. Attorney Borromeo cooperated in the execution of the document
and had, at lease, some knowledge of its contents, although he may not have been fully informed
because of a difference in dialect. The contract in substance purported to formulate an agreement
between the husband and the wife which permitted the husband to take unto himself a concubine
and the wife to live in adulterous relationship with another man, without opposition from either
one of them.
Two questions are suggested by the record. The first concerns the points of whether or not the
contract sanctioned an illicit and immoral purpose. The second concerns the point, on the
supposition that the contract did sanction an illicit and immoral purpose, of whether a lawyer may
be disciplined for misconduct as a notary public.
The contract of the spouses, it will be recalled, was executed at a time when the Spanish Penal
Code, as modified by Act No. 1773 was in force. Conceding, however, that the more liberal
provisions of the Revised Penal Code should be given application, it is herein provided that the
consent or pardon given by the offended party constitutes a bar to prosecution for adultery or
concubinage. In this instance, if the spouses should retain their present frame of mind, no
prosecution of either one by the other could be expected. Nevertheless, we think it far from the
purpose of the Legislature to legalize adultery and concubinage. They still remain crimes, with the
qualification that prosecution cannot be instituted if the offended party consent to the act or pardon
the offender. This is a matter of future contingency and is not matter for legalization in wanton
disregard of good morals. We hold the contract to contain provisions contrary to law, morals and
public order, and as a consequence not judicially recognizable.
Passing to the second question, we think there can be no question as to the right of the court to
discipline an attorney who, in his capacity as notary public, has been guilty of misconduct. To the
office of notary public there is not attached such importance under present conditions as under
the Spanish administration. Even so, the notary public exercise duties calling for carefulness and
faithfulness. It is for the notary to inform himself of the facts to which he intends to certify, and
to take part in no illegal enterprise. The notary public is usually a person who has been admitted
to the practice of law, and such, in the commingling of his duties as notary and lawyer, must be
held responsible for both. We are led to hold that a member of the bar who performs an act as a
134
A.C. No. 932
June 21, 1940
opinion of some members of the court. The majority, however, have inclined to follow the
recommendation of the investigator, the Honorable Sotero Rodas, in view of the circumstances
stated in the report of said investigator and the fact that immediately after discovering his
mistakes, respondent endeavored to correct it by making the parties sign another document
cancelling the previous one.
In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent,
LAUREL, J.:
The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one year. So ordered.
This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint of the Solicitor-General against the
respondent Roque Santiago, charging the latter with malpractice and praying that disciplinary
action be taken against him.
It appears that one Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife Soledad Colares
for some nine consecutive years and who was bent on contracting a second marriage, sought the
legal advice of the respondent, who was at the time a practicing and notary public in the Province
of Occidental Negros. The respondent, after hearing Baniquit's side of the case, assured the latter
that he could secure a separation from his wife and marry again, and asked him to bring his wife
on the afternoon of the same day, May 29, 1939. This was done and the respondent right then
and there prepared the document Exhibit A in which it was stipulated, among other things, that
the contracting parties, who are husband and wife authorized each other to marry again, at the
same time renouncing or waiving whatever right of action one might have against the party so
marrying. After the execution and acknowledgment of Exhibit A by the parties, the respondent
asked the spouses to shake hands and assured them that they were single and as such could
contract another and subsequent marriage. Baniquit then remarked, "Would there be no trouble?"
Upon hearing it the respondent stood up and, pointing to his diploma hanging on the wall, said: "I
would tear that off if this document turns out not to be valid." Relying on the validity of Exhibit A,
Ernesto Baniquit, on June 11, 1939, contracted a second marriage with Trinidad Aurelio. There is
also evidence to show that the respondent tried to collect for this service the sum of P50, but as
the evidence on this point is not clear and the same is not material in the resolution of the present
case, we do not find it necessary to make any express finding as to whether the full amount or
any portion thereof was paid or, as contended by the respondent, the service were rendered free
of charge.
The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit A, put up the defense that he had the idea
that seven years separation of husband and wife would entitle either of them to contract a second
marriage and for that reason prepared Exhibit A, but immediately after the execution of said
document he realized that he had made a mistake and for that reason immediately sent for the
contracting parties who, on June 30, 1939, came to his office and signed the deed of cancellation
Exhibit A.
There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and between the spouses Ernesto
Baniquit and Soledad Colares upon the advice of the respondent and prepared by the latter as a
lawyer and acknowledged by him as a notary public is contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert
the vital foundation of the family. The advice given by the respondent, the preparation and
acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the
practice of law. The admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that
his continued enjoyment of the privilege conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe
person to society. When it appears that he, by recklessness or sheer ignorance of the law, is unfit
or unsafe to be entrusted with the responsibilities and obligations of a lawyer, his right to continue
in the enjoyment of this professional privilege should be declared terminated. In the present case,
respondent was either ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in
giving the complainant legal advice. Drastic action should lead to his disbarment and this is the
135
A.M. No. 804-CJ May 19, 1975
the agreement was signed before Judge Mendoza not only by Selanova but also by his wife and
two witnesses, Lamberts M. Ceniza and Florencio C. Pono.
SATURNINO
SELANOVA, complainant,
vs.
ALEJANDRO E. MENDOZA, City Judge of Mandaue City, respondent.
Judge Mendoza retired on February 27, 1975 when he reached the age of seventy. In his letter of
April 8, 1975 he asked for a compassionate view of his case considering his forty-three years'
service in the government (he started his public career in 1932 as a policeman and became a
justice of the peace in 1954). He also cited the financial predicament of his big family occasioned
by the delay in the payment of his retirement and terminal leave pay.
RESOLUTION
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
The case was not referred to a Judge of the Court of First Instance for investigation because
actually no factual issues necessitate a hearing and presentation of evidence. Respondent Judge
admitted that he was responsible for the execution of the questioned document, an extrajudicial
"Liquidation of Conjugal Properties", which he caused complainant Saturnino Selanova and his
wife, Avelina Ceniza, to sign.
Saturnino Selanova charged Judge Alejandro E. Mendoza of Mandaue City with gross ignorance of
the law for having prepared and ratified a document dated November 21, 1972, extrajudicially
liquidating the conjugal partnership of the complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza. One condition
of the liquidation was that either spouse (as the case may be) would withdraw the complaint for
adultery or concubinage which each had filed against the other and that they waived their "right
to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity" either one would commit against the other.
In that instrument Judge Mendoza divided the two pieces of conjugal assets of the spouses by
allocating to the husband a thirteen-hectare riceland and to the wife the residential house and lot.
The last paragraph of the instrument, which licensed either spouse to commit any act of infidelity,
was in effect a ratification of their personal separation. The agreement in question is void because
it contravenes the following provisions of the Civil Code:têñ.£îhqwâ£
ART. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
(2) Every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife;
Judge Mendoza in his comment on the charge purposed to convey the impression that he was
aware of the invalidity of the agreement but he nevertheless ratified it and gave it his nihil
obstat on the assurance of the spouses that they would ask the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental (where they were residing) to approve the agreement. That pretension is disbelieved by
the Judicial Consultant.
Respondent Judge alleged that he relied on the provision that "the husband and the wife may
agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial
approval" (Par. 4, Art. 191, Civil Code).
Even before the enactment of the new Civil Code, this Court held that the extrajudicial dissolution
of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval was void (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285;
De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15, De La Rosa vs. Barruga, L-2368, June 30, 1950, 4 ROP Digest
171, sec. 29).
He argues that to give the prohibition against an extrajudicial liquidation of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage "an unqualified and literal legal construction" would lender
nugatory the aforequoted provisions of article 191. He cites Lacson vs. San Jose-Lacson, L-23482,
L-23767 and L-24259, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 837 as authority for the propriety of an
extrajudicial agreement for the dissolution during the marriage of the conjugal partnership as long
as the agreement is subsequently approved by the court.
On the other hand, disciplinary action had been taken against notaries who authenticated
agreements for the personal separation of spouses wherein either spouse was permitted to commit
acts of infidelity.
Thus, in Panganiban vs. Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367, a lawyer was severely censured for having
notarized a document containing "an agreement between the husband and the wife which
permitted the husband to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous
relationship with another man, without opposition from either one of them". The document was
prepared by another person.
However, the respondent overlooks the unmistakable ruling of this Court in the Lacson case that
judicial sanction for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage should be
"secured beforehand."
Respondent Judge surmised that Selanova's complaint was instigated by a lawyer whose case was
adversely decided by the Judge. That speculation was denied by Selanova who also belied Judge
Mendoza's version that the complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza, "together with their parents",
came to the office of Judge Mendoza and solicited his help in the amicable settlement of their
marital imbroglio.
In that case this Court noted that while adultery and concubinage are private crimes, "they still
remain crimes" and a contract legalizing their commission is "contrary to law, morals and public
order, and as a consequence not judicially recognizable". Since the notary's commission was
already revoked, this Court did not disbar him. The fact that he "may not have realized the full
purport of the document to which he took acknowledgment' was considered mitigating.
According to Selanova, in 1972 his father was already dead and his mother was ninety-one years
old. They could not possibly have come to Judge Mendoza's office. Selanova said that only he and
his brother-in-law, Arcadio Ceniza, an alleged classmate of Judge Mendoza, were the persons who
went to the Judge's office. But that version may be inaccurate and oversimplified, considering that
Severe censure was also administered to a notary of Cebu City who ratified a document entitled
"Legal Separation", executed by husband and wife, wherein they agreed that they separated
mutually and voluntarily, that they renounced their rights and obligations, and that they authorized
136
each other to remarry, renouncing any action to which they might be entitled and each promising
not to be a witness against the other. Those covenants are contrary to law, morals and good
customs and tend to subvert the vital foundation of the legitimate family (Biton vs. Momongon,
62 Phil. 7).
G.R. No. 80965 June 6, 1990
SYLVIA
vs.
THE HON. COURT
LEON, respondents.
In the Santiago case respondent lawyer prepared for a married couple (who had been separated
for nine years) a document wherein it was stipulated, inter alia, that they authorized each other
to marry again, at the same time renouncing whatever right of action one might have against the
other. When the husband inquired if there would be no trouble, respondent lawyer pointed to his
diploma which was hanging on the wall and said: "I would tear that off if this document turns out
not to be valid." The husband remarried. The respondent was suspended from the practice of law
for one year for having been ignorant of the law or being careless in giving legal advice (In
re Santiago, 70 Phil. 66).
LICHAUCO
OF
APPEALS,
DE
MACARIA
DE
LEON
LEON, petitioner,
AND
JOSE
VICENTE
DE
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.
De Jesus & Associates for Macaria de Leon.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for Jose Vicente de Leon.
In Balinon vs. De Leon, 94 Phil. 277, Attorney Celestino M. de Leon prepared an affidavit wherein
he declared that he was married to Vertudes Marquez, from whom he had been separated, their
conjugal partnership having been dissolved, and that he was consorting with Regina S. Balinon his
"new found life-partner," to whom he would "remain loyal and faithful" "as a lawful and devoted
loving husband for the rest of" his life "at all costs". Attorney Justo T. Velayo notarized that
affidavit. This Court reprimanded Velayo and suspended De Leon from the practice of law for three
years.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
06649 dated June 30, 1987 the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in SP Proc. No. 8492
dated December 29, 1983; and its resolution dated November 24, 1987 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
In the instant case, respondent Judge, due to his unawareness of the legal prohibition against
contracts for the personal separation of husband and wife and for the extrajudicial dissolution of
their conjugal partnership, prepared the said void agreement which was acknowledged before him
as "City Judge and Notary Public Ex-Officio". (Because he was admitted to the bar in 1948 and,
consequently, he did not study the new Civil Code in the law school, he might not have been
cognizant of its aforecited article 221).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Taking into account that circumstance and his apparent good faith and honest desire to terminate
the marital conflict between the complainant and his wife, we are of the opinion that a drastic
penalty should not be imposed on him. But he deserves a severe censure for his mistake in
preparing and notarizing the aforementioned immoral and illegal agreement. Such severe
reprimand should not be an obstacle to his enjoyment of retirement privileges, assuming that
there are no causes for depriving him of such benefits.
Sometime in October, 1972, a de facto separation between the spouses occured due to
irreconcilable marital differences, with Sylvia leaving the conjugal home. Sometime in March,
1973, Sylvia went to the United States where she obtained American citizenship.
On October 18, 1969, private respondent Jose Vicente De Leon and petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De
Leon were united in wedlock before the Municipal Mayor of Binangonan, Rizal. On August 28, 1971,
a child named Susana L. De Leon was born from this union.
On November 23, 1973, Sylvia filed with the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco,
a petition for dissolution of marriage against Jose Vicente. In the said divorce proceedings, Sylvia
also filed claims for support and distribution of properties. It appears, however, that since Jose
Vicente was then a Philippine resident and did not have any assets in the United States, Sylvia
chose to hold in abeyance the divorce proceedings, and in the meantime, concentrated her efforts
to obtain some sort of property settlements with Jose Vicente in the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the respondent is severely censured.
Thus, on March 16, 1977, Sylvia succeeded in entering into a Letter-Agreement with her motherin-law, private respondent Macaria De Leon, which We quote in full, as follows (pp. 40-42, Rollo):
March 16, 1977
Mrs. Macaria Madrigal de Leon
12 Jacaranda, North Forbes Park
Makati, Metro Manila
Dear Dora Macaria:
137
This letter represents a contractual undertaking among (A) the undersigned (B) your son, Mr.
Jose Vicente de Leon, represented by you, and (C) yourself in your personal capacity.
5. To allow her daughter to spend two to three months each year with the father upon mutual
convenience.
You hereby bind yourself jointly and severally to answer for the undertakings of Joe Vincent
under this contract.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Sylvia de Leon t/ SYLVIA L. DE LEON
CONFORME:
s/t/MACARIA M. DE LEON
with my marital consent:
s/t/JUAN L. DE LEON
In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of relations between the undersigned
and her lawfully wedded husband, Jose Vicente de Leon, your son, the following are agreed
upon:
Obligations of Jose Vicente de Leon and/ or yourself in a joint and several capacity:
1. To deliver with clear title free from all liens and encumbrances and subject to no claims
in any form whatsoever the following properties to Sylvia Lichauco-de Leon hereinafter
referred to as the wife:
A. Suite 11-C, Avalon Condominium, Ortigas Ave., corner Xavier St., Mandaluyong, Rizal,
Philippines.
B. Apartment 702, Wack Wack Condominium, Mandaluyong, Rizal, Philippines.
C. The rights to assignment of 2 Ayala lots in Alabang, Rizal (Corner lots, 801 s q. meters
each). (Fully paid).
D. 2470 Wexford Ave., South San Francisco, California, U.S.A. (Lot 18 Block 22
Westborough Unit No. 2). (Fully paid).
E. 1) The sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000)
2) $30,000
3) $5,000
2. To give monthly support payable six (6) months in advance every year to any designated
assignee of the wife for the care and upbringing of Susana Lichauco de Leon which is hereby
pegged at the exchange rate of 7.50 to the dollar subject to adjustments in the event of
monetary exchange fluctuations. Subsequent increase on actual need upon negotiation.
On the same date, Macaria made cash payments to Sylvia in the amount of P100,000 and
US$35,000.00 or P280,000.00, in compliance with her obligations as stipulated in the aforestated
Letter-Agreement.
On March 30, 1977, Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal a
joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of their conjugal partnership, the main part of
which reads as follows (pp. 37-38, Rollo):
5. For the best interest of each of them and of their minor child, petitioners have agreed to
dissolve their conjugal partnership and to partition the assets thereof, under the following terms
and conditions-this document, a pleading being intended by them to embody and evidence their
agreement:
(c) The following properties shall be adjudicated to petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon. These
properties will be free of any and all liens and encumbrances, with clear title and subject to no
claims by third parties. Petitioner Jose Vicente De Leon fully assumes all responsibility and
liability in the event these properties shall not be as described in the previous sentence:
Sedan (1972 model)
Suite
11-C,
Avalon
Condominium,
Ortigas
Ave.,
comer
Xavier
St.,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, Philippines
Apt.
702,
Wack-Wack
Condominium,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, Philippines
The rights to assignment of 2 Ayala lots in Alabang Rizal (corner lots, 801 sq. meters each)
(Fully paid)
2470 Wexford Ave., South San Francisco, California, U.S.A. (Lot 18, Block 22 Westborough
Unit 2) (Fully paid)
The sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
$30,000.00
at
current
exchange
rate
$5,000.00 at current exchange rate
3. To respect the custody of said minor daughter as pertaining exclusively to the wife except
as herein provided.
Obligations of the wife:
1. To agree to a judicial separation of property in accordance with Philippine law and in this
connection to do all that may be necessary to secure said separation of property including
her approval in writing of a joint petition or consent decree.
2. To amend her complaint in the United States before the Federal Court of California, U.S.A.
entitled "Sylvia Lichauco de Leon vs. Jose V. de Leon" in a manner compatible with the
objectives of this herein agreement. It is the stated objective of this agreement that said
divorce proceedings will continue.
3. All the properties herein described for assignment to the wife must be assigned to Sylvia
Lichauco de Leon upon the decree of the Court of First Instance in the Joint Petition for
Separation of Property; except for the P100,000, $30,000 and $5,000 which will be paid
immediately.
4. This contract is intended to be applicable both in the Republic of the Philippines and in the
United States of America. It is agreed that this will constitute an actionable document in both
jurisdictions and the parties herein waive their right to object to the use of this document in
the event a legal issue should arise relating to the validity of this document. In the event of
a dispute, this letter is subject to interpretation under the laws of California, U.S.A.
After ex-parte hearings, the trial court issued an Order dated February 19, 1980 approving the
petition, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 143, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that the conjugal partnership of the Spouses is DISSOLVED
henceforth, without prejudice to the terms of their agreement that each spouse shall own,
dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her separate estate, without the consent of the
other, and all earnings from any profession, business or industries shall likewise belong to each
spouse.
138
On March 17, 1980, Sylvia moved for the execution of the above-mentioned order. However, Jose
Vicente moved for a reconsideration of the order alleging that Sylvia made a verbal reformation
of the petition as there was no such agreement for the payment of P4,500.00 monthly support to
commence from the alleged date of separation in April, 1973 and that there was no notice given
to him that Sylvia would attempt verbal reformation of the agreement contained in the joint
petition
The only basis by which Sylvia may lay claim to the properties which are the subject matter of the
Letter-Agreement, is the Letter-Agreement itself. The main issue, therefore, is whether or not the
Letter-Agreement is valid. The third paragraph of the Letter-Agreement, supra, reads:
In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of relations between the undersigned
and her lawfully wedded husband, Jose Vicente De Leon, your son, the following are agreed
upon: (emphasis supplied)
While the said motion for reconsideration was pending resolution, on April 20, 1980, Macaria filed
with the trial court a motion for leave to intervene alleging that she is the owner of the properties
involved in the case. The motion was granted. On October 29, 1980, Macaria, assisted by her
husband Juan De Leon, filed her complaint in intervention. She assailed the validity and legality of
the Letter-Agreement which had for its purpose, according to her, the termination of marital
relationship between Sylvia and Jose Vicente. However, before any hearing could be had, the
judicial reorganization took place and the case was transferred to the-Regional Trial Court of Pasig.
On December 29, 1983, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads
(pp. 35-36, Rollo):
It is readily apparent that the use of the word "relations" is ambiguous, perforce, it is subject to
interpretation. There being a doubt as to the meaning of this word taken by itself, a consideration
of the general scope and purpose of the instrument in which it occurs (see Germann and Co. v.
Donaldson, Sim and Co., 1 Phil. 63) and Article 1374 of the Civil Code which provides that the
various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones
that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly, is necessary.
Sylvia insists that the consideration for her execution of the Letter-Agreement was the termination
of property relations with her husband. Indeed, Sylvia and Jose Vicente subsequently filed a joint
petition for judicial approval of the dissolution of their conjugal partnership, sanctioned by Article
191 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, Macaria and Jose Vicente assert that the consideration
was the termination of marital relationship.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the complaint in intervention in favor of the
intervenor, declaring null and void the letter agreement dated March 16, 1977 (Exhibits 'E' to
'E-2'), and ordering petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon to restore to intervenor the amount of
P380,000.00 plus legal interest from date of complaint, and to pay intervenor the amount of
P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
We sustain the observations and conclusion made by the trial court, to wit (pp. 44- 46, Rollo):
On page two of the letter agreement (Exhibit' E'), the parties contemplated not only to agree to
a judicial separation of property of the spouses but likewise to continue with divorce proceedings
(paragraphs 1 and 2, Obligations of the Wife, Exhibit 'E-1'). If taken with the apparently
ambiguous provisions in Exhibit E' regarding termination of 'relations', the parties clearly
contemplated not only the termination of property relationship but likewise of marital
relationship in its entirety. Furthermore, it would be safe to assume that the parties in Exhibit
'E' not having specified the particular relationship which they wanted to peacefully and amicably
terminate had intended to terminate all kinds of relations, both marital and property. While there
could be inherent benefits to a termination of conjugal property relationship between the
spouses, the court could not clearly perceive the underlying benefit for the intervenor insofar as
termination of property relationship between petitioners is concerned, unless the underlying
consideration for intervenor is the termination of marital relationship by divorce proceedings
between her son Jose Vicente and his wife petitioner Sylvia. The last sentence of paragraph 2
under "Obligations of the Wife" unequivocally states: "It is the stated objective of this agreement
that said divorce proceedings (in the United States) will continue. "There is merit in concluding
that the consideration by which Intervenor executed Exhibit 'E' to 'E-2' was to secure freedom
for her son petitioner Jose Vicente De Leon, especially if Exhibit 'R'-Intervenor, which is (sic)
agreement signed by petitioner Sylvia to consent to and pardon Jose Vicente De Leon for adultery
and concubinage (among others) would be considered. In the light, therefore, of the foregoing
circumstances, this Court finds credible the testimony of intervenor as follows:
Q Will you please go over the Exhibit 'E' to 'E-2'- intervenor consisting of three pages and
inform us whether or not this is the letter of March 16, 1977 which you just referred to?
A Yes, this is the letter.
Why did you affix your signature to this Exh. 'E'-intervenor (sic)?
A Because at that time when I signed it I want to buy peace for myself and for the whole
family.
Q From whom did you want to buy peace and/or what kind of peace?
A I wanted to buy peace from Sylvia Lichauco whom I knew was kind of 'matapang;' so I want
peace for me and primarily for the peaceful and amicable termination of marital relationship
Judgment is likewise rendered affirming the order of the Court dated February 19, 1980 declaring
the conjugal partnership of the spouses Jose Vicente De Leon and Sylvia Lichauco De Leon
DISSOLVED; and adjudicating to each of them his or her share of the properties and assets of
said conjugal partnership in accordance with the agreement embodied in paragraph 5 of the
petition, except insofar as the adjudication to petitioner Sylvia L. De Leon of the properties
belonging to and owned by Intervenor Macaria De Leon is concerned.
Henceforth, (a) each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her
separate estate, present and future without the consent of the other; (b) an earnings from any
profession, business or industry shall likewise belong to each of them separately; (c) the minor
child Susana De Leon shall stay with petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon for two to three months
every year-the transportation both ways of the child for the trip to the Philippines to be at the
expense of the petitioner Jose Vicente De Leon; and (d) petitioner Jose Vicente De Leon shall
give petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon the sum of P4,500.00 as monthly support for the minor
child Susana to commence from February 19, 1980.
Sylvia appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals raising the following errors:
1) The trial court erred in finding that the cause or consideration of the Letter- Agreement is the
termination of marital relations;
2) The trial court failed to appreciate testimonial and documentary evidence proving that Macaria
de Leon's claims of threat, intimidation and mistake are baseless; and
3) The trial court erred in finding that Sylvia Lichauco de Leon committed breach of the LetterAgreement; and further, failed to appreciate evidence proving Macaria de Leon's material breach
thereof.
The respondent court affirmed the decision in toto. The motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
139
between my son, Joe Vincent and Sylvia. (Deposition dated September 6, 1983-Macaria de
Leon, p. 6-7)
in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity" (see Equitable Banking Corp. vs.
IAC, G.R. No. 74451, May 25, 1988, 161 SCRA 518).
This Court, therefore, finds and holds that the cause or consideration for the intervenor Macaria
De Leon in having executed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2' was the termination of the marital relationship
between her son Jose Vicente De Leon and Sylvia Lichauco de Leon.
Sylvia alleges further that since the nullity of the Letter-Agreement proceeds from the unlawful
consideration solely of Macaria, applying the pari delicto rule, it is clear that she cannot recover
what she has given by reason of the Letter-Agreement nor ask for the fulfillment of what has been
promised her. On her part, Macaria raises the defenses of intimidation and mistake which led her
to execute the Letter-Agreement. In resolving this issue, the trial court said (pp. 148-151, Rollo):
Article 1306 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy.
If the stipulation is contrary to law, morals or public policy, the contract is void and inexistent
from the beginning.
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy;
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be
waived.
But marriage is not a mere contract but a sacred social institution. Thus, Art. 52 of the Civil
Code provides:
Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulations...
In her second cause of action, intervenor claims that her signing of Exhibits 'E' to 'E- 2' was due
to a fear of an unpeaceful and troublesome separation other son with petitioner Sylvia Lichauco
de Leon. In support of her claim, intervenor testified as follows:
Q Will you please inform us how did Sylvia Lichauco disturb or threaten your son or yourself?
A Despite the fact that Sylvia Lichauco voluntarily left my son Joe Vincent and abandoned him,
she unashamedly nagged Joe and me to get money and when her demands were not met she
resorted to threats like, she threatened to bring Joe to court for support. Sylvia threatened to
scandalize our family by these baseless suits; in fact she caused the service of summons to
Joe when he went to the United States. (Intervenor's deposition dated Sept. 6, 1983, p. 8).
On the other hand, petitioner Sylvia claims that it was intervenor and petitioner Jose Vicente
who initiated the move to convince her to agree to a dissolution of their conjugal partnership
due to the alleged extra-marital activities of petitioner Jose Vicente de Leon. She testified as
follows:
Q Now in her testimony, Macaria Madrigal de Leon also said that you threatened her by
demanding money and nagged her until she agreed to the letter agreement of March 1977,
what can you say about that?
A I think with all the people sitting around with Atty. Quisumbing, Atty. Chuidian, my fatherin-law, my sister-in-law and I, you know, it can be shown that this was a friendly amicable
settlement that they were much really interested in settling down as I was. I think there were
certain reasons that they wanted to get done or planned, being at that time Jose was already
remarried and had a child. That since she then found out that since she was worried about
what might be, you know, involved in any future matters. She just wanted to do what she
could. She just want me out of the picture. So in no way, it cannot be said that I nagged and
threatened her. (TSN dated December 8, 1983, p. 137-138)
From the foregoing provisions of the New Civil Code, this court is of the considered opinion
and so holds that intervenor's undertaking under Exhibit 'E' premised on the termination of
marital relationship is not only contrary to law but contrary to Filipino morals and public Policy.
As such, any agreement or obligations based on such unlawful consideration and which is
contrary to public policy should be deemed null and void. (emphasis supplied)
Additionally, Article 191 of the Civil Case contemplates properties belonging to the spouses and
not those belonging to a third party, who, in the case at bar., is Macaria. In the petition for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, it was made to appear that the said properties are conjugal
in nature. However, Macaria was able to prove that the questioned properties are owned by her.
Neither Sylvia nor Jose Vicente adduced any contrary evidence.
In resolving this issue, this Court leans heavily on Exhibit 'R'-intervenor, which was not
controverted by petitioner Sylvia. A reading of Exhibit 'R' would show that petitioner Sylvia would
consent to and pardon petitioner Jose Vicente, son of intervenor, for possible crimes of adultery
and/or concubinage, with a sizing attached; that is, the transfer of the properties subject herein
to her. There appears some truth to the apprehensions of intervenor for in petitioner Sylvia's
testimony she confirms the worry of intervenor as follows:'... being at that time Jose (De Leon)
was already remarried and had a child. That since she (intervenor) found out that, she was
worried about what might be, you know, involved in any future matters. She just want me out
of the picture." The aforesaid fear of intervenor was further corroborated by her witness
Concepcion Tagudin who testified as follows:
Granting, in gratia argumenti, that the consideration of the Letter-Agreement was the termination
of property relations, We agree with the respondent court that (pp. 46-47, Rollo):
... the agreement nevertheless is void because it contravenes the following provisions of the
Civil Code:
Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife;
Q Now, you mentioned that you were present when Mrs. Macaria De Leon signed this Exhibit
'E-2, ' will you inform us whether there was anything unusual which you noticed when Mrs.
Macaria M. De Leon signed this Exhibit 'E-2'?
Besides, the Letter-Agreement shows on its face that it was prepared by Sylvia, and in this regard,
the ambiguity in a contract is to be taken contra proferentem, i.e., construed against the party
who caused the ambiguity and could have also avoided it by the exercise of a little more care.
Thus, Article 1377 of the Civil Code provides: "The interpretation of obscure words of stipulations
140
A Mrs. Macaria M. De Leon was in a state of tension and anger. She was so mad that she
remarked: 'Punetang Sylvia ito bakit ba niya ako ginugulo. Ipakukulong daw niya si Joe Vincent
kung hindi ko pipirmahan ito. Sana matapos na itong problemang ito pagkapirmang ito,' sabi
niya.' (Deposition-Concepcion Tagudin, Oct. 21, 1983, pp. 10-11)
A threat to enforce one's claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does
not vitiate consent.
In order that intimidation may vitiate consent and render the contract invalid, the following
requisites must concur: (1) that the intimidation must be the determining cause of the contract,
or must have caused the consent to be given; (2) that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful;
(3) that the threat be real and serious, there being an evident disproportion between the evil and
the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of the contract as the lesser evil; and
(4) that it produces a reasonable and well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom
it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury. Applying the foregoing
to the present case, the claim of Macaria that Sylvia threatened her to bring Jose Vicente to court
for support, to scandalize their family by baseless suits and that Sylvia would pardon Jose Vicente
for possible crimes of adultery and/or concubinage subject to the transfer of certain properties to
her, is obviously not the intimidation referred to by law. With respect to mistake as a vice of
consent, neither is Macaria's alleged mistake in having signed the Letter-Agreement because of
her belief that Sylvia will thereby eliminate inheritance rights from her and Jose Vicente, the
mistake referred to in Article 1331 of the Civil Code, supra. It does not appear that the condition
that Sylvia "will eliminate her inheritance rights" principally moved Macaria to enter into the
contract. Rather, such condition was but an incident of the consideration thereof which, as
discussed earlier, is the termination of marital relations.
In her third cause of action, intervenor claims mistake or error in having signed Exhibits '1' to
'E-2' alleging in her testimony as follows:
Q Before you were told such by your lawyers what if any were your basis to believe that Sylvia
would no longer have inheritance rights from your son, Joe Vincent?
A Well, that was what Sylvia told me. That she will eliminate any inheritance rights from me
or my son Joe Vincent's properties if I sign the document amicably. ... (Intervenor's depositionSept. 6, 1983, pp. 9-10).
On the other hand, petitioner Sylvia claims that intervenor could not have been mistaken in her
having signed the document as she was under advice of counsel during the time that Exhibits
'E' to 'E-2' was negotiated. To support such claims by Sylvia Lichauco De Leon, the deposition
testimony of Atty. Vicente Chuidian was presented before this Court:
Atty. Herbosa: Now you mentioned Atty. Norberto Quisumbing, would you be able to tell us in
what capacity he was present in that negotiation?
Atty. Chuidian: He was counsel for Dona Macaria and for Joe Vincent, the spouse of Sylvia.
(Deposition of V. Chuidian, December 16, 1983, p. 8)
In the ultimate analysis, therefore, both parties acted in violation of the laws. However, the pari
delicto rule, expressed in the maxims "Ex dolo malo non oritur actio" and "In pari delicto potior
est conditio defendentis," which refuses remedy to either party to an illegal agreement and leaves
them where they are, does not apply in this case. Contrary to the ruling of the respondent Court
that (pp. 47-48, Rollo):
... [C]onsequently, intervenor appellees' obligation under the said agreement having been
annulled, the contracting parties shall restore to each other that things which have been subject
matter of the contract, their fruits and the price or its interest, except as provided by law (Art.
1398, Civil Code).
The New Civil Code provides:
Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud is voidable.
Art. 1331. In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of
the thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally
moved one or both parties to enter into a contract. ...
The preponderance of evidence leans in favor of intervenor who even utilized the statement of
the divorce lawyer of petitioner Sylvia (Mr. Penrod) in support of the fact that intervenor was
mistaken in having signed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2' because when she signed said Exhibits she believed
that fact that petitioner Sylvia would eliminate her inheritance rights and there is no showing
that said intervenor was properly advised by any American lawyer on the fact whether petitioner
Sylvia, being an American citizen, could rightfully do the same. Transcending, however, the issue
of whether there was mistake of fact on the part of intervenor or not, this Court could not. see
a valid cause or consideration in favor of intervenor Macaria De Leon having signed Exhibits 'E'
to 'E-2.' For even if petitioner Sylvia had confirmed Mr. Penrod's statement during the divorce
proceedings in the United States that she would undertake to eliminate her hereditary rights in
the event of the property settlement, under Philippine laws, such contract would likewise be
voidable, for under Art. 1347 of the New Civil Code 'no contract may be entered into upon future
inheritance.
Article 1414 of the Civil Code, which is an exception to the pari delicto rule, is the proper law to
be applied. It provides:
When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal purpose, the contract may be repudiated
by one of the parties before the purpose has been accomplished, or before any damage has been
caused to a third person. In such case, the courts may, if the public interest wig thus be
subserved, allow the party repudiating the contract to recover the money or property.
Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose has been accomplished and to
adhere to the pari delicto rule in this case is to put a premium to the circumvention of the laws,
positive relief should be granted to Macaria. Justice would be served by allowing her to be placed
in the position in which she was before the transaction was entered into.
We do not subscribe to the aforestated view of the trial court. Article 1335 of the Civil Code
provides:
There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and wellgrounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person
or property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent.
To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be
borne in mind.
With the conclusions thus reached, We find it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
dated June 30, 1987 and its resolution dated November 24, 1987 are AFFIRMED.
141
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC
OF
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
THE
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.6
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that
when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is
likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated July 4,
2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent
Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code
and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is
given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino
citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while
in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State
asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on
a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the
controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to
the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the
first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and
then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566
A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE4
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227
was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant
case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
142
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise
be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous
results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore
be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.12
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case
at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage
was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed
she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article
26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who
divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the
spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For
those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly
divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after
more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
Legislative Intent
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus
Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph
2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to
file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long
and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage
of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would
not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated
Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent
concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that
one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita, the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by
way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married
under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by
our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife
143
to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient
to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
G.R. No. 138322
October 2, 2001
GRACE
J.
GARCIA,
a.k.a.
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
(E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who
has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence
submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that
his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could
only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
GRACE
J.
GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree
is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law
on evidence.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January
7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City,
Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now
remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and
"Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the court a
quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time
he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to
Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
144
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his
prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in
1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue: Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down."13
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any
other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself.
She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated
no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.15 The court
marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties.16 After they submitted their
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.17
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage
was performed.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia
was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis
of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify
or annual.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 21 A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because
of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."26 A
divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.27
Hence, this Petition.18
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be
made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law."28 Therefore,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 29 Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him
to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
"2. The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of
legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner'
marriage to the respondent.
"3. The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
"4. The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and
53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5. The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing
that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties
to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree
before our courts."19
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply
with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles
read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall
specify the following:
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal
ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2)
whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling
on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last
145
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment
or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian
divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign
laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the same shall not affect their persons."
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact
or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer;
and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document –
a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.43 Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. 44 The power of
judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should
be resolved in the negative.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.30 A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is
the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially
body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Second Issue: Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.34
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued
by an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution
of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two
basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond
in full force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.36 The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.37 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation
is effected.46
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective
cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices,
still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute;
thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited
from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.47
Burden of Proving Australian Law
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because
she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia,
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48
146
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a
nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro
Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case
to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's
legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on
the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 3949 of the Rules of Court,
for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree
obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code
was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its
absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of
the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were
presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B"
– Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia
(Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987
in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson
was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act
1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" –
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto; 58 (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" – Statutory
Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since
October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto
clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove
his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on
the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated
to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most
judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
147
G.R. No. 221029
REPUBLIC
OF
vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
THE
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese
husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living
separately from said Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was
previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married
to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she
shall not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the
marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce
decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of
her marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse
and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 20120005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.
SO ORDERED.3
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her
employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient
in form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012,
and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the
Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The facts are undisputed.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation
of Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of
divorce Japanese court.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice
of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in newspaper of general
circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence
(consisting of the trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of
the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12,
2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the
New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether
they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they
celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are
naturalized as citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to
Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal
capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."6
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the
Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf.
Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition
considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her
Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita,
et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in
view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo
as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate
court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to
this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino
was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended
Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgment alleged:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO
MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die
proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x
x x;
148
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a
favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the
parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized
American citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the
way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married
under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two
types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this
jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.15
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3,
1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending
Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision
was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented and
approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26
now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under
Philippine law.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage,
but their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the
case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the principles of
comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality,
but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations
of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining
a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically,
Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese
court and for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it
would not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer
her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried,
she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden
surname.
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is
to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although
the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that
is recognized by his or national law.24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of many
Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands
even after the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws
and perhaps have already married again.25
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child
custody and property relation, respectively.
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their
minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the
149
Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial
court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce
decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved
to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was
denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the
Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court
lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was
obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that
foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron
v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce
decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting
of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect
and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be
recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay,
et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to
obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her
second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue
of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy, We ruled:
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the
ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business
that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the same. Van
Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On
his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts
and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case
filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and
their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he
is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also
no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to
be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the
Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and
wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right
in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce,
which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in
accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court
agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the
case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to
determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property.
150
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop
short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute
divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and
observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the
domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the
foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article
15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto.
Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust
discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected
by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature
only if they are constitutional.43
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject
to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained
under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit
of the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the
framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court
is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its
decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may be
subjected to judicial review.44 The deference stops where the classification violates a
fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution.45 When
these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If
a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since
it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest.47
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent
in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We
put words in the mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the
words to have used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as
are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there
should be departure."38
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection
clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes
the right to free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and
the right to vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured
by the scale rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin
to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such
as the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare.51 It essentially involves
a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the
former to take precedence over the latter.52
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that
the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow
the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting
law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may
render it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this
aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law
itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with
respect to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless declared
otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the
essential requisites53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision
only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her countr.42 Whether
the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving
the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result:
the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the
receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married
to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo,
they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a
doubt, there are political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal
systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien
spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a
Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against
his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the
foreigner.55
151
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a
foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or
her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos
who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them
are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner
spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them
based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or
not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate
against the other.
fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and
so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,
are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid
cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general
prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question
by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was
categorical about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment
because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his
or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36,
37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse
cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should
be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should
be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before
the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything but
comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent
discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case
as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will
automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted.
All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer
specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a
general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot
pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was
primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce.
But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr.
Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a
divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos
to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying
foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine
courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or
concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature.67 On
March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the
Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of
the Philippine Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which
repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as intentional or
unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by
deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living
together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated
and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No.
2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the
New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no
longer recognized.70
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support
what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction.
Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and
overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong, 57 that a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced
in was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, 61 and that the law has been
obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of
a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is
presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than
prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively
more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims or losing end
of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision
to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society
to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.)
Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of representatives. In substitution of
these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage
in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on
Population
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictated
on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go
into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right
marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see it
152
And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree
of absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended,
as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of a
petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even
if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the
Philippines or abroad;
h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse
during the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born
to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim
of rape;
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of a
petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1)
year.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition
for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code,
whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex
to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or
transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of
the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any
attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and
traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of
permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government
to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to
restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion and, thus establish a state religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the
rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely
believes that they are good for country.77 While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil
and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of
any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or
both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of
legal separation.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be
harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the
Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total development.79 It is also
obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. 80 To
Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss
to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of
domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize,
if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person
Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social
institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of
every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.81
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years
of age or over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent
of the parents guradian or personl having substitute parental authority over the party, in that
order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited with the
other and both lived together as husband and wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband and wife;
d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the
same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such
incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or appears
to be incurable.
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a
Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2
Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family
Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or
supervening after the marriage.
153
as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has
to suffer the stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive
interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage
under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against
unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in
arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.82
justice, presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be
dispensed with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead
to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute
may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.88
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement
of communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation
system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have become
not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that
imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the
unfortunate reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self
fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to
safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that
some of them are rotten quality.
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's
petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel
the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation
solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before
a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from
the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse
should not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first
be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of
foreign country.
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add,
by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern
of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably,
the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within
the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only of
our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language.
What we do instead is find a balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be done
even as the law is obeyed.
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese
Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate
General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of
Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the
subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's
judgment decreeing the divorce.93
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them."
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered
admissible a a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree
was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the
validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or
law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the
facts and the law in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient
of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
154
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary
in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the
material defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. x x x
G.R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018
STEPHEN I. JUEGO-SAKAI, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like
any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise
d with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. 96
PERALTA, J.:
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law
validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese
laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the Amended Decision1 dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253 that set aside its former Decision dated November 25, 2015, which in
turn, affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Daet, Camarines Norte,
granting
petitioner's
Petition
for
Judicial
Recognition
of
Foreign
Judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision
and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are
AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and
reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August 11, 2000 in Japan
pursuant to the wedding rites therein. After two (2) years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a
divorce decree in said country dissolving their marriage.2 Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner
filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 40, Camarines Norte. In its Decision dated October 9, 2014, the RTC granted the petition
and recognized the divorce between the parties as valid and effective under Philippine Laws.3 On
November 25, 2015, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
In an Amended Decision4 dated March 3, 2016, however, the CA revisited its findings and recalled
and set aside its previous decision. According to the appellate court, the second of the following
requisites under Article 26 of the Family Code is missing: (a) there is a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.5 This is because the divorce herein was
consensual in nature, obtained by agreement of the parties, and not by Sakai alone. Thus, since
petitioner, a Filipino citizen, also obtained the divorce herein, said divorce cannot be recognized in
the Philippines. In addition, the CA ruled that petitioner's failure to present authenticated copies
of the Civil Code of Japan was fatal to her cause.6
On May 2, 2016, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following arguments:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN
IT HELD THAT THE SECOND REQUISITE FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF
ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE IS NOT PRESENT BECAUSE THE PETITIONER GAVE CONSENT
TO THE DIVORCE OBTAINED BY HER JAPANESE HUSBAND.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE [COURT OF APPEALS] GRAVELY ERRED UNDER LAW WHEN
IT HELD THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENT ON THE
SUBMISSION OF AUTHENTICATED COPIES OF [THE] CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN RELATIVE TO DIVORCE
AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES.7
Petitioner posits that the divorce she obtained with her husband, designated as Divorce by
Agreement in Japan, as opposed to Judicial Divorce, is the more practical and common type of
divorce in Japan. She insists that it is to her great disadvantage if said divorce is not recognized
155
and instead, Judicial Divorce is required in order for her to avail of the benefit under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, since their divorce had already been granted
abroad.8 Moreover, petitioner asserts that the mere fact that she consented to the divorce does
not prevent the application of Article 26 for said provision does not state that where the consent
of the Filipino spouse was obtained in the divorce, the same no longer finds application. In support
of her contentions, petitioner cites the ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Orbecido III wherein
the Court held that a Filipino spouse is allowed to remarry in the event that he or she is divorced
by a Filipino spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship.9 As to the issue of evidence presented,
petitioner explains that the reason why she was unable to present authenticated copies of the
provisions of the Civil Code of Japan relative to divorce is because she was unable to go to Japan
due to the fact that she was pregnant. Also, none of her friends could obtain a copy of the same
for her. Instead, she went to the library of the Japanese Embassy to photocopy the Civil Code.
There, she was issued a document which states that diplomatic missions of Japan overseas do not
issue certified true copies of Japanese Law nor process translation certificates of Japanese Law
due to the potential problem in the legal interpretation thereof. Thus, petitioner maintains that
this constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules on Evidence.10
Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant petitioner's Petition for Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment for she has yet to comply with certain guidelines before our
courts may recognize the subject divorce decree and the effects thereof. Time and again, the Court
has held that the starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. 13 This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on
the alien himself or herself.14 Since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 2415 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court applies.16 Thus, what is required is proof,
either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated
by the seal of his office.17
We grant the petition.
In the instant case, the Office of the Solicitor General does not dispute the existence of the divorce
decree, rendering the same admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the pertinent
Japanese Law on divorce considering that Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not
among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.18
The issue before Us has already been resolved in the landmark ruling of Republic v. Manalo,11 the
facts of which fall squarely on point with the facts herein. In Manalo, respondent Marelyn Manalo,
a Filipino, was married to a Japanese national named Yoshino Minoro. She, however, filed a case
for divorce before a Japanese Court, which granted the same and consequently issued a divorce
decree dissolving their marriage. Thereafter, she sought to have said decree recognized in the
Philippines and to have the entry of her marriage to Minoro in the Civil Registry in San Juan, Metro
Manila, cancelled, so that said entry shall not become a hindrance if and when she decides to
remarry. The trial court, however, denied Manalo's petition and ruled that Philippine law does not
afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or abroad, if they are
married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in
another country.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended
Decision dated March 3, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
On appeal, however, the Court therein rejected the trial court's view and affirmed, instead, the
ruling of the CA. There, the Court held that the fact that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated
the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted should not affect the application nor
remove him from the coverage of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code which states that
"where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." We observed that to
interpret the word "obtained" to mean that the divorce proceeding must actually be initiated by
the alien spouse would depart from the true intent of the legislature and would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is,
specifically, to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The subject provision, therefore, should not make a
distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. 12
Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly rules that despite
the fact that petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is assumed
that she initiated the same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the exception provided under
Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already been
dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu
to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
156
G.R. No. 226013, July 02, 2018
The Court's Ruling
LUZVIMINDA DELA CRUZ MORISONO, Petitioner, v. RYOJI* MORISONO AND LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents.
The petition is partly meritorious.
The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as follows: first, Philippine
laws do not provide for absolute divorce, and hence, the courts cannot grant the
same; second, consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the Civil Code, the marital bond between
two (2) Filipino citizens cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad; third, an
absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws; and fourth, in mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.13
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105
(RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated July 18, 2016 of
the RTC in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 which denied petitioner Luzviminda Dela Cruz Morisono's
(Luzviminda) petition before it.
The fourth rule, which has been invoked by Luzviminda in this case, is encapsulated in Article 26
(2) of the Family Code which reads:
Article 26. x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise. have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
The Facts
Luzviminda was married to private respondent Ryoji Morisono (Ryoji) in Quezon City on December
8, 2009.3 Thereafter, they lived together in Japan for one (1) year and three (3) months but were
not blessed with a child. During their married life, they would constantly quarrel mainly due to
Ryoji's philandering ways, in addition to the fact that he was much older than Luzviminda. 4 As
such, she and Ryoji submitted a "Divorce by Agreement" before the City Hall of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya
City, Japan, which was eventually approved on January 17, 2012 and duly recorded with the Head
of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya City, Japan on July 1, 2012.5 In view of the foregoing, she filed a petition
for recognition of the foreign divorce decree obtained by her and Ryoji6 before the RTC so that she
could cancel the surname of her former husband in her passport and for her to be able to marry
again.7
This provision confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely
because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction
recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses,
must still be determined by our courts. The rationale for this rule is to avoid the absurd situation
of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married
to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or her
national law.14 In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,15 the Court held:
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts
created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition
of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or
as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since
our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil
Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the
Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and se