The Historiography of America’s Involvement in the
Chilean Coup of 1973
Nicholas Matteliano (400081518)
History 3HI3
November 11, 2019
Dr. Stephen Streeter
Matteliano 1
Salvador Allende, the Chilean president from 1970 until he died in 1973, was viewed as a
problem for the United States because of his Marxist ideology, despite being democratically elected. 1
The current evidence shows that President Richard Nixon had both attempted to prevent Salvador
Allende’s election in Chile and, when that failed, prevent him from being appointed by parliament after
winning a plurality in the 1970 election.2 The earliest substantial evidence of U.S. covert actions against
Allende dates back to March 21, 1972. On this day, journalist Jack Anderson discovered “secret
documents which escaped shredding” revealing that International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT
Corporation) had “dealt regularly with the [CIA]” and “considered triggering a military coup to head off
Allende’s election” in 1970.3 A day after Anderson’s article was released, Senator J. William Fulbright
established “a special Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations,” appointing Idaho senator Frank
Church as chairman.4 The Church Committee was created on January 27, 1975. The “public revulsion”
regarding the actions of the Nixon administration prompted a swift public release of the Church
Committee’s report on covert action in Chile from 1963-1973.5 The report was published the same year
the Committee was formed. The Church Committee’s investigations exposed the U.S. covert actions in
Chile which came to be known as Track I and Track II.6
Track I began with the “direct funding” of Eduardo Frei, who won the 1964 Chilean election on
behalf of the Christian Democrats because of these efforts.7 It was mostly “a massive propaganda
1
Jaechun Kim, “Democratic Peace and Covert War: A Case Study of the U.S. Covert War in Chile,” Journal of
International and Area Studies 12, no. 1 (2005): 25
2
Jaechun Kim, “Democratic Peace and Covert War: A Case Study of the U.S. Covert War in Chile,” Journal of
International and Area Studies 12, no. 1 (2005): 40
3
Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability, New Press, 2016. 97
4
Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability, New Press, 2016. 98
5
Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability, New Press, 2016. xiii
6
U.S. Senate, “Covert Action in Chile 1963–1973: The Church Report,” U.S. Senate (1975). 23, 25
7
Jaechun Kim, “Democratic Peace and Covert War: A Case Study of the U.S. Covert War in Chile,” Journal of
International and Area Studies 12, no. 1 (2005): 30
Matteliano 2
campaign against Allende.”8 Nixon continued to organize various “spoiling operations,” funding
Allende’s opposition, but Track I ultimately failed when Allende won a plurality in 1970.9 Track II was
America’s plan to “induce the Chilean military to move against Allende, in effect inciting a military coup”
in 1970. 10 Chilean commander-in-chief Rene Schneider was seen as the primary obstacle to persuading
the military because he respected Chilean democratic traditions and did not want to force Allende out of
office.11 Still, even after Schneider was killed in a botched kidnapping attempt, the coup did not happen
because Chile was not used to officials being murdered like this – Chileans respected the rule of law.12
We now know that the CIA sent money and weapons to “ultra-rightist” Chileans to kidnap Schneider
because he stood in the way of Track II.13 Although the assets were hired to kidnap Schneider, they killed
him in the process.14 Director of Central Intelligence William Colby partook in a closed testimony on July
14 and 15 1975 led by Frank Church, but it was “promptly leaked to the New York Times.”15 He was
“questioned extensively” regarding “orders to foment a coup in Chile in 1970” and admitted that Nixon
“had attempted to foster a coup in Chile” at that time.16 However, Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s Secretary of
State testified that “in my mind, Track II was finished” before Schneider’s assassination.17 Going forward,
8
Jaechun Kim, “Democratic Peace and Covert War: A Case Study of the U.S. Covert War in Chile,” Journal of
International and Area Studies 12, no. 1 (2005): 30
9
Jaechun Kim, “Democratic Peace and Covert War: A Case Study of the U.S. Covert War in Chile,” Journal of
International and Area Studies 12, no. 1 (2005): 31
10
Jaechun Kim, “Democratic Peace and Covert War: A Case Study of the U.S. Covert War in Chile,” Journal of
International and Area Studies 12, no. 1 (2005): 31
11
Jaechun Kim, “Democratic Peace and Covert War: A Case Study of the U.S. Covert War in Chile,” Journal of
International and Area Studies 12, no. 1 (2005): 31
12
Jaechun Kim, "Democratic Peace and Covert War: A Case Study of the U.S. Covert War in Chile," Journal of
International and Area Studies 12, no. 1 (2005): 41, 37
13
Jaechun Kim, “Democratic Peace and Covert War: A Case Study of the U.S. Covert War in Chile,” Journal of
International and Area Studies 12, no. 1 (2005): 41
14
Lubna Z. Qureshi, Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile, Lexington Books,
2009. 64
15
Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability, New Press, 2016. 225
16
Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability, New Press, 2016. 225
17
Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability, New Press, 2016. 24
Matteliano 3
Nixon’s official policy with Chile was to be “very cool and very correct.”18 That he will be cold with
Allende, but do everything diplomatically.19 Yet, a successful coup was launched in Chile on September
11, 1973, when “the Chilean military began its assault on La Moneda palace,” and Allende died of a
suspected suicide, leading General Augusto Pinochet to seize power.20
Although the Church Committee’s report on covert action in Chile uncovered that Nixon was
certainly not “cool” nor “correct” with Allende, the Committee asserted that “[their] report does not
attempt to offer a final judgement on the political propriety, the morality, or even the effectiveness of
American covert activity in Chile.”21 The Committee members were divided on how much they saw their
country as responsible for the 1973 coup despite the clear evidence of America’s failed coup attempt in
1970. Likewise, scholars have also failed to reach a consensus regarding America’s role in 1973.
Nevertheless, no serious scholar would argue that Nixon did not meddle in Chilean affairs in ways that
were not as “correct” as he led on – even if they believe he had nothing to do with the coup. 22 The point
of contention lies in whether it was American covert action or domestic Chilean tensions which caused
the 1973 coup. Some believe that that it was a continuation of the efforts made in 1970, while others
believe that the Nixon administration truly did abandon its efforts to instigate a coup after their failure.
Even with the release of nearly 24,000 declassified documents under the Clinton Administration,
scholars have barely deviated from these two interpretations, only adapting to include new evidence.
In 1976, Mark Falcoff gave a concise overview of the dominant argument which permeated the
contemporary scholarship on the coup of 1973.23 The prevailing narrative according to Falcoff was that
18
Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability, New Press, 2016. 81
Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability, New Press, 2016. 81
20
Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability, New Press, 2016. 466
21
U.S. Senate, “Covert Action in Chile 1963–1973: The Church Report,” U.S. Senate (1975). 28, 56
22
U.S. Senate, “Covert Action in Chile 1963–1973: The Church Report,” U.S. Senate (1975). 28, 56
23
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 38
19
Matteliano 4
the efficacy of the Allende administration had been hindered by an American led “international
conspiracy” despite having initial success regardless of his “scrupulous” navigation of democratic
politics.24 This “international conspiracy” manifested as an “invisible blockade” designed to “strangle the
government.”25 Since this was not enough to defeat Allende, the U.S. enabled the Chilean military to
dispose of him in a coup that killed democracy.26 However, Paul Sigmund was an exception. In his 1974
article “The ‘Invisible Blockade’ and the Overthrow of Allende,” he explains why he is not convinced by
the argument that an “invisible blockade” imposed by the U.S. is what brought Allende’s downfall.27
Sigmund leans toward the realist camp of historians who see American involvement in Chile as being
guided simply by American interests without desiring to meddle in Chilean affairs where their holdings
in Chile were not concerned. Still, he recognized a steep decline in loans from the Inter-American
Development Bank and the World Bank to Chile.28
Nevertheless, he believes Allende’s “clever footwork” enabled him to acquire the necessary
foreign aid “to cover food imports as domestic food production dropped” and that the International
Monetary Fund and other agencies gave “considerable” help in 1971 and 1972.29 To clarify, Sigmund
affirms that the Nixon administration had only “put pressure” on the Chilean economy in hopes that
Chile would negotiate with copper companies and discourage “further cases of expropriation of
American property without compensation.”30 According to him, this was to discourage Allende and
protect American corporate interests because of the expropriation of American corporate assets in Chile
without proper compensation. Not to overthrow Allende in a coup.31 Sigmund claims Allende abused
24
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 38
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 38
26
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 38
27
Paul E. Sigmund, "The "Invisible Blockade" and the Overthrow of Allende," Foreign Affairs 52, no. 2 (1974): 337
28
Paul E. Sigmund, “The “Invisible Blockade” and the Overthrow of Allende,” Foreign Affairs 52, no. 2 (1974): 337
29
Paul E. Sigmund, “The “Invisible Blockade” and the Overthrow of Allende,” Foreign Affairs 52, no. 2 (1974): 337
30
Paul E. Sigmund, “The “Invisible Blockade” and the Overthrow of Allende,” Foreign Affairs 52, no. 2 (1974): 337338
31
Paul E. Sigmund, “The “Invisible Blockade” and the Overthrow of Allende,” Foreign Affairs 52, no. 2 (1974): 338
25
Matteliano 5
“loopholes” in Chilean law.32 In Paris, Allende accepted to “[compensate] for all nationalizations in
conformity with Chilean and international law.”33 According to Sigmund’s narrative, this made Allende’s
nationalization of copper companies illegal because he neglected to compensate for “the remaining
American ownership.”34 Sigmund also argues the majority of the Chilean Congress believed this to be
unconstitutional.35 Thus, Sigmund attributes Allende’s removal to domestic factors. He also views
Allende’s ambitious socialist policies as having led to an inflation increase by “323 percent between July
1972 and July 1973” and the “massive printing of money to solve all problems.”36 Moreover, when
Chile’s foreign aid was cut, it was largely because of its “disingenuousness in contrast references to
credit-worthiness” since the nation remained in debt.37
Elizabeth Farnsworth (1974) along with James Petras and Morris Morley (1974) side with the
New Left and do not believe the nature of U.S. foreign relations is simply to protect American holdings.
Rather, they see American policy as guided by corporate interests. Farnsworth does not buy Sigmund’s
argument and contends there was more than enough circumstantial evidence to link the U.S. to the
coup. She claims the U.S. desire to bring down Allende can be inferred from its relationship to “the
Chilean Right – and its allies in the military – and U.S. corporate and government policymakers.”38
Farnsworth notes that the U.S. government poured $45.5 million into the Chilean military from 1970-74
“double the total for the previous four years.”39 Farnsworth also cites a document among the ITT
memos which discuss goals to have “American businesses … bring on economic chaos.”40 According to
32
Paul E. Sigmund, “The “Invisible Blockade” and the Overthrow of Allende,” Foreign Affairs 52, no. 2 (1974): 335
Paul E. Sigmund, “The “Invisible Blockade” and the Overthrow of Allende,” Foreign Affairs 52, no. 2 (1974): 335336
34
Paul E. Sigmund, “The “Invisible Blockade” and the Overthrow of Allende,” Foreign Affairs 52, no. 2 (1974): 325
35
Paul E. Sigmund, “The “Invisible Blockade” and the Overthrow of Allende,” Foreign Affairs 52, no. 2 (1974): 339
36
Paul E. Sigmund, “The “Invisible Blockade” and the Overthrow of Allende,” Foreign Affairs 52, no. 2 (1974): 339
37
Paul E. Sigmund, “The “Invisible Blockade” and the Overthrow of Allende,” Foreign Affairs 52, no. 2 (1974): 338
38
Elizabeth Farnsworth, “More Than Admitted,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 139
39
Elizabeth Farnsworth, “More Than Admitted,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 138
40
Elizabeth Farnsworth, “More Than Admitted,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 130
33
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Farnsworth, the coup only happened because economic interference was insufficient to take out
Allende.41 Despite Allende’s controversy, his popularity increased in 1972 and 73. He won “7% more
than in 1970” in the 73 election.42 This is notable because “the governing body traditionally loses votes
in mid-term elections.”43 Farnsworth blames “Right-Wing sabotage by the U.S.” for 1973 because the
blockade cultivated a “climate of insecurity” which drove “previously uncommitted” Chileans to support
a military overthrow of Allende.44 Evidence of the U.S. credit blockade can be observed by the way the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) “granted Chile a $65 million loan for a hydroelectric project” on
September 18, 1973 – just 7 days after the coup.45
Petras and Morley propose that the investment of multinational corporations not only guide,
but compete with American state goals.46 Thus, America’s role in Chile should not be interpreted as
defending economic interests from a country with questionable “credit-worthiness.”47 According to
Petras and Morley, an “imperial strategy” led to the Chilean coup due to the “aggregate interests” of
U.S. corporations taking precedent over the desires of the U.S. government.48 The policies of companies,
especially ITT, who wanted a coup of Allende’s government got their way because their motives in Chile
were “more narrowly conceived” and thus more focused than those of the U.S. government.49 While
Sigmund argues “[U.S. policy] was neither as complete, effective nor successful as Petras and Morley
say,” Petras and Morley maintain that it was because the American capitalist system is, by design,
41
Elizabeth Farnsworth, “More Than Admitted,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 139
Elizabeth Farnsworth, “More Than Admitted,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 139
43
Elizabeth Farnsworth, “More Than Admitted,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 139
44
Elizabeth Farnsworth, “More Than Admitted,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 140
45
Elizabeth Farnsworth, “More Than Admitted,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 140
46
James Petras and Morris Morley, “On the U.S. and the Overthrow of Allende: A Reply to Professor Sigmund’s
Criticism,” Latin American Research Review 13, no. 1 (1978): 207
47
James Petras and Morris Morley, “On the U.S. and the Overthrow of Allende: A Reply to Professor Sigmund’s
Criticism,” Latin American Research Review 13, no. 1 (1978): 207
48
James Petras and Morris Morley, “On the U.S. and the Overthrow of Allende: A Reply to Professor Sigmund’s
Criticism,” Latin American Research Review 13, no. 1 (1978): 207
49
James Petras and Morris Morley, “On the U.S. and the Overthrow of Allende: A Reply to Professor Sigmund’s
Criticism,” Latin American Research Review 13, no. 1 (1978): 207
42
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sympathetic to corporate interests above all others.50 Thus, U.S. policymakers were being guided to
create a coup whether those individuals knew it or not.51 There was no singular event that caused the
coup.52
Sigmund also says Farnsworth’s argument makes a “straw man” of his by painting him as an
“apologist for U.S. policy.”53 Sigmund’s main problem with Farnsworth is that he believes she insists that
“there must be an international conspiracy” helmed by the U.S. government in conjunction with
“international financial institutions.”54 He also deems Farnsworth’s analysis of the coup as unreasonable.
He feels she does not consider “that there might be good economic reasons” for providing economic
support to the Pinochet regime regardless of its domestic social policies because it has “scrupulously
observed its foreign debt obligations.”55 Sigmund clarifies his rejection of the “invisible blockade” thesis
by noting what he perceives as “a consistent exaggeration … of U.S. economic pressures.”56 Despite
pressure from ITT from September 1970 to late 1971 and by copper companies, mainly Anaconda and
Kennecott, Sigmund contends Allende was not “cut off,” citing “continued” U.S. military funding of $15
million, not $45 million as Farnsworth says. 57 He claims that $45 million was the amount “authorized”
by congress, not used.58
To Sigmund, this is a significant distinction because the implications of sending $15 million in
military aid indicate supportive intentions whereas $45 million could allude to an American desire to
50
James Petras and Morris Morley, “On the U.S. and the Overthrow of Allende: A Reply to Professor Sigmund’s
Criticism,” Latin American Research Review 13, no. 1 (1978): 213
51
James Petras and Morris Morley, “On the U.S. and the Overthrow of Allende: A Reply to Professor Sigmund’s
Criticism,” Latin American Research Review 13, no. 1 (1978): 213
52
James Petras and Morris Morley, “On the U.S. and the Overthrow of Allende: A Reply to Professor Sigmund’s
Criticism,” Latin American Research Review 13, no. 1 (1978): 206
53
Paul E. Sigmund, “Less Than Charged,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 142
54
Paul E. Sigmund, “Less Than Charged,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 156
55
Paul E. Sigmund, “Less Than Charged,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 156
56
Paul E. Sigmund, “Less Than Charged,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 142
57
Paul E. Sigmund, “Less Than Charged,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 144
58
Paul E. Sigmund, “Less Than Charged,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 144
Matteliano 8
overhaul the Chilean military for the purpose of launching a coup. 59 Sigmund also cites that “Food for
Peace shipments actually increased” under Allende, totalling $5.5 million in 1971 and 1972.60 He
recognizes cuts were made to certain aspects of Chilean aid, but explains this as resulting from Chile’s
questionable “credit-worthiness” given Allende’s hyperinflation.61 Moreover, Sigmund argues that even
if there was a “squeeze” on American support for Allende, he still enjoyed “surprising success in securing
aid from [other] countries, especially in Western Europe and Latin America” and that Chile used “$490
million in short-term credits mostly from Europe and Latin America” in 1973 “before the coup.”62 Hence,
according to Sigmund, U.S. intervention would have had a negligible impact on the coup anyway. This
argument is echoed by Jack Devine and Kristian Gustafson, who will be addressed later in this essay.
Sigmund argues one of the “main causes” for the coup was that Allende was unconstitutional and
“ignoring court orders,” by not preventing “the illegal distribution of arms to [his] supporters.”63
Sigmund acknowledges that “arms were also widely distributed among the right-wing opposition” but
only so Allende could allow leftists to continue their armament.64 Basically, Sigmund asserts that Allende
was willing to look the other way and ignore a public safety threat to please his supporters causing the
military to act against him in a coup.65 However, he does not explain exactly how he thinks Allende was
involved in this.
Mark Falcoff in his 1976 article “Why Allende Fell” takes a more centred approach to the coup,
taking bits of his argument from both realists like Sigmund and his New Left adversaries. Still, he felt that
the contemporary evidence was “embarrassing” for the United States.66 Yet, Falcoff also feels that many
59
Paul E. Sigmund, “Less Than Charged,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 144
Paul E. Sigmund, “Less Than Charged,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 144
61
Paul E. Sigmund, “Less Than Charged,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 145, 148
62
Paul E. Sigmund, “Less Than Charged,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 147
63
Paul E. Sigmund, “Less Than Charged,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 148
64
Paul E. Sigmund, “Less Than Charged,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 148
65
Paul E. Sigmund, “Less Than Charged,” Foreign Policy, no. 16 (1974): 148
66
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 38
60
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scholars have hopped on the bandwagon just to “[score] points against capitalism or [American] foreign
policy.”67 He notes that Patria y Libertad, an extreme right-wing Chilean paramilitary organization, had
existed independently of the CIA and that domestic tensions were prevalent enough to have had a role
in the coup without American encouragement.68 The right-wing Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez had lost to
Allende by “only one and four-tenths of a percentage point.”69 Chileans were “[voting] for radical
change.”70 According to Falcoff, Allende’s policy objectives were primarily the “nationalization of
[Chile’s] mineral resources” which were “largely in the hands of American corporations” as well as “a
redress of social grievances.”71 Unlike Sigmund, Falcoff believes America had a stranglehold on much of
the Chilean economy through the enormous holdings of Anaconda and Kennecott in Chilean copper.72
Both companies had deep and manipulative ties in the industry. Falcoff notes how even in the 1920’s
Anaconda and Kennecott “[paid] practically no taxes” on their earnings from Chilean copper to Chile’s
government.73 The American domination of Chilean copper also became a more pressing issue over time
since Chile was increasingly dependant on this industry.74 By the 70s, copper exports made up “30 to 80
percent of all hard-currency earning” in Chile.75 Thus, Allende’s nationalization of copper can be seen as
an effort to restore Chilean autonomy. However, Falcoff refuses to conflate American control of Chilean
copper with the control of Chilean sovereignty despite America’s powerful influence on the Chilean
economy; especially since Chilean copper faced “serious competition,” particularly from aluminum.76
Falcoff believes Washington worked to discredit Allende both before and after his election but denies it
67
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 38
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 39
69
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 39
70
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 39
71
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 38
72
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 43
73
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 43
74
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 44
75
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 44
76
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 44
68
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instigated the coup.77 Former Chilean Ambassador Edward Korry admitted he was “against Dr. Allende …
and everything he stood for” but that ITT twice volunteered to fund a coup but Washington refused.78
Falcoff at least partly sides with Sigmund’s rejection of the “invisible blockade” thesis, agreeing that the
U.S. could have cut Chile’s economic aid much more suddenly and harshly than it did.79 However, Falcoff
recognizes that America desired to see Chile struggle under Marxism and gradually lessened its financial
aid partly in order to do so – not simply because of Chile’s questionable “credit-worthiness.”80 Falcoff
also accounts for American Cold War foreign policy objectives by noting this. But Ultimately, Falcoff
denies “violent overthrow” was part of the American agenda in Chile in 1973.81
The release of almost 24,000 declassified documents under the Clinton administration marked a
new paradigm in the scholarship regarding the 1973 Chilean coup. Thus, recent scholarship has turned
mostly to U.S. government reports. However, many arguments evident in older scholarship are still
being applied since the approaches of modern historians draw largely from the realists and the New
Left. In 2014, former CIA operative Jack Devine argued the CIA’s activities in Chile certainly aided
Allende’s downfall, but claims “that outcome was not the intention.”82 And although their efforts did
support the coup, their role was “relatively minor.”83 Devine criticizes Peter Kornbluh, who is
sympathetic to the New Left’s argument, for disregarding what he sees as a vital distinction between the
American role in Chile in 1970 and that of 1973. Devine observes that in 1970, the U.S. had tried to
prevent Allende’s presidency after winning the election and took part in the killing of Schneider whereas
77
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 42
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 42
79
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 42
80
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 43
81
Mark Falcoff, “Why Allende Fell,” Commentary 62, no. 1 (1976): 43
82
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 173
83
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 173
78
Matteliano 11
in 1973, “the conditions on the ground in Chile did not favour the kind of military coup that the
Whitehouse had envisioned.”84 Devine cites the CIA station chief in Santiago as having “strongly
recommended against supporting [the 1973 coup].”85 Devine sees his disagreement with Kornbluh as a
matter of how much “[CIA] activities influenced the political environment which contributed to Allende’s
downfall.”86 Devine argues that the CIA abandoned plans for an overthrow of Chilean democracy
following the accidental murder of Commander in Chief Rene Schneider in 1970 during a botched
kidnapping attempt. Instead, the CIA’s approach was centred on supporting “certain media outlets and
protest groups . . . [but] not the Chilean military” since it would be easier if Allende could be removed
democratically by losing the next election.87
Devine’s interpretation shares continuity with Sigmund’s because, as he sees it, the CIA played
“a relatively minor role” in the 1973 coup.88 He maintains that domestic tensions were sufficient to
account for Allende’s downfall. Devine feels that Kornbluh and the others in his camp “overlook the
economic and political incompetence of Allende’s government.”89 According to Devine, Allende was a
grave threat to Chilean democracy through his “very serious flirtation with President Fidel Castro of
Cuba” and especially “the extreme leftists of Chile’s Revolutionary Left Movement”90 Devine cites his
own role in the March of Empty Pots and Pans as first-hand experience of President Allende’s disastrous
84
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 172
85
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 172
86
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 173
87
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 173
88
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 173
89
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 173
90
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 173
Matteliano 12
economics and the violence of radical Chilean leftists.91 Devine claims that one of his covert assets in
Chile was the one who led the March. He claims she organized the demonstration in response to
Allende’s “nationalization of industry” and the resulting “shortages of basic goods” due to “business
owners . . . leaving the country” and “taking their capital . . . with them.”92 Devine contends that the
march was also a display of the brutality of Allende’s supporters. He recalls gangs of “leftist youths”
assaulting the protestors and how “images of Chilean housewives getting harassed . . . flashed around
the world.”93 Although Allende blamed the United States, Devine says “his claims of American meddling
had begun to sound like an excuse” since the public was increasingly discontent with his rule.94
In funding El Mercurio, Chile’s major newspaper, Devine believes the CIA was defending Chilean
democracy by keeping them in business since Allende “was blocking its access to newsprint.”95 Devine’s
view of Allende is of a leader who had destroyed his economy through nationalizing private industries,
essentially robbing his citizens while neglecting to defend Chileans from violent attacks from leftists,
among various other infractions against democracy. 96 Thus, the Chilean military attacked Allende “not
because the United States wanted it to do so but because the country was in disarray.”97 Devine admits
Nixon and Kissinger “take credit for Allende’s removal” as mentioned in a declassified transcript, but still
91
Jack Devine, “What Really Happened in Chile: The CIA, the Coup against Allende, and the Rise of Pinochet,”
Foreign Affairs 93, no. 4 (2014): 30.
92
Jack Devine, “What Really Happened in Chile: The CIA, the Coup against Allende, and the Rise of Pinochet,”
Foreign Affairs 93, no. 4 (2014): 30.
93
Jack Devine, “What Really Happened in Chile: The CIA, the Coup against Allende, and the Rise of Pinochet,”
Foreign Affairs 93, no. 4 (2014): 30.
94
Jack Devine, “What Really Happened in Chile: The CIA, the Coup against Allende, and the Rise of Pinochet,”
Foreign Affairs 93, no. 4 (2014): 31.
95
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 173
96
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 174
97
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 174
Matteliano 13
asserts that the 1973 coup was not their invention.98 He says they did this simply because the coup
resulted in “a Cold War victory for the United States” and that “it is hardly uncommon for political
figures to take excessive credit” for such things.99
Kornbluh suggests that Devine puts too much weight on his own experience in the CIA in
support of his interpretation of the American role in the coup.100 According to Kornbluh, even if the CIA
channelled more efforts into other means of removing Allende after the failed coup attempt in 1970,
this does not mean that the U.S. did not intentionally continue to support future efforts for a coup.101 He
argues that “U.S. policymakers adjusted their strategy but not their ultimate goal.”102 Kornbluh cites
agent Thomas Karamessines’ testimony that “Track II never really ended [for the CIA].”103 Kornbluh
notes that Nixon was influenced by Henry Kissinger to not heed the State Department’s advice to
“accept Allende’s election and work toward his electoral defeat in 1976.”104 According to Kornbluh, to
maintain the illusion that he was not interfering in Chilean democracy, President Nixon “instructed his
top national security aides” to disguise their subversive activities against Allende with a “ ‘very cool and
very correct’ public posture” to prevent suspicion of their undermining of Chilean democracy.105
Kornbluh also notes that U.S. military officials “met with Pinochet and his aides … a full year before the
98
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 174
99
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 174
100
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 174
101
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 172
102
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 169
103
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 169
104
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 169
105
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 169
Matteliano 14
coup” and that the CIA gave millions to El Mercurio recognizing in the summer of 1973 that El Mercurio
and Patria y Libertad “have set as their objective” the instigation “of military intervention.”106 The CIA
funded Patria y Libertad as well.107 Kornbluh observes that questioning if “Washington played a direct
role in the coup is a red herring” since their methods can be indirect and still render their desired
results.108 He also lends new evidence to the “invisible blockade” thesis, going as far as to blame early
scholars who denied the blockade for producing “disingenuous official histories.”109 He cites a “secret
memo” as evidence that Nixon “[acted] to effect the early departure” of the Inter-American
Developmental Bank because it was unwilling to bend to his interests.110
Kristian Gustafson (2007) and Lubna Qureshi (2008) also reflect the legacy of the realist and
New Left perspectives respectively but take more extreme positions than Devine and Kornbluh.
Gustafson asserts that the U.S. had nothing to do with the plotting of coup of 1973 whereas Devine says
they had a “relatively minor role” in it. 111 He notes that the CIA was “ordered to avoid prompting a coup
on its own” and “minimized its contacts with the army.”112 The CIA had depended on its ties to the
Christian Democrats to follow the coup’s development, but the military did not trust them, convincing
Gustafson that “the CIA did not have the best intelligence on the coup plot as it developed.’’113
Gustafson also notes Col. Paul Wimert’s account of his attempt “to disburse bribery money on behalf of
the CIA [to the Chilean army.]” 114 Wimert was rejected by his contacts, who claimed they did not want
106
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 170-171
107
Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability, New Press, 2016. 91
108
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 170
109
Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability, New Press, 2016. 84
110
Peter Kornbluh, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability, New Press, 2016. 84
111
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 173
112
Kristian Gustafson, Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974, Potomac Books, 2007. 231
113
Kristian Gustafson, Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974, Potomac Books, 2007. 231
114
Kristian Gustafson, Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974, Potomac Books, 2007. 239
Matteliano 15
the money because they were “doing this for [their] country not because of the United States.”115
Gustafson chastises “those who argue that the United States played the decisive role in the [coup]” for
adhering to an “absurd” kind of “American exceptionalism,” countering that the American government
simply does not work that synergistically.116 To understand the American role in the coup, Gustafson
stresses that “one needs to separate causation from correlation.”117 Here, Gustafson reiterates the claim
Devine makes of the CIA’s actions as being “a relatively minor role” and having far less of an impact than
those like Kornbluh happen to think.118 He notes ITT’s involvement in the coup as “peripheral
participation in Chile” and also believes the CIA’s claim that they rejected a coup funded by ITT.119
Gustafson notes that the popular tendency to view U.S. intelligence operations as “superhuman” and
“inherently evil” distracts many from interpreting America’s roll in Chile in a way that does not conform
to this perspective.120 As a realist, Gustafson sees “covert action … [as] a tool of statecraft used by all the
major world powers, whose study is important for its future use” and that it is not only necessary but
sometimes good.121 Gustafson shares this belief with Devine, in that they both believe that the U.S.
mission in Chile was to preserve democracy.122
Lubna Qureshi’s view of Allende is unique in that she sees his economic policies as largely
successful despite being ambitious. Despite acknowledging that Allende nationalized “30 percent of
Chilean industry” (including not only copper and telecommunications but also top industrial companies,
banks and “other important raw materials”), Qureshi denies Allende’s expropriation was “heavy-
115
Kristian Gustafson, Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974, Potomac Books, 2007. 239
Kristian Gustafson, Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974, Potomac Books, 2007. 239
117
Kristian Gustafson, Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974, Potomac Books, 2007. 239
118
Jack Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93,
no. 5 (2014): 173
119
Kristian Gustafson, Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974, Potomac Books, 2007. 241
120
Kristian Gustafson, Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974, Potomac Books, 2007. 242
121
Kristian Gustafson, Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974, Potomac Books, 2007. 4
122
Kristian Gustafson, Hostile Intent: U.S. Covert Operations in Chile, 1964-1974, Potomac Books, 2007. 239, Jack
Devine and Peter Kornbluh, “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5
(2014): 173
116
Matteliano 16
handed.”123 Qureshi praises Allende’s nationalization policy because his “radical redistribution of
income” improved the nutrition of impoverished Chileans and gave them clothes to wear “instead of
rags.”124 She argues the hyperinflation Allende caused was worth it because it enabled the “boost in
state spending by 70 percent in 1971” which generated these results.125 Rather than draw most of her
attention to the detrimental aspects of Allende’s leadership, Qureshi’s focus is on Nixon, who she calls
“[contemptuous] for Latin American political processes.”126 Qureshi believes that corporate interest
rather than Cold War fears of communist expansion are what drove the U.S. toward success in initiating
the coup of 1973. Evidently, she is very sympathetic to the New Left’s perspective on corporate interest
in American foreign policy.
According to Qureshi, the Nixon Administration was not motivated to start the coup because of
Allende’s Marxist threat because they knew “Allende could never have matched the might and power of
Washington and its reactionary Chilean clients.”127 Qureshi, like Devine, also cites “the March of Empty
Pots and Pans” as a critical event leading to the coup of 1973, but she sees it as evidence of American
intervention.128 She feels that the protestors who partook in the march were “manipulated” by the
upper class since “many of the shortages” Chileans endured under Allende were actually “the direct
123
Lubna Z. Qureshi, Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile, Lexington Books,
2009. 101-102
124
Lubna Z. Qureshi, Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile, Lexington Books,
2009. 103
125
Lubna Z. Qureshi, Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile, Lexington Books,
2009. 104
126
Lubna Z. Qureshi, Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile, Lexington Books,
2009. 3
127
Lubna Z. Qureshi, Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile, Lexington Books,
2009. xii
128
Lubna Z. Qureshi, Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile, Lexington Books,
2009. 119
Matteliano 17
result of the machinations of Washington and the Chilean social elite.”129 Qureshi also believes the
Chilean trucker’s strikes of 1972 and 1973 were especially destructive orchestrations of Washington and
corporate America in Chile because it “lacked an extensive railway system” to deliver products across
the country.130 Qureshi claims the strikes were artificial because truckers, who were presumably
protesting because of their poor living conditions, were found eating “lavish communal [meals] of steak,
vegetables, wine and empanadas” they said came “from the CIA.”131 Qureshi also reports that the
truckers received $400,000 from ITT to continue their strike.132 Qureshi not only blames Washington as
the most significant instigator of the 1973 coup, she even believes that Pinochet was “previously [a]
strict constitutionalist” who “reluctantly admitted,” after being influenced by the CIA “that Allende …
must be eliminated.”133 Qureshi’s claim of Pinochet’s supposed constitutionalism is controversial
considering his disturbing disregard for human rights during his reign.
Ultimately, the point of contention regarding America’s involvement in the Chilean coup of 1973
is small considering the overwhelming evidence of Nixon’s meddling in Chile. Even so, deciding whether
or not American covert action was the primary cause of the coup carries drastic implications regarding
the context for analyzing America’s role as a global power. Of the many moments in American history
which contributed to the gradual dissolution of its identity as a benevolent power, the Chilean coup is
easily among the most damning. To say Nixon started the coup rather than just facilitated it lends strong
support to the narrative that America is consistently more committed to supporting imperial interests
129
Lubna Z. Qureshi, Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile, Lexington Books,
2009. 119
130
Lubna Z. Qureshi, Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile, Lexington Books,
2009. 119
131
Lubna Z. Qureshi, Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile, Lexington Books,
2009. 119
132
Lubna Z. Qureshi, Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile, Lexington Books,
2009. 120
133
Lubna Z. Qureshi, Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile, Lexington Books,
2009. 123
Matteliano 18
over the liberal democratic values extolled by its constitution. Still, the historiography of the coup
reveals that scholars are nowhere near reaching a consensus answer to this vital question; even the
introduction of new evidence has done nothing to bring us closer to reaching one. The current
interpretations are very similar to those found decades earlier. Little has been done to push past the
interpretations put forth by the realists and the New Left.
Matteliano 19
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