MODERNIZATION
Theories
and Facts
By ADAM PRZEWORSKI andFERNANDO LIMONGI*
Introduction
T
JL
THAT makes political regimes rise, endure, and fall?Do democ
V V
racies
as a consequence
of economic
development?
destabilize
democracies?
Is
there some
growth
emerge
rapid economic
Does
level of
development beyond which democracies aremore likely to fall? Is Eu
ropean
veloped
Our
history unique
countries?
or is it
repeating
itself
in contemporary
less de
two theories
is to distinguish
that relate economic
de
purpose
some facts in
and democracy
and to examine
velopment
light of these
concern
theories. While
the interesting
the mech
ultimately
questions
anisms that mediate
between
economic
and the dynamics
development
we must nevertheless
of political
the facts to be ex
regimes,
identify
we stick as close as
into explanations.
Hence,
plained before plunging
nar
to
pose the question
patterns. We
possible
elementary
descriptive
the impact of development,
rather than
rowly, examining
exclusively
seeking
to
broadly
deliberately
the world
we
the dynamic
of political
regimes. Hence,
such as religion,
in
colonial
legacy, position
or diffusion,
which
have been
distribution,
to influence
the incidence
of democracy
We
believe
explain
ignore factors
income
system,
by others
that our question
answers,
vergent
well understood.
found
In Section
in its own
is important
right, that
and that it raises methodological
I, we
reconstruct
two alternative
views
it lends
itself to di
issues
that are not
of the relation
be
tween development and democracy, both put forth by Lipset,1 and we
count
the cases
that fit them.
In Section
II we
examine
the vulnerabil
*
We
Cheibub, Fernando Cort?s, Larry Dia
appreciate comments by Mike Alvarez, Jos? Antonio
mond, John H. Kautsky, Seymour Martin
Lipset, Alejandro
Lopez, Jos? Maria Maravall, Guillermo
and Susan Stokes. This work was supported in part by a grant from the National
Science
O'Donnell,
no. SES-9022605.
Foundation
1
of Democracy:
Economic Development
and Po
Seymour Martin
Lipset, "Some Social Requisites
litical Legitimacy,'' American Political Science Review 53 (March 1959); and idem, Political Man:
Social Bases of Politics (Baltimore: Johns
Press, 1981).
Hopkins University
WorldPolitics 49 (January1997), 155-83
The
WORLD POLITICS
156
to economic
crises. In Section
the
III we consider
ity of democracies
most
criticisms
substantive
of Lipset
'sviews, and in Section
important
IV we study methodological
reflections
close
criticisms. Methodological
the paper.
Appendix
1 explains
and political
our classification
of
regimes, while Appendix 2 spells out the analytics of regime dynamics.
I. Economic
Development
and Democracy
observation
that democracy
is related to economic
develop
Lipset's
in 1959, has generated
the largest body of research
ment, first advanced
on any
and con
It has been supported
topic in comparative
politics.
several
buried and resuscitated. And while
tested, revised and extended,
articles
in the recent Festschrift
to
Lipset
the theory nor the facts are clear.2
Even a glance at the aggregate
patterns,
the relation between
levels of development
proclaim
conclusions,
neither
such as Figure
1, shows that
and the incidence of demo
a
of regimes
is strong.3 Indeed,
condi
regimes
probit analysis
as
to which we refer
tional only on the per capita income,
throughout
the level of development,
correctly classifies 77 percent of 4,126 annual
cratic
observations.4
The
probability
is
than 0.99.
chance
greater
by
are
two
Yet there
distinct
democracies
nomically,
may
or
that
this classification
is not generated
reasons
this relation may hold: either
eco
as countries
to emerge
develop
likely
de
be established
of economic
independently
be more
they may
2
in Gary Marks
and
"Economic Development
and Democracy
Reconsidered,"
Larry Diamond,
in
Honor
Martin
eds., Reexamining
Larry Diamond,
of Seymour
Lipset (Newbury
Democracy: Essays
Park, Calif: Sage Publications,
1992).
3
lead to somewhat divergent results, the
While
different data sets and different estimation methods
most
finds that
study of the aggregate patterns thus far, by Burkhart and Lewis-Beck,
causes democracy. Ross E. Burkhart and Michael
S. Lewis-Beck,
Granger
Thesis," American Political Science Review 88
Democracy: The Economic Development
careful statistical
economic
development
"Comparative
(December
1994), 903-10.
4
and democ
the relation between development
A fair amount of ink has been spilled over whether
to
Democratic
W.
of
Economic
is
linear.
See
Robert
"On
the
Relation
Jackman,
racy
Development
and Zehra F. Arat,
Science 17 (August 1973), 611-21;
American Journal of Political
Performance,"
Modernization
Theory Revisited," Comparative Politics 21
"Democracy and Economic Development:
is a qualitative or a lim
however measured,
(October 1988), 21-36. We now know better. Democracy,
it ranges from 2 to 14 on the Freedom
ited variable: it assumes values of 0 or 1 under our measurement;
House Scale created by R. D. Gastil, Freedom in theWorld: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1987-88
(New York: Freedom House,
1988); from 0 to 100 on the scale of Kenneth A. Bollen, "Issues in the
American Sociological Review 45 (June 1980),
of Political Democracy,"
Measurement
Comparative
can become negative as the level of de
no
and so on. Hence,
index
of
370-90,
democracy
predicted
can exceed whatever
is the maximum
index of democracy
tends to zero, and no predicted
velopment
value of a particular scale as the level gets very large. Only a nonlinear function, such as the normal or
as
can satisfy these constraints. See Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven:
logistic,
suggested by Robert A. Dahl
is
Yale University
This
Press, 1971).
throughout.
why we use probit or logit models
MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS
157
1.00000
0.94737
0.88421
0.82105
0.75789
0.69474
0.63158
0.56842
0.50526
0.44211
*
*
*
0.37895
0.31579
0.25263
0.18947
0.12632
0.06315
*
*
2,0000
4,000
Level:
Probability
that
a Regime
a1985 PPP USD-purchasing-power
*
*
parities
6,000 8,000
GNP/cap
in 1985
1
Figure
is Democratic,
inU.S.
PPP USD*
by Per Capita
Income
dollars.
to survive in
but may be more
countries.
velopment
likely
developed
We
call the first explanation
and the second "exogenous."
"endogenous"
we
are
two
Since
democracies
emerge
dealing with
only
regimes,
to assert that democracies
whenever
die.5
Hence,
emerge
dictatorships
as a result of economic
same as to say that dictator
is
the
development
as countries
die
ruled
ships
by them become
economically
developed.
is then secreted out of
Democracy
by economic
develop
dictatorships
ment. A story told about country after country
is that as they develop,
to
social structure becomes
labor processes
require the
begin
complex,
active cooperation
of employees,
and new groups emerge and organize.
run
As a result, the system can no longer be effectively
by command:
the society is too complex,
the direct pro
technological
change endows
some
ducers with
and private
civil society
information,
autonomy
and dictatorial
forms of control
lose their effectiveness.
Vari
emerges,
ous groups, whether
or
the bourgeoisie,
workers,
just the amorphous
"civil society," rise against the dictatorial
regime, and it falls.
The
is a "modernization"
endogenous
theory. The basic
explanation
of this theory, in any of its versions,
is that there is one gen
assumption
5
is not quite true of our data set, since different countries enter and exit the sample at differ
This
ent moments.
For now, we consider the population of countries as fixed, but see Section IV.
WORLD POLITICS
158
eral process of which democratization
ization
other
of a gradual differentiation
in a separation
that culminates
consists
structures
structures
consist
chains
is but the final stage.Modern
and makes
society
ready
Modernization
democracy
of industrialization,
and political
mobilization,
of sequences
tion, communication,
others:
innumerable
a
of social
and specialization
structures
from
of political
causal
The
specific
possible.
to
a
accumulation
urbanization,
educa
among
incorporation,
that
of social changes
democratization.
progressive
to its culmination,
proceed
may be one reason the incidence
is re
of democracy
commen
and this is the reading most
lated to economic
development,
to
tators
influential
His most
critic, O'Donnell,
impute
Lipset.6
as
s thesis as
countries
become
Lipset
saying that "if other
paraphrases
rich as the economically advanced nations, it is highly probable that
democracies."7
then, is endoge
Democracy,
they will become
political
Ac
since it results from development
under authoritarianism.
nous,
one
to this
of events one would
expect is
theory, the sequence
cording
democratic
countries
and becoming
of poor authoritarian
developing
a "threshold."
some level of
once
they reach
development,
are
to die and democra
that dictatorships
equally likely
so many
cies to emerge at any level of development.
They may die for
conse
reasons
with
all its modernizing
that development,
different
no
role. After
all, as Therborn
quences,
emphasized,
plays
privileged
not
because of
of
countries
because
democratized
wars,
many European
a story
defeat in the Malv
"modernization,"
repeated by the Argentine
of the
fell in the aftermath
inas and elsewhere.8
Some dictatorships
Yet
suppose
for instance?who
had been
dictator?a
of a founding
Franco,
order. Some collapsed
the dictatorial
capable of maintaining
uniquely
crises. Some because of foreign pressures.
because of economic
to
die and democracies
If dictatorships
emerge randomly with
regard
be more democracies
is it still possible
that there would
development,
countries
than among
poor ones? If one is to take
among wealthy
a nation,
more well-to-do
at his own word?"The
the greater
Lipset
even if the emergence
of
the chances
itwill sustain democracy"9?then
death
democracy is independent of the level of development, the chance that
6
Diamond
and John D. Stephens,
(fn. 2), 45; as well as Evelyne Huber, Dietrich
Rueschemeyer,
on
7 (Summer
Economic
"The Impact of Economic Development
Democracy," Journal of
Perspectives
1993), 71-86.
7
Studies in South American
and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism:
Guillermo
O'Donnell, Modernization
of California,
Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International
1973), 3.
Studies, University
8
Goran Therborn,
"The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy," New Left Review, no. 103
(May-June
9
Lipset
1977).
(fh. 1,1959),
56.
MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS
159
such a regime will survive is greater if it has been established in an af
fluent
country. We
thus expect
would
to observe
democracies
to appear
randomly with regard to levels of development, but to die in the poorer
democracy
ac
ones. Thus,
history gradually
since every time a
democracies,
dictatorship
happens
wealthy
an affluent country,
to stay (see
is
there
democracy
Appendix
since
is therefore no longer a modernization
the emer
theory,
is not brought
about by development.
Rather,
democracy
as a deus ex machina.
survives
if a
It
appears exogenously
country
is "modern,"
countries
cumulates
to die
in
2). This
of
gence
and survive
in the wealthier
it is not
but
Are we splitting hairs?
Examine
first some descriptive
a
product
patterns.
of "modernization."
The
facts we
report
concern
135 countries between roughly 1950 and 1990. "Entry" year refers to
or to the first
country became
independent,
and "exit" year refers to
data are available,
year
the data are available. All the regimes that
1990 or to the last year when
or dictator
as democracies
occurred during
this period were classified
with
"authoritarian
(we use the latter term interchangeably
ships
we observed
101 democratic
224 regimes,
and
regimes").10 Altogether,
1950,
or to the year when
economic
for which
a
to levels of
and growth
development
at
rates are
in constant U.S.
dollars computed
purchasing
expressed
in
all
numbers
refer
and
1985
$
(Thus
power parities
prices.
expressed
123 authoritarian.
The
references
to 1985 PPPUSD.) The lowest level we observed in the entire sample
is $226 (Burma in 1950), the highest is $18,095 (United States in
1989).11
as a result of economic
devel
If the theory that democracy
emerges
to
be more
is true, transitions
would
opment
democracy
likely when
In fact, tran
authoritarian
regimes reach higher levels of development.
as per
rises
sitions are increasingly
likely
capita income of dictatorships
but only until it reaches a level of about $6,000. Above
that, dictator
more
stable as countries become more affluent. Dictator
ships become
10
Our
1 and in
in Appendix
and the resulting list of regimes are described
regime classification
Alvarex et al., "Classifying Political Regimes," Studies in International Comparative Development
reason for
selecting this period and the sample is the availability of internationally
(forthcoming). The
we describe
we took from the Penn World Tables 5.6. The
which
economic
data,
sample
comparable
here and use throughout does not include six countries that derive at least half of their income from oil
are available for 4,730 country years, data for economic growth are avail
revenues. While
political data
in most analyses.
is the number of observations
able for only 4,126 country years, which
11
Readers used to the UN or theWorld Bank GNP figures should be aware that counting incomes at
to increase significantly
the levels for poor countries and to decrease
purchasing-power
parities tends
It
be
useful for future reference to know what different
may
slighdy the numbers for rich countries.
numbers describe: by 1990, Nigeria had a per capita income of $995, Indonesia had $1,973, Czecho
slovakia $4,094, Spain $9,576, and the United States $18,073.
Mike
WORLD POLITICS
160
survive,
ships
or at least succeed
one another,12
in the
invariably
are somewhat
less stable
almost
those under $1,000. They
very poor countries,
in countries with
incomes between
and $4,000
$1,001
and even
less so
above $4,000. But if they reach the level of $6,000, transitions to
democracy become less likely.As the lower panel of Table 1 (PADcol
umn 4) shows, the probability of any dictatorship dying during any year
is 0.0206; for those dictatorships with incomes over $1,000, this prob
over
ability is 0.0294, over $5,000 it is 0.0641, over $6,000 it is 0.0484,
it is 0.0333.
$7,000
it seems, was
Huntington,
correct with
to
regard
dictatorships: they exhibit a "bell shaped pattern of instability"13
we
these patterns can be predicted
by per capita income,
on level and,
the transition
conditional
given
probabilities
test whether
To
estimate
the nonlinearity
The results are
of the observed
its square (see Appendix
2).
patterns,
inTable 2. As we see, the probabilities
of dic
presented
tatorships falling, p^, predicted by the level of development correspond
to those observed.
closely
and then decline.
Indeed,
flourished
good health.
than one-half
of their
in
Singapore,
and Mexico
Argentina,
comes above
in countries
range
that were
it is clear that many dictator
regimes,
that
those countries
Even disregarding
it in
ships passed
derive more
the $5,001-$6,000
the threshold at which development is supposed to
for authoritarian
the grave
until
for years
survived
dictatorships
wealthy. Whatever
dig
increase
They
$5,000,
revenues
from
Belgium,
France,
dictatorships
USSR, Spain, Bulgaria,
Taiwan,
in
after these countries
enjoyed
East Germany,
for many years
which
Austria,
oil,
Germany,
Ice
land, Italy,Netherlands, and Norway did not have by 1950. Table 3 lists
the dictatorships that survived even though the probability that the
was above
regime is democratic
predicted
by the level of development
to per
0.50, which
capita income of $4,115.
corresponds
Yet this may not be a fair test of modernization
theory. The hypoth
over a
esis implied by this theory is that ifa country develops
longer pe
so
have
the
that all
riod under dictatorship,
consequences
modernizing
to accumulate,
then itwill embrace
this premise
is vacuous:
only
tatorships
time
out
of
123?did
"modernity."
that developed
Let
over
develop
us thus examine
under
longer
more
authoritarianism
But for most dic
democracy.
19 dictatorships?to
remind,
of time and reached
periods
the ones
closely these countries,
and became
"modern," which
12
If President Viola succeeds President
successive dictatorships.
that we do not distinguish
Note
Videla or even if ayatollahs succeed a shah, we treat it as one continuous
spell of dictatorship.
13
Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University
Samuel P. Huntington,
Press,
1968), 43.
MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS
1
Table
Regime
by Lagged
Transitions
Per Capita
(annual
Income
(Level)"
data)
TRD
TA
PDA
TRA
TD
0.0066
0.0248
0.0276
0.0161
0.0492
0.0641
0.0625
0.0333
6
18
8
3
6
5
2
1
915
727
290
186
0.1250
0.0571
0.0380
0.0333
0.0187
0.0088
0.0083
0.0000
9
14
7
5
2
1
1
0
72
245
184
150
107
113
121
619
3991
0.0206
49
2380
0.0242
39
1611
3004
2032
1558
1222
993
802
649
0.0294
0.0339
0.0379
0.0534
0.0571
0.0484
0.0333
43
25
17
14
8
3
1
1465
738
448
262
140
62
30
0.0195
0.0124
0.0081
0.0042
0.0023
0.0014
0.0000
30
16
9
1539
1294
1110
960
853
740
619
PJK
TTR
TOT
PAD
-1000
1001-2000
2001-3000
3001-4000
4001-5000
5001-6000
6001-7000
7001
0.0152
0.0329
0.0316
0.0238
0.0349
0.0314
0.0196
0.0015
15
32
15
987
972
474
336
229
191
153
649
AU
0.0221
88
0.0243
0.0202
0.0167
0.0147
0.0101
0.0050
0.0015
73
41
26
18
10
4
1
Low-High
161
122
78
32
30
Above
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
is lagged, we
"Since per capita income
are used:
abbreviations
lose 135 observations,
that either regime dies during
PJK is the probability
TTR is the number of transitions
TOT is the total number
of regime years at a particular
of transition to democracy
PAD is the
probability
TRD is their number
TA is the total number
PDA is the
probability
TRA is their number
TD is the total number
we will
and eighteen
year
level
of years under democracy
to mean
that at some
income of $4,115. (SeeTable 4.)
teen,
more
particular
following
of years under authoritarianism
of transition to authoritarianism
take arbitrarily
Gabon,
Syria,
enced a sustained
a
for the total of 3,991. The
time
a per
they had
capita
are the three countries
and Yugoslavia
that experi
increase in income over, respectively,
twelve, seven
was the
years, reached the level at which
democracy
remained
under
likely regime, and, having
experi
dictatorships,
are the two
enced a series of economic
crises.
and
Malaysia
Singapore
over a
countries
that
became
and re
long period,
wealthy,
developed
mained
until now. In East Germany,
USSR, Spain,
Taiwan,
dictatorships
and
but
fell,
Bulgaria,
dictatorships
eventually
only many
Hungary
WORLD POLITICS
162
Table
Regime
Transition
_Per
Level
<1000
1001-2000
2
Probabilities
Capita
Income
by Lagged
Predicted
and
Its
Square3_
PM N
PD*
PDA
0.098
PAD
0.010
PDD
0.902
0.990
0.092
987
(0.125)
0.072
(0.007)
0.017
(0.875)
0.928
(0.993)
0.983
(0.053)
0.191
972
(0.057)
(0.025)
(0.943)
(0.975)
(0.304)
2001-3000
0.044
0.028
0.956
0.972
0.388
474
3001-4000
(0.038)
0.026
(0.028)
0.039
(0.962)
0.974
(0.972)
0.961
(0.424)
0.600
336
4001-5000
(0.033)
0.015
(0.016)
0.047
(0.967)
0.985
(0.984)
0.953
(0.326)
0.758
229
5001-6000
(0.019)
0.008
(0.049)
0.050
(0.981)
0.992
(0.951)
0.950
(0.720)
0.862
191
6001-7000
(0.009)
0.004
(0.064)
0.047
(0.991)
0.996
(0.936)
0.953
(0.876)
0.921
153
7001-
(0.008)
0.0006
(0.063)
0.017
(0.992)
0.999
(0.937)
0.983
(0.887)
0.965
649
(0.000)
(0.033)
(1.000)
(0.967)
(1.000)
0.051
0.028
0.959
0.977
0.354
(0.024)
(0.021)
(0.976)
(0.979)
(0.466)
All
3991
*
Based on a dynamic probit model. See Appendix
2. The probabilities pv j=A,D, k=A,D
sitions and survival.
is the equilibrium proportion of democracies. Observed
transition
p*D
Table 1) are in parentheses.
are of tran
rates (from
years after they had reached the critical level of income. Given its 1974
income
level, Uruguay
should
never
have been
a
dictatorship.
The
eco
nomic history of the Chilean dictatorship is convoluted: its income in
1974 was $3,561, it climbed with downs and ups to $4,130 by 1981,
collapsed to $3,199 by 1983, recovered to surpass the 1974 level only
by 1986, and passed the threshold of $4,155 in 1989, exactly the year of
transition.
The
the threshold
history
of Poland
of democracy
our criteria,
it reached
an economic
it experienced
crisis
is similar:
in 1974;
by
in 1979 and a mass movement for democracy in 1980, passed the
threshold again in 1985, and became a democracy in 1989. In turn,
Brazil,
Greece
Czechoslovakia,
are the dream
and perhaps
Portugal,
cases of a modernization
that developed
under a dictatorship,
off more or less at the same
threw dictatorships
are few.
countries
This
is not
to say that democracies
did not
even
South
Korea
and
theorist.
These
are
wealthy,
levels. But
and
became
income
sometimes
emerge
they
be
MODERNIZATION:
Highest
& FACTS
163
3
Table
of Per Capita
Income
(Level) under Which
in different
dictatorships
survived
countries
Levels
Highest Level
11698
10433
8598
8067
7744
7390
6969
6939
6866
6505
6463
6434
5815
5674
Year
Country
1990
1988
1979
1990
1989
1976
1976
1957
1988
1980
1981
1976
1972
1979
1987
1973
1981
1990
1978
1987
1981
1974
1962
1957
1981
Singapore
East
Germany
Iraq
Taiwan
USSR
Spain
Gabon
Venezuela
Bulgaria
Argentina
Mexico
Iran
Argentina
Yugoslavia
Hungary
Greece
Uruguay
Malaysia
Poland
South
THEORIES
Korea
Syria
Portugal
Argentina
Argentina
Suriname
prob(reg=dem)?
0.992
0.977
0.923
0.895
0.875
0.851
0.818
0.815
0.809
0.776
0.772
0.769
0.705
0.690
0.687
0.637
0.630
0.625
0.623
0.620
0.569
0.568
0.553
0.530
0.513
5650
5218
5162
5117
5102
5080
4668
4657
4541
4355
4220
*
The
is the probability that a regime is democratic given the level. It is calculated as
PROB(reg=DEM)
nor
where
the
l-F(a+?*LEVEL),
parameters are estimated by the probit model and F(.) is the cdf of the
mal distribution.
cause
do not
modern;
put otherwise,
dictatorships
fall for the same reasons in all countries. Thus moderniza
countries
necessarily
tion may
became
"explain" why
democracy
was
established
in countries
that de
even it these countries had waited for its
veloped over a long period
But ifmoderniza
of time that cannot be predicted.
periods
some level of
tion
is to have any predictive
power, there must be
theory
sure that the country will throw
one can be
income at which
relatively
advent
for
off the dictatorship. One is hard put to find this level, however: among
the countries
that
satisfy
the premise
of the modernization
theory,
the
range of levels atwhich dictatorships survived is very wide (see the list
inTable 4).
WORLD POLITICS
164
Countries
That
4
Table
over Long
Developed
and Reached
Incomes
Entry
Country
Gabon
Brazil
Chile
Uruguay
South Korea
Malaysia
Singapore
Syria
Taiwan
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
East
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Poland
Level
1961
1965
1974
1969
1864
3561
1974
1961
1957
1965
1961
1952
1981
1964
1971
1967
1971
1971
4148
911
1282
1845
1607
968
4216
1654
4995
3308
3657
3109
Spain
USSR
Yugoslavia
PROB=0.50
1314
2205
2536
2073
Dictatorship
Peak
Passes
Year
1951
1951
1961
1961
Portugal
under
Periods
above
$4,115a
1973
1980
1981
1989
1974
1985
1982
1972
1978
1979
?
1989
?
1970
1974
1974
1985
1973
1964
1971
1974
Transition
Year
PROB
1976
1980
1981
1989
1981
1988
1990
1990
1981
1990
1989
1989
1988
1974
1987
1978
1988
1974
1976
1989
1979
0.82
never
0.52
0.47
0.53
1978
no
1989
0.63
1985
0.48
0.68
0.50
at PROB
Year
0.53
0.68
1988
0.63
never
0.99
never
0.57
never
0.90
post 1990
1989
1989
1990
1974
1989
no
1989
0.80
0.51
0.98
0.61
0.69
0.62
0.55
0.57
1975
0.85
1976
0.88
0.69
0.80
0.51
}
0.61
0.68
0.55
0.52
0.85
collapsed
collapsed
that grew over the period of at least seven years and at some time reached
or the year after the country became
or the
income
of
$4,115.
per capita
Entry is 1951
independent
data
became
available.
Passes
PROB=0.50
is
the
when
the
reached
after
economic
year
year
per
country
capita income of $4,115. Peak gives the time when the country reached the highest income level under
aThis table lists countries
and the probability, as predicted
dictatorship
transition
gives the year the dictatorship
democracy. Finally,
at
that time.
racy
the particular
Moreover,
even
if to
predict
is not
by per capita income, that itwould be a
fell, if ever, and the probability of democ
the same
as to
explain,
"explain
ing" can easily entail an ex post fallacy.Consider Taiwan, which in 1961
had a per capita income of $968, which developed rapidly, passing by
1979 our threshold of $4,115, which on the basis of its income level
had a probability of 0.10 of being a dictatorship in 1990, andwhich in
1995
elected
its president
in contested
elections
for the first
time.
Sup
pose that every year during all this time, the Taiwanese dictatorship
faced a probability of 0.02 of dying for reasons not related to develop
ment.
It thus had
about
a 50 percent
chance
of not
being
around
by
1995 even if it had not developed at all.We may therefore attribute to
development
what
may
have
been
just
a culmination
of random
haz
MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS
165
ards.And, indeed, theTaiwanese dictatorship most likely democratized
ones.14
reasons, not for economic
geopolitical
the causal power of economic
Thus,
development
Few
authoritarian
down
appears paltry.
torships
for
of modernization
premise
theory;
in bringing
dicta
regimes
satisfy the
over a
that is, few developed
long pe
riod. And even ifmost of those that did develop eventually became
no level of income
occur.
that would
democracies,
predicts when
of the level of development,
In turn, per capita income, our measure
on
is
The
the survival of democracies.
has a strong impact
simple fact
that during the period under our scrutiny or ever before, no democracy
ever fell,
else, in a country with a per capita in
regardless of everything
come higher than that of Argentina
democracies
collapsed,
countries
in 1975: $6,055.15 Thirty-two
and not one
incomes
above $6,055
spent 736 years with
out of
democracies
while
sixty-nine
thirty-nine
that were poorer.
did
fall
in
survives increases
1 shows, the probability
that democracy
In countries with per capita
with per capita income.16
As Table
monotonically
income under $1,000, the probability that a democracy would die dur
ing
was
a
life
year was 0.125, which
implies that their expected
was
this probability
and $2,000,
$1,001
years.17 Between
particular
eight
of about
duration
for an expected
0.0571,
years. Above
eighteen
could expect to last forever. Statistical
$6,055, democracies
analysis, the
results of which
are shown inTable 2 (column 1), confirms that per
is a good predictor
of the stability of democracies.
capita income
himself
These
cry out for an explanation.
thought
Lipset
findings
is that wealth
survive in affluent countries
that the reason democracies
moderates
is a plausible
in various ways
explanation
the intensity
but not easy
of distributional
to prove
conflicts.
This
The
intu
rigorously.18
itive story is this: Suppose that the political forces competing over the
14
An analogy may be useful. Suppose that someone runs the risk of 0.01 of dying from accidental
at the age of seventy-eight
causes
she gets hit by a falling brick. To
during each year of her life and that
old
to
she
of
to
conclude
that
died
is
death
this
attribute
age.
development
15
The claim about the prewar period is based on rather heroic backward extrapolation of 1950 in
lower: we guess
fell in Europe were an order of magnitude
comes, but the levels at which democracies
in 1933, and
in 1930, $1,474 inGermany
it to have been $1,825 inAustria in 1934, $1,974 in Finland
$1,814 in Italy in 1922.
16
and Keith T. Poole, "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive
John B. Londregan
and Poole found a similar pattern with regard to
Politics
42
World
Power,"
(January 1990). Londregan
times more
1950
121
between
and 1982 coups were twenty-one
In
countries
of
their
coups.
sample
to
occur
wealthiest
countries.
than
the
the
among
among
poorest
likely
17
life in any state is the inverse of the probability of transition away from this state.
Expected
18
at the
Survive in Affluent Countries?"
Adam Przeworski,
(Paper presented
"Why Democracies
San Francisco, August 28-September
annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,
1,
1996).
WORLD POLITICS
166
of income
distribution
democratic
share
of
choose
the verdicts of
with
complying
some
case each can
to
expect
get
a
over
is
which
fight
dictatorship,
between
in which
competition,
total income,
or
risking
costly but which gives the victor all of the income. Now
suppose that
the marginal
is lower at higher
levels of con
utility of consumption
is
the struggle for dictatorship
the gain from winning
sumption. Thus
smaller. In turn, if the production function has diminishing marginal
a part of it dur
in capital stock, the "catch-up" from destroying
war for
in
is faster at lower levels of wealth. Hence,
ing the
dictatorship
a dictator
is greater and the accu
the value of becoming
poor countries
returns
cost of
countries,
destroying
capital stock is lower. In wealthy
the gain from getting
all rather than a part of total income
by contrast,
is smaller
is slower. Hence,
and the recuperation
from destruction
is more attractive
in poorer countries.
struggle for dictatorship
mulated
for ex
there are always alternative
One,
interpretations.
Obviously,
is just a proxy for education
and more educated
ample, is that income
are more
to embrace democratic
the ac
values. But while
likely
people
cumulated
of an average member
of the labor
years of education
measure
stocks we have?does
increase the
force?the
of educational
probability
of income
stronger.
These
Lipset
nation,
The
of survival
of democracies
survives when
observations
education
strongly
of level, the effect
independently
is controlled,
and indeed it ismuch
confirm
the
s
is established,
theory. Once
democracy
the more
likely that itwill survive.
reason we observe
the relation between
and the incidence
to survive
once
version
exogenous
the more
of
a
well-to-do
levels
is that democracies
of democracy
are established
in rich countries.
they
of development
are almost certain
True, dictator
are less stable when
they reach the per capita income of $4,000.
ships
1 is that while
the pattern we observe
in Figure
But what
generates
it is impregnable
in the
is terribly fragile in poor countries,
democracy
rich ones. The probability that a democracy will die during any partic
an income above
ular year in a country with
two in a thousand
since at such
years. And
zero:
is practically
$4,000
die at
levels dictatorships
that independently
of the
one would
percent,
expect
in the long run democracies
initial distribution,
in such wealthy
countries.19
percent of regimes
the rate of 5.7
torships
died
at a double,
triple,
or whatever
would
Even
times
constitute
if wealthy
higher
96.1
dicta
rate, that
is,
*
19
where p stands for tran
In the long run the proportion of democracies
equals p^/
PDA)>
(p^
D
2. The
for
sition probabilities, A for dictatorship
and
("authoritarianism"),
democracy. See Appendix
numbers in the text are derived from Table 1.
MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS
167
even
to
if development
made
transitions
much more
democracy
likely,
all the difference
is
could
3.9
make
percent.
endogenous
theory
to believe
there are no grounds
To conclude,
that economic
develop
ment breeds democracies:
as O'Donnell
Lipset's
"optimistic
equation,"
dubs it,20 the "benign line" in the language of Huntington
son,21 has few countries
running
In turn, once
random directions.
and certain
die in poor countries
and Nel
it and those that do scatter
along
are
democracies
established,
likely
to survive in
ones.
wealthy
in
to
II.Ups or Downs?
There
factors
to
irony
Lipset
democracies
why
is yet another
to
explain
he
Huntington,23
when
destabilized
thought
countries
s
cited several
theory. While
Lipset
and
Olson22
survive, anticipating
were more
to be
that democracies
likely
s view, this threat to
grew rapidly. In Lipset
and com
"extremist movements"?fascism
democracy
originated with
was a
as he saw it, extremism
of rapid de
munism?because,
product
occurred
"Wherever
industrialization
velopment.
rapidly, introducing
industrial
discontinuities
and
between
the
situation,
pre-industrial
sharp
more
Here
rather
less extremist
than
and company
Lipset
working-class
could not have
movements
been more
emerged."24
wrong.
Rapid
growth is not destabilizing for democracy (and neither is it for dicta
a decline
at the
in incomes,
they die
in
to last nineteen
and can be expected
years, but when
an
life
comes are
at the rate of 0.0160, with
expected
they die
growing,
democracies
that grow slowly, at the
of sixty-four
years.25 Moreover,
rate of less than 5 percent per annum, die at the rate of 0.0173, while
those that grow at a rate faster than 5 percent die at the rate of 0.0132.
torship). When
rate of 0.0523
democracies
face
(SeeTable 5.)
ismost
What
striking is how fragile
crises. In poor countries,
of economic
poor democracies
those with
per
are in the face
capita
income
under $2,000, of the 107 years during which a decline of incomes oc
curred,
twelve
democracy
democracies
under
such
the following
is about
conditions
fell
life of
year: the expected
nine years. Even
among
20O,Donnell(fn.7),4.
21
inDeveloping
and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation
Samuel P. Huntington
19.
Countries (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976)
22
as aDestabilizing
Mancur Olson Jr., "Rapid Growth
Voice? Journal ofEconomic History 23 (De
cember 1963).
23
(fn. 13).
24Huntington
54.
(fn. 1,1981),
Lipset
25
and Poole (fn. 16) with regard to coups,
This finding parallels again the results of Londregan
which
they found to be less likely when the economy grows.
Observed
Table
5
by Lagged
Rates of Transitions,
of
Rate
Lagged
Economic
All
Growth
Level
0-1000
1001-2000
2001-3000
3001-4000
4001-5000
5001-6000
6001-7000
7001
Total
PJK
Income
Per Capita
Growth3
Democracies
Dictatorships
TTR
TOT
PAD
15
987
420
567
0.66
1.01
0.39
972
299
673
TRD
6
4
2
915
397
518
12.50
21.74
23
8.16
49
2.48
3.26
2.15
18
7
11
727
215
512
5.71
2.76
8
3
5
290
80
210
3
186
3.33
1
52
4.88
2
134
4.55
1.52
2.14
9
G> 0
1.06
6
Total
3.29
32
G<=0
4.68
14
G> 0
2.67
18
Total
3.16
15
G<=0
4.96
6
474
121
G> 0
2.55
9
353
2.38
Total
2.38
8
3
5
336
93
243
1.61
1.92
1.49
229
54
175
4.92
6.25
4.44
122
32
90
191
35
156
6.41
10.53
5.08
78
19
59
0.88
32
0.83
G> 0
2.06
Total
3.49
G<=0
5.56
G> 0
2.86
Total
3.14
G<=0
5.71
G> 0
2.56
Total
1.96
G<=0
8.82
G> 0
0.00
Total
0.15
G<=0
0.00
G> 0
0.19
Total
2.21
G<=0
3.43
G>0
1.70
a
Since per capita income
are used:
abbreviations
88
40
48
is lagged, we
3.75
PDA is the
probability
TRA is their number
TD is the total number
245
84
161
7
3
4
184
41
143
2.75
5
2
3
150
41
109
1.87
2
107
22
85
8.33
4.35
3.80
7.32
2.80
1.18
113
16
97
0.00
1.03
5
0
27
0.00
0
3.33
0.00
3.70
1
0
1
30
3
27
0.00
0.00
0
0
619
107
0.00
0
512
2.06
2.61
1.78
49
21
28
2380
803
1577
649
110
539
3991
1166
2825
lose 135 observations,
a
of regime years at a particular
of transition to democracy
of years under authoritarianism
of transition to authoritarianism
of years under democracy
14
7
7
2
2
TOT is the total number
TA is the total number
72
121
29
92
153
6.25
34 40.00
119
0.00
that either regime dies during
PJK is the probability
TTR is the number of transitions
PAD is the
probability
TRD is their number
TD
PDA
Total
3.23
TRA
TA
G<=0
G<=0
and
2.42
5.23
1.60
for the total of 3991. The
particular
level
3.44
year
39
19
20
1611
363
1248
following
MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS
169
countries with incomes between $2,001 and $6,000, a decline of in
comes resulted in the fall of six democracies in 120 years during which
to last 20 years. And
could expect
this happened:
these democracies
a miracle
occurs:
in the 252 years during which
then, above $6,055
economic
democracies
crises, none ever fell.
wealthy
experienced
is that the political
effects
Another
striking feature of these patterns
crises are immediate:
occur one year later.We
tried to
they
over a
account
longer period and
growth
reproduce Table 5 taking into
more
we did statistical
than one year.
(survival) analyses
lagging growth
one year of
Both
show that past
does not matter:
procedures
growth
to
economic
crisis is enough
effects.
the political
produce
of economic
Thus the hypothesis that rapid growth destabilizes regimes is simply
it is true that "economic
In turn, to cite Diamond
and Linz,
crisis
common
one of the most
to
democratic
threats
represents
stability."26
are
and
economic
What
destabilizes
democracies,
crises,
par
regimes
false.
ticularly
poor
are
democracies,
vulnerable
extremely
to bad
economic
performance.
III. Kinks: Modernization
While
ences
there are important
between Huntington
theoretical
Theory
Revisited
and even
sharper political differ
both argued that there is a
and O'Donnell,
level beyond which further development decreases the probability that
that both regimes be
will survive. Huntington
contended
democracy
occurs
a country
come unstable when
which
modernization,
undergoes
at some
in turn,
levels of development.
intermediate
O'Donnell,
a country exhausts "the easy
tend to die when
claimed
that democracies
stage of import
substitution,"
was concerned
Huntington
were
whether
they
distinction
political
form
of government
democratic
at some intermediate
level.
again
with stability of regimes and did not care
or authoritarian.
"The most
important
countries,"
among
but their degree
he
not
their
Hence,
the
told us, "concerns
of government."27
United States, theUnited Kingdom, and the Soviet Union were all sys
tems
it is the
"the government
governs." Whether
politburo,
he insisted,
little. "The problem,"
the cabinet, or the president matters
"was not to hold elections but to create organizations."
Indeed, we were
in which
told, "The primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legiti
26
in Latin Amer
and Juan J. Linz. "Introduction: Politics, Society, and Democracy
Larry Diamond
Latin Amer
in
Countries:
and
S.
M.
in
L.
Diamond,
ica,"
J. J. Linz,
Lipset, eds., Democracy
Developing
ica (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 17.
27
(fn. 13), 1.
Huntington
WORLD POLITICS
170
never
to
While
public order."28
explicitly
referring
Lipset, Hunt
some of the tendencies
encom
that "in
ington observed
actuality, only
in the concept
of political
the
modernization'
characterized
passed
areas. Instead
of a trend toward competitiveness
and
modernizing'
to auto
there was an erosion of democracy'
and a tendency
democracy,
cratic military
and one-party
of stability
Instead
,
regimes
regimes.
there were repeated coups and revolts."29
mate
raked Lipset through the coals
Anticipating Huntington, O'Donnell
for various
methodological
in retrospect,
he observed
nant?testimony
of a debate that in 1971 had recently begun and today
it is no
is finished:
series
on his criticisms
transgressions.
Reflecting
rem
that "Chapter I is now an archeological
of data
longer necessary
to demonstrate
that
to lead the reader
'socio-economic
not foster
through
tedious
development'
"30
What
the data
does
show,
'democracy and/or political
stability.'
that
in
is
South
the
O'Donnell
asserted,
America,
contemporary
higher
are associated with non-demo
and the lower levels of modernization
are found at inter
democracies
cratic political
systems, while
political
at least within
the range
mediate
levels of modernization."
Hence,
we should observe
fall as
that democracies
observed
by O'Donnell,
economies
develop.
Is there
some
level of development
more likely to die than before? Note
that the function
relating
beyond
which
democracies
are
(returning toTable 2, column 5)
the equilibrium
proportion
to
of democracies
per capita income has a kink at levels between $3,001 and $4,000: the
observed
values
are 42.4
percent
between
$2,001
and $3,000,32.6
per
cent between $3,001 and $4,000, and 72.0 percent between $4,001 and
are
$5,000. But this kink is due to the fact that dictatorships
ally stable in this range, rather than that democracies
exception
are less stable.
did find a countercase
O'Donnell
capita income. While
his account of the rise of bureaucratic
authoritarianism
against Lipset,
is not a com
The probability of a democracy dying declines monotonically with per
studied a country that turns out to be a dis
peting
theory.31 O'Donnell
a
tant outlier:
is the only country where
fell at an
democracy
Argentina
income above $6,000; Argentina
is also the only country where one col
at an income between
two democra
and $6,000. Only
$5,000
lapsed
28
29
Ibid., 7.
Ibid., 35-36.
30
Studies in South American Politics, 2d
and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism:
O'Donnell, Modernization
ed. (Berkeley: Institute of International
of California,
1979), 204.
Studies, University
31
was careful about not
was
to
his
O'Donnell
claims:
purpose
making general
explain the downfall
of democracies
in the Southern Cone. But his theory of "bureaucratic authoritarianism"
captured the
as
of
scholars
around
treated
it
almost
the
who
world,
imagination
everywhere.
applicable
MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS
171
cies fell in countries with incomes between $4,000 and $5,000: again
one of them inArgentina, and the other inUruguay. Five democracies
fell between $3,000 and $4,000: one of them inArgentina. Indeed,
only five democracies
outside Argentina,
fell in countries
with
incomes
above $3,000: in Uruguay in 1973 at $4,034, Suriname in 1980 at
$3,923, Chile in 1973 at $3,957, Fiji in 1987 at $3,398, and Greece in
1967 at $3,176. Thus, Lipset was right in thinking that the richer the
the more
country
likely
it is to sustain
IV.Does History
democracy,
Repeat
except
inArgentina.
Itself?
came
in 1950, the regimes we observed
or the en
of two effects: their dynamic
into being
or at least into our
trance of new countries
into the world,
sample.
inde
in our sample that were
countries
the seventy-three
Consider
of them had democratic
in 1950, when
regimes. By
thirty-five
pendent
to
countries
increased
these
of democracies
1960 the number
among
was still
in
to fall to
thirty-one
by 1968. It
only
thirty-one
thirty-nine,
Since
our observations
begin
as a result of either
1978, afterwhich
it climbed, back to thirty-nine in 1984 and to forty
our count
to the "old" countries,
with
regard
by 1990. Hence,
to which
oceanic analysis, according
roughly agrees with Huntingtons32
eight
(1) the "secondwave" of democratization began in 1943 and ended in
1962, (2) the "second reversewave" started in 1958 and ended in 1975,
and (3) the "thirdwave" of democratization began in 1974. But the
story of the countries
that became
independent
after
1950
is entirely
different. Three out of twenty-five (12.0 percent) newly independent
countries
seven
were
democracies
out of forty-two
(14.3
in 1960;
percent)
the numbers were
subsequently,
in 1968, eleven out of fifty-five
(16.6 percent) in 1978, and twelve out of sixty-eight in 1990 (17.6 per
of democracies
the proportion
among these "new" coun
cent). Hence,
or up. In turn, the
no waves
tries grew slightly with
rolling down
in the world during
of democracies
of the aggregate
decline
proportion
rather than
of new countries
the 1960s is largely due to the emergence
to transformations
of old ones.
Since observations of any limited period of time combine dynamic
contro
and entry effects, the question whether
repeats itself is
history
tradition assume it does: they infer the his
in the
versial. Studies
Lipset
observations.
from cross-sectional
of "modernization"
torical process
32
Samuel P. Huntington,
in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman:
The Third Wave: Democratization
74 countries while our sample cov
16.
considered
of Oklahoma
Press, 1991),
Huntington
University
ers 135 countries; hence, the data are not exacdy comparable.
WORLD POLITICS
172
Followers
claiming
not to be
of Moore33
that
contest
theWestern
repeated.
Cross-sectional
the validity
of such inferences,
however,
was
route to
democracy
unique,
European
observations
can be used
to infer historical
processes
on some ex
that regimes
survive or die conditional
are the same across
(in our case per capita income)
cross sections,
so that the
different
that a country has a par
probability
on the realized values of these
ticular regime at any time depends
only
or the time when
the
rather than the period,
the region,
variables,
if the probabilities
variables
ogenous
country became independent. And we know that (1) the probability
that a democracy is born iswidely scattered with regard to the level of
development, rising at low levels and declining at high levels; (2) the
probability that a democracy dies declines monotonically with per capita
the probability
that a country has a demo
these
level. The question,
then, iswhether
were the same in different
or
conditional
regions.
probabilities
periods
cross-sec
on
about
the
The
of
inferences
based
controversy
validity
can be formulated
in a number
tional observations
of alternative ways:
income; and
cratic regime
(3) as a result,
increases with
(1)Were these probabilities different beforeWorld War II inWestern
Europe and elsewhere? (2)Were they different during the postwar pe
countries
and
that existed before
1950 ("old" countries)
among
later ("new" countries)?
those that became
independent
a
set
Without
full
of data for the prewar period, we can only make
to the first
economic
data for
guesses with
regard
question. Although
riod
with
after
the prewar period are not comparable
those at our disposal
to guess the
levels at
1950, we made heroic assumptions
approximate
which
democracies were established
and fell in some of the present OECD
are
inTable 6.
countries. The results of these calculations
presented
that these are not the only democracies
that existed
however,
Note,
as well
as several Latin
War
II. Southern
before World
European
American
while
countries
in Eastern
experienced
relatively
long spells of democracy,
most of the democratic
regimes that emerged
Europe
in the aftermath ofWorld War I collapsed after the first election.34And
must have been
at the
and Uruguay
relatively wealthy
Argentina
of the century, the average per capita income in Latin Amer
beginning
in 1913
ica was about one-half
of that of the present OECD countries
while
and
in 1950,
while
the average
income
in Eastern
Europe
was
only
33
and Democracy
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1965).
Jr., Social Origins ofDictatorship
Barrington Moore
34
in office between parties occurred
is Czechoslovakia,
The exception
but note that no alternation
in the history of Eastern Eu
during this period. Indeed, the first alternation resulting from elections
in
1991.
in
Poland
occurred
rope
MODERNIZATION:
Approximate
THEORIES
6
Table
Per Capita
Income at the Time of Democratization
in Some of the Present
oecd Countries3
First Democratization
Date
Australia (1901)
Austria
Belgium
Canada (1920)
Denmark
Finland (1917)
France
Germany
Italy
Norway (1905)
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
173
& FACTS
1901
1918b
1919b
1920
1901
1919
1875c
1919
1919
1884
1918
1870d
1911e
1830f
Reversal
Level
Date
Level
3733
1545
2960
3838
2213
1184
1748
1072
1920
1228
1919
2226
3016
1119
Present
Date
1825
none
none
none
1930
none
1933
1922
Level
1901
1951
1919
1920
1901
1944
1875
1949
1946
1884
1918
1870
1911
1830
none
1934
Democracy
1974
(?)
1474
1814
none
none
none
none
none
3733
2535
2960
3838
2213
2636
1748
2567
1708
1228
1919
2226
3016
1119
"Levels are GDP/cap expressed in 1985 USD. They are calculated by extrapolating backward the 1951
for per capita GDP expressed in 1985 PPP USD, using the index numbers for GDP and the pop
in the Twentieth Century (Paris:
ulation figures provided by Angus Maddison,
The World Economy
is dated by (1) the presence of contested elections or
OECD, 1992), Appendixes
I, II. Democratization
on a
partisan basis and (2) legislative sovereignty of the house elected by broadest suffrage
ganized
came later, but not
to the crown or a nonelective
(rather than responsibility
upper chamber), whichever
numbers
or
For countries
participation.
by the extent of franchise
are for the year of
independence.
parentheses
b1920 figures were used.
that became
independent
after 1871, dates
in
in France to 1884, while John D. Stephens, "Democratic Transi
cTherborn (fn. 8) dates democracy
in Europe, 1870-1939:
A Test of theMoore Thesis," American Journal of Sociol
tion and Breakdown
as one of consolidation.
The question mark for France
ogy 94 (1989), refers to the period 1875-84
refers to the Vichy
dBothTherborn
regime.
and Stephens
date democracy
in Switzerland
to circa 1880, when
the first national
register was established.
in the United Kingdom,
but scholars who use universal
eRobert Dahl uses 1911 to date democracy
as
to
and
Its Critics (New Haven: Yale
male suffrage
the criterion date it
1918. See Dahl, Democracy
Press, 1989).
University
f
in the United States ranges widely, from 1828 by Huntington
The dating of democracy
(fn. 32), 16,
as a criterion, we date it early.Maddison
to 1970 by Therborn.
does
Since we do not take participation
not provide a figure for 1830; we interpolated
the numbers using 1820 and 1840.
electoral
slightly higher.35All this is not much to stand on, but perhaps enough
to believe that (1) the levels at which democracies emerged before
World War IIwere highly scattered; (2) they did not differ between
and (3) once established,
and other parts of the world;
Europe
were more
to fall in the poorer countries.
democracies
likely
Western
35
World
Table 1.1.
Bank, World Bank Development
Report
1991
(Washington,
D.C.: World
Bank,
1991),
WORLD POLITICS
174
are on firmer
the second question.36 Compar
ground answering
are more
shows that democracies
ing the "new" and the "old" countries
are more
to die in
brittle in the new countries while dictatorships
likely
We
the old ones. And, asTable 7 shows, the level of development again has
powerful effects. The probabilities of a democracy falling decline dra
matically with level in both groups of countries: indeed, this probabil
ity is the
same
once
countries
reach
an
income
$2,000. The
level among the
above
to
increases with
of a transition
democracy
probability
after
But among the countries
that became
old countries.
independent
are
as when
are as stable when
are
1950, dictatorships
they
they
wealthy
in new countries with
incomes above
fifteen dictatorships
poor. Among
$2,000, only one fell during their 185 years until 1990, in Suriname in
at $2,888,
in the Seychelles,
after 1990.
and only one more,
coun
the effect of levels at which
We may be confusing,
however,
tries were first observed
and the effect of development
they experienced
new countries were much
the
And
the
under
scrutiny.
during
period
income was $1,103?than
the old ones?which
average
poorer?their
were first observed. To
had an average income of $2,613?when
they
1988
of the tran
these effects, we show inTable 8 the derivatives
distinguish
to the entry levels and to the
sition
regard
separately with
probabilities
since then.37 The
effects of the entry level are about the
development
are more
same for the two groups of countries. Democracies
stable and
more brittle in countries
either when
that were wealthier,
dictatorships
But the
in 1950 or whenever
first observed
they became
independent.
since the time of entry differ greatly between
effects of development
increases much
the two groups of countries. The
stability of democracy
36
A third question has also been posed: when D. A. Rustow, pointed out that the levels of develop
ment atwhich different countries permanendy
institutions vary widely, Lipset s
established democratic
was that the thresholds at which democracy was established were lower for the
(fn. 1,1981)
rejoinder
to Democracy,"
see Rustow,
A
"Transitions
Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970).
early democracies;
war indicates
at
at
levels
which
democracies
the
emerged before and after the
rough guess
comparing
that levels at which democracy was established before the war must have been on the average lower.
of incomes during the two periods was not the same: it is doubtful that many
But the distribution
countries enjoyed incomes above $4,000 before the war. Hence, we do not know how long the coun
democracies. At most, we can
tries that were poor at the time would have waited before becoming
occurred before the war with the distrib
of levels at which democratization
compare the distribution
inTable 6 we
ution in the postwar period truncated at $4,000. If in addition to the guesses presented
the two distribu
also assume that incomes were lower in Eastern Europe and most of Latin America,
tions will be highly similar. But that is too many guesses to take seriously.
37
to level is Pr[R?GIME(t)=DEMOC
relates regimes
that the function which
Suppose
a normal or
F
where
for
stands
RACY]=REG(t)=F[a+?LEVEL(t)],
logistic distribution. Now sub
to get REG(t)=F{cc+?LEVEL(0)+
tract and add ?LEVEL(O)
within
the square brackets,
?[LEVEL(t)-LEVEL(0)]}. Defining LEVEL(O) as INI andLEVEL(t)-LEVEL(0) asDEV(t), and
allowing the (cross-sectional)
ment
yields REG(t)=
F[a+?c
effect of the initial level to differ from the (dynamic) effect of develop
is the model we estimated, by dynamic probit.
INI+?DDEV(t)].This
7
Table
and Predicted
Observed
Regime
Lagged
Per Capita
Income
(level)
by
Transition
Probabilities,
and by Groups
of Countries51
PJK
TJK
TOT
PAD
New
0.0124
18
1448
0.0058
Old
0.0275
70
2543
(0.0058)
0.0359
Low-High
TA
PDA
TRA
TD
7
1211
0.0464
11
237
42
1169
(0.1183)
0.0204
28
1374
TRD
All
(0.0544)
(0.0340)
-2000
New
0.0135
15
1111
0.0058
6
1036
0.1200
9
75
Old
0.0377
32
848
(0.0058)
0.0297
18
606
(0.1480)
0.0578
14
242
(0.0279)
(0.0707)
2000
New
0.0086
3
347
0.0054
Old
0.0225
38
1695
(0.0058)
0.0427
1
185
0.0123
2
162
24
563
(0.0203)
0.0124
14
1132
(0.0676)
(0.0156)
are used:
aThe following abbreviations
is
that either regime dies during
PJK the probability
TTR is the number of transitions
a
particular
of regime years at a particular
of transition to democracy
TOT is the total number
PAD is the
probability
TRD is their number
TA is the total number
level
of years under authoritarianism
of transition to authoritarianism
PDA is the
probability
TRA is their number
TD is the total number
New
year
of years under democracy
that did not exist in 1950
stands for countries
Old
stands for countries
Numbers
in parentheses
that existed
in 1950
are values
predicted
by the dynamic
Table
probit model.
8
of Transition
with
to the
Probabilities
Regard
the
and
Initial
Development
Accumulated
("Entry") Level
at the Means
by Groups
of Countries51
Evaluated
Derivatives
with Regard to
Initial Level
Derivative
Old
of
-0.0554
Pda
aLevel ismeasured
for countries
in thousands. New
that existed
Old
New
stands for countries
-0.0191
0.0112
0.0277
in 1950. Derivatives
New
-0.0966
-0.0552
0.0383
Pad
Development
-0.0190
that did not exist in 1950. Old
are based on a dynamic
probit model;
see
stands
Appendix
2.
176
more
WORLD POLITICS
with
development
in the old
in the new
than
countries.
In turn,
while development decreases slightly the probability of survival of dic
to
in old countries,
the probability
of transitions
democracy
tatorships
as new countries
declines
under
authoritarian
rule.
develop
the promise
that development
would breed democracy
Hence,
proved
to be particularly futile precisely with regard to thoseThirdWorld coun
tries towhich itwas supposed to offer hope. Development during the
postwar period just did not have much of an impact on the collapse of
an increase
dictatorships:
of per capita
income
raised the probability of dictatorship
and lowered
among the old countries
countries. But at least "modernization"
of one
thousand
dollars
falling by only 1.12 percent
it by 1.90 percent among the new
in the right direction
in
worked
where most
countries,
including
long-standing
dictatorships,
did in the end fall. Most
of the new countries,
those in Eastern Europe,
of them poor when
the great majority
just
they became
independent,
the old
remained
poor;
and those
few that did develop
remained
authoritarian.
V. Conclusion
Whether
in the language
theories
perspective,
couched
the historical
terministic.
In the modernization
democracy
it is secreted
about;
social
transformations.
corollary
s
Moore
theory, but they operate
class structure of the seventeenth
tries
settle
on
or
perspective
of the origins of democracy were de
no one does
to
bring
theory
anything
and
the
economic
by
development
of the modernization
Class
actors
at a distance
do move
of centuries:
in
history
the agrarian
the regimes coun
century determines
two or three hundred
ob
years later.38 As Przeworski39
this deterministic
made
served,
emphasis
the issue of democratization
irrelevant when
both
appear
approaches
on the
political
appeared
in the struggles for democ
The protagonists
agenda in the mid-1970s.
that the fate of their countries
racy could not and did not believe
would
be determined either by current levels of development or by the distant
democratization
constraints,
that, albeit within
past. They maintained
was an outcome
the O'Don
of actions, not just of conditions.
Hence,
was couched
in terms of actors and strategies,
nell-Schmitter
project
rather than in terms of deterministic
conditions.40
38
and Stevens (fn. 6) go back just a few decades but the question remains:
Huber, Rueschemeyer,
in the 1920s cause events in the 1960s, not earlier or later?
conditions
would
found
why
39
Adam Przeworski, Democracy and theMarket: Political and Economic Reforms inEastern Europe and
Latin America (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1991).
40
and Philippe C Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore:
Guillermo O'Donnell
Press, 1986).
Johns Hopkins University
THEORIES
MODERNIZATION:
Our
& FACTS
177
this latter approach. The
emergence
strongly validate
of
is not a
economic
of
Democ
democracy
development.
by-product
actors
their goals, and
racy is or is not established
pursuing
by political
once it is estab
at any level of
it can be initiated
Only
development.
findings
a role: the chances for the survival
play
are
of democracy
is richer. Yet even the cur
the country
greater when
to sur
rent wealth
ismore
of a country
is not decisive: democracy
likely
vive in a
income
with
less than $1,000
economy
per capita
growing
an income between
that de
than in a country with
$1,000 and $2,000
democ
clines economically.
If they succeed in generating
development,
lished
do economic
racies can survive
Viewed
from
constraints
even
in the poorest nations.
the vision of the relation
this perspective,
de
between
that dominated
mood
and
the intellectual
and democracy
velopment
war
to
the cold
orient U.S.
served
years appears
foreign policy during
as
treated development
exogenous,
strangely convoluted. While
Lipset
were
is the inevitable
his contemporaries
that
dictatorship
persuaded
a
of
claimed
that "the more democratic
Galenson
price
development.
. . . the
of resources
from invest
is,
greater the diversion
government
ment
to
De Schweinitz
argued that if the less devel
consumption."41
must
limit democratic
"are to grow economically,
they
oped countries
participation in political affairs/'42And thiswas also the belief of Hunt
ington
The
and Dominguez:
interest
of
sonal
consumption
a nondemocratic
the voters
a
vis-?-vis
higher
system.
leads
generally
In
priority
the Soviet
to
the
give
parties
investment
than
for
Union,
instance,
expansion
itwould
the
of per
in
receive
percentage
of
GDP devoted to consumption was driven down from 65 percent in 1928 to 52
percent
tained
in 1937.
a revolution
Dictatorships
Nelson
put
porarily,
Since
It is unlikely
from above
are needed
that
like
a
competitive
this.43
to generate
it, "Political participation
economic
in order to promote
party
system
would
have
sus
and
As Huntington
development.
must be held down, at least tem
development.,,44
while
devel
generate
development
dictatorships
the best way to democracy was said to be a
leads to democracy,
opment
sense would
one. Yet common
that in order to
indicate
circuitous
41
Walter
in this view
to Galenson,
"Introduction"
(New York:
ed., Labor and Economic Development
Galenson,
1959), 3.
Wiley,
42
Labor Controls
and Democracy," Economic Development
Karl de Schweinitzjr.,
Industrialization,
and Cultural Change 7 (July 1959).
43
in F. I. Greenstein
and
"Political Development,"
and Jorge I. Dominguez,
Samuel P. Huntington
60.
3
Political
vol.
Mass.:
N. W. Polsby, eds., Handbook
1975),
Science,
Addison-Wesley,
(Reading,
of
44
and Nelson
(fn. 21), 23.
Huntington
WORLD POLITICS
178
we should
not
democracy,
democracy
strengthen
even if G. B. Shaw warned
that "common
And,
dictatorships.
strengthen
that
it is the best
time
this
in poor
flourish
is flat," the lesson of our analysis is
tells us that the world
that which
guide. With
can
democracy
development,
countries.
1:Classifying
Appendix
Political
Regimes45
some
is a regime inwhich
governmental
Democracy
a consequence
of contested
elections. This definition
fices"
support
sense is
offices
are filled as
has two parts: "of
and "contestation."
In no regime
elections. What
as a consequence
as democratic
a
regime
are all
offices
governmental
to
is essential
considering
of
filled
is
that two kinds of offices are filled by elections, whether directly or in
the chief
directly:
tive body.
office
occurs when
Contestation
chance
executive
of winning
we
classify
doubt,
bent parties
and the seats
there
exists
an
as a consequence
as democracies
only those
office
in the effective
that has
opposition
of elections.
systems
legisla
some
in
Whenever
in which
incum
actually did lose them.
a
was classified
as a
if none of the
democracy
regime
Operationally,
as a dicta
was classified
a
four rules listed below applied. Thus,
regime
at least one of these conditions
held.
torship if
1. Executive
Rule
the chief
selection:
is not
executive
elected.
Rule 2. Legislative selection: the legislature is not elected.
Rule 3. Party: there is no more than one party. Specifically, this rule applies if
(1) there were
tenure
in office
or
no
parties,
ended up
(2)
there
in the establishment
(4) the incumbents unconstitutionally
in their
rules
4.
Rule
Type
was
one
or (3) the
party,
only
or
of a nonparty
one-party
current
rule, or
closed the legislature and rewrote the
favor.
II error:
a
passes
regime
the
previous
three
rules,
the
incumbents
held office in the immediate past by virtue of elections for more than two terms
or without
they
have
and until
elected,
being
an
not lost
election.
Alternation
where
a
single
in office
party
today
or the
time when
they
were
overthrown
the party rule. Hence,
Jamaica?
time held 100 percent
of the seats in the
overrides
at one
lost an election?was
office having
yielded
legislature yet subsequently
as democratic
classified
during the entire period.
code the regime that pre
rules are the following. We
Our
timing
vailed at the end of the year, even if it came to power on December
31,
45
For a full explanation
and historical
details,
see Alvarez
et al. (fn. 10).
MODERNIZATION:
THEORIES
& FACTS
179
to
in 1983. Transitions
arrived in Nigeria
dictatorship
a
are
to democ
coup d etat. Transitions
signaled by
of the newly elected gov
racy are dated by the time of the inauguration
a democratic
not of the election.
In the few cases where
ernment,
as, for example,
authoritarianism
regime lasted sixmonths (for example, theDominican Republic in 1963)
or where
several times (Bolivia in 1979), the infor
changed
the same year is lost.
mation
about regimes that began and ended within
our
is
and the alternatives
The main
difference
between
approach
rather than a polychotomous
that we use a dichotomous
classification,
are more
some
than
democratic
that while
scale. We
believe
regimes
the situation
not be considered
de
others, unless offices are contested,
they should
mea
mocratic.
from a practical point of view, alternative
Nonetheless,
sures of
dimensions
similar results. The
generate
highly
democracy
or to what
extent a
is demo
used to assess whether
regime
particular
the
is no exception:
cratic seem to make
little difference.46 Our measure
Coppedge-Reinicke47
the Bollen48
1965
scale for 1978 predicts 92 percent of our regimes,
scale predicts
85 percent,
the Gurr49
scales
of Au
tocracy and Democracy for 1950-86 jointly predict 91 percent. The
Gastil50 scale of political liberties, covering the period from 1972 to
his scale of civil liber
93.2 percent of our classification;
1990, predicts
ties predicts
91.5 percent;
and the two scales jointly predict 94.2 per
cent of our
there is no reason to think that our results
regimes. Hence,
are
to the
particular
idiosyncratic
Appendix
classification
2: Dynamics
of regimes.
of Regimes
in the distinction
be
is entailed
help elucidate what
tween
mechanisms.
and exogenous
endogenous
has an authoritarian
i= 1,...,N,
that a country,
Let the probability
a
t= 1,...,T, be
where
the subscript
regime during
particular year,
pA(it),
that it has a demo
and the probability
A stands for "authoritarian,"
Some
algebra may
46
Alex
25 (Spring 1990),
Inkeless, "Introduction," Studies in Comparative International Development
3-6. Note, however, that different measures appear to be biased in somewhat different directions. See
Factors in Cross-National
Kenneth A. Bollen, "Liberal Democracy:
Measures,"
Validity and Method
American Journal of Political Science 37 (November
1993).
47
and Wolfgang
H. Reinicke,
Michael
"Measuring Polyarchy," Studies in Comparative
Coppedge
25 (Spring 1990), 51-72.
International Development
48
American Sociologi
of Development,"
and the Timing
Kenneth A. Bollen, "Political Democracy
cal Review 44 (August 1979), 572-87.
49
Ted Robert Gurr, Keith Jaggers, andWill H. Moore,
and State Power
The Growth of Democracy,
Autocracy,
tional Development
25 (Spring
50
Gastil (fn. 4).
1990).
State:
"The Transformation
of theWestern
since 1800," Studies in Comparative Interna
WORLD POLITICS
cratic regime be pD(it) = 1
the probability that a dictator
pA(it). Let
ship dies from one year to another be pAD(it), so that the probability
that it survives is p^iit) = 1 pAD(it). Similarly, let the probability that
= 1a democracy dies be
we assume for the time
pDD(it). If
pDA(it)
180
=
are
k = A,D,
that these "transition
being
p.k, j A,D,
probabilities/'
over time and the same for all countries,
constant
then we can describe
the evolution of regimes by
pD(t+D
Pdd
Pad
Po(t)
pA(t+D
Pda
Paa
PaW
The
of regimes
proportion
therefore on the
that
are democracies
of democracies
next
that survived
year depends
from the cur
proportion
rent year,
that died, that is, be
of dictatorships
and
the proportion
pDD,
came democracies,
same holds for
pAD. The
dictatorships.
a
there
of regimes that,
Given
the transition
exists
distribution
rates,
disturbances.
if reached, will remain stable in the absence of exogenous
These equilibrium probabilities are
=
Pd
Pad
+
Pda Pad
and
Pda
Pa
Pda
Moreover,
tions will
+
Pad
whatever
the
over
tend
time
initial
their propor
of regimes,
since the
values. And
equilibrium
distribution
to these
are likely to be
probabilities that regimes die during any particular year
fact they are low?this
convergence
of one type of regime will
the proportion
the other to decline.51
low?in
be monotonie;
to increase
continue
will
that is,
and of
of regimes depends
distribution
time passes,
then, the long-run
not on their initial distrib
on the relative rates at which
they die,
only
As
51
is monotonie
Convergence
around the equilibrium.
if Pad + pDA < 1; otherwise,
the proportions
of regimes will
oscillate
MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS
ution.
>
If Pad
in the long run there will
pDA, then
be more
181
democracies
than dictatorships in the world and if at the beginning the proportion
of democracies
crease over
was
lower
than
this proportion
pD*,
will
continually
in
time.
now that while
die at some constant
annual
dictatorships
Suppose
=
never die, so that
see
that in
rate, democracies
immediately
pDA 0. You
time a dictator
the long run all countries will be democracies.
Every
a
it sur
is established,
and, once it is established,
ship dies,
democracy
on the rate at which
vives forever. The
speed of this process depends
is inexorable.
of democracies
die, but the accumulation
dictatorships
to return to the issue at stake,
that these transition
Now,
imagine
are not constant but
on the level of
probabilities
depend
development.
are
two
that
low (L)
To keep matters
levels:
there
only
simple, suppose
and high (H). At the low level, both regimes have some probability of
that
dying
ismore
than zero
and less than one. Now
consider
two pos
sibilities.
< 1, once
One is that while p^L)
dictatorships pass the threshold
=
that defines the high level, they are certain to die, so that p^H)
1,
while
democracies
probabilities
~
die
and while
rate at either
level. The
transition
are thus
Level = Low
Pdd
Pda
at the same
Pad
Paa
the long-run
Level =High
LOO
Pdd
0.00
Pda
proportion
of democracies
at the low level will
be pD*(L) = Pm/?Pad'PdaX at the high ievel itwill be pD*(H) = 1/(1 +
<
pDA), pD*(L) pD*(H). Thus, the proportion of democracies will be
are more
at the
because democracies
high level of development
as a result of
to emerge
is the
This
likely
development.
endogenous?
of the explanation.
modernization?version
higher
at
that authoritarian
suppose alternatively
exactly the
regimes die
same rate whether
or
in poor countries
ones, so that p^L)
developed
=
=
never die once
in turn democratic
they
regimes
pAD, while
pAD(H)
are established
so that
in affluent countries,
transition
The
pDA=0.00.
are then
probabilities
But
Level = Low
Level =High
Pdd
Pad
LOO Pad
Pda
Paa
0.00
Paa
WORLD
182
and we
already
that while
know
POLITICS
the long-run
proportion
of democra
cies at the low levelwin be pD*(L) < 1, at the high level all countries will
we will observe
an
in the long run. Hence,
the level of development
relation
and the incidence
aggregate
are
even
to emerge at
of democracies
though democracies
equally likely
under authoritarianism
does not
any level, that is, even if development
a
increase the
that
is
democratic.
This
country will become
probability
then the exogenous
version.
have
a democratic
to decide
regime
between
the relation between
generates
how the respective
and democracy, we need to determine
development
transition
the level of development.
To esti
change with
probabilities
Thus,
which
mechanism
we
on transition
on Ame
impact of level
probabilities,
rely
data obey a first-order
Markov
that is, the
processes;
myia.52 Our
on the
present
regime depends
regimes during the previous year,
only
not
are
but
defined by:
Such processes
beyond.
mate
the
=
P(t)Rt.1,
E(R=l|R.1,Rt_2,...)
where R = D,A
for democracy
stands for regimes, R=D
and R=A for
and P(t) is the matrix
of transition probabilities,
with
ele
dictatorship,
ments
p k(t). Hence,
R = P(t) R,
Taking
+
u,
of both
expectations
sides yields
P(R=D
Paa
Pda
p(R,rD
p(R=0)
Pad
Pdd
p(Rt-rO)
sum of columns
where
the
k=0,l.
Hence
of the
transition
matrix,
=
+
p(R=l Rtl)
p^top?R^-l) p^WR^O)
|
=
=
+
PAAttpdVrD PDA(t)[l-p(R,rl)]
=
Now
Pda?
+
?.p.k
=
1, j=0,l;
=
[PAA^-PDA^?-rD
let X be the vector
of the exogenous
variables.
Assume
that
=
pDA(t) F(XA ?),
=
PAA(t) F[XJcc+?)],
52
Takeshi
chap. 11.
Amemyia,
Advanced
Econometrics
(Cambridge:
Harvard
University
Press,
1985),
MODERNIZATION: THEORIES & FACTS
183
where F(.) is the CDF of normal distribution. Note that p.k(t) is the
probability of transition from being in state j at time (t-1) to being in
state k at time
regime
t. Given
as the one
that whenever
that became
a transition
installed
during
occurred
this year,
we
code
the
the probabil
ity of transition between (t-1) and t depends on the conditions at (t-1).
Hence,
we
lag the X
p(R=l
|RJ
s.
Then
=
pDA(t)
+
[pAA(t)-pDA(t)]p(Rt.1=l)
=
+
FCX,.^ {FtX^a+j^-FQi^pCR^l)
=
=
+
+
FQit_? FQ^aMR^l)
?Q?tJ
xt,R,?).
to estimate a and /?, from which
Hence,
and thus pDD = 1 pDA and pAD = 1 -p^,
one can calculate
all we
need
pDA and pAA,
on
to do is
probit
This is the model we used to generate results inTables 2 and 8,with
R(0) as observed. The derivatives used inTable 8 are
dPpA =
dpAD =-f
+
fQC^?)? and
[XJa ?)](a+?).
dX
dX