University of Dhaka
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Department of Law
Tutorial Examination
Course Name: Law of Torts
Course Code : LLB-105
Assignment on :
“Six cases of the Law of Torts on “Trespass to Person,Trespass to Land and
Negligence”
Submitted to,
Submitted by,
Assistant Professor
Roll : 04
Abdullah Al-Mahdi
Taslima Yasmin
Derartment of Law
First Year LLB Honours
University of Dhaka
Phone : 01724623056

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Bocardo SA v Star Energy Weald Basin Ltd & Another1
Parties :
The plaintiff was Bocardo SA and the defendant was Star Energy Weald Basin Ltd.
Fact of the case :
Issuing a licence by the Secretary of State for Energy on behalf of the Crown,
Star Energy started to drill and install three wells.These three wells were drilled diagonally from
a site outside Bocardo's Oxsted estate. They each entered the estate at various depths below
ground level of Bocardo’s estate. Their drilling and installation occasioned no harm to the estate.
Again,there was no interference with Bocardo's use of enjoyment of its land.The Mines
(Working Facilities and Support) Act 1966 enabled Star Energy to acquire such ancillary rights
as they required in order to win the petroleum. But Star's did not seek to negotiate any
contractual licence or way-leave from Bocardo to drill and install the wells.Nor they applied for
any statutory right to do this under the Mines Act 1966 or the Pipelines Act 1962.
Issues:
Held :
1
Was the drilling of the wells under Bocardo's land an actionable trespass?
The High Court held that it was a trespass to land.
[2010]UKSC 35.
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Reasoning :
Bocardo owned the starta at the depth of the oil well and an agreement should have
been made between Bocardo and Star but Star didn’t do that.That’s why,it is a trespass to
land.Star argued that they had a licence issued by the Secretary of State for Energy on behalf of
the Crown so they had a right to drill and entered into the land to persue oil.But this should be
overrulled as per my reasoning.The Star should have negotiated the contractual licence with
Bocardo.With the permission of Bocardo,they should have entered beneath the subsoil of
Bocardo.
Lord Hope, giving the first and dissenting judgment, said a land owner did own the ground
beneath, including minerals.2
As Lord Hope Identfied : 3
There must obviously be some stopping point, as one reaches the point at which physical features
such as pressure and temperature render the concept of the strata belonging to anybody so absurd
as to be not worth arguing about. But the wells that are at issue in this case, extending from about
800 feet to 2,800 feet below the surtace, are far from being so deep as to reach the point of
absurdity. Indeed the fact that the strata can be worked upon at those depths points to the
opposite conclusion.
Personal comment :
Historically it was considered that the land owner owned everything above
and below the surface of the land.There is a Latin maxim in this regard,
"cujus est solum eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos"
That means,whoever's is the soil, it is theirs all the way to Heaven and all the way to Hell.Thus,
Bocardo owned his subsoil.Therefore, no one has right to enter into his subsoil without his
permission.
2
3
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bocardo_SA_v_Star_Energy_UK_Onshore_Ltd
Unlocking Torts-Chris Turner (4thedition,page no.212)
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Established Principle:
The legal owner owns the subsoil beneath his land.Entering into the
subsoil without the owner’s permission is a trespass and actionable per se.
Conclusion :
Bocardo is thefirst modern case to consider how far beneath the surface a landowner's title to
land extends and whether the landowner can sue for trespass for underground incursions into the
sub-soil and sub-strata. The Supreme Court held that the landowner owns everything below the
surface and can sue for damages for trespasses.
Robinson v Balmain New Ferry Co.4
Parties :
Robinson was the the plaintiff in this case and the defendant was Balmain New Ferry Co.
Fact of the case :
The defendants operated a ferry from Sydney to Balmain. there were some
turnstiles on the Sydney side. By the turnstiles was a notice saying “A fare of one penny must be
paid on entering or leaving the wharf. No exception will be made to this rule, whether the
passenger has travelled by the ferry or not” The claimant entered on the Sydney side and paid
one penny.He found that no ferry was due to cross for 20 minutes,then he decided to leave the
wharf.However, he was asked to pay a further penny. He refused and for a short time was
prevented from leaving.
4
(1910) A.C. 295
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Issues :
Held:
Whether this is a false imprisonment or not?
The defendants were not liable for false imprisonment.
Reasoning :.
Loard Loreburn L.C. says :5
There was no complaint, at all events there was no question left to the jury by the plaintiff’s
request, of any excessive violence, and in the circumstances admitted it is clear to their
Lordships that there was no false imprisonment at all. The plaintiff was merely called upon to
leave the wharf in the way in which he contracted to leave it. The question whether the notice
which was affixed to these premises was brought home to the knowledge of the plaintiff is
immaterial, because the notice itself is immaterial. When the plaintiff entered the defendants’
premises there was nothing agreed as to the terms on which he might go back, because neither
party contemplated his going back. When he desired to do so the defendants were entitled to
impose a reasonable condition before allowing him to pass through their turnstile from a place to
which he had gone of his own free will. The payment of a penny was a quite fair condition, and
if he did not choose to comply with it the defendants were not bound to let him through. He
could proceed on the journey he had contracted for.
Personal comment :
If it was mere partial restraint or if the plaintiff had a safe reasonable means
to escape,then it will not be actionable.In this case,the plaintiff had many reasonable means of
escape by taking the next ferry or by swimming in water.He had also a option for leaving the
wharf on payment of one penny.That’s why this can’t be amount to a false imprisonment.
5
Casebook on Tort-Richard Kidner (page no.331)
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Established Principle:
A partial restraint,or a reasonable contractual provisions couldn’t amount
to be a false imprisonment.
Conclusion :
The claimant was free to leave on the terms by which he had agreed to enter.That’s
why,it can’t be said wrongful confinement.
Anchor Brewhouse Developments Ltd and Others v Berkley House Ltd 6
Fact of the case :
The defendants were developing a site in London and were using a tower crane
in the construction work. The booms of the tower crane swung over the claimants' property.
Issues :
The question arose as to whether it is regarded as trespassing or not?
Held :
It was a trespass to the airspace and an injunction was granted.
6
(1987) 38 Build LR 82, Times: 03-Apr-1987
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Reasoning:
Unauthorised access will be amounted as trespass though it causes no harm or
hamper the claimant’s enjoyment of land.
Mr.Justice Scott says : 7
“If an adjoining owner places a structure on his (the adjoining owner's) land that overhangs his
neighbour's land, he thereby takes into his possession airspace to which his neighbour is entitled.
That, in my judgment, is trespass.
”
Personal comment :
This case established that an unauthorised access is a trespass even if it
constitutes no harm to the adjoining property.Because trespass is actionable per se which
requires no damage need be caused.
Conclusion :
In law,the land owner ‘s possession of “Air space’ extends to height necessary for
ordinary use and enjoyment of land.if somebody erects on his own land a structure, part of which
invades the air space(as of paramount importance)above the land of another, the invasion is
trespass.Because,itvioates one’s own legitimate interest.
7
Casebook on Tort-Richard Kidner (page no.343)
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Scott v. Shepherd8
Fact of the case :
In this case,Shepherd threw a lighted squib into a market house. It placed on
the shop of a ginger bread vendor. To prevent damage to the shop, Mr.Willis picked it up and
threw it across the market. Again,Ryal,to save his own stall, picked it up and threw it away. It
struck the claimant in the face and exploded, blinding him in one eye.
Issues :
Whether the defendant throwing the squib caused the injury.Whether other people are
active doer or passive doer.
Held :
The court held that the defendant,Shepherd, was liable for battery.
Reasoning :
The defendant intended to scare someone although he did not intend to hurt the particular person who was actually injuręd. He was liable in battery, Willis and Ryal being held to
be Shepherd's tools.They didn’t act as free agents.
W V H Rogers said :9
"the law insists, and insists quite rightly, that fools and mischievous persons must answer for
Consequences which common sense would unhesitatingly attribute to their wrongdoing.
8
9
[1773] 2 Wm BI 892
Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (16thedition,Sweet& Maxwell,2002), p.235
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Analysis :
This case resembles to some other case where the defendant use other person/s as a
tool.Those famous cases are mentioned below :


Smith v Stone(Trespass to land)
Innes v Wylie (Tress to the person-Battery)
Personal comment :
In this case, the two persons were used as tools,asweapons.Although their act
caused plaintiff’s injury but they are not used as a free agent rather they are used as
weapons.That’s why Shepherd,who,actually,started the act,is liable and the others are regarded
as tools here.This case bears many significances as it paved the way that a man who is used in an
incident as a tool is not liable.
Conclusion:
This case is commonly known as "the famous Squib Case," is an important English
tort law case regarding remoteness.
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Letang v Cooper10
Parties :
The plaintiff was Mrs.Letang and the defendant was Mr. Cooper.
Fact of the case :
Mr. Cooper with negligent ran over Mrs Letang while she was in his car. The
plaintiff filed a claim in trespass to the person.
Issues :
Whether it was possible to make a claim under trespass to the person if the action was
negligent rather than intentional.
Held :
This will amount to a negligence rather that trespass to the person.
Reasoning :
The Court of Appeal, consisting of Lord Denning MR, Diplock LJ and Danckwerts
LJ, held unanimously that since Mr. Cooper's actions were negligent rather than
intentional.Therefore,damage caused by negligence applied. 11
Lord Denning: If one man intentionally applies force directly to another, the plaintiff has a cause
of action in assault or battery. If he does not intentionally inflict injury, but only unintentionally,
the plaintiff has no cause of action in trespass; his only cause of action is in negligence.
10
11
(1964) 2 AII ER 929
www.legalservice india.com/article/1073/trespass-to-person
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Analysis :
To be amount as trespass to the person,the action must be done deliberately and
intentionally. The case involved with such an action which was done negligently.That’why,this
will not be amounted as trespass to the person. In terms of the law, the judgement signifies a
distinction between the torts of negligence and the trespass to the person based on intent. In
effect, it means that the law on trespass to the person has been narrowed.
Personal comment :
An act will not constitute trespass to the person unless it is done
intentionally.Thus,intention is the chief criteria for trespass to the person.
Conclusion :
This case bears many significances.The effect of this case was that an action for
trespass to the person can now only be brought for intentional torts, such as assault, battery, false
imprisonment, trespass to land or chattels, etc.
Scott v London& St. Catherine Docks Co.12
Fact of the case :
A custom officer was passing the doorway of the defendant’s warehouse when
six bags of sugger fall on him and he was injured.
12
(1865) 119 E. R. 656
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Issues :
Establishing negligence involves establishing that the defendant breached their duty of
care to the claimant. To establish breach, the claimant must establish that the defendant failed to
act as a reasonable person would in their position.
Here, the claimant could not prove what had happened to cause the sugar bags to fall, making it
difficult to prove that the defendant had breached their duty. The issue was whether a claimant
can establish negligence if they cannot prove what the defendant did to cause the harm.
Held :
Relying on the doctrine of “res ipsa loquitur” the court held that the defendant is liable.
Reasoning :
In the course of his judgment Erle C.J., said: 13
`...where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant, or his servants, and
the accident is such as, in the ordinary course of things, does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care'
Personal comment :
There are certain situations where the doctrine of “res ipsa loquitur” applies.
In this situation the plaintiff has to only prove that the accident happened while things were
under defendant’s control.He need not establish that the defendant was negligent.In this case,the
things were under defendant control.That’s why,he is liable under negligence.
https://www.coursehero.com/file/p1ff5f92/In-SCOTT-v-LONDON-AND-ST-KATHERINES-DOCKS-CO-Theplaintiff-a-Customs-officer/
13
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Conclusion :
“res ipsa loquitur” means the thing (accident) speakes for itself. The development
of a trial strategy addressing the “res ipsa” factors may prove vital in defending a negligence
action.
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