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US Foreign Policy Objectives 1945-1947

The overall objective was to protect its position as a Great Power and wherever
possible maintain the power differential with the USSR. This could be achieved
by:
- Promoting political stability in the Allied states through the Truman
Doctrine. The security of the US was seen as dependent upon the defence
of Britain, France and other western states.
- Promoting economic prosperity in western European markets through
Marshall Aid.
- Containing communist expansion beyond the eastern sphere of influence
conceded at Yalta. This meant resisting Soviet initiatives to reunite
Germany on a communist model (based on the Kennan analysis of Soviet
intentions) and maintaining the provisional status of West Berlin and the
western zones of Germany. It also meant preventing communism from
taking root in non-aligned areas such as Greece and Turkey.
- Making Europe the priority area of interest.

The US did not seek to establish a military alliance involving the western
European powers during this period. It relied on the atomic monopoly to deter.
Ad hoc responses to unacceptable forms of aggression could always be devised
as happened just after this period with the Berlin Airlift.

Note that Europe was the primary area of concern. China had yet to go
communist, Korea did not appear to be a potential trouble spot and the French
were still nominally in control in Indochina.
Soviet Foreign Policy Objectives 1945-1956

Following the USSR’s experience in WWII (27m dead, extensive destruction of
farming, industry, transport & housing) Stalin’s main concern was the defence
and security of her western frontiers. This meant ensuring that the states of
Eastern Europe had governments that were friendly towards the USSR. This
could not have been achieved through the holding of free elections as promised
at Yalta since the result could not have been guaranteed. Hence communist
regimes were effectively imposed across Eastern Europe between 1945 and
1948. Czechoslovakia was the last eastern European state to succumb to a
communist takeover following the coup of February 1948. Only Yugoslavia freely
chose a communist future.

The communisation of Eastern Europe was a protracted process, however, as
Stalin was keen to avoid confrontation with the western powers. Hence while
there was speedy action in Bulgaria & Rumania (both belonged to the Soviet
sphere of influence according to the percentage agreement of Oct. 1944 and
represented a continuation of traditional Russian policy concerning control of
the Black Sea), there was a ‘go-slow’ policy in Hungary and Czechoslovakia while
in Poland, partly in regard to British and US opinion, a civil war continued in
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some parts until 1952. Finland, which had enjoyed a large measure of autonomy
under the Tsars, was allowed a considerable measure of independence.

Stalin was also conciliatory by withdrawing Soviet forces from Northern Iran and
relinquishing pressure on Turkey and Greece.

It appeared for a while that there was a change of emphasis following the death
of Stalin and the Hungarians clearly felt there was a new tolerance within the
Kremlin when they demonstrated against the oppressive regime of Rakosi and
impelled his successor, Nagy, towards a programme of radical reform. But
Khrushchev’s ultimate response involving the dispatch of tanks to Budapest
showed that he was as determined as Stalin had been before him to maintain the
integrity of the eastern European defensive system.

The promotion of the worldwide expansion of communism. Although Eastern
Europe was Stalin’s priority he was also keen to exploit every opportunity to
push forward the frontiers of the communist world in areas distant from Europe.
Hence he supplied weapons and equipment to Mao’s forces engaged in the
Chinese Civil War (1946-1949) and supported the plans of Kim Il Sung when he
invaded South Korea in 1950. Moral support was offered to other groups of
communist insurgents operating in South East Asia.

Between 1945 and 1949 the USA had an atomic monopoly. Stalin made
strenuous efforts to end this state of affairs both through espionage and
promotion of the USSR’s own atomic programme which achieved success in
August 1949. From this point onwards the nuclear arms race began with both
sides progressing to the development of the Hydrogen bomb in 1953 and 1954.
Although the aim of the USSR was nuclear parity with the USA this was never
achieved during this period. For example, in 1956 the USSR had 60 strategic
bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons whereas the USA had 550.

The USSR sought to maintain a weak Germany and change the status of Berlin.
The former objective was thwarted by the decision of the western powers to
revive the economy of the western zones in 1947 and 1948 through the
introduction of a new currency and the ending of rationing and price controls.
Stalin’s defensive response to this perceived renewed threat to Soviet security
was to try to force the western powers out of Berlin. Khrushchev was equally
anxious to end the anomaly of a western presence deep in the heart of the
communist bloc.

Ideological expansion through anti-capitalist propaganda. This was based partly
on the assumption that capitalism would self-destruct after WWII and some
ideological undermining of the rival system might assist this process. Stalin
interpreted the Great War and the 1930s Depression as symptomatic of the
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terminal decline of western capitalism. He expected major rifts to occur between
the USA and Great Britain – Stalin seriously overestimated the ability of GB to
pursue an independent line from the US.

Devising an effective counter to American attempts to woo the states of Europe
with economic and financial assistance. Both the Cominform and the Molotov
Plan were responses to Marshall Aid.