McKinney’s Penal Law § 5.00
§ 5.00 Penal law not strictly construed
The general rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to this chapter, but the provisions herein must be
construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law.
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Liberal construction
Penal Law should not be strictly construed, and thus conduct that falls within the plain, natural meaning of a Penal Law provision
may be punished as criminal. Matter of Winner S., 1998, 177 Misc.2d 414, 676 N.Y.S.2d 783. Criminal Law
12.7(2)
A penal statute should not be stretched to fit the facts of a particular case regardless of their nature, and a conviction cannot be justified
unless the facts fit into the statute. People v. Buscemi, 1977, 89 Misc.2d 174, 391 N.Y.S.2d 343. Statutes
1318
A penal statute should not be stretched to fit the facts of a particular case regardless of their nature, and a conviction cannot be justified
unless the facts fit into the statute. People v. Feliciano, 1958, 10 Misc.2d 836, 173 N.Y.S.2d 123. Constitutional Law
2507(1);
Criminal Law
562
Former Penal Law 1909, § 21 did not call for an interpretation so wide and liberal as to embrace within the terms of a statute those to
whom no reference was made by name or description. People v. Fleishman, 1928, 133 Misc. 288, 232 N.Y.S. 187.
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Strict construction
Penal enactment must not only be strictly construed, especially where act is a malum prohibitum and not a malum in se, but it must be
reasonable and pellucid as well. People v. Scott, 1970, 26 N.Y.2d 286, 309 N.Y.S.2d 919, 258 N.E.2d 206. Constitutional Law
1130.8
It has been said in a case wherein a provision of this law was under construction but without direct reference to former Penal Law 1909,
§ 21 that “penal statutes must be strictly construed, and cannot be extended to cases that are not clearly covered thereby.” People v.
Nelson, 1897, 153 N.Y. 90, 46 N.E. 1040. See, also, Cowley v. People, 1881, 83 N.Y. 464, 38 Am.R. 464; Citrin v. Belcastro, 1949,
196 Misc. 272, 91 N.Y.S.2d 275; Beebe v. Sullivan County, 1892, 64 Hun 377, 19 N.Y.S. 629, affirmed 1894, 142 N.Y. 631, 37 N.E.
566.
Common-law policy of strictly construing penal code is no longer in effect in New York. People v. Belfrom, 1984, 124 Misc.2d 185,
475 N.Y.S.2d 978. Criminal Law
12.7(2)
Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed. People v. Minuto, 1972, 71 Misc.2d 800, 337 N.Y.S.2d 88. See, also, People v. Gordon,
1972, 71 Misc.2d 540, 336 N.Y.S.2d 753. Criminal Law
12.7(2)
All sections of Penal Law and Code of Criminal Procedure [now CPL] must be strictly construed. People v. Sack, 1967, 54 Misc.2d
815, 283 N.Y.S.2d 402. Criminal Law
12.7(2)
A statute dealing with crime in class of mala prohibita must be strictly construed to avoid creation of a crime not expressly provided for.
People, on Complaint of Kantor, v. Bort, 1945, 53 N.Y.S.2d 345. Criminal Law
12.7(2)
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Construction with other laws
The rule of construction prescribed by former Penal Law 1909, § 21 relates only to provisions of this law, and has no application to
penal provisions found in other laws of the state. People v. Thomas, 1911, 71 Misc. 339, 130 N.Y.S. 246. See, also, People v. Rosenberg,
1893, 138 N.Y. 410, 34 N.E. 285.
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Fair import of terms
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Common-law policy of strictly construing a penal code no longer obtains; however, rule that criminal laws are to be interpreted according
to the fair import of their terms does not justify imposition of criminal sanctions for conduct that falls beyond the scope of this chapter
although it does authorize the court to dispense with hypertechnical or strained interpretations. People v. Ditta, 1981, 52 N.Y.2d 657,
439 N.Y.S.2d 855, 422 N.E.2d 515. See, also, People v. Belfrom, 1984, 124 Misc.2d 185, 475 N.Y.S.2d 978; People v. Feliciano, 1958,
10 Misc.2d 836, 173 N.Y.S.2d 123. Criminal Law
12.7(2)
Conduct which falls within the plain, natural meaning of the language of a provision of this chapter may be punished as criminal. People
v. Ditta, 1981, 52 N.Y.2d 657, 439 N.Y.S.2d 855, 422 N.E.2d 515. Criminal Law
13(1)
Since the crime of murder does not include any limitation as to time, for a court to introduce a limitation would result in a plain defiance
of former Penal Law 1909, § 21 which directed that it be construed “according to the fair import of [its] terms.” People v. Brengard,
1934, 265 N.Y. 100, 191 N.E. 850.
Former Penal Law 1909, § 21, while directing that the provisions of this law should be construed according to their fair import and with
a view to effecting their objects and to promoting justice, did not justify a strained construction of a provision to the end that it would
embrace acts not fairly within its purview and did not mean that an essential part thereof might be ignored for the purpose of promoting
justice in a particular case. People v. Teal, 1909, 196 N.Y. 372, 89 N.E. 1086. See, also, People v. Phelps, 1892, 133 N.Y. 267, 30 N.E.
1012; People v. McLaughlin, 1908, 60 Misc. 306, 113 N.Y.S. 306, affirmed 128 A.D. 599, 113 N.Y.S. 188.
Test in determining validity of penal statute was whether reasonable man subject to statute would be informed of what was required of
him, and test is satisfied where statutory words have through daily use acquired content that conveys to any interested person sufficiently
accurate concept of what is forbidden. State v. J. S. Garlick Parkside Memorial Chapels, Inc. (1 Dept. 1968) 30 A.D.2d 143, 290
N.Y.S.2d 829, affirmed 23 N.Y.2d 754, 296 N.Y.S.2d 952, 244 N.E.2d 467. Constitutional Law
1130.10
Since crime of larceny as defined in former Penal Law 1909 § 1290 did not include limitation as to persons or ownership of property
with respect to which larceny could be committed, for court to introduce limitation would result in defiance of former Penal Law 1909,
§ 21 directing it to be construed according to fair import of its terms. People v. Morton (2 Dept. 1954) 284 A.D. 413, 132 N.Y.S.2d 302,
affirmed 308 N.Y. 96, 123 N.E.2d 790. Constitutional Law
2507(1)
Provisions of the Penal Law are not to be strictly construed, but, rather, must be construed according to the fair import of their terms to
promote justice and effect the objects of the law. People v. Perez, 2001, 189 Misc.2d 516, 734 N.Y.S.2d 398. Statutes
1318
Plain, natural meaning of the language and import of penal statutes must be followed. People v. Varuzzi, 1999, 179 Misc.2d 716, 686
N.Y.S.2d 657. Statutes
1318
Penal statutes, while strictly construed at common law, are to be interpreted in accordance with their natural, plain meaning, and fair
import of their terms. People v. Darryl M., 1984, 123 Misc.2d 723, 475 N.Y.S.2d 704. Statutes
1318
Plain, natural meaning of the language and import of penal statutes must be followed. People v. Walker, 1983, 120 Misc.2d 235, 465
N.Y.S.2d 812. Statutes
1317
Legislative declaration that Penal Law provisions shall be construed according to fair import of their terms to promote justice and effect
objects of law does not permit essential part of a statute to be ignored in particular case. People v. Ebuzome, 1981, 107 Misc.2d 464,
435 N.Y.S.2d 243. Statutes
1317
The words of the Penal Law should be given their usually accepted meaning so that a wrongdoer shall be punished. People ex rel. Kahan
v. Jaffe, 1942, 178 Misc. 523, 35 N.Y.S.2d 104. See, also, People v. Reilly, 1938, 225 A.D. 109, 6 N.Y.S.2d 161, affirmed 280 N.Y.
509, 19 N.E.2d 919. Statutes
1317
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Scope of statutory mandate
Although court must not be over-technical in interpreting penal provisions, penal responsibility cannot be extended beyond the fair
scope of statutory mandate. People v. Gottlieb, 1975, 36 N.Y.2d 629, 370 N.Y.S.2d 884, 331 N.E.2d 670. See, also, People v. Sansanese,
1966, 17 N.Y.2d 302, 270 N.Y.S.2d 607, 217 N.E.2d 660; People v. Wood, 1960, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 201 N.Y.S.2d 328, 167 N.E.2d 736.
Statutes
1318
In determining applicability of a Penal Law to a given set of facts, trial court is neither to be overly technical in interpreting penal
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provisions nor to extend them beyond fair scope of statutory mandate.
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